diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'auth.c')
-rw-r--r-- | auth.c | 96 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 94 deletions
@@ -372,7 +372,8 @@ auth_root_allowed(const char *method) | |||
372 | case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD: | 372 | case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD: |
373 | if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 || | 373 | if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 || |
374 | strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 || | 374 | strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 || |
375 | strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0) | 375 | strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0 || |
376 | strcmp(method, "gssapi-keyex") == 0) | ||
376 | return 1; | 377 | return 1; |
377 | break; | 378 | break; |
378 | case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY: | 379 | case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY: |
@@ -795,99 +796,6 @@ fakepw(void) | |||
795 | } | 796 | } |
796 | 797 | ||
797 | /* | 798 | /* |
798 | * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not | ||
799 | * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is | ||
800 | * called. | ||
801 | * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some | ||
802 | * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication. | ||
803 | * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these? | ||
804 | * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?) | ||
805 | */ | ||
806 | |||
807 | static char * | ||
808 | remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh) | ||
809 | { | ||
810 | struct sockaddr_storage from; | ||
811 | socklen_t fromlen; | ||
812 | struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; | ||
813 | char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST]; | ||
814 | const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); | ||
815 | |||
816 | /* Get IP address of client. */ | ||
817 | fromlen = sizeof(from); | ||
818 | memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); | ||
819 | if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), | ||
820 | (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) { | ||
821 | debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); | ||
822 | return strdup(ntop); | ||
823 | } | ||
824 | |||
825 | ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen); | ||
826 | if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) | ||
827 | fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); | ||
828 | |||
829 | debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop); | ||
830 | /* Map the IP address to a host name. */ | ||
831 | if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name), | ||
832 | NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) { | ||
833 | /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */ | ||
834 | return strdup(ntop); | ||
835 | } | ||
836 | |||
837 | /* | ||
838 | * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname, | ||
839 | * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following: | ||
840 | * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5 | ||
841 | */ | ||
842 | memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); | ||
843 | hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/ | ||
844 | hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; | ||
845 | if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) { | ||
846 | logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring", | ||
847 | name, ntop); | ||
848 | freeaddrinfo(ai); | ||
849 | return strdup(ntop); | ||
850 | } | ||
851 | |||
852 | /* Names are stored in lowercase. */ | ||
853 | lowercase(name); | ||
854 | |||
855 | /* | ||
856 | * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given | ||
857 | * address actually is an address of this host. This is | ||
858 | * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can | ||
859 | * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from | ||
860 | * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be | ||
861 | * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of | ||
862 | * the domain). | ||
863 | */ | ||
864 | memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); | ||
865 | hints.ai_family = from.ss_family; | ||
866 | hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; | ||
867 | if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) { | ||
868 | logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s " | ||
869 | "[%s] failed.", name, ntop); | ||
870 | return strdup(ntop); | ||
871 | } | ||
872 | /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */ | ||
873 | for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { | ||
874 | if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2, | ||
875 | sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 && | ||
876 | (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0)) | ||
877 | break; | ||
878 | } | ||
879 | freeaddrinfo(aitop); | ||
880 | /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */ | ||
881 | if (ai == NULL) { | ||
882 | /* Address not found for the host name. */ | ||
883 | logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not " | ||
884 | "map back to the address.", ntop, name); | ||
885 | return strdup(ntop); | ||
886 | } | ||
887 | return strdup(name); | ||
888 | } | ||
889 | |||
890 | /* | ||
891 | * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current | 799 | * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current |
892 | * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this | 800 | * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this |
893 | * several times. | 801 | * several times. |