diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'auth.c')
-rw-r--r-- | auth.c | 96 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 94 deletions
@@ -363,7 +363,8 @@ auth_root_allowed(const char *method) | |||
363 | case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD: | 363 | case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD: |
364 | if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 || | 364 | if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 || |
365 | strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 || | 365 | strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 || |
366 | strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0) | 366 | strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0 || |
367 | strcmp(method, "gssapi-keyex") == 0) | ||
367 | return 1; | 368 | return 1; |
368 | break; | 369 | break; |
369 | case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY: | 370 | case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY: |
@@ -786,99 +787,6 @@ fakepw(void) | |||
786 | } | 787 | } |
787 | 788 | ||
788 | /* | 789 | /* |
789 | * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not | ||
790 | * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is | ||
791 | * called. | ||
792 | * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some | ||
793 | * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication. | ||
794 | * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these? | ||
795 | * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?) | ||
796 | */ | ||
797 | |||
798 | static char * | ||
799 | remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh) | ||
800 | { | ||
801 | struct sockaddr_storage from; | ||
802 | socklen_t fromlen; | ||
803 | struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; | ||
804 | char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST]; | ||
805 | const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); | ||
806 | |||
807 | /* Get IP address of client. */ | ||
808 | fromlen = sizeof(from); | ||
809 | memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); | ||
810 | if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), | ||
811 | (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) { | ||
812 | debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); | ||
813 | return strdup(ntop); | ||
814 | } | ||
815 | |||
816 | ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen); | ||
817 | if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) | ||
818 | fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); | ||
819 | |||
820 | debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop); | ||
821 | /* Map the IP address to a host name. */ | ||
822 | if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name), | ||
823 | NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) { | ||
824 | /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */ | ||
825 | return strdup(ntop); | ||
826 | } | ||
827 | |||
828 | /* | ||
829 | * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname, | ||
830 | * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following: | ||
831 | * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5 | ||
832 | */ | ||
833 | memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); | ||
834 | hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/ | ||
835 | hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; | ||
836 | if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) { | ||
837 | logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring", | ||
838 | name, ntop); | ||
839 | freeaddrinfo(ai); | ||
840 | return strdup(ntop); | ||
841 | } | ||
842 | |||
843 | /* Names are stored in lowercase. */ | ||
844 | lowercase(name); | ||
845 | |||
846 | /* | ||
847 | * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given | ||
848 | * address actually is an address of this host. This is | ||
849 | * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can | ||
850 | * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from | ||
851 | * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be | ||
852 | * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of | ||
853 | * the domain). | ||
854 | */ | ||
855 | memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); | ||
856 | hints.ai_family = from.ss_family; | ||
857 | hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; | ||
858 | if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) { | ||
859 | logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s " | ||
860 | "[%s] failed.", name, ntop); | ||
861 | return strdup(ntop); | ||
862 | } | ||
863 | /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */ | ||
864 | for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { | ||
865 | if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2, | ||
866 | sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 && | ||
867 | (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0)) | ||
868 | break; | ||
869 | } | ||
870 | freeaddrinfo(aitop); | ||
871 | /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */ | ||
872 | if (ai == NULL) { | ||
873 | /* Address not found for the host name. */ | ||
874 | logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not " | ||
875 | "map back to the address.", ntop, name); | ||
876 | return strdup(ntop); | ||
877 | } | ||
878 | return strdup(name); | ||
879 | } | ||
880 | |||
881 | /* | ||
882 | * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current | 790 | * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current |
883 | * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this | 791 | * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this |
884 | * several times. | 792 | * several times. |