1 files changed, 128 insertions, 452 deletions

diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
index 6dc5076ef..43f880b6b 100644
--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.62 2017/01/30 01:03:00 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.71 2017/09/07 23:48:09 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@
 
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
 
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
@@ -52,7 +51,7 @@
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
 #include "compat.h"
-#include "key.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
 #include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
@@ -75,42 +74,52 @@ extern u_char *session_id2;
 extern u_int session_id2_len;
 
 static int
-userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
+userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
 {
-        Buffer b;
-        Key *key = NULL;
-        char *pkalg, *userstyle, *fp = NULL;
-        u_char *pkblob, *sig;
-        u_int alen, blen, slen;
-        int have_sig, pktype;
+        Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+        struct sshbuf *b;
+        struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+        char *pkalg, *userstyle = NULL, *fp = NULL;
+        u_char *pkblob, *sig, have_sig;
+        size_t blen, slen;
+        int r, pktype;
         int authenticated = 0;
 
         if (!authctxt->valid) {
                 debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__);
                 return 0;
         }
-        have_sig = packet_get_char();
-        if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
+        if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &have_sig)) != 0)
+                fatal("%s: sshpkt_get_u8 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+        if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
                 debug2("%s: SSH_BUG_PKAUTH", __func__);
+                if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+                        fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
                 /* no explicit pkalg given */
-                pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
-                buffer_init(&b);
-                buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen);
                 /* so we have to extract the pkalg from the pkblob */
-                pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen);
-                buffer_free(&b);
+                /* XXX use sshbuf_from() */
+                if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0 ||
+                    (r = sshbuf_put(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0 ||
+                    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0)
+                        fatal("%s: failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+                sshbuf_free(b);
         } else {
-                pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen);
-                pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
+                if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 ||
+                    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0)
+                        fatal("%s: sshpkt_get_cstring failed: %s",
+                            __func__, ssh_err(r));
         }
-        pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg);
+        pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg);
         if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
                 /* this is perfectly legal */
                 logit("%s: unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
                     __func__, pkalg);
                 goto done;
         }
-        key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen);
+        if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
+                error("%s: could not parse key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+                goto done;
+        }
         if (key == NULL) {
                 error("%s: cannot decode key: %s", __func__, pkalg);
                 goto done;
@@ -120,15 +129,15 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
                     "(received %d, expected %d)", __func__, key->type, pktype);
                 goto done;
         }
-        if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
-            (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
+        if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
+            (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
                 logit("Refusing RSA key because client uses unsafe "
                     "signature scheme");
                 goto done;
         }
         fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
-        if (auth2_userkey_already_used(authctxt, key)) {
-                logit("refusing previously-used %s key", key_type(key));
+        if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key)) {
+                logit("refusing previously-used %s key", sshkey_type(key));
                 goto done;
         }
         if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
@@ -141,54 +150,65 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
         if (have_sig) {
                 debug3("%s: have signature for %s %s",
                     __func__, sshkey_type(key), fp);
-                sig = packet_get_string(&slen);
-                packet_check_eom();
-                buffer_init(&b);
-                if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
-                        buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
+                if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &sig, &slen)) != 0 ||
+                    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+                        fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+                if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+                        fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+                if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
+                        if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, session_id2,
+                            session_id2_len)) != 0)
+                                fatal("%s: sshbuf_put session id: %s",
+                                    __func__, ssh_err(r));
                 } else {
-                        buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
+                        if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2,
+                            session_id2_len)) != 0)
+                                fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_string session id: %s",
+                                    __func__, ssh_err(r));
                 }
                 /* reconstruct packet */
-                buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
                 xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
                     authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
                     authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
-                buffer_put_cstring(&b, userstyle);
-                free(userstyle);
-                buffer_put_cstring(&b,
-                    datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ?
-                    "ssh-userauth" :
-                    authctxt->service);
-                if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
-                        buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
+                if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+                    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, userstyle)) != 0 ||
+                    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ?
+                    "ssh-userauth" : authctxt->service)) != 0)
+                        fatal("%s: build packet failed: %s",
+                            __func__, ssh_err(r));
+                if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
+                        if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_sig)) != 0)
+                                fatal("%s: build packet failed: %s",
+                                    __func__, ssh_err(r));
                 } else {
-                        buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");
-                        buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
-                        buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
+                        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "publickey")) != 0 ||
+                            (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_sig)) != 0 ||
+                            (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, pkalg) != 0))
+                                fatal("%s: build packet failed: %s",
+                                    __func__, ssh_err(r));
                 }
-                buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
+                if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
+                        fatal("%s: build packet failed: %s",
+                            __func__, ssh_err(r));
 #ifdef DEBUG_PK
-                buffer_dump(&b);
+                sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
 #endif
-                pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
 
                 /* test for correct signature */
                 authenticated = 0;
                 if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 1)) &&
-                    PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
-                    buffer_len(&b))) == 1) {
+                    PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, sshbuf_ptr(b),
+                    sshbuf_len(b), ssh->compat)) == 0) {
                         authenticated = 1;
-                        /* Record the successful key to prevent reuse */
-                        auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key);
-                        key = NULL; /* Don't free below */
                 }
-                buffer_free(&b);
+                sshbuf_free(b);
                 free(sig);
+                auth2_record_key(authctxt, authenticated, key);
         } else {
                 debug("%s: test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable for %s %s",
                     __func__, sshkey_type(key), fp);
-                packet_check_eom();
+                if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+                        fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 
                 /* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */
                 /*
@@ -199,11 +219,13 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
                  * issue? -markus
                  */
                 if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 0))) {
-                        packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK);
-                        packet_put_string(pkalg, alen);
-                        packet_put_string(pkblob, blen);
-                        packet_send();
-                        packet_write_wait();
+                        if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK))
+                            != 0 ||
+                            (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, pkalg)) != 0 ||
+                            (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, pkblob, blen)) != 0 ||
+                            (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+                                fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+                        ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh);
                         authctxt->postponed = 1;
                 }
         }
@@ -211,333 +233,14 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
                 auth_clear_options();
 done:
         debug2("%s: authenticated %d pkalg %s", __func__, authenticated, pkalg);
-        if (key != NULL)
-                key_free(key);
+        sshkey_free(key);
+        free(userstyle);
         free(pkalg);
         free(pkblob);
         free(fp);
         return authenticated;
 }
 
-void
-pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const Key *key, const char *fmt, ...)
-{
-        char *fp, *extra;
-        va_list ap;
-        int i;
-
-        extra = NULL;
-        if (fmt != NULL) {
-                va_start(ap, fmt);
-                i = vasprintf(&extra, fmt, ap);
-                va_end(ap);
-                if (i < 0 || extra == NULL)
-                        fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);        
-        }
-
-        if (key_is_cert(key)) {
-                fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
-                    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
-                auth_info(authctxt, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s", 
-                    key_type(key), key->cert->key_id,
-                    (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
-                    key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
-                    fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
-                    extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
-                free(fp);
-        } else {
-                fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
-                    SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
-                auth_info(authctxt, "%s %s%s%s", key_type(key),
-                    fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
-                    extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
-                free(fp);
-        }
-        free(extra);
-}
-
-/*
- * Splits 's' into an argument vector. Handles quoted string and basic
- * escape characters (\\, \", \'). Caller must free the argument vector
- * and its members.
- */
-static int
-split_argv(const char *s, int *argcp, char ***argvp)
-{
-        int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-        int argc = 0, quote, i, j;
-        char *arg, **argv = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*argv));
-
-        *argvp = NULL;
-        *argcp = 0;
-
-        for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
-                /* Skip leading whitespace */
-                if (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t')
-                        continue;
-
-                /* Start of a token */
-                quote = 0;
-                if (s[i] == '\\' &&
-                    (s[i + 1] == '\'' || s[i + 1] == '\"' || s[i + 1] == '\\'))
-                        i++;
-                else if (s[i] == '\'' || s[i] == '"')
-                        quote = s[i++];
-
-                argv = xreallocarray(argv, (argc + 2), sizeof(*argv));
-                arg = argv[argc++] = xcalloc(1, strlen(s + i) + 1);
-                argv[argc] = NULL;
-
-                /* Copy the token in, removing escapes */
-                for (j = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
-                        if (s[i] == '\\') {
-                                if (s[i + 1] == '\'' ||
-                                    s[i + 1] == '\"' ||
-                                    s[i + 1] == '\\') {
-                                        i++; /* Skip '\' */
-                                        arg[j++] = s[i];
-                                } else {
-                                        /* Unrecognised escape */
-                                        arg[j++] = s[i];
-                                }
-                        } else if (quote == 0 && (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t'))
-                                break; /* done */
-                        else if (quote != 0 && s[i] == quote)
-                                break; /* done */
-                        else
-                                arg[j++] = s[i];
-                }
-                if (s[i] == '\0') {
-                        if (quote != 0) {
-                                /* Ran out of string looking for close quote */
-                                r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
-                                goto out;
-                        }
-                        break;
-                }
-        }
-        /* Success */
-        *argcp = argc;
-        *argvp = argv;
-        argc = 0;
-        argv = NULL;
-        r = 0;
- out:
-        if (argc != 0 && argv != NULL) {
-                for (i = 0; i < argc; i++)
-                        free(argv[i]);
-                free(argv);
-        }
-        return r;
-}
-
-/*
- * Reassemble an argument vector into a string, quoting and escaping as
- * necessary. Caller must free returned string.
- */
-static char *
-assemble_argv(int argc, char **argv)
-{
-        int i, j, ws, r;
-        char c, *ret;
-        struct sshbuf *buf, *arg;
-
-        if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (arg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-                fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
-
-        for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
-                ws = 0;
-                sshbuf_reset(arg);
-                for (j = 0; argv[i][j] != '\0'; j++) {
-                        r = 0;
-                        c = argv[i][j];
-                        switch (c) {
-                        case ' ':
-                        case '\t':
-                                ws = 1;
-                                r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c);
-                                break;
-                        case '\\':
-                        case '\'':
-                        case '"':
-                                if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, '\\')) != 0)
-                                        break;
-                                /* FALLTHROUGH */
-                        default:
-                                r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c);
-                                break;
-                        }
-                        if (r != 0)
-                                fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u8: %s",
-                                    __func__, ssh_err(r));
-                }
-                if ((i != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ' ')) != 0) ||
-                    (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0) ||
-                    (r = sshbuf_putb(buf, arg)) != 0 ||
-                    (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0))
-                        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-        }
-        if ((ret = malloc(sshbuf_len(buf) + 1)) == NULL)
-                fatal("%s: malloc failed", __func__);
-        memcpy(ret, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
-        ret[sshbuf_len(buf)] = '\0';
-        sshbuf_free(buf);
-        sshbuf_free(arg);
-        return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Runs command in a subprocess. Returns pid on success and a FILE* to the
- * subprocess' stdout or 0 on failure.
- * NB. "command" is only used for logging.
- */
-static pid_t
-subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command,
-    int ac, char **av, FILE **child)
-{
-        FILE *f;
-        struct stat st;
-        int devnull, p[2], i;
-        pid_t pid;
-        char *cp, errmsg[512];
-        u_int envsize;
-        char **child_env;
-
-        *child = NULL;
-
-        debug3("%s: %s command \"%s\" running as %s", __func__,
-            tag, command, pw->pw_name);
-
-        /* Verify the path exists and is safe-ish to execute */
-        if (*av[0] != '/') {
-                error("%s path is not absolute", tag);
-                return 0;
-        }
-        temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-        if (stat(av[0], &st) < 0) {
-                error("Could not stat %s \"%s\": %s", tag,
-                    av[0], strerror(errno));
-                restore_uid();
-                return 0;
-        }
-        if (auth_secure_path(av[0], &st, NULL, 0,
-            errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
-                error("Unsafe %s \"%s\": %s", tag, av[0], errmsg);
-                restore_uid();
-                return 0;
-        }
-
-        /*
-         * Run the command; stderr is left in place, stdout is the
-         * authorized_keys output.
-         */
-        if (pipe(p) != 0) {
-                error("%s: pipe: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
-                restore_uid();
-                return 0;
-        }
-
-        /*
-         * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
-         * run cleanup_exit() code.
-         */
-        restore_uid();
-
-        switch ((pid = fork())) {
-        case -1: /* error */
-                error("%s: fork: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
-                close(p[0]);
-                close(p[1]);
-                return 0;
-        case 0: /* child */
-                /* Prepare a minimal environment for the child. */
-                envsize = 5;
-                child_env = xcalloc(sizeof(*child_env), envsize);
-                child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
-                child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
-                child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
-                child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
-                if ((cp = getenv("LANG")) != NULL)
-                        child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LANG", cp);
-
-                for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
-                        signal(i, SIG_DFL);
-
-                if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
-                        error("%s: open %s: %s", tag, _PATH_DEVNULL,
-                            strerror(errno));
-                        _exit(1);
-                }
-                /* Keep stderr around a while longer to catch errors */
-                if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
-                    dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
-                        error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
-                        _exit(1);
-                }
-                closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
-
-                /* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
-                if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
-                        error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
-                            strerror(errno));
-                        _exit(1);
-                }
-                if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
-                        error("%s: setresuid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
-                            strerror(errno));
-                        _exit(1);
-                }
-                /* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */
-                if (dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
-                        error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
-                        _exit(1);
-                }
-
-                execve(av[0], av, child_env);
-                error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno));
-                _exit(127);
-        default: /* parent */
-                break;
-        }
-
-        close(p[1]);
-        if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
-                error("%s: fdopen: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
-                close(p[0]);
-                /* Don't leave zombie child */
-                kill(pid, SIGTERM);
-                while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
-                        ;
-                return 0;
-        }
-        /* Success */
-        debug3("%s: %s pid %ld", __func__, tag, (long)pid);
-        *child = f;
-        return pid;
-}
-
-/* Returns 0 if pid exited cleanly, non-zero otherwise */
-static int
-exited_cleanly(pid_t pid, const char *tag, const char *cmd)
-{
-        int status;
-
-        while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
-                if (errno != EINTR) {
-                        error("%s: waitpid: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
-                        return -1;
-                }
-        }
-        if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
-                error("%s %s exited on signal %d", tag, cmd, WTERMSIG(status));
-                return -1;
-        } else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
-                error("%s %s failed, status %d", tag, cmd, WEXITSTATUS(status));
-                return -1;
-        }
-        return 0;
-}
-
 static int
 match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
 {
@@ -559,7 +262,7 @@ match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
 }
 
 static int
-process_principals(FILE *f, char *file, struct passwd *pw,
+process_principals(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
     const struct sshkey_cert *cert)
 {
         char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES], *cp, *ep, *line_opts;
@@ -598,8 +301,7 @@ process_principals(FILE *f, char *file, struct passwd *pw,
                 for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
                         if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) == 0) {
                                 debug3("%s:%lu: matched principal \"%.100s\"",
-                                    file == NULL ? "(command)" : file,
-                                    linenum, cert->principals[i]);
+                                    file, linenum, cert->principals[i]);
                                 if (auth_parse_options(pw, line_opts,
                                     file, linenum) != 1)
                                         continue;
@@ -672,7 +374,7 @@ match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, const struct sshkey *key)
         }
 
         /* Turn the command into an argument vector */
-        if (split_argv(options.authorized_principals_command, &ac, &av) != 0) {
+        if (argv_split(options.authorized_principals_command, &ac, &av) != 0) {
                 error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" contains "
                     "invalid quotes", command);
                 goto out;
@@ -721,21 +423,22 @@ match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, const struct sshkey *key)
                 av[i] = tmp;
         }
         /* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */
-        command = assemble_argv(ac, av);
+        command = argv_assemble(ac, av);
 
         if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", pw, command,
-            ac, av, &f)) == 0)
+            ac, av, &f,
+            SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
                 goto out;
 
         uid_swapped = 1;
         temporarily_use_uid(pw);
 
-        ok = process_principals(f, NULL, pw, cert);
+        ok = process_principals(f, "(command)", pw, cert);
 
         fclose(f);
         f = NULL;
 
-        if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command) != 0)
+        if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command, 0) != 0)
                 goto out;
 
         /* Read completed successfully */
@@ -762,27 +465,26 @@ match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, const struct sshkey *key)
  * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
  */
 static int
-check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
+check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, struct sshkey *key, struct passwd *pw)
 {
         char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
         int found_key = 0;
         u_long linenum = 0;
-        Key *found;
-
-        found_key = 0;
+        struct sshkey *found = NULL;
 
-        found = NULL;
         auth_start_parse_options();
         while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
                 char *cp, *key_options = NULL, *fp = NULL;
                 const char *reason = NULL;
 
-                /* Always consume entrire file */
+                /* Always consume entire file */
                 if (found_key)
                         continue;
                 if (found != NULL)
-                        key_free(found);
-                found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type);
+                        sshkey_free(found);
+                found = sshkey_new(sshkey_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type);
+                if (found == NULL)
+                        goto done;
                 auth_clear_options();
 
                 /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
@@ -791,7 +493,7 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
                 if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
                         continue;
 
-                if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
+                if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
                         /* no key?  check if there are options for this key */
                         int quoted = 0;
                         debug2("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
@@ -805,14 +507,14 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
                         /* Skip remaining whitespace. */
                         for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
                                 ;
-                        if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
+                        if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
                                 debug2("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
                                 /* still no key?  advance to next line*/
                                 continue;
                         }
                 }
-                if (key_is_cert(key)) {
-                        if (!key_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key))
+                if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+                        if (!sshkey_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key))
                                 continue;
                         if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file,
                             linenum) != 1)
@@ -823,7 +525,7 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
                             options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
                                 continue;
                         debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s",
-                            file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
+                            file, linenum, sshkey_type(found), fp);
                         /*
                          * If the user has specified a list of principals as
                          * a key option, then prefer that list to matching
@@ -840,7 +542,7 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
                                 auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
                                 continue;
                         }
-                        if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 0,
+                        if (sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 0,
                             authorized_principals == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL,
                             &reason) != 0)
                                 goto fail_reason;
@@ -849,11 +551,11 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
                         verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) "
                             "signed by %s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id,
                             (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
-                            key_type(found), fp, file);
+                            sshkey_type(found), fp, file);
                         free(fp);
                         found_key = 1;
                         break;
-                } else if (key_equal(found, key)) {
+                } else if (sshkey_equal(found, key)) {
                         if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file,
                             linenum) != 1)
                                 continue;
@@ -863,14 +565,15 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
                             options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
                                 continue;
                         debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
-                            file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
+                            file, linenum, sshkey_type(found), fp);
                         free(fp);
                         found_key = 1;
                         continue;
                 }
         }
+ done:
         if (found != NULL)
-                key_free(found);
+                sshkey_free(found);
         if (!found_key)
                 debug2("key not found");
         return found_key;
@@ -878,24 +581,24 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
 
 /* Authenticate a certificate key against TrustedUserCAKeys */
 static int
-user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
+user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key)
 {
         char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL;
         const char *reason;
-        int ret = 0, found_principal = 0, use_authorized_principals;
+        int r, ret = 0, found_principal = 0, use_authorized_principals;
 
-        if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)
+        if (!sshkey_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)
                 return 0;
 
         if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
             options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
                 return 0;
 
-        if (sshkey_in_file(key->cert->signature_key,
-            options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1, 0) != 0) {
-                debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s", __func__,
-                    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
-                    options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
+        if ((r = sshkey_in_file(key->cert->signature_key,
+            options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1, 0)) != 0) {
+                debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s: %s", __func__,
+                    sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
+                    options.trusted_user_ca_keys, ssh_err(r));
                 goto out;
         }
         /*
@@ -920,7 +623,7 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
                 auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
                 goto out;
         }
-        if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1,
+        if (sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1,
             use_authorized_principals ? NULL : pw->pw_name, &reason) != 0)
                 goto fail_reason;
         auth_start_parse_options();
@@ -930,7 +633,7 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
         verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) signed by "
             "%s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id,
             (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
-            key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
+            sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
             options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
         ret = 1;
 
@@ -945,7 +648,7 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
  * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
  */
 static int
-user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
+user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, char *file)
 {
         FILE *f;
         int found_key = 0;
@@ -968,7 +671,7 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
  * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
  */
 static int
-user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
+user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey *key)
 {
         FILE *f = NULL;
         int r, ok, found_key = 0;
@@ -1014,7 +717,7 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
         }
 
         /* Turn the command into an argument vector */
-        if (split_argv(options.authorized_keys_command, &ac, &av) != 0) {
+        if (argv_split(options.authorized_keys_command, &ac, &av) != 0) {
                 error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" contains invalid quotes",
                     command);
                 goto out;
@@ -1038,7 +741,7 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
                 av[i] = tmp;
         }
         /* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */
-        command = assemble_argv(ac, av);
+        command = argv_assemble(ac, av);
 
         /*
          * If AuthorizedKeysCommand was run without arguments
@@ -1055,7 +758,8 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
         }
 
         if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", pw, command,
-            ac, av, &f)) == 0)
+            ac, av, &f,
+            SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
                 goto out;
 
         uid_swapped = 1;
@@ -1066,7 +770,7 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
         fclose(f);
         f = NULL;
 
-        if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedKeysCommand", command) != 0)
+        if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedKeysCommand", command, 0) != 0)
                 goto out;
 
         /* Read completed successfully */
@@ -1091,14 +795,15 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
  * Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user.
  */
 int
-user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, int auth_attempt)
+user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, int auth_attempt)
 {
         u_int success, i;
         char *file;
 
         if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
                 return 0;
-        if (key_is_cert(key) && auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key))
+        if (sshkey_is_cert(key) &&
+            auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key))
                 return 0;
 
         success = user_cert_trusted_ca(pw, key);
@@ -1123,35 +828,6 @@ user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, int auth_attempt)
         return success;
 }
 
-/* Records a public key in the list of previously-successful keys */
-void
-auth2_record_userkey(Authctxt *authctxt, struct sshkey *key)
-{
-        struct sshkey **tmp;
-
-        if (authctxt->nprev_userkeys >= INT_MAX ||
-            (tmp = reallocarray(authctxt->prev_userkeys,
-            authctxt->nprev_userkeys + 1, sizeof(*tmp))) == NULL)
-                fatal("%s: reallocarray failed", __func__);
-        authctxt->prev_userkeys = tmp;
-        authctxt->prev_userkeys[authctxt->nprev_userkeys] = key;
-        authctxt->nprev_userkeys++;
-}
-
-/* Checks whether a key has already been used successfully for authentication */
-int
-auth2_userkey_already_used(Authctxt *authctxt, struct sshkey *key)
-{
-        u_int i;
-
-        for (i = 0; i < authctxt->nprev_userkeys; i++) {
-                if (sshkey_equal_public(key, authctxt->prev_userkeys[i])) {
-                        return 1;
-                }
-        }
-        return 0;
-}
-
 Authmethod method_pubkey = {
         "publickey",
         userauth_pubkey,