1 files changed, 2 insertions, 14 deletions

diff --git a/authfile.c b/authfile.c
index af4190eeb..3481e0b04 100644
--- a/authfile.c
+++ b/authfile.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.125 2017/05/30 08:49:32 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.126 2017/05/31 09:15:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2013 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -100,25 +100,13 @@ sshkey_load_file(int fd, struct sshbuf *blob)
         u_char buf[1024];
         size_t len;
         struct stat st;
-        int r, dontmax = 0;
+        int r;
 
         if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
                 return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
         if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 &&
             st.st_size > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE)
                 return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
-        /*
-         * Pre-allocate the buffer used for the key contents and clamp its
-         * maximum size. This ensures that key contents are never leaked via
-         * implicit realloc() in the sshbuf code.
-         */
-        if ((st.st_mode & S_IFREG) == 0 || st.st_size <= 0) {
-                st.st_size = 64*1024; /* 64k ought to be enough for anybody. :) */
-                dontmax = 1;
-        }
-        if ((r = sshbuf_allocate(blob, st.st_size)) != 0 ||
-            (dontmax && (r = sshbuf_set_max_size(blob, st.st_size)) != 0))
-                return r;
         for (;;) {
                 if ((len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) == 0) {
                         if (errno == EPIPE)