1 files changed, 187 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/debian/patches/check-filenames-in-scp-client.patch b/debian/patches/check-filenames-in-scp-client.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..519358ce6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/check-filenames-in-scp-client.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+From 125924e47db3713a85a70e0f8d6c23818d2ea054 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat, 26 Jan 2019 22:41:28 +0000
+Subject: upstream: check in scp client that filenames sent during
+
+remote->local directory copies satisfy the wildcard specified by the user.
+
+This checking provides some protection against a malicious server
+sending unexpected filenames, but it comes at a risk of rejecting wanted
+files due to differences between client and server wildcard expansion rules.
+
+For this reason, this also adds a new -T flag to disable the check.
+
+reported by Harry Sintonen
+fix approach suggested by markus@;
+has been in snaps for ~1wk courtesy deraadt@
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 00f44b50d2be8e321973f3c6d014260f8f7a8eda
+
+CVE-2019-6111
+
+Origin: backport, https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=391ffc4b9d31fa1f4ad566499fef9176ff8a07dc
+Last-Update: 2019-02-08
+
+Patch-Name: check-filenames-in-scp-client.patch
+---
+ scp.1 | 12 +++++++++++-
+ scp.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
+ 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/scp.1 b/scp.1
+index 0e5cc1b2d..397e77091 100644
+--- a/scp.1
++++ b/scp.1
+@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
+ .Nd secure copy (remote file copy program)
+ .Sh SYNOPSIS
+ .Nm scp
+-.Op Fl 346BCpqrv
++.Op Fl 346BCpqrTv
+ .Op Fl c Ar cipher
+ .Op Fl F Ar ssh_config
+ .Op Fl i Ar identity_file
+@@ -208,6 +208,16 @@ to use for the encrypted connection.
+ The program must understand
+ .Xr ssh 1
+ options.
++.It Fl T
++Disable strict filename checking.
++By default when copying files from a remote host to a local directory
++.Nm
++checks that the received filenames match those requested on the command-line
++to prevent the remote end from sending unexpected or unwanted files.
++Because of differences in how various operating systems and shells interpret
++filename wildcards, these checks may cause wanted files to be rejected.
++This option disables these checks at the expense of fully trusting that
++the server will not send unexpected filenames.
+ .It Fl v
+ Verbose mode.
+ Causes
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index 1971c80cd..035037bcc 100644
+--- a/scp.c
++++ b/scp.c
+@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@
+ #include <dirent.h>
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #include <fcntl.h>
++#include <fnmatch.h>
+ #include <limits.h>
+ #include <locale.h>
+ #include <pwd.h>
+@@ -383,14 +384,14 @@ void verifydir(char *);
+ struct passwd *pwd;
+ uid_t userid;
+ int errs, remin, remout;
+-int pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory;
++int Tflag, pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory;
+ 
+ #define        CMDNEEDS        64
+ char cmd[CMDNEEDS];            /* must hold "rcp -r -p -d\0" */
+ 
+ int response(void);
+ void rsource(char *, struct stat *);
+-void sink(int, char *[]);
++void sink(int, char *[], const char *);
+ void source(int, char *[]);
+ void tolocal(int, char *[]);
+ void toremote(int, char *[]);
+@@ -429,8 +430,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+        addargs(&args, "-oRemoteCommand=none");
+        addargs(&args, "-oRequestTTY=no");
+ 
+-       fflag = tflag = 0;
+-       while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "dfl:prtvBCc:i:P:q12346S:o:F:")) != -1)
++       fflag = Tflag = tflag = 0;
++       while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv,
++           "dfl:prtTvBCc:i:P:q12346S:o:F:")) != -1) {
+                switch (ch) {
+                /* User-visible flags. */
+                case '1':
+@@ -509,9 +511,13 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+                        setmode(0, O_BINARY);
+ #endif
+                        break;
++               case 'T':
++                       Tflag = 1;
++                       break;
+                default:
+                        usage();
+                }
++       }
+        argc -= optind;
+        argv += optind;
+ 
+@@ -542,7 +548,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+        }
+        if (tflag) {
+                /* Receive data. */
+-               sink(argc, argv);
++               sink(argc, argv, NULL);
+                exit(errs != 0);
+        }
+        if (argc < 2)
+@@ -800,7 +806,7 @@ tolocal(int argc, char **argv)
+                        continue;
+                }
+                free(bp);
+-               sink(1, argv + argc - 1);
++               sink(1, argv + argc - 1, src);
+                (void) close(remin);
+                remin = remout = -1;
+        }
+@@ -976,7 +982,7 @@ rsource(char *name, struct stat *statp)
+         (sizeof(type) != 4 && sizeof(type) != 8))
+ 
+ void
+-sink(int argc, char **argv)
++sink(int argc, char **argv, const char *src)
+ {
+        static BUF buffer;
+        struct stat stb;
+@@ -992,6 +998,7 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
+        unsigned long long ull;
+        int setimes, targisdir, wrerrno = 0;
+        char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048], visbuf[2048];
++       char *src_copy = NULL, *restrict_pattern = NULL;
+        struct timeval tv[2];
+ 
+ #define        atime   tv[0]
+@@ -1016,6 +1023,17 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
+        (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
+        if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode))
+                targisdir = 1;
++       if (src != NULL && !iamrecursive && !Tflag) {
++               /*
++                * Prepare to try to restrict incoming filenames to match
++                * the requested destination file glob.
++                */
++               if ((src_copy = strdup(src)) == NULL)
++                       fatal("strdup failed");
++               if ((restrict_pattern = strrchr(src_copy, '/')) != NULL) {
++                       *restrict_pattern++ = '\0';
++               }
++       }
+        for (first = 1;; first = 0) {
+                cp = buf;
+                if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) != 1)
+@@ -1120,6 +1138,9 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
+                        run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp);
+                        exit(1);
+                }
++               if (restrict_pattern != NULL &&
++                   fnmatch(restrict_pattern, cp, 0) != 0)
++                       SCREWUP("filename does not match request");
+                if (targisdir) {
+                        static char *namebuf;
+                        static size_t cursize;
+@@ -1157,7 +1178,7 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
+                                        goto bad;
+                        }
+                        vect[0] = xstrdup(np);
+-                       sink(1, vect);
++                       sink(1, vect, src);
+                        if (setimes) {
+                                setimes = 0;
+                                if (utimes(vect[0], tv) < 0)