summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/debian/patches
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'debian/patches')
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/auth-log-verbosity.patch133
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch26
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/consolekit.patch741
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/debian-banner.patch111
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/debian-config.patch165
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/dnssec-sshfp.patch94
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/doc-hash-tab-completion.patch28
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/doc-upstart.patch29
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch26
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/gssapi.patch3143
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/helpful-wait-terminate.patch26
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/keepalive-extensions.patch135
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/lintian-symlink-pickiness.patch32
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch41
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/no-openssl-version-status.patch62
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/openbsd-docs.patch148
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/package-versioning.patch65
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/quieter-signals.patch40
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/restore-tcp-wrappers.patch172
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/scp-quoting.patch41
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/selinux-role.patch504
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/series29
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/shell-path.patch39
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/sigstop.patch35
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/ssh-agent-setgid.patch40
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/ssh-argv0.patch31
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch42
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/ssh1-keepalive.patch74
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/syslog-level-silent.patch47
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/user-group-modes.patch266
30 files changed, 6365 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/debian/patches/auth-log-verbosity.patch b/debian/patches/auth-log-verbosity.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..84a14cfb8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/auth-log-verbosity.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
1From 1ecd5db58295874d8b9a7ce98fe1880ab08fbcaf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:02 +0000
4Subject: Quieten logs when multiple from= restrictions are used
5
6Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/630606
7Forwarded: no
8Last-Update: 2013-09-14
9
10Patch-Name: auth-log-verbosity.patch
11---
12 auth-options.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
13 auth-options.h | 1 +
14 auth-rsa.c | 2 ++
15 auth2-pubkey.c | 3 +++
16 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
17
18diff --git a/auth-options.c b/auth-options.c
19index f3d9c9d..d4d22d7 100644
20--- a/auth-options.c
21+++ b/auth-options.c
22@@ -54,9 +54,20 @@ int forced_tun_device = -1;
23 /* "principals=" option. */
24 char *authorized_principals = NULL;
25
26+/* Throttle log messages. */
27+int logged_from_hostip = 0;
28+int logged_cert_hostip = 0;
29+
30 extern ServerOptions options;
31
32 void
33+auth_start_parse_options(void)
34+{
35+ logged_from_hostip = 0;
36+ logged_cert_hostip = 0;
37+}
38+
39+void
40 auth_clear_options(void)
41 {
42 no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
43@@ -284,10 +295,13 @@ auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum)
44 /* FALLTHROUGH */
45 case 0:
46 free(patterns);
47- logit("Authentication tried for %.100s with "
48- "correct key but not from a permitted "
49- "host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s).",
50- pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip);
51+ if (!logged_from_hostip) {
52+ logit("Authentication tried for %.100s with "
53+ "correct key but not from a permitted "
54+ "host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s).",
55+ pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip);
56+ logged_from_hostip = 1;
57+ }
58 auth_debug_add("Your host '%.200s' is not "
59 "permitted to use this key for login.",
60 remote_host);
61@@ -511,11 +525,14 @@ parse_option_list(u_char *optblob, size_t optblob_len, struct passwd *pw,
62 break;
63 case 0:
64 /* no match */
65- logit("Authentication tried for %.100s "
66- "with valid certificate but not "
67- "from a permitted host "
68- "(ip=%.200s).", pw->pw_name,
69- remote_ip);
70+ if (!logged_cert_hostip) {
71+ logit("Authentication tried for %.100s "
72+ "with valid certificate but not "
73+ "from a permitted host "
74+ "(ip=%.200s).", pw->pw_name,
75+ remote_ip);
76+ logged_cert_hostip = 1;
77+ }
78 auth_debug_add("Your address '%.200s' "
79 "is not permitted to use this "
80 "certificate for login.",
81diff --git a/auth-options.h b/auth-options.h
82index 7455c94..a3f0a02 100644
83--- a/auth-options.h
84+++ b/auth-options.h
85@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ extern int forced_tun_device;
86 extern int key_is_cert_authority;
87 extern char *authorized_principals;
88
89+void auth_start_parse_options(void);
90 int auth_parse_options(struct passwd *, char *, char *, u_long);
91 void auth_clear_options(void);
92 int auth_cert_options(Key *, struct passwd *);
93diff --git a/auth-rsa.c b/auth-rsa.c
94index e9f4ede..5d7bdcb 100644
95--- a/auth-rsa.c
96+++ b/auth-rsa.c
97@@ -179,6 +179,8 @@ rsa_key_allowed_in_file(struct passwd *pw, char *file,
98 if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL)
99 return 0;
100
101+ auth_start_parse_options();
102+
103 /*
104 * Go though the accepted keys, looking for the current key. If
105 * found, perform a challenge-response dialog to verify that the
106diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
107index f3ca965..f78b046 100644
108--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
109+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
110@@ -263,6 +263,7 @@ match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
111 restore_uid();
112 return 0;
113 }
114+ auth_start_parse_options();
115 while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
116 /* Skip leading whitespace. */
117 for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
118@@ -324,6 +325,7 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
119 found_key = 0;
120
121 found = NULL;
122+ auth_start_parse_options();
123 while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
124 char *cp, *key_options = NULL;
125 if (found != NULL)
126@@ -459,6 +461,7 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
127 if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1,
128 principals_file == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL, &reason) != 0)
129 goto fail_reason;
130+ auth_start_parse_options();
131 if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0)
132 goto out;
133
diff --git a/debian/patches/authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch b/debian/patches/authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6afb0420b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
1From 19b0441502c07401dd6d418f8f81cc7f1a44ccb1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Tomas Pospisek <tpo_deb@sourcepole.ch>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:07 +0000
4Subject: Install authorized_keys(5) as a symlink to sshd(8)
5
6Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1720
7Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/441817
8Last-Update: 2013-09-14
9
10Patch-Name: authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
11---
12 Makefile.in | 1 +
13 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
14
15diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
16index c4cb8ea..a4402e9 100644
17--- a/Makefile.in
18+++ b/Makefile.in
19@@ -309,6 +309,7 @@ install-files:
20 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5
21 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/ssh_config.5
22 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8
23+ ln -s ../$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/authorized_keys.5
24 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
25 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
26 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
diff --git a/debian/patches/consolekit.patch b/debian/patches/consolekit.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e50c77f62
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/consolekit.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,741 @@
1From f51fe0c55e54c12db952624e980d18f39c41e581 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@ubuntu.com>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:57 +0000
4Subject: Add support for registering ConsoleKit sessions on login
5
6Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1450
7Last-Updated: 2014-10-07
8
9Patch-Name: consolekit.patch
10---
11 Makefile.in | 3 +-
12 configure | 132 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
13 configure.ac | 25 ++++++
14 consolekit.c | 241 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
15 consolekit.h | 24 ++++++
16 monitor.c | 42 ++++++++++
17 monitor.h | 2 +
18 monitor_wrap.c | 30 +++++++
19 monitor_wrap.h | 4 +
20 session.c | 13 ++++
21 session.h | 6 ++
22 11 files changed, 521 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
23 create mode 100644 consolekit.c
24 create mode 100644 consolekit.h
25
26diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
27index 086d8dd..c4cb8ea 100644
28--- a/Makefile.in
29+++ b/Makefile.in
30@@ -107,7 +107,8 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \
31 sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
32 roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o \
33 sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
34- sandbox-seccomp-filter.o sandbox-capsicum.o
35+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.o sandbox-capsicum.o \
36+ consolekit.o
37
38 MANPAGES = moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-keysign.8.out ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out
39 MANPAGES_IN = moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5
40diff --git a/configure b/configure
41index ea5f200..7be478a 100755
42--- a/configure
43+++ b/configure
44@@ -739,6 +739,7 @@ with_privsep_user
45 with_sandbox
46 with_selinux
47 with_kerberos5
48+with_consolekit
49 with_privsep_path
50 with_xauth
51 enable_strip
52@@ -1430,6 +1431,7 @@ Optional Packages:
53 --with-sandbox=style Specify privilege separation sandbox (no, darwin, rlimit, systrace, seccomp_filter, capsicum)
54 --with-selinux Enable SELinux support
55 --with-kerberos5=PATH Enable Kerberos 5 support
56+ --with-consolekit Enable ConsoleKit support
57 --with-privsep-path=xxx Path for privilege separation chroot (default=/var/empty)
58 --with-xauth=PATH Specify path to xauth program
59 --with-maildir=/path/to/mail Specify your system mail directory
60@@ -17211,6 +17213,135 @@ fi
61
62
63
64+# Check whether user wants ConsoleKit support
65+CONSOLEKIT_MSG="no"
66+LIBCK_CONNECTOR=""
67+
68+# Check whether --with-consolekit was given.
69+if test "${with_consolekit+set}" = set; then :
70+ withval=$with_consolekit; if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
71+ if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
72+ # Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}pkg-config", so it can be a program name with args.
73+set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}pkg-config; ac_word=$2
74+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
75+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
76+if ${ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG+:} false; then :
77+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
78+else
79+ case $PKGCONFIG in
80+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
81+ ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG="$PKGCONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
82+ ;;
83+ *)
84+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
85+for as_dir in $PATH
86+do
87+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
88+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
89+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
90+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
91+ ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
92+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
93+ break 2
94+ fi
95+done
96+ done
97+IFS=$as_save_IFS
98+
99+ ;;
100+esac
101+fi
102+PKGCONFIG=$ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG
103+if test -n "$PKGCONFIG"; then
104+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PKGCONFIG" >&5
105+$as_echo "$PKGCONFIG" >&6; }
106+else
107+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
108+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
109+fi
110+
111+
112+fi
113+if test -z "$ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG"; then
114+ ac_pt_PKGCONFIG=$PKGCONFIG
115+ # Extract the first word of "pkg-config", so it can be a program name with args.
116+set dummy pkg-config; ac_word=$2
117+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
118+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
119+if ${ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG+:} false; then :
120+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
121+else
122+ case $ac_pt_PKGCONFIG in
123+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
124+ ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG="$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
125+ ;;
126+ *)
127+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
128+for as_dir in $PATH
129+do
130+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
131+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
132+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
133+ if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
134+ ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
135+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
136+ break 2
137+ fi
138+done
139+ done
140+IFS=$as_save_IFS
141+
142+ ;;
143+esac
144+fi
145+ac_pt_PKGCONFIG=$ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG
146+if test -n "$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG"; then
147+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" >&5
148+$as_echo "$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" >&6; }
149+else
150+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
151+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
152+fi
153+
154+ if test "x$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" = x; then
155+ PKGCONFIG="no"
156+ else
157+ case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
158+yes:)
159+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5
160+$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;}
161+ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
162+esac
163+ PKGCONFIG=$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG
164+ fi
165+else
166+ PKGCONFIG="$ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG"
167+fi
168+
169+ if test "$PKGCONFIG" != "no"; then
170+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ck-connector" >&5
171+$as_echo_n "checking for ck-connector... " >&6; }
172+ if $PKGCONFIG --exists ck-connector; then
173+ CKCON_CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags ck-connector`
174+ CKCON_LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs ck-connector`
175+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $CKCON_CFLAGS"
176+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $CKCON_LIBS"
177+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
178+$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
179+
180+$as_echo "#define USE_CONSOLEKIT 1" >>confdefs.h
181+
182+ CONSOLEKIT_MSG="yes"
183+ else
184+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
185+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
186+ fi
187+ fi
188+ fi
189+
190+fi
191+
192+
193 # Looking for programs, paths and files
194
195 PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
196@@ -19739,6 +19870,7 @@ echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
197 echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
198 echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
199 echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
200+echo " ConsoleKit support: $CONSOLEKIT_MSG"
201 echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
202 echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
203 echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
204diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
205index 7f160f1..f5c65c5 100644
206--- a/configure.ac
207+++ b/configure.ac
208@@ -4113,6 +4113,30 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
209 AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
210 AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
211
212+# Check whether user wants ConsoleKit support
213+CONSOLEKIT_MSG="no"
214+LIBCK_CONNECTOR=""
215+AC_ARG_WITH(consolekit,
216+ [ --with-consolekit Enable ConsoleKit support],
217+ [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
218+ AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
219+ if test "$PKGCONFIG" != "no"; then
220+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for ck-connector])
221+ if $PKGCONFIG --exists ck-connector; then
222+ CKCON_CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags ck-connector`
223+ CKCON_LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs ck-connector`
224+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $CKCON_CFLAGS"
225+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $CKCON_LIBS"
226+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
227+ AC_DEFINE(USE_CONSOLEKIT, 1, [Define if you want ConsoleKit support.])
228+ CONSOLEKIT_MSG="yes"
229+ else
230+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
231+ fi
232+ fi
233+ fi ]
234+)
235+
236 # Looking for programs, paths and files
237
238 PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
239@@ -4914,6 +4938,7 @@ echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
240 echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
241 echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
242 echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
243+echo " ConsoleKit support: $CONSOLEKIT_MSG"
244 echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
245 echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
246 echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
247diff --git a/consolekit.c b/consolekit.c
248new file mode 100644
249index 0000000..0266f06
250--- /dev/null
251+++ b/consolekit.c
252@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
253+/*
254+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Colin Watson. All rights reserved.
255+ *
256+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
257+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
258+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
259+ *
260+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
261+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
262+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
263+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
264+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
265+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
266+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
267+ */
268+/*
269+ * Loosely based on pam-ck-connector, which is:
270+ *
271+ * Copyright (c) 2007 David Zeuthen <davidz@redhat.com>
272+ *
273+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person
274+ * obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation
275+ * files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without
276+ * restriction, including without limitation the rights to use,
277+ * copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
278+ * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the
279+ * Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following
280+ * conditions:
281+ *
282+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
283+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
284+ *
285+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
286+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES
287+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
288+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT
289+ * HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY,
290+ * WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
291+ * FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR
292+ * OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
293+ */
294+
295+#include "includes.h"
296+
297+#ifdef USE_CONSOLEKIT
298+
299+#include <ck-connector.h>
300+
301+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
302+#include "xmalloc.h"
303+#include "channels.h"
304+#include "key.h"
305+#include "hostfile.h"
306+#include "auth.h"
307+#include "log.h"
308+#include "misc.h"
309+#include "servconf.h"
310+#include "canohost.h"
311+#include "session.h"
312+#include "consolekit.h"
313+
314+extern ServerOptions options;
315+extern u_int utmp_len;
316+
317+void
318+set_active(const char *cookie)
319+{
320+ DBusError err;
321+ DBusConnection *connection;
322+ DBusMessage *message = NULL, *reply = NULL;
323+ char *sid;
324+ DBusMessageIter iter, subiter;
325+ const char *interface, *property;
326+ dbus_bool_t active;
327+
328+ dbus_error_init(&err);
329+ connection = dbus_bus_get_private(DBUS_BUS_SYSTEM, &err);
330+ if (!connection) {
331+ if (dbus_error_is_set(&err)) {
332+ error("unable to open DBus connection: %s",
333+ err.message);
334+ dbus_error_free(&err);
335+ }
336+ goto out;
337+ }
338+ dbus_connection_set_exit_on_disconnect(connection, FALSE);
339+
340+ message = dbus_message_new_method_call("org.freedesktop.ConsoleKit",
341+ "/org/freedesktop/ConsoleKit/Manager",
342+ "org.freedesktop.ConsoleKit.Manager",
343+ "GetSessionForCookie");
344+ if (!message)
345+ goto out;
346+ if (!dbus_message_append_args(message, DBUS_TYPE_STRING, &cookie,
347+ DBUS_TYPE_INVALID)) {
348+ if (dbus_error_is_set(&err)) {
349+ error("unable to get current session: %s",
350+ err.message);
351+ dbus_error_free(&err);
352+ }
353+ goto out;
354+ }
355+
356+ dbus_error_init(&err);
357+ reply = dbus_connection_send_with_reply_and_block(connection, message,
358+ -1, &err);
359+ if (!reply) {
360+ if (dbus_error_is_set(&err)) {
361+ error("unable to get current session: %s",
362+ err.message);
363+ dbus_error_free(&err);
364+ }
365+ goto out;
366+ }
367+
368+ dbus_error_init(&err);
369+ if (!dbus_message_get_args(reply, &err,
370+ DBUS_TYPE_OBJECT_PATH, &sid,
371+ DBUS_TYPE_INVALID)) {
372+ if (dbus_error_is_set(&err)) {
373+ error("unable to get current session: %s",
374+ err.message);
375+ dbus_error_free(&err);
376+ }
377+ goto out;
378+ }
379+ dbus_message_unref(reply);
380+ dbus_message_unref(message);
381+ message = reply = NULL;
382+
383+ message = dbus_message_new_method_call("org.freedesktop.ConsoleKit",
384+ sid, "org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties", "Set");
385+ if (!message)
386+ goto out;
387+ interface = "org.freedesktop.ConsoleKit.Session";
388+ property = "active";
389+ if (!dbus_message_append_args(message,
390+ DBUS_TYPE_STRING, &interface, DBUS_TYPE_STRING, &property,
391+ DBUS_TYPE_INVALID))
392+ goto out;
393+ dbus_message_iter_init_append(message, &iter);
394+ if (!dbus_message_iter_open_container(&iter, DBUS_TYPE_VARIANT,
395+ DBUS_TYPE_BOOLEAN_AS_STRING, &subiter))
396+ goto out;
397+ active = TRUE;
398+ if (!dbus_message_iter_append_basic(&subiter, DBUS_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
399+ &active))
400+ goto out;
401+ if (!dbus_message_iter_close_container(&iter, &subiter))
402+ goto out;
403+
404+ dbus_error_init(&err);
405+ reply = dbus_connection_send_with_reply_and_block(connection, message,
406+ -1, &err);
407+ if (!reply) {
408+ if (dbus_error_is_set(&err)) {
409+ error("unable to make current session active: %s",
410+ err.message);
411+ dbus_error_free(&err);
412+ }
413+ goto out;
414+ }
415+
416+out:
417+ if (reply)
418+ dbus_message_unref(reply);
419+ if (message)
420+ dbus_message_unref(message);
421+}
422+
423+/*
424+ * We pass display separately rather than using s->display because the
425+ * latter is not available in the monitor when using privsep.
426+ */
427+
428+char *
429+consolekit_register(Session *s, const char *display)
430+{
431+ DBusError err;
432+ const char *tty = s->tty;
433+ const char *remote_host_name;
434+ dbus_bool_t is_local = FALSE;
435+ const char *cookie = NULL;
436+
437+ if (s->ckc) {
438+ debug("already registered with ConsoleKit");
439+ return xstrdup(ck_connector_get_cookie(s->ckc));
440+ }
441+
442+ s->ckc = ck_connector_new();
443+ if (!s->ckc) {
444+ error("ck_connector_new failed");
445+ return NULL;
446+ }
447+
448+ if (!tty)
449+ tty = "";
450+ if (!display)
451+ display = "";
452+ remote_host_name = get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns);
453+ if (!remote_host_name)
454+ remote_host_name = "";
455+
456+ dbus_error_init(&err);
457+ if (!ck_connector_open_session_with_parameters(s->ckc, &err,
458+ "unix-user", &s->pw->pw_uid,
459+ "display-device", &tty,
460+ "x11-display", &display,
461+ "remote-host-name", &remote_host_name,
462+ "is-local", &is_local,
463+ NULL)) {
464+ if (dbus_error_is_set(&err)) {
465+ debug("%s", err.message);
466+ dbus_error_free(&err);
467+ } else {
468+ debug("insufficient privileges or D-Bus / ConsoleKit "
469+ "not available");
470+ }
471+ return NULL;
472+ }
473+
474+ debug("registered uid=%d on tty='%s' with ConsoleKit",
475+ s->pw->pw_uid, s->tty);
476+
477+ cookie = ck_connector_get_cookie(s->ckc);
478+ set_active(cookie);
479+ return xstrdup(cookie);
480+}
481+
482+void
483+consolekit_unregister(Session *s)
484+{
485+ if (s->ckc) {
486+ debug("unregistering ConsoleKit session %s",
487+ ck_connector_get_cookie(s->ckc));
488+ ck_connector_unref(s->ckc);
489+ s->ckc = NULL;
490+ }
491+}
492+
493+#endif /* USE_CONSOLEKIT */
494diff --git a/consolekit.h b/consolekit.h
495new file mode 100644
496index 0000000..8ce3716
497--- /dev/null
498+++ b/consolekit.h
499@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
500+/*
501+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Colin Watson. All rights reserved.
502+ *
503+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
504+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
505+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
506+ *
507+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
508+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
509+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
510+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
511+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
512+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
513+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
514+ */
515+
516+#ifdef USE_CONSOLEKIT
517+
518+struct Session;
519+
520+char * consolekit_register(struct Session *, const char *);
521+void consolekit_unregister(struct Session *);
522+
523+#endif /* USE_CONSOLEKIT */
524diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
525index 94b194d..cc15ce4 100644
526--- a/monitor.c
527+++ b/monitor.c
528@@ -100,6 +100,9 @@
529 #include "ssh2.h"
530 #include "roaming.h"
531 #include "authfd.h"
532+#ifdef USE_CONSOLEKIT
533+#include "consolekit.h"
534+#endif
535
536 #ifdef GSSAPI
537 static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
538@@ -190,6 +193,10 @@ int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
539
540 static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
541
542+#ifdef USE_CONSOLEKIT
543+int mm_answer_consolekit_register(int, Buffer *);
544+#endif
545+
546 static Authctxt *authctxt;
547
548 #ifdef WITH_SSH1
549@@ -282,6 +289,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
550 {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
551 {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
552 #endif
553+#ifdef USE_CONSOLEKIT
554+ {MONITOR_REQ_CONSOLEKIT_REGISTER, 0, mm_answer_consolekit_register},
555+#endif
556 {0, 0, NULL}
557 };
558
559@@ -327,6 +337,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
560 {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
561 {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
562 #endif
563+#ifdef USE_CONSOLEKIT
564+ {MONITOR_REQ_CONSOLEKIT_REGISTER, 0, mm_answer_consolekit_register},
565+#endif
566 #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
567 {0, 0, NULL}
568 };
569@@ -509,6 +522,9 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
570 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
571 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
572 }
573+#ifdef USE_CONSOLEKIT
574+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_CONSOLEKIT_REGISTER, 1);
575+#endif
576
577 for (;;)
578 monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
579@@ -2296,3 +2312,29 @@ mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) {
580
581 #endif /* GSSAPI */
582
583+#ifdef USE_CONSOLEKIT
584+int
585+mm_answer_consolekit_register(int sock, Buffer *m)
586+{
587+ Session *s;
588+ char *tty, *display;
589+ char *cookie = NULL;
590+
591+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
592+
593+ tty = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
594+ display = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
595+ s = session_by_tty(tty);
596+ if (s != NULL)
597+ cookie = consolekit_register(s, display);
598+ buffer_clear(m);
599+ buffer_put_cstring(m, cookie != NULL ? cookie : "");
600+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_CONSOLEKIT_REGISTER, m);
601+
602+ free(cookie);
603+ free(display);
604+ free(tty);
605+
606+ return (0);
607+}
608+#endif /* USE_CONSOLEKIT */
609diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
610index 4d5e8fa..10ba59e 100644
611--- a/monitor.h
612+++ b/monitor.h
613@@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
614
615 MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 154,
616
617+ MONITOR_REQ_CONSOLEKIT_REGISTER = 156, MONITOR_ANS_CONSOLEKIT_REGISTER = 157,
618+
619 };
620
621 struct mm_master;
622diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
623index 6dc890a..4c57d4d 100644
624--- a/monitor_wrap.c
625+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
626@@ -1363,3 +1363,33 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store)
627
628 #endif /* GSSAPI */
629
630+#ifdef USE_CONSOLEKIT
631+char *
632+mm_consolekit_register(Session *s, const char *display)
633+{
634+ Buffer m;
635+ char *cookie;
636+
637+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
638+
639+ if (s->ttyfd == -1)
640+ return NULL;
641+ buffer_init(&m);
642+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, s->tty);
643+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, display != NULL ? display : "");
644+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_CONSOLEKIT_REGISTER, &m);
645+ buffer_clear(&m);
646+
647+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
648+ MONITOR_ANS_CONSOLEKIT_REGISTER, &m);
649+ cookie = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
650+ buffer_free(&m);
651+
652+ /* treat empty cookie as missing cookie */
653+ if (strlen(cookie) == 0) {
654+ free(cookie);
655+ cookie = NULL;
656+ }
657+ return (cookie);
658+}
659+#endif /* USE_CONSOLEKIT */
660diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
661index 9c2ee49..00e93fe 100644
662--- a/monitor_wrap.h
663+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
664@@ -111,4 +111,8 @@ void *mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *, u_int, u_int);
665 void mm_zfree(struct mm_master *, void *);
666 void mm_init_compression(struct mm_master *);
667
668+#ifdef USE_CONSOLEKIT
669+char *mm_consolekit_register(struct Session *, const char *);
670+#endif /* USE_CONSOLEKIT */
671+
672 #endif /* _MM_WRAP_H_ */
673diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
674index 6f389ac..6250c20 100644
675--- a/session.c
676+++ b/session.c
677@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@
678 #include "kex.h"
679 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
680 #include "sftp.h"
681+#include "consolekit.h"
682
683 #if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS)
684 #include <kafs.h>
685@@ -1143,6 +1144,9 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell)
686 #if !defined (HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined (HAVE_CYGWIN)
687 char *path = NULL;
688 #endif
689+#ifdef USE_CONSOLEKIT
690+ const char *ckcookie = NULL;
691+#endif /* USE_CONSOLEKIT */
692
693 /* Initialize the environment. */
694 envsize = 100;
695@@ -1287,6 +1291,11 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell)
696 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
697 s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
698 #endif
699+#ifdef USE_CONSOLEKIT
700+ ckcookie = PRIVSEP(consolekit_register(s, s->display));
701+ if (ckcookie)
702+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "XDG_SESSION_COOKIE", ckcookie);
703+#endif /* USE_CONSOLEKIT */
704 #ifdef USE_PAM
705 /*
706 * Pull in any environment variables that may have
707@@ -2350,6 +2359,10 @@ session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s)
708
709 debug("session_pty_cleanup: session %d release %s", s->self, s->tty);
710
711+#ifdef USE_CONSOLEKIT
712+ consolekit_unregister(s);
713+#endif /* USE_CONSOLEKIT */
714+
715 /* Record that the user has logged out. */
716 if (s->pid != 0)
717 record_logout(s->pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name);
718diff --git a/session.h b/session.h
719index ef6593c..a6b6983 100644
720--- a/session.h
721+++ b/session.h
722@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
723 #ifndef SESSION_H
724 #define SESSION_H
725
726+struct _CkConnector;
727+
728 #define TTYSZ 64
729 typedef struct Session Session;
730 struct Session {
731@@ -61,6 +63,10 @@ struct Session {
732 char *name;
733 char *val;
734 } *env;
735+
736+#ifdef USE_CONSOLEKIT
737+ struct _CkConnector *ckc;
738+#endif /* USE_CONSOLEKIT */
739 };
740
741 void do_authenticated(Authctxt *);
diff --git a/debian/patches/debian-banner.patch b/debian/patches/debian-banner.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ab64cbed5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/debian-banner.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
1From 114c8a8fb488cbe39507edb75c51198a4b9e8b24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Kees Cook <kees@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:06 +0000
4Subject: Add DebianBanner server configuration option
5
6Setting this to "no" causes sshd to omit the Debian revision from its
7initial protocol handshake, for those scared by package-versioning.patch.
8
9Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/562048
10Forwarded: not-needed
11Last-Update: 2014-10-07
12
13Patch-Name: debian-banner.patch
14---
15 servconf.c | 9 +++++++++
16 servconf.h | 2 ++
17 sshd.c | 3 ++-
18 sshd_config.5 | 5 +++++
19 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
20
21diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
22index a252487..6c7741a 100644
23--- a/servconf.c
24+++ b/servconf.c
25@@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
26 options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
27 options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
28 options->version_addendum = NULL;
29+ options->debian_banner = -1;
30 }
31
32 void
33@@ -321,6 +322,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
34 options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177;
35 if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1)
36 options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0;
37+ if (options->debian_banner == -1)
38+ options->debian_banner = 1;
39 /* Turn privilege separation on by default */
40 if (use_privsep == -1)
41 use_privsep = PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX;
42@@ -373,6 +376,7 @@ typedef enum {
43 sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC,
44 sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink,
45 sAllowStreamLocalForwarding,
46+ sDebianBanner,
47 sDeprecated, sUnsupported
48 } ServerOpCodes;
49
50@@ -514,6 +518,7 @@ static struct {
51 { "streamlocalbindmask", sStreamLocalBindMask, SSHCFG_ALL },
52 { "streamlocalbindunlink", sStreamLocalBindUnlink, SSHCFG_ALL },
53 { "allowstreamlocalforwarding", sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
54+ { "debianbanner", sDebianBanner, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
55 { NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
56 };
57
58@@ -1697,6 +1702,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
59 intptr = &options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink;
60 goto parse_flag;
61
62+ case sDebianBanner:
63+ intptr = &options->debian_banner;
64+ goto parse_int;
65+
66 case sDeprecated:
67 logit("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s",
68 filename, linenum, arg);
69diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
70index f8265a8..fa48804 100644
71--- a/servconf.h
72+++ b/servconf.h
73@@ -188,6 +188,8 @@ typedef struct {
74
75 u_int num_auth_methods;
76 char *auth_methods[MAX_AUTH_METHODS];
77+
78+ int debian_banner;
79 } ServerOptions;
80
81 /* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
82diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
83index 1710e71..87331c1 100644
84--- a/sshd.c
85+++ b/sshd.c
86@@ -443,7 +443,8 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
87 }
88
89 xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s",
90- major, minor, SSH_RELEASE,
91+ major, minor,
92+ options.debian_banner ? SSH_RELEASE : SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM,
93 *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
94 options.version_addendum, newline);
95
96diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
97index 2843048..58997d3 100644
98--- a/sshd_config.5
99+++ b/sshd_config.5
100@@ -447,6 +447,11 @@ or
101 .Dq no .
102 The default is
103 .Dq delayed .
104+.It Cm DebianBanner
105+Specifies whether the distribution-specified extra version suffix is
106+included during initial protocol handshake.
107+The default is
108+.Dq yes .
109 .It Cm DenyGroups
110 This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated
111 by spaces.
diff --git a/debian/patches/debian-config.patch b/debian/patches/debian-config.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f81d731f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/debian-config.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
1From 44f0937b56758f662ff388d474213107e3290863 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:18 +0000
4Subject: Various Debian-specific configuration changes
5
6ssh: Enable ForwardX11Trusted, returning to earlier semantics which cause
7fewer problems with existing setups (http://bugs.debian.org/237021).
8
9ssh: Set 'SendEnv LANG LC_*' by default (http://bugs.debian.org/264024).
10
11ssh: Enable HashKnownHosts by default to try to limit the spread of ssh
12worms.
13
14ssh: Enable GSSAPIAuthentication and disable GSSAPIDelegateCredentials by
15default.
16
17sshd: Refer to /usr/share/doc/openssh-server/README.Debian.gz alongside
18PermitRootLogin default.
19
20Document all of this, along with several sshd defaults set in
21debian/openssh-server.postinst.
22
23Author: Russ Allbery <rra@debian.org>
24Forwarded: not-needed
25Last-Update: 2014-11-06
26
27Patch-Name: debian-config.patch
28---
29 readconf.c | 2 +-
30 ssh_config | 7 ++++++-
31 ssh_config.5 | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
32 sshd_config | 1 +
33 sshd_config.5 | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
34 5 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
35
36diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
37index 0648867..29338b6 100644
38--- a/readconf.c
39+++ b/readconf.c
40@@ -1681,7 +1681,7 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
41 if (options->forward_x11 == -1)
42 options->forward_x11 = 0;
43 if (options->forward_x11_trusted == -1)
44- options->forward_x11_trusted = 0;
45+ options->forward_x11_trusted = 1;
46 if (options->forward_x11_timeout == -1)
47 options->forward_x11_timeout = 1200;
48 if (options->exit_on_forward_failure == -1)
49diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
50index 228e5ab..91be1e7 100644
51--- a/ssh_config
52+++ b/ssh_config
53@@ -17,9 +17,10 @@
54 # list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the
55 # ssh_config(5) man page.
56
57-# Host *
58+Host *
59 # ForwardAgent no
60 # ForwardX11 no
61+# ForwardX11Trusted yes
62 # RhostsRSAAuthentication no
63 # RSAAuthentication yes
64 # PasswordAuthentication yes
65@@ -48,3 +49,7 @@
66 # VisualHostKey no
67 # ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
68 # RekeyLimit 1G 1h
69+ SendEnv LANG LC_ADDRESS LC_COLLATE LC_CTYPE LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_MEASUREMENT LC_MESSAGES LC_MONETARY LC_NAME LC_NUMERIC LC_PAPER LC_TELEPHONE LC_TIME LC_ALL
70+ HashKnownHosts yes
71+ GSSAPIAuthentication yes
72+ GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
73diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
74index a1005ba..5985769 100644
75--- a/ssh_config.5
76+++ b/ssh_config.5
77@@ -71,6 +71,26 @@ Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more
78 host-specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the
79 file, and general defaults at the end.
80 .Pp
81+Note that the Debian
82+.Ic openssh-client
83+package sets several options as standard in
84+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
85+which are not the default in
86+.Xr ssh 1 :
87+.Pp
88+.Bl -bullet -offset indent -compact
89+.It
90+.Cm SendEnv No LANG Xo
91+.No LC_ADDRESS LC_COLLATE LC_CTYPE LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_MEASUREMENT
92+.No LC_MESSAGES LC_MONETARY LC_NAME LC_NUMERIC LC_PAPER LC_TELEPHONE LC_TIME
93+.No LC_ALL
94+.Xc
95+.It
96+.Cm HashKnownHosts No yes
97+.It
98+.Cm GSSAPIAuthentication No yes
99+.El
100+.Pp
101 The configuration file has the following format:
102 .Pp
103 Empty lines and lines starting with
104@@ -673,7 +693,8 @@ token used for the session will be set to expire after 20 minutes.
105 Remote clients will be refused access after this time.
106 .Pp
107 The default is
108-.Dq no .
109+.Dq yes
110+(Debian-specific).
111 .Pp
112 See the X11 SECURITY extension specification for full details on
113 the restrictions imposed on untrusted clients.
114diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
115index d9b8594..4db32f5 100644
116--- a/sshd_config
117+++ b/sshd_config
118@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
119 # Authentication:
120
121 #LoginGraceTime 2m
122+# See /usr/share/doc/openssh-server/README.Debian.gz.
123 #PermitRootLogin yes
124 #StrictModes yes
125 #MaxAuthTries 6
126diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
127index 7396b23..09bb5fe 100644
128--- a/sshd_config.5
129+++ b/sshd_config.5
130@@ -57,6 +57,35 @@ Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes
131 .Pq \&"
132 in order to represent arguments containing spaces.
133 .Pp
134+Note that the Debian
135+.Ic openssh-server
136+package sets several options as standard in
137+.Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
138+which are not the default in
139+.Xr sshd 8 .
140+The exact list depends on whether the package was installed fresh or
141+upgraded from various possible previous versions, but includes at least the
142+following:
143+.Pp
144+.Bl -bullet -offset indent -compact
145+.It
146+.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication No no
147+.It
148+.Cm X11Forwarding No yes
149+.It
150+.Cm PrintMotd No no
151+.It
152+.Cm AcceptEnv No LANG Xo
153+.No LC_ADDRESS LC_COLLATE LC_CTYPE LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_MEASUREMENT
154+.No LC_MESSAGES LC_MONETARY LC_NAME LC_NUMERIC LC_PAPER LC_TELEPHONE LC_TIME
155+.No LC_ALL
156+.Xc
157+.It
158+.Cm Subsystem No sftp /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server
159+.It
160+.Cm UsePAM No yes
161+.El
162+.Pp
163 The possible
164 keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
165 keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
diff --git a/debian/patches/dnssec-sshfp.patch b/debian/patches/dnssec-sshfp.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0212ea841
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/dnssec-sshfp.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
1From 4ac9937c1d9f1901ab0694114d76e59a138aae96 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:01 +0000
4Subject: Force use of DNSSEC even if "options edns0" isn't in resolv.conf
5
6This allows SSHFP DNS records to be verified if glibc 2.11 is installed.
7
8Origin: vendor, https://cvs.fedoraproject.org/viewvc/F-12/openssh/openssh-5.2p1-edns.patch?revision=1.1&view=markup
9Bug: http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=572049
10Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=572049
11Last-Update: 2010-04-06
12
13Patch-Name: dnssec-sshfp.patch
14---
15 dns.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
16 openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c | 10 +++++-----
17 openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h | 3 +++
18 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
19
20diff --git a/dns.c b/dns.c
21index c4d073c..e5872c1 100644
22--- a/dns.c
23+++ b/dns.c
24@@ -203,6 +203,7 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address,
25 {
26 u_int counter;
27 int result;
28+ unsigned int rrset_flags = 0;
29 struct rrsetinfo *fingerprints = NULL;
30
31 u_int8_t hostkey_algorithm;
32@@ -226,8 +227,19 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address,
33 return -1;
34 }
35
36+ /*
37+ * Original getrrsetbyname function, found on OpenBSD for example,
38+ * doesn't accept any flag and prerequisite for obtaining AD bit in
39+ * DNS response is set by "options edns0" in resolv.conf.
40+ *
41+ * Our version is more clever and use RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 flag.
42+ */
43+#ifndef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME
44+ rrset_flags |= RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0;
45+#endif
46 result = getrrsetbyname(hostname, DNS_RDATACLASS_IN,
47- DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, 0, &fingerprints);
48+ DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, rrset_flags, &fingerprints);
49+
50 if (result) {
51 verbose("DNS lookup error: %s", dns_result_totext(result));
52 return -1;
53diff --git a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
54index dc6fe05..e061a29 100644
55--- a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
56+++ b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
57@@ -209,8 +209,8 @@ getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, unsigned int rdclass,
58 goto fail;
59 }
60
61- /* don't allow flags yet, unimplemented */
62- if (flags) {
63+ /* Allow RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 flag only. */
64+ if ((flags & !RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0) != 0) {
65 result = ERRSET_INVAL;
66 goto fail;
67 }
68@@ -226,9 +226,9 @@ getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, unsigned int rdclass,
69 #endif /* DEBUG */
70
71 #ifdef RES_USE_DNSSEC
72- /* turn on DNSSEC if EDNS0 is configured */
73- if (_resp->options & RES_USE_EDNS0)
74- _resp->options |= RES_USE_DNSSEC;
75+ /* turn on DNSSEC if required */
76+ if (flags & RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0)
77+ _resp->options |= (RES_USE_EDNS0|RES_USE_DNSSEC);
78 #endif /* RES_USE_DNSEC */
79
80 /* make query */
81diff --git a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
82index 1283f55..dbbc85a 100644
83--- a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
84+++ b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
85@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
86 #ifndef RRSET_VALIDATED
87 # define RRSET_VALIDATED 1
88 #endif
89+#ifndef RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0
90+# define RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 0x0001
91+#endif
92
93 /*
94 * Return codes for getrrsetbyname()
diff --git a/debian/patches/doc-hash-tab-completion.patch b/debian/patches/doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8e6cfa575
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
1From 2fd0b3814e27d584efa6df92845a7354e7c2de6c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:11 +0000
4Subject: Document that HashKnownHosts may break tab-completion
5
6Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1727
7Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/430154
8Last-Update: 2013-09-14
9
10Patch-Name: doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
11---
12 ssh_config.5 | 3 +++
13 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
14
15diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
16index d68b45a..a1005ba 100644
17--- a/ssh_config.5
18+++ b/ssh_config.5
19@@ -759,6 +759,9 @@ Note that existing names and addresses in known hosts files
20 will not be converted automatically,
21 but may be manually hashed using
22 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
23+Use of this option may break facilities such as tab-completion that rely
24+on being able to read unhashed host names from
25+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts .
26 .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
27 Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key
28 authentication.
diff --git a/debian/patches/doc-upstart.patch b/debian/patches/doc-upstart.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c1ce1bcae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/doc-upstart.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
1From 252e76b3ad6e83a798e479a2beba5be7000ff85e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@ubuntu.com>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:12 +0000
4Subject: Refer to ssh's Upstart job as well as its init script
5
6Forwarded: not-needed
7Last-Update: 2013-09-14
8
9Patch-Name: doc-upstart.patch
10---
11 sshd.8 | 5 ++++-
12 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
13
14diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
15index 3538208..f8f9eac 100644
16--- a/sshd.8
17+++ b/sshd.8
18@@ -67,7 +67,10 @@ over an insecure network.
19 .Nm
20 listens for connections from clients.
21 It is normally started at boot from
22-.Pa /etc/init.d/ssh .
23+.Pa /etc/init.d/ssh
24+(or
25+.Pa /etc/init/ssh.conf
26+on systems using the Upstart init daemon).
27 It forks a new
28 daemon for each incoming connection.
29 The forked daemons handle
diff --git a/debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch b/debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..84fe03acc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
1From 1195b028cb9f402633cfdcae6ec34bf63b4ab771 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Vincent Untz <vuntz@ubuntu.com>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:16 +0000
4Subject: Give the ssh-askpass-gnome window a default icon
5
6Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/27152
7Last-Update: 2010-02-28
8
9Patch-Name: gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
10---
11 contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c | 2 ++
12 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
13
14diff --git a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
15index 9d97c30..04b3a11 100644
16--- a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
17+++ b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
18@@ -209,6 +209,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
19
20 gtk_init(&argc, &argv);
21
22+ gtk_window_set_default_icon_from_file ("/usr/share/pixmaps/ssh-askpass-gnome.png", NULL);
23+
24 if (argc > 1) {
25 message = g_strjoinv(" ", argv + 1);
26 } else {
diff --git a/debian/patches/gssapi.patch b/debian/patches/gssapi.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e8cbc1083
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/gssapi.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,3143 @@
1From 1c1b6fa17982eb622e2c4e8f4a279f2113f57413 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Simon Wilkinson <simon@sxw.org.uk>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:48 +0000
4Subject: GSSAPI key exchange support
5
6This patch has been rejected upstream: "None of the OpenSSH developers are
7in favour of adding this, and this situation has not changed for several
8years. This is not a slight on Simon's patch, which is of fine quality, but
9just that a) we don't trust GSSAPI implementations that much and b) we don't
10like adding new KEX since they are pre-auth attack surface. This one is
11particularly scary, since it requires hooks out to typically root-owned
12system resources."
13
14However, quite a lot of people rely on this in Debian, and it's better to
15have it merged into the main openssh package rather than having separate
16-krb5 packages (as we used to have). It seems to have a generally good
17security history.
18
19Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1242
20Last-Updated: 2014-10-07
21
22Patch-Name: gssapi.patch
23---
24 ChangeLog.gssapi | 113 +++++++++++++++++++
25 Makefile.in | 3 +-
26 auth-krb5.c | 17 ++-
27 auth2-gss.c | 48 +++++++-
28 auth2.c | 2 +
29 clientloop.c | 13 +++
30 config.h.in | 6 +
31 configure | 57 ++++++++++
32 configure.ac | 24 ++++
33 gss-genr.c | 275 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
34 gss-serv-krb5.c | 85 ++++++++++++--
35 gss-serv.c | 221 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
36 kex.c | 16 +++
37 kex.h | 14 +++
38 kexgssc.c | 332 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
39 kexgsss.c | 290 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
40 monitor.c | 108 +++++++++++++++++-
41 monitor.h | 3 +
42 monitor_wrap.c | 47 +++++++-
43 monitor_wrap.h | 4 +-
44 readconf.c | 42 +++++++
45 readconf.h | 5 +
46 servconf.c | 38 ++++++-
47 servconf.h | 3 +
48 ssh-gss.h | 41 ++++++-
49 ssh_config | 2 +
50 ssh_config.5 | 34 +++++-
51 sshconnect2.c | 124 ++++++++++++++++++++-
52 sshd.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++
53 sshd_config | 2 +
54 sshd_config.5 | 28 +++++
55 sshkey.c | 3 +-
56 sshkey.h | 1 +
57 33 files changed, 2052 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-)
58 create mode 100644 ChangeLog.gssapi
59 create mode 100644 kexgssc.c
60 create mode 100644 kexgsss.c
61
62diff --git a/ChangeLog.gssapi b/ChangeLog.gssapi
63new file mode 100644
64index 0000000..f117a33
65--- /dev/null
66+++ b/ChangeLog.gssapi
67@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
68+20110101
69+ - Finally update for OpenSSH 5.6p1
70+ - Add GSSAPIServerIdentity option from Jim Basney
71+
72+20100308
73+ - [ Makefile.in, key.c, key.h ]
74+ Updates for OpenSSH 5.4p1
75+ - [ servconf.c ]
76+ Include GSSAPI options in the sshd -T configuration dump, and flag
77+ some older configuration options as being unsupported. Thanks to Colin
78+ Watson.
79+ -
80+
81+20100124
82+ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
83+ Adapt to deal with additional element in Authmethod structure. Thanks to
84+ Colin Watson
85+
86+20090615
87+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c
88+ sshd.c ]
89+ Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review
90+ Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs
91+ Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled
92+ Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange
93+ Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value
94+ Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust
95+ Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled
96+ Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list
97+ Cast data.length before printing
98+ If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL
99+
100+20090201
101+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h
102+ ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ]
103+ Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user
104+ to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server
105+
106+20080404
107+ - [ gss-serv.c ]
108+ Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow
109+ been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav
110+ Stoichkov
111+
112+20070317
113+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
114+ Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a
115+ function
116+
117+20061220
118+ - [ servconf.c ]
119+ Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and
120+ documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson.
121+
122+20060910
123+ - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c
124+ ssh-gss.h ]
125+ add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms
126+ - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ]
127+ Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of
128+ acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines.
129+ <Bugzilla #928>
130+ - [ sshd_config ssh_config ]
131+ Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample
132+ configuration files
133+ - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ]
134+ Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf()
135+ Limit length of error messages displayed by client
136+
137+20060909
138+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ]
139+ move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server
140+ only, where they belong
141+ <Bugzilla #1225>
142+
143+20060829
144+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
145+ Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment
146+ variable
147+
148+20060828
149+ - [ gss-genr.c ]
150+ Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem
151+ <Fixed upstream 20060829>
152+
153+20060818
154+ - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ]
155+ Make sure that SPENGO is disabled
156+ <Bugzilla #1218 - Fixed upstream 20060818>
157+
158+20060421
159+ - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ]
160+ a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to
161+ fix compiler errors/warnings
162+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
163+ - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ]
164+ fix uninitialized variable warnings
165+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
166+ - [ gssgenr.c ]
167+ pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue)
168+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
169+ <Bugzilla #1220 >
170+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
171+ #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
172+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
173+ <Fixed upstream 20060304>
174+ - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c
175+ add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option
176+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
177+ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
178+ add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic
179+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
180+ <gssapi-with-mic support is Bugzilla #1008>
181diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
182index 06be3d5..086d8dd 100644
183--- a/Makefile.in
184+++ b/Makefile.in
185@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
186 atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
187 monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
188 kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \
189+ kexgssc.o \
190 msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
191 ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
192 kexc25519.o kexc25519c.o poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \
193@@ -101,7 +102,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \
194 auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
195 monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o \
196 kexc25519s.o auth-krb5.o \
197- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
198+ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
199 loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
200 sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
201 roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o \
202diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
203index 0089b18..ec47869 100644
204--- a/auth-krb5.c
205+++ b/auth-krb5.c
206@@ -183,8 +183,13 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
207
208 len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
209 authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
210+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
211+ snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s",
212+ authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
213+#else
214 snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
215 authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
216+#endif
217
218 #ifdef USE_PAM
219 if (options.use_pam)
220@@ -241,15 +246,22 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
221 #ifndef HEIMDAL
222 krb5_error_code
223 ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
224- int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
225+ int ret, oerrno;
226 char ccname[40];
227 mode_t old_umask;
228+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
229+ char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d";
230+#else
231+ char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX";
232+ int tmpfd;
233+#endif
234
235 ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
236- "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
237+ cctemplate, geteuid());
238 if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
239 return ENOMEM;
240
241+#ifndef USE_CCAPI
242 old_umask = umask(0177);
243 tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
244 oerrno = errno;
245@@ -266,6 +278,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
246 return oerrno;
247 }
248 close(tmpfd);
249+#endif
250
251 return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
252 }
253diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
254index 447f896..284f364 100644
255--- a/auth2-gss.c
256+++ b/auth2-gss.c
257@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
258 /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.21 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */
259
260 /*
261- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
262+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
263 *
264 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
265 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
266@@ -53,6 +53,40 @@ static void input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
267 static void input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
268 static void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
269
270+/*
271+ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
272+ */
273+static int
274+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
275+{
276+ int authenticated = 0;
277+ Buffer b;
278+ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
279+ u_int len;
280+
281+ mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
282+ mic.length = len;
283+
284+ packet_check_eom();
285+
286+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
287+ "gssapi-keyex");
288+
289+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
290+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
291+
292+ /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
293+ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
294+ &gssbuf, &mic))))
295+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
296+ authctxt->pw));
297+
298+ buffer_free(&b);
299+ free(mic.value);
300+
301+ return (authenticated);
302+}
303+
304 /*
305 * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
306 * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
307@@ -236,7 +270,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
308
309 packet_check_eom();
310
311- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
312+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
313+ authctxt->pw));
314
315 authctxt->postponed = 0;
316 dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
317@@ -271,7 +306,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
318 gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
319
320 if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
321- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
322+ authenticated =
323+ PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw));
324 else
325 logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
326
327@@ -286,6 +322,12 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
328 userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
329 }
330
331+Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
332+ "gssapi-keyex",
333+ userauth_gsskeyex,
334+ &options.gss_authentication
335+};
336+
337 Authmethod method_gssapi = {
338 "gssapi-with-mic",
339 userauth_gssapi,
340diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
341index d9b440a..2f0d565 100644
342--- a/auth2.c
343+++ b/auth2.c
344@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd;
345 extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
346 extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
347 #ifdef GSSAPI
348+extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex;
349 extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
350 #endif
351
352@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
353 &method_none,
354 &method_pubkey,
355 #ifdef GSSAPI
356+ &method_gsskeyex,
357 &method_gssapi,
358 #endif
359 &method_passwd,
360diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
361index 397c965..f9175e3 100644
362--- a/clientloop.c
363+++ b/clientloop.c
364@@ -111,6 +111,10 @@
365 #include "msg.h"
366 #include "roaming.h"
367
368+#ifdef GSSAPI
369+#include "ssh-gss.h"
370+#endif
371+
372 /* import options */
373 extern Options options;
374
375@@ -1596,6 +1600,15 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id)
376 /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
377 if (!rekeying) {
378 channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
379+
380+#ifdef GSSAPI
381+ if (options.gss_renewal_rekey &&
382+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(NULL)) {
383+ debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey");
384+ need_rekeying = 1;
385+ }
386+#endif
387+
388 if (need_rekeying || packet_need_rekeying()) {
389 debug("need rekeying");
390 xxx_kex->done = 0;
391diff --git a/config.h.in b/config.h.in
392index 16d6206..a9a8b7a 100644
393--- a/config.h.in
394+++ b/config.h.in
395@@ -1622,6 +1622,9 @@
396 /* Use btmp to log bad logins */
397 #undef USE_BTMP
398
399+/* platform uses an in-memory credentials cache */
400+#undef USE_CCAPI
401+
402 /* Use libedit for sftp */
403 #undef USE_LIBEDIT
404
405@@ -1637,6 +1640,9 @@
406 /* Use PIPES instead of a socketpair() */
407 #undef USE_PIPES
408
409+/* platform has the Security Authorization Session API */
410+#undef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
411+
412 /* Define if you have Solaris process contracts */
413 #undef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
414
415diff --git a/configure b/configure
416index 6815388..ea5f200 100755
417--- a/configure
418+++ b/configure
419@@ -7168,6 +7168,63 @@ $as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF 1" >>confdefs.h
420
421 $as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF 1" >>confdefs.h
422
423+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if we have the Security Authorization Session API" >&5
424+$as_echo_n "checking if we have the Security Authorization Session API... " >&6; }
425+ cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
426+/* end confdefs.h. */
427+#include <Security/AuthSession.h>
428+int
429+main ()
430+{
431+SessionCreate(0, 0);
432+ ;
433+ return 0;
434+}
435+_ACEOF
436+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
437+ ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes"
438+
439+$as_echo "#define USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API 1" >>confdefs.h
440+
441+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
442+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
443+$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
444+else
445+ ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no"
446+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
447+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
448+fi
449+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
450+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if we have an in-memory credentials cache" >&5
451+$as_echo_n "checking if we have an in-memory credentials cache... " >&6; }
452+ cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
453+/* end confdefs.h. */
454+#include <Kerberos/Kerberos.h>
455+int
456+main ()
457+{
458+cc_context_t c;
459+ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);
460+ ;
461+ return 0;
462+}
463+_ACEOF
464+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
465+
466+$as_echo "#define USE_CCAPI 1" >>confdefs.h
467+
468+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
469+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
470+$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
471+ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then
472+ as_fn_error $? "*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***" "$LINENO" 5
473+ fi
474+else
475+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
476+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
477+
478+fi
479+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
480
481 ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "AU_IPv4" "ac_cv_have_decl_AU_IPv4" "$ac_includes_default"
482 if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_AU_IPv4" = xyes; then :
483diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
484index 67c4486..90e81e1 100644
485--- a/configure.ac
486+++ b/configure.ac
487@@ -584,6 +584,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
488 [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
489 AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
490 [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
491+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have the Security Authorization Session API])
492+ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <Security/AuthSession.h>],
493+ [SessionCreate(0, 0);],
494+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes"
495+ AC_DEFINE([USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API], [1],
496+ [platform has the Security Authorization Session API])
497+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
498+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
499+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no"
500+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])])
501+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have an in-memory credentials cache])
502+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
503+ [#include <Kerberos/Kerberos.h>],
504+ [cc_context_t c;
505+ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);],
506+ [AC_DEFINE([USE_CCAPI], [1],
507+ [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache])
508+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
509+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
510+ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then
511+ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***])
512+ fi],
513+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])]
514+ )
515 m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv])
516 AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [],
517 AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
518diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c
519index b39281b..1e569ad 100644
520--- a/gss-genr.c
521+++ b/gss-genr.c
522@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
523 /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.22 2013/11/08 00:39:15 djm Exp $ */
524
525 /*
526- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
527+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
528 *
529 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
530 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
531@@ -39,12 +39,167 @@
532 #include "buffer.h"
533 #include "log.h"
534 #include "ssh2.h"
535+#include "cipher.h"
536+#include "key.h"
537+#include "kex.h"
538+#include <openssl/evp.h>
539
540 #include "ssh-gss.h"
541
542 extern u_char *session_id2;
543 extern u_int session_id2_len;
544
545+typedef struct {
546+ char *encoded;
547+ gss_OID oid;
548+} ssh_gss_kex_mapping;
549+
550+/*
551+ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the
552+ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines
553+ */
554+
555+Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL;
556+
557+static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL;
558+
559+int
560+ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void) {
561+ return (gss_enc2oid != NULL);
562+}
563+
564+/*
565+ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program
566+ *
567+ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting
568+ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism
569+ */
570+
571+char *
572+ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) {
573+ gss_OID_set gss_supported;
574+ OM_uint32 min_status;
575+
576+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported)))
577+ return NULL;
578+
579+ return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
580+ host, client));
581+}
582+
583+char *
584+ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
585+ const char *host, const char *client) {
586+ Buffer buf;
587+ size_t i;
588+ int oidpos, enclen;
589+ char *mechs, *encoded;
590+ u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
591+ char deroid[2];
592+ const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
593+ EVP_MD_CTX md;
594+
595+ if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
596+ for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++)
597+ free(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded);
598+ free(gss_enc2oid);
599+ }
600+
601+ gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) *
602+ (gss_supported->count + 1));
603+
604+ buffer_init(&buf);
605+
606+ oidpos = 0;
607+ for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
608+ if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
609+ (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
610+
611+ deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
612+ deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
613+
614+ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
615+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2);
616+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,
617+ gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
618+ gss_supported->elements[i].length);
619+ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
620+
621+ encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
622+ enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md),
623+ encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
624+
625+ if (oidpos != 0)
626+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
627+
628+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
629+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1);
630+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
631+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
632+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
633+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1);
634+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
635+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
636+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
637+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1);
638+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
639+
640+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
641+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
642+ oidpos++;
643+ }
644+ }
645+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
646+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
647+
648+ buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0');
649+
650+ mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf));
651+ buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf));
652+ buffer_free(&buf);
653+
654+ if (strlen(mechs) == 0) {
655+ free(mechs);
656+ mechs = NULL;
657+ }
658+
659+ return (mechs);
660+}
661+
662+gss_OID
663+ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) {
664+ int i = 0;
665+
666+ switch (kex_type) {
667+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
668+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID))
669+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
670+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1;
671+ break;
672+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
673+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID))
674+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
675+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1;
676+ break;
677+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
678+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID))
679+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
680+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1;
681+ break;
682+ default:
683+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
684+ }
685+
686+ while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL &&
687+ strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0)
688+ i++;
689+
690+ if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL)
691+ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid);
692+
693+ return gss_enc2oid[i].oid;
694+}
695+
696 /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
697 int
698 ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
699@@ -197,7 +352,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int deleg_creds, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
700 }
701
702 ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
703- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
704+ ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
705 GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
706 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
707
708@@ -227,8 +382,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host)
709 }
710
711 OM_uint32
712+ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name)
713+{
714+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
715+ gss_name_t gssname;
716+ OM_uint32 status;
717+ gss_OID_set oidset;
718+
719+ gssbuf.value = (void *) name;
720+ gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
721+
722+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
723+ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
724+
725+ ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf,
726+ GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname);
727+
728+ if (!ctx->major)
729+ ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
730+ gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE,
731+ &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL);
732+
733+ gss_release_name(&status, &gssname);
734+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
735+
736+ if (ctx->major)
737+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
738+
739+ return(ctx->major);
740+}
741+
742+OM_uint32
743 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
744 {
745+ if (ctx == NULL)
746+ return -1;
747+
748 if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
749 GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
750 ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
751@@ -236,6 +425,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
752 return (ctx->major);
753 }
754
755+/* Priviledged when used by server */
756+OM_uint32
757+ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
758+{
759+ if (ctx == NULL)
760+ return -1;
761+
762+ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
763+ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
764+
765+ return (ctx->major);
766+}
767+
768 void
769 ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
770 const char *context)
771@@ -249,11 +451,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
772 }
773
774 int
775-ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
776+ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host,
777+ const char *client)
778 {
779 gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
780 OM_uint32 major, minor;
781 gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
782+ Gssctxt *intctx = NULL;
783+
784+ if (ctx == NULL)
785+ ctx = &intctx;
786
787 /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
788 if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length &&
789@@ -263,6 +470,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
790 ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
791 ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
792 major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
793+
794+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client)
795+ major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client);
796+
797 if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
798 major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token,
799 NULL);
800@@ -272,10 +483,66 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
801 GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
802 }
803
804- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
805+ if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL)
806 ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
807
808 return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
809 }
810
811+int
812+ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) {
813+ static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
814+ static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0;
815+ static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
816+ static gss_name_t name;
817+ static OM_uint32 last_call = 0;
818+ OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor;
819+ int equal;
820+
821+ now = time(NULL);
822+
823+ if (ctxt) {
824+ debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions");
825+
826+ if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
827+ gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name);
828+
829+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
830+ &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL);
831+
832+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
833+ saved_mech = ctxt->oid;
834+ saved_lifetime+= now;
835+ } else {
836+ /* Handle the error */
837+ }
838+ return 0;
839+ }
840+
841+ if (now - last_call < 10)
842+ return 0;
843+
844+ last_call = now;
845+
846+ if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID)
847+ return 0;
848+
849+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
850+ &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL);
851+ if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED)
852+ return 0;
853+ else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
854+ return 0;
855+
856+ major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal);
857+ gss_release_name(&minor, &name);
858+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
859+ return 0;
860+
861+ if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10))
862+ return 1;
863+
864+ return 0;
865+}
866+
867 #endif /* GSSAPI */
868diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
869index 795992d..fd8b371 100644
870--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
871+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
872@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
873 /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.8 2013/07/20 01:55:13 djm Exp $ */
874
875 /*
876- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
877+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
878 *
879 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
880 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
881@@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
882 krb5_error_code problem;
883 krb5_principal princ;
884 OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
885- int len;
886 const char *errmsg;
887+ const char *new_ccname;
888
889 if (client->creds == NULL) {
890 debug("No credentials stored");
891@@ -181,11 +181,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
892 return;
893 }
894
895- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache));
896+ new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
897+
898 client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
899- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6;
900- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len);
901- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename);
902+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
903+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
904+ client->store.filename = NULL;
905+#else
906+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "FILE:%s", new_ccname);
907+ client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
908+#endif
909
910 #ifdef USE_PAM
911 if (options.use_pam)
912@@ -197,6 +202,71 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
913 return;
914 }
915
916+int
917+ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,
918+ ssh_gssapi_client *client)
919+{
920+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
921+ krb5_principal principal = NULL;
922+ char *name = NULL;
923+ krb5_error_code problem;
924+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
925+
926+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) {
927+ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
928+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
929+ return 0;
930+ }
931+
932+ /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */
933+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache,
934+ &principal))) {
935+ logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s",
936+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
937+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
938+ return 0;
939+ }
940+
941+ if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) {
942+ logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s",
943+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
944+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
945+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
946+ return 0;
947+ }
948+
949+
950+ if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) {
951+ debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing");
952+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
953+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
954+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
955+ return 0;
956+ }
957+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
958+
959+ /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */
960+
961+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) {
962+ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s",
963+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
964+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
965+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
966+ return 0;
967+ }
968+
969+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
970+
971+ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds,
972+ ccache))) {
973+ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!");
974+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
975+ return 0;
976+ }
977+
978+ return 1;
979+}
980+
981 ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
982 "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
983 "Kerberos",
984@@ -204,7 +274,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
985 NULL,
986 &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
987 NULL,
988- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds
989+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds,
990+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds
991 };
992
993 #endif /* KRB5 */
994diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
995index 5c59924..50fa438 100644
996--- a/gss-serv.c
997+++ b/gss-serv.c
998@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
999 /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.27 2014/07/03 03:34:09 djm Exp $ */
1000
1001 /*
1002- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
1003+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
1004 *
1005 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
1006 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
1007@@ -45,15 +45,21 @@
1008 #include "channels.h"
1009 #include "session.h"
1010 #include "misc.h"
1011+#include "servconf.h"
1012+#include "uidswap.h"
1013
1014 #include "ssh-gss.h"
1015+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
1016+
1017+extern ServerOptions options;
1018
1019 static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
1020 { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
1021- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}};
1022+ GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL,
1023+ {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
1024
1025 ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
1026- { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
1027+ { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
1028
1029 #ifdef KRB5
1030 extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
1031@@ -100,25 +106,32 @@ ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx)
1032 char lname[NI_MAXHOST];
1033 gss_OID_set oidset;
1034
1035- gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
1036- gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
1037+ if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) {
1038+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
1039+ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
1040
1041- if (gethostname(lname, sizeof(lname))) {
1042- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
1043- return (-1);
1044- }
1045+ if (gethostname(lname, sizeof(lname))) {
1046+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
1047+ return (-1);
1048+ }
1049+
1050+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
1051+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
1052+ return (ctx->major);
1053+ }
1054+
1055+ if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
1056+ ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds,
1057+ NULL, NULL)))
1058+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
1059
1060- if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
1061 gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
1062 return (ctx->major);
1063+ } else {
1064+ ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
1065+ ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
1066 }
1067-
1068- if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
1069- ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL)))
1070- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
1071-
1072- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
1073- return (ctx->major);
1074+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1075 }
1076
1077 /* Privileged */
1078@@ -133,6 +146,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
1079 }
1080
1081 /* Unprivileged */
1082+char *
1083+ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void) {
1084+ gss_OID_set supported;
1085+
1086+ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported);
1087+ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech,
1088+ NULL, NULL));
1089+}
1090+
1091+/* Unprivileged */
1092+int
1093+ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data,
1094+ const char *dummy) {
1095+ Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
1096+ int res;
1097+
1098+ res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
1099+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
1100+
1101+ return (res);
1102+}
1103+
1104+/* Unprivileged */
1105 void
1106 ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
1107 {
1108@@ -142,7 +178,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
1109 gss_OID_set supported;
1110
1111 gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
1112- gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
1113+
1114+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported)))
1115+ return;
1116
1117 while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
1118 if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
1119@@ -268,8 +306,48 @@ OM_uint32
1120 ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1121 {
1122 int i = 0;
1123+ int equal = 0;
1124+ gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
1125+ gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1126+
1127+ if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
1128+ if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
1129+ (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements,
1130+ ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) {
1131+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
1132+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1133+ }
1134+
1135+ if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
1136+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name,
1137+ NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
1138+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
1139+ return (ctx->major);
1140+ }
1141+
1142+ ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name,
1143+ new_name, &equal);
1144
1145- gss_buffer_desc ename;
1146+ if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
1147+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
1148+ return (ctx->major);
1149+ }
1150+
1151+ if (!equal) {
1152+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name");
1153+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1154+ }
1155+
1156+ debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
1157+
1158+ gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
1159+ gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds);
1160+ client->name = new_name;
1161+ client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
1162+ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
1163+ client->updated = 1;
1164+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1165+ }
1166
1167 client->mech = NULL;
1168
1169@@ -284,6 +362,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1170 if (client->mech == NULL)
1171 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1172
1173+ if (ctx->client_creds &&
1174+ (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
1175+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
1176+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
1177+ return (ctx->major);
1178+ }
1179+
1180 if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
1181 &client->displayname, NULL))) {
1182 ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
1183@@ -301,6 +386,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1184 return (ctx->major);
1185 }
1186
1187+ gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
1188+
1189 /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
1190 client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
1191 ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
1192@@ -348,7 +435,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep)
1193
1194 /* Privileged */
1195 int
1196-ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
1197+ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
1198 {
1199 OM_uint32 lmin;
1200
1201@@ -358,9 +445,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
1202 return 0;
1203 }
1204 if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
1205- if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
1206+ if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
1207+ gssapi_client.used = 1;
1208+ gssapi_client.store.owner = pw;
1209 return 1;
1210- else {
1211+ } else {
1212 /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
1213 gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
1214 gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
1215@@ -374,14 +463,90 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
1216 return (0);
1217 }
1218
1219-/* Privileged */
1220-OM_uint32
1221-ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
1222+/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running
1223+ * as the user, the monitor is root.
1224+ *
1225+ * In the child, we want to :
1226+ * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify
1227+ * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update
1228+ */
1229+
1230+/* Stuff for PAM */
1231+
1232+#ifdef USE_PAM
1233+static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg,
1234+ struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
1235 {
1236- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
1237- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
1238+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
1239+}
1240+#endif
1241
1242- return (ctx->major);
1243+void
1244+ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) {
1245+ int ok;
1246+ int ret;
1247+#ifdef USE_PAM
1248+ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
1249+ struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
1250+ char *envstr;
1251+#endif
1252+
1253+ if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
1254+ gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
1255+ gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
1256+ return;
1257+
1258+ ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
1259+
1260+ if (!ok)
1261+ return;
1262+
1263+ debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully");
1264+
1265+ /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will
1266+ * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options
1267+ * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
1268+ */
1269+#ifdef USE_PAM
1270+ if (!use_privsep) {
1271+ debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
1272+ return;
1273+ }
1274+
1275+ ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
1276+ &pamconv, &pamh);
1277+ if (ret)
1278+ return;
1279+
1280+ xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
1281+ gssapi_client.store.envval);
1282+
1283+ ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr);
1284+ if (!ret)
1285+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
1286+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
1287+#endif
1288+}
1289+
1290+int
1291+ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) {
1292+ int ok = 0;
1293+
1294+ /* Check we've got credentials to store */
1295+ if (!gssapi_client.updated)
1296+ return 0;
1297+
1298+ gssapi_client.updated = 0;
1299+
1300+ temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner);
1301+ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)
1302+ ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client);
1303+ else
1304+ debug("No update function for this mechanism");
1305+
1306+ restore_uid();
1307+
1308+ return ok;
1309 }
1310
1311 #endif
1312diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
1313index a173e70..891852b 100644
1314--- a/kex.c
1315+++ b/kex.c
1316@@ -53,6 +53,10 @@
1317 #include "roaming.h"
1318 #include "digest.h"
1319
1320+#ifdef GSSAPI
1321+#include "ssh-gss.h"
1322+#endif
1323+
1324 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
1325 # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
1326 # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256
1327@@ -96,6 +100,14 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
1328 #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 */
1329 { NULL, -1, -1, -1},
1330 };
1331+static const struct kexalg kexalg_prefixes[] = {
1332+#ifdef GSSAPI
1333+ { KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
1334+ { KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
1335+ { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
1336+#endif
1337+ { NULL, -1, -1, -1 },
1338+};
1339
1340 char *
1341 kex_alg_list(char sep)
1342@@ -124,6 +136,10 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
1343 if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
1344 return k;
1345 }
1346+ for (k = kexalg_prefixes; k->name != NULL; k++) {
1347+ if (strncmp(k->name, name, strlen(k->name)) == 0)
1348+ return k;
1349+ }
1350 return NULL;
1351 }
1352
1353diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
1354index 4c40ec8..c179a4d 100644
1355--- a/kex.h
1356+++ b/kex.h
1357@@ -76,6 +76,9 @@ enum kex_exchange {
1358 KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
1359 KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
1360 KEX_C25519_SHA256,
1361+ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
1362+ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
1363+ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1,
1364 KEX_MAX
1365 };
1366
1367@@ -135,6 +138,12 @@ struct Kex {
1368 int flags;
1369 int hash_alg;
1370 int ec_nid;
1371+#ifdef GSSAPI
1372+ int gss_deleg_creds;
1373+ int gss_trust_dns;
1374+ char *gss_host;
1375+ char *gss_client;
1376+#endif
1377 char *client_version_string;
1378 char *server_version_string;
1379 int (*verify_host_key)(Key *);
1380@@ -167,6 +176,11 @@ void kexecdh_server(Kex *);
1381 void kexc25519_client(Kex *);
1382 void kexc25519_server(Kex *);
1383
1384+#ifdef GSSAPI
1385+void kexgss_client(Kex *);
1386+void kexgss_server(Kex *);
1387+#endif
1388+
1389 void
1390 kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int,
1391 BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
1392diff --git a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c
1393new file mode 100644
1394index 0000000..92a31c5
1395--- /dev/null
1396+++ b/kexgssc.c
1397@@ -0,0 +1,332 @@
1398+/*
1399+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
1400+ *
1401+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
1402+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
1403+ * are met:
1404+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
1405+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
1406+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
1407+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
1408+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
1409+ *
1410+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
1411+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
1412+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
1413+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
1414+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
1415+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
1416+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
1417+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
1418+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
1419+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
1420+ */
1421+
1422+#include "includes.h"
1423+
1424+#ifdef GSSAPI
1425+
1426+#include "includes.h"
1427+
1428+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
1429+#include <openssl/bn.h>
1430+
1431+#include <string.h>
1432+
1433+#include "xmalloc.h"
1434+#include "buffer.h"
1435+#include "ssh2.h"
1436+#include "key.h"
1437+#include "cipher.h"
1438+#include "kex.h"
1439+#include "log.h"
1440+#include "packet.h"
1441+#include "dh.h"
1442+
1443+#include "ssh-gss.h"
1444+
1445+void
1446+kexgss_client(Kex *kex) {
1447+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1448+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr;
1449+ Gssctxt *ctxt;
1450+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
1451+ u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, hashlen, strlen;
1452+ DH *dh;
1453+ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
1454+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
1455+ BIGNUM *p = NULL;
1456+ BIGNUM *g = NULL;
1457+ u_char *kbuf, *hash;
1458+ u_char *serverhostkey = NULL;
1459+ u_char *empty = "";
1460+ char *msg;
1461+ int type = 0;
1462+ int first = 1;
1463+ int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
1464+
1465+ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */
1466+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
1467+ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type)
1468+ == GSS_C_NO_OID)
1469+ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
1470+
1471+ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host))
1472+ fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
1473+
1474+ if (kex->gss_client &&
1475+ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client))
1476+ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
1477+
1478+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
1479+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
1480+ dh = dh_new_group1();
1481+ break;
1482+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
1483+ dh = dh_new_group14();
1484+ break;
1485+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
1486+ debug("Doing group exchange\n");
1487+ nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8);
1488+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
1489+ packet_put_int(min);
1490+ packet_put_int(nbits);
1491+ packet_put_int(max);
1492+
1493+ packet_send();
1494+
1495+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
1496+
1497+ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
1498+ fatal("BN_new() failed");
1499+ packet_get_bignum2(p);
1500+ if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
1501+ fatal("BN_new() failed");
1502+ packet_get_bignum2(g);
1503+ packet_check_eom();
1504+
1505+ if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
1506+ fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
1507+ min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
1508+
1509+ dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
1510+ break;
1511+ default:
1512+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
1513+ }
1514+
1515+ /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */
1516+ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
1517+
1518+ /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */
1519+ dh_server_pub = BN_new();
1520+ if (dh_server_pub == NULL)
1521+ fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
1522+
1523+ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
1524+
1525+ do {
1526+ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
1527+
1528+ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
1529+ kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
1530+ &ret_flags);
1531+
1532+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
1533+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
1534+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
1535+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
1536+ send_tok.length);
1537+ }
1538+ fatal("gss_init_context failed");
1539+ }
1540+
1541+ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
1542+ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
1543+ free(recv_tok.value);
1544+
1545+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1546+ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
1547+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
1548+ fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
1549+
1550+ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
1551+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
1552+ fatal("Integrity check failed");
1553+ }
1554+
1555+ /*
1556+ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
1557+ * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
1558+ */
1559+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
1560+ if (first) {
1561+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT);
1562+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
1563+ send_tok.length);
1564+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
1565+ first = 0;
1566+ } else {
1567+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
1568+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
1569+ send_tok.length);
1570+ }
1571+ packet_send();
1572+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
1573+
1574+ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
1575+ do {
1576+ type = packet_read();
1577+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
1578+ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
1579+ if (serverhostkey)
1580+ fatal("Server host key received more than once");
1581+ serverhostkey =
1582+ packet_get_string(&slen);
1583+ }
1584+ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
1585+
1586+ switch (type) {
1587+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
1588+ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
1589+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
1590+ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
1591+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
1592+ recv_tok.length = strlen;
1593+ break;
1594+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
1595+ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
1596+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
1597+ msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
1598+ msg_tok.length = strlen;
1599+
1600+ /* Is there a token included? */
1601+ if (packet_get_char()) {
1602+ recv_tok.value=
1603+ packet_get_string(&strlen);
1604+ recv_tok.length = strlen;
1605+ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */
1606+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
1607+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete");
1608+ } else {
1609+ /* No token included */
1610+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
1611+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token");
1612+ }
1613+ break;
1614+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
1615+ debug("Received Error");
1616+ maj_status = packet_get_int();
1617+ min_status = packet_get_int();
1618+ msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
1619+ (void) packet_get_string_ptr(NULL);
1620+ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg);
1621+ default:
1622+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
1623+ type);
1624+ }
1625+ token_ptr = &recv_tok;
1626+ } else {
1627+ /* No data, and not complete */
1628+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
1629+ fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
1630+ }
1631+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
1632+
1633+ /*
1634+ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the
1635+ * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok
1636+ */
1637+
1638+ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
1639+ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
1640+
1641+ /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */
1642+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
1643+ packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
1644+
1645+ /* compute K=f^x mod p */
1646+ klen = DH_size(dh);
1647+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
1648+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh);
1649+ if (kout < 0)
1650+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
1651+
1652+ shared_secret = BN_new();
1653+ if (shared_secret == NULL)
1654+ fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed");
1655+
1656+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
1657+ fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
1658+
1659+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
1660+ free(kbuf);
1661+
1662+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
1663+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
1664+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
1665+ kex_dh_hash( kex->client_version_string,
1666+ kex->server_version_string,
1667+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
1668+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
1669+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
1670+ dh->pub_key, /* e */
1671+ dh_server_pub, /* f */
1672+ shared_secret, /* K */
1673+ &hash, &hashlen
1674+ );
1675+ break;
1676+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
1677+ kexgex_hash(
1678+ kex->hash_alg,
1679+ kex->client_version_string,
1680+ kex->server_version_string,
1681+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
1682+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
1683+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
1684+ min, nbits, max,
1685+ dh->p, dh->g,
1686+ dh->pub_key,
1687+ dh_server_pub,
1688+ shared_secret,
1689+ &hash, &hashlen
1690+ );
1691+ break;
1692+ default:
1693+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
1694+ }
1695+
1696+ gssbuf.value = hash;
1697+ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
1698+
1699+ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
1700+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
1701+ packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify");
1702+
1703+ free(msg_tok.value);
1704+
1705+ DH_free(dh);
1706+ free(serverhostkey);
1707+ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
1708+
1709+ /* save session id */
1710+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
1711+ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
1712+ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
1713+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
1714+ }
1715+
1716+ if (kex->gss_deleg_creds)
1717+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
1718+
1719+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
1720+ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
1721+ else
1722+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
1723+
1724+ kex_derive_keys_bn(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
1725+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
1726+ kex_finish(kex);
1727+}
1728+
1729+#endif /* GSSAPI */
1730diff --git a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c
1731new file mode 100644
1732index 0000000..6a0ece8
1733--- /dev/null
1734+++ b/kexgsss.c
1735@@ -0,0 +1,290 @@
1736+/*
1737+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
1738+ *
1739+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
1740+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
1741+ * are met:
1742+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
1743+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
1744+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
1745+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
1746+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
1747+ *
1748+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
1749+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
1750+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
1751+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
1752+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
1753+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
1754+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
1755+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
1756+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
1757+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
1758+ */
1759+
1760+#include "includes.h"
1761+
1762+#ifdef GSSAPI
1763+
1764+#include <string.h>
1765+
1766+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
1767+#include <openssl/bn.h>
1768+
1769+#include "xmalloc.h"
1770+#include "buffer.h"
1771+#include "ssh2.h"
1772+#include "key.h"
1773+#include "cipher.h"
1774+#include "kex.h"
1775+#include "log.h"
1776+#include "packet.h"
1777+#include "dh.h"
1778+#include "ssh-gss.h"
1779+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
1780+#include "misc.h"
1781+#include "servconf.h"
1782+
1783+extern ServerOptions options;
1784+
1785+void
1786+kexgss_server(Kex *kex)
1787+{
1788+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
1789+
1790+ /*
1791+ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
1792+ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific
1793+ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently
1794+ * activating this non-standard behaviour.
1795+ */
1796+
1797+ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
1798+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
1799+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1800+ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
1801+ u_int slen, klen, kout, hashlen;
1802+ u_char *kbuf, *hash;
1803+ DH *dh;
1804+ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
1805+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
1806+ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
1807+ int type = 0;
1808+ gss_OID oid;
1809+ char *mechs;
1810+
1811+ /* Initialise GSSAPI */
1812+
1813+ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures
1814+ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
1815+ * into life
1816+ */
1817+ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) {
1818+ mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
1819+ free(mechs);
1820+ }
1821+
1822+ debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name);
1823+ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
1824+ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
1825+ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
1826+
1827+ debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
1828+
1829+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
1830+ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
1831+
1832+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
1833+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
1834+ dh = dh_new_group1();
1835+ break;
1836+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
1837+ dh = dh_new_group14();
1838+ break;
1839+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
1840+ debug("Doing group exchange");
1841+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
1842+ min = packet_get_int();
1843+ nbits = packet_get_int();
1844+ max = packet_get_int();
1845+ min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
1846+ max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
1847+ packet_check_eom();
1848+ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
1849+ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
1850+ min, nbits, max);
1851+ dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
1852+ if (dh == NULL)
1853+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found");
1854+
1855+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
1856+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
1857+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
1858+ packet_send();
1859+
1860+ packet_write_wait();
1861+ break;
1862+ default:
1863+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
1864+ }
1865+
1866+ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
1867+
1868+ do {
1869+ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
1870+ type = packet_read();
1871+ switch(type) {
1872+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
1873+ if (dh_client_pub != NULL)
1874+ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
1875+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
1876+ recv_tok.length = slen;
1877+
1878+ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
1879+ fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
1880+
1881+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
1882+
1883+ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
1884+ break;
1885+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
1886+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
1887+ recv_tok.length = slen;
1888+ break;
1889+ default:
1890+ packet_disconnect(
1891+ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
1892+ type);
1893+ }
1894+
1895+ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
1896+ &send_tok, &ret_flags));
1897+
1898+ free(recv_tok.value);
1899+
1900+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
1901+ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
1902+
1903+ if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
1904+ fatal("No client public key");
1905+
1906+ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
1907+ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
1908+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
1909+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
1910+ packet_send();
1911+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
1912+ }
1913+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
1914+
1915+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
1916+ if (send_tok.length > 0) {
1917+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
1918+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
1919+ packet_send();
1920+ }
1921+ fatal("accept_ctx died");
1922+ }
1923+
1924+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
1925+ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
1926+
1927+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
1928+ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
1929+
1930+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
1931+ packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
1932+
1933+ klen = DH_size(dh);
1934+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
1935+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
1936+ if (kout < 0)
1937+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
1938+
1939+ shared_secret = BN_new();
1940+ if (shared_secret == NULL)
1941+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed");
1942+
1943+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
1944+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
1945+
1946+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
1947+ free(kbuf);
1948+
1949+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
1950+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
1951+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
1952+ kex_dh_hash(
1953+ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
1954+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
1955+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
1956+ NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */
1957+ dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret,
1958+ &hash, &hashlen
1959+ );
1960+ break;
1961+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
1962+ kexgex_hash(
1963+ kex->hash_alg,
1964+ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
1965+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
1966+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
1967+ NULL, 0,
1968+ min, nbits, max,
1969+ dh->p, dh->g,
1970+ dh_client_pub,
1971+ dh->pub_key,
1972+ shared_secret,
1973+ &hash, &hashlen
1974+ );
1975+ break;
1976+ default:
1977+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
1978+ }
1979+
1980+ BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
1981+
1982+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
1983+ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
1984+ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
1985+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
1986+ }
1987+
1988+ gssbuf.value = hash;
1989+ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
1990+
1991+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok))))
1992+ fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
1993+
1994+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE);
1995+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
1996+ packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length);
1997+
1998+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
1999+ packet_put_char(1); /* true */
2000+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
2001+ } else {
2002+ packet_put_char(0); /* false */
2003+ }
2004+ packet_send();
2005+
2006+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
2007+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
2008+
2009+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
2010+ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
2011+ else
2012+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
2013+
2014+ DH_free(dh);
2015+
2016+ kex_derive_keys_bn(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
2017+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
2018+ kex_finish(kex);
2019+
2020+ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
2021+ * just exchanged. */
2022+ if (options.gss_store_rekey)
2023+ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
2024+}
2025+#endif /* GSSAPI */
2026diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
2027index dbe29f1..b0896ef 100644
2028--- a/monitor.c
2029+++ b/monitor.c
2030@@ -178,6 +178,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
2031 int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
2032 int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
2033 int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
2034+int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *);
2035+int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *);
2036 #endif
2037
2038 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
2039@@ -255,11 +257,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
2040 {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
2041 {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
2042 {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
2043+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign},
2044 #endif
2045 {0, 0, NULL}
2046 };
2047
2048 struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
2049+#ifdef GSSAPI
2050+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
2051+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
2052+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
2053+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
2054+#endif
2055 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
2056 {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
2057 #endif
2058@@ -374,6 +383,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
2059 /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
2060 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
2061 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
2062+#ifdef GSSAPI
2063+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
2064+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
2065+#endif
2066 } else {
2067 mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
2068
2069@@ -482,6 +495,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
2070 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
2071 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
2072 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
2073+#ifdef GSSAPI
2074+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
2075+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
2076+#endif
2077 } else {
2078 mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
2079 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
2080@@ -1861,6 +1878,13 @@ mm_get_kex(Buffer *m)
2081 kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
2082 #endif
2083 kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
2084+#ifdef GSSAPI
2085+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
2086+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
2087+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
2088+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
2089+ }
2090+#endif
2091 kex->server = 1;
2092 kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
2093 kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
2094@@ -2068,6 +2092,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
2095 OM_uint32 major;
2096 u_int len;
2097
2098+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
2099+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
2100+
2101 goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
2102 goid.length = len;
2103
2104@@ -2095,6 +2122,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
2105 OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
2106 u_int len;
2107
2108+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
2109+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
2110+
2111 in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
2112 in.length = len;
2113 major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
2114@@ -2112,6 +2142,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
2115 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
2116 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
2117 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
2118+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1);
2119 }
2120 return (0);
2121 }
2122@@ -2123,6 +2154,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
2123 OM_uint32 ret;
2124 u_int len;
2125
2126+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
2127+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
2128+
2129 gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
2130 gssbuf.length = len;
2131 mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
2132@@ -2149,7 +2183,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
2133 {
2134 int authenticated;
2135
2136- authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
2137+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
2138+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
2139+
2140+ authenticated = authctxt->valid &&
2141+ ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw);
2142
2143 buffer_clear(m);
2144 buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
2145@@ -2162,5 +2200,73 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
2146 /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
2147 return (authenticated);
2148 }
2149+
2150+int
2151+mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
2152+{
2153+ gss_buffer_desc data;
2154+ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
2155+ OM_uint32 major, minor;
2156+ u_int len;
2157+
2158+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
2159+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
2160+
2161+ data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
2162+ data.length = len;
2163+ if (data.length != 20)
2164+ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__,
2165+ (int) data.length);
2166+
2167+ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */
2168+ if (session_id2_len == 0) {
2169+ session_id2_len = data.length;
2170+ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
2171+ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
2172+ }
2173+ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
2174+
2175+ free(data.value);
2176+
2177+ buffer_clear(m);
2178+ buffer_put_int(m, major);
2179+ buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length);
2180+
2181+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
2182+
2183+ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
2184+
2185+ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
2186+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
2187+
2188+ /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */
2189+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1);
2190+
2191+ return (0);
2192+}
2193+
2194+int
2195+mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) {
2196+ ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
2197+ int ok;
2198+
2199+ store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
2200+ store.envvar = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
2201+ store.envval = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
2202+
2203+ ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
2204+
2205+ free(store.filename);
2206+ free(store.envvar);
2207+ free(store.envval);
2208+
2209+ buffer_clear(m);
2210+ buffer_put_int(m, ok);
2211+
2212+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
2213+
2214+ return(0);
2215+}
2216+
2217 #endif /* GSSAPI */
2218
2219diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
2220index 5bc41b5..7f32b0c 100644
2221--- a/monitor.h
2222+++ b/monitor.h
2223@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
2224 MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
2225 MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
2226
2227+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151,
2228+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153,
2229+
2230 };
2231
2232 struct mm_master;
2233diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
2234index 45dc169..e476f0d 100644
2235--- a/monitor_wrap.c
2236+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
2237@@ -1281,7 +1281,7 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
2238 }
2239
2240 int
2241-mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
2242+mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
2243 {
2244 Buffer m;
2245 int authenticated = 0;
2246@@ -1298,5 +1298,50 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
2247 debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
2248 return (authenticated);
2249 }
2250+
2251+OM_uint32
2252+mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
2253+{
2254+ Buffer m;
2255+ OM_uint32 major;
2256+ u_int len;
2257+
2258+ buffer_init(&m);
2259+ buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length);
2260+
2261+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m);
2262+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m);
2263+
2264+ major = buffer_get_int(&m);
2265+ hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
2266+ hash->length = len;
2267+
2268+ buffer_free(&m);
2269+
2270+ return(major);
2271+}
2272+
2273+int
2274+mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store)
2275+{
2276+ Buffer m;
2277+ int ok;
2278+
2279+ buffer_init(&m);
2280+
2281+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : "");
2282+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : "");
2283+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : "");
2284+
2285+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
2286+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
2287+
2288+ ok = buffer_get_int(&m);
2289+
2290+ buffer_free(&m);
2291+
2292+ return (ok);
2293+}
2294+
2295 #endif /* GSSAPI */
2296
2297diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
2298index 18c2501..a4e9d24 100644
2299--- a/monitor_wrap.h
2300+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
2301@@ -58,8 +58,10 @@ BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);
2302 OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
2303 OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
2304 gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
2305-int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
2306+int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *);
2307 OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
2308+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
2309+int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *);
2310 #endif
2311
2312 #ifdef USE_PAM
2313diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
2314index 7948ce1..9127e93 100644
2315--- a/readconf.c
2316+++ b/readconf.c
2317@@ -142,6 +142,8 @@ typedef enum {
2318 oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
2319 oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
2320 oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
2321+ oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey,
2322+ oGssServerIdentity,
2323 oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
2324 oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
2325 oHashKnownHosts,
2326@@ -185,10 +187,19 @@ static struct {
2327 { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
2328 #if defined(GSSAPI)
2329 { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
2330+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx },
2331 { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
2332+ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
2333+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity },
2334+ { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity },
2335+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey },
2336 #else
2337 { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
2338+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
2339 { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
2340+ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
2341+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported },
2342+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported },
2343 #endif
2344 { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
2345 { "usersh", oDeprecated },
2346@@ -865,10 +876,30 @@ parse_time:
2347 intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
2348 goto parse_flag;
2349
2350+ case oGssKeyEx:
2351+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
2352+ goto parse_flag;
2353+
2354 case oGssDelegateCreds:
2355 intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
2356 goto parse_flag;
2357
2358+ case oGssTrustDns:
2359+ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
2360+ goto parse_flag;
2361+
2362+ case oGssClientIdentity:
2363+ charptr = &options->gss_client_identity;
2364+ goto parse_string;
2365+
2366+ case oGssServerIdentity:
2367+ charptr = &options->gss_server_identity;
2368+ goto parse_string;
2369+
2370+ case oGssRenewalRekey:
2371+ intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey;
2372+ goto parse_flag;
2373+
2374 case oBatchMode:
2375 intptr = &options->batch_mode;
2376 goto parse_flag;
2377@@ -1538,7 +1569,12 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
2378 options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
2379 options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
2380 options->gss_authentication = -1;
2381+ options->gss_keyex = -1;
2382 options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
2383+ options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
2384+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1;
2385+ options->gss_client_identity = NULL;
2386+ options->gss_server_identity = NULL;
2387 options->password_authentication = -1;
2388 options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
2389 options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
2390@@ -1661,8 +1697,14 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
2391 options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
2392 if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
2393 options->gss_authentication = 0;
2394+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
2395+ options->gss_keyex = 0;
2396 if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
2397 options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
2398+ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
2399+ options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
2400+ if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
2401+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0;
2402 if (options->password_authentication == -1)
2403 options->password_authentication = 1;
2404 if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
2405diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
2406index 0b9cb77..0e29889 100644
2407--- a/readconf.h
2408+++ b/readconf.h
2409@@ -45,7 +45,12 @@ typedef struct {
2410 int challenge_response_authentication;
2411 /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
2412 int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */
2413+ int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */
2414 int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */
2415+ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
2416+ int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */
2417+ char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */
2418+ char *gss_server_identity; /* GSSAPI target principal */
2419 int password_authentication; /* Try password
2420 * authentication. */
2421 int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
2422diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
2423index b7f3294..cb3c831 100644
2424--- a/servconf.c
2425+++ b/servconf.c
2426@@ -109,7 +109,10 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
2427 options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
2428 options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
2429 options->gss_authentication=-1;
2430+ options->gss_keyex = -1;
2431 options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
2432+ options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
2433+ options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
2434 options->password_authentication = -1;
2435 options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
2436 options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
2437@@ -250,8 +253,14 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
2438 options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
2439 if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
2440 options->gss_authentication = 0;
2441+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
2442+ options->gss_keyex = 0;
2443 if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
2444 options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
2445+ if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
2446+ options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
2447+ if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
2448+ options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
2449 if (options->password_authentication == -1)
2450 options->password_authentication = 1;
2451 if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
2452@@ -352,7 +361,9 @@ typedef enum {
2453 sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
2454 sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
2455 sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
2456- sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
2457+ sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
2458+ sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey,
2459+ sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
2460 sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
2461 sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
2462 sHostCertificate,
2463@@ -421,10 +432,20 @@ static struct {
2464 #ifdef GSSAPI
2465 { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
2466 { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2467+ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2468+ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2469+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2470+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2471 #else
2472 { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
2473 { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2474+ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2475+ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2476+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2477+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2478 #endif
2479+ { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2480+ { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2481 { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
2482 { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
2483 { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2484@@ -1104,10 +1125,22 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
2485 intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
2486 goto parse_flag;
2487
2488+ case sGssKeyEx:
2489+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
2490+ goto parse_flag;
2491+
2492 case sGssCleanupCreds:
2493 intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
2494 goto parse_flag;
2495
2496+ case sGssStrictAcceptor:
2497+ intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
2498+ goto parse_flag;
2499+
2500+ case sGssStoreRekey:
2501+ intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey;
2502+ goto parse_flag;
2503+
2504 case sPasswordAuthentication:
2505 intptr = &options->password_authentication;
2506 goto parse_flag;
2507@@ -2042,7 +2075,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
2508 #endif
2509 #ifdef GSSAPI
2510 dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
2511+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
2512 dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
2513+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
2514+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
2515 #endif
2516 dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
2517 dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
2518diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
2519index 766db3a..f8265a8 100644
2520--- a/servconf.h
2521+++ b/servconf.h
2522@@ -113,7 +113,10 @@ typedef struct {
2523 int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if
2524 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
2525 int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
2526+ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
2527 int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
2528+ int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
2529+ int gss_store_rekey;
2530 int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password
2531 * authentication. */
2532 int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
2533diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
2534index a99d7f0..914701b 100644
2535--- a/ssh-gss.h
2536+++ b/ssh-gss.h
2537@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
2538 /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.11 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */
2539 /*
2540- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
2541+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
2542 *
2543 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
2544 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
2545@@ -61,10 +61,22 @@
2546
2547 #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
2548
2549+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30
2550+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31
2551+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32
2552+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33
2553+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34
2554+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40
2555+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41
2556+#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-"
2557+#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-"
2558+#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-"
2559+
2560 typedef struct {
2561 char *filename;
2562 char *envvar;
2563 char *envval;
2564+ struct passwd *owner;
2565 void *data;
2566 } ssh_gssapi_ccache;
2567
2568@@ -72,8 +84,11 @@ typedef struct {
2569 gss_buffer_desc displayname;
2570 gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
2571 gss_cred_id_t creds;
2572+ gss_name_t name;
2573 struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
2574 ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
2575+ int used;
2576+ int updated;
2577 } ssh_gssapi_client;
2578
2579 typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
2580@@ -84,6 +99,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
2581 int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
2582 int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
2583 void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
2584+ int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
2585 } ssh_gssapi_mech;
2586
2587 typedef struct {
2588@@ -94,10 +110,11 @@ typedef struct {
2589 gss_OID oid; /* client */
2590 gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */
2591 gss_name_t client; /* server */
2592- gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */
2593+ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */
2594 } Gssctxt;
2595
2596 extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
2597+extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context;
2598
2599 int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
2600 void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
2601@@ -119,16 +136,32 @@ void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **);
2602 void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
2603 OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
2604 void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
2605-int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
2606+int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *);
2607+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
2608+int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
2609
2610 /* In the server */
2611+typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *,
2612+ const char *);
2613+char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *);
2614+char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
2615+ const char *);
2616+gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
2617+int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *,
2618+ const char *);
2619 OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
2620-int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
2621+int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *);
2622 OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
2623 void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
2624 void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
2625 void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
2626
2627+char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
2628+int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void);
2629+
2630+int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store);
2631+void ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void);
2632+
2633 #endif /* GSSAPI */
2634
2635 #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
2636diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
2637index 03a228f..228e5ab 100644
2638--- a/ssh_config
2639+++ b/ssh_config
2640@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
2641 # HostbasedAuthentication no
2642 # GSSAPIAuthentication no
2643 # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
2644+# GSSAPIKeyExchange no
2645+# GSSAPITrustDNS no
2646 # BatchMode no
2647 # CheckHostIP yes
2648 # AddressFamily any
2649diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
2650index f9ede7a..e6649ac 100644
2651--- a/ssh_config.5
2652+++ b/ssh_config.5
2653@@ -701,11 +701,43 @@ Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
2654 The default is
2655 .Dq no .
2656 Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
2657+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
2658+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using
2659+GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key.
2660+The default is
2661+.Dq no .
2662+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
2663+.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity
2664+If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when
2665+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default
2666+identity will be used.
2667+.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity
2668+If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when
2669+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the
2670+expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target
2671+hostname.
2672 .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
2673 Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
2674 The default is
2675 .Dq no .
2676-Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
2677+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
2678+.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
2679+If set to
2680+.Dq yes
2681+then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the
2682+ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed
2683+credentials to a session on the server.
2684+The default is
2685+.Dq no .
2686+.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
2687+Set to
2688+.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
2689+the name of the host being connected to. If
2690+.Dq no, the hostname entered on the
2691+command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
2692+The default is
2693+.Dq no .
2694+This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
2695 .It Cm HashKnownHosts
2696 Indicates that
2697 .Xr ssh 1
2698diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
2699index 68f7f4f..7b478f1 100644
2700--- a/sshconnect2.c
2701+++ b/sshconnect2.c
2702@@ -159,9 +159,34 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
2703 char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
2704 Kex *kex;
2705
2706+#ifdef GSSAPI
2707+ char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL;
2708+ char *gss_host = NULL;
2709+#endif
2710+
2711 xxx_host = host;
2712 xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
2713
2714+#ifdef GSSAPI
2715+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
2716+ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
2717+ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
2718+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
2719+
2720+ if (options.gss_trust_dns)
2721+ gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1);
2722+ else
2723+ gss_host = host;
2724+
2725+ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity);
2726+ if (gss) {
2727+ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
2728+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
2729+ "%s,%s", gss, orig);
2730+ }
2731+ }
2732+#endif
2733+
2734 if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) {
2735 logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults.");
2736 options.ciphers = NULL;
2737@@ -199,6 +224,17 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
2738 myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
2739 myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
2740
2741+#ifdef GSSAPI
2742+ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
2743+ * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
2744+ if (options.gss_keyex && gss) {
2745+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
2746+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
2747+ "%s,null", orig);
2748+ free(gss);
2749+ }
2750+#endif
2751+
2752 if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
2753 packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
2754 (time_t)options.rekey_interval);
2755@@ -213,10 +249,30 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
2756 kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client;
2757 #endif
2758 kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client;
2759+#ifdef GSSAPI
2760+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
2761+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
2762+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
2763+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
2764+ }
2765+#endif
2766 kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
2767 kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
2768 kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
2769
2770+#ifdef GSSAPI
2771+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
2772+ kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
2773+ kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
2774+ kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity;
2775+ if (options.gss_server_identity) {
2776+ kex->gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
2777+ } else {
2778+ kex->gss_host = gss_host;
2779+ }
2780+ }
2781+#endif
2782+
2783 xxx_kex = kex;
2784
2785 dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex);
2786@@ -306,6 +362,7 @@ void input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
2787 void input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
2788 void input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
2789 void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
2790+int userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt);
2791 #endif
2792
2793 void userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
2794@@ -321,6 +378,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
2795
2796 Authmethod authmethods[] = {
2797 #ifdef GSSAPI
2798+ {"gssapi-keyex",
2799+ userauth_gsskeyex,
2800+ NULL,
2801+ &options.gss_authentication,
2802+ NULL},
2803 {"gssapi-with-mic",
2804 userauth_gssapi,
2805 NULL,
2806@@ -617,19 +679,31 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
2807 static u_int mech = 0;
2808 OM_uint32 min;
2809 int ok = 0;
2810+ const char *gss_host;
2811+
2812+ if (options.gss_server_identity)
2813+ gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
2814+ else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
2815+ gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1);
2816+ else
2817+ gss_host = authctxt->host;
2818
2819 /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
2820 * once. */
2821
2822 if (gss_supported == NULL)
2823- gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported);
2824+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) {
2825+ gss_supported = NULL;
2826+ return 0;
2827+ }
2828
2829 /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
2830 while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
2831 /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
2832 if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
2833 ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
2834- &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
2835+ &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host,
2836+ options.gss_client_identity)) {
2837 ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
2838 } else {
2839 mech++;
2840@@ -726,8 +800,8 @@ input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
2841 {
2842 Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
2843 Gssctxt *gssctxt;
2844- int oidlen;
2845- char *oidv;
2846+ u_int oidlen;
2847+ u_char *oidv;
2848
2849 if (authctxt == NULL)
2850 fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
2851@@ -836,6 +910,48 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
2852 free(msg);
2853 free(lang);
2854 }
2855+
2856+int
2857+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
2858+{
2859+ Buffer b;
2860+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
2861+ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
2862+ OM_uint32 ms;
2863+
2864+ static int attempt = 0;
2865+ if (attempt++ >= 1)
2866+ return (0);
2867+
2868+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
2869+ debug("No valid Key exchange context");
2870+ return (0);
2871+ }
2872+
2873+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
2874+ "gssapi-keyex");
2875+
2876+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
2877+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
2878+
2879+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
2880+ buffer_free(&b);
2881+ return (0);
2882+ }
2883+
2884+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
2885+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
2886+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
2887+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
2888+ packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
2889+ packet_send();
2890+
2891+ buffer_free(&b);
2892+ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
2893+
2894+ return (1);
2895+}
2896+
2897 #endif /* GSSAPI */
2898
2899 int
2900diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
2901index 481d001..e6706a8 100644
2902--- a/sshd.c
2903+++ b/sshd.c
2904@@ -123,6 +123,10 @@
2905 #include "ssh-sandbox.h"
2906 #include "version.h"
2907
2908+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
2909+#include <Security/AuthSession.h>
2910+#endif
2911+
2912 #ifndef O_NOCTTY
2913 #define O_NOCTTY 0
2914 #endif
2915@@ -1745,10 +1749,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
2916 logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
2917 options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
2918 }
2919+#ifndef GSSAPI
2920+ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
2921 if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
2922 logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
2923 options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
2924 }
2925+#endif
2926 if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
2927 logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
2928 exit(1);
2929@@ -2060,6 +2067,60 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
2930 remote_ip, remote_port,
2931 get_local_ipaddr(sock_in), get_local_port());
2932
2933+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
2934+ /*
2935+ * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if
2936+ * the current session is the root session or we are not launched
2937+ * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode). We do not
2938+ * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from
2939+ * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us.
2940+ *
2941+ * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an
2942+ * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating
2943+ * new sessions for us. Then all the users will end up in the
2944+ * same session (bad).
2945+ *
2946+ * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us
2947+ * automatically.
2948+ *
2949+ * We must create the session before any credentials are stored
2950+ * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below).
2951+ */
2952+ {
2953+ OSStatus err = 0;
2954+ SecuritySessionId sid = 0;
2955+ SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0;
2956+
2957+ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs);
2958+ if (err)
2959+ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
2960+ (unsigned) err);
2961+ else
2962+ debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
2963+ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
2964+
2965+ if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot))
2966+ debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... "
2967+ "assuming inetd created the session for us.");
2968+ else {
2969+ debug("Creating new security session...");
2970+ err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote);
2971+ if (err)
2972+ error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X",
2973+ (unsigned) err);
2974+
2975+ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid,
2976+ &sattrs);
2977+ if (err)
2978+ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
2979+ (unsigned) err);
2980+ else
2981+ debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
2982+ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
2983+ }
2984+ }
2985+#endif
2986+
2987 /*
2988 * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
2989 * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
2990@@ -2482,6 +2543,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
2991 myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
2992 list_hostkey_types());
2993
2994+#ifdef GSSAPI
2995+ {
2996+ char *orig;
2997+ char *gss = NULL;
2998+ char *newstr = NULL;
2999+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
3000+
3001+ /*
3002+ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
3003+ * the other key exchange algorithms
3004+ */
3005+
3006+ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
3007+ orig = NULL;
3008+
3009+ if (options.gss_keyex)
3010+ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
3011+ else
3012+ gss = NULL;
3013+
3014+ if (gss && orig)
3015+ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
3016+ else if (gss)
3017+ newstr = gss;
3018+ else if (orig)
3019+ newstr = orig;
3020+
3021+ /*
3022+ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
3023+ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
3024+ * host key algorithm we support
3025+ */
3026+ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
3027+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
3028+
3029+ if (newstr)
3030+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
3031+ else
3032+ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
3033+ }
3034+#endif
3035+
3036 /* start key exchange */
3037 kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
3038 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
3039@@ -2492,6 +2595,13 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
3040 kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
3041 #endif
3042 kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
3043+#ifdef GSSAPI
3044+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
3045+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
3046+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
3047+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
3048+ }
3049+#endif
3050 kex->server = 1;
3051 kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
3052 kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
3053diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
3054index e9045bc..d9b8594 100644
3055--- a/sshd_config
3056+++ b/sshd_config
3057@@ -84,6 +84,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
3058 # GSSAPI options
3059 #GSSAPIAuthentication no
3060 #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
3061+#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
3062+#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
3063
3064 # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
3065 # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
3066diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
3067index fd44abe..c8b43da 100644
3068--- a/sshd_config.5
3069+++ b/sshd_config.5
3070@@ -527,12 +527,40 @@ Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
3071 The default is
3072 .Dq no .
3073 Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
3074+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
3075+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
3076+doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
3077+The default is
3078+.Dq no .
3079+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
3080 .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
3081 Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
3082 on logout.
3083 The default is
3084 .Dq yes .
3085 Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
3086+.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
3087+Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor
3088+a client authenticates against. If
3089+.Dq yes
3090+then the client must authenticate against the
3091+.Pa host
3092+service on the current hostname. If
3093+.Dq no
3094+then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the
3095+machine's default store. This facility is provided to assist with operation
3096+on multi homed machines.
3097+The default is
3098+.Dq yes .
3099+Note that this option applies only to protocol version 2 GSSAPI connections,
3100+and setting it to
3101+.Dq no
3102+may only work with recent Kerberos GSSAPI libraries.
3103+.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey
3104+Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a
3105+successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed
3106+or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is
3107+.Dq no .
3108 .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
3109 Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
3110 with successful public key client host authentication is allowed
3111diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
3112index fdd0c8a..1a96eae 100644
3113--- a/sshkey.c
3114+++ b/sshkey.c
3115@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] = {
3116 { "ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com", "DSA-CERT-V00",
3117 KEY_DSA_CERT_V00, 0, 1 },
3118 #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
3119+ { "null", "null", KEY_NULL, 0, 0 },
3120 { NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0 }
3121 };
3122
3123@@ -198,7 +199,7 @@ key_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only)
3124 const struct keytype *kt;
3125
3126 for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
3127- if (kt->name == NULL)
3128+ if (kt->name == NULL || kt->type == KEY_NULL)
3129 continue;
3130 if ((certs_only && !kt->cert) || (plain_only && kt->cert))
3131 continue;
3132diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
3133index 450b30c..b573e7f 100644
3134--- a/sshkey.h
3135+++ b/sshkey.h
3136@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ enum sshkey_types {
3137 KEY_ED25519_CERT,
3138 KEY_RSA_CERT_V00,
3139 KEY_DSA_CERT_V00,
3140+ KEY_NULL,
3141 KEY_UNSPEC
3142 };
3143
diff --git a/debian/patches/helpful-wait-terminate.patch b/debian/patches/helpful-wait-terminate.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..de43f2a80
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/helpful-wait-terminate.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
1From aca34215fc0e85d6b49e04f0a3cd0db79732125e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:56 +0000
4Subject: Mention ~& when waiting for forwarded connections to terminate
5
6Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/50308
7Last-Update: 2010-02-27
8
9Patch-Name: helpful-wait-terminate.patch
10---
11 serverloop.c | 2 +-
12 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
13
14diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
15index e92f9e2..813e5bf 100644
16--- a/serverloop.c
17+++ b/serverloop.c
18@@ -687,7 +687,7 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int fdout_arg, int fderr_arg)
19 if (!channel_still_open())
20 break;
21 if (!waiting_termination) {
22- const char *s = "Waiting for forwarded connections to terminate...\r\n";
23+ const char *s = "Waiting for forwarded connections to terminate... (press ~& to background)\r\n";
24 char *cp;
25 waiting_termination = 1;
26 buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, s, strlen(s));
diff --git a/debian/patches/keepalive-extensions.patch b/debian/patches/keepalive-extensions.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..15acabc0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/keepalive-extensions.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
1From bd3abc2f732da3a61e4158b915480808957a4357 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Richard Kettlewell <rjk@greenend.org.uk>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:52 +0000
4Subject: Various keepalive extensions
5
6Add compatibility aliases for ProtocolKeepAlives and SetupTimeOut, supported
7in previous versions of Debian's OpenSSH package but since superseded by
8ServerAliveInterval. (We're probably stuck with this bit for
9compatibility.)
10
11In batch mode, default ServerAliveInterval to five minutes.
12
13Adjust documentation to match and to give some more advice on use of
14keepalives.
15
16Author: Ian Jackson <ian@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
17Author: Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>
18Author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
19Last-Update: 2014-10-07
20
21Patch-Name: keepalive-extensions.patch
22---
23 readconf.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
24 ssh_config.5 | 21 +++++++++++++++++++--
25 sshd_config.5 | 3 +++
26 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
27
28diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
29index bc879eb..337818c 100644
30--- a/readconf.c
31+++ b/readconf.c
32@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ typedef enum {
33 oCanonicalDomains, oCanonicalizeHostname, oCanonicalizeMaxDots,
34 oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs,
35 oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink,
36+ oProtocolKeepAlives, oSetupTimeOut,
37 oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported
38 } OpCodes;
39
40@@ -278,6 +279,8 @@ static struct {
41 { "streamlocalbindmask", oStreamLocalBindMask },
42 { "streamlocalbindunlink", oStreamLocalBindUnlink },
43 { "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown },
44+ { "protocolkeepalives", oProtocolKeepAlives },
45+ { "setuptimeout", oSetupTimeOut },
46
47 { NULL, oBadOption }
48 };
49@@ -1271,6 +1274,8 @@ parse_int:
50 goto parse_flag;
51
52 case oServerAliveInterval:
53+ case oProtocolKeepAlives: /* Debian-specific compatibility alias */
54+ case oSetupTimeOut: /* Debian-specific compatibility alias */
55 intptr = &options->server_alive_interval;
56 goto parse_time;
57
58@@ -1791,8 +1796,13 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
59 options->rekey_interval = 0;
60 if (options->verify_host_key_dns == -1)
61 options->verify_host_key_dns = 0;
62- if (options->server_alive_interval == -1)
63- options->server_alive_interval = 0;
64+ if (options->server_alive_interval == -1) {
65+ /* in batch mode, default is 5mins */
66+ if (options->batch_mode == 1)
67+ options->server_alive_interval = 300;
68+ else
69+ options->server_alive_interval = 0;
70+ }
71 if (options->server_alive_count_max == -1)
72 options->server_alive_count_max = 3;
73 if (options->control_master == -1)
74diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
75index 01f1f7f..ea92ea8 100644
76--- a/ssh_config.5
77+++ b/ssh_config.5
78@@ -205,8 +205,12 @@ Valid arguments are
79 If set to
80 .Dq yes ,
81 passphrase/password querying will be disabled.
82+In addition, the
83+.Cm ServerAliveInterval
84+option will be set to 300 seconds by default.
85 This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no user
86-is present to supply the password.
87+is present to supply the password,
88+and where it is desirable to detect a broken network swiftly.
89 The argument must be
90 .Dq yes
91 or
92@@ -1336,8 +1340,15 @@ from the server,
93 will send a message through the encrypted
94 channel to request a response from the server.
95 The default
96-is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server.
97+is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server,
98+or 300 if the
99+.Cm BatchMode
100+option is set.
101 This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
102+.Cm ProtocolKeepAlives
103+and
104+.Cm SetupTimeOut
105+are Debian-specific compatibility aliases for this option.
106 .It Cm StreamLocalBindMask
107 Sets the octal file creation mode mask
108 .Pq umask
109@@ -1403,6 +1414,12 @@ Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the
110 other side.
111 If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one
112 of the machines will be properly noticed.
113+This option only uses TCP keepalives (as opposed to using ssh level
114+keepalives), so takes a long time to notice when the connection dies.
115+As such, you probably want
116+the
117+.Cm ServerAliveInterval
118+option as well.
119 However, this means that
120 connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people
121 find it annoying.
122diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
123index c8b43da..2843048 100644
124--- a/sshd_config.5
125+++ b/sshd_config.5
126@@ -1307,6 +1307,9 @@ This avoids infinitely hanging sessions.
127 .Pp
128 To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
129 .Dq no .
130+.Pp
131+This option was formerly called
132+.Cm KeepAlive .
133 .It Cm TrustedUserCAKeys
134 Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate authorities that are
135 trusted to sign user certificates for authentication.
diff --git a/debian/patches/lintian-symlink-pickiness.patch b/debian/patches/lintian-symlink-pickiness.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..81b924e35
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/lintian-symlink-pickiness.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
1From 248d3bb8de371b55aaf3a8f544c15f3a25eb7339 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:08 +0000
4Subject: Fix picky lintian errors about slogin symlinks
5
6Apparently this breaks some SVR4 packaging systems, so upstream can't win
7either way and opted to keep the status quo. We need this patch anyway.
8
9Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1728
10Last-Update: 2013-09-14
11
12Patch-Name: lintian-symlink-pickiness.patch
13---
14 Makefile.in | 4 ++--
15 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
16
17diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
18index a4402e9..4eab574 100644
19--- a/Makefile.in
20+++ b/Makefile.in
21@@ -315,9 +315,9 @@ install-files:
22 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
23 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
24 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
25- ln -s ./ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
26+ ln -s ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
27 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
28- ln -s ./ssh.1 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
29+ ln -s ssh.1 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
30
31 install-sysconf:
32 if [ ! -d $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir) ]; then \
diff --git a/debian/patches/mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch b/debian/patches/mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f90c7e2b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
1From 064453886f4c3d8ac0b0c8d015ad614c8bce3b42 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Scott Moser <smoser@ubuntu.com>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:03 +0000
4Subject: Mention ssh-keygen in ssh fingerprint changed warning
5
6Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1843
7Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/686607
8Last-Update: 2013-09-14
9
10Patch-Name: mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch
11---
12 sshconnect.c | 7 ++++++-
13 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
14
15diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
16index 26116d2..ab83d0c 100644
17--- a/sshconnect.c
18+++ b/sshconnect.c
19@@ -1066,9 +1066,12 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
20 error("%s. This could either mean that", key_msg);
21 error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host");
22 error("and its host key have changed at the same time.");
23- if (ip_status != HOST_NEW)
24+ if (ip_status != HOST_NEW) {
25 error("Offending key for IP in %s:%lu",
26 ip_found->file, ip_found->line);
27+ error(" remove with: ssh-keygen -f \"%s\" -R %s",
28+ ip_found->file, ip);
29+ }
30 }
31 /* The host key has changed. */
32 warn_changed_key(host_key);
33@@ -1076,6 +1079,8 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
34 user_hostfiles[0]);
35 error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu", key_type(host_found->key),
36 host_found->file, host_found->line);
37+ error(" remove with: ssh-keygen -f \"%s\" -R %s",
38+ host_found->file, host);
39
40 /*
41 * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
diff --git a/debian/patches/no-openssl-version-status.patch b/debian/patches/no-openssl-version-status.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dfcef83b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/no-openssl-version-status.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
1From 37fd625165d0df302e441d9cad9bcc742378eef5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:14 +0000
4Subject: Don't check the status field of the OpenSSL version
5
6There is no reason to check the version of OpenSSL (in Debian). If it's
7not compatible the soname will change. OpenSSH seems to want to do a
8check for the soname based on the version number, but wants to keep the
9status of the release the same. Remove that check on the status since
10it doesn't tell you anything about how compatible that version is.
11
12Author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
13Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/93581
14Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/664383
15Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/732940
16Forwarded: not-needed
17Last-Update: 2014-10-07
18
19Patch-Name: no-openssl-version-status.patch
20---
21 openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c | 6 +++---
22 openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c | 1 +
23 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
24
25diff --git a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
26index 36570e4..defd5fb 100644
27--- a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
28+++ b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
29@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
30 /*
31 * OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
32 * We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0.
33- * After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we
34+ * After that, we accept compatible fix and status versions (so we
35 * allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed
36 * within a patch series.
37 */
38@@ -55,10 +55,10 @@ ssh_compatible_openssl(long headerver, long libver)
39 }
40
41 /*
42- * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor,status must match and library
43+ * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor must match and library
44 * fix version must be equal to or newer than the header.
45 */
46- mask = 0xfff0000fL; /* major,minor,status */
47+ mask = 0xfff00000L; /* major,minor */
48 hfix = (headerver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
49 lfix = (libver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
50 if ( (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask) && lfix >= hfix)
51diff --git a/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c b/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
52index 5d019b5..5847487 100644
53--- a/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
54+++ b/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
55@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ struct version_test {
56
57 /* built with 1.0.1b release headers */
58 { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000101fL, 1},/* exact match */
59+ { 0x1000101fL, 0x10001010L, 1}, /* different status: ok */
60 { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000102fL, 1}, /* newer library patch version: ok */
61 { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000100fL, 1}, /* older library patch version: ok */
62 { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000201fL, 1}, /* newer library fix version: ok */
diff --git a/debian/patches/openbsd-docs.patch b/debian/patches/openbsd-docs.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..37ad675d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/openbsd-docs.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
1From 0b9407d3023938b02bccf7dd1874a871d0cc8eb5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:09 +0000
4Subject: Adjust various OpenBSD-specific references in manual pages
5
6No single bug reference for this patch, but history includes:
7 http://bugs.debian.org/154434 (login.conf(5))
8 http://bugs.debian.org/513417 (/etc/rc)
9 http://bugs.debian.org/530692 (ssl(8))
10 https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/456660 (ssl(8))
11
12Forwarded: not-needed
13Last-Update: 2014-10-07
14
15Patch-Name: openbsd-docs.patch
16---
17 moduli.5 | 4 ++--
18 ssh-keygen.1 | 12 ++++--------
19 ssh.1 | 4 ++++
20 sshd.8 | 5 ++---
21 sshd_config.5 | 3 +--
22 5 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
23
24diff --git a/moduli.5 b/moduli.5
25index ef0de08..149846c 100644
26--- a/moduli.5
27+++ b/moduli.5
28@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
29 .Nd Diffie-Hellman moduli
30 .Sh DESCRIPTION
31 The
32-.Pa /etc/moduli
33+.Pa /etc/ssh/moduli
34 file contains prime numbers and generators for use by
35 .Xr sshd 8
36 in the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange key exchange method.
37@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ first estimates the size of the modulus required to produce enough
38 Diffie-Hellman output to sufficiently key the selected symmetric cipher.
39 .Xr sshd 8
40 then randomly selects a modulus from
41-.Fa /etc/moduli
42+.Fa /etc/ssh/moduli
43 that best meets the size requirement.
44 .Sh SEE ALSO
45 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
46diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
47index 723a016..79b948c 100644
48--- a/ssh-keygen.1
49+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
50@@ -172,9 +172,7 @@ key in
51 .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
52 or
53 .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa .
54-Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys,
55-as seen in
56-.Pa /etc/rc .
57+Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys.
58 .Pp
59 Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which
60 to store the private key.
61@@ -221,9 +219,7 @@ For each of the key types (rsa1, rsa, dsa, ecdsa and ed25519)
62 for which host keys
63 do not exist, generate the host keys with the default key file path,
64 an empty passphrase, default bits for the key type, and default comment.
65-This is used by
66-.Pa /etc/rc
67-to generate new host keys.
68+This is used by system administration scripts to generate new host keys.
69 .It Fl a Ar rounds
70 When saving a new-format private key (i.e. an ed25519 key or any SSH protocol
71 2 key when the
72@@ -628,7 +624,7 @@ option.
73 Valid generator values are 2, 3, and 5.
74 .Pp
75 Screened DH groups may be installed in
76-.Pa /etc/moduli .
77+.Pa /etc/ssh/moduli .
78 It is important that this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths and
79 that both ends of a connection share common moduli.
80 .Sh CERTIFICATES
81@@ -827,7 +823,7 @@ on all machines
82 where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication.
83 There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret.
84 .Pp
85-.It Pa /etc/moduli
86+.It Pa /etc/ssh/moduli
87 Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX.
88 The file format is described in
89 .Xr moduli 5 .
90diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
91index 7f6ab77..de178cd 100644
92--- a/ssh.1
93+++ b/ssh.1
94@@ -753,6 +753,10 @@ Protocol 1 is restricted to using only RSA keys,
95 but protocol 2 may use any.
96 The HISTORY section of
97 .Xr ssl 8
98+(on non-OpenBSD systems, see
99+.nh
100+http://www.openbsd.org/cgi\-bin/man.cgi?query=ssl&sektion=8#HISTORY)
101+.hy
102 contains a brief discussion of the DSA and RSA algorithms.
103 .Pp
104 The file
105diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
106index eaeac45..3538208 100644
107--- a/sshd.8
108+++ b/sshd.8
109@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ over an insecure network.
110 .Nm
111 listens for connections from clients.
112 It is normally started at boot from
113-.Pa /etc/rc .
114+.Pa /etc/init.d/ssh .
115 It forks a new
116 daemon for each incoming connection.
117 The forked daemons handle
118@@ -862,7 +862,7 @@ This file is for host-based authentication (see
119 .Xr ssh 1 ) .
120 It should only be writable by root.
121 .Pp
122-.It Pa /etc/moduli
123+.It Pa /etc/ssh/moduli
124 Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange".
125 The file format is described in
126 .Xr moduli 5 .
127@@ -961,7 +961,6 @@ The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
128 .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
129 .Xr chroot 2 ,
130 .Xr hosts_access 5 ,
131-.Xr login.conf 5 ,
132 .Xr moduli 5 ,
133 .Xr sshd_config 5 ,
134 .Xr inetd 8 ,
135diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
136index 58997d3..7396b23 100644
137--- a/sshd_config.5
138+++ b/sshd_config.5
139@@ -303,8 +303,7 @@ This option is only available for protocol version 2.
140 By default, no banner is displayed.
141 .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
142 Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
143-PAM or through authentication styles supported in
144-.Xr login.conf 5 )
145+PAM).
146 The default is
147 .Dq yes .
148 .It Cm ChrootDirectory
diff --git a/debian/patches/package-versioning.patch b/debian/patches/package-versioning.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..07a28af9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/package-versioning.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
1From 8679c96f74ee7dbea6c15c764b036fbab7372740 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:05 +0000
4Subject: Include the Debian version in our identification
5
6This makes it easier to audit networks for versions patched against security
7vulnerabilities. It has little detrimental effect, as attackers will
8generally just try attacks rather than bothering to scan for
9vulnerable-looking version strings. (However, see debian-banner.patch.)
10
11Forwarded: not-needed
12Last-Update: 2013-09-14
13
14Patch-Name: package-versioning.patch
15---
16 sshconnect.c | 4 ++--
17 sshd.c | 2 +-
18 version.h | 7 ++++++-
19 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
20
21diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
22index ab83d0c..563405e 100644
23--- a/sshconnect.c
24+++ b/sshconnect.c
25@@ -521,10 +521,10 @@ send_client_banner(int connection_out, int minor1)
26 /* Send our own protocol version identification. */
27 if (compat20) {
28 xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\r\n",
29- PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION);
30+ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE);
31 } else {
32 xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n",
33- PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, minor1, SSH_VERSION);
34+ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, minor1, SSH_RELEASE);
35 }
36 if (roaming_atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, client_version_string,
37 strlen(client_version_string)) != strlen(client_version_string))
38diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
39index 48a14dd..1710e71 100644
40--- a/sshd.c
41+++ b/sshd.c
42@@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
43 }
44
45 xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s",
46- major, minor, SSH_VERSION,
47+ major, minor, SSH_RELEASE,
48 *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
49 options.version_addendum, newline);
50
51diff --git a/version.h b/version.h
52index cc8a079..0fee7c3 100644
53--- a/version.h
54+++ b/version.h
55@@ -3,4 +3,9 @@
56 #define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_6.7"
57
58 #define SSH_PORTABLE "p1"
59-#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
60+#define SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
61+#ifdef SSH_EXTRAVERSION
62+#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM " " SSH_EXTRAVERSION
63+#else
64+#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM
65+#endif
diff --git a/debian/patches/quieter-signals.patch b/debian/patches/quieter-signals.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6d9a2f9c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/quieter-signals.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
1From dc028c5992b4b14cca380b6ad2115fcc6907a8b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Peter Samuelson <peter@p12n.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:55 +0000
4Subject: Reduce severity of "Killed by signal %d"
5
6This produces irritating messages when using ProxyCommand or other programs
7that use ssh under the covers (e.g. Subversion). These messages are more
8normally printed by the calling program, such as the shell.
9
10According to the upstream bug, the right way to avoid this is to use the -q
11option, so we may drop this patch after further investigation into whether
12any software in Debian is still relying on it.
13
14Author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
15Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1118
16Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/313371
17Last-Update: 2013-09-14
18
19Patch-Name: quieter-signals.patch
20---
21 clientloop.c | 6 ++++--
22 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
23
24diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
25index 046ca8b..0180774 100644
26--- a/clientloop.c
27+++ b/clientloop.c
28@@ -1705,8 +1705,10 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id)
29 exit_status = 0;
30 }
31
32- if (received_signal)
33- fatal("Killed by signal %d.", (int) received_signal);
34+ if (received_signal) {
35+ debug("Killed by signal %d.", (int) received_signal);
36+ cleanup_exit((int) received_signal + 128);
37+ }
38
39 /*
40 * In interactive mode (with pseudo tty) display a message indicating
diff --git a/debian/patches/restore-tcp-wrappers.patch b/debian/patches/restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c590f52ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
1From b25d6dd3b6b5a2cb93723586c56d6fa0277ea56a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Tue, 7 Oct 2014 13:22:41 +0100
4Subject: Restore TCP wrappers support
5
6Support for TCP wrappers was dropped in OpenSSH 6.7. See this message
7and thread:
8
9 https://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/2014-April/032497.html
10
11It is true that this reduces preauth attack surface in sshd. On the
12other hand, this support seems to be quite widely used, and abruptly
13dropping it (from the perspective of users who don't read
14openssh-unix-dev) could easily cause more serious problems in practice.
15
16It's not entirely clear what the right long-term answer for Debian is,
17but it at least probably doesn't involve dropping this feature shortly
18before a freeze.
19
20Forwarded: not-needed
21Last-Update: 2014-10-07
22
23Patch-Name: restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
24---
25 configure.ac | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
26 sshd.8 | 7 +++++++
27 sshd.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
28 3 files changed, 89 insertions(+)
29
30diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
31index 90e81e1..7f160f1 100644
32--- a/configure.ac
33+++ b/configure.ac
34@@ -1404,6 +1404,62 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([skey],
35 ]
36 )
37
38+# Check whether user wants TCP wrappers support
39+TCPW_MSG="no"
40+AC_ARG_WITH([tcp-wrappers],
41+ [ --with-tcp-wrappers[[=PATH]] Enable tcpwrappers support (optionally in PATH)],
42+ [
43+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
44+ saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
45+ saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
46+ saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
47+ if test -n "${withval}" && \
48+ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
49+ if test -d "${withval}/lib"; then
50+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
51+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
52+ else
53+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
54+ fi
55+ else
56+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
57+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
58+ else
59+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
60+ fi
61+ fi
62+ if test -d "${withval}/include"; then
63+ CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
64+ else
65+ CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
66+ fi
67+ fi
68+ LIBS="-lwrap $LIBS"
69+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libwrap])
70+ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
71+#include <sys/types.h>
72+#include <sys/socket.h>
73+#include <netinet/in.h>
74+#include <tcpd.h>
75+int deny_severity = 0, allow_severity = 0;
76+ ]], [[
77+ hosts_access(0);
78+ ]])], [
79+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
80+ AC_DEFINE([LIBWRAP], [1],
81+ [Define if you want
82+ TCP Wrappers support])
83+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lwrap"
84+ TCPW_MSG="yes"
85+ ], [
86+ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libwrap missing])
87+
88+ ])
89+ LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
90+ fi
91+ ]
92+)
93+
94 # Check whether user wants to use ldns
95 LDNS_MSG="no"
96 AC_ARG_WITH(ldns,
97@@ -4853,6 +4909,7 @@ echo " KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG"
98 echo " SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
99 echo " Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG"
100 echo " S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"
101+echo " TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG"
102 echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
103 echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
104 echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
105diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
106index 01459d6..eaeac45 100644
107--- a/sshd.8
108+++ b/sshd.8
109@@ -851,6 +851,12 @@ the user's home directory becomes accessible.
110 This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be
111 readable by anyone else.
112 .Pp
113+.It Pa /etc/hosts.allow
114+.It Pa /etc/hosts.deny
115+Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are defined here.
116+Further details are described in
117+.Xr hosts_access 5 .
118+.Pp
119 .It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
120 This file is for host-based authentication (see
121 .Xr ssh 1 ) .
122@@ -954,6 +960,7 @@ The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
123 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
124 .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
125 .Xr chroot 2 ,
126+.Xr hosts_access 5 ,
127 .Xr login.conf 5 ,
128 .Xr moduli 5 ,
129 .Xr sshd_config 5 ,
130diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
131index e6706a8..3a6be65 100644
132--- a/sshd.c
133+++ b/sshd.c
134@@ -127,6 +127,13 @@
135 #include <Security/AuthSession.h>
136 #endif
137
138+#ifdef LIBWRAP
139+#include <tcpd.h>
140+#include <syslog.h>
141+int allow_severity;
142+int deny_severity;
143+#endif /* LIBWRAP */
144+
145 #ifndef O_NOCTTY
146 #define O_NOCTTY 0
147 #endif
148@@ -2061,6 +2068,24 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
149 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
150 audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
151 #endif
152+#ifdef LIBWRAP
153+ allow_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_INFO;
154+ deny_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_WARNING;
155+ /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */
156+ if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
157+ struct request_info req;
158+
159+ request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0);
160+ fromhost(&req);
161+
162+ if (!hosts_access(&req)) {
163+ debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper");
164+ refuse(&req);
165+ /* NOTREACHED */
166+ fatal("libwrap refuse returns");
167+ }
168+ }
169+#endif /* LIBWRAP */
170
171 /* Log the connection. */
172 verbose("Connection from %s port %d on %s port %d",
diff --git a/debian/patches/scp-quoting.patch b/debian/patches/scp-quoting.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ee006da93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/scp-quoting.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
1From fd174c13c46191abdb33c0a45545573a8e06b061 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: =?UTF-8?q?Nicolas=20Valc=C3=A1rcel?= <nvalcarcel@ubuntu.com>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:59 +0000
4Subject: Adjust scp quoting in verbose mode
5
6Tweak scp's reporting of filenames in verbose mode to be a bit less
7confusing with spaces.
8
9This should be revised to mimic real shell quoting.
10
11Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/89945
12Last-Update: 2010-02-27
13
14Patch-Name: scp-quoting.patch
15---
16 scp.c | 12 ++++++++++--
17 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
18
19diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
20index 1ec3b70..a1b318b 100644
21--- a/scp.c
22+++ b/scp.c
23@@ -189,8 +189,16 @@ do_local_cmd(arglist *a)
24
25 if (verbose_mode) {
26 fprintf(stderr, "Executing:");
27- for (i = 0; i < a->num; i++)
28- fprintf(stderr, " %s", a->list[i]);
29+ for (i = 0; i < a->num; i++) {
30+ if (i == 0)
31+ fprintf(stderr, " %s", a->list[i]);
32+ else
33+ /*
34+ * TODO: misbehaves if a->list[i] contains a
35+ * single quote
36+ */
37+ fprintf(stderr, " '%s'", a->list[i]);
38+ }
39 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
40 }
41 if ((pid = fork()) == -1)
diff --git a/debian/patches/selinux-role.patch b/debian/patches/selinux-role.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1fa0bf928
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/selinux-role.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,504 @@
1From c9638aa44d787849cea1ae273f0908c6313fd19b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Manoj Srivastava <srivasta@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:49 +0000
4Subject: Handle SELinux authorisation roles
5
6Rejected upstream due to discomfort with magic usernames; a better approach
7will need an SSH protocol change. In the meantime, this came from Debian's
8SELinux maintainer, so we'll keep it until we have something better.
9
10Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1641
11Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/394795
12Last-Update: 2013-09-14
13
14Patch-Name: selinux-role.patch
15---
16 auth.h | 1 +
17 auth1.c | 8 +++++++-
18 auth2.c | 10 ++++++++--
19 monitor.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
20 monitor.h | 2 ++
21 monitor_wrap.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++--
22 monitor_wrap.h | 3 ++-
23 openbsd-compat/port-linux.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++-------
24 openbsd-compat/port-linux.h | 4 ++--
25 platform.c | 4 ++--
26 platform.h | 2 +-
27 session.c | 10 +++++-----
28 session.h | 2 +-
29 sshd.c | 2 +-
30 sshpty.c | 4 ++--
31 sshpty.h | 2 +-
32 16 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
33
34diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
35index d081c94..f099e98 100644
36--- a/auth.h
37+++ b/auth.h
38@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
39 char *service;
40 struct passwd *pw; /* set if 'valid' */
41 char *style;
42+ char *role;
43 void *kbdintctxt;
44 char *info; /* Extra info for next auth_log */
45 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
46diff --git a/auth1.c b/auth1.c
47index 5038828..52b17db 100644
48--- a/auth1.c
49+++ b/auth1.c
50@@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ void
51 do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
52 {
53 u_int ulen;
54- char *user, *style = NULL;
55+ char *user, *style = NULL, *role = NULL;
56
57 /* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */
58 packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_USER);
59@@ -390,11 +390,17 @@ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
60 user = packet_get_cstring(&ulen);
61 packet_check_eom();
62
63+ if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
64+ *role++ = '\0';
65+
66 if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
67 *style++ = '\0';
68+ else if (role && (style = strchr(role, ':')) != NULL)
69+ *style++ = '\0';
70
71 authctxt->user = user;
72 authctxt->style = style;
73+ authctxt->role = role;
74
75 /* Verify that the user is a valid user. */
76 if ((authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user))) != NULL)
77diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
78index 2f0d565..fa1a588 100644
79--- a/auth2.c
80+++ b/auth2.c
81@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
82 {
83 Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
84 Authmethod *m = NULL;
85- char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL;
86+ char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL, *role = NULL;
87 int authenticated = 0;
88
89 if (authctxt == NULL)
90@@ -229,8 +229,13 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
91 debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
92 debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
93
94+ if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
95+ *role++ = 0;
96+
97 if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
98 *style++ = 0;
99+ else if (role && (style = strchr(role, ':')) != NULL)
100+ *style++ = '\0';
101
102 if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) {
103 /* setup auth context */
104@@ -254,8 +259,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
105 use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
106 authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
107 authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
108+ authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
109 if (use_privsep)
110- mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
111+ mm_inform_authserv(service, style, role);
112 userauth_banner();
113 if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
114 packet_disconnect("no authentication methods enabled");
115diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
116index b0896ef..94b194d 100644
117--- a/monitor.c
118+++ b/monitor.c
119@@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
120 int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
121 int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
122 int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
123+int mm_answer_authrole(int, Buffer *);
124 int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
125 int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
126 int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
127@@ -229,6 +230,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
128 {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
129 {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
130 {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
131+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole},
132 {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
133 {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
134 #ifdef USE_PAM
135@@ -841,6 +843,7 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
136 else {
137 /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
138 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
139+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1);
140 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
141 }
142 #ifdef USE_PAM
143@@ -871,14 +874,37 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
144
145 authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
146 authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
147- debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
148- __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
149+ authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
150+ debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s, role=%s",
151+ __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style, authctxt->role);
152
153 if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
154 free(authctxt->style);
155 authctxt->style = NULL;
156 }
157
158+ if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
159+ free(authctxt->role);
160+ authctxt->role = NULL;
161+ }
162+
163+ return (0);
164+}
165+
166+int
167+mm_answer_authrole(int sock, Buffer *m)
168+{
169+ monitor_permit_authentications(1);
170+
171+ authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
172+ debug3("%s: role=%s",
173+ __func__, authctxt->role);
174+
175+ if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
176+ free(authctxt->role);
177+ authctxt->role = NULL;
178+ }
179+
180 return (0);
181 }
182
183@@ -1485,7 +1511,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
184 res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
185 if (res == 0)
186 goto error;
187- pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
188+ pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty, authctxt->role);
189
190 buffer_put_int(m, 1);
191 buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
192diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
193index 7f32b0c..4d5e8fa 100644
194--- a/monitor.h
195+++ b/monitor.h
196@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
197 MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151,
198 MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153,
199
200+ MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 154,
201+
202 };
203
204 struct mm_master;
205diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
206index e476f0d..6dc890a 100644
207--- a/monitor_wrap.c
208+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
209@@ -324,10 +324,10 @@ mm_auth2_read_banner(void)
210 return (banner);
211 }
212
213-/* Inform the privileged process about service and style */
214+/* Inform the privileged process about service, style, and role */
215
216 void
217-mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
218+mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style, char *role)
219 {
220 Buffer m;
221
222@@ -336,12 +336,30 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
223 buffer_init(&m);
224 buffer_put_cstring(&m, service);
225 buffer_put_cstring(&m, style ? style : "");
226+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : "");
227
228 mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, &m);
229
230 buffer_free(&m);
231 }
232
233+/* Inform the privileged process about role */
234+
235+void
236+mm_inform_authrole(char *role)
237+{
238+ Buffer m;
239+
240+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
241+
242+ buffer_init(&m);
243+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : "");
244+
245+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, &m);
246+
247+ buffer_free(&m);
248+}
249+
250 /* Do the password authentication */
251 int
252 mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password)
253diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
254index a4e9d24..9c2ee49 100644
255--- a/monitor_wrap.h
256+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
257@@ -41,7 +41,8 @@ void mm_log_handler(LogLevel, const char *, void *);
258 int mm_is_monitor(void);
259 DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
260 int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int);
261-void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
262+void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *, char *);
263+void mm_inform_authrole(char *);
264 struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *);
265 char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
266 int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *);
267diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
268index 4637a7a..de6ad3f 100644
269--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
270+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
271@@ -29,6 +29,12 @@
272 #include <string.h>
273 #include <stdio.h>
274
275+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
276+#include "key.h"
277+#include "hostfile.h"
278+#include "auth.h"
279+#endif
280+
281 #include "log.h"
282 #include "xmalloc.h"
283 #include "port-linux.h"
284@@ -58,7 +64,7 @@ ssh_selinux_enabled(void)
285
286 /* Return the default security context for the given username */
287 static security_context_t
288-ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
289+ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, const char *role)
290 {
291 security_context_t sc = NULL;
292 char *sename = NULL, *lvl = NULL;
293@@ -73,9 +79,16 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
294 #endif
295
296 #ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
297- r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
298+ if (role != NULL && role[0])
299+ r = get_default_context_with_rolelevel(sename, role, lvl, NULL,
300+ &sc);
301+ else
302+ r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
303 #else
304- r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
305+ if (role != NULL && role[0])
306+ r = get_default_context_with_role(sename, role, NULL, &sc);
307+ else
308+ r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
309 #endif
310
311 if (r != 0) {
312@@ -105,7 +118,7 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
313
314 /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
315 void
316-ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
317+ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname, const char *role)
318 {
319 security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
320
321@@ -114,7 +127,7 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
322
323 debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
324
325- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
326+ user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, role);
327 if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
328 switch (security_getenforce()) {
329 case -1:
330@@ -136,7 +149,7 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
331
332 /* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
333 void
334-ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
335+ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty, const char *role)
336 {
337 security_context_t new_tty_ctx = NULL;
338 security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
339@@ -147,7 +160,7 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
340
341 debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
342
343- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
344+ user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, role);
345
346 /* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
347
348diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
349index e3d1004..80ce13a 100644
350--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
351+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
352@@ -21,8 +21,8 @@
353
354 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
355 int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
356-void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
357-void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
358+void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *, const char *);
359+void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *, const char *);
360 void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
361 void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
362 #endif
363diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
364index ee313da..f35ec39 100644
365--- a/platform.c
366+++ b/platform.c
367@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
368 * called if sshd is running as root.
369 */
370 void
371-platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
372+platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw, const char *role)
373 {
374 #if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(USE_PAM)
375 /*
376@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
377 }
378 #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
379 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
380- ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
381+ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name, role);
382 #endif
383 }
384
385diff --git a/platform.h b/platform.h
386index 1c7a45d..436ae7c 100644
387--- a/platform.h
388+++ b/platform.h
389@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ void platform_post_fork_parent(pid_t child_pid);
390 void platform_post_fork_child(void);
391 int platform_privileged_uidswap(void);
392 void platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
393-void platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *);
394+void platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *, const char *);
395 char *platform_get_krb5_client(const char *);
396 char *platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *);
397 int platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t);
398diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
399index 3e96557..6f389ac 100644
400--- a/session.c
401+++ b/session.c
402@@ -1486,7 +1486,7 @@ safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid)
403
404 /* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */
405 void
406-do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
407+do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw, const char *role)
408 {
409 char *chroot_path, *tmp;
410 #ifdef USE_LIBIAF
411@@ -1517,7 +1517,7 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
412 endgrent();
413 #endif
414
415- platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw);
416+ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw, role);
417
418 if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
419 strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
420@@ -1676,7 +1676,7 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
421
422 /* Force a password change */
423 if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
424- do_setusercontext(pw);
425+ do_setusercontext(pw, s->authctxt->role);
426 child_close_fds();
427 do_pwchange(s);
428 exit(1);
429@@ -1703,7 +1703,7 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
430 /* When PAM is enabled we rely on it to do the nologin check */
431 if (!options.use_pam)
432 do_nologin(pw);
433- do_setusercontext(pw);
434+ do_setusercontext(pw, s->authctxt->role);
435 /*
436 * PAM session modules in do_setusercontext may have
437 * generated messages, so if this in an interactive
438@@ -2114,7 +2114,7 @@ session_pty_req(Session *s)
439 tty_parse_modes(s->ttyfd, &n_bytes);
440
441 if (!use_privsep)
442- pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty);
443+ pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty, s->authctxt->role);
444
445 /* Set window size from the packet. */
446 pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
447diff --git a/session.h b/session.h
448index 6a2f35e..ef6593c 100644
449--- a/session.h
450+++ b/session.h
451@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *);
452 Session *session_new(void);
453 Session *session_by_tty(char *);
454 void session_close(Session *);
455-void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
456+void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *, const char *);
457 void child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
458 const char *value);
459
460diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
461index 3a6be65..48a14dd 100644
462--- a/sshd.c
463+++ b/sshd.c
464@@ -772,7 +772,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
465 explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
466
467 /* Drop privileges */
468- do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
469+ do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw, authctxt->role);
470
471 skip:
472 /* It is safe now to apply the key state */
473diff --git a/sshpty.c b/sshpty.c
474index a2059b7..3512ec8 100644
475--- a/sshpty.c
476+++ b/sshpty.c
477@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ pty_change_window_size(int ptyfd, u_int row, u_int col,
478 }
479
480 void
481-pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty)
482+pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty, const char *role)
483 {
484 struct group *grp;
485 gid_t gid;
486@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty)
487 strerror(errno));
488
489 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
490- ssh_selinux_setup_pty(pw->pw_name, tty);
491+ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(pw->pw_name, tty, role);
492 #endif
493
494 if (st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid || st.st_gid != gid) {
495diff --git a/sshpty.h b/sshpty.h
496index cfa3224..edf2436 100644
497--- a/sshpty.h
498+++ b/sshpty.h
499@@ -24,4 +24,4 @@ int pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
500 void pty_release(const char *);
501 void pty_make_controlling_tty(int *, const char *);
502 void pty_change_window_size(int, u_int, u_int, u_int, u_int);
503-void pty_setowner(struct passwd *, const char *);
504+void pty_setowner(struct passwd *, const char *, const char *);
diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bbc7a5fb4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/series
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
1gssapi.patch
2restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
3selinux-role.patch
4ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch
5ssh1-keepalive.patch
6keepalive-extensions.patch
7syslog-level-silent.patch
8quieter-signals.patch
9helpful-wait-terminate.patch
10consolekit.patch
11user-group-modes.patch
12scp-quoting.patch
13shell-path.patch
14dnssec-sshfp.patch
15auth-log-verbosity.patch
16mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch
17package-versioning.patch
18debian-banner.patch
19authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
20lintian-symlink-pickiness.patch
21openbsd-docs.patch
22ssh-argv0.patch
23doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
24doc-upstart.patch
25ssh-agent-setgid.patch
26no-openssl-version-status.patch
27gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
28sigstop.patch
29debian-config.patch
diff --git a/debian/patches/shell-path.patch b/debian/patches/shell-path.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..07e20f03d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/shell-path.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
1From 66377fbb52584b41bd7f6f19116107fbbad41058 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:00 +0000
4Subject: Look for $SHELL on the path for ProxyCommand/LocalCommand
5
6There's some debate on the upstream bug about whether POSIX requires this.
7I (Colin Watson) agree with Vincent and think it does.
8
9Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1494
10Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/492728
11Last-Update: 2013-09-14
12
13Patch-Name: shell-path.patch
14---
15 sshconnect.c | 4 ++--
16 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
17
18diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
19index ac09eae..26116d2 100644
20--- a/sshconnect.c
21+++ b/sshconnect.c
22@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command)
23 /* Execute the proxy command. Note that we gave up any
24 extra privileges above. */
25 signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
26- execv(argv[0], argv);
27+ execvp(argv[0], argv);
28 perror(argv[0]);
29 exit(1);
30 }
31@@ -1416,7 +1416,7 @@ ssh_local_cmd(const char *args)
32 if (pid == 0) {
33 signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
34 debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args);
35- execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
36+ execlp(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
37 error("Couldn't execute %s -c \"%s\": %s",
38 shell, args, strerror(errno));
39 _exit(1);
diff --git a/debian/patches/sigstop.patch b/debian/patches/sigstop.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1eaa7758b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/sigstop.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
1From 689f465c66059e527974c6d4ea8e95f04d5abab7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:17 +0000
4Subject: Support synchronisation with service supervisor using SIGSTOP
5
6Author: Robie Basak <robie.basak@ubuntu.com>
7Forwarded: no
8Last-Update: 2014-04-14
9
10Patch-Name: sigstop.patch
11---
12 sshd.c | 10 ++++++++++
13 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
14
15diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
16index 87331c1..23d5a64 100644
17--- a/sshd.c
18+++ b/sshd.c
19@@ -1958,6 +1958,16 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
20 }
21 }
22
23+ if (getenv("SSH_SIGSTOP")) {
24+ /* Tell service supervisor that we are ready. */
25+ kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP);
26+ /* The service supervisor only ever expects a single
27+ * STOP signal, so do not ever signal it again, even
28+ * in the case of a re-exec or future children.
29+ */
30+ unsetenv("SSH_SIGSTOP");
31+ }
32+
33 /* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
34 server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
35 &newsock, config_s);
diff --git a/debian/patches/ssh-agent-setgid.patch b/debian/patches/ssh-agent-setgid.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9c3ddc86e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/ssh-agent-setgid.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
1From 78dd041bb6ad29ceb35f05b539b09ccf761eaee2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:13 +0000
4Subject: Document consequences of ssh-agent being setgid in ssh-agent(1)
5
6Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/711623
7Forwarded: no
8Last-Update: 2013-06-08
9
10Patch-Name: ssh-agent-setgid.patch
11---
12 ssh-agent.1 | 15 +++++++++++++++
13 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
14
15diff --git a/ssh-agent.1 b/ssh-agent.1
16index a1e634f..f2c4080 100644
17--- a/ssh-agent.1
18+++ b/ssh-agent.1
19@@ -172,6 +172,21 @@ environment variable holds the agent's process ID.
20 .Pp
21 The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command
22 line terminates.
23+.Pp
24+In Debian,
25+.Nm
26+is installed with the set-group-id bit set, to prevent
27+.Xr ptrace 2
28+attacks retrieving private key material.
29+This has the side-effect of causing the run-time linker to remove certain
30+environment variables which might have security implications for set-id
31+programs, including
32+.Ev LD_PRELOAD ,
33+.Ev LD_LIBRARY_PATH ,
34+and
35+.Ev TMPDIR .
36+If you need to set any of these environment variables, you will need to do
37+so in the program executed by ssh-agent.
38 .Sh FILES
39 .Bl -tag -width Ds
40 .It Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt
diff --git a/debian/patches/ssh-argv0.patch b/debian/patches/ssh-argv0.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0ccf7c42b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/ssh-argv0.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
1From cbd5cb03866f6df50c82d26588b73135d05bf245 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:10 +0000
4Subject: ssh(1): Refer to ssh-argv0(1)
5
6Old versions of OpenSSH (up to 2.5 or thereabouts) allowed creating symlinks
7to ssh with the name of the host you want to connect to. Debian ships an
8ssh-argv0 script restoring this feature; this patch refers to its manual
9page from ssh(1).
10
11Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/111341
12Forwarded: not-needed
13Last-Update: 2013-09-14
14
15Patch-Name: ssh-argv0.patch
16---
17 ssh.1 | 1 +
18 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
19
20diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
21index de178cd..2606b15 100644
22--- a/ssh.1
23+++ b/ssh.1
24@@ -1458,6 +1458,7 @@ if an error occurred.
25 .Xr sftp 1 ,
26 .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
27 .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
28+.Xr ssh-argv0 1 ,
29 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
30 .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
31 .Xr tun 4 ,
diff --git a/debian/patches/ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch b/debian/patches/ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..427ee6be1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
1From e6836d7c98c75d3252de56c2f3ea07e12c817e00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@ubuntu.com>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:50 +0000
4Subject: Accept obsolete ssh-vulnkey configuration options
5
6These options were used as part of Debian's response to CVE-2008-0166.
7Nearly six years later, we no longer need to continue carrying the bulk
8of that patch, but we do need to avoid failing when the associated
9configuration options are still present.
10
11Last-Update: 2014-02-09
12
13Patch-Name: ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch
14---
15 readconf.c | 1 +
16 servconf.c | 1 +
17 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
18
19diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
20index 9127e93..bc879eb 100644
21--- a/readconf.c
22+++ b/readconf.c
23@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ static struct {
24 { "passwordauthentication", oPasswordAuthentication },
25 { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication },
26 { "kbdinteractivedevices", oKbdInteractiveDevices },
27+ { "useblacklistedkeys", oDeprecated },
28 { "rsaauthentication", oRSAAuthentication },
29 { "pubkeyauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication },
30 { "dsaauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication }, /* alias */
31diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
32index cb3c831..a252487 100644
33--- a/servconf.c
34+++ b/servconf.c
35@@ -462,6 +462,7 @@ static struct {
36 { "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
37 { "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
38 { "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
39+ { "permitblacklistedkeys", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
40 { "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd, SSHCFG_ALL },
41 { "permituserenvironment", sPermitUserEnvironment, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
42 { "uselogin", sUseLogin, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
diff --git a/debian/patches/ssh1-keepalive.patch b/debian/patches/ssh1-keepalive.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2e5fa306d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/ssh1-keepalive.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
1From cbbc8577950b93090171c7394bcdeb68b7c3cd0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:51 +0000
4Subject: Partial server keep-alive implementation for SSH1
5
6Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1712
7Last-Update: 2013-09-14
8
9Patch-Name: ssh1-keepalive.patch
10---
11 clientloop.c | 25 +++++++++++++++----------
12 ssh_config.5 | 5 ++++-
13 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
14
15diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
16index f9175e3..046ca8b 100644
17--- a/clientloop.c
18+++ b/clientloop.c
19@@ -563,16 +563,21 @@ client_global_request_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
20 static void
21 server_alive_check(void)
22 {
23- if (packet_inc_alive_timeouts() > options.server_alive_count_max) {
24- logit("Timeout, server %s not responding.", host);
25- cleanup_exit(255);
26+ if (compat20) {
27+ if (packet_inc_alive_timeouts() > options.server_alive_count_max) {
28+ logit("Timeout, server %s not responding.", host);
29+ cleanup_exit(255);
30+ }
31+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
32+ packet_put_cstring("keepalive@openssh.com");
33+ packet_put_char(1); /* boolean: want reply */
34+ packet_send();
35+ /* Insert an empty placeholder to maintain ordering */
36+ client_register_global_confirm(NULL, NULL);
37+ } else {
38+ packet_send_ignore(0);
39+ packet_send();
40 }
41- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
42- packet_put_cstring("keepalive@openssh.com");
43- packet_put_char(1); /* boolean: want reply */
44- packet_send();
45- /* Insert an empty placeholder to maintain ordering */
46- client_register_global_confirm(NULL, NULL);
47 }
48
49 /*
50@@ -634,7 +639,7 @@ client_wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp,
51 */
52
53 timeout_secs = INT_MAX; /* we use INT_MAX to mean no timeout */
54- if (options.server_alive_interval > 0 && compat20) {
55+ if (options.server_alive_interval > 0) {
56 timeout_secs = options.server_alive_interval;
57 server_alive_time = now + options.server_alive_interval;
58 }
59diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
60index e6649ac..01f1f7f 100644
61--- a/ssh_config.5
62+++ b/ssh_config.5
63@@ -1325,7 +1325,10 @@ If, for example,
64 .Cm ServerAliveCountMax
65 is left at the default, if the server becomes unresponsive,
66 ssh will disconnect after approximately 45 seconds.
67-This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
68+This option applies to protocol version 2 only; in protocol version
69+1 there is no mechanism to request a response from the server to the
70+server alive messages, so disconnection is the responsibility of the TCP
71+stack.
72 .It Cm ServerAliveInterval
73 Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received
74 from the server,
diff --git a/debian/patches/syslog-level-silent.patch b/debian/patches/syslog-level-silent.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bfc236927
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/syslog-level-silent.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
1From 69f7c00e04d1baa01a9038eeb764cfed0830fb19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Jonathan David Amery <jdamery@ysolde.ucam.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:54 +0000
4Subject: "LogLevel SILENT" compatibility
5
6"LogLevel SILENT" (-qq) was introduced in Debian openssh 1:3.0.1p1-1 to
7match the behaviour of non-free SSH, in which -q does not suppress fatal
8errors. However, this was unintentionally broken in 1:4.6p1-2 and nobody
9complained, so we've dropped most of it. The parts that remain are basic
10configuration file compatibility, and an adjustment to "Pseudo-terminal will
11not be allocated ..." which should be split out into a separate patch.
12
13Author: Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>
14Author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
15Last-Update: 2013-09-14
16
17Patch-Name: syslog-level-silent.patch
18---
19 log.c | 1 +
20 ssh.c | 2 +-
21 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
22
23diff --git a/log.c b/log.c
24index 32e1d2e..53e7b65 100644
25--- a/log.c
26+++ b/log.c
27@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ static struct {
28 LogLevel val;
29 } log_levels[] =
30 {
31+ { "SILENT", SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET }, /* compatibility */
32 { "QUIET", SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET },
33 { "FATAL", SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL },
34 { "ERROR", SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR },
35diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
36index 26e9681..5bce695 100644
37--- a/ssh.c
38+++ b/ssh.c
39@@ -989,7 +989,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
40 /* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */
41 if ((!isatty(fileno(stdin)) || stdin_null_flag) &&
42 options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_FORCE) {
43- if (tty_flag)
44+ if (tty_flag && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
45 logit("Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because "
46 "stdin is not a terminal.");
47 tty_flag = 0;
diff --git a/debian/patches/user-group-modes.patch b/debian/patches/user-group-modes.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e4e4657f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/user-group-modes.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
1From 28ea747089f695e58a476a2849133402d4f86b92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:58 +0000
4Subject: Allow harmless group-writability
5
6Allow secure files (~/.ssh/config, ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, etc.) to be
7group-writable, provided that the group in question contains only the file's
8owner. Rejected upstream for IMO incorrect reasons (e.g. a misunderstanding
9about the contents of gr->gr_mem). Given that per-user groups and umask 002
10are the default setup in Debian (for good reasons - this makes operating in
11setgid directories with other groups much easier), we need to permit this by
12default.
13
14Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1060
15Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=314347
16Last-Update: 2013-09-14
17
18Patch-Name: user-group-modes.patch
19---
20 auth-rhosts.c | 6 ++----
21 auth.c | 9 +++-----
22 misc.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
23 misc.h | 2 ++
24 platform.c | 16 --------------
25 readconf.c | 5 +++--
26 ssh.1 | 2 ++
27 ssh_config.5 | 2 ++
28 8 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
29
30diff --git a/auth-rhosts.c b/auth-rhosts.c
31index b5bedee..11fcca6 100644
32--- a/auth-rhosts.c
33+++ b/auth-rhosts.c
34@@ -256,8 +256,7 @@ auth_rhosts2_raw(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostnam
35 return 0;
36 }
37 if (options.strict_modes &&
38- ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
39- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
40+ !secure_permissions(&st, pw->pw_uid)) {
41 logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
42 "bad ownership or modes for home directory.", pw->pw_name);
43 auth_debug_add("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
44@@ -283,8 +282,7 @@ auth_rhosts2_raw(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostnam
45 * allowing access to their account by anyone.
46 */
47 if (options.strict_modes &&
48- ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
49- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
50+ !secure_permissions(&st, pw->pw_uid)) {
51 logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: bad modes for %.200s",
52 pw->pw_name, buf);
53 auth_debug_add("Bad file modes for %.200s", buf);
54diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
55index 5e60682..18de51a 100644
56--- a/auth.c
57+++ b/auth.c
58@@ -421,8 +421,7 @@ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
59 user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
60 if (options.strict_modes &&
61 (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
62- ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
63- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
64+ !secure_permissions(&st, pw->pw_uid)) {
65 logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
66 "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
67 pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
68@@ -484,8 +483,7 @@ auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
69 snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf);
70 return -1;
71 }
72- if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) ||
73- (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) {
74+ if (!secure_permissions(stp, uid)) {
75 snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
76 buf);
77 return -1;
78@@ -500,8 +498,7 @@ auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
79 strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
80
81 if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
82- (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) ||
83- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
84+ !secure_permissions(&st, uid)) {
85 snprintf(err, errlen,
86 "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
87 return -1;
88diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
89index 94b05b0..c25ccd8 100644
90--- a/misc.c
91+++ b/misc.c
92@@ -50,8 +50,9 @@
93 #include <netdb.h>
94 #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
95 # include <paths.h>
96-#include <pwd.h>
97 #endif
98+#include <pwd.h>
99+#include <grp.h>
100 #ifdef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD
101 #include <net/if.h>
102 #endif
103@@ -60,6 +61,7 @@
104 #include "misc.h"
105 #include "log.h"
106 #include "ssh.h"
107+#include "platform.h"
108
109 /* remove newline at end of string */
110 char *
111@@ -644,6 +646,71 @@ read_keyfile_line(FILE *f, const char *filename, char *buf, size_t bufsz,
112 return -1;
113 }
114
115+/*
116+ * return 1 if the specified uid is a uid that may own a system directory
117+ * otherwise 0.
118+ */
119+int
120+platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t uid)
121+{
122+ if (uid == 0)
123+ return 1;
124+#ifdef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID
125+ if (uid == PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID)
126+ return 1;
127+#endif
128+ return 0;
129+}
130+
131+int
132+secure_permissions(struct stat *st, uid_t uid)
133+{
134+ if (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st->st_uid) && st->st_uid != uid)
135+ return 0;
136+ if ((st->st_mode & 002) != 0)
137+ return 0;
138+ if ((st->st_mode & 020) != 0) {
139+ /* If the file is group-writable, the group in question must
140+ * have exactly one member, namely the file's owner.
141+ * (Zero-member groups are typically used by setgid
142+ * binaries, and are unlikely to be suitable.)
143+ */
144+ struct passwd *pw;
145+ struct group *gr;
146+ int members = 0;
147+
148+ gr = getgrgid(st->st_gid);
149+ if (!gr)
150+ return 0;
151+
152+ /* Check primary group memberships. */
153+ while ((pw = getpwent()) != NULL) {
154+ if (pw->pw_gid == gr->gr_gid) {
155+ ++members;
156+ if (pw->pw_uid != uid)
157+ return 0;
158+ }
159+ }
160+ endpwent();
161+
162+ pw = getpwuid(st->st_uid);
163+ if (!pw)
164+ return 0;
165+
166+ /* Check supplementary group memberships. */
167+ if (gr->gr_mem[0]) {
168+ ++members;
169+ if (strcmp(pw->pw_name, gr->gr_mem[0]) ||
170+ gr->gr_mem[1])
171+ return 0;
172+ }
173+
174+ if (!members)
175+ return 0;
176+ }
177+ return 1;
178+}
179+
180 int
181 tun_open(int tun, int mode)
182 {
183diff --git a/misc.h b/misc.h
184index 374c33c..89e1f75 100644
185--- a/misc.h
186+++ b/misc.h
187@@ -135,4 +135,6 @@ char *read_passphrase(const char *, int);
188 int ask_permission(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
189 int read_keyfile_line(FILE *, const char *, char *, size_t, u_long *);
190
191+int secure_permissions(struct stat *st, uid_t uid);
192+
193 #endif /* _MISC_H */
194diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
195index f35ec39..9a23e6e 100644
196--- a/platform.c
197+++ b/platform.c
198@@ -197,19 +197,3 @@ platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *pw_name)
199 return NULL;
200 #endif
201 }
202-
203-/*
204- * return 1 if the specified uid is a uid that may own a system directory
205- * otherwise 0.
206- */
207-int
208-platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t uid)
209-{
210- if (uid == 0)
211- return 1;
212-#ifdef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID
213- if (uid == PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID)
214- return 1;
215-#endif
216- return 0;
217-}
218diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
219index 337818c..0648867 100644
220--- a/readconf.c
221+++ b/readconf.c
222@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@
223 #include <stdio.h>
224 #include <string.h>
225 #include <unistd.h>
226+#include <pwd.h>
227+#include <grp.h>
228 #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
229 #include <util.h>
230 #endif
231@@ -1516,8 +1518,7 @@ read_config_file(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
232
233 if (fstat(fileno(f), &sb) == -1)
234 fatal("fstat %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno));
235- if (((sb.st_uid != 0 && sb.st_uid != getuid()) ||
236- (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0))
237+ if (!secure_permissions(&sb, getuid()))
238 fatal("Bad owner or permissions on %s", filename);
239 }
240
241diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
242index fa5cfb2..7f6ab77 100644
243--- a/ssh.1
244+++ b/ssh.1
245@@ -1342,6 +1342,8 @@ The file format and configuration options are described in
246 .Xr ssh_config 5 .
247 Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
248 read/write for the user, and not writable by others.
249+It may be group-writable provided that the group in question contains only
250+the user.
251 .Pp
252 .It Pa ~/.ssh/environment
253 Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see
254diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
255index ea92ea8..d68b45a 100644
256--- a/ssh_config.5
257+++ b/ssh_config.5
258@@ -1587,6 +1587,8 @@ The format of this file is described above.
259 This file is used by the SSH client.
260 Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
261 read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
262+It may be group-writable provided that the group in question contains only
263+the user.
264 .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
265 Systemwide configuration file.
266 This file provides defaults for those
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-14 19:40:44 +0000