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-rw-r--r--debian/patches/auth-log-verbosity.patch119
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch26
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/debian-banner.patch111
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/debian-config.patch238
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/dnssec-sshfp.patch94
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/doc-hash-tab-completion.patch28
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/doc-upstart.patch29
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch26
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/gssapi.patch3283
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/keepalive-extensions.patch134
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch42
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/no-openssl-version-status.patch62
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/openbsd-docs.patch148
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/package-versioning.patch65
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/quieter-signals.patch40
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/regress-forwarding-race.patch115
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/regress-integrity-robust.patch57
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/regress-mktemp.patch167
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/restore-tcp-wrappers.patch172
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/sandbox-x32-workaround.patch37
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/scp-quoting.patch41
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/selinux-role.patch473
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/series30
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/shell-path.patch39
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/sigstop.patch35
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/ssh-agent-setgid.patch40
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/ssh-argv0.patch31
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch42
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/syslog-level-silent.patch47
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/systemd-readiness.patch84
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/user-group-modes.patch259
31 files changed, 6114 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/debian/patches/auth-log-verbosity.patch b/debian/patches/auth-log-verbosity.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0f46b253b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/auth-log-verbosity.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
1From 46602f789c947e6af524d0b4c9774faf3dd073d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:02 +0000
4Subject: Quieten logs when multiple from= restrictions are used
5
6Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/630606
7Forwarded: no
8Last-Update: 2013-09-14
9
10Patch-Name: auth-log-verbosity.patch
11---
12 auth-options.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
13 auth-options.h | 1 +
14 auth2-pubkey.c | 3 +++
15 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
16
17diff --git a/auth-options.c b/auth-options.c
18index 57b49f7f..7eb87b35 100644
19--- a/auth-options.c
20+++ b/auth-options.c
21@@ -59,9 +59,20 @@ int forced_tun_device = -1;
22 /* "principals=" option. */
23 char *authorized_principals = NULL;
24
25+/* Throttle log messages. */
26+int logged_from_hostip = 0;
27+int logged_cert_hostip = 0;
28+
29 extern ServerOptions options;
30
31 void
32+auth_start_parse_options(void)
33+{
34+ logged_from_hostip = 0;
35+ logged_cert_hostip = 0;
36+}
37+
38+void
39 auth_clear_options(void)
40 {
41 no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
42@@ -316,10 +327,13 @@ auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum)
43 /* FALLTHROUGH */
44 case 0:
45 free(patterns);
46- logit("Authentication tried for %.100s with "
47- "correct key but not from a permitted "
48- "host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s).",
49- pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip);
50+ if (!logged_from_hostip) {
51+ logit("Authentication tried for %.100s with "
52+ "correct key but not from a permitted "
53+ "host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s).",
54+ pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip);
55+ logged_from_hostip = 1;
56+ }
57 auth_debug_add("Your host '%.200s' is not "
58 "permitted to use this key for login.",
59 remote_host);
60@@ -543,11 +557,14 @@ parse_option_list(struct sshbuf *oblob, struct passwd *pw,
61 break;
62 case 0:
63 /* no match */
64- logit("Authentication tried for %.100s "
65- "with valid certificate but not "
66- "from a permitted host "
67- "(ip=%.200s).", pw->pw_name,
68- remote_ip);
69+ if (!logged_cert_hostip) {
70+ logit("Authentication tried for %.100s "
71+ "with valid certificate but not "
72+ "from a permitted host "
73+ "(ip=%.200s).", pw->pw_name,
74+ remote_ip);
75+ logged_cert_hostip = 1;
76+ }
77 auth_debug_add("Your address '%.200s' "
78 "is not permitted to use this "
79 "certificate for login.",
80diff --git a/auth-options.h b/auth-options.h
81index 52cbb42a..82355276 100644
82--- a/auth-options.h
83+++ b/auth-options.h
84@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ extern int forced_tun_device;
85 extern int key_is_cert_authority;
86 extern char *authorized_principals;
87
88+void auth_start_parse_options(void);
89 int auth_parse_options(struct passwd *, char *, char *, u_long);
90 void auth_clear_options(void);
91 int auth_cert_options(struct sshkey *, struct passwd *, const char **);
92diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
93index 20f3309e..add77136 100644
94--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
95+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
96@@ -566,6 +566,7 @@ process_principals(FILE *f, char *file, struct passwd *pw,
97 u_long linenum = 0;
98 u_int i;
99
100+ auth_start_parse_options();
101 while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
102 /* Skip leading whitespace. */
103 for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
104@@ -764,6 +765,7 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
105 found_key = 0;
106
107 found = NULL;
108+ auth_start_parse_options();
109 while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
110 char *cp, *key_options = NULL, *fp = NULL;
111 const char *reason = NULL;
112@@ -911,6 +913,7 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
113 if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1,
114 use_authorized_principals ? NULL : pw->pw_name, &reason) != 0)
115 goto fail_reason;
116+ auth_start_parse_options();
117 if (auth_cert_options(key, pw, &reason) != 0)
118 goto fail_reason;
119
diff --git a/debian/patches/authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch b/debian/patches/authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2bee50ff1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
1From 300ba52e4888c6ee488eb8d4cd8fcb9936c420be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Tomas Pospisek <tpo_deb@sourcepole.ch>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:07 +0000
4Subject: Install authorized_keys(5) as a symlink to sshd(8)
5
6Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1720
7Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/441817
8Last-Update: 2013-09-14
9
10Patch-Name: authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
11---
12 Makefile.in | 1 +
13 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
14
15diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
16index 00a320e1..a6eb81ec 100644
17--- a/Makefile.in
18+++ b/Makefile.in
19@@ -335,6 +335,7 @@ install-files:
20 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5
21 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/ssh_config.5
22 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8
23+ ln -s ../$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/authorized_keys.5
24 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
25 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
26 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
diff --git a/debian/patches/debian-banner.patch b/debian/patches/debian-banner.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..afca1f120
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/debian-banner.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
1From c32eb5bc49794211d9c093694b960480d0f9c6cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Kees Cook <kees@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:06 +0000
4Subject: Add DebianBanner server configuration option
5
6Setting this to "no" causes sshd to omit the Debian revision from its
7initial protocol handshake, for those scared by package-versioning.patch.
8
9Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/562048
10Forwarded: not-needed
11Last-Update: 2015-11-29
12
13Patch-Name: debian-banner.patch
14---
15 servconf.c | 9 +++++++++
16 servconf.h | 2 ++
17 sshd.c | 3 ++-
18 sshd_config.5 | 5 +++++
19 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
20
21diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
22index 49d3bdc8..1cee3d6c 100644
23--- a/servconf.c
24+++ b/servconf.c
25@@ -166,6 +166,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
26 options->version_addendum = NULL;
27 options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
28 options->disable_forwarding = -1;
29+ options->debian_banner = -1;
30 }
31
32 /* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */
33@@ -339,6 +340,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
34 options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
35 if (options->disable_forwarding == -1)
36 options->disable_forwarding = 0;
37+ if (options->debian_banner == -1)
38+ options->debian_banner = 1;
39
40 assemble_algorithms(options);
41
42@@ -425,6 +428,7 @@ typedef enum {
43 sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC,
44 sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink,
45 sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash, sDisableForwarding,
46+ sDebianBanner,
47 sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported
48 } ServerOpCodes;
49
50@@ -577,6 +581,7 @@ static struct {
51 { "allowstreamlocalforwarding", sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
52 { "fingerprinthash", sFingerprintHash, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
53 { "disableforwarding", sDisableForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
54+ { "debianbanner", sDebianBanner, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
55 { NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
56 };
57
58@@ -1860,6 +1865,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
59 options->fingerprint_hash = value;
60 break;
61
62+ case sDebianBanner:
63+ intptr = &options->debian_banner;
64+ goto parse_int;
65+
66 case sDeprecated:
67 case sIgnore:
68 case sUnsupported:
69diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
70index 90dfa4c2..913a21b3 100644
71--- a/servconf.h
72+++ b/servconf.h
73@@ -191,6 +191,8 @@ typedef struct {
74 char *auth_methods[MAX_AUTH_METHODS];
75
76 int fingerprint_hash;
77+
78+ int debian_banner;
79 } ServerOptions;
80
81 /* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
82diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
83index 49f3a2e5..eebf1984 100644
84--- a/sshd.c
85+++ b/sshd.c
86@@ -378,7 +378,8 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int sock_in, int sock_out)
87 char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */
88
89 xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s",
90- PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE,
91+ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2,
92+ options.debian_banner ? SSH_RELEASE : SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM,
93 *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
94 options.version_addendum, newline);
95
96diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
97index 283ba889..4ea0a9c3 100644
98--- a/sshd_config.5
99+++ b/sshd_config.5
100@@ -526,6 +526,11 @@ or
101 .Cm no .
102 The default is
103 .Cm yes .
104+.It Cm DebianBanner
105+Specifies whether the distribution-specified extra version suffix is
106+included during initial protocol handshake.
107+The default is
108+.Cm yes .
109 .It Cm DenyGroups
110 This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated
111 by spaces.
diff --git a/debian/patches/debian-config.patch b/debian/patches/debian-config.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e1555494a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/debian-config.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
1From 624433c4fff092e3aaaff6aa8954eb93e0387c44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:18 +0000
4Subject: Various Debian-specific configuration changes
5
6ssh: Enable ForwardX11Trusted, returning to earlier semantics which cause
7fewer problems with existing setups (http://bugs.debian.org/237021).
8
9ssh: Set 'SendEnv LANG LC_*' by default (http://bugs.debian.org/264024).
10
11ssh: Enable HashKnownHosts by default to try to limit the spread of ssh
12worms.
13
14ssh: Enable GSSAPIAuthentication by default.
15
16sshd: Enable PAM, disable ChallengeResponseAuthentication, and disable
17PrintMotd.
18
19sshd: Enable X11Forwarding.
20
21sshd: Set 'AcceptEnv LANG LC_*' by default.
22
23sshd: Change sftp subsystem path to /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server.
24
25Document all of this.
26
27Author: Russ Allbery <rra@debian.org>
28Forwarded: not-needed
29Last-Update: 2016-12-26
30
31Patch-Name: debian-config.patch
32---
33 readconf.c | 2 +-
34 ssh.1 | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
35 ssh_config | 6 +++++-
36 ssh_config.5 | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
37 sshd_config | 16 ++++++++++------
38 sshd_config.5 | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
39 6 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
40
41diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
42index c02cdf63..d1091cbd 100644
43--- a/readconf.c
44+++ b/readconf.c
45@@ -1927,7 +1927,7 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
46 if (options->forward_x11 == -1)
47 options->forward_x11 = 0;
48 if (options->forward_x11_trusted == -1)
49- options->forward_x11_trusted = 0;
50+ options->forward_x11_trusted = 1;
51 if (options->forward_x11_timeout == -1)
52 options->forward_x11_timeout = 1200;
53 /*
54diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
55index 22e56a7b..6aa57c46 100644
56--- a/ssh.1
57+++ b/ssh.1
58@@ -785,6 +785,16 @@ directive in
59 .Xr ssh_config 5
60 for more information.
61 .Pp
62+(Debian-specific: X11 forwarding is not subjected to X11 SECURITY extension
63+restrictions by default, because too many programs currently crash in this
64+mode.
65+Set the
66+.Cm ForwardX11Trusted
67+option to
68+.Dq no
69+to restore the upstream behaviour.
70+This may change in future depending on client-side improvements.)
71+.Pp
72 .It Fl x
73 Disables X11 forwarding.
74 .Pp
75@@ -793,6 +803,17 @@ Enables trusted X11 forwarding.
76 Trusted X11 forwardings are not subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension
77 controls.
78 .Pp
79+(Debian-specific: This option does nothing in the default configuration: it
80+is equivalent to
81+.Dq Cm ForwardX11Trusted No yes ,
82+which is the default as described above.
83+Set the
84+.Cm ForwardX11Trusted
85+option to
86+.Dq no
87+to restore the upstream behaviour.
88+This may change in future depending on client-side improvements.)
89+.Pp
90 .It Fl y
91 Send log information using the
92 .Xr syslog 3
93diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
94index 4e879cd2..093c8366 100644
95--- a/ssh_config
96+++ b/ssh_config
97@@ -17,9 +17,10 @@
98 # list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the
99 # ssh_config(5) man page.
100
101-# Host *
102+Host *
103 # ForwardAgent no
104 # ForwardX11 no
105+# ForwardX11Trusted yes
106 # RhostsRSAAuthentication no
107 # RSAAuthentication yes
108 # PasswordAuthentication yes
109@@ -50,3 +51,6 @@
110 # VisualHostKey no
111 # ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
112 # RekeyLimit 1G 1h
113+ SendEnv LANG LC_*
114+ HashKnownHosts yes
115+ GSSAPIAuthentication yes
116diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
117index 8698c28e..26f983a3 100644
118--- a/ssh_config.5
119+++ b/ssh_config.5
120@@ -74,6 +74,22 @@ Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more
121 host-specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the
122 file, and general defaults at the end.
123 .Pp
124+Note that the Debian
125+.Ic openssh-client
126+package sets several options as standard in
127+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
128+which are not the default in
129+.Xr ssh 1 :
130+.Pp
131+.Bl -bullet -offset indent -compact
132+.It
133+.Cm SendEnv No LANG LC_*
134+.It
135+.Cm HashKnownHosts No yes
136+.It
137+.Cm GSSAPIAuthentication No yes
138+.El
139+.Pp
140 The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line.
141 Lines starting with
142 .Ql #
143@@ -711,11 +727,12 @@ elapsed.
144 .It Cm ForwardX11Trusted
145 If this option is set to
146 .Cm yes ,
147+(the Debian-specific default),
148 remote X11 clients will have full access to the original X11 display.
149 .Pp
150 If this option is set to
151 .Cm no
152-(the default),
153+(the upstream default),
154 remote X11 clients will be considered untrusted and prevented
155 from stealing or tampering with data belonging to trusted X11
156 clients.
157diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
158index 00e5a728..13cbe2c6 100644
159--- a/sshd_config
160+++ b/sshd_config
161@@ -58,8 +58,9 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
162 #PasswordAuthentication yes
163 #PermitEmptyPasswords no
164
165-# Change to no to disable s/key passwords
166-#ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes
167+# Change to yes to enable challenge-response passwords (beware issues with
168+# some PAM modules and threads)
169+ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
170
171 # Kerberos options
172 #KerberosAuthentication no
173@@ -82,16 +83,16 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
174 # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
175 # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
176 # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
177-#UsePAM no
178+UsePAM yes
179
180 #AllowAgentForwarding yes
181 #AllowTcpForwarding yes
182 #GatewayPorts no
183-#X11Forwarding no
184+X11Forwarding yes
185 #X11DisplayOffset 10
186 #X11UseLocalhost yes
187 #PermitTTY yes
188-#PrintMotd yes
189+PrintMotd no
190 #PrintLastLog yes
191 #TCPKeepAlive yes
192 #UseLogin no
193@@ -110,8 +111,11 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
194 # no default banner path
195 #Banner none
196
197+# Allow client to pass locale environment variables
198+AcceptEnv LANG LC_*
199+
200 # override default of no subsystems
201-Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server
202+Subsystem sftp /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server
203
204 # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
205 #Match User anoncvs
206diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
207index e45a8937..703a9cdd 100644
208--- a/sshd_config.5
209+++ b/sshd_config.5
210@@ -57,6 +57,28 @@ Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes
211 .Pq \&"
212 in order to represent arguments containing spaces.
213 .Pp
214+Note that the Debian
215+.Ic openssh-server
216+package sets several options as standard in
217+.Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
218+which are not the default in
219+.Xr sshd 8 :
220+.Pp
221+.Bl -bullet -offset indent -compact
222+.It
223+.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication No no
224+.It
225+.Cm X11Forwarding No yes
226+.It
227+.Cm PrintMotd No no
228+.It
229+.Cm AcceptEnv No LANG LC_*
230+.It
231+.Cm Subsystem No sftp /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server
232+.It
233+.Cm UsePAM No yes
234+.El
235+.Pp
236 The possible
237 keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
238 keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
diff --git a/debian/patches/dnssec-sshfp.patch b/debian/patches/dnssec-sshfp.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9bf19dcf8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/dnssec-sshfp.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
1From 6ba1a4137b4cf1418e2b756f1abae3cc549961ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:01 +0000
4Subject: Force use of DNSSEC even if "options edns0" isn't in resolv.conf
5
6This allows SSHFP DNS records to be verified if glibc 2.11 is installed.
7
8Origin: vendor, https://cvs.fedoraproject.org/viewvc/F-12/openssh/openssh-5.2p1-edns.patch?revision=1.1&view=markup
9Bug: http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=572049
10Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=572049
11Last-Update: 2010-04-06
12
13Patch-Name: dnssec-sshfp.patch
14---
15 dns.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
16 openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c | 10 +++++-----
17 openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h | 3 +++
18 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
19
20diff --git a/dns.c b/dns.c
21index e813afea..fce2e308 100644
22--- a/dns.c
23+++ b/dns.c
24@@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address,
25 {
26 u_int counter;
27 int result;
28+ unsigned int rrset_flags = 0;
29 struct rrsetinfo *fingerprints = NULL;
30
31 u_int8_t hostkey_algorithm;
32@@ -229,8 +230,19 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address,
33 return -1;
34 }
35
36+ /*
37+ * Original getrrsetbyname function, found on OpenBSD for example,
38+ * doesn't accept any flag and prerequisite for obtaining AD bit in
39+ * DNS response is set by "options edns0" in resolv.conf.
40+ *
41+ * Our version is more clever and use RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 flag.
42+ */
43+#ifndef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME
44+ rrset_flags |= RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0;
45+#endif
46 result = getrrsetbyname(hostname, DNS_RDATACLASS_IN,
47- DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, 0, &fingerprints);
48+ DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, rrset_flags, &fingerprints);
49+
50 if (result) {
51 verbose("DNS lookup error: %s", dns_result_totext(result));
52 return -1;
53diff --git a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
54index dc6fe053..e061a290 100644
55--- a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
56+++ b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
57@@ -209,8 +209,8 @@ getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, unsigned int rdclass,
58 goto fail;
59 }
60
61- /* don't allow flags yet, unimplemented */
62- if (flags) {
63+ /* Allow RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 flag only. */
64+ if ((flags & !RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0) != 0) {
65 result = ERRSET_INVAL;
66 goto fail;
67 }
68@@ -226,9 +226,9 @@ getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, unsigned int rdclass,
69 #endif /* DEBUG */
70
71 #ifdef RES_USE_DNSSEC
72- /* turn on DNSSEC if EDNS0 is configured */
73- if (_resp->options & RES_USE_EDNS0)
74- _resp->options |= RES_USE_DNSSEC;
75+ /* turn on DNSSEC if required */
76+ if (flags & RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0)
77+ _resp->options |= (RES_USE_EDNS0|RES_USE_DNSSEC);
78 #endif /* RES_USE_DNSEC */
79
80 /* make query */
81diff --git a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
82index 1283f550..dbbc85a2 100644
83--- a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
84+++ b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
85@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
86 #ifndef RRSET_VALIDATED
87 # define RRSET_VALIDATED 1
88 #endif
89+#ifndef RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0
90+# define RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 0x0001
91+#endif
92
93 /*
94 * Return codes for getrrsetbyname()
diff --git a/debian/patches/doc-hash-tab-completion.patch b/debian/patches/doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2ab099d96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
1From b812c38deda716bc94de2aaa99d6e61a2719c822 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:11 +0000
4Subject: Document that HashKnownHosts may break tab-completion
5
6Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1727
7Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/430154
8Last-Update: 2013-09-14
9
10Patch-Name: doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
11---
12 ssh_config.5 | 3 +++
13 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
14
15diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
16index 0483a1ee..8698c28e 100644
17--- a/ssh_config.5
18+++ b/ssh_config.5
19@@ -805,6 +805,9 @@ Note that existing names and addresses in known hosts files
20 will not be converted automatically,
21 but may be manually hashed using
22 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
23+Use of this option may break facilities such as tab-completion that rely
24+on being able to read unhashed host names from
25+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts .
26 .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
27 Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key
28 authentication.
diff --git a/debian/patches/doc-upstart.patch b/debian/patches/doc-upstart.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7d053e8ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/doc-upstart.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
1From 1bf9a6bfb80250544b8ff1d50c94a4c851d9fb2e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@ubuntu.com>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:12 +0000
4Subject: Refer to ssh's Upstart job as well as its init script
5
6Forwarded: not-needed
7Last-Update: 2013-09-14
8
9Patch-Name: doc-upstart.patch
10---
11 sshd.8 | 5 ++++-
12 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
13
14diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
15index e6915141..38a72540 100644
16--- a/sshd.8
17+++ b/sshd.8
18@@ -65,7 +65,10 @@ over an insecure network.
19 .Nm
20 listens for connections from clients.
21 It is normally started at boot from
22-.Pa /etc/init.d/ssh .
23+.Pa /etc/init.d/ssh
24+(or
25+.Pa /etc/init/ssh.conf
26+on systems using the Upstart init daemon).
27 It forks a new
28 daemon for each incoming connection.
29 The forked daemons handle
diff --git a/debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch b/debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f36a851a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
1From c5aacd35abd57633871aa81af2e089deb5f72aab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Vincent Untz <vuntz@ubuntu.com>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:16 +0000
4Subject: Give the ssh-askpass-gnome window a default icon
5
6Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/27152
7Last-Update: 2010-02-28
8
9Patch-Name: gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
10---
11 contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c | 2 ++
12 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
13
14diff --git a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
15index 535a6927..e37a1338 100644
16--- a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
17+++ b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
18@@ -211,6 +211,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
19
20 gtk_init(&argc, &argv);
21
22+ gtk_window_set_default_icon_from_file ("/usr/share/pixmaps/ssh-askpass-gnome.png", NULL);
23+
24 if (argc > 1) {
25 message = g_strjoinv(" ", argv + 1);
26 } else {
diff --git a/debian/patches/gssapi.patch b/debian/patches/gssapi.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..57def8057
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/gssapi.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,3283 @@
1From 40ab38b3f501f3e21662f0294eef06789605c5f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Simon Wilkinson <simon@sxw.org.uk>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:48 +0000
4Subject: GSSAPI key exchange support
5
6This patch has been rejected upstream: "None of the OpenSSH developers are
7in favour of adding this, and this situation has not changed for several
8years. This is not a slight on Simon's patch, which is of fine quality, but
9just that a) we don't trust GSSAPI implementations that much and b) we don't
10like adding new KEX since they are pre-auth attack surface. This one is
11particularly scary, since it requires hooks out to typically root-owned
12system resources."
13
14However, quite a lot of people rely on this in Debian, and it's better to
15have it merged into the main openssh package rather than having separate
16-krb5 packages (as we used to have). It seems to have a generally good
17security history.
18
19Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1242
20Last-Updated: 2016-12-28
21
22Patch-Name: gssapi.patch
23---
24 ChangeLog.gssapi | 113 +++++++++++++++++++
25 Makefile.in | 3 +-
26 auth-krb5.c | 17 ++-
27 auth.c | 96 +---------------
28 auth2-gss.c | 48 +++++++-
29 auth2.c | 2 +
30 canohost.c | 93 +++++++++++++++
31 canohost.h | 3 +
32 clientloop.c | 15 ++-
33 config.h.in | 6 +
34 configure.ac | 24 ++++
35 gss-genr.c | 275 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
36 gss-serv-krb5.c | 85 ++++++++++++--
37 gss-serv.c | 184 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
38 kex.c | 19 ++++
39 kex.h | 14 +++
40 kexgssc.c | 338 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
41 kexgsss.c | 295 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
42 monitor.c | 115 +++++++++++++++++--
43 monitor.h | 3 +
44 monitor_wrap.c | 47 +++++++-
45 monitor_wrap.h | 4 +-
46 readconf.c | 42 +++++++
47 readconf.h | 5 +
48 servconf.c | 28 ++++-
49 servconf.h | 2 +
50 ssh-gss.h | 41 ++++++-
51 ssh_config | 2 +
52 ssh_config.5 | 32 ++++++
53 sshconnect2.c | 122 +++++++++++++++++++-
54 sshd.c | 112 +++++++++++++++++-
55 sshd_config | 2 +
56 sshd_config.5 | 10 ++
57 sshkey.c | 3 +-
58 sshkey.h | 1 +
59 35 files changed, 2053 insertions(+), 148 deletions(-)
60 create mode 100644 ChangeLog.gssapi
61 create mode 100644 kexgssc.c
62 create mode 100644 kexgsss.c
63
64diff --git a/ChangeLog.gssapi b/ChangeLog.gssapi
65new file mode 100644
66index 00000000..f117a336
67--- /dev/null
68+++ b/ChangeLog.gssapi
69@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
70+20110101
71+ - Finally update for OpenSSH 5.6p1
72+ - Add GSSAPIServerIdentity option from Jim Basney
73+
74+20100308
75+ - [ Makefile.in, key.c, key.h ]
76+ Updates for OpenSSH 5.4p1
77+ - [ servconf.c ]
78+ Include GSSAPI options in the sshd -T configuration dump, and flag
79+ some older configuration options as being unsupported. Thanks to Colin
80+ Watson.
81+ -
82+
83+20100124
84+ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
85+ Adapt to deal with additional element in Authmethod structure. Thanks to
86+ Colin Watson
87+
88+20090615
89+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c
90+ sshd.c ]
91+ Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review
92+ Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs
93+ Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled
94+ Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange
95+ Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value
96+ Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust
97+ Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled
98+ Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list
99+ Cast data.length before printing
100+ If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL
101+
102+20090201
103+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h
104+ ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ]
105+ Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user
106+ to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server
107+
108+20080404
109+ - [ gss-serv.c ]
110+ Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow
111+ been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav
112+ Stoichkov
113+
114+20070317
115+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
116+ Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a
117+ function
118+
119+20061220
120+ - [ servconf.c ]
121+ Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and
122+ documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson.
123+
124+20060910
125+ - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c
126+ ssh-gss.h ]
127+ add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms
128+ - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ]
129+ Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of
130+ acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines.
131+ <Bugzilla #928>
132+ - [ sshd_config ssh_config ]
133+ Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample
134+ configuration files
135+ - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ]
136+ Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf()
137+ Limit length of error messages displayed by client
138+
139+20060909
140+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ]
141+ move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server
142+ only, where they belong
143+ <Bugzilla #1225>
144+
145+20060829
146+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
147+ Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment
148+ variable
149+
150+20060828
151+ - [ gss-genr.c ]
152+ Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem
153+ <Fixed upstream 20060829>
154+
155+20060818
156+ - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ]
157+ Make sure that SPENGO is disabled
158+ <Bugzilla #1218 - Fixed upstream 20060818>
159+
160+20060421
161+ - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ]
162+ a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to
163+ fix compiler errors/warnings
164+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
165+ - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ]
166+ fix uninitialized variable warnings
167+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
168+ - [ gssgenr.c ]
169+ pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue)
170+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
171+ <Bugzilla #1220 >
172+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
173+ #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
174+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
175+ <Fixed upstream 20060304>
176+ - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c
177+ add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option
178+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
179+ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
180+ add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic
181+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
182+ <gssapi-with-mic support is Bugzilla #1008>
183diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
184index e10f3742..00a320e1 100644
185--- a/Makefile.in
186+++ b/Makefile.in
187@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
188 kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
189 kexdhc.o kexgexc.o kexecdhc.o kexc25519c.o \
190 kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o \
191+ kexgssc.o \
192 platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o
193
194 SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
195@@ -105,7 +106,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \
196 auth-skey.o auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
197 auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
198 monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
199- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
200+ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
201 loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
202 sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
203 sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
204diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
205index a5a81ed2..38e7fee2 100644
206--- a/auth-krb5.c
207+++ b/auth-krb5.c
208@@ -182,8 +182,13 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
209
210 len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
211 authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
212+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
213+ snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s",
214+ authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
215+#else
216 snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
217 authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
218+#endif
219
220 #ifdef USE_PAM
221 if (options.use_pam)
222@@ -240,15 +245,22 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
223 #ifndef HEIMDAL
224 krb5_error_code
225 ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
226- int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
227+ int ret, oerrno;
228 char ccname[40];
229 mode_t old_umask;
230+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
231+ char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d";
232+#else
233+ char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX";
234+ int tmpfd;
235+#endif
236
237 ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
238- "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
239+ cctemplate, geteuid());
240 if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
241 return ENOMEM;
242
243+#ifndef USE_CCAPI
244 old_umask = umask(0177);
245 tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
246 oerrno = errno;
247@@ -265,6 +277,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
248 return oerrno;
249 }
250 close(tmpfd);
251+#endif
252
253 return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
254 }
255diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
256index 6ee6116d..c6390687 100644
257--- a/auth.c
258+++ b/auth.c
259@@ -372,7 +372,8 @@ auth_root_allowed(const char *method)
260 case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
261 if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
262 strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
263- strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0)
264+ strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0 ||
265+ strcmp(method, "gssapi-keyex") == 0)
266 return 1;
267 break;
268 case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
269@@ -795,99 +796,6 @@ fakepw(void)
270 }
271
272 /*
273- * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
274- * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
275- * called.
276- * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
277- * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
278- * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
279- * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
280- */
281-
282-static char *
283-remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
284-{
285- struct sockaddr_storage from;
286- socklen_t fromlen;
287- struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
288- char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
289- const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
290-
291- /* Get IP address of client. */
292- fromlen = sizeof(from);
293- memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
294- if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
295- (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
296- debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
297- return strdup(ntop);
298- }
299-
300- ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
301- if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
302- fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
303-
304- debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
305- /* Map the IP address to a host name. */
306- if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
307- NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
308- /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */
309- return strdup(ntop);
310- }
311-
312- /*
313- * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
314- * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
315- * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5
316- */
317- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
318- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
319- hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
320- if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
321- logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
322- name, ntop);
323- freeaddrinfo(ai);
324- return strdup(ntop);
325- }
326-
327- /* Names are stored in lowercase. */
328- lowercase(name);
329-
330- /*
331- * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
332- * address actually is an address of this host. This is
333- * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
334- * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
335- * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
336- * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
337- * the domain).
338- */
339- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
340- hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
341- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
342- if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
343- logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
344- "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
345- return strdup(ntop);
346- }
347- /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
348- for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
349- if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
350- sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
351- (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
352- break;
353- }
354- freeaddrinfo(aitop);
355- /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
356- if (ai == NULL) {
357- /* Address not found for the host name. */
358- logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
359- "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
360- return strdup(ntop);
361- }
362- return strdup(name);
363-}
364-
365-/*
366 * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
367 * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
368 * several times.
369diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
370index 1ca83577..3b5036df 100644
371--- a/auth2-gss.c
372+++ b/auth2-gss.c
373@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
374 /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.22 2015/01/19 20:07:45 markus Exp $ */
375
376 /*
377- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
378+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
379 *
380 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
381 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
382@@ -53,6 +53,40 @@ static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
383 static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
384 static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
385
386+/*
387+ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
388+ */
389+static int
390+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
391+{
392+ int authenticated = 0;
393+ Buffer b;
394+ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
395+ u_int len;
396+
397+ mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
398+ mic.length = len;
399+
400+ packet_check_eom();
401+
402+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
403+ "gssapi-keyex");
404+
405+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
406+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
407+
408+ /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
409+ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
410+ &gssbuf, &mic))))
411+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
412+ authctxt->pw));
413+
414+ buffer_free(&b);
415+ free(mic.value);
416+
417+ return (authenticated);
418+}
419+
420 /*
421 * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
422 * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
423@@ -238,7 +272,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
424
425 packet_check_eom();
426
427- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
428+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
429+ authctxt->pw));
430
431 authctxt->postponed = 0;
432 dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
433@@ -274,7 +309,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
434 gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
435
436 if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
437- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
438+ authenticated =
439+ PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw));
440 else
441 logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
442
443@@ -290,6 +326,12 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
444 return 0;
445 }
446
447+Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
448+ "gssapi-keyex",
449+ userauth_gsskeyex,
450+ &options.gss_authentication
451+};
452+
453 Authmethod method_gssapi = {
454 "gssapi-with-mic",
455 userauth_gssapi,
456diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
457index 9108b861..ce0d3760 100644
458--- a/auth2.c
459+++ b/auth2.c
460@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd;
461 extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
462 extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
463 #ifdef GSSAPI
464+extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex;
465 extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
466 #endif
467
468@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
469 &method_none,
470 &method_pubkey,
471 #ifdef GSSAPI
472+ &method_gsskeyex,
473 &method_gssapi,
474 #endif
475 &method_passwd,
476diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c
477index f71a0856..404731d2 100644
478--- a/canohost.c
479+++ b/canohost.c
480@@ -35,6 +35,99 @@
481 #include "canohost.h"
482 #include "misc.h"
483
484+/*
485+ * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
486+ * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
487+ * called.
488+ * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
489+ * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
490+ * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
491+ * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
492+ */
493+
494+char *
495+remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
496+{
497+ struct sockaddr_storage from;
498+ socklen_t fromlen;
499+ struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
500+ char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
501+ const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
502+
503+ /* Get IP address of client. */
504+ fromlen = sizeof(from);
505+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
506+ if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
507+ (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
508+ debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
509+ return strdup(ntop);
510+ }
511+
512+ ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
513+ if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
514+ fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
515+
516+ debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
517+ /* Map the IP address to a host name. */
518+ if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
519+ NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
520+ /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */
521+ return strdup(ntop);
522+ }
523+
524+ /*
525+ * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
526+ * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
527+ * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5
528+ */
529+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
530+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
531+ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
532+ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
533+ logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
534+ name, ntop);
535+ freeaddrinfo(ai);
536+ return strdup(ntop);
537+ }
538+
539+ /* Names are stored in lowercase. */
540+ lowercase(name);
541+
542+ /*
543+ * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
544+ * address actually is an address of this host. This is
545+ * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
546+ * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
547+ * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
548+ * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
549+ * the domain).
550+ */
551+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
552+ hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
553+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
554+ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
555+ logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
556+ "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
557+ return strdup(ntop);
558+ }
559+ /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
560+ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
561+ if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
562+ sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
563+ (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
564+ break;
565+ }
566+ freeaddrinfo(aitop);
567+ /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
568+ if (ai == NULL) {
569+ /* Address not found for the host name. */
570+ logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
571+ "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
572+ return strdup(ntop);
573+ }
574+ return strdup(name);
575+}
576+
577 void
578 ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *addr, socklen_t *len)
579 {
580diff --git a/canohost.h b/canohost.h
581index 26d62855..0cadc9f1 100644
582--- a/canohost.h
583+++ b/canohost.h
584@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@
585 #ifndef _CANOHOST_H
586 #define _CANOHOST_H
587
588+struct ssh;
589+
590+char *remote_hostname(struct ssh *);
591 char *get_peer_ipaddr(int);
592 int get_peer_port(int);
593 char *get_local_ipaddr(int);
594diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
595index 4289a408..99c68b69 100644
596--- a/clientloop.c
597+++ b/clientloop.c
598@@ -113,6 +113,10 @@
599 #include "ssherr.h"
600 #include "hostfile.h"
601
602+#ifdef GSSAPI
603+#include "ssh-gss.h"
604+#endif
605+
606 /* import options */
607 extern Options options;
608
609@@ -1664,9 +1668,18 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id)
610 break;
611
612 /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
613- if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state))
614+ if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state)) {
615 channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
616
617+#ifdef GSSAPI
618+ if (options.gss_renewal_rekey &&
619+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(NULL)) {
620+ debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey");
621+ need_rekeying = 1;
622+ }
623+#endif
624+ }
625+
626 /* Buffer input from the connection. */
627 client_process_net_input(readset);
628
629diff --git a/config.h.in b/config.h.in
630index 75e02ab4..afe540e9 100644
631--- a/config.h.in
632+++ b/config.h.in
633@@ -1667,6 +1667,9 @@
634 /* Use btmp to log bad logins */
635 #undef USE_BTMP
636
637+/* platform uses an in-memory credentials cache */
638+#undef USE_CCAPI
639+
640 /* Use libedit for sftp */
641 #undef USE_LIBEDIT
642
643@@ -1682,6 +1685,9 @@
644 /* Use PIPES instead of a socketpair() */
645 #undef USE_PIPES
646
647+/* platform has the Security Authorization Session API */
648+#undef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
649+
650 /* Define if you have Solaris privileges */
651 #undef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS
652
653diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
654index eb9f45dc..5fdc696c 100644
655--- a/configure.ac
656+++ b/configure.ac
657@@ -623,6 +623,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
658 [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
659 AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
660 [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
661+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have the Security Authorization Session API])
662+ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <Security/AuthSession.h>],
663+ [SessionCreate(0, 0);],
664+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes"
665+ AC_DEFINE([USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API], [1],
666+ [platform has the Security Authorization Session API])
667+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
668+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
669+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no"
670+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])])
671+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have an in-memory credentials cache])
672+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
673+ [#include <Kerberos/Kerberos.h>],
674+ [cc_context_t c;
675+ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);],
676+ [AC_DEFINE([USE_CCAPI], [1],
677+ [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache])
678+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
679+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
680+ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then
681+ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***])
682+ fi],
683+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])]
684+ )
685 m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv])
686 AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [],
687 AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
688diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c
689index 62559ed9..0b3ae073 100644
690--- a/gss-genr.c
691+++ b/gss-genr.c
692@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
693 /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.24 2016/09/12 01:22:38 deraadt Exp $ */
694
695 /*
696- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
697+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
698 *
699 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
700 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
701@@ -40,12 +40,167 @@
702 #include "buffer.h"
703 #include "log.h"
704 #include "ssh2.h"
705+#include "cipher.h"
706+#include "key.h"
707+#include "kex.h"
708+#include <openssl/evp.h>
709
710 #include "ssh-gss.h"
711
712 extern u_char *session_id2;
713 extern u_int session_id2_len;
714
715+typedef struct {
716+ char *encoded;
717+ gss_OID oid;
718+} ssh_gss_kex_mapping;
719+
720+/*
721+ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the
722+ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines
723+ */
724+
725+Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL;
726+
727+static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL;
728+
729+int
730+ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void) {
731+ return (gss_enc2oid != NULL);
732+}
733+
734+/*
735+ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program
736+ *
737+ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting
738+ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism
739+ */
740+
741+char *
742+ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) {
743+ gss_OID_set gss_supported;
744+ OM_uint32 min_status;
745+
746+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported)))
747+ return NULL;
748+
749+ return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
750+ host, client));
751+}
752+
753+char *
754+ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
755+ const char *host, const char *client) {
756+ Buffer buf;
757+ size_t i;
758+ int oidpos, enclen;
759+ char *mechs, *encoded;
760+ u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
761+ char deroid[2];
762+ const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
763+ EVP_MD_CTX md;
764+
765+ if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
766+ for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++)
767+ free(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded);
768+ free(gss_enc2oid);
769+ }
770+
771+ gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) *
772+ (gss_supported->count + 1));
773+
774+ buffer_init(&buf);
775+
776+ oidpos = 0;
777+ for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
778+ if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
779+ (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
780+
781+ deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
782+ deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
783+
784+ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
785+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2);
786+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,
787+ gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
788+ gss_supported->elements[i].length);
789+ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
790+
791+ encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
792+ enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md),
793+ encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
794+
795+ if (oidpos != 0)
796+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
797+
798+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
799+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1);
800+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
801+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
802+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
803+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1);
804+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
805+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
806+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
807+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1);
808+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
809+
810+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
811+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
812+ oidpos++;
813+ }
814+ }
815+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
816+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
817+
818+ buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0');
819+
820+ mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf));
821+ buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf));
822+ buffer_free(&buf);
823+
824+ if (strlen(mechs) == 0) {
825+ free(mechs);
826+ mechs = NULL;
827+ }
828+
829+ return (mechs);
830+}
831+
832+gss_OID
833+ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) {
834+ int i = 0;
835+
836+ switch (kex_type) {
837+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
838+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID))
839+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
840+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1;
841+ break;
842+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
843+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID))
844+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
845+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1;
846+ break;
847+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
848+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID))
849+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
850+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1;
851+ break;
852+ default:
853+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
854+ }
855+
856+ while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL &&
857+ strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0)
858+ i++;
859+
860+ if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL)
861+ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid);
862+
863+ return gss_enc2oid[i].oid;
864+}
865+
866 /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
867 int
868 ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
869@@ -198,7 +353,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int deleg_creds, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
870 }
871
872 ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
873- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
874+ ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
875 GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
876 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
877
878@@ -228,8 +383,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host)
879 }
880
881 OM_uint32
882+ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name)
883+{
884+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
885+ gss_name_t gssname;
886+ OM_uint32 status;
887+ gss_OID_set oidset;
888+
889+ gssbuf.value = (void *) name;
890+ gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
891+
892+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
893+ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
894+
895+ ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf,
896+ GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname);
897+
898+ if (!ctx->major)
899+ ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
900+ gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE,
901+ &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL);
902+
903+ gss_release_name(&status, &gssname);
904+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
905+
906+ if (ctx->major)
907+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
908+
909+ return(ctx->major);
910+}
911+
912+OM_uint32
913 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
914 {
915+ if (ctx == NULL)
916+ return -1;
917+
918 if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
919 GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
920 ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
921@@ -237,6 +426,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
922 return (ctx->major);
923 }
924
925+/* Priviledged when used by server */
926+OM_uint32
927+ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
928+{
929+ if (ctx == NULL)
930+ return -1;
931+
932+ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
933+ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
934+
935+ return (ctx->major);
936+}
937+
938 void
939 ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
940 const char *context)
941@@ -250,11 +452,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
942 }
943
944 int
945-ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
946+ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host,
947+ const char *client)
948 {
949 gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
950 OM_uint32 major, minor;
951 gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
952+ Gssctxt *intctx = NULL;
953+
954+ if (ctx == NULL)
955+ ctx = &intctx;
956
957 /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
958 if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length &&
959@@ -264,6 +471,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
960 ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
961 ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
962 major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
963+
964+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client)
965+ major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client);
966+
967 if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
968 major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token,
969 NULL);
970@@ -273,10 +484,66 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
971 GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
972 }
973
974- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
975+ if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL)
976 ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
977
978 return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
979 }
980
981+int
982+ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) {
983+ static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
984+ static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0;
985+ static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
986+ static gss_name_t name;
987+ static OM_uint32 last_call = 0;
988+ OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor;
989+ int equal;
990+
991+ now = time(NULL);
992+
993+ if (ctxt) {
994+ debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions");
995+
996+ if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
997+ gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name);
998+
999+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
1000+ &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL);
1001+
1002+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
1003+ saved_mech = ctxt->oid;
1004+ saved_lifetime+= now;
1005+ } else {
1006+ /* Handle the error */
1007+ }
1008+ return 0;
1009+ }
1010+
1011+ if (now - last_call < 10)
1012+ return 0;
1013+
1014+ last_call = now;
1015+
1016+ if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID)
1017+ return 0;
1018+
1019+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
1020+ &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL);
1021+ if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED)
1022+ return 0;
1023+ else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
1024+ return 0;
1025+
1026+ major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal);
1027+ gss_release_name(&minor, &name);
1028+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
1029+ return 0;
1030+
1031+ if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10))
1032+ return 1;
1033+
1034+ return 0;
1035+}
1036+
1037 #endif /* GSSAPI */
1038diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
1039index 795992d9..fd8b3718 100644
1040--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
1041+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
1042@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
1043 /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.8 2013/07/20 01:55:13 djm Exp $ */
1044
1045 /*
1046- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
1047+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
1048 *
1049 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
1050 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
1051@@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1052 krb5_error_code problem;
1053 krb5_principal princ;
1054 OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
1055- int len;
1056 const char *errmsg;
1057+ const char *new_ccname;
1058
1059 if (client->creds == NULL) {
1060 debug("No credentials stored");
1061@@ -181,11 +181,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1062 return;
1063 }
1064
1065- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache));
1066+ new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
1067+
1068 client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
1069- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6;
1070- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len);
1071- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename);
1072+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
1073+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
1074+ client->store.filename = NULL;
1075+#else
1076+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "FILE:%s", new_ccname);
1077+ client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
1078+#endif
1079
1080 #ifdef USE_PAM
1081 if (options.use_pam)
1082@@ -197,6 +202,71 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1083 return;
1084 }
1085
1086+int
1087+ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,
1088+ ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1089+{
1090+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
1091+ krb5_principal principal = NULL;
1092+ char *name = NULL;
1093+ krb5_error_code problem;
1094+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
1095+
1096+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) {
1097+ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
1098+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
1099+ return 0;
1100+ }
1101+
1102+ /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */
1103+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache,
1104+ &principal))) {
1105+ logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s",
1106+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
1107+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
1108+ return 0;
1109+ }
1110+
1111+ if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) {
1112+ logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s",
1113+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
1114+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
1115+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
1116+ return 0;
1117+ }
1118+
1119+
1120+ if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) {
1121+ debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing");
1122+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
1123+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
1124+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
1125+ return 0;
1126+ }
1127+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
1128+
1129+ /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */
1130+
1131+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) {
1132+ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s",
1133+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
1134+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
1135+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
1136+ return 0;
1137+ }
1138+
1139+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
1140+
1141+ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds,
1142+ ccache))) {
1143+ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!");
1144+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
1145+ return 0;
1146+ }
1147+
1148+ return 1;
1149+}
1150+
1151 ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
1152 "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
1153 "Kerberos",
1154@@ -204,7 +274,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
1155 NULL,
1156 &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
1157 NULL,
1158- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds
1159+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds,
1160+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds
1161 };
1162
1163 #endif /* KRB5 */
1164diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
1165index 53993d67..2e27cbf9 100644
1166--- a/gss-serv.c
1167+++ b/gss-serv.c
1168@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
1169 /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.29 2015/05/22 03:50:02 djm Exp $ */
1170
1171 /*
1172- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
1173+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
1174 *
1175 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
1176 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
1177@@ -45,17 +45,22 @@
1178 #include "session.h"
1179 #include "misc.h"
1180 #include "servconf.h"
1181+#include "uidswap.h"
1182
1183 #include "ssh-gss.h"
1184+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
1185+
1186+extern ServerOptions options;
1187
1188 extern ServerOptions options;
1189
1190 static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
1191 { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
1192- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}};
1193+ GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL,
1194+ {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
1195
1196 ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
1197- { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
1198+ { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
1199
1200 #ifdef KRB5
1201 extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
1202@@ -142,6 +147,28 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
1203 }
1204
1205 /* Unprivileged */
1206+char *
1207+ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void) {
1208+ if (supported_oids == NULL)
1209+ ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
1210+ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported_oids,
1211+ &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech, NULL, NULL));
1212+}
1213+
1214+/* Unprivileged */
1215+int
1216+ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data,
1217+ const char *dummy) {
1218+ Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
1219+ int res;
1220+
1221+ res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
1222+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
1223+
1224+ return (res);
1225+}
1226+
1227+/* Unprivileged */
1228 void
1229 ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
1230 {
1231@@ -151,7 +178,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
1232 gss_OID_set supported;
1233
1234 gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
1235- gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
1236+
1237+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported)))
1238+ return;
1239
1240 while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
1241 if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
1242@@ -277,8 +306,48 @@ OM_uint32
1243 ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1244 {
1245 int i = 0;
1246+ int equal = 0;
1247+ gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
1248+ gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1249+
1250+ if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
1251+ if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
1252+ (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements,
1253+ ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) {
1254+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
1255+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1256+ }
1257+
1258+ if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
1259+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name,
1260+ NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
1261+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
1262+ return (ctx->major);
1263+ }
1264+
1265+ ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name,
1266+ new_name, &equal);
1267+
1268+ if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
1269+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
1270+ return (ctx->major);
1271+ }
1272+
1273+ if (!equal) {
1274+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name");
1275+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1276+ }
1277
1278- gss_buffer_desc ename;
1279+ debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
1280+
1281+ gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
1282+ gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds);
1283+ client->name = new_name;
1284+ client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
1285+ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
1286+ client->updated = 1;
1287+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1288+ }
1289
1290 client->mech = NULL;
1291
1292@@ -293,6 +362,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1293 if (client->mech == NULL)
1294 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1295
1296+ if (ctx->client_creds &&
1297+ (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
1298+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
1299+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
1300+ return (ctx->major);
1301+ }
1302+
1303 if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
1304 &client->displayname, NULL))) {
1305 ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
1306@@ -310,6 +386,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1307 return (ctx->major);
1308 }
1309
1310+ gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
1311+
1312 /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
1313 client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
1314 ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
1315@@ -357,7 +435,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep)
1316
1317 /* Privileged */
1318 int
1319-ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
1320+ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
1321 {
1322 OM_uint32 lmin;
1323
1324@@ -367,9 +445,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
1325 return 0;
1326 }
1327 if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
1328- if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
1329+ if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
1330+ gssapi_client.used = 1;
1331+ gssapi_client.store.owner = pw;
1332 return 1;
1333- else {
1334+ } else {
1335 /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
1336 gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
1337 gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
1338@@ -383,14 +463,90 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
1339 return (0);
1340 }
1341
1342-/* Privileged */
1343-OM_uint32
1344-ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
1345+/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running
1346+ * as the user, the monitor is root.
1347+ *
1348+ * In the child, we want to :
1349+ * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify
1350+ * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update
1351+ */
1352+
1353+/* Stuff for PAM */
1354+
1355+#ifdef USE_PAM
1356+static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg,
1357+ struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
1358 {
1359- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
1360- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
1361+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
1362+}
1363+#endif
1364
1365- return (ctx->major);
1366+void
1367+ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) {
1368+ int ok;
1369+ int ret;
1370+#ifdef USE_PAM
1371+ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
1372+ struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
1373+ char *envstr;
1374+#endif
1375+
1376+ if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
1377+ gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
1378+ gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
1379+ return;
1380+
1381+ ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
1382+
1383+ if (!ok)
1384+ return;
1385+
1386+ debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully");
1387+
1388+ /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will
1389+ * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options
1390+ * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
1391+ */
1392+#ifdef USE_PAM
1393+ if (!use_privsep) {
1394+ debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
1395+ return;
1396+ }
1397+
1398+ ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
1399+ &pamconv, &pamh);
1400+ if (ret)
1401+ return;
1402+
1403+ xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
1404+ gssapi_client.store.envval);
1405+
1406+ ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr);
1407+ if (!ret)
1408+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
1409+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
1410+#endif
1411+}
1412+
1413+int
1414+ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) {
1415+ int ok = 0;
1416+
1417+ /* Check we've got credentials to store */
1418+ if (!gssapi_client.updated)
1419+ return 0;
1420+
1421+ gssapi_client.updated = 0;
1422+
1423+ temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner);
1424+ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)
1425+ ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client);
1426+ else
1427+ debug("No update function for this mechanism");
1428+
1429+ restore_uid();
1430+
1431+ return ok;
1432 }
1433
1434 #endif
1435diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
1436index 6a94bc53..d8708684 100644
1437--- a/kex.c
1438+++ b/kex.c
1439@@ -54,6 +54,10 @@
1440 #include "sshbuf.h"
1441 #include "digest.h"
1442
1443+#ifdef GSSAPI
1444+#include "ssh-gss.h"
1445+#endif
1446+
1447 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
1448 # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
1449 # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256
1450@@ -113,6 +117,14 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
1451 #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */
1452 { NULL, -1, -1, -1},
1453 };
1454+static const struct kexalg kexalg_prefixes[] = {
1455+#ifdef GSSAPI
1456+ { KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
1457+ { KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
1458+ { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
1459+#endif
1460+ { NULL, -1, -1, -1 },
1461+};
1462
1463 char *
1464 kex_alg_list(char sep)
1465@@ -145,6 +157,10 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
1466 if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
1467 return k;
1468 }
1469+ for (k = kexalg_prefixes; k->name != NULL; k++) {
1470+ if (strncmp(k->name, name, strlen(k->name)) == 0)
1471+ return k;
1472+ }
1473 return NULL;
1474 }
1475
1476@@ -597,6 +613,9 @@ kex_free(struct kex *kex)
1477 sshbuf_free(kex->peer);
1478 sshbuf_free(kex->my);
1479 free(kex->session_id);
1480+#ifdef GSSAPI
1481+ free(kex->gss_host);
1482+#endif /* GSSAPI */
1483 free(kex->client_version_string);
1484 free(kex->server_version_string);
1485 free(kex->failed_choice);
1486diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
1487index 3794f212..fd56171d 100644
1488--- a/kex.h
1489+++ b/kex.h
1490@@ -99,6 +99,9 @@ enum kex_exchange {
1491 KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
1492 KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
1493 KEX_C25519_SHA256,
1494+ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
1495+ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
1496+ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1,
1497 KEX_MAX
1498 };
1499
1500@@ -147,6 +150,12 @@ struct kex {
1501 u_int flags;
1502 int hash_alg;
1503 int ec_nid;
1504+#ifdef GSSAPI
1505+ int gss_deleg_creds;
1506+ int gss_trust_dns;
1507+ char *gss_host;
1508+ char *gss_client;
1509+#endif
1510 char *client_version_string;
1511 char *server_version_string;
1512 char *failed_choice;
1513@@ -197,6 +206,11 @@ int kexecdh_server(struct ssh *);
1514 int kexc25519_client(struct ssh *);
1515 int kexc25519_server(struct ssh *);
1516
1517+#ifdef GSSAPI
1518+int kexgss_client(struct ssh *);
1519+int kexgss_server(struct ssh *);
1520+#endif
1521+
1522 int kex_dh_hash(int, const char *, const char *,
1523 const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t,
1524 const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, u_char *, size_t *);
1525diff --git a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c
1526new file mode 100644
1527index 00000000..10447f2b
1528--- /dev/null
1529+++ b/kexgssc.c
1530@@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
1531+/*
1532+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
1533+ *
1534+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
1535+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
1536+ * are met:
1537+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
1538+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
1539+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
1540+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
1541+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
1542+ *
1543+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
1544+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
1545+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
1546+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
1547+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
1548+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
1549+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
1550+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
1551+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
1552+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
1553+ */
1554+
1555+#include "includes.h"
1556+
1557+#ifdef GSSAPI
1558+
1559+#include "includes.h"
1560+
1561+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
1562+#include <openssl/bn.h>
1563+
1564+#include <string.h>
1565+
1566+#include "xmalloc.h"
1567+#include "buffer.h"
1568+#include "ssh2.h"
1569+#include "key.h"
1570+#include "cipher.h"
1571+#include "kex.h"
1572+#include "log.h"
1573+#include "packet.h"
1574+#include "dh.h"
1575+#include "digest.h"
1576+
1577+#include "ssh-gss.h"
1578+
1579+int
1580+kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) {
1581+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1582+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr;
1583+ Gssctxt *ctxt;
1584+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
1585+ u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, strlen;
1586+ DH *dh;
1587+ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
1588+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
1589+ BIGNUM *p = NULL;
1590+ BIGNUM *g = NULL;
1591+ u_char *kbuf;
1592+ u_char *serverhostkey = NULL;
1593+ u_char *empty = "";
1594+ char *msg;
1595+ int type = 0;
1596+ int first = 1;
1597+ int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
1598+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
1599+ size_t hashlen;
1600+
1601+ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */
1602+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
1603+ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, ssh->kex->name, ssh->kex->kex_type)
1604+ == GSS_C_NO_OID)
1605+ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
1606+
1607+ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, ssh->kex->gss_host))
1608+ fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
1609+
1610+ if (ssh->kex->gss_client &&
1611+ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, ssh->kex->gss_client))
1612+ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
1613+
1614+ switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
1615+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
1616+ dh = dh_new_group1();
1617+ break;
1618+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
1619+ dh = dh_new_group14();
1620+ break;
1621+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
1622+ debug("Doing group exchange\n");
1623+ nbits = dh_estimate(ssh->kex->we_need * 8);
1624+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
1625+ packet_put_int(min);
1626+ packet_put_int(nbits);
1627+ packet_put_int(max);
1628+
1629+ packet_send();
1630+
1631+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
1632+
1633+ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
1634+ fatal("BN_new() failed");
1635+ packet_get_bignum2(p);
1636+ if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
1637+ fatal("BN_new() failed");
1638+ packet_get_bignum2(g);
1639+ packet_check_eom();
1640+
1641+ if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
1642+ fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
1643+ min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
1644+
1645+ dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
1646+ break;
1647+ default:
1648+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
1649+ }
1650+
1651+ /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */
1652+ dh_gen_key(dh, ssh->kex->we_need * 8);
1653+
1654+ /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */
1655+ dh_server_pub = BN_new();
1656+ if (dh_server_pub == NULL)
1657+ fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
1658+
1659+ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
1660+
1661+ do {
1662+ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
1663+
1664+ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
1665+ ssh->kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
1666+ &ret_flags);
1667+
1668+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
1669+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
1670+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
1671+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
1672+ send_tok.length);
1673+ }
1674+ fatal("gss_init_context failed");
1675+ }
1676+
1677+ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
1678+ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
1679+ free(recv_tok.value);
1680+
1681+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1682+ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
1683+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
1684+ fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
1685+
1686+ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
1687+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
1688+ fatal("Integrity check failed");
1689+ }
1690+
1691+ /*
1692+ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
1693+ * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
1694+ */
1695+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
1696+ if (first) {
1697+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT);
1698+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
1699+ send_tok.length);
1700+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
1701+ first = 0;
1702+ } else {
1703+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
1704+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
1705+ send_tok.length);
1706+ }
1707+ packet_send();
1708+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
1709+
1710+ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
1711+ do {
1712+ type = packet_read();
1713+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
1714+ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
1715+ if (serverhostkey)
1716+ fatal("Server host key received more than once");
1717+ serverhostkey =
1718+ packet_get_string(&slen);
1719+ }
1720+ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
1721+
1722+ switch (type) {
1723+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
1724+ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
1725+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
1726+ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
1727+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
1728+ recv_tok.length = strlen;
1729+ break;
1730+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
1731+ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
1732+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
1733+ msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
1734+ msg_tok.length = strlen;
1735+
1736+ /* Is there a token included? */
1737+ if (packet_get_char()) {
1738+ recv_tok.value=
1739+ packet_get_string(&strlen);
1740+ recv_tok.length = strlen;
1741+ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */
1742+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
1743+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete");
1744+ } else {
1745+ /* No token included */
1746+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
1747+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token");
1748+ }
1749+ break;
1750+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
1751+ debug("Received Error");
1752+ maj_status = packet_get_int();
1753+ min_status = packet_get_int();
1754+ msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
1755+ (void) packet_get_string_ptr(NULL);
1756+ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg);
1757+ default:
1758+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
1759+ type);
1760+ }
1761+ token_ptr = &recv_tok;
1762+ } else {
1763+ /* No data, and not complete */
1764+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
1765+ fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
1766+ }
1767+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
1768+
1769+ /*
1770+ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the
1771+ * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok
1772+ */
1773+
1774+ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
1775+ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
1776+
1777+ /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */
1778+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
1779+ packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
1780+
1781+ /* compute K=f^x mod p */
1782+ klen = DH_size(dh);
1783+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
1784+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh);
1785+ if (kout < 0)
1786+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
1787+
1788+ shared_secret = BN_new();
1789+ if (shared_secret == NULL)
1790+ fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed");
1791+
1792+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
1793+ fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
1794+
1795+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
1796+ free(kbuf);
1797+
1798+ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
1799+ switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
1800+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
1801+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
1802+ kex_dh_hash(
1803+ ssh->kex->hash_alg,
1804+ ssh->kex->client_version_string,
1805+ ssh->kex->server_version_string,
1806+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
1807+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
1808+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
1809+ dh->pub_key, /* e */
1810+ dh_server_pub, /* f */
1811+ shared_secret, /* K */
1812+ hash, &hashlen
1813+ );
1814+ break;
1815+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
1816+ kexgex_hash(
1817+ ssh->kex->hash_alg,
1818+ ssh->kex->client_version_string,
1819+ ssh->kex->server_version_string,
1820+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
1821+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
1822+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
1823+ min, nbits, max,
1824+ dh->p, dh->g,
1825+ dh->pub_key,
1826+ dh_server_pub,
1827+ shared_secret,
1828+ hash, &hashlen
1829+ );
1830+ break;
1831+ default:
1832+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
1833+ }
1834+
1835+ gssbuf.value = hash;
1836+ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
1837+
1838+ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
1839+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
1840+ packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify");
1841+
1842+ free(msg_tok.value);
1843+
1844+ DH_free(dh);
1845+ free(serverhostkey);
1846+ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
1847+
1848+ /* save session id */
1849+ if (ssh->kex->session_id == NULL) {
1850+ ssh->kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
1851+ ssh->kex->session_id = xmalloc(ssh->kex->session_id_len);
1852+ memcpy(ssh->kex->session_id, hash, ssh->kex->session_id_len);
1853+ }
1854+
1855+ if (ssh->kex->gss_deleg_creds)
1856+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
1857+
1858+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
1859+ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
1860+ else
1861+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
1862+
1863+ kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
1864+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
1865+ return kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
1866+}
1867+
1868+#endif /* GSSAPI */
1869diff --git a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c
1870new file mode 100644
1871index 00000000..38ca082b
1872--- /dev/null
1873+++ b/kexgsss.c
1874@@ -0,0 +1,295 @@
1875+/*
1876+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
1877+ *
1878+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
1879+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
1880+ * are met:
1881+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
1882+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
1883+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
1884+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
1885+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
1886+ *
1887+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
1888+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
1889+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
1890+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
1891+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
1892+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
1893+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
1894+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
1895+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
1896+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
1897+ */
1898+
1899+#include "includes.h"
1900+
1901+#ifdef GSSAPI
1902+
1903+#include <string.h>
1904+
1905+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
1906+#include <openssl/bn.h>
1907+
1908+#include "xmalloc.h"
1909+#include "buffer.h"
1910+#include "ssh2.h"
1911+#include "key.h"
1912+#include "cipher.h"
1913+#include "kex.h"
1914+#include "log.h"
1915+#include "packet.h"
1916+#include "dh.h"
1917+#include "ssh-gss.h"
1918+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
1919+#include "misc.h"
1920+#include "servconf.h"
1921+#include "digest.h"
1922+
1923+extern ServerOptions options;
1924+
1925+int
1926+kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
1927+{
1928+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
1929+
1930+ /*
1931+ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
1932+ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific
1933+ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently
1934+ * activating this non-standard behaviour.
1935+ */
1936+
1937+ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
1938+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
1939+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1940+ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
1941+ u_int slen, klen, kout;
1942+ u_char *kbuf;
1943+ DH *dh;
1944+ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
1945+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
1946+ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
1947+ int type = 0;
1948+ gss_OID oid;
1949+ char *mechs;
1950+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
1951+ size_t hashlen;
1952+
1953+ /* Initialise GSSAPI */
1954+
1955+ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures
1956+ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
1957+ * into life
1958+ */
1959+ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) {
1960+ mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
1961+ free(mechs);
1962+ }
1963+
1964+ debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, ssh->kex->name);
1965+ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, ssh->kex->name, ssh->kex->kex_type);
1966+ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
1967+ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
1968+
1969+ debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
1970+
1971+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
1972+ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
1973+
1974+ switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
1975+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
1976+ dh = dh_new_group1();
1977+ break;
1978+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
1979+ dh = dh_new_group14();
1980+ break;
1981+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
1982+ debug("Doing group exchange");
1983+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
1984+ min = packet_get_int();
1985+ nbits = packet_get_int();
1986+ max = packet_get_int();
1987+ packet_check_eom();
1988+ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
1989+ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
1990+ min, nbits, max);
1991+ dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min),
1992+ nbits, MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max)));
1993+ if (dh == NULL)
1994+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found");
1995+
1996+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
1997+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
1998+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
1999+ packet_send();
2000+
2001+ packet_write_wait();
2002+ break;
2003+ default:
2004+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
2005+ }
2006+
2007+ dh_gen_key(dh, ssh->kex->we_need * 8);
2008+
2009+ do {
2010+ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
2011+ type = packet_read();
2012+ switch(type) {
2013+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
2014+ if (dh_client_pub != NULL)
2015+ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
2016+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
2017+ recv_tok.length = slen;
2018+
2019+ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
2020+ fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
2021+
2022+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
2023+
2024+ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
2025+ break;
2026+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
2027+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
2028+ recv_tok.length = slen;
2029+ break;
2030+ default:
2031+ packet_disconnect(
2032+ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
2033+ type);
2034+ }
2035+
2036+ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
2037+ &send_tok, &ret_flags));
2038+
2039+ free(recv_tok.value);
2040+
2041+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
2042+ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
2043+
2044+ if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
2045+ fatal("No client public key");
2046+
2047+ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
2048+ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
2049+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
2050+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
2051+ packet_send();
2052+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
2053+ }
2054+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
2055+
2056+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
2057+ if (send_tok.length > 0) {
2058+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
2059+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
2060+ packet_send();
2061+ }
2062+ fatal("accept_ctx died");
2063+ }
2064+
2065+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
2066+ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
2067+
2068+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
2069+ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
2070+
2071+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
2072+ packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
2073+
2074+ klen = DH_size(dh);
2075+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
2076+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
2077+ if (kout < 0)
2078+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
2079+
2080+ shared_secret = BN_new();
2081+ if (shared_secret == NULL)
2082+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed");
2083+
2084+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
2085+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
2086+
2087+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
2088+ free(kbuf);
2089+
2090+ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
2091+ switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
2092+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
2093+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
2094+ kex_dh_hash(
2095+ ssh->kex->hash_alg,
2096+ ssh->kex->client_version_string, ssh->kex->server_version_string,
2097+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
2098+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
2099+ NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */
2100+ dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret,
2101+ hash, &hashlen
2102+ );
2103+ break;
2104+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
2105+ kexgex_hash(
2106+ ssh->kex->hash_alg,
2107+ ssh->kex->client_version_string, ssh->kex->server_version_string,
2108+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
2109+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
2110+ NULL, 0,
2111+ min, nbits, max,
2112+ dh->p, dh->g,
2113+ dh_client_pub,
2114+ dh->pub_key,
2115+ shared_secret,
2116+ hash, &hashlen
2117+ );
2118+ break;
2119+ default:
2120+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
2121+ }
2122+
2123+ BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
2124+
2125+ if (ssh->kex->session_id == NULL) {
2126+ ssh->kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
2127+ ssh->kex->session_id = xmalloc(ssh->kex->session_id_len);
2128+ memcpy(ssh->kex->session_id, hash, ssh->kex->session_id_len);
2129+ }
2130+
2131+ gssbuf.value = hash;
2132+ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
2133+
2134+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok))))
2135+ fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
2136+
2137+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE);
2138+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
2139+ packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length);
2140+
2141+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
2142+ packet_put_char(1); /* true */
2143+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
2144+ } else {
2145+ packet_put_char(0); /* false */
2146+ }
2147+ packet_send();
2148+
2149+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
2150+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
2151+
2152+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
2153+ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
2154+ else
2155+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
2156+
2157+ DH_free(dh);
2158+
2159+ kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
2160+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
2161+ kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
2162+
2163+ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
2164+ * just exchanged. */
2165+ if (options.gss_store_rekey)
2166+ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
2167+ return 0;
2168+}
2169+#endif /* GSSAPI */
2170diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
2171index 43f48470..76d9e346 100644
2172--- a/monitor.c
2173+++ b/monitor.c
2174@@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
2175 int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
2176 int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
2177 int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
2178+int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *);
2179+int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *);
2180 #endif
2181
2182 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
2183@@ -230,11 +232,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
2184 {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
2185 {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok},
2186 {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
2187+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign},
2188 #endif
2189 {0, 0, NULL}
2190 };
2191
2192 struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
2193+#ifdef GSSAPI
2194+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
2195+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
2196+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
2197+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
2198+#endif
2199 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
2200 {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
2201 #endif
2202@@ -301,6 +310,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
2203 /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
2204 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
2205 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
2206+#ifdef GSSAPI
2207+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
2208+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
2209+#endif
2210
2211 /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
2212 while (!authenticated) {
2213@@ -400,6 +413,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
2214 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
2215 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
2216 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
2217+#ifdef GSSAPI
2218+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
2219+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
2220+#endif
2221
2222 if (!no_pty_flag) {
2223 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
2224@@ -1601,6 +1618,13 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
2225 # endif
2226 #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
2227 kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
2228+#ifdef GSSAPI
2229+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
2230+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
2231+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
2232+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
2233+ }
2234+#endif
2235 kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
2236 kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
2237 kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
2238@@ -1680,8 +1704,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
2239 OM_uint32 major;
2240 u_int len;
2241
2242- if (!options.gss_authentication)
2243- fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
2244+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
2245+ fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
2246
2247 goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
2248 goid.length = len;
2249@@ -1710,8 +1734,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
2250 OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
2251 u_int len;
2252
2253- if (!options.gss_authentication)
2254- fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
2255+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
2256+ fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
2257
2258 in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
2259 in.length = len;
2260@@ -1730,6 +1754,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
2261 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
2262 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
2263 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
2264+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1);
2265 }
2266 return (0);
2267 }
2268@@ -1741,8 +1766,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
2269 OM_uint32 ret;
2270 u_int len;
2271
2272- if (!options.gss_authentication)
2273- fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
2274+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
2275+ fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
2276
2277 gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
2278 gssbuf.length = len;
2279@@ -1770,10 +1795,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
2280 {
2281 int authenticated;
2282
2283- if (!options.gss_authentication)
2284- fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
2285+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
2286+ fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
2287
2288- authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
2289+ authenticated = authctxt->valid &&
2290+ ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw);
2291
2292 buffer_clear(m);
2293 buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
2294@@ -1786,5 +1812,76 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
2295 /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
2296 return (authenticated);
2297 }
2298+
2299+int
2300+mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
2301+{
2302+ gss_buffer_desc data;
2303+ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
2304+ OM_uint32 major, minor;
2305+ u_int len;
2306+
2307+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
2308+ fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
2309+
2310+ data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
2311+ data.length = len;
2312+ if (data.length != 20)
2313+ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__,
2314+ (int) data.length);
2315+
2316+ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */
2317+ if (session_id2_len == 0) {
2318+ session_id2_len = data.length;
2319+ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
2320+ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
2321+ }
2322+ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
2323+
2324+ free(data.value);
2325+
2326+ buffer_clear(m);
2327+ buffer_put_int(m, major);
2328+ buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length);
2329+
2330+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
2331+
2332+ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
2333+
2334+ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
2335+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
2336+
2337+ /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */
2338+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1);
2339+
2340+ return (0);
2341+}
2342+
2343+int
2344+mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) {
2345+ ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
2346+ int ok;
2347+
2348+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
2349+ fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
2350+
2351+ store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
2352+ store.envvar = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
2353+ store.envval = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
2354+
2355+ ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
2356+
2357+ free(store.filename);
2358+ free(store.envvar);
2359+ free(store.envval);
2360+
2361+ buffer_clear(m);
2362+ buffer_put_int(m, ok);
2363+
2364+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
2365+
2366+ return(0);
2367+}
2368+
2369 #endif /* GSSAPI */
2370
2371diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
2372index d68f6745..ec41404c 100644
2373--- a/monitor.h
2374+++ b/monitor.h
2375@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
2376 MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
2377 MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
2378
2379+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151,
2380+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153,
2381+
2382 };
2383
2384 struct monitor {
2385diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
2386index 64ff9288..d5cb640a 100644
2387--- a/monitor_wrap.c
2388+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
2389@@ -924,7 +924,7 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
2390 }
2391
2392 int
2393-mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
2394+mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
2395 {
2396 Buffer m;
2397 int authenticated = 0;
2398@@ -941,5 +941,50 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
2399 debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
2400 return (authenticated);
2401 }
2402+
2403+OM_uint32
2404+mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
2405+{
2406+ Buffer m;
2407+ OM_uint32 major;
2408+ u_int len;
2409+
2410+ buffer_init(&m);
2411+ buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length);
2412+
2413+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m);
2414+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m);
2415+
2416+ major = buffer_get_int(&m);
2417+ hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
2418+ hash->length = len;
2419+
2420+ buffer_free(&m);
2421+
2422+ return(major);
2423+}
2424+
2425+int
2426+mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store)
2427+{
2428+ Buffer m;
2429+ int ok;
2430+
2431+ buffer_init(&m);
2432+
2433+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : "");
2434+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : "");
2435+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : "");
2436+
2437+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
2438+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
2439+
2440+ ok = buffer_get_int(&m);
2441+
2442+ buffer_free(&m);
2443+
2444+ return (ok);
2445+}
2446+
2447 #endif /* GSSAPI */
2448
2449diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
2450index db5902f5..8f9dd896 100644
2451--- a/monitor_wrap.h
2452+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
2453@@ -55,8 +55,10 @@ int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
2454 OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
2455 OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
2456 gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
2457-int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
2458+int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *);
2459 OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
2460+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
2461+int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *);
2462 #endif
2463
2464 #ifdef USE_PAM
2465diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
2466index fa3fab8f..7902ef26 100644
2467--- a/readconf.c
2468+++ b/readconf.c
2469@@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ typedef enum {
2470 oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
2471 oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
2472 oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
2473+ oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey,
2474+ oGssServerIdentity,
2475 oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
2476 oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
2477 oHashKnownHosts,
2478@@ -205,10 +207,19 @@ static struct {
2479 { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
2480 #if defined(GSSAPI)
2481 { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
2482+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx },
2483 { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
2484+ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
2485+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity },
2486+ { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity },
2487+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey },
2488 #else
2489 { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
2490+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
2491 { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
2492+ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
2493+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported },
2494+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported },
2495 #endif
2496 { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
2497 { "usersh", oDeprecated },
2498@@ -961,10 +972,30 @@ parse_time:
2499 intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
2500 goto parse_flag;
2501
2502+ case oGssKeyEx:
2503+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
2504+ goto parse_flag;
2505+
2506 case oGssDelegateCreds:
2507 intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
2508 goto parse_flag;
2509
2510+ case oGssTrustDns:
2511+ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
2512+ goto parse_flag;
2513+
2514+ case oGssClientIdentity:
2515+ charptr = &options->gss_client_identity;
2516+ goto parse_string;
2517+
2518+ case oGssServerIdentity:
2519+ charptr = &options->gss_server_identity;
2520+ goto parse_string;
2521+
2522+ case oGssRenewalRekey:
2523+ intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey;
2524+ goto parse_flag;
2525+
2526 case oBatchMode:
2527 intptr = &options->batch_mode;
2528 goto parse_flag;
2529@@ -1776,7 +1807,12 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
2530 options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
2531 options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
2532 options->gss_authentication = -1;
2533+ options->gss_keyex = -1;
2534 options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
2535+ options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
2536+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1;
2537+ options->gss_client_identity = NULL;
2538+ options->gss_server_identity = NULL;
2539 options->password_authentication = -1;
2540 options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
2541 options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
2542@@ -1920,8 +1956,14 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
2543 options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
2544 if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
2545 options->gss_authentication = 0;
2546+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
2547+ options->gss_keyex = 0;
2548 if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
2549 options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
2550+ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
2551+ options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
2552+ if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
2553+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0;
2554 if (options->password_authentication == -1)
2555 options->password_authentication = 1;
2556 if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
2557diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
2558index cef55f71..fd3d7c75 100644
2559--- a/readconf.h
2560+++ b/readconf.h
2561@@ -45,7 +45,12 @@ typedef struct {
2562 int challenge_response_authentication;
2563 /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
2564 int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */
2565+ int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */
2566 int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */
2567+ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
2568+ int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */
2569+ char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */
2570+ char *gss_server_identity; /* GSSAPI target principal */
2571 int password_authentication; /* Try password
2572 * authentication. */
2573 int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
2574diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
2575index 795ddbab..14c81fa9 100644
2576--- a/servconf.c
2577+++ b/servconf.c
2578@@ -113,8 +113,10 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
2579 options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
2580 options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
2581 options->gss_authentication=-1;
2582+ options->gss_keyex = -1;
2583 options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
2584 options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
2585+ options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
2586 options->password_authentication = -1;
2587 options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
2588 options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
2589@@ -267,10 +269,14 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
2590 options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
2591 if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
2592 options->gss_authentication = 0;
2593+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
2594+ options->gss_keyex = 0;
2595 if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
2596 options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
2597 if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
2598- options->gss_strict_acceptor = 0;
2599+ options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
2600+ if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
2601+ options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
2602 if (options->password_authentication == -1)
2603 options->password_authentication = 1;
2604 if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
2605@@ -407,6 +413,7 @@ typedef enum {
2606 sHostKeyAlgorithms,
2607 sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
2608 sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
2609+ sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey,
2610 sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
2611 sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
2612 sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
2613@@ -480,12 +487,20 @@ static struct {
2614 #ifdef GSSAPI
2615 { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
2616 { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2617+ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2618 { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2619+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2620+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2621 #else
2622 { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
2623 { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2624+ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2625 { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2626+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2627+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2628 #endif
2629+ { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2630+ { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2631 { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
2632 { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
2633 { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2634@@ -1207,6 +1222,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
2635 intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
2636 goto parse_flag;
2637
2638+ case sGssKeyEx:
2639+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
2640+ goto parse_flag;
2641+
2642 case sGssCleanupCreds:
2643 intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
2644 goto parse_flag;
2645@@ -1215,6 +1234,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
2646 intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
2647 goto parse_flag;
2648
2649+ case sGssStoreRekey:
2650+ intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey;
2651+ goto parse_flag;
2652+
2653 case sPasswordAuthentication:
2654 intptr = &options->password_authentication;
2655 goto parse_flag;
2656@@ -2248,7 +2271,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
2657 #endif
2658 #ifdef GSSAPI
2659 dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
2660+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
2661 dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
2662+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
2663+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
2664 #endif
2665 dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
2666 dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
2667diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
2668index 5853a974..90dfa4c2 100644
2669--- a/servconf.h
2670+++ b/servconf.h
2671@@ -112,8 +112,10 @@ typedef struct {
2672 int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if
2673 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
2674 int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
2675+ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
2676 int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
2677 int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
2678+ int gss_store_rekey;
2679 int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password
2680 * authentication. */
2681 int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
2682diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
2683index a99d7f08..914701bc 100644
2684--- a/ssh-gss.h
2685+++ b/ssh-gss.h
2686@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
2687 /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.11 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */
2688 /*
2689- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
2690+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
2691 *
2692 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
2693 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
2694@@ -61,10 +61,22 @@
2695
2696 #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
2697
2698+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30
2699+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31
2700+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32
2701+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33
2702+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34
2703+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40
2704+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41
2705+#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-"
2706+#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-"
2707+#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-"
2708+
2709 typedef struct {
2710 char *filename;
2711 char *envvar;
2712 char *envval;
2713+ struct passwd *owner;
2714 void *data;
2715 } ssh_gssapi_ccache;
2716
2717@@ -72,8 +84,11 @@ typedef struct {
2718 gss_buffer_desc displayname;
2719 gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
2720 gss_cred_id_t creds;
2721+ gss_name_t name;
2722 struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
2723 ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
2724+ int used;
2725+ int updated;
2726 } ssh_gssapi_client;
2727
2728 typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
2729@@ -84,6 +99,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
2730 int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
2731 int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
2732 void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
2733+ int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
2734 } ssh_gssapi_mech;
2735
2736 typedef struct {
2737@@ -94,10 +110,11 @@ typedef struct {
2738 gss_OID oid; /* client */
2739 gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */
2740 gss_name_t client; /* server */
2741- gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */
2742+ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */
2743 } Gssctxt;
2744
2745 extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
2746+extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context;
2747
2748 int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
2749 void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
2750@@ -119,16 +136,32 @@ void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **);
2751 void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
2752 OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
2753 void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
2754-int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
2755+int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *);
2756+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
2757+int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
2758
2759 /* In the server */
2760+typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *,
2761+ const char *);
2762+char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *);
2763+char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
2764+ const char *);
2765+gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
2766+int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *,
2767+ const char *);
2768 OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
2769-int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
2770+int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *);
2771 OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
2772 void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
2773 void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
2774 void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
2775
2776+char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
2777+int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void);
2778+
2779+int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store);
2780+void ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void);
2781+
2782 #endif /* GSSAPI */
2783
2784 #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
2785diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
2786index 90fb63f0..4e879cd2 100644
2787--- a/ssh_config
2788+++ b/ssh_config
2789@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
2790 # HostbasedAuthentication no
2791 # GSSAPIAuthentication no
2792 # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
2793+# GSSAPIKeyExchange no
2794+# GSSAPITrustDNS no
2795 # BatchMode no
2796 # CheckHostIP yes
2797 # AddressFamily any
2798diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
2799index 591365f3..a7703fc7 100644
2800--- a/ssh_config.5
2801+++ b/ssh_config.5
2802@@ -748,10 +748,42 @@ The default is
2803 Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
2804 The default is
2805 .Cm no .
2806+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
2807+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using
2808+GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key.
2809+The default is
2810+.Cm no .
2811+.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity
2812+If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when
2813+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default
2814+identity will be used.
2815+.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity
2816+If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when
2817+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the
2818+expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target
2819+hostname.
2820 .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
2821 Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
2822 The default is
2823 .Cm no .
2824+.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
2825+If set to
2826+.Cm yes
2827+then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the
2828+ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed
2829+credentials to a session on the server.
2830+The default is
2831+.Cm no .
2832+.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
2833+Set to
2834+.Cm yes
2835+to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
2836+the name of the host being connected to. If
2837+.Cm no ,
2838+the hostname entered on the
2839+command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
2840+The default is
2841+.Cm no .
2842 .It Cm HashKnownHosts
2843 Indicates that
2844 .Xr ssh 1
2845diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
2846index 103a2b36..d534e619 100644
2847--- a/sshconnect2.c
2848+++ b/sshconnect2.c
2849@@ -162,6 +162,11 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
2850 struct kex *kex;
2851 int r;
2852
2853+#ifdef GSSAPI
2854+ char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL;
2855+ char *gss_host = NULL;
2856+#endif
2857+
2858 xxx_host = host;
2859 xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
2860
2861@@ -192,6 +197,36 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
2862 order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port));
2863 }
2864
2865+#ifdef GSSAPI
2866+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
2867+ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
2868+ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
2869+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
2870+
2871+ if (options.gss_server_identity)
2872+ gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
2873+ else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
2874+ gss_host = remote_hostname(active_state);
2875+ else
2876+ gss_host = xstrdup(host);
2877+
2878+ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
2879+ options.gss_client_identity);
2880+ if (gss) {
2881+ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
2882+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
2883+ "%s,%s", gss, orig);
2884+
2885+ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also
2886+ * support the 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
2887+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
2888+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
2889+ "%s,null", orig);
2890+ free(gss);
2891+ }
2892+ }
2893+#endif
2894+
2895 if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
2896 packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
2897 (time_t)options.rekey_interval);
2898@@ -213,10 +248,26 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
2899 # endif
2900 #endif
2901 kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client;
2902+#ifdef GSSAPI
2903+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
2904+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
2905+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
2906+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
2907+ }
2908+#endif
2909 kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
2910 kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
2911 kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
2912
2913+#ifdef GSSAPI
2914+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
2915+ kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
2916+ kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
2917+ kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity;
2918+ kex->gss_host = gss_host;
2919+ }
2920+#endif
2921+
2922 dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, active_state);
2923
2924 /* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */
2925@@ -311,6 +362,7 @@ int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
2926 int input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
2927 int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
2928 int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
2929+int userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt);
2930 #endif
2931
2932 void userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
2933@@ -327,6 +379,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
2934
2935 Authmethod authmethods[] = {
2936 #ifdef GSSAPI
2937+ {"gssapi-keyex",
2938+ userauth_gsskeyex,
2939+ NULL,
2940+ &options.gss_authentication,
2941+ NULL},
2942 {"gssapi-with-mic",
2943 userauth_gssapi,
2944 NULL,
2945@@ -652,25 +709,40 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
2946 static u_int mech = 0;
2947 OM_uint32 min;
2948 int ok = 0;
2949+ char *gss_host;
2950+
2951+ if (options.gss_server_identity)
2952+ gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
2953+ else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
2954+ gss_host = remote_hostname(active_state);
2955+ else
2956+ gss_host = xstrdup(authctxt->host);
2957
2958 /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
2959 * once. */
2960
2961 if (gss_supported == NULL)
2962- gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported);
2963+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) {
2964+ gss_supported = NULL;
2965+ free(gss_host);
2966+ return 0;
2967+ }
2968
2969 /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
2970 while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
2971 /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
2972 if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
2973 ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
2974- &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
2975+ &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host,
2976+ options.gss_client_identity)) {
2977 ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
2978 } else {
2979 mech++;
2980 }
2981 }
2982
2983+ free(gss_host);
2984+
2985 if (!ok)
2986 return 0;
2987
2988@@ -761,8 +833,8 @@ input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
2989 {
2990 Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
2991 Gssctxt *gssctxt;
2992- int oidlen;
2993- char *oidv;
2994+ u_int oidlen;
2995+ u_char *oidv;
2996
2997 if (authctxt == NULL)
2998 fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
2999@@ -875,6 +947,48 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
3000 free(lang);
3001 return 0;
3002 }
3003+
3004+int
3005+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
3006+{
3007+ Buffer b;
3008+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
3009+ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
3010+ OM_uint32 ms;
3011+
3012+ static int attempt = 0;
3013+ if (attempt++ >= 1)
3014+ return (0);
3015+
3016+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
3017+ debug("No valid Key exchange context");
3018+ return (0);
3019+ }
3020+
3021+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
3022+ "gssapi-keyex");
3023+
3024+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
3025+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
3026+
3027+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
3028+ buffer_free(&b);
3029+ return (0);
3030+ }
3031+
3032+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
3033+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
3034+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
3035+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
3036+ packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
3037+ packet_send();
3038+
3039+ buffer_free(&b);
3040+ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
3041+
3042+ return (1);
3043+}
3044+
3045 #endif /* GSSAPI */
3046
3047 int
3048diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
3049index 1dc4d182..0970f297 100644
3050--- a/sshd.c
3051+++ b/sshd.c
3052@@ -123,6 +123,10 @@
3053 #include "version.h"
3054 #include "ssherr.h"
3055
3056+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
3057+#include <Security/AuthSession.h>
3058+#endif
3059+
3060 /* Re-exec fds */
3061 #define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
3062 #define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
3063@@ -531,7 +535,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
3064
3065 #ifdef GSSAPI
3066 /* Cache supported mechanism OIDs for later use */
3067- if (options.gss_authentication)
3068+ if (options.gss_authentication || options.gss_keyex)
3069 ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
3070 #endif
3071
3072@@ -1705,10 +1709,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
3073 key ? "private" : "agent", i, sshkey_ssh_name(pubkey), fp);
3074 free(fp);
3075 }
3076+#ifndef GSSAPI
3077+ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
3078 if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
3079 logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
3080 exit(1);
3081 }
3082+#endif
3083
3084 /*
3085 * Load certificates. They are stored in an array at identical
3086@@ -1978,6 +1985,60 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
3087 remote_ip, remote_port, laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh));
3088 free(laddr);
3089
3090+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
3091+ /*
3092+ * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if
3093+ * the current session is the root session or we are not launched
3094+ * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode). We do not
3095+ * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from
3096+ * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us.
3097+ *
3098+ * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an
3099+ * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating
3100+ * new sessions for us. Then all the users will end up in the
3101+ * same session (bad).
3102+ *
3103+ * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us
3104+ * automatically.
3105+ *
3106+ * We must create the session before any credentials are stored
3107+ * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below).
3108+ */
3109+ {
3110+ OSStatus err = 0;
3111+ SecuritySessionId sid = 0;
3112+ SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0;
3113+
3114+ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs);
3115+ if (err)
3116+ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
3117+ (unsigned) err);
3118+ else
3119+ debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
3120+ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
3121+
3122+ if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot))
3123+ debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... "
3124+ "assuming inetd created the session for us.");
3125+ else {
3126+ debug("Creating new security session...");
3127+ err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote);
3128+ if (err)
3129+ error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X",
3130+ (unsigned) err);
3131+
3132+ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid,
3133+ &sattrs);
3134+ if (err)
3135+ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
3136+ (unsigned) err);
3137+ else
3138+ debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
3139+ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
3140+ }
3141+ }
3142+#endif
3143+
3144 /*
3145 * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
3146 * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
3147@@ -2159,6 +2220,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
3148 myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
3149 list_hostkey_types());
3150
3151+#ifdef GSSAPI
3152+ {
3153+ char *orig;
3154+ char *gss = NULL;
3155+ char *newstr = NULL;
3156+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
3157+
3158+ /*
3159+ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
3160+ * the other key exchange algorithms
3161+ */
3162+
3163+ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
3164+ orig = NULL;
3165+
3166+ if (options.gss_keyex)
3167+ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
3168+ else
3169+ gss = NULL;
3170+
3171+ if (gss && orig)
3172+ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
3173+ else if (gss)
3174+ newstr = gss;
3175+ else if (orig)
3176+ newstr = orig;
3177+
3178+ /*
3179+ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
3180+ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
3181+ * host key algorithm we support
3182+ */
3183+ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
3184+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
3185+
3186+ if (newstr)
3187+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
3188+ else
3189+ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
3190+ }
3191+#endif
3192+
3193 /* start key exchange */
3194 if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0)
3195 fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r));
3196@@ -2176,6 +2279,13 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
3197 # endif
3198 #endif
3199 kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
3200+#ifdef GSSAPI
3201+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
3202+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
3203+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
3204+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
3205+ }
3206+#endif
3207 kex->server = 1;
3208 kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
3209 kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
3210diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
3211index 9f09e4a6..00e5a728 100644
3212--- a/sshd_config
3213+++ b/sshd_config
3214@@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
3215 # GSSAPI options
3216 #GSSAPIAuthentication no
3217 #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
3218+#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
3219+#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
3220
3221 # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
3222 # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
3223diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
3224index 32b29d24..dd765b39 100644
3225--- a/sshd_config.5
3226+++ b/sshd_config.5
3227@@ -623,6 +623,11 @@ The default is
3228 Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
3229 The default is
3230 .Cm no .
3231+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
3232+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
3233+doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
3234+The default is
3235+.Cm no .
3236 .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
3237 Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
3238 on logout.
3239@@ -642,6 +647,11 @@ machine's default store.
3240 This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines.
3241 The default is
3242 .Cm yes .
3243+.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey
3244+Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a
3245+successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed
3246+or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is
3247+.Cm no .
3248 .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
3249 Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication
3250 as a comma-separated pattern list.
3251diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
3252index c01da6c3..377d72fa 100644
3253--- a/sshkey.c
3254+++ b/sshkey.c
3255@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] = {
3256 # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
3257 # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
3258 #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
3259+ { "null", "null", KEY_NULL, 0, 0, 0 },
3260 { NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0 }
3261 };
3262
3263@@ -202,7 +203,7 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, char sep)
3264 const struct keytype *kt;
3265
3266 for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
3267- if (kt->name == NULL || kt->sigonly)
3268+ if (kt->name == NULL || kt->sigonly || kt->type == KEY_NULL)
3269 continue;
3270 if ((certs_only && !kt->cert) || (plain_only && kt->cert))
3271 continue;
3272diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
3273index f3936384..7eb2a139 100644
3274--- a/sshkey.h
3275+++ b/sshkey.h
3276@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ enum sshkey_types {
3277 KEY_DSA_CERT,
3278 KEY_ECDSA_CERT,
3279 KEY_ED25519_CERT,
3280+ KEY_NULL,
3281 KEY_UNSPEC
3282 };
3283
diff --git a/debian/patches/keepalive-extensions.patch b/debian/patches/keepalive-extensions.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..36497da1d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/keepalive-extensions.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
1From 2336e779d7f90c0574ae8632584d3f9c3e06c4b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Richard Kettlewell <rjk@greenend.org.uk>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:52 +0000
4Subject: Various keepalive extensions
5
6Add compatibility aliases for ProtocolKeepAlives and SetupTimeOut, supported
7in previous versions of Debian's OpenSSH package but since superseded by
8ServerAliveInterval. (We're probably stuck with this bit for
9compatibility.)
10
11In batch mode, default ServerAliveInterval to five minutes.
12
13Adjust documentation to match and to give some more advice on use of
14keepalives.
15
16Author: Ian Jackson <ian@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
17Author: Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>
18Author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
19Last-Update: 2016-12-26
20
21Patch-Name: keepalive-extensions.patch
22---
23 readconf.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
24 ssh_config.5 | 21 +++++++++++++++++++--
25 sshd_config.5 | 3 +++
26 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
27
28diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
29index c1c3aae0..3efba242 100644
30--- a/readconf.c
31+++ b/readconf.c
32@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ typedef enum {
33 oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys,
34 oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedKeyTypes,
35 oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, oProxyJump,
36+ oProtocolKeepAlives, oSetupTimeOut,
37 oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported
38 } OpCodes;
39
40@@ -308,6 +309,8 @@ static struct {
41 { "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes },
42 { "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown },
43 { "proxyjump", oProxyJump },
44+ { "protocolkeepalives", oProtocolKeepAlives },
45+ { "setuptimeout", oSetupTimeOut },
46
47 { NULL, oBadOption }
48 };
49@@ -1402,6 +1405,8 @@ parse_keytypes:
50 goto parse_flag;
51
52 case oServerAliveInterval:
53+ case oProtocolKeepAlives: /* Debian-specific compatibility alias */
54+ case oSetupTimeOut: /* Debian-specific compatibility alias */
55 intptr = &options->server_alive_interval;
56 goto parse_time;
57
58@@ -2047,8 +2052,13 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
59 options->rekey_interval = 0;
60 if (options->verify_host_key_dns == -1)
61 options->verify_host_key_dns = 0;
62- if (options->server_alive_interval == -1)
63- options->server_alive_interval = 0;
64+ if (options->server_alive_interval == -1) {
65+ /* in batch mode, default is 5mins */
66+ if (options->batch_mode == 1)
67+ options->server_alive_interval = 300;
68+ else
69+ options->server_alive_interval = 0;
70+ }
71 if (options->server_alive_count_max == -1)
72 options->server_alive_count_max = 3;
73 if (options->control_master == -1)
74diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
75index a7703fc7..a0457314 100644
76--- a/ssh_config.5
77+++ b/ssh_config.5
78@@ -250,8 +250,12 @@ Valid arguments are
79 If set to
80 .Cm yes ,
81 passphrase/password querying will be disabled.
82+In addition, the
83+.Cm ServerAliveInterval
84+option will be set to 300 seconds by default (Debian-specific).
85 This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no user
86-is present to supply the password.
87+is present to supply the password,
88+and where it is desirable to detect a broken network swiftly.
89 The argument must be
90 .Cm yes
91 or
92@@ -1485,7 +1489,14 @@ from the server,
93 will send a message through the encrypted
94 channel to request a response from the server.
95 The default
96-is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server.
97+is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server,
98+or 300 if the
99+.Cm BatchMode
100+option is set (Debian-specific).
101+.Cm ProtocolKeepAlives
102+and
103+.Cm SetupTimeOut
104+are Debian-specific compatibility aliases for this option.
105 .It Cm StreamLocalBindMask
106 Sets the octal file creation mode mask
107 .Pq umask
108@@ -1544,6 +1555,12 @@ Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the
109 other side.
110 If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one
111 of the machines will be properly noticed.
112+This option only uses TCP keepalives (as opposed to using ssh level
113+keepalives), so takes a long time to notice when the connection dies.
114+As such, you probably want
115+the
116+.Cm ServerAliveInterval
117+option as well.
118 However, this means that
119 connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people
120 find it annoying.
121diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
122index dd765b39..283ba889 100644
123--- a/sshd_config.5
124+++ b/sshd_config.5
125@@ -1427,6 +1427,9 @@ This avoids infinitely hanging sessions.
126 .Pp
127 To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
128 .Cm no .
129+.Pp
130+This option was formerly called
131+.Cm KeepAlive .
132 .It Cm TrustedUserCAKeys
133 Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate authorities that are
134 trusted to sign user certificates for authentication, or
diff --git a/debian/patches/mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch b/debian/patches/mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b097627b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
1From 432a9b5cd1f63c4c1dc678cc0916819bc57280bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Scott Moser <smoser@ubuntu.com>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:03 +0000
4Subject: Mention ssh-keygen in ssh fingerprint changed warning
5
6Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1843
7Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/686607
8Last-Update: 2015-09-08
9
10Patch-Name: mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch
11---
12 sshconnect.c | 8 +++++++-
13 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
14
15diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
16index 698a0711..1cc556e8 100644
17--- a/sshconnect.c
18+++ b/sshconnect.c
19@@ -1080,9 +1080,13 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
20 error("%s. This could either mean that", key_msg);
21 error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host");
22 error("and its host key have changed at the same time.");
23- if (ip_status != HOST_NEW)
24+ if (ip_status != HOST_NEW) {
25 error("Offending key for IP in %s:%lu",
26 ip_found->file, ip_found->line);
27+ error(" remove with:");
28+ error(" ssh-keygen -f \"%s\" -R %s",
29+ ip_found->file, ip);
30+ }
31 }
32 /* The host key has changed. */
33 warn_changed_key(host_key);
34@@ -1090,6 +1094,8 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
35 user_hostfiles[0]);
36 error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu", key_type(host_found->key),
37 host_found->file, host_found->line);
38+ error(" remove with:");
39+ error(" ssh-keygen -f \"%s\" -R %s", host_found->file, host);
40
41 /*
42 * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
diff --git a/debian/patches/no-openssl-version-status.patch b/debian/patches/no-openssl-version-status.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..495da970f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/no-openssl-version-status.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
1From 3dc476595ed1850596f833153fde8ce166ff13f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:14 +0000
4Subject: Don't check the status field of the OpenSSL version
5
6There is no reason to check the version of OpenSSL (in Debian). If it's
7not compatible the soname will change. OpenSSH seems to want to do a
8check for the soname based on the version number, but wants to keep the
9status of the release the same. Remove that check on the status since
10it doesn't tell you anything about how compatible that version is.
11
12Author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
13Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/93581
14Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/664383
15Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/732940
16Forwarded: not-needed
17Last-Update: 2014-10-07
18
19Patch-Name: no-openssl-version-status.patch
20---
21 openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c | 6 +++---
22 openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c | 1 +
23 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
24
25diff --git a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
26index 259fccbe..aaa953f2 100644
27--- a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
28+++ b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
29@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
30 /*
31 * OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
32 * We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0.
33- * After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we
34+ * After that, we accept compatible fix and status versions (so we
35 * allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed
36 * within a patch series.
37 */
38@@ -55,10 +55,10 @@ ssh_compatible_openssl(long headerver, long libver)
39 }
40
41 /*
42- * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor,status must match and library
43+ * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor must match and library
44 * fix version must be equal to or newer than the header.
45 */
46- mask = 0xfff0000fL; /* major,minor,status */
47+ mask = 0xfff00000L; /* major,minor */
48 hfix = (headerver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
49 lfix = (libver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
50 if ( (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask) && lfix >= hfix)
51diff --git a/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c b/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
52index 5d019b59..58474873 100644
53--- a/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
54+++ b/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
55@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ struct version_test {
56
57 /* built with 1.0.1b release headers */
58 { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000101fL, 1},/* exact match */
59+ { 0x1000101fL, 0x10001010L, 1}, /* different status: ok */
60 { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000102fL, 1}, /* newer library patch version: ok */
61 { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000100fL, 1}, /* older library patch version: ok */
62 { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000201fL, 1}, /* newer library fix version: ok */
diff --git a/debian/patches/openbsd-docs.patch b/debian/patches/openbsd-docs.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f4cef1af6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/openbsd-docs.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
1From 807a8417d6f3c3203024ed8c026a1f79ace12ecb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:09 +0000
4Subject: Adjust various OpenBSD-specific references in manual pages
5
6No single bug reference for this patch, but history includes:
7 http://bugs.debian.org/154434 (login.conf(5))
8 http://bugs.debian.org/513417 (/etc/rc)
9 http://bugs.debian.org/530692 (ssl(8))
10 https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/456660 (ssl(8))
11
12Forwarded: not-needed
13Last-Update: 2014-10-07
14
15Patch-Name: openbsd-docs.patch
16---
17 moduli.5 | 4 ++--
18 ssh-keygen.1 | 12 ++++--------
19 ssh.1 | 4 ++++
20 sshd.8 | 5 ++---
21 sshd_config.5 | 3 +--
22 5 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
23
24diff --git a/moduli.5 b/moduli.5
25index ef0de085..149846c8 100644
26--- a/moduli.5
27+++ b/moduli.5
28@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
29 .Nd Diffie-Hellman moduli
30 .Sh DESCRIPTION
31 The
32-.Pa /etc/moduli
33+.Pa /etc/ssh/moduli
34 file contains prime numbers and generators for use by
35 .Xr sshd 8
36 in the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange key exchange method.
37@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ first estimates the size of the modulus required to produce enough
38 Diffie-Hellman output to sufficiently key the selected symmetric cipher.
39 .Xr sshd 8
40 then randomly selects a modulus from
41-.Fa /etc/moduli
42+.Fa /etc/ssh/moduli
43 that best meets the size requirement.
44 .Sh SEE ALSO
45 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
46diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
47index ce2213c7..01711dff 100644
48--- a/ssh-keygen.1
49+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
50@@ -178,9 +178,7 @@ key in
51 .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
52 or
53 .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa .
54-Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys,
55-as seen in
56-.Pa /etc/rc .
57+Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys.
58 .Pp
59 Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which
60 to store the private key.
61@@ -227,9 +225,7 @@ For each of the key types (rsa1, rsa, dsa, ecdsa and ed25519)
62 for which host keys
63 do not exist, generate the host keys with the default key file path,
64 an empty passphrase, default bits for the key type, and default comment.
65-This is used by
66-.Pa /etc/rc
67-to generate new host keys.
68+This is used by system administration scripts to generate new host keys.
69 .It Fl a Ar rounds
70 When saving a new-format private key (i.e. an ed25519 key or any SSH protocol
71 2 key when the
72@@ -644,7 +640,7 @@ option.
73 Valid generator values are 2, 3, and 5.
74 .Pp
75 Screened DH groups may be installed in
76-.Pa /etc/moduli .
77+.Pa /etc/ssh/moduli .
78 It is important that this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths and
79 that both ends of a connection share common moduli.
80 .Sh CERTIFICATES
81@@ -843,7 +839,7 @@ on all machines
82 where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication.
83 There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret.
84 .Pp
85-.It Pa /etc/moduli
86+.It Pa /etc/ssh/moduli
87 Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX.
88 The file format is described in
89 .Xr moduli 5 .
90diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
91index feef81a5..b1f128c2 100644
92--- a/ssh.1
93+++ b/ssh.1
94@@ -877,6 +877,10 @@ implements public key authentication protocol automatically,
95 using one of the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA algorithms.
96 The HISTORY section of
97 .Xr ssl 8
98+(on non-OpenBSD systems, see
99+.nh
100+http://www.openbsd.org/cgi\-bin/man.cgi?query=ssl&sektion=8#HISTORY)
101+.hy
102 contains a brief discussion of the DSA and RSA algorithms.
103 .Pp
104 The file
105diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
106index c6784602..e6915141 100644
107--- a/sshd.8
108+++ b/sshd.8
109@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ over an insecure network.
110 .Nm
111 listens for connections from clients.
112 It is normally started at boot from
113-.Pa /etc/rc .
114+.Pa /etc/init.d/ssh .
115 It forks a new
116 daemon for each incoming connection.
117 The forked daemons handle
118@@ -836,7 +836,7 @@ This file is for host-based authentication (see
119 .Xr ssh 1 ) .
120 It should only be writable by root.
121 .Pp
122-.It Pa /etc/moduli
123+.It Pa /etc/ssh/moduli
124 Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange"
125 key exchange method.
126 The file format is described in
127@@ -936,7 +936,6 @@ The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
128 .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
129 .Xr chroot 2 ,
130 .Xr hosts_access 5 ,
131-.Xr login.conf 5 ,
132 .Xr moduli 5 ,
133 .Xr sshd_config 5 ,
134 .Xr inetd 8 ,
135diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
136index 4ea0a9c3..e45a8937 100644
137--- a/sshd_config.5
138+++ b/sshd_config.5
139@@ -372,8 +372,7 @@ then no banner is displayed.
140 By default, no banner is displayed.
141 .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
142 Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
143-PAM or through authentication styles supported in
144-.Xr login.conf 5 )
145+PAM).
146 The default is
147 .Cm yes .
148 .It Cm ChrootDirectory
diff --git a/debian/patches/package-versioning.patch b/debian/patches/package-versioning.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..678fb551d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/package-versioning.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
1From 9d2f9a1fb49b3d3c73a654e1b4aae6e26ad23075 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:05 +0000
4Subject: Include the Debian version in our identification
5
6This makes it easier to audit networks for versions patched against security
7vulnerabilities. It has little detrimental effect, as attackers will
8generally just try attacks rather than bothering to scan for
9vulnerable-looking version strings. (However, see debian-banner.patch.)
10
11Forwarded: not-needed
12Last-Update: 2013-09-14
13
14Patch-Name: package-versioning.patch
15---
16 sshconnect.c | 4 ++--
17 sshd.c | 2 +-
18 version.h | 7 ++++++-
19 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
20
21diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
22index 1cc556e8..c64c51bb 100644
23--- a/sshconnect.c
24+++ b/sshconnect.c
25@@ -526,10 +526,10 @@ send_client_banner(int connection_out, int minor1)
26 /* Send our own protocol version identification. */
27 if (compat20) {
28 xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\r\n",
29- PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION);
30+ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE);
31 } else {
32 xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n",
33- PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, minor1, SSH_VERSION);
34+ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, minor1, SSH_RELEASE);
35 }
36 if (atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, client_version_string,
37 strlen(client_version_string)) != strlen(client_version_string))
38diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
39index 9aab36c3..49f3a2e5 100644
40--- a/sshd.c
41+++ b/sshd.c
42@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int sock_in, int sock_out)
43 char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */
44
45 xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s",
46- PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION,
47+ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE,
48 *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
49 options.version_addendum, newline);
50
51diff --git a/version.h b/version.h
52index 269ebcda..850a2f7d 100644
53--- a/version.h
54+++ b/version.h
55@@ -3,4 +3,9 @@
56 #define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_7.4"
57
58 #define SSH_PORTABLE "p1"
59-#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
60+#define SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
61+#ifdef SSH_EXTRAVERSION
62+#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM " " SSH_EXTRAVERSION
63+#else
64+#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM
65+#endif
diff --git a/debian/patches/quieter-signals.patch b/debian/patches/quieter-signals.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..89c47e308
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/quieter-signals.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
1From 466cba7557bc735e09e9b362582ebbc7785cbcd0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Peter Samuelson <peter@p12n.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:55 +0000
4Subject: Reduce severity of "Killed by signal %d"
5
6This produces irritating messages when using ProxyCommand or other programs
7that use ssh under the covers (e.g. Subversion). These messages are more
8normally printed by the calling program, such as the shell.
9
10According to the upstream bug, the right way to avoid this is to use the -q
11option, so we may drop this patch after further investigation into whether
12any software in Debian is still relying on it.
13
14Author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
15Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1118
16Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/313371
17Last-Update: 2013-09-14
18
19Patch-Name: quieter-signals.patch
20---
21 clientloop.c | 6 ++++--
22 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
23
24diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
25index 99c68b69..5876cc9a 100644
26--- a/clientloop.c
27+++ b/clientloop.c
28@@ -1755,8 +1755,10 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id)
29 exit_status = 0;
30 }
31
32- if (received_signal)
33- fatal("Killed by signal %d.", (int) received_signal);
34+ if (received_signal) {
35+ debug("Killed by signal %d.", (int) received_signal);
36+ cleanup_exit((int) received_signal + 128);
37+ }
38
39 /*
40 * In interactive mode (with pseudo tty) display a message indicating
diff --git a/debian/patches/regress-forwarding-race.patch b/debian/patches/regress-forwarding-race.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..92d13c82c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/regress-forwarding-race.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
1From d225c4fe44ad94a30a5033e58594f2bebaa674f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Mon, 2 Jan 2017 14:55:16 +0000
4Subject: Fix race conditions in forwarding tests
5
6The forwarding tests sometimes seem to fail in a way that suggests ports
7are in use even though they shouldn't be. Convert more of them to use a
8mux socket rather than relying on sleeps in the hope that that makes
9behaviour more consistent.
10
11Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2659
12Patch-Name: regress-forwarding-race.patch
13
14Last-Update: 2017-01-02
15---
16 regress/forwarding.sh | 32 +++++++++++++++++++-------------
17 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
18
19diff --git a/regress/forwarding.sh b/regress/forwarding.sh
20index 2539db9b..a1a4b13f 100644
21--- a/regress/forwarding.sh
22+++ b/regress/forwarding.sh
23@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ base=33
24 last=$PORT
25 fwd=""
26 CTL=$OBJ/ctl-sock
27-rm -f $CTL
28
29 for j in 0 1 2; do
30 for i in 0 1 2; do
31@@ -29,7 +28,8 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
32 q=$p
33 fi
34 trace "start forwarding, fork to background"
35- ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f $fwd somehost sleep 10
36+ rm -f $CTL
37+ ${SSH} -S $CTL -M -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f $fwd somehost sleep 10
38
39 trace "transfer over forwarded channels and check result"
40 ${SSH} -$q -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$last -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \
41@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
42 test -s ${COPY} || fail "failed copy of ${DATA}"
43 cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
44
45- sleep 10
46+ ${SSH} -S $CTL -O exit somehost
47 done
48
49 for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
50@@ -75,7 +75,8 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
51 ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost true
52
53 trace "clear local forward proto $p"
54- ${SSH} -$p -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
55+ rm -f $CTL
56+ ${SSH} -S $CTL -M -$p -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
57 -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost sleep 10
58 if [ $? != 0 ]; then
59 fail "connection failed with cleared local forwarding"
60@@ -85,10 +86,11 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
61 >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 && \
62 fail "local forwarding not cleared"
63 fi
64- sleep 10
65+ ${SSH} -S $CTL -O exit somehost
66
67 trace "clear remote forward proto $p"
68- ${SSH} -$p -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
69+ rm -f $CTL
70+ ${SSH} -S $CTL -M -$p -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
71 -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost sleep 10
72 if [ $? != 0 ]; then
73 fail "connection failed with cleared remote forwarding"
74@@ -98,7 +100,7 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
75 >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 && \
76 fail "remote forwarding not cleared"
77 fi
78- sleep 10
79+ ${SSH} -S $CTL -O exit somehost
80 done
81
82 for p in 2; do
83@@ -115,6 +117,7 @@ echo "LocalForward ${base}01 127.0.0.1:$PORT" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
84 echo "RemoteForward ${base}02 127.0.0.1:${base}01" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
85 for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
86 trace "config file: start forwarding, fork to background"
87+ rm -f $CTL
88 ${SSH} -S $CTL -M -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f somehost sleep 10
89
90 trace "config file: transfer over forwarded channels and check result"
91@@ -129,15 +132,18 @@ done
92 for p in 2; do
93 trace "transfer over chained unix domain socket forwards and check result"
94 rm -f $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd
95- ${SSH} -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R${base}01:[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd] somehost sleep 10
96- ${SSH} -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd] somehost sleep 10
97- ${SSH} -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd] somehost sleep 10
98- ${SSH} -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd]:127.0.0.1:$PORT somehost sleep 10
99+ rm -f $CTL $CTL.[123]
100+ ${SSH} -S $CTL -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R${base}01:[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd] somehost sleep 10
101+ ${SSH} -S $CTL.1 -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd] somehost sleep 10
102+ ${SSH} -S $CTL.2 -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd] somehost sleep 10
103+ ${SSH} -S $CTL.3 -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd]:127.0.0.1:$PORT somehost sleep 10
104 ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p${base}01 -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \
105 somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
106 test -s ${COPY} || fail "failed copy ${DATA}"
107 cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
108
109- #wait
110- sleep 10
111+ ${SSH} -S $CTL -O exit somehost
112+ ${SSH} -S $CTL.1 -O exit somehost
113+ ${SSH} -S $CTL.2 -O exit somehost
114+ ${SSH} -S $CTL.3 -O exit somehost
115 done
diff --git a/debian/patches/regress-integrity-robust.patch b/debian/patches/regress-integrity-robust.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..92b5ae5fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/regress-integrity-robust.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
1From ada7edd8b4ec246a0c1c283c5e5956f09d503fbd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 1 Jan 2017 15:21:10 +0000
4Subject: Make integrity tests more robust against timeouts
5
6If the first test in a series for a given MAC happens to modify the low
7bytes of a packet length, then ssh will time out and this will be
8interpreted as a test failure. Handle this failure mode.
9
10Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2658
11Patch-Name: regress-integrity-robust.patch
12
13Last-Update: 2017-01-01
14---
15 regress/integrity.sh | 9 +++++----
16 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
17
18diff --git a/regress/integrity.sh b/regress/integrity.sh
19index 39d310de..fd7d58bc 100644
20--- a/regress/integrity.sh
21+++ b/regress/integrity.sh
22@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@ tid="integrity"
23 cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
24
25 # start at byte 2900 (i.e. after kex) and corrupt at different offsets
26-# XXX the test hangs if we modify the low bytes of the packet length
27-# XXX and ssh tries to read...
28 tries=10
29 startoffset=2900
30 macs=`${SSH} -Q mac`
31@@ -27,6 +25,7 @@ for m in $macs; do
32 elen=0
33 epad=0
34 emac=0
35+ etmo=0
36 ecnt=0
37 skip=0
38 for off in `jot $tries $startoffset`; do
39@@ -61,14 +60,16 @@ for m in $macs; do
40 Corrupted?MAC* | *message?authentication?code?incorrect*)
41 emac=`expr $emac + 1`; skip=0;;
42 padding*) epad=`expr $epad + 1`; skip=0;;
43+ *Timeout,?server*)
44+ etmo=`expr $etmo + 1`; skip=0;;
45 *) fail "unexpected error mac $m at $off: $out";;
46 esac
47 done
48- verbose "test $tid: $ecnt errors: mac $emac padding $epad length $elen"
49+ verbose "test $tid: $ecnt errors: mac $emac padding $epad length $elen timeout $etmo"
50 if [ $emac -eq 0 ]; then
51 fail "$m: no mac errors"
52 fi
53- expect=`expr $ecnt - $epad - $elen`
54+ expect=`expr $ecnt - $epad - $elen - $etmo`
55 if [ $emac -ne $expect ]; then
56 fail "$m: expected $expect mac errors, got $emac"
57 fi
diff --git a/debian/patches/regress-mktemp.patch b/debian/patches/regress-mktemp.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2d9b436f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/regress-mktemp.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
1From cc50ca70e3b438577c33a85147e2a68666deaad9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2017 12:09:42 +0000
4Subject: Create mux socket for regress in temp directory
5
6In some setups, creating the socket under OBJ may result in a path that
7is too long for a Unix domain socket. Add a helper to let us portably
8create a temporary directory instead.
9
10Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2660
11Last-Update: 2017-01-03
12
13Patch-Name: regress-mktemp.patch
14---
15 Makefile.in | 5 +++++
16 regress/forwarding.sh | 3 ++-
17 regress/mkdtemp.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
18 regress/multiplex.sh | 3 ++-
19 regress/test-exec.sh | 11 ++++++++++
20 5 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
21 create mode 100644 regress/mkdtemp.c
22
23diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
24index a6eb81ec..a00347e2 100644
25--- a/Makefile.in
26+++ b/Makefile.in
27@@ -459,6 +459,10 @@ regress/check-perm$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/check-perm.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
28 $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/check-perm.c \
29 $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
30
31+regress/mkdtemp$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/mkdtemp.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
32+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/mkdtemp.c \
33+ $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
34+
35 UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS=\
36 regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.o \
37 regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.o
38@@ -557,6 +561,7 @@ regress-binaries: regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT) \
39 regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT) \
40 regress/netcat$(EXEEXT) \
41 regress/check-perm$(EXEEXT) \
42+ regress/mkdtemp$(EXEEXT) \
43 regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT) \
44 regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT) \
45 regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT) \
46diff --git a/regress/forwarding.sh b/regress/forwarding.sh
47index a1a4b13f..592de7bc 100644
48--- a/regress/forwarding.sh
49+++ b/regress/forwarding.sh
50@@ -10,7 +10,8 @@ start_sshd
51 base=33
52 last=$PORT
53 fwd=""
54-CTL=$OBJ/ctl-sock
55+make_tmpdir
56+CTL=$TMP/ctl-sock
57
58 for j in 0 1 2; do
59 for i in 0 1 2; do
60diff --git a/regress/mkdtemp.c b/regress/mkdtemp.c
61new file mode 100644
62index 00000000..8c7d2e21
63--- /dev/null
64+++ b/regress/mkdtemp.c
65@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
66+/*
67+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
68+ *
69+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
70+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
71+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
72+ *
73+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
74+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
75+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
76+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
77+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
78+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
79+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
80+ */
81+
82+/* Roughly equivalent to "mktemp -d -t TEMPLATE", but portable. */
83+
84+#include "includes.h"
85+
86+#include <limits.h>
87+#include <stdio.h>
88+#include <stdlib.h>
89+
90+#include "log.h"
91+
92+static void
93+usage(void)
94+{
95+ fprintf(stderr, "mkdtemp template\n");
96+ exit(1);
97+}
98+
99+int
100+main(int argc, char **argv)
101+{
102+ const char *base;
103+ const char *tmpdir;
104+ char template[PATH_MAX];
105+ int r;
106+ char *dir;
107+
108+ if (argc != 2)
109+ usage();
110+ base = argv[1];
111+
112+ if ((tmpdir = getenv("TMPDIR")) == NULL)
113+ tmpdir = "/tmp";
114+ r = snprintf(template, sizeof(template), "%s/%s", tmpdir, base);
115+ if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(template))
116+ fatal("template string too long");
117+ dir = mkdtemp(template);
118+ if (dir == NULL) {
119+ perror("mkdtemp");
120+ exit(1);
121+ }
122+ puts(dir);
123+ return 0;
124+}
125diff --git a/regress/multiplex.sh b/regress/multiplex.sh
126index acb9234d..0ac4065e 100644
127--- a/regress/multiplex.sh
128+++ b/regress/multiplex.sh
129@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
130 # $OpenBSD: multiplex.sh,v 1.27 2014/12/22 06:14:29 djm Exp $
131 # Placed in the Public Domain.
132
133-CTL=/tmp/openssh.regress.ctl-sock.$$
134+make_tmpdir
135+CTL=$TMP/ctl-sock
136
137 tid="connection multiplexing"
138
139diff --git a/regress/test-exec.sh b/regress/test-exec.sh
140index bfa48803..13a8e18f 100644
141--- a/regress/test-exec.sh
142+++ b/regress/test-exec.sh
143@@ -317,6 +317,14 @@ stop_sshd ()
144 fi
145 }
146
147+TMP=
148+
149+make_tmpdir ()
150+{
151+ TMP="$($OBJ/mkdtemp openssh-regress-XXXXXXXXXXXX)" || \
152+ fatal "failed to create temporary directory"
153+}
154+
155 # helper
156 cleanup ()
157 {
158@@ -327,6 +335,9 @@ cleanup ()
159 kill $SSH_PID
160 fi
161 fi
162+ if [ "x$TMP" != "x" ]; then
163+ rm -rf "$TMP"
164+ fi
165 stop_sshd
166 }
167
diff --git a/debian/patches/restore-tcp-wrappers.patch b/debian/patches/restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dc9fec5fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
1From 10d7583287f2d589da0786819e62a0be5ec9847f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Tue, 7 Oct 2014 13:22:41 +0100
4Subject: Restore TCP wrappers support
5
6Support for TCP wrappers was dropped in OpenSSH 6.7. See this message
7and thread:
8
9 https://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/2014-April/032497.html
10
11It is true that this reduces preauth attack surface in sshd. On the
12other hand, this support seems to be quite widely used, and abruptly
13dropping it (from the perspective of users who don't read
14openssh-unix-dev) could easily cause more serious problems in practice.
15
16It's not entirely clear what the right long-term answer for Debian is,
17but it at least probably doesn't involve dropping this feature shortly
18before a freeze.
19
20Forwarded: not-needed
21Last-Update: 2014-10-07
22
23Patch-Name: restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
24---
25 configure.ac | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
26 sshd.8 | 7 +++++++
27 sshd.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
28 3 files changed, 89 insertions(+)
29
30diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
31index 5fdc696c..4747ce4a 100644
32--- a/configure.ac
33+++ b/configure.ac
34@@ -1491,6 +1491,62 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([skey],
35 ]
36 )
37
38+# Check whether user wants TCP wrappers support
39+TCPW_MSG="no"
40+AC_ARG_WITH([tcp-wrappers],
41+ [ --with-tcp-wrappers[[=PATH]] Enable tcpwrappers support (optionally in PATH)],
42+ [
43+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
44+ saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
45+ saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
46+ saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
47+ if test -n "${withval}" && \
48+ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
49+ if test -d "${withval}/lib"; then
50+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
51+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
52+ else
53+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
54+ fi
55+ else
56+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
57+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
58+ else
59+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
60+ fi
61+ fi
62+ if test -d "${withval}/include"; then
63+ CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
64+ else
65+ CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
66+ fi
67+ fi
68+ LIBS="-lwrap $LIBS"
69+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libwrap])
70+ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
71+#include <sys/types.h>
72+#include <sys/socket.h>
73+#include <netinet/in.h>
74+#include <tcpd.h>
75+int deny_severity = 0, allow_severity = 0;
76+ ]], [[
77+ hosts_access(0);
78+ ]])], [
79+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
80+ AC_DEFINE([LIBWRAP], [1],
81+ [Define if you want
82+ TCP Wrappers support])
83+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lwrap"
84+ TCPW_MSG="yes"
85+ ], [
86+ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libwrap missing])
87+
88+ ])
89+ LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
90+ fi
91+ ]
92+)
93+
94 # Check whether user wants to use ldns
95 LDNS_MSG="no"
96 AC_ARG_WITH(ldns,
97@@ -5105,6 +5161,7 @@ echo " KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG"
98 echo " SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
99 echo " Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG"
100 echo " S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"
101+echo " TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG"
102 echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
103 echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
104 echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
105diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
106index 41fc5051..c6784602 100644
107--- a/sshd.8
108+++ b/sshd.8
109@@ -825,6 +825,12 @@ the user's home directory becomes accessible.
110 This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be
111 readable by anyone else.
112 .Pp
113+.It Pa /etc/hosts.allow
114+.It Pa /etc/hosts.deny
115+Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are defined here.
116+Further details are described in
117+.Xr hosts_access 5 .
118+.Pp
119 .It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
120 This file is for host-based authentication (see
121 .Xr ssh 1 ) .
122@@ -929,6 +935,7 @@ The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
123 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
124 .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
125 .Xr chroot 2 ,
126+.Xr hosts_access 5 ,
127 .Xr login.conf 5 ,
128 .Xr moduli 5 ,
129 .Xr sshd_config 5 ,
130diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
131index 0970f297..72d85de1 100644
132--- a/sshd.c
133+++ b/sshd.c
134@@ -127,6 +127,13 @@
135 #include <Security/AuthSession.h>
136 #endif
137
138+#ifdef LIBWRAP
139+#include <tcpd.h>
140+#include <syslog.h>
141+int allow_severity;
142+int deny_severity;
143+#endif /* LIBWRAP */
144+
145 /* Re-exec fds */
146 #define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
147 #define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
148@@ -1978,6 +1985,24 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
149 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
150 audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
151 #endif
152+#ifdef LIBWRAP
153+ allow_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_INFO;
154+ deny_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_WARNING;
155+ /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */
156+ if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
157+ struct request_info req;
158+
159+ request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0);
160+ fromhost(&req);
161+
162+ if (!hosts_access(&req)) {
163+ debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper");
164+ refuse(&req);
165+ /* NOTREACHED */
166+ fatal("libwrap refuse returns");
167+ }
168+ }
169+#endif /* LIBWRAP */
170
171 /* Log the connection. */
172 laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock_in);
diff --git a/debian/patches/sandbox-x32-workaround.patch b/debian/patches/sandbox-x32-workaround.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9fabaecfa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/sandbox-x32-workaround.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
1From e346421ca6852fbf9f95cf0e764ecc345e5ce21d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2017 14:01:56 +0000
4Subject: Work around clock_gettime kernel bug on Linux x32
5
6On Linux x32, the clock_gettime VDSO currently falls back to the x86-64
7syscall, so allow that as well as its x32 sibling.
8
9Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/849923
10Forwarded: no
11Last-Update: 2017-01-03
12
13Patch-Name: sandbox-x32-workaround.patch
14---
15 sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 9 +++++++++
16 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
17
18diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
19index 2e1ed2c5..62c578d3 100644
20--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
21+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
22@@ -137,6 +137,15 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
23 #endif
24 #ifdef __NR_clock_gettime
25 SC_ALLOW(clock_gettime),
26+# if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__)
27+ /* On Linux x32, the clock_gettime VDSO currently falls back to the
28+ * x86-64 syscall (see https://bugs.debian.org/849923), so allow
29+ * that too.
30+ */
31+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K,
32+ __NR_clock_gettime & ~__X32_SYSCALL_BIT, 0, 1),
33+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
34+# endif
35 #endif
36 #ifdef __NR_close
37 SC_ALLOW(close),
diff --git a/debian/patches/scp-quoting.patch b/debian/patches/scp-quoting.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7aa44ac8f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/scp-quoting.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
1From 5362ffb871dbb4ca9f19f25756eee0a88cd177e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: =?UTF-8?q?Nicolas=20Valc=C3=A1rcel?= <nvalcarcel@ubuntu.com>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:59 +0000
4Subject: Adjust scp quoting in verbose mode
5
6Tweak scp's reporting of filenames in verbose mode to be a bit less
7confusing with spaces.
8
9This should be revised to mimic real shell quoting.
10
11Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/89945
12Last-Update: 2010-02-27
13
14Patch-Name: scp-quoting.patch
15---
16 scp.c | 12 ++++++++++--
17 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
18
19diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
20index b4db8519..18c27720 100644
21--- a/scp.c
22+++ b/scp.c
23@@ -191,8 +191,16 @@ do_local_cmd(arglist *a)
24
25 if (verbose_mode) {
26 fprintf(stderr, "Executing:");
27- for (i = 0; i < a->num; i++)
28- fmprintf(stderr, " %s", a->list[i]);
29+ for (i = 0; i < a->num; i++) {
30+ if (i == 0)
31+ fmprintf(stderr, " %s", a->list[i]);
32+ else
33+ /*
34+ * TODO: misbehaves if a->list[i] contains a
35+ * single quote
36+ */
37+ fmprintf(stderr, " '%s'", a->list[i]);
38+ }
39 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
40 }
41 if ((pid = fork()) == -1)
diff --git a/debian/patches/selinux-role.patch b/debian/patches/selinux-role.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a09f8c82d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/selinux-role.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,473 @@
1From ef3ee35a1061c563f2c32ab13f77324b6372e8be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Manoj Srivastava <srivasta@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:49 +0000
4Subject: Handle SELinux authorisation roles
5
6Rejected upstream due to discomfort with magic usernames; a better approach
7will need an SSH protocol change. In the meantime, this came from Debian's
8SELinux maintainer, so we'll keep it until we have something better.
9
10Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1641
11Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/394795
12Last-Update: 2015-08-19
13
14Patch-Name: selinux-role.patch
15---
16 auth.h | 1 +
17 auth2.c | 10 ++++++++--
18 monitor.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
19 monitor.h | 2 ++
20 monitor_wrap.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++--
21 monitor_wrap.h | 3 ++-
22 openbsd-compat/port-linux.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++-------
23 openbsd-compat/port-linux.h | 4 ++--
24 platform.c | 4 ++--
25 platform.h | 2 +-
26 session.c | 10 +++++-----
27 session.h | 2 +-
28 sshd.c | 2 +-
29 sshpty.c | 4 ++--
30 sshpty.h | 2 +-
31 15 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
32
33diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
34index 338a62da..8c658d16 100644
35--- a/auth.h
36+++ b/auth.h
37@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
38 char *service;
39 struct passwd *pw; /* set if 'valid' */
40 char *style;
41+ char *role;
42 void *kbdintctxt;
43 char *info; /* Extra info for next auth_log */
44 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
45diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
46index ce0d3760..461311bd 100644
47--- a/auth2.c
48+++ b/auth2.c
49@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
50 {
51 Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
52 Authmethod *m = NULL;
53- char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL;
54+ char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL, *role = NULL;
55 int authenticated = 0;
56
57 if (authctxt == NULL)
58@@ -228,8 +228,13 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
59 debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
60 debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
61
62+ if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
63+ *role++ = 0;
64+
65 if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
66 *style++ = 0;
67+ else if (role && (style = strchr(role, ':')) != NULL)
68+ *style++ = '\0';
69
70 if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) {
71 /* setup auth context */
72@@ -253,8 +258,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
73 use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
74 authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
75 authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
76+ authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
77 if (use_privsep)
78- mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
79+ mm_inform_authserv(service, style, role);
80 userauth_banner();
81 if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
82 packet_disconnect("no authentication methods enabled");
83diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
84index 76d9e346..64286a12 100644
85--- a/monitor.c
86+++ b/monitor.c
87@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
88 int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
89 int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
90 int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
91+int mm_answer_authrole(int, Buffer *);
92 int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
93 int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
94 int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
95@@ -204,6 +205,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
96 {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
97 {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
98 {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
99+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole},
100 {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
101 {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
102 #ifdef USE_PAM
103@@ -786,6 +788,7 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
104
105 /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
106 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
107+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1);
108 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
109
110 #ifdef USE_PAM
111@@ -816,14 +819,37 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
112
113 authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
114 authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
115- debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
116- __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
117+ authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
118+ debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s, role=%s",
119+ __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style, authctxt->role);
120
121 if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
122 free(authctxt->style);
123 authctxt->style = NULL;
124 }
125
126+ if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
127+ free(authctxt->role);
128+ authctxt->role = NULL;
129+ }
130+
131+ return (0);
132+}
133+
134+int
135+mm_answer_authrole(int sock, Buffer *m)
136+{
137+ monitor_permit_authentications(1);
138+
139+ authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
140+ debug3("%s: role=%s",
141+ __func__, authctxt->role);
142+
143+ if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
144+ free(authctxt->role);
145+ authctxt->role = NULL;
146+ }
147+
148 return (0);
149 }
150
151@@ -1458,7 +1484,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
152 res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
153 if (res == 0)
154 goto error;
155- pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
156+ pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty, authctxt->role);
157
158 buffer_put_int(m, 1);
159 buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
160diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
161index ec41404c..4c7955d7 100644
162--- a/monitor.h
163+++ b/monitor.h
164@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
165 MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151,
166 MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153,
167
168+ MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 154,
169+
170 };
171
172 struct monitor {
173diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
174index d5cb640a..2ff8064a 100644
175--- a/monitor_wrap.c
176+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
177@@ -327,10 +327,10 @@ mm_auth2_read_banner(void)
178 return (banner);
179 }
180
181-/* Inform the privileged process about service and style */
182+/* Inform the privileged process about service, style, and role */
183
184 void
185-mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
186+mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style, char *role)
187 {
188 Buffer m;
189
190@@ -339,12 +339,30 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
191 buffer_init(&m);
192 buffer_put_cstring(&m, service);
193 buffer_put_cstring(&m, style ? style : "");
194+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : "");
195
196 mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, &m);
197
198 buffer_free(&m);
199 }
200
201+/* Inform the privileged process about role */
202+
203+void
204+mm_inform_authrole(char *role)
205+{
206+ Buffer m;
207+
208+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
209+
210+ buffer_init(&m);
211+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : "");
212+
213+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, &m);
214+
215+ buffer_free(&m);
216+}
217+
218 /* Do the password authentication */
219 int
220 mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password)
221diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
222index 8f9dd896..3e75867c 100644
223--- a/monitor_wrap.h
224+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
225@@ -41,7 +41,8 @@ void mm_log_handler(LogLevel, const char *, void *);
226 int mm_is_monitor(void);
227 DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
228 int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int, const char *);
229-void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
230+void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *, char *);
231+void mm_inform_authrole(char *);
232 struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *);
233 char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
234 int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *);
235diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
236index e4c5d1b7..e26faf08 100644
237--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
238+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
239@@ -27,6 +27,12 @@
240 #include <string.h>
241 #include <stdio.h>
242
243+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
244+#include "key.h"
245+#include "hostfile.h"
246+#include "auth.h"
247+#endif
248+
249 #include "log.h"
250 #include "xmalloc.h"
251 #include "port-linux.h"
252@@ -56,7 +62,7 @@ ssh_selinux_enabled(void)
253
254 /* Return the default security context for the given username */
255 static security_context_t
256-ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
257+ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, const char *role)
258 {
259 security_context_t sc = NULL;
260 char *sename = NULL, *lvl = NULL;
261@@ -71,9 +77,16 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
262 #endif
263
264 #ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
265- r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
266+ if (role != NULL && role[0])
267+ r = get_default_context_with_rolelevel(sename, role, lvl, NULL,
268+ &sc);
269+ else
270+ r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
271 #else
272- r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
273+ if (role != NULL && role[0])
274+ r = get_default_context_with_role(sename, role, NULL, &sc);
275+ else
276+ r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
277 #endif
278
279 if (r != 0) {
280@@ -103,7 +116,7 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
281
282 /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
283 void
284-ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
285+ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname, const char *role)
286 {
287 security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
288
289@@ -112,7 +125,7 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
290
291 debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
292
293- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
294+ user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, role);
295 if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
296 switch (security_getenforce()) {
297 case -1:
298@@ -134,7 +147,7 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
299
300 /* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
301 void
302-ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
303+ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty, const char *role)
304 {
305 security_context_t new_tty_ctx = NULL;
306 security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
307@@ -145,7 +158,7 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
308
309 debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
310
311- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
312+ user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, role);
313
314 /* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
315
316diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
317index 3c22a854..c8812942 100644
318--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
319+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
320@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@
321
322 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
323 int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
324-void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
325-void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
326+void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *, const char *);
327+void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *, const char *);
328 void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
329 void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
330 #endif
331diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
332index 973a63e4..cd7bf566 100644
333--- a/platform.c
334+++ b/platform.c
335@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
336 * called if sshd is running as root.
337 */
338 void
339-platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
340+platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw, const char *role)
341 {
342 #if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(USE_PAM)
343 /*
344@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
345 }
346 #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
347 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
348- ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
349+ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name, role);
350 #endif
351 }
352
353diff --git a/platform.h b/platform.h
354index ea4f9c58..60d72ffe 100644
355--- a/platform.h
356+++ b/platform.h
357@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ void platform_post_fork_parent(pid_t child_pid);
358 void platform_post_fork_child(void);
359 int platform_privileged_uidswap(void);
360 void platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
361-void platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *);
362+void platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *, const char *);
363 char *platform_get_krb5_client(const char *);
364 char *platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *);
365 int platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t);
366diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
367index a08aa69d..ea3871eb 100644
368--- a/session.c
369+++ b/session.c
370@@ -1325,7 +1325,7 @@ safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid)
371
372 /* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */
373 void
374-do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
375+do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw, const char *role)
376 {
377 char *chroot_path, *tmp;
378
379@@ -1353,7 +1353,7 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
380 endgrent();
381 #endif
382
383- platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw);
384+ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw, role);
385
386 if (!in_chroot && options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
387 strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
388@@ -1489,7 +1489,7 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
389
390 /* Force a password change */
391 if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
392- do_setusercontext(pw);
393+ do_setusercontext(pw, s->authctxt->role);
394 child_close_fds();
395 do_pwchange(s);
396 exit(1);
397@@ -1511,7 +1511,7 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
398 /* When PAM is enabled we rely on it to do the nologin check */
399 if (!options.use_pam)
400 do_nologin(pw);
401- do_setusercontext(pw);
402+ do_setusercontext(pw, s->authctxt->role);
403 /*
404 * PAM session modules in do_setusercontext may have
405 * generated messages, so if this in an interactive
406@@ -1903,7 +1903,7 @@ session_pty_req(Session *s)
407 tty_parse_modes(s->ttyfd, &n_bytes);
408
409 if (!use_privsep)
410- pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty);
411+ pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty, s->authctxt->role);
412
413 /* Set window size from the packet. */
414 pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
415diff --git a/session.h b/session.h
416index 98e1dafe..0a31dce4 100644
417--- a/session.h
418+++ b/session.h
419@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *);
420 Session *session_new(void);
421 Session *session_by_tty(char *);
422 void session_close(Session *);
423-void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
424+void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *, const char *);
425 void child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
426 const char *value);
427
428diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
429index 72d85de1..9aab36c3 100644
430--- a/sshd.c
431+++ b/sshd.c
432@@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
433 reseed_prngs();
434
435 /* Drop privileges */
436- do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
437+ do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw, authctxt->role);
438
439 skip:
440 /* It is safe now to apply the key state */
441diff --git a/sshpty.c b/sshpty.c
442index fe2fb5aa..feb22b06 100644
443--- a/sshpty.c
444+++ b/sshpty.c
445@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ pty_change_window_size(int ptyfd, u_int row, u_int col,
446 }
447
448 void
449-pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty)
450+pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty, const char *role)
451 {
452 struct group *grp;
453 gid_t gid;
454@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty)
455 strerror(errno));
456
457 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
458- ssh_selinux_setup_pty(pw->pw_name, tty);
459+ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(pw->pw_name, tty, role);
460 #endif
461
462 if (st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid || st.st_gid != gid) {
463diff --git a/sshpty.h b/sshpty.h
464index 9ec7e9a1..de7e000a 100644
465--- a/sshpty.h
466+++ b/sshpty.h
467@@ -24,5 +24,5 @@ int pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
468 void pty_release(const char *);
469 void pty_make_controlling_tty(int *, const char *);
470 void pty_change_window_size(int, u_int, u_int, u_int, u_int);
471-void pty_setowner(struct passwd *, const char *);
472+void pty_setowner(struct passwd *, const char *, const char *);
473 void disconnect_controlling_tty(void);
diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7edc511b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/series
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
1gssapi.patch
2restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
3selinux-role.patch
4ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch
5keepalive-extensions.patch
6syslog-level-silent.patch
7quieter-signals.patch
8user-group-modes.patch
9scp-quoting.patch
10shell-path.patch
11dnssec-sshfp.patch
12auth-log-verbosity.patch
13mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch
14package-versioning.patch
15debian-banner.patch
16authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
17openbsd-docs.patch
18ssh-argv0.patch
19doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
20doc-upstart.patch
21ssh-agent-setgid.patch
22no-openssl-version-status.patch
23gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
24sigstop.patch
25systemd-readiness.patch
26debian-config.patch
27regress-integrity-robust.patch
28regress-forwarding-race.patch
29regress-mktemp.patch
30sandbox-x32-workaround.patch
diff --git a/debian/patches/shell-path.patch b/debian/patches/shell-path.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7e522ff17
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/shell-path.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
1From fa35a4226bf7f9e4c3fa6b6be06d1a38a58bd162 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:00 +0000
4Subject: Look for $SHELL on the path for ProxyCommand/LocalCommand
5
6There's some debate on the upstream bug about whether POSIX requires this.
7I (Colin Watson) agree with Vincent and think it does.
8
9Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1494
10Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/492728
11Last-Update: 2013-09-14
12
13Patch-Name: shell-path.patch
14---
15 sshconnect.c | 4 ++--
16 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
17
18diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
19index 96b91ce1..698a0711 100644
20--- a/sshconnect.c
21+++ b/sshconnect.c
22@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command)
23 /* Execute the proxy command. Note that we gave up any
24 extra privileges above. */
25 signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
26- execv(argv[0], argv);
27+ execvp(argv[0], argv);
28 perror(argv[0]);
29 exit(1);
30 }
31@@ -1498,7 +1498,7 @@ ssh_local_cmd(const char *args)
32 if (pid == 0) {
33 signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
34 debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args);
35- execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
36+ execlp(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
37 error("Couldn't execute %s -c \"%s\": %s",
38 shell, args, strerror(errno));
39 _exit(1);
diff --git a/debian/patches/sigstop.patch b/debian/patches/sigstop.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7a62bce5e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/sigstop.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
1From 78a2f42f1ae8a81e2a229405273b2c1369667b5c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:17 +0000
4Subject: Support synchronisation with service supervisor using SIGSTOP
5
6Author: Robie Basak <robie.basak@ubuntu.com>
7Forwarded: no
8Last-Update: 2014-04-14
9
10Patch-Name: sigstop.patch
11---
12 sshd.c | 10 ++++++++++
13 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
14
15diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
16index eebf1984..b6826c84 100644
17--- a/sshd.c
18+++ b/sshd.c
19@@ -1878,6 +1878,16 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
20 }
21 }
22
23+ if (getenv("SSH_SIGSTOP")) {
24+ /* Tell service supervisor that we are ready. */
25+ kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP);
26+ /* The service supervisor only ever expects a single
27+ * STOP signal, so do not ever signal it again, even
28+ * in the case of a re-exec or future children.
29+ */
30+ unsetenv("SSH_SIGSTOP");
31+ }
32+
33 /* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
34 server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
35 &newsock, config_s);
diff --git a/debian/patches/ssh-agent-setgid.patch b/debian/patches/ssh-agent-setgid.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f61725049
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/ssh-agent-setgid.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
1From 76b2e45116ded18137a30406cf5f22b11b9feeab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:13 +0000
4Subject: Document consequences of ssh-agent being setgid in ssh-agent(1)
5
6Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/711623
7Forwarded: no
8Last-Update: 2013-06-08
9
10Patch-Name: ssh-agent-setgid.patch
11---
12 ssh-agent.1 | 15 +++++++++++++++
13 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
14
15diff --git a/ssh-agent.1 b/ssh-agent.1
16index 83b2b41c..7230704a 100644
17--- a/ssh-agent.1
18+++ b/ssh-agent.1
19@@ -206,6 +206,21 @@ environment variable holds the agent's process ID.
20 .Pp
21 The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command
22 line terminates.
23+.Pp
24+In Debian,
25+.Nm
26+is installed with the set-group-id bit set, to prevent
27+.Xr ptrace 2
28+attacks retrieving private key material.
29+This has the side-effect of causing the run-time linker to remove certain
30+environment variables which might have security implications for set-id
31+programs, including
32+.Ev LD_PRELOAD ,
33+.Ev LD_LIBRARY_PATH ,
34+and
35+.Ev TMPDIR .
36+If you need to set any of these environment variables, you will need to do
37+so in the program executed by ssh-agent.
38 .Sh FILES
39 .Bl -tag -width Ds
40 .It Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.<ppid>
diff --git a/debian/patches/ssh-argv0.patch b/debian/patches/ssh-argv0.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5ea2fb243
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/ssh-argv0.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
1From e11b941efd85f5b55c055eb11511c7bbb6464b5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:10 +0000
4Subject: ssh(1): Refer to ssh-argv0(1)
5
6Old versions of OpenSSH (up to 2.5 or thereabouts) allowed creating symlinks
7to ssh with the name of the host you want to connect to. Debian ships an
8ssh-argv0 script restoring this feature; this patch refers to its manual
9page from ssh(1).
10
11Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/111341
12Forwarded: not-needed
13Last-Update: 2013-09-14
14
15Patch-Name: ssh-argv0.patch
16---
17 ssh.1 | 1 +
18 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
19
20diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
21index b1f128c2..22e56a7b 100644
22--- a/ssh.1
23+++ b/ssh.1
24@@ -1586,6 +1586,7 @@ if an error occurred.
25 .Xr sftp 1 ,
26 .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
27 .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
28+.Xr ssh-argv0 1 ,
29 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
30 .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
31 .Xr tun 4 ,
diff --git a/debian/patches/ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch b/debian/patches/ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2398598f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
1From 8bdb2e6f613ad62c3aa781ba6cb7088ee16a6dfd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@ubuntu.com>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:50 +0000
4Subject: Accept obsolete ssh-vulnkey configuration options
5
6These options were used as part of Debian's response to CVE-2008-0166.
7Nearly six years later, we no longer need to continue carrying the bulk
8of that patch, but we do need to avoid failing when the associated
9configuration options are still present.
10
11Last-Update: 2014-02-09
12
13Patch-Name: ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch
14---
15 readconf.c | 1 +
16 servconf.c | 1 +
17 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
18
19diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
20index 7902ef26..c1c3aae0 100644
21--- a/readconf.c
22+++ b/readconf.c
23@@ -194,6 +194,7 @@ static struct {
24 { "passwordauthentication", oPasswordAuthentication },
25 { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication },
26 { "kbdinteractivedevices", oKbdInteractiveDevices },
27+ { "useblacklistedkeys", oDeprecated },
28 { "rsaauthentication", oRSAAuthentication },
29 { "pubkeyauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication },
30 { "dsaauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication }, /* alias */
31diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
32index 14c81fa9..49d3bdc8 100644
33--- a/servconf.c
34+++ b/servconf.c
35@@ -521,6 +521,7 @@ static struct {
36 { "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
37 { "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
38 { "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
39+ { "permitblacklistedkeys", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
40 { "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd, SSHCFG_ALL },
41 { "permituserenvironment", sPermitUserEnvironment, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
42 { "uselogin", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
diff --git a/debian/patches/syslog-level-silent.patch b/debian/patches/syslog-level-silent.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a8eeb7ebc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/syslog-level-silent.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
1From ed3f2695800c03da18c36191aefd27d554bf052e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Jonathan David Amery <jdamery@ysolde.ucam.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:54 +0000
4Subject: "LogLevel SILENT" compatibility
5
6"LogLevel SILENT" (-qq) was introduced in Debian openssh 1:3.0.1p1-1 to
7match the behaviour of non-free SSH, in which -q does not suppress fatal
8errors. However, this was unintentionally broken in 1:4.6p1-2 and nobody
9complained, so we've dropped most of it. The parts that remain are basic
10configuration file compatibility, and an adjustment to "Pseudo-terminal will
11not be allocated ..." which should be split out into a separate patch.
12
13Author: Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>
14Author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
15Last-Update: 2013-09-14
16
17Patch-Name: syslog-level-silent.patch
18---
19 log.c | 1 +
20 ssh.c | 2 +-
21 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
22
23diff --git a/log.c b/log.c
24index 2b59c427..ffc8ffbb 100644
25--- a/log.c
26+++ b/log.c
27@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ static struct {
28 LogLevel val;
29 } log_levels[] =
30 {
31+ { "SILENT", SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET }, /* compatibility */
32 { "QUIET", SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET },
33 { "FATAL", SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL },
34 { "ERROR", SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR },
35diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
36index ee0b16dc..39609e79 100644
37--- a/ssh.c
38+++ b/ssh.c
39@@ -1167,7 +1167,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
40 /* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */
41 if ((!isatty(fileno(stdin)) || stdin_null_flag) &&
42 options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_FORCE) {
43- if (tty_flag)
44+ if (tty_flag && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
45 logit("Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because "
46 "stdin is not a terminal.");
47 tty_flag = 0;
diff --git a/debian/patches/systemd-readiness.patch b/debian/patches/systemd-readiness.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a5a543596
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/systemd-readiness.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
1From a7e11f49e8d6dfe6b44b24960af5e112cd953ae7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Michael Biebl <biebl@debian.org>
3Date: Mon, 21 Dec 2015 16:08:47 +0000
4Subject: Add systemd readiness notification support
5
6Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/778913
7Forwarded: no
8Last-Update: 2016-01-04
9
10Patch-Name: systemd-readiness.patch
11---
12 configure.ac | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
13 sshd.c | 9 +++++++++
14 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+)
15
16diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
17index 4747ce4a..9f59794b 100644
18--- a/configure.ac
19+++ b/configure.ac
20@@ -4364,6 +4364,29 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
21 AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
22 AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
23
24+# Check whether user wants systemd support
25+SYSTEMD_MSG="no"
26+AC_ARG_WITH(systemd,
27+ [ --with-systemd Enable systemd support],
28+ [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
29+ AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
30+ if test "$PKGCONFIG" != "no"; then
31+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libsystemd])
32+ if $PKGCONFIG --exists libsystemd; then
33+ SYSTEMD_CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags libsystemd`
34+ SYSTEMD_LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libsystemd`
35+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $SYSTEMD_CFLAGS"
36+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $SYSTEMD_LIBS"
37+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
38+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYSTEMD, 1, [Define if you want systemd support.])
39+ SYSTEMD_MSG="yes"
40+ else
41+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
42+ fi
43+ fi
44+ fi ]
45+)
46+
47 # Looking for programs, paths and files
48
49 PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
50@@ -5167,6 +5190,7 @@ echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
51 echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
52 echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
53 echo " Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
54+echo " systemd support: $SYSTEMD_MSG"
55 echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
56 echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
57 echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
58diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
59index b6826c84..027daa9d 100644
60--- a/sshd.c
61+++ b/sshd.c
62@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@
63 #include <prot.h>
64 #endif
65
66+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
67+#include <systemd/sd-daemon.h>
68+#endif
69+
70 #include "xmalloc.h"
71 #include "ssh.h"
72 #include "ssh2.h"
73@@ -1888,6 +1892,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
74 unsetenv("SSH_SIGSTOP");
75 }
76
77+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
78+ /* Signal systemd that we are ready to accept connections */
79+ sd_notify(0, "READY=1");
80+#endif
81+
82 /* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
83 server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
84 &newsock, config_s);
diff --git a/debian/patches/user-group-modes.patch b/debian/patches/user-group-modes.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ee5c38c23
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/user-group-modes.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
1From 5ba9e0eff0a725c4d616f296c6449fe3dbe0bdcf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:58 +0000
4Subject: Allow harmless group-writability
5
6Allow secure files (~/.ssh/config, ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, etc.) to be
7group-writable, provided that the group in question contains only the file's
8owner. Rejected upstream for IMO incorrect reasons (e.g. a misunderstanding
9about the contents of gr->gr_mem). Given that per-user groups and umask 002
10are the default setup in Debian (for good reasons - this makes operating in
11setgid directories with other groups much easier), we need to permit this by
12default.
13
14Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1060
15Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=314347
16Last-Update: 2013-09-14
17
18Patch-Name: user-group-modes.patch
19---
20 auth-rhosts.c | 6 ++----
21 auth.c | 9 +++-----
22 misc.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
23 misc.h | 2 ++
24 platform.c | 16 --------------
25 readconf.c | 3 +--
26 ssh.1 | 2 ++
27 ssh_config.5 | 2 ++
28 8 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
29
30diff --git a/auth-rhosts.c b/auth-rhosts.c
31index ecf956f0..4dccd5e6 100644
32--- a/auth-rhosts.c
33+++ b/auth-rhosts.c
34@@ -261,8 +261,7 @@ auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
35 return 0;
36 }
37 if (options.strict_modes &&
38- ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
39- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
40+ !secure_permissions(&st, pw->pw_uid)) {
41 logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
42 "bad ownership or modes for home directory.", pw->pw_name);
43 auth_debug_add("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
44@@ -288,8 +287,7 @@ auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
45 * allowing access to their account by anyone.
46 */
47 if (options.strict_modes &&
48- ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
49- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
50+ !secure_permissions(&st, pw->pw_uid)) {
51 logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: bad modes for %.200s",
52 pw->pw_name, buf);
53 auth_debug_add("Bad file modes for %.200s", buf);
54diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
55index c6390687..90390724 100644
56--- a/auth.c
57+++ b/auth.c
58@@ -444,8 +444,7 @@ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
59 user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
60 if (options.strict_modes &&
61 (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
62- ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
63- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
64+ !secure_permissions(&st, pw->pw_uid)) {
65 logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
66 "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
67 pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
68@@ -507,8 +506,7 @@ auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
69 snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf);
70 return -1;
71 }
72- if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) ||
73- (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) {
74+ if (!secure_permissions(stp, uid)) {
75 snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
76 buf);
77 return -1;
78@@ -523,8 +521,7 @@ auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
79 strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
80
81 if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
82- (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) ||
83- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
84+ !secure_permissions(&st, uid)) {
85 snprintf(err, errlen,
86 "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
87 return -1;
88diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
89index 65c9222a..bf9153a6 100644
90--- a/misc.c
91+++ b/misc.c
92@@ -51,8 +51,9 @@
93 #include <netdb.h>
94 #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
95 # include <paths.h>
96-#include <pwd.h>
97 #endif
98+#include <pwd.h>
99+#include <grp.h>
100 #ifdef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD
101 #include <net/if.h>
102 #endif
103@@ -61,6 +62,7 @@
104 #include "misc.h"
105 #include "log.h"
106 #include "ssh.h"
107+#include "platform.h"
108
109 /* remove newline at end of string */
110 char *
111@@ -708,6 +710,71 @@ read_keyfile_line(FILE *f, const char *filename, char *buf, size_t bufsz,
112 return -1;
113 }
114
115+/*
116+ * return 1 if the specified uid is a uid that may own a system directory
117+ * otherwise 0.
118+ */
119+int
120+platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t uid)
121+{
122+ if (uid == 0)
123+ return 1;
124+#ifdef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID
125+ if (uid == PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID)
126+ return 1;
127+#endif
128+ return 0;
129+}
130+
131+int
132+secure_permissions(struct stat *st, uid_t uid)
133+{
134+ if (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st->st_uid) && st->st_uid != uid)
135+ return 0;
136+ if ((st->st_mode & 002) != 0)
137+ return 0;
138+ if ((st->st_mode & 020) != 0) {
139+ /* If the file is group-writable, the group in question must
140+ * have exactly one member, namely the file's owner.
141+ * (Zero-member groups are typically used by setgid
142+ * binaries, and are unlikely to be suitable.)
143+ */
144+ struct passwd *pw;
145+ struct group *gr;
146+ int members = 0;
147+
148+ gr = getgrgid(st->st_gid);
149+ if (!gr)
150+ return 0;
151+
152+ /* Check primary group memberships. */
153+ while ((pw = getpwent()) != NULL) {
154+ if (pw->pw_gid == gr->gr_gid) {
155+ ++members;
156+ if (pw->pw_uid != uid)
157+ return 0;
158+ }
159+ }
160+ endpwent();
161+
162+ pw = getpwuid(st->st_uid);
163+ if (!pw)
164+ return 0;
165+
166+ /* Check supplementary group memberships. */
167+ if (gr->gr_mem[0]) {
168+ ++members;
169+ if (strcmp(pw->pw_name, gr->gr_mem[0]) ||
170+ gr->gr_mem[1])
171+ return 0;
172+ }
173+
174+ if (!members)
175+ return 0;
176+ }
177+ return 1;
178+}
179+
180 int
181 tun_open(int tun, int mode)
182 {
183diff --git a/misc.h b/misc.h
184index c242f901..8b223b55 100644
185--- a/misc.h
186+++ b/misc.h
187@@ -143,6 +143,8 @@ char *read_passphrase(const char *, int);
188 int ask_permission(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
189 int read_keyfile_line(FILE *, const char *, char *, size_t, u_long *);
190
191+int secure_permissions(struct stat *st, uid_t uid);
192+
193 #define MINIMUM(a, b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b))
194 #define MAXIMUM(a, b) (((a) > (b)) ? (a) : (b))
195 #define ROUNDUP(x, y) ((((x)+((y)-1))/(y))*(y))
196diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
197index cd7bf566..380ee3a4 100644
198--- a/platform.c
199+++ b/platform.c
200@@ -197,19 +197,3 @@ platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *pw_name)
201 return NULL;
202 #endif
203 }
204-
205-/*
206- * return 1 if the specified uid is a uid that may own a system directory
207- * otherwise 0.
208- */
209-int
210-platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t uid)
211-{
212- if (uid == 0)
213- return 1;
214-#ifdef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID
215- if (uid == PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID)
216- return 1;
217-#endif
218- return 0;
219-}
220diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
221index 3efba242..c02cdf63 100644
222--- a/readconf.c
223+++ b/readconf.c
224@@ -1752,8 +1752,7 @@ read_config_file_depth(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw,
225
226 if (fstat(fileno(f), &sb) == -1)
227 fatal("fstat %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno));
228- if (((sb.st_uid != 0 && sb.st_uid != getuid()) ||
229- (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0))
230+ if (!secure_permissions(&sb, getuid()))
231 fatal("Bad owner or permissions on %s", filename);
232 }
233
234diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
235index 4011c65a..feef81a5 100644
236--- a/ssh.1
237+++ b/ssh.1
238@@ -1484,6 +1484,8 @@ The file format and configuration options are described in
239 .Xr ssh_config 5 .
240 Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
241 read/write for the user, and not writable by others.
242+It may be group-writable provided that the group in question contains only
243+the user.
244 .Pp
245 .It Pa ~/.ssh/environment
246 Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see
247diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
248index a0457314..0483a1ee 100644
249--- a/ssh_config.5
250+++ b/ssh_config.5
251@@ -1803,6 +1803,8 @@ The format of this file is described above.
252 This file is used by the SSH client.
253 Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
254 read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
255+It may be group-writable provided that the group in question contains only
256+the user.
257 .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
258 Systemwide configuration file.
259 This file provides defaults for those
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-11 03:42:54 +0000