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-rw-r--r--debian/patches/auth-log-verbosity.patch120
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch26
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/debian-banner.patch111
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/debian-config.patch238
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/dnssec-sshfp.patch94
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/doc-hash-tab-completion.patch28
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/fix-regress-putty-transfer.patch37
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch26
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/gssapi.patch3300
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/keepalive-extensions.patch134
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch44
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/no-dsa-host-key-by-default.patch83
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/no-openssl-version-status.patch62
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/openbsd-docs.patch148
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/package-versioning.patch61
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/permitopen-argument-handling.patch51
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/restore-authorized_keys2.patch35
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/restore-tcp-wrappers.patch172
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/scp-quoting.patch41
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/seccomp-getuid-geteuid.patch44
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/seccomp-s390-flock-ipc.patch47
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/seccomp-s390-ioctl-ep11-crypto.patch33
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/selinux-role.patch473
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/series30
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/shell-path.patch39
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/ssh-agent-setgid.patch40
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/ssh-argv0.patch31
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch42
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/syslog-level-silent.patch47
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/systemd-readiness.patch84
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/user-group-modes.patch210
31 files changed, 5931 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/debian/patches/auth-log-verbosity.patch b/debian/patches/auth-log-verbosity.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ba7642d83
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/auth-log-verbosity.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
1From 50e9edb57b6808cbbf63fe3433febb103baac1e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:02 +0000
4Subject: Quieten logs when multiple from= restrictions are used
5
6Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/630606
7Forwarded: no
8Last-Update: 2017-10-04
9
10Patch-Name: auth-log-verbosity.patch
11---
12 auth-options.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
13 auth-options.h | 1 +
14 auth2-pubkey.c | 3 +++
15 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
16
17diff --git a/auth-options.c b/auth-options.c
18index bed00eef..ccdd0b20 100644
19--- a/auth-options.c
20+++ b/auth-options.c
21@@ -59,10 +59,21 @@ int forced_tun_device = -1;
22 /* "principals=" option. */
23 char *authorized_principals = NULL;
24
25+/* Throttle log messages. */
26+int logged_from_hostip = 0;
27+int logged_cert_hostip = 0;
28+
29 extern ServerOptions options;
30
31 /* XXX refactor to be stateless */
32
33+void
34+auth_start_parse_options(void)
35+{
36+ logged_from_hostip = 0;
37+ logged_cert_hostip = 0;
38+}
39+
40 void
41 auth_clear_options(void)
42 {
43@@ -322,10 +333,13 @@ auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, const char *file,
44 /* FALLTHROUGH */
45 case 0:
46 free(patterns);
47- logit("Authentication tried for %.100s with "
48- "correct key but not from a permitted "
49- "host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s).",
50- pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip);
51+ if (!logged_from_hostip) {
52+ logit("Authentication tried for %.100s with "
53+ "correct key but not from a permitted "
54+ "host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s).",
55+ pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip);
56+ logged_from_hostip = 1;
57+ }
58 auth_debug_add("Your host '%.200s' is not "
59 "permitted to use this key for login.",
60 remote_host);
61@@ -549,11 +563,14 @@ parse_option_list(struct sshbuf *oblob, struct passwd *pw,
62 break;
63 case 0:
64 /* no match */
65- logit("Authentication tried for %.100s "
66- "with valid certificate but not "
67- "from a permitted host "
68- "(ip=%.200s).", pw->pw_name,
69- remote_ip);
70+ if (!logged_cert_hostip) {
71+ logit("Authentication tried for %.100s "
72+ "with valid certificate but not "
73+ "from a permitted host "
74+ "(ip=%.200s).", pw->pw_name,
75+ remote_ip);
76+ logged_cert_hostip = 1;
77+ }
78 auth_debug_add("Your address '%.200s' "
79 "is not permitted to use this "
80 "certificate for login.",
81diff --git a/auth-options.h b/auth-options.h
82index 547f0163..4de0f14d 100644
83--- a/auth-options.h
84+++ b/auth-options.h
85@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ extern int forced_tun_device;
86 extern int key_is_cert_authority;
87 extern char *authorized_principals;
88
89+void auth_start_parse_options(void);
90 int auth_parse_options(struct passwd *, char *, const char *, u_long);
91 void auth_clear_options(void);
92 int auth_cert_options(struct sshkey *, struct passwd *, const char **);
93diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
94index 169839b0..43f880b6 100644
95--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
96+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
97@@ -269,6 +269,7 @@ process_principals(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
98 u_long linenum = 0;
99 u_int i, found_principal = 0;
100
101+ auth_start_parse_options();
102 while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
103 /* Always consume entire input */
104 if (found_principal)
105@@ -471,6 +472,7 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, struct sshkey *key, struct passwd *pw)
106 u_long linenum = 0;
107 struct sshkey *found = NULL;
108
109+ auth_start_parse_options();
110 while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
111 char *cp, *key_options = NULL, *fp = NULL;
112 const char *reason = NULL;
113@@ -624,6 +626,7 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key)
114 if (sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1,
115 use_authorized_principals ? NULL : pw->pw_name, &reason) != 0)
116 goto fail_reason;
117+ auth_start_parse_options();
118 if (auth_cert_options(key, pw, &reason) != 0)
119 goto fail_reason;
120
diff --git a/debian/patches/authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch b/debian/patches/authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..56f6de37f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
1From 312eb64a9faf4e8cdb95f2ae147ecbfa6c0efd83 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Tomas Pospisek <tpo_deb@sourcepole.ch>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:07 +0000
4Subject: Install authorized_keys(5) as a symlink to sshd(8)
5
6Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1720
7Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/441817
8Last-Update: 2013-09-14
9
10Patch-Name: authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
11---
12 Makefile.in | 1 +
13 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
14
15diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
16index f6e9fe4c..08b989a4 100644
17--- a/Makefile.in
18+++ b/Makefile.in
19@@ -340,6 +340,7 @@ install-files:
20 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5
21 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/ssh_config.5
22 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8
23+ ln -s ../$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/authorized_keys.5
24 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
25 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
26 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
diff --git a/debian/patches/debian-banner.patch b/debian/patches/debian-banner.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8134afba4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/debian-banner.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
1From ae96c03ce51af2c529bfa2f2de57f4fa938ea552 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Kees Cook <kees@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:06 +0000
4Subject: Add DebianBanner server configuration option
5
6Setting this to "no" causes sshd to omit the Debian revision from its
7initial protocol handshake, for those scared by package-versioning.patch.
8
9Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/562048
10Forwarded: not-needed
11Last-Update: 2017-10-04
12
13Patch-Name: debian-banner.patch
14---
15 servconf.c | 9 +++++++++
16 servconf.h | 2 ++
17 sshd.c | 3 ++-
18 sshd_config.5 | 5 +++++
19 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
20
21diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
22index 9889fb0a..b0146405 100644
23--- a/servconf.c
24+++ b/servconf.c
25@@ -167,6 +167,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
26 options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
27 options->disable_forwarding = -1;
28 options->expose_userauth_info = -1;
29+ options->debian_banner = -1;
30 }
31
32 /* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */
33@@ -342,6 +343,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
34 options->disable_forwarding = 0;
35 if (options->expose_userauth_info == -1)
36 options->expose_userauth_info = 0;
37+ if (options->debian_banner == -1)
38+ options->debian_banner = 1;
39
40 assemble_algorithms(options);
41
42@@ -429,6 +432,7 @@ typedef enum {
43 sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink,
44 sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash, sDisableForwarding,
45 sExposeAuthInfo,
46+ sDebianBanner,
47 sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported
48 } ServerOpCodes;
49
50@@ -582,6 +586,7 @@ static struct {
51 { "fingerprinthash", sFingerprintHash, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
52 { "disableforwarding", sDisableForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
53 { "exposeauthinfo", sExposeAuthInfo, SSHCFG_ALL },
54+ { "debianbanner", sDebianBanner, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
55 { NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
56 };
57
58@@ -1907,6 +1912,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
59 intptr = &options->expose_userauth_info;
60 goto parse_flag;
61
62+ case sDebianBanner:
63+ intptr = &options->debian_banner;
64+ goto parse_int;
65+
66 case sDeprecated:
67 case sIgnore:
68 case sUnsupported:
69diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
70index 641e93c8..410c4275 100644
71--- a/servconf.h
72+++ b/servconf.h
73@@ -200,6 +200,8 @@ typedef struct {
74
75 int fingerprint_hash;
76 int expose_userauth_info;
77+
78+ int debian_banner;
79 } ServerOptions;
80
81 /* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
82diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
83index eccf81bb..a5a1193d 100644
84--- a/sshd.c
85+++ b/sshd.c
86@@ -378,7 +378,8 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int sock_in, int sock_out)
87 char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */
88
89 xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n",
90- PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE,
91+ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2,
92+ options.debian_banner ? SSH_RELEASE : SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM,
93 *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
94 options.version_addendum);
95
96diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
97index 7db25552..41e8c939 100644
98--- a/sshd_config.5
99+++ b/sshd_config.5
100@@ -530,6 +530,11 @@ or
101 .Cm no .
102 The default is
103 .Cm yes .
104+.It Cm DebianBanner
105+Specifies whether the distribution-specified extra version suffix is
106+included during initial protocol handshake.
107+The default is
108+.Cm yes .
109 .It Cm DenyGroups
110 This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated
111 by spaces.
diff --git a/debian/patches/debian-config.patch b/debian/patches/debian-config.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a3f595752
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/debian-config.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
1From 4847e512c0b94c615b838904a5f139a761bee284 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:18 +0000
4Subject: Various Debian-specific configuration changes
5
6ssh: Enable ForwardX11Trusted, returning to earlier semantics which cause
7fewer problems with existing setups (http://bugs.debian.org/237021).
8
9ssh: Set 'SendEnv LANG LC_*' by default (http://bugs.debian.org/264024).
10
11ssh: Enable HashKnownHosts by default to try to limit the spread of ssh
12worms.
13
14ssh: Enable GSSAPIAuthentication by default.
15
16sshd: Enable PAM, disable ChallengeResponseAuthentication, and disable
17PrintMotd.
18
19sshd: Enable X11Forwarding.
20
21sshd: Set 'AcceptEnv LANG LC_*' by default.
22
23sshd: Change sftp subsystem path to /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server.
24
25Document all of this.
26
27Author: Russ Allbery <rra@debian.org>
28Forwarded: not-needed
29Last-Update: 2017-10-04
30
31Patch-Name: debian-config.patch
32---
33 readconf.c | 2 +-
34 ssh.1 | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
35 ssh_config | 6 +++++-
36 ssh_config.5 | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
37 sshd_config | 16 ++++++++++------
38 sshd_config.5 | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
39 6 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
40
41diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
42index be3d5873..41f36aa8 100644
43--- a/readconf.c
44+++ b/readconf.c
45@@ -1940,7 +1940,7 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
46 if (options->forward_x11 == -1)
47 options->forward_x11 = 0;
48 if (options->forward_x11_trusted == -1)
49- options->forward_x11_trusted = 0;
50+ options->forward_x11_trusted = 1;
51 if (options->forward_x11_timeout == -1)
52 options->forward_x11_timeout = 1200;
53 /*
54diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
55index 711fe608..f1b01c56 100644
56--- a/ssh.1
57+++ b/ssh.1
58@@ -764,6 +764,16 @@ directive in
59 .Xr ssh_config 5
60 for more information.
61 .Pp
62+(Debian-specific: X11 forwarding is not subjected to X11 SECURITY extension
63+restrictions by default, because too many programs currently crash in this
64+mode.
65+Set the
66+.Cm ForwardX11Trusted
67+option to
68+.Dq no
69+to restore the upstream behaviour.
70+This may change in future depending on client-side improvements.)
71+.Pp
72 .It Fl x
73 Disables X11 forwarding.
74 .Pp
75@@ -772,6 +782,17 @@ Enables trusted X11 forwarding.
76 Trusted X11 forwardings are not subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension
77 controls.
78 .Pp
79+(Debian-specific: This option does nothing in the default configuration: it
80+is equivalent to
81+.Dq Cm ForwardX11Trusted No yes ,
82+which is the default as described above.
83+Set the
84+.Cm ForwardX11Trusted
85+option to
86+.Dq no
87+to restore the upstream behaviour.
88+This may change in future depending on client-side improvements.)
89+.Pp
90 .It Fl y
91 Send log information using the
92 .Xr syslog 3
93diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
94index bcb9f153..1b676fb2 100644
95--- a/ssh_config
96+++ b/ssh_config
97@@ -17,9 +17,10 @@
98 # list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the
99 # ssh_config(5) man page.
100
101-# Host *
102+Host *
103 # ForwardAgent no
104 # ForwardX11 no
105+# ForwardX11Trusted yes
106 # PasswordAuthentication yes
107 # HostbasedAuthentication no
108 # GSSAPIAuthentication no
109@@ -46,3 +47,6 @@
110 # VisualHostKey no
111 # ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
112 # RekeyLimit 1G 1h
113+ SendEnv LANG LC_*
114+ HashKnownHosts yes
115+ GSSAPIAuthentication yes
116diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
117index 1edfe761..2da7029a 100644
118--- a/ssh_config.5
119+++ b/ssh_config.5
120@@ -71,6 +71,22 @@ Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more
121 host-specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the
122 file, and general defaults at the end.
123 .Pp
124+Note that the Debian
125+.Ic openssh-client
126+package sets several options as standard in
127+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
128+which are not the default in
129+.Xr ssh 1 :
130+.Pp
131+.Bl -bullet -offset indent -compact
132+.It
133+.Cm SendEnv No LANG LC_*
134+.It
135+.Cm HashKnownHosts No yes
136+.It
137+.Cm GSSAPIAuthentication No yes
138+.El
139+.Pp
140 The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line.
141 Lines starting with
142 .Ql #
143@@ -683,11 +699,12 @@ elapsed.
144 .It Cm ForwardX11Trusted
145 If this option is set to
146 .Cm yes ,
147+(the Debian-specific default),
148 remote X11 clients will have full access to the original X11 display.
149 .Pp
150 If this option is set to
151 .Cm no
152-(the default),
153+(the upstream default),
154 remote X11 clients will be considered untrusted and prevented
155 from stealing or tampering with data belonging to trusted X11
156 clients.
157diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
158index c01dd656..f68edf36 100644
159--- a/sshd_config
160+++ b/sshd_config
161@@ -58,8 +58,9 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
162 #PasswordAuthentication yes
163 #PermitEmptyPasswords no
164
165-# Change to no to disable s/key passwords
166-#ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes
167+# Change to yes to enable challenge-response passwords (beware issues with
168+# some PAM modules and threads)
169+ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
170
171 # Kerberos options
172 #KerberosAuthentication no
173@@ -82,16 +83,16 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
174 # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
175 # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
176 # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
177-#UsePAM no
178+UsePAM yes
179
180 #AllowAgentForwarding yes
181 #AllowTcpForwarding yes
182 #GatewayPorts no
183-#X11Forwarding no
184+X11Forwarding yes
185 #X11DisplayOffset 10
186 #X11UseLocalhost yes
187 #PermitTTY yes
188-#PrintMotd yes
189+PrintMotd no
190 #PrintLastLog yes
191 #TCPKeepAlive yes
192 #UseLogin no
193@@ -109,8 +110,11 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
194 # no default banner path
195 #Banner none
196
197+# Allow client to pass locale environment variables
198+AcceptEnv LANG LC_*
199+
200 # override default of no subsystems
201-Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server
202+Subsystem sftp /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server
203
204 # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
205 #Match User anoncvs
206diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
207index 79676a95..16be4f62 100644
208--- a/sshd_config.5
209+++ b/sshd_config.5
210@@ -55,6 +55,28 @@ Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes
211 .Pq \&"
212 in order to represent arguments containing spaces.
213 .Pp
214+Note that the Debian
215+.Ic openssh-server
216+package sets several options as standard in
217+.Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
218+which are not the default in
219+.Xr sshd 8 :
220+.Pp
221+.Bl -bullet -offset indent -compact
222+.It
223+.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication No no
224+.It
225+.Cm X11Forwarding No yes
226+.It
227+.Cm PrintMotd No no
228+.It
229+.Cm AcceptEnv No LANG LC_*
230+.It
231+.Cm Subsystem No sftp /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server
232+.It
233+.Cm UsePAM No yes
234+.El
235+.Pp
236 The possible
237 keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
238 keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
diff --git a/debian/patches/dnssec-sshfp.patch b/debian/patches/dnssec-sshfp.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a8d98855a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/dnssec-sshfp.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
1From f500e89e2310f6308a998357d72d767e3b01553c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:01 +0000
4Subject: Force use of DNSSEC even if "options edns0" isn't in resolv.conf
5
6This allows SSHFP DNS records to be verified if glibc 2.11 is installed.
7
8Origin: vendor, https://cvs.fedoraproject.org/viewvc/F-12/openssh/openssh-5.2p1-edns.patch?revision=1.1&view=markup
9Bug: http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=572049
10Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=572049
11Last-Update: 2010-04-06
12
13Patch-Name: dnssec-sshfp.patch
14---
15 dns.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
16 openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c | 10 +++++-----
17 openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h | 3 +++
18 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
19
20diff --git a/dns.c b/dns.c
21index 6e1abb53..8e0ca691 100644
22--- a/dns.c
23+++ b/dns.c
24@@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address,
25 {
26 u_int counter;
27 int result;
28+ unsigned int rrset_flags = 0;
29 struct rrsetinfo *fingerprints = NULL;
30
31 u_int8_t hostkey_algorithm;
32@@ -229,8 +230,19 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address,
33 return -1;
34 }
35
36+ /*
37+ * Original getrrsetbyname function, found on OpenBSD for example,
38+ * doesn't accept any flag and prerequisite for obtaining AD bit in
39+ * DNS response is set by "options edns0" in resolv.conf.
40+ *
41+ * Our version is more clever and use RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 flag.
42+ */
43+#ifndef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME
44+ rrset_flags |= RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0;
45+#endif
46 result = getrrsetbyname(hostname, DNS_RDATACLASS_IN,
47- DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, 0, &fingerprints);
48+ DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, rrset_flags, &fingerprints);
49+
50 if (result) {
51 verbose("DNS lookup error: %s", dns_result_totext(result));
52 return -1;
53diff --git a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
54index dc6fe053..e061a290 100644
55--- a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
56+++ b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
57@@ -209,8 +209,8 @@ getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, unsigned int rdclass,
58 goto fail;
59 }
60
61- /* don't allow flags yet, unimplemented */
62- if (flags) {
63+ /* Allow RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 flag only. */
64+ if ((flags & !RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0) != 0) {
65 result = ERRSET_INVAL;
66 goto fail;
67 }
68@@ -226,9 +226,9 @@ getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, unsigned int rdclass,
69 #endif /* DEBUG */
70
71 #ifdef RES_USE_DNSSEC
72- /* turn on DNSSEC if EDNS0 is configured */
73- if (_resp->options & RES_USE_EDNS0)
74- _resp->options |= RES_USE_DNSSEC;
75+ /* turn on DNSSEC if required */
76+ if (flags & RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0)
77+ _resp->options |= (RES_USE_EDNS0|RES_USE_DNSSEC);
78 #endif /* RES_USE_DNSEC */
79
80 /* make query */
81diff --git a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
82index 1283f550..dbbc85a2 100644
83--- a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
84+++ b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
85@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
86 #ifndef RRSET_VALIDATED
87 # define RRSET_VALIDATED 1
88 #endif
89+#ifndef RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0
90+# define RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 0x0001
91+#endif
92
93 /*
94 * Return codes for getrrsetbyname()
diff --git a/debian/patches/doc-hash-tab-completion.patch b/debian/patches/doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c4342181d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
1From a07f7c1fe9d8dc3bfe4cb8bbe6bb5a27b638d024 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:11 +0000
4Subject: Document that HashKnownHosts may break tab-completion
5
6Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1727
7Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/430154
8Last-Update: 2013-09-14
9
10Patch-Name: doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
11---
12 ssh_config.5 | 3 +++
13 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
14
15diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
16index 7810a418..1edfe761 100644
17--- a/ssh_config.5
18+++ b/ssh_config.5
19@@ -777,6 +777,9 @@ Note that existing names and addresses in known hosts files
20 will not be converted automatically,
21 but may be manually hashed using
22 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
23+Use of this option may break facilities such as tab-completion that rely
24+on being able to read unhashed host names from
25+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts .
26 .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
27 Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key
28 authentication.
diff --git a/debian/patches/fix-regress-putty-transfer.patch b/debian/patches/fix-regress-putty-transfer.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cfec3a9d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/fix-regress-putty-transfer.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
1From bd081a1ae125c7c6b2cfec89746d1298a306ad78 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2018 17:38:36 +0000
4Subject: Fix putty-transfer regression test
5
6The test key file is still called putty.rsa2, not putty.rsa.
7
8Forwarded: no
9Last-Update: 2018-01-16
10
11Patch-Name: fix-regress-putty-transfer.patch
12---
13 regress/putty-transfer.sh | 4 ++--
14 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
15
16diff --git a/regress/putty-transfer.sh b/regress/putty-transfer.sh
17index 32c79f9e..57e46540 100644
18--- a/regress/putty-transfer.sh
19+++ b/regress/putty-transfer.sh
20@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ for c in 0 1 ; do
21 ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/compression_$c
22 echo "Compression=$c" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/kex_$k
23 env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load compression_$c -batch \
24- -i putty.rsa cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
25+ -i putty.rsa2 cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
26 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
27 fail "ssh cat $DATA failed"
28 fi
29@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ for c in 0 1 ; do
30 rm -f ${COPY}
31 dd if=$DATA obs=${s} 2> /dev/null | \
32 env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load compression_$c \
33- -batch -i putty.rsa \
34+ -batch -i putty.rsa2 \
35 "cat > ${COPY}"
36 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
37 fail "ssh cat $DATA failed"
diff --git a/debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch b/debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e46c0f8b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
1From 18950b79898be885c6b77d463367639647e54e28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Vincent Untz <vuntz@ubuntu.com>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:16 +0000
4Subject: Give the ssh-askpass-gnome window a default icon
5
6Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/27152
7Last-Update: 2010-02-28
8
9Patch-Name: gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
10---
11 contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c | 2 ++
12 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
13
14diff --git a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
15index 535a6927..e37a1338 100644
16--- a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
17+++ b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
18@@ -211,6 +211,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
19
20 gtk_init(&argc, &argv);
21
22+ gtk_window_set_default_icon_from_file ("/usr/share/pixmaps/ssh-askpass-gnome.png", NULL);
23+
24 if (argc > 1) {
25 message = g_strjoinv(" ", argv + 1);
26 } else {
diff --git a/debian/patches/gssapi.patch b/debian/patches/gssapi.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0726a5020
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/gssapi.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,3300 @@
1From 4e70490950e5c5134df48848affaf73685bf0284 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Simon Wilkinson <simon@sxw.org.uk>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:48 +0000
4Subject: GSSAPI key exchange support
5
6This patch has been rejected upstream: "None of the OpenSSH developers are
7in favour of adding this, and this situation has not changed for several
8years. This is not a slight on Simon's patch, which is of fine quality, but
9just that a) we don't trust GSSAPI implementations that much and b) we don't
10like adding new KEX since they are pre-auth attack surface. This one is
11particularly scary, since it requires hooks out to typically root-owned
12system resources."
13
14However, quite a lot of people rely on this in Debian, and it's better to
15have it merged into the main openssh package rather than having separate
16-krb5 packages (as we used to have). It seems to have a generally good
17security history.
18
19Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1242
20Last-Updated: 2017-10-04
21
22Patch-Name: gssapi.patch
23---
24 ChangeLog.gssapi | 113 +++++++++++++++++++
25 Makefile.in | 3 +-
26 auth-krb5.c | 17 ++-
27 auth.c | 96 +---------------
28 auth2-gss.c | 49 +++++++-
29 auth2.c | 2 +
30 canohost.c | 93 +++++++++++++++
31 canohost.h | 3 +
32 clientloop.c | 15 ++-
33 config.h.in | 6 +
34 configure.ac | 24 ++++
35 gss-genr.c | 275 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
36 gss-serv-krb5.c | 85 ++++++++++++--
37 gss-serv.c | 184 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
38 kex.c | 19 ++++
39 kex.h | 14 +++
40 kexgssc.c | 338 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
41 kexgsss.c | 295 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
42 monitor.c | 115 +++++++++++++++++--
43 monitor.h | 3 +
44 monitor_wrap.c | 47 +++++++-
45 monitor_wrap.h | 4 +-
46 readconf.c | 43 +++++++
47 readconf.h | 5 +
48 servconf.c | 26 +++++
49 servconf.h | 2 +
50 ssh-gss.h | 41 ++++++-
51 ssh_config | 2 +
52 ssh_config.5 | 32 ++++++
53 sshconnect2.c | 131 ++++++++++++++++++++-
54 sshd.c | 112 +++++++++++++++++-
55 sshd_config | 2 +
56 sshd_config.5 | 10 ++
57 sshkey.c | 3 +-
58 sshkey.h | 1 +
59 35 files changed, 2063 insertions(+), 147 deletions(-)
60 create mode 100644 ChangeLog.gssapi
61 create mode 100644 kexgssc.c
62 create mode 100644 kexgsss.c
63
64diff --git a/ChangeLog.gssapi b/ChangeLog.gssapi
65new file mode 100644
66index 00000000..f117a336
67--- /dev/null
68+++ b/ChangeLog.gssapi
69@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
70+20110101
71+ - Finally update for OpenSSH 5.6p1
72+ - Add GSSAPIServerIdentity option from Jim Basney
73+
74+20100308
75+ - [ Makefile.in, key.c, key.h ]
76+ Updates for OpenSSH 5.4p1
77+ - [ servconf.c ]
78+ Include GSSAPI options in the sshd -T configuration dump, and flag
79+ some older configuration options as being unsupported. Thanks to Colin
80+ Watson.
81+ -
82+
83+20100124
84+ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
85+ Adapt to deal with additional element in Authmethod structure. Thanks to
86+ Colin Watson
87+
88+20090615
89+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c
90+ sshd.c ]
91+ Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review
92+ Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs
93+ Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled
94+ Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange
95+ Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value
96+ Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust
97+ Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled
98+ Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list
99+ Cast data.length before printing
100+ If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL
101+
102+20090201
103+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h
104+ ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ]
105+ Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user
106+ to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server
107+
108+20080404
109+ - [ gss-serv.c ]
110+ Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow
111+ been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav
112+ Stoichkov
113+
114+20070317
115+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
116+ Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a
117+ function
118+
119+20061220
120+ - [ servconf.c ]
121+ Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and
122+ documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson.
123+
124+20060910
125+ - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c
126+ ssh-gss.h ]
127+ add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms
128+ - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ]
129+ Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of
130+ acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines.
131+ <Bugzilla #928>
132+ - [ sshd_config ssh_config ]
133+ Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample
134+ configuration files
135+ - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ]
136+ Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf()
137+ Limit length of error messages displayed by client
138+
139+20060909
140+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ]
141+ move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server
142+ only, where they belong
143+ <Bugzilla #1225>
144+
145+20060829
146+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
147+ Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment
148+ variable
149+
150+20060828
151+ - [ gss-genr.c ]
152+ Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem
153+ <Fixed upstream 20060829>
154+
155+20060818
156+ - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ]
157+ Make sure that SPENGO is disabled
158+ <Bugzilla #1218 - Fixed upstream 20060818>
159+
160+20060421
161+ - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ]
162+ a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to
163+ fix compiler errors/warnings
164+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
165+ - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ]
166+ fix uninitialized variable warnings
167+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
168+ - [ gssgenr.c ]
169+ pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue)
170+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
171+ <Bugzilla #1220 >
172+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
173+ #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
174+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
175+ <Fixed upstream 20060304>
176+ - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c
177+ add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option
178+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
179+ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
180+ add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic
181+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
182+ <gssapi-with-mic support is Bugzilla #1008>
183diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
184index c52ce191..f6e9fe4c 100644
185--- a/Makefile.in
186+++ b/Makefile.in
187@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
188 kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
189 kexdhc.o kexgexc.o kexecdhc.o kexc25519c.o \
190 kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o \
191+ kexgssc.o \
192 platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o
193
194 SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
195@@ -105,7 +106,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \
196 auth-skey.o auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
197 auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
198 monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
199- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
200+ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
201 loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
202 sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
203 sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
204diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
205index a5a81ed2..38e7fee2 100644
206--- a/auth-krb5.c
207+++ b/auth-krb5.c
208@@ -182,8 +182,13 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
209
210 len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
211 authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
212+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
213+ snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s",
214+ authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
215+#else
216 snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
217 authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
218+#endif
219
220 #ifdef USE_PAM
221 if (options.use_pam)
222@@ -240,15 +245,22 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
223 #ifndef HEIMDAL
224 krb5_error_code
225 ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
226- int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
227+ int ret, oerrno;
228 char ccname[40];
229 mode_t old_umask;
230+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
231+ char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d";
232+#else
233+ char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX";
234+ int tmpfd;
235+#endif
236
237 ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
238- "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
239+ cctemplate, geteuid());
240 if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
241 return ENOMEM;
242
243+#ifndef USE_CCAPI
244 old_umask = umask(0177);
245 tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
246 oerrno = errno;
247@@ -265,6 +277,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
248 return oerrno;
249 }
250 close(tmpfd);
251+#endif
252
253 return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
254 }
255diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
256index a4490617..6aec3605 100644
257--- a/auth.c
258+++ b/auth.c
259@@ -395,7 +395,8 @@ auth_root_allowed(const char *method)
260 case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
261 if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
262 strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
263- strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0)
264+ strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0 ||
265+ strcmp(method, "gssapi-keyex") == 0)
266 return 1;
267 break;
268 case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
269@@ -727,99 +728,6 @@ fakepw(void)
270 return (&fake);
271 }
272
273-/*
274- * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
275- * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
276- * called.
277- * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
278- * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
279- * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
280- * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
281- */
282-
283-static char *
284-remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
285-{
286- struct sockaddr_storage from;
287- socklen_t fromlen;
288- struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
289- char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
290- const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
291-
292- /* Get IP address of client. */
293- fromlen = sizeof(from);
294- memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
295- if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
296- (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
297- debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
298- return strdup(ntop);
299- }
300-
301- ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
302- if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
303- fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
304-
305- debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
306- /* Map the IP address to a host name. */
307- if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
308- NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
309- /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */
310- return strdup(ntop);
311- }
312-
313- /*
314- * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
315- * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
316- * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5
317- */
318- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
319- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
320- hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
321- if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
322- logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
323- name, ntop);
324- freeaddrinfo(ai);
325- return strdup(ntop);
326- }
327-
328- /* Names are stored in lowercase. */
329- lowercase(name);
330-
331- /*
332- * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
333- * address actually is an address of this host. This is
334- * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
335- * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
336- * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
337- * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
338- * the domain).
339- */
340- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
341- hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
342- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
343- if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
344- logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
345- "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
346- return strdup(ntop);
347- }
348- /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
349- for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
350- if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
351- sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
352- (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
353- break;
354- }
355- freeaddrinfo(aitop);
356- /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
357- if (ai == NULL) {
358- /* Address not found for the host name. */
359- logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
360- "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
361- return strdup(ntop);
362- }
363- return strdup(name);
364-}
365-
366 /*
367 * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
368 * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
369diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
370index 589283b7..fd411d3a 100644
371--- a/auth2-gss.c
372+++ b/auth2-gss.c
373@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
374 /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.26 2017/06/24 06:34:38 djm Exp $ */
375
376 /*
377- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
378+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
379 *
380 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
381 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
382@@ -53,6 +53,41 @@ static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
383 static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
384 static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
385
386+/*
387+ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
388+ */
389+static int
390+userauth_gsskeyex(struct ssh *ssh)
391+{
392+ Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
393+ int authenticated = 0;
394+ Buffer b;
395+ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
396+ u_int len;
397+
398+ mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
399+ mic.length = len;
400+
401+ packet_check_eom();
402+
403+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
404+ "gssapi-keyex");
405+
406+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
407+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
408+
409+ /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
410+ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
411+ &gssbuf, &mic))))
412+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
413+ authctxt->pw));
414+
415+ buffer_free(&b);
416+ free(mic.value);
417+
418+ return (authenticated);
419+}
420+
421 /*
422 * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
423 * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
424@@ -240,7 +275,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
425
426 packet_check_eom();
427
428- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
429+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
430+ authctxt->pw));
431
432 if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
433 (displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
434@@ -281,7 +317,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
435 gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
436
437 if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
438- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
439+ authenticated =
440+ PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw));
441 else
442 logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
443
444@@ -301,6 +338,12 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
445 return 0;
446 }
447
448+Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
449+ "gssapi-keyex",
450+ userauth_gsskeyex,
451+ &options.gss_authentication
452+};
453+
454 Authmethod method_gssapi = {
455 "gssapi-with-mic",
456 userauth_gssapi,
457diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
458index 862e0996..54070e3a 100644
459--- a/auth2.c
460+++ b/auth2.c
461@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd;
462 extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
463 extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
464 #ifdef GSSAPI
465+extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex;
466 extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
467 #endif
468
469@@ -79,6 +80,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
470 &method_none,
471 &method_pubkey,
472 #ifdef GSSAPI
473+ &method_gsskeyex,
474 &method_gssapi,
475 #endif
476 &method_passwd,
477diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c
478index f71a0856..404731d2 100644
479--- a/canohost.c
480+++ b/canohost.c
481@@ -35,6 +35,99 @@
482 #include "canohost.h"
483 #include "misc.h"
484
485+/*
486+ * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
487+ * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
488+ * called.
489+ * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
490+ * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
491+ * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
492+ * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
493+ */
494+
495+char *
496+remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
497+{
498+ struct sockaddr_storage from;
499+ socklen_t fromlen;
500+ struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
501+ char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
502+ const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
503+
504+ /* Get IP address of client. */
505+ fromlen = sizeof(from);
506+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
507+ if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
508+ (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
509+ debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
510+ return strdup(ntop);
511+ }
512+
513+ ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
514+ if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
515+ fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
516+
517+ debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
518+ /* Map the IP address to a host name. */
519+ if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
520+ NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
521+ /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */
522+ return strdup(ntop);
523+ }
524+
525+ /*
526+ * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
527+ * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
528+ * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5
529+ */
530+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
531+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
532+ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
533+ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
534+ logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
535+ name, ntop);
536+ freeaddrinfo(ai);
537+ return strdup(ntop);
538+ }
539+
540+ /* Names are stored in lowercase. */
541+ lowercase(name);
542+
543+ /*
544+ * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
545+ * address actually is an address of this host. This is
546+ * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
547+ * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
548+ * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
549+ * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
550+ * the domain).
551+ */
552+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
553+ hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
554+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
555+ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
556+ logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
557+ "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
558+ return strdup(ntop);
559+ }
560+ /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
561+ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
562+ if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
563+ sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
564+ (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
565+ break;
566+ }
567+ freeaddrinfo(aitop);
568+ /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
569+ if (ai == NULL) {
570+ /* Address not found for the host name. */
571+ logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
572+ "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
573+ return strdup(ntop);
574+ }
575+ return strdup(name);
576+}
577+
578 void
579 ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *addr, socklen_t *len)
580 {
581diff --git a/canohost.h b/canohost.h
582index 26d62855..0cadc9f1 100644
583--- a/canohost.h
584+++ b/canohost.h
585@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@
586 #ifndef _CANOHOST_H
587 #define _CANOHOST_H
588
589+struct ssh;
590+
591+char *remote_hostname(struct ssh *);
592 char *get_peer_ipaddr(int);
593 int get_peer_port(int);
594 char *get_local_ipaddr(int);
595diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
596index 791d336e..0010b833 100644
597--- a/clientloop.c
598+++ b/clientloop.c
599@@ -112,6 +112,10 @@
600 #include "ssherr.h"
601 #include "hostfile.h"
602
603+#ifdef GSSAPI
604+#include "ssh-gss.h"
605+#endif
606+
607 /* import options */
608 extern Options options;
609
610@@ -1349,9 +1353,18 @@ client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pty, int escape_char_arg,
611 break;
612
613 /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
614- if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh))
615+ if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) {
616 channel_after_select(ssh, readset, writeset);
617
618+#ifdef GSSAPI
619+ if (options.gss_renewal_rekey &&
620+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(NULL)) {
621+ debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey");
622+ need_rekeying = 1;
623+ }
624+#endif
625+ }
626+
627 /* Buffer input from the connection. */
628 client_process_net_input(readset);
629
630diff --git a/config.h.in b/config.h.in
631index 63fc548b..0b244fd5 100644
632--- a/config.h.in
633+++ b/config.h.in
634@@ -1696,6 +1696,9 @@
635 /* Use btmp to log bad logins */
636 #undef USE_BTMP
637
638+/* platform uses an in-memory credentials cache */
639+#undef USE_CCAPI
640+
641 /* Use libedit for sftp */
642 #undef USE_LIBEDIT
643
644@@ -1711,6 +1714,9 @@
645 /* Use PIPES instead of a socketpair() */
646 #undef USE_PIPES
647
648+/* platform has the Security Authorization Session API */
649+#undef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
650+
651 /* Define if you have Solaris privileges */
652 #undef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS
653
654diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
655index 889f5063..84bfad8c 100644
656--- a/configure.ac
657+++ b/configure.ac
658@@ -621,6 +621,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
659 [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
660 AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
661 [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
662+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have the Security Authorization Session API])
663+ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <Security/AuthSession.h>],
664+ [SessionCreate(0, 0);],
665+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes"
666+ AC_DEFINE([USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API], [1],
667+ [platform has the Security Authorization Session API])
668+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
669+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
670+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no"
671+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])])
672+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have an in-memory credentials cache])
673+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
674+ [#include <Kerberos/Kerberos.h>],
675+ [cc_context_t c;
676+ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);],
677+ [AC_DEFINE([USE_CCAPI], [1],
678+ [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache])
679+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
680+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
681+ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then
682+ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***])
683+ fi],
684+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])]
685+ )
686 m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv])
687 AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [],
688 AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
689diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c
690index 62559ed9..0b3ae073 100644
691--- a/gss-genr.c
692+++ b/gss-genr.c
693@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
694 /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.24 2016/09/12 01:22:38 deraadt Exp $ */
695
696 /*
697- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
698+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
699 *
700 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
701 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
702@@ -40,12 +40,167 @@
703 #include "buffer.h"
704 #include "log.h"
705 #include "ssh2.h"
706+#include "cipher.h"
707+#include "key.h"
708+#include "kex.h"
709+#include <openssl/evp.h>
710
711 #include "ssh-gss.h"
712
713 extern u_char *session_id2;
714 extern u_int session_id2_len;
715
716+typedef struct {
717+ char *encoded;
718+ gss_OID oid;
719+} ssh_gss_kex_mapping;
720+
721+/*
722+ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the
723+ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines
724+ */
725+
726+Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL;
727+
728+static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL;
729+
730+int
731+ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void) {
732+ return (gss_enc2oid != NULL);
733+}
734+
735+/*
736+ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program
737+ *
738+ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting
739+ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism
740+ */
741+
742+char *
743+ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) {
744+ gss_OID_set gss_supported;
745+ OM_uint32 min_status;
746+
747+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported)))
748+ return NULL;
749+
750+ return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
751+ host, client));
752+}
753+
754+char *
755+ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
756+ const char *host, const char *client) {
757+ Buffer buf;
758+ size_t i;
759+ int oidpos, enclen;
760+ char *mechs, *encoded;
761+ u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
762+ char deroid[2];
763+ const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
764+ EVP_MD_CTX md;
765+
766+ if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
767+ for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++)
768+ free(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded);
769+ free(gss_enc2oid);
770+ }
771+
772+ gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) *
773+ (gss_supported->count + 1));
774+
775+ buffer_init(&buf);
776+
777+ oidpos = 0;
778+ for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
779+ if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
780+ (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
781+
782+ deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
783+ deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
784+
785+ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
786+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2);
787+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,
788+ gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
789+ gss_supported->elements[i].length);
790+ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
791+
792+ encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
793+ enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md),
794+ encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
795+
796+ if (oidpos != 0)
797+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
798+
799+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
800+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1);
801+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
802+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
803+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
804+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1);
805+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
806+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
807+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
808+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1);
809+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
810+
811+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
812+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
813+ oidpos++;
814+ }
815+ }
816+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
817+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
818+
819+ buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0');
820+
821+ mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf));
822+ buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf));
823+ buffer_free(&buf);
824+
825+ if (strlen(mechs) == 0) {
826+ free(mechs);
827+ mechs = NULL;
828+ }
829+
830+ return (mechs);
831+}
832+
833+gss_OID
834+ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) {
835+ int i = 0;
836+
837+ switch (kex_type) {
838+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
839+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID))
840+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
841+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1;
842+ break;
843+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
844+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID))
845+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
846+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1;
847+ break;
848+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
849+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID))
850+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
851+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1;
852+ break;
853+ default:
854+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
855+ }
856+
857+ while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL &&
858+ strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0)
859+ i++;
860+
861+ if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL)
862+ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid);
863+
864+ return gss_enc2oid[i].oid;
865+}
866+
867 /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
868 int
869 ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
870@@ -198,7 +353,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int deleg_creds, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
871 }
872
873 ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
874- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
875+ ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
876 GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
877 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
878
879@@ -227,9 +382,43 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host)
880 return (ctx->major);
881 }
882
883+OM_uint32
884+ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name)
885+{
886+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
887+ gss_name_t gssname;
888+ OM_uint32 status;
889+ gss_OID_set oidset;
890+
891+ gssbuf.value = (void *) name;
892+ gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
893+
894+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
895+ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
896+
897+ ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf,
898+ GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname);
899+
900+ if (!ctx->major)
901+ ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
902+ gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE,
903+ &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL);
904+
905+ gss_release_name(&status, &gssname);
906+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
907+
908+ if (ctx->major)
909+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
910+
911+ return(ctx->major);
912+}
913+
914 OM_uint32
915 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
916 {
917+ if (ctx == NULL)
918+ return -1;
919+
920 if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
921 GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
922 ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
923@@ -237,6 +426,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
924 return (ctx->major);
925 }
926
927+/* Priviledged when used by server */
928+OM_uint32
929+ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
930+{
931+ if (ctx == NULL)
932+ return -1;
933+
934+ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
935+ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
936+
937+ return (ctx->major);
938+}
939+
940 void
941 ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
942 const char *context)
943@@ -250,11 +452,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
944 }
945
946 int
947-ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
948+ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host,
949+ const char *client)
950 {
951 gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
952 OM_uint32 major, minor;
953 gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
954+ Gssctxt *intctx = NULL;
955+
956+ if (ctx == NULL)
957+ ctx = &intctx;
958
959 /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
960 if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length &&
961@@ -264,6 +471,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
962 ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
963 ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
964 major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
965+
966+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client)
967+ major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client);
968+
969 if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
970 major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token,
971 NULL);
972@@ -273,10 +484,66 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
973 GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
974 }
975
976- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
977+ if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL)
978 ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
979
980 return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
981 }
982
983+int
984+ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) {
985+ static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
986+ static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0;
987+ static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
988+ static gss_name_t name;
989+ static OM_uint32 last_call = 0;
990+ OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor;
991+ int equal;
992+
993+ now = time(NULL);
994+
995+ if (ctxt) {
996+ debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions");
997+
998+ if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
999+ gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name);
1000+
1001+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
1002+ &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL);
1003+
1004+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
1005+ saved_mech = ctxt->oid;
1006+ saved_lifetime+= now;
1007+ } else {
1008+ /* Handle the error */
1009+ }
1010+ return 0;
1011+ }
1012+
1013+ if (now - last_call < 10)
1014+ return 0;
1015+
1016+ last_call = now;
1017+
1018+ if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID)
1019+ return 0;
1020+
1021+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
1022+ &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL);
1023+ if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED)
1024+ return 0;
1025+ else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
1026+ return 0;
1027+
1028+ major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal);
1029+ gss_release_name(&minor, &name);
1030+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
1031+ return 0;
1032+
1033+ if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10))
1034+ return 1;
1035+
1036+ return 0;
1037+}
1038+
1039 #endif /* GSSAPI */
1040diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
1041index 795992d9..fd8b3718 100644
1042--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
1043+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
1044@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
1045 /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.8 2013/07/20 01:55:13 djm Exp $ */
1046
1047 /*
1048- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
1049+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
1050 *
1051 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
1052 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
1053@@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1054 krb5_error_code problem;
1055 krb5_principal princ;
1056 OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
1057- int len;
1058 const char *errmsg;
1059+ const char *new_ccname;
1060
1061 if (client->creds == NULL) {
1062 debug("No credentials stored");
1063@@ -181,11 +181,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1064 return;
1065 }
1066
1067- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache));
1068+ new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
1069+
1070 client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
1071- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6;
1072- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len);
1073- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename);
1074+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
1075+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
1076+ client->store.filename = NULL;
1077+#else
1078+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "FILE:%s", new_ccname);
1079+ client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
1080+#endif
1081
1082 #ifdef USE_PAM
1083 if (options.use_pam)
1084@@ -197,6 +202,71 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1085 return;
1086 }
1087
1088+int
1089+ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,
1090+ ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1091+{
1092+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
1093+ krb5_principal principal = NULL;
1094+ char *name = NULL;
1095+ krb5_error_code problem;
1096+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
1097+
1098+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) {
1099+ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
1100+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
1101+ return 0;
1102+ }
1103+
1104+ /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */
1105+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache,
1106+ &principal))) {
1107+ logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s",
1108+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
1109+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
1110+ return 0;
1111+ }
1112+
1113+ if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) {
1114+ logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s",
1115+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
1116+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
1117+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
1118+ return 0;
1119+ }
1120+
1121+
1122+ if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) {
1123+ debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing");
1124+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
1125+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
1126+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
1127+ return 0;
1128+ }
1129+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
1130+
1131+ /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */
1132+
1133+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) {
1134+ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s",
1135+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
1136+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
1137+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
1138+ return 0;
1139+ }
1140+
1141+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
1142+
1143+ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds,
1144+ ccache))) {
1145+ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!");
1146+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
1147+ return 0;
1148+ }
1149+
1150+ return 1;
1151+}
1152+
1153 ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
1154 "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
1155 "Kerberos",
1156@@ -204,7 +274,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
1157 NULL,
1158 &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
1159 NULL,
1160- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds
1161+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds,
1162+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds
1163 };
1164
1165 #endif /* KRB5 */
1166diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
1167index 6cae720e..967c6cfb 100644
1168--- a/gss-serv.c
1169+++ b/gss-serv.c
1170@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
1171 /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.30 2017/06/24 06:34:38 djm Exp $ */
1172
1173 /*
1174- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
1175+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
1176 *
1177 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
1178 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
1179@@ -45,17 +45,22 @@
1180 #include "session.h"
1181 #include "misc.h"
1182 #include "servconf.h"
1183+#include "uidswap.h"
1184
1185 #include "ssh-gss.h"
1186+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
1187+
1188+extern ServerOptions options;
1189
1190 extern ServerOptions options;
1191
1192 static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
1193 { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
1194- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}};
1195+ GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL,
1196+ {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
1197
1198 ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
1199- { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
1200+ { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
1201
1202 #ifdef KRB5
1203 extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
1204@@ -141,6 +146,28 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
1205 return (ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(*ctx));
1206 }
1207
1208+/* Unprivileged */
1209+char *
1210+ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void) {
1211+ if (supported_oids == NULL)
1212+ ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
1213+ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported_oids,
1214+ &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech, NULL, NULL));
1215+}
1216+
1217+/* Unprivileged */
1218+int
1219+ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data,
1220+ const char *dummy) {
1221+ Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
1222+ int res;
1223+
1224+ res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
1225+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
1226+
1227+ return (res);
1228+}
1229+
1230 /* Unprivileged */
1231 void
1232 ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
1233@@ -151,7 +178,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
1234 gss_OID_set supported;
1235
1236 gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
1237- gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
1238+
1239+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported)))
1240+ return;
1241
1242 while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
1243 if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
1244@@ -277,8 +306,48 @@ OM_uint32
1245 ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1246 {
1247 int i = 0;
1248+ int equal = 0;
1249+ gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
1250+ gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1251+
1252+ if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
1253+ if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
1254+ (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements,
1255+ ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) {
1256+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
1257+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1258+ }
1259+
1260+ if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
1261+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name,
1262+ NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
1263+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
1264+ return (ctx->major);
1265+ }
1266+
1267+ ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name,
1268+ new_name, &equal);
1269+
1270+ if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
1271+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
1272+ return (ctx->major);
1273+ }
1274+
1275+ if (!equal) {
1276+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name");
1277+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1278+ }
1279
1280- gss_buffer_desc ename;
1281+ debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
1282+
1283+ gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
1284+ gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds);
1285+ client->name = new_name;
1286+ client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
1287+ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
1288+ client->updated = 1;
1289+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1290+ }
1291
1292 client->mech = NULL;
1293
1294@@ -293,6 +362,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1295 if (client->mech == NULL)
1296 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1297
1298+ if (ctx->client_creds &&
1299+ (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
1300+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
1301+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
1302+ return (ctx->major);
1303+ }
1304+
1305 if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
1306 &client->displayname, NULL))) {
1307 ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
1308@@ -310,6 +386,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1309 return (ctx->major);
1310 }
1311
1312+ gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
1313+
1314 /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
1315 client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
1316 ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
1317@@ -357,7 +435,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep)
1318
1319 /* Privileged */
1320 int
1321-ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
1322+ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
1323 {
1324 OM_uint32 lmin;
1325
1326@@ -367,9 +445,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
1327 return 0;
1328 }
1329 if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
1330- if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
1331+ if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
1332+ gssapi_client.used = 1;
1333+ gssapi_client.store.owner = pw;
1334 return 1;
1335- else {
1336+ } else {
1337 /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
1338 gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
1339 gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
1340@@ -383,14 +463,90 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
1341 return (0);
1342 }
1343
1344-/* Privileged */
1345-OM_uint32
1346-ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
1347+/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running
1348+ * as the user, the monitor is root.
1349+ *
1350+ * In the child, we want to :
1351+ * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify
1352+ * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update
1353+ */
1354+
1355+/* Stuff for PAM */
1356+
1357+#ifdef USE_PAM
1358+static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg,
1359+ struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
1360 {
1361- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
1362- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
1363+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
1364+}
1365+#endif
1366
1367- return (ctx->major);
1368+void
1369+ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) {
1370+ int ok;
1371+ int ret;
1372+#ifdef USE_PAM
1373+ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
1374+ struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
1375+ char *envstr;
1376+#endif
1377+
1378+ if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
1379+ gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
1380+ gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
1381+ return;
1382+
1383+ ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
1384+
1385+ if (!ok)
1386+ return;
1387+
1388+ debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully");
1389+
1390+ /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will
1391+ * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options
1392+ * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
1393+ */
1394+#ifdef USE_PAM
1395+ if (!use_privsep) {
1396+ debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
1397+ return;
1398+ }
1399+
1400+ ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
1401+ &pamconv, &pamh);
1402+ if (ret)
1403+ return;
1404+
1405+ xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
1406+ gssapi_client.store.envval);
1407+
1408+ ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr);
1409+ if (!ret)
1410+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
1411+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
1412+#endif
1413+}
1414+
1415+int
1416+ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) {
1417+ int ok = 0;
1418+
1419+ /* Check we've got credentials to store */
1420+ if (!gssapi_client.updated)
1421+ return 0;
1422+
1423+ gssapi_client.updated = 0;
1424+
1425+ temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner);
1426+ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)
1427+ ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client);
1428+ else
1429+ debug("No update function for this mechanism");
1430+
1431+ restore_uid();
1432+
1433+ return ok;
1434 }
1435
1436 /* Privileged */
1437diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
1438index d5d5a9da..bb1bd661 100644
1439--- a/kex.c
1440+++ b/kex.c
1441@@ -54,6 +54,10 @@
1442 #include "sshbuf.h"
1443 #include "digest.h"
1444
1445+#ifdef GSSAPI
1446+#include "ssh-gss.h"
1447+#endif
1448+
1449 /* prototype */
1450 static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *);
1451 static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
1452@@ -105,6 +109,14 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
1453 #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */
1454 { NULL, -1, -1, -1},
1455 };
1456+static const struct kexalg kexalg_prefixes[] = {
1457+#ifdef GSSAPI
1458+ { KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
1459+ { KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
1460+ { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
1461+#endif
1462+ { NULL, -1, -1, -1 },
1463+};
1464
1465 char *
1466 kex_alg_list(char sep)
1467@@ -137,6 +149,10 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
1468 if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
1469 return k;
1470 }
1471+ for (k = kexalg_prefixes; k->name != NULL; k++) {
1472+ if (strncmp(k->name, name, strlen(k->name)) == 0)
1473+ return k;
1474+ }
1475 return NULL;
1476 }
1477
1478@@ -601,6 +617,9 @@ kex_free(struct kex *kex)
1479 sshbuf_free(kex->peer);
1480 sshbuf_free(kex->my);
1481 free(kex->session_id);
1482+#ifdef GSSAPI
1483+ free(kex->gss_host);
1484+#endif /* GSSAPI */
1485 free(kex->client_version_string);
1486 free(kex->server_version_string);
1487 free(kex->failed_choice);
1488diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
1489index 01bb3986..a708e486 100644
1490--- a/kex.h
1491+++ b/kex.h
1492@@ -99,6 +99,9 @@ enum kex_exchange {
1493 KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
1494 KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
1495 KEX_C25519_SHA256,
1496+ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
1497+ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
1498+ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1,
1499 KEX_MAX
1500 };
1501
1502@@ -147,6 +150,12 @@ struct kex {
1503 u_int flags;
1504 int hash_alg;
1505 int ec_nid;
1506+#ifdef GSSAPI
1507+ int gss_deleg_creds;
1508+ int gss_trust_dns;
1509+ char *gss_host;
1510+ char *gss_client;
1511+#endif
1512 char *client_version_string;
1513 char *server_version_string;
1514 char *failed_choice;
1515@@ -197,6 +206,11 @@ int kexecdh_server(struct ssh *);
1516 int kexc25519_client(struct ssh *);
1517 int kexc25519_server(struct ssh *);
1518
1519+#ifdef GSSAPI
1520+int kexgss_client(struct ssh *);
1521+int kexgss_server(struct ssh *);
1522+#endif
1523+
1524 int kex_dh_hash(int, const char *, const char *,
1525 const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t,
1526 const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, u_char *, size_t *);
1527diff --git a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c
1528new file mode 100644
1529index 00000000..10447f2b
1530--- /dev/null
1531+++ b/kexgssc.c
1532@@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
1533+/*
1534+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
1535+ *
1536+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
1537+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
1538+ * are met:
1539+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
1540+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
1541+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
1542+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
1543+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
1544+ *
1545+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
1546+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
1547+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
1548+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
1549+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
1550+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
1551+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
1552+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
1553+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
1554+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
1555+ */
1556+
1557+#include "includes.h"
1558+
1559+#ifdef GSSAPI
1560+
1561+#include "includes.h"
1562+
1563+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
1564+#include <openssl/bn.h>
1565+
1566+#include <string.h>
1567+
1568+#include "xmalloc.h"
1569+#include "buffer.h"
1570+#include "ssh2.h"
1571+#include "key.h"
1572+#include "cipher.h"
1573+#include "kex.h"
1574+#include "log.h"
1575+#include "packet.h"
1576+#include "dh.h"
1577+#include "digest.h"
1578+
1579+#include "ssh-gss.h"
1580+
1581+int
1582+kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) {
1583+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1584+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr;
1585+ Gssctxt *ctxt;
1586+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
1587+ u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, strlen;
1588+ DH *dh;
1589+ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
1590+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
1591+ BIGNUM *p = NULL;
1592+ BIGNUM *g = NULL;
1593+ u_char *kbuf;
1594+ u_char *serverhostkey = NULL;
1595+ u_char *empty = "";
1596+ char *msg;
1597+ int type = 0;
1598+ int first = 1;
1599+ int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
1600+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
1601+ size_t hashlen;
1602+
1603+ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */
1604+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
1605+ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, ssh->kex->name, ssh->kex->kex_type)
1606+ == GSS_C_NO_OID)
1607+ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
1608+
1609+ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, ssh->kex->gss_host))
1610+ fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
1611+
1612+ if (ssh->kex->gss_client &&
1613+ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, ssh->kex->gss_client))
1614+ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
1615+
1616+ switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
1617+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
1618+ dh = dh_new_group1();
1619+ break;
1620+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
1621+ dh = dh_new_group14();
1622+ break;
1623+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
1624+ debug("Doing group exchange\n");
1625+ nbits = dh_estimate(ssh->kex->we_need * 8);
1626+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
1627+ packet_put_int(min);
1628+ packet_put_int(nbits);
1629+ packet_put_int(max);
1630+
1631+ packet_send();
1632+
1633+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
1634+
1635+ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
1636+ fatal("BN_new() failed");
1637+ packet_get_bignum2(p);
1638+ if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
1639+ fatal("BN_new() failed");
1640+ packet_get_bignum2(g);
1641+ packet_check_eom();
1642+
1643+ if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
1644+ fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
1645+ min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
1646+
1647+ dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
1648+ break;
1649+ default:
1650+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
1651+ }
1652+
1653+ /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */
1654+ dh_gen_key(dh, ssh->kex->we_need * 8);
1655+
1656+ /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */
1657+ dh_server_pub = BN_new();
1658+ if (dh_server_pub == NULL)
1659+ fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
1660+
1661+ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
1662+
1663+ do {
1664+ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
1665+
1666+ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
1667+ ssh->kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
1668+ &ret_flags);
1669+
1670+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
1671+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
1672+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
1673+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
1674+ send_tok.length);
1675+ }
1676+ fatal("gss_init_context failed");
1677+ }
1678+
1679+ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
1680+ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
1681+ free(recv_tok.value);
1682+
1683+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1684+ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
1685+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
1686+ fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
1687+
1688+ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
1689+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
1690+ fatal("Integrity check failed");
1691+ }
1692+
1693+ /*
1694+ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
1695+ * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
1696+ */
1697+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
1698+ if (first) {
1699+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT);
1700+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
1701+ send_tok.length);
1702+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
1703+ first = 0;
1704+ } else {
1705+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
1706+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
1707+ send_tok.length);
1708+ }
1709+ packet_send();
1710+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
1711+
1712+ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
1713+ do {
1714+ type = packet_read();
1715+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
1716+ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
1717+ if (serverhostkey)
1718+ fatal("Server host key received more than once");
1719+ serverhostkey =
1720+ packet_get_string(&slen);
1721+ }
1722+ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
1723+
1724+ switch (type) {
1725+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
1726+ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
1727+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
1728+ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
1729+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
1730+ recv_tok.length = strlen;
1731+ break;
1732+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
1733+ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
1734+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
1735+ msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
1736+ msg_tok.length = strlen;
1737+
1738+ /* Is there a token included? */
1739+ if (packet_get_char()) {
1740+ recv_tok.value=
1741+ packet_get_string(&strlen);
1742+ recv_tok.length = strlen;
1743+ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */
1744+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
1745+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete");
1746+ } else {
1747+ /* No token included */
1748+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
1749+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token");
1750+ }
1751+ break;
1752+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
1753+ debug("Received Error");
1754+ maj_status = packet_get_int();
1755+ min_status = packet_get_int();
1756+ msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
1757+ (void) packet_get_string_ptr(NULL);
1758+ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg);
1759+ default:
1760+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
1761+ type);
1762+ }
1763+ token_ptr = &recv_tok;
1764+ } else {
1765+ /* No data, and not complete */
1766+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
1767+ fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
1768+ }
1769+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
1770+
1771+ /*
1772+ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the
1773+ * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok
1774+ */
1775+
1776+ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
1777+ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
1778+
1779+ /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */
1780+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
1781+ packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
1782+
1783+ /* compute K=f^x mod p */
1784+ klen = DH_size(dh);
1785+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
1786+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh);
1787+ if (kout < 0)
1788+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
1789+
1790+ shared_secret = BN_new();
1791+ if (shared_secret == NULL)
1792+ fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed");
1793+
1794+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
1795+ fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
1796+
1797+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
1798+ free(kbuf);
1799+
1800+ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
1801+ switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
1802+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
1803+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
1804+ kex_dh_hash(
1805+ ssh->kex->hash_alg,
1806+ ssh->kex->client_version_string,
1807+ ssh->kex->server_version_string,
1808+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
1809+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
1810+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
1811+ dh->pub_key, /* e */
1812+ dh_server_pub, /* f */
1813+ shared_secret, /* K */
1814+ hash, &hashlen
1815+ );
1816+ break;
1817+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
1818+ kexgex_hash(
1819+ ssh->kex->hash_alg,
1820+ ssh->kex->client_version_string,
1821+ ssh->kex->server_version_string,
1822+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
1823+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
1824+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
1825+ min, nbits, max,
1826+ dh->p, dh->g,
1827+ dh->pub_key,
1828+ dh_server_pub,
1829+ shared_secret,
1830+ hash, &hashlen
1831+ );
1832+ break;
1833+ default:
1834+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
1835+ }
1836+
1837+ gssbuf.value = hash;
1838+ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
1839+
1840+ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
1841+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
1842+ packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify");
1843+
1844+ free(msg_tok.value);
1845+
1846+ DH_free(dh);
1847+ free(serverhostkey);
1848+ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
1849+
1850+ /* save session id */
1851+ if (ssh->kex->session_id == NULL) {
1852+ ssh->kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
1853+ ssh->kex->session_id = xmalloc(ssh->kex->session_id_len);
1854+ memcpy(ssh->kex->session_id, hash, ssh->kex->session_id_len);
1855+ }
1856+
1857+ if (ssh->kex->gss_deleg_creds)
1858+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
1859+
1860+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
1861+ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
1862+ else
1863+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
1864+
1865+ kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
1866+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
1867+ return kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
1868+}
1869+
1870+#endif /* GSSAPI */
1871diff --git a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c
1872new file mode 100644
1873index 00000000..38ca082b
1874--- /dev/null
1875+++ b/kexgsss.c
1876@@ -0,0 +1,295 @@
1877+/*
1878+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
1879+ *
1880+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
1881+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
1882+ * are met:
1883+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
1884+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
1885+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
1886+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
1887+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
1888+ *
1889+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
1890+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
1891+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
1892+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
1893+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
1894+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
1895+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
1896+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
1897+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
1898+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
1899+ */
1900+
1901+#include "includes.h"
1902+
1903+#ifdef GSSAPI
1904+
1905+#include <string.h>
1906+
1907+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
1908+#include <openssl/bn.h>
1909+
1910+#include "xmalloc.h"
1911+#include "buffer.h"
1912+#include "ssh2.h"
1913+#include "key.h"
1914+#include "cipher.h"
1915+#include "kex.h"
1916+#include "log.h"
1917+#include "packet.h"
1918+#include "dh.h"
1919+#include "ssh-gss.h"
1920+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
1921+#include "misc.h"
1922+#include "servconf.h"
1923+#include "digest.h"
1924+
1925+extern ServerOptions options;
1926+
1927+int
1928+kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
1929+{
1930+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
1931+
1932+ /*
1933+ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
1934+ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific
1935+ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently
1936+ * activating this non-standard behaviour.
1937+ */
1938+
1939+ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
1940+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
1941+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1942+ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
1943+ u_int slen, klen, kout;
1944+ u_char *kbuf;
1945+ DH *dh;
1946+ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
1947+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
1948+ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
1949+ int type = 0;
1950+ gss_OID oid;
1951+ char *mechs;
1952+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
1953+ size_t hashlen;
1954+
1955+ /* Initialise GSSAPI */
1956+
1957+ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures
1958+ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
1959+ * into life
1960+ */
1961+ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) {
1962+ mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
1963+ free(mechs);
1964+ }
1965+
1966+ debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, ssh->kex->name);
1967+ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, ssh->kex->name, ssh->kex->kex_type);
1968+ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
1969+ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
1970+
1971+ debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
1972+
1973+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
1974+ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
1975+
1976+ switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
1977+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
1978+ dh = dh_new_group1();
1979+ break;
1980+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
1981+ dh = dh_new_group14();
1982+ break;
1983+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
1984+ debug("Doing group exchange");
1985+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
1986+ min = packet_get_int();
1987+ nbits = packet_get_int();
1988+ max = packet_get_int();
1989+ packet_check_eom();
1990+ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
1991+ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
1992+ min, nbits, max);
1993+ dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min),
1994+ nbits, MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max)));
1995+ if (dh == NULL)
1996+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found");
1997+
1998+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
1999+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
2000+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
2001+ packet_send();
2002+
2003+ packet_write_wait();
2004+ break;
2005+ default:
2006+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
2007+ }
2008+
2009+ dh_gen_key(dh, ssh->kex->we_need * 8);
2010+
2011+ do {
2012+ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
2013+ type = packet_read();
2014+ switch(type) {
2015+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
2016+ if (dh_client_pub != NULL)
2017+ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
2018+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
2019+ recv_tok.length = slen;
2020+
2021+ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
2022+ fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
2023+
2024+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
2025+
2026+ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
2027+ break;
2028+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
2029+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
2030+ recv_tok.length = slen;
2031+ break;
2032+ default:
2033+ packet_disconnect(
2034+ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
2035+ type);
2036+ }
2037+
2038+ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
2039+ &send_tok, &ret_flags));
2040+
2041+ free(recv_tok.value);
2042+
2043+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
2044+ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
2045+
2046+ if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
2047+ fatal("No client public key");
2048+
2049+ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
2050+ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
2051+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
2052+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
2053+ packet_send();
2054+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
2055+ }
2056+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
2057+
2058+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
2059+ if (send_tok.length > 0) {
2060+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
2061+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
2062+ packet_send();
2063+ }
2064+ fatal("accept_ctx died");
2065+ }
2066+
2067+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
2068+ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
2069+
2070+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
2071+ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
2072+
2073+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
2074+ packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
2075+
2076+ klen = DH_size(dh);
2077+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
2078+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
2079+ if (kout < 0)
2080+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
2081+
2082+ shared_secret = BN_new();
2083+ if (shared_secret == NULL)
2084+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed");
2085+
2086+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
2087+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
2088+
2089+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
2090+ free(kbuf);
2091+
2092+ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
2093+ switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
2094+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
2095+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
2096+ kex_dh_hash(
2097+ ssh->kex->hash_alg,
2098+ ssh->kex->client_version_string, ssh->kex->server_version_string,
2099+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
2100+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
2101+ NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */
2102+ dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret,
2103+ hash, &hashlen
2104+ );
2105+ break;
2106+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
2107+ kexgex_hash(
2108+ ssh->kex->hash_alg,
2109+ ssh->kex->client_version_string, ssh->kex->server_version_string,
2110+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
2111+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
2112+ NULL, 0,
2113+ min, nbits, max,
2114+ dh->p, dh->g,
2115+ dh_client_pub,
2116+ dh->pub_key,
2117+ shared_secret,
2118+ hash, &hashlen
2119+ );
2120+ break;
2121+ default:
2122+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
2123+ }
2124+
2125+ BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
2126+
2127+ if (ssh->kex->session_id == NULL) {
2128+ ssh->kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
2129+ ssh->kex->session_id = xmalloc(ssh->kex->session_id_len);
2130+ memcpy(ssh->kex->session_id, hash, ssh->kex->session_id_len);
2131+ }
2132+
2133+ gssbuf.value = hash;
2134+ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
2135+
2136+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok))))
2137+ fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
2138+
2139+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE);
2140+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
2141+ packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length);
2142+
2143+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
2144+ packet_put_char(1); /* true */
2145+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
2146+ } else {
2147+ packet_put_char(0); /* false */
2148+ }
2149+ packet_send();
2150+
2151+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
2152+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
2153+
2154+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
2155+ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
2156+ else
2157+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
2158+
2159+ DH_free(dh);
2160+
2161+ kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
2162+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
2163+ kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
2164+
2165+ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
2166+ * just exchanged. */
2167+ if (options.gss_store_rekey)
2168+ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
2169+ return 0;
2170+}
2171+#endif /* GSSAPI */
2172diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
2173index f517da48..cabfeb8a 100644
2174--- a/monitor.c
2175+++ b/monitor.c
2176@@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
2177 int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
2178 int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
2179 int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
2180+int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *);
2181+int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *);
2182 #endif
2183
2184 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
2185@@ -230,11 +232,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
2186 {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
2187 {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok},
2188 {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
2189+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign},
2190 #endif
2191 {0, 0, NULL}
2192 };
2193
2194 struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
2195+#ifdef GSSAPI
2196+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
2197+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
2198+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
2199+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
2200+#endif
2201 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
2202 {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
2203 #endif
2204@@ -302,6 +311,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
2205 /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
2206 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
2207 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
2208+#ifdef GSSAPI
2209+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
2210+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
2211+#endif
2212
2213 /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
2214 while (!authenticated) {
2215@@ -408,6 +421,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
2216 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
2217 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
2218 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
2219+#ifdef GSSAPI
2220+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
2221+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
2222+#endif
2223
2224 if (!no_pty_flag) {
2225 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
2226@@ -1626,6 +1643,13 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
2227 # endif
2228 #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
2229 kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
2230+#ifdef GSSAPI
2231+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
2232+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
2233+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
2234+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
2235+ }
2236+#endif
2237 kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
2238 kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
2239 kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
2240@@ -1714,8 +1738,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
2241 OM_uint32 major;
2242 u_int len;
2243
2244- if (!options.gss_authentication)
2245- fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
2246+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
2247+ fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
2248
2249 goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
2250 goid.length = len;
2251@@ -1744,8 +1768,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
2252 OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
2253 u_int len;
2254
2255- if (!options.gss_authentication)
2256- fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
2257+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
2258+ fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
2259
2260 in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
2261 in.length = len;
2262@@ -1764,6 +1788,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
2263 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
2264 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
2265 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
2266+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1);
2267 }
2268 return (0);
2269 }
2270@@ -1775,8 +1800,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
2271 OM_uint32 ret;
2272 u_int len;
2273
2274- if (!options.gss_authentication)
2275- fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
2276+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
2277+ fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
2278
2279 gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
2280 gssbuf.length = len;
2281@@ -1805,10 +1830,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
2282 int authenticated;
2283 const char *displayname;
2284
2285- if (!options.gss_authentication)
2286- fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
2287+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
2288+ fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
2289
2290- authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
2291+ authenticated = authctxt->valid &&
2292+ ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw);
2293
2294 buffer_clear(m);
2295 buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
2296@@ -1824,5 +1850,76 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
2297 /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
2298 return (authenticated);
2299 }
2300+
2301+int
2302+mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
2303+{
2304+ gss_buffer_desc data;
2305+ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
2306+ OM_uint32 major, minor;
2307+ u_int len;
2308+
2309+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
2310+ fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
2311+
2312+ data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
2313+ data.length = len;
2314+ if (data.length != 20)
2315+ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__,
2316+ (int) data.length);
2317+
2318+ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */
2319+ if (session_id2_len == 0) {
2320+ session_id2_len = data.length;
2321+ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
2322+ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
2323+ }
2324+ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
2325+
2326+ free(data.value);
2327+
2328+ buffer_clear(m);
2329+ buffer_put_int(m, major);
2330+ buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length);
2331+
2332+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
2333+
2334+ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
2335+
2336+ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
2337+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
2338+
2339+ /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */
2340+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1);
2341+
2342+ return (0);
2343+}
2344+
2345+int
2346+mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) {
2347+ ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
2348+ int ok;
2349+
2350+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
2351+ fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
2352+
2353+ store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
2354+ store.envvar = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
2355+ store.envval = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
2356+
2357+ ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
2358+
2359+ free(store.filename);
2360+ free(store.envvar);
2361+ free(store.envval);
2362+
2363+ buffer_clear(m);
2364+ buffer_put_int(m, ok);
2365+
2366+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
2367+
2368+ return(0);
2369+}
2370+
2371 #endif /* GSSAPI */
2372
2373diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
2374index d68f6745..ec41404c 100644
2375--- a/monitor.h
2376+++ b/monitor.h
2377@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
2378 MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
2379 MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
2380
2381+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151,
2382+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153,
2383+
2384 };
2385
2386 struct monitor {
2387diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
2388index 69212aaf..0e171a6a 100644
2389--- a/monitor_wrap.c
2390+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
2391@@ -937,7 +937,7 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
2392 }
2393
2394 int
2395-mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
2396+mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
2397 {
2398 Buffer m;
2399 int authenticated = 0;
2400@@ -954,5 +954,50 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
2401 debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
2402 return (authenticated);
2403 }
2404+
2405+OM_uint32
2406+mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
2407+{
2408+ Buffer m;
2409+ OM_uint32 major;
2410+ u_int len;
2411+
2412+ buffer_init(&m);
2413+ buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length);
2414+
2415+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m);
2416+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m);
2417+
2418+ major = buffer_get_int(&m);
2419+ hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
2420+ hash->length = len;
2421+
2422+ buffer_free(&m);
2423+
2424+ return(major);
2425+}
2426+
2427+int
2428+mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store)
2429+{
2430+ Buffer m;
2431+ int ok;
2432+
2433+ buffer_init(&m);
2434+
2435+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : "");
2436+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : "");
2437+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : "");
2438+
2439+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
2440+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
2441+
2442+ ok = buffer_get_int(&m);
2443+
2444+ buffer_free(&m);
2445+
2446+ return (ok);
2447+}
2448+
2449 #endif /* GSSAPI */
2450
2451diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
2452index 9e032d20..7b2e8945 100644
2453--- a/monitor_wrap.h
2454+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
2455@@ -57,8 +57,10 @@ int mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
2456 OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
2457 OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
2458 gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
2459-int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
2460+int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *);
2461 OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
2462+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
2463+int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *);
2464 #endif
2465
2466 #ifdef USE_PAM
2467diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
2468index f63894f9..99e03ee1 100644
2469--- a/readconf.c
2470+++ b/readconf.c
2471@@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ typedef enum {
2472 oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
2473 oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
2474 oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
2475+ oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey,
2476+ oGssServerIdentity,
2477 oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
2478 oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
2479 oHashKnownHosts,
2480@@ -199,10 +201,20 @@ static struct {
2481 /* Sometimes-unsupported options */
2482 #if defined(GSSAPI)
2483 { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
2484+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx },
2485 { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
2486+ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
2487+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity },
2488+ { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity },
2489+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey },
2490 # else
2491 { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
2492+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
2493 { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
2494+ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
2495+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported },
2496+ { "gssapiserveridentity", oUnsupported },
2497+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported },
2498 #endif
2499 #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
2500 { "smartcarddevice", oPKCS11Provider },
2501@@ -976,10 +988,30 @@ parse_time:
2502 intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
2503 goto parse_flag;
2504
2505+ case oGssKeyEx:
2506+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
2507+ goto parse_flag;
2508+
2509 case oGssDelegateCreds:
2510 intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
2511 goto parse_flag;
2512
2513+ case oGssTrustDns:
2514+ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
2515+ goto parse_flag;
2516+
2517+ case oGssClientIdentity:
2518+ charptr = &options->gss_client_identity;
2519+ goto parse_string;
2520+
2521+ case oGssServerIdentity:
2522+ charptr = &options->gss_server_identity;
2523+ goto parse_string;
2524+
2525+ case oGssRenewalRekey:
2526+ intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey;
2527+ goto parse_flag;
2528+
2529 case oBatchMode:
2530 intptr = &options->batch_mode;
2531 goto parse_flag;
2532@@ -1790,7 +1822,12 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
2533 options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
2534 options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
2535 options->gss_authentication = -1;
2536+ options->gss_keyex = -1;
2537 options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
2538+ options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
2539+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1;
2540+ options->gss_client_identity = NULL;
2541+ options->gss_server_identity = NULL;
2542 options->password_authentication = -1;
2543 options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
2544 options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
2545@@ -1930,8 +1967,14 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
2546 options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
2547 if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
2548 options->gss_authentication = 0;
2549+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
2550+ options->gss_keyex = 0;
2551 if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
2552 options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
2553+ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
2554+ options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
2555+ if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
2556+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0;
2557 if (options->password_authentication == -1)
2558 options->password_authentication = 1;
2559 if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
2560diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
2561index 22fe5c18..d61161a8 100644
2562--- a/readconf.h
2563+++ b/readconf.h
2564@@ -42,7 +42,12 @@ typedef struct {
2565 int challenge_response_authentication;
2566 /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
2567 int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */
2568+ int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */
2569 int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */
2570+ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
2571+ int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */
2572+ char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */
2573+ char *gss_server_identity; /* GSSAPI target principal */
2574 int password_authentication; /* Try password
2575 * authentication. */
2576 int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
2577diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
2578index 2c321a4a..8ba74517 100644
2579--- a/servconf.c
2580+++ b/servconf.c
2581@@ -113,8 +113,10 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
2582 options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
2583 options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
2584 options->gss_authentication=-1;
2585+ options->gss_keyex = -1;
2586 options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
2587 options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
2588+ options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
2589 options->password_authentication = -1;
2590 options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
2591 options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
2592@@ -268,10 +270,14 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
2593 options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
2594 if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
2595 options->gss_authentication = 0;
2596+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
2597+ options->gss_keyex = 0;
2598 if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
2599 options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
2600 if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
2601 options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
2602+ if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
2603+ options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
2604 if (options->password_authentication == -1)
2605 options->password_authentication = 1;
2606 if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
2607@@ -410,6 +416,7 @@ typedef enum {
2608 sHostKeyAlgorithms,
2609 sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
2610 sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
2611+ sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey,
2612 sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
2613 sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
2614 sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
2615@@ -484,12 +491,20 @@ static struct {
2616 #ifdef GSSAPI
2617 { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
2618 { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2619+ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2620 { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2621+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2622+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2623 #else
2624 { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
2625 { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2626+ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2627 { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2628+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2629+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2630 #endif
2631+ { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2632+ { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2633 { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
2634 { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
2635 { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2636@@ -1253,6 +1268,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
2637 intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
2638 goto parse_flag;
2639
2640+ case sGssKeyEx:
2641+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
2642+ goto parse_flag;
2643+
2644 case sGssCleanupCreds:
2645 intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
2646 goto parse_flag;
2647@@ -1261,6 +1280,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
2648 intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
2649 goto parse_flag;
2650
2651+ case sGssStoreRekey:
2652+ intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey;
2653+ goto parse_flag;
2654+
2655 case sPasswordAuthentication:
2656 intptr = &options->password_authentication;
2657 goto parse_flag;
2658@@ -2301,7 +2324,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
2659 #endif
2660 #ifdef GSSAPI
2661 dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
2662+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
2663 dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
2664+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
2665+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
2666 #endif
2667 dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
2668 dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
2669diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
2670index 1dca702e..641e93c8 100644
2671--- a/servconf.h
2672+++ b/servconf.h
2673@@ -119,8 +119,10 @@ typedef struct {
2674 int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if
2675 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
2676 int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
2677+ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
2678 int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
2679 int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
2680+ int gss_store_rekey;
2681 int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password
2682 * authentication. */
2683 int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
2684diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
2685index 6593e422..919660a0 100644
2686--- a/ssh-gss.h
2687+++ b/ssh-gss.h
2688@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
2689 /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.12 2017/06/24 06:34:38 djm Exp $ */
2690 /*
2691- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
2692+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
2693 *
2694 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
2695 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
2696@@ -61,10 +61,22 @@
2697
2698 #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
2699
2700+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30
2701+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31
2702+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32
2703+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33
2704+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34
2705+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40
2706+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41
2707+#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-"
2708+#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-"
2709+#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-"
2710+
2711 typedef struct {
2712 char *filename;
2713 char *envvar;
2714 char *envval;
2715+ struct passwd *owner;
2716 void *data;
2717 } ssh_gssapi_ccache;
2718
2719@@ -72,8 +84,11 @@ typedef struct {
2720 gss_buffer_desc displayname;
2721 gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
2722 gss_cred_id_t creds;
2723+ gss_name_t name;
2724 struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
2725 ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
2726+ int used;
2727+ int updated;
2728 } ssh_gssapi_client;
2729
2730 typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
2731@@ -84,6 +99,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
2732 int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
2733 int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
2734 void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
2735+ int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
2736 } ssh_gssapi_mech;
2737
2738 typedef struct {
2739@@ -94,10 +110,11 @@ typedef struct {
2740 gss_OID oid; /* client */
2741 gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */
2742 gss_name_t client; /* server */
2743- gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */
2744+ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */
2745 } Gssctxt;
2746
2747 extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
2748+extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context;
2749
2750 int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
2751 void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
2752@@ -119,17 +136,33 @@ void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **);
2753 void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
2754 OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
2755 void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
2756-int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
2757+int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *);
2758+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
2759+int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
2760
2761 /* In the server */
2762+typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *,
2763+ const char *);
2764+char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *);
2765+char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
2766+ const char *);
2767+gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
2768+int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *,
2769+ const char *);
2770 OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
2771-int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
2772+int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *);
2773 OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
2774 void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
2775 void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
2776 void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
2777 const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
2778
2779+char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
2780+int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void);
2781+
2782+int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store);
2783+void ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void);
2784+
2785 #endif /* GSSAPI */
2786
2787 #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
2788diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
2789index c12f5ef5..bcb9f153 100644
2790--- a/ssh_config
2791+++ b/ssh_config
2792@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
2793 # HostbasedAuthentication no
2794 # GSSAPIAuthentication no
2795 # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
2796+# GSSAPIKeyExchange no
2797+# GSSAPITrustDNS no
2798 # BatchMode no
2799 # CheckHostIP yes
2800 # AddressFamily any
2801diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
2802index eab8dd01..9a06a757 100644
2803--- a/ssh_config.5
2804+++ b/ssh_config.5
2805@@ -720,10 +720,42 @@ The default is
2806 Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
2807 The default is
2808 .Cm no .
2809+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
2810+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using
2811+GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key.
2812+The default is
2813+.Cm no .
2814+.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity
2815+If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when
2816+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default
2817+identity will be used.
2818+.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity
2819+If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when
2820+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the
2821+expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target
2822+hostname.
2823 .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
2824 Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
2825 The default is
2826 .Cm no .
2827+.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
2828+If set to
2829+.Cm yes
2830+then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the
2831+ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed
2832+credentials to a session on the server.
2833+The default is
2834+.Cm no .
2835+.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
2836+Set to
2837+.Cm yes
2838+to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
2839+the name of the host being connected to. If
2840+.Cm no ,
2841+the hostname entered on the
2842+command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
2843+The default is
2844+.Cm no .
2845 .It Cm HashKnownHosts
2846 Indicates that
2847 .Xr ssh 1
2848diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
2849index be9397e4..c22477f5 100644
2850--- a/sshconnect2.c
2851+++ b/sshconnect2.c
2852@@ -162,6 +162,11 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
2853 struct kex *kex;
2854 int r;
2855
2856+#ifdef GSSAPI
2857+ char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL;
2858+ char *gss_host = NULL;
2859+#endif
2860+
2861 xxx_host = host;
2862 xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
2863
2864@@ -192,6 +197,35 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
2865 order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port));
2866 }
2867
2868+#ifdef GSSAPI
2869+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
2870+ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
2871+ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
2872+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
2873+
2874+ if (options.gss_server_identity)
2875+ gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
2876+ else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
2877+ gss_host = remote_hostname(active_state);
2878+ else
2879+ gss_host = xstrdup(host);
2880+
2881+ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
2882+ options.gss_client_identity);
2883+ if (gss) {
2884+ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
2885+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
2886+ "%s,%s", gss, orig);
2887+
2888+ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also
2889+ * support the 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
2890+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
2891+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
2892+ "%s,null", orig);
2893+ }
2894+ }
2895+#endif
2896+
2897 if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
2898 packet_set_rekey_limits(options.rekey_limit,
2899 options.rekey_interval);
2900@@ -213,15 +247,41 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
2901 # endif
2902 #endif
2903 kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client;
2904+#ifdef GSSAPI
2905+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
2906+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
2907+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
2908+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
2909+ }
2910+#endif
2911 kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
2912 kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
2913 kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
2914
2915+#ifdef GSSAPI
2916+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
2917+ kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
2918+ kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
2919+ kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity;
2920+ kex->gss_host = gss_host;
2921+ }
2922+#endif
2923+
2924 ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(active_state, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done);
2925
2926 /* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */
2927 myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] =
2928 compat_kex_proposal(options.kex_algorithms);
2929+#ifdef GSSAPI
2930+ /* repair myproposal after it was crumpled by the */
2931+ /* ext-info removal above */
2932+ if (gss) {
2933+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
2934+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
2935+ "%s,%s", gss, orig);
2936+ free(gss);
2937+ }
2938+#endif
2939 if ((r = kex_prop2buf(kex->my, myproposal)) != 0)
2940 fatal("kex_prop2buf: %s", ssh_err(r));
2941
2942@@ -311,6 +371,7 @@ int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
2943 int input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
2944 int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
2945 int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
2946+int userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt);
2947 #endif
2948
2949 void userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
2950@@ -327,6 +388,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
2951
2952 Authmethod authmethods[] = {
2953 #ifdef GSSAPI
2954+ {"gssapi-keyex",
2955+ userauth_gsskeyex,
2956+ NULL,
2957+ &options.gss_authentication,
2958+ NULL},
2959 {"gssapi-with-mic",
2960 userauth_gssapi,
2961 NULL,
2962@@ -654,25 +720,40 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
2963 static u_int mech = 0;
2964 OM_uint32 min;
2965 int ok = 0;
2966+ char *gss_host;
2967+
2968+ if (options.gss_server_identity)
2969+ gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
2970+ else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
2971+ gss_host = remote_hostname(active_state);
2972+ else
2973+ gss_host = xstrdup(authctxt->host);
2974
2975 /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
2976 * once. */
2977
2978 if (gss_supported == NULL)
2979- gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported);
2980+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) {
2981+ gss_supported = NULL;
2982+ free(gss_host);
2983+ return 0;
2984+ }
2985
2986 /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
2987 while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
2988 /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
2989 if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
2990 ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
2991- &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
2992+ &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host,
2993+ options.gss_client_identity)) {
2994 ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
2995 } else {
2996 mech++;
2997 }
2998 }
2999
3000+ free(gss_host);
3001+
3002 if (!ok)
3003 return 0;
3004
3005@@ -763,8 +844,8 @@ input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
3006 {
3007 Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
3008 Gssctxt *gssctxt;
3009- int oidlen;
3010- char *oidv;
3011+ u_int oidlen;
3012+ u_char *oidv;
3013
3014 if (authctxt == NULL)
3015 fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
3016@@ -877,6 +958,48 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
3017 free(lang);
3018 return 0;
3019 }
3020+
3021+int
3022+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
3023+{
3024+ Buffer b;
3025+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
3026+ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
3027+ OM_uint32 ms;
3028+
3029+ static int attempt = 0;
3030+ if (attempt++ >= 1)
3031+ return (0);
3032+
3033+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
3034+ debug("No valid Key exchange context");
3035+ return (0);
3036+ }
3037+
3038+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
3039+ "gssapi-keyex");
3040+
3041+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
3042+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
3043+
3044+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
3045+ buffer_free(&b);
3046+ return (0);
3047+ }
3048+
3049+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
3050+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
3051+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
3052+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
3053+ packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
3054+ packet_send();
3055+
3056+ buffer_free(&b);
3057+ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
3058+
3059+ return (1);
3060+}
3061+
3062 #endif /* GSSAPI */
3063
3064 int
3065diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
3066index 51a1aaf6..45e50fac 100644
3067--- a/sshd.c
3068+++ b/sshd.c
3069@@ -122,6 +122,10 @@
3070 #include "version.h"
3071 #include "ssherr.h"
3072
3073+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
3074+#include <Security/AuthSession.h>
3075+#endif
3076+
3077 /* Re-exec fds */
3078 #define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
3079 #define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
3080@@ -529,7 +533,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
3081
3082 #ifdef GSSAPI
3083 /* Cache supported mechanism OIDs for later use */
3084- if (options.gss_authentication)
3085+ if (options.gss_authentication || options.gss_keyex)
3086 ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
3087 #endif
3088
3089@@ -1708,10 +1712,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
3090 key ? "private" : "agent", i, sshkey_ssh_name(pubkey), fp);
3091 free(fp);
3092 }
3093+#ifndef GSSAPI
3094+ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
3095 if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
3096 logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
3097 exit(1);
3098 }
3099+#endif
3100
3101 /*
3102 * Load certificates. They are stored in an array at identical
3103@@ -1987,6 +1994,60 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
3104 remote_ip, remote_port, laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh));
3105 free(laddr);
3106
3107+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
3108+ /*
3109+ * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if
3110+ * the current session is the root session or we are not launched
3111+ * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode). We do not
3112+ * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from
3113+ * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us.
3114+ *
3115+ * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an
3116+ * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating
3117+ * new sessions for us. Then all the users will end up in the
3118+ * same session (bad).
3119+ *
3120+ * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us
3121+ * automatically.
3122+ *
3123+ * We must create the session before any credentials are stored
3124+ * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below).
3125+ */
3126+ {
3127+ OSStatus err = 0;
3128+ SecuritySessionId sid = 0;
3129+ SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0;
3130+
3131+ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs);
3132+ if (err)
3133+ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
3134+ (unsigned) err);
3135+ else
3136+ debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
3137+ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
3138+
3139+ if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot))
3140+ debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... "
3141+ "assuming inetd created the session for us.");
3142+ else {
3143+ debug("Creating new security session...");
3144+ err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote);
3145+ if (err)
3146+ error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X",
3147+ (unsigned) err);
3148+
3149+ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid,
3150+ &sattrs);
3151+ if (err)
3152+ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
3153+ (unsigned) err);
3154+ else
3155+ debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
3156+ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
3157+ }
3158+ }
3159+#endif
3160+
3161 /*
3162 * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
3163 * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
3164@@ -2170,6 +2231,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
3165 myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
3166 list_hostkey_types());
3167
3168+#ifdef GSSAPI
3169+ {
3170+ char *orig;
3171+ char *gss = NULL;
3172+ char *newstr = NULL;
3173+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
3174+
3175+ /*
3176+ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
3177+ * the other key exchange algorithms
3178+ */
3179+
3180+ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
3181+ orig = NULL;
3182+
3183+ if (options.gss_keyex)
3184+ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
3185+ else
3186+ gss = NULL;
3187+
3188+ if (gss && orig)
3189+ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
3190+ else if (gss)
3191+ newstr = gss;
3192+ else if (orig)
3193+ newstr = orig;
3194+
3195+ /*
3196+ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
3197+ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
3198+ * host key algorithm we support
3199+ */
3200+ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
3201+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
3202+
3203+ if (newstr)
3204+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
3205+ else
3206+ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
3207+ }
3208+#endif
3209+
3210 /* start key exchange */
3211 if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0)
3212 fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r));
3213@@ -2187,6 +2290,13 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
3214 # endif
3215 #endif
3216 kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
3217+#ifdef GSSAPI
3218+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
3219+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
3220+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
3221+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
3222+ }
3223+#endif
3224 kex->server = 1;
3225 kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
3226 kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
3227diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
3228index 4eb2e02e..c01dd656 100644
3229--- a/sshd_config
3230+++ b/sshd_config
3231@@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
3232 # GSSAPI options
3233 #GSSAPIAuthentication no
3234 #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
3235+#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
3236+#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
3237
3238 # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
3239 # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
3240diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
3241index 251b7467..0dbcb8da 100644
3242--- a/sshd_config.5
3243+++ b/sshd_config.5
3244@@ -635,6 +635,11 @@ The default is
3245 Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
3246 The default is
3247 .Cm no .
3248+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
3249+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
3250+doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
3251+The default is
3252+.Cm no .
3253 .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
3254 Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
3255 on logout.
3256@@ -654,6 +659,11 @@ machine's default store.
3257 This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines.
3258 The default is
3259 .Cm yes .
3260+.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey
3261+Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a
3262+successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed
3263+or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is
3264+.Cm no .
3265 .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
3266 Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication
3267 as a comma-separated pattern list.
3268diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
3269index e91c54f5..c2cf0e03 100644
3270--- a/sshkey.c
3271+++ b/sshkey.c
3272@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] = {
3273 # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
3274 # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
3275 #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
3276+ { "null", "null", KEY_NULL, 0, 0, 0 },
3277 { NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0 }
3278 };
3279
3280@@ -200,7 +201,7 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep)
3281 const struct keytype *kt;
3282
3283 for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
3284- if (kt->name == NULL)
3285+ if (kt->name == NULL || kt->type == KEY_NULL)
3286 continue;
3287 if (!include_sigonly && kt->sigonly)
3288 continue;
3289diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
3290index 9093eac5..b5d020cb 100644
3291--- a/sshkey.h
3292+++ b/sshkey.h
3293@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ enum sshkey_types {
3294 KEY_DSA_CERT,
3295 KEY_ECDSA_CERT,
3296 KEY_ED25519_CERT,
3297+ KEY_NULL,
3298 KEY_UNSPEC
3299 };
3300
diff --git a/debian/patches/keepalive-extensions.patch b/debian/patches/keepalive-extensions.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d3eca5924
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/keepalive-extensions.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
1From c147d4dbab74e0dbf738beb9d9f4220534ae9da6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Richard Kettlewell <rjk@greenend.org.uk>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:52 +0000
4Subject: Various keepalive extensions
5
6Add compatibility aliases for ProtocolKeepAlives and SetupTimeOut, supported
7in previous versions of Debian's OpenSSH package but since superseded by
8ServerAliveInterval. (We're probably stuck with this bit for
9compatibility.)
10
11In batch mode, default ServerAliveInterval to five minutes.
12
13Adjust documentation to match and to give some more advice on use of
14keepalives.
15
16Author: Ian Jackson <ian@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
17Author: Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>
18Author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
19Last-Update: 2017-10-04
20
21Patch-Name: keepalive-extensions.patch
22---
23 readconf.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
24 ssh_config.5 | 21 +++++++++++++++++++--
25 sshd_config.5 | 3 +++
26 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
27
28diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
29index d2b28a41..45caa095 100644
30--- a/readconf.c
31+++ b/readconf.c
32@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ typedef enum {
33 oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys,
34 oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedKeyTypes,
35 oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, oProxyJump,
36+ oProtocolKeepAlives, oSetupTimeOut,
37 oIgnore, oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported
38 } OpCodes;
39
40@@ -318,6 +319,8 @@ static struct {
41 { "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes },
42 { "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown },
43 { "proxyjump", oProxyJump },
44+ { "protocolkeepalives", oProtocolKeepAlives },
45+ { "setuptimeout", oSetupTimeOut },
46
47 { NULL, oBadOption }
48 };
49@@ -1406,6 +1409,8 @@ parse_keytypes:
50 goto parse_flag;
51
52 case oServerAliveInterval:
53+ case oProtocolKeepAlives: /* Debian-specific compatibility alias */
54+ case oSetupTimeOut: /* Debian-specific compatibility alias */
55 intptr = &options->server_alive_interval;
56 goto parse_time;
57
58@@ -2042,8 +2047,13 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
59 options->rekey_interval = 0;
60 if (options->verify_host_key_dns == -1)
61 options->verify_host_key_dns = 0;
62- if (options->server_alive_interval == -1)
63- options->server_alive_interval = 0;
64+ if (options->server_alive_interval == -1) {
65+ /* in batch mode, default is 5mins */
66+ if (options->batch_mode == 1)
67+ options->server_alive_interval = 300;
68+ else
69+ options->server_alive_interval = 0;
70+ }
71 if (options->server_alive_count_max == -1)
72 options->server_alive_count_max = 3;
73 if (options->control_master == -1)
74diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
75index 9a06a757..d6f43c2d 100644
76--- a/ssh_config.5
77+++ b/ssh_config.5
78@@ -247,8 +247,12 @@ Valid arguments are
79 If set to
80 .Cm yes ,
81 passphrase/password querying will be disabled.
82+In addition, the
83+.Cm ServerAliveInterval
84+option will be set to 300 seconds by default (Debian-specific).
85 This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no user
86-is present to supply the password.
87+is present to supply the password,
88+and where it is desirable to detect a broken network swiftly.
89 The argument must be
90 .Cm yes
91 or
92@@ -1455,7 +1459,14 @@ from the server,
93 will send a message through the encrypted
94 channel to request a response from the server.
95 The default
96-is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server.
97+is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server,
98+or 300 if the
99+.Cm BatchMode
100+option is set (Debian-specific).
101+.Cm ProtocolKeepAlives
102+and
103+.Cm SetupTimeOut
104+are Debian-specific compatibility aliases for this option.
105 .It Cm StreamLocalBindMask
106 Sets the octal file creation mode mask
107 .Pq umask
108@@ -1529,6 +1540,12 @@ Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the
109 other side.
110 If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one
111 of the machines will be properly noticed.
112+This option only uses TCP keepalives (as opposed to using ssh level
113+keepalives), so takes a long time to notice when the connection dies.
114+As such, you probably want
115+the
116+.Cm ServerAliveInterval
117+option as well.
118 However, this means that
119 connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people
120 find it annoying.
121diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
122index 0dbcb8da..7db25552 100644
123--- a/sshd_config.5
124+++ b/sshd_config.5
125@@ -1454,6 +1454,9 @@ This avoids infinitely hanging sessions.
126 .Pp
127 To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
128 .Cm no .
129+.Pp
130+This option was formerly called
131+.Cm KeepAlive .
132 .It Cm TrustedUserCAKeys
133 Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate authorities that are
134 trusted to sign user certificates for authentication, or
diff --git a/debian/patches/mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch b/debian/patches/mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3edb37705
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
1From 19be4218cdb262f7b584b0104ee430de0e24eeb8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Scott Moser <smoser@ubuntu.com>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:03 +0000
4Subject: Mention ssh-keygen in ssh fingerprint changed warning
5
6Author: Chris Lamb <lamby@debian.org>
7Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1843
8Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/686607
9Last-Update: 2017-08-22
10
11Patch-Name: mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch
12---
13 sshconnect.c | 9 ++++++++-
14 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
15
16diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
17index 5eed5880..7ce2716c 100644
18--- a/sshconnect.c
19+++ b/sshconnect.c
20@@ -1022,9 +1022,13 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
21 error("%s. This could either mean that", key_msg);
22 error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host");
23 error("and its host key have changed at the same time.");
24- if (ip_status != HOST_NEW)
25+ if (ip_status != HOST_NEW) {
26 error("Offending key for IP in %s:%lu",
27 ip_found->file, ip_found->line);
28+ error(" remove with:");
29+ error(" ssh-keygen -f \"%s\" -R \"%s\"",
30+ ip_found->file, ip);
31+ }
32 }
33 /* The host key has changed. */
34 warn_changed_key(host_key);
35@@ -1033,6 +1037,9 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
36 error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu",
37 sshkey_type(host_found->key),
38 host_found->file, host_found->line);
39+ error(" remove with:");
40+ error(" ssh-keygen -f \"%s\" -R \"%s\"",
41+ host_found->file, host);
42
43 /*
44 * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
diff --git a/debian/patches/no-dsa-host-key-by-default.patch b/debian/patches/no-dsa-host-key-by-default.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c24ff4e3f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/no-dsa-host-key-by-default.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
1From 922f3a7599d03234b6bb2ffb22a33624e7cf1953 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Mon, 16 Jan 2017 13:53:04 +0000
4Subject: Remove ssh_host_dsa_key from HostKey default
5
6The client no longer accepts DSA host keys, and servers using the
7default HostKey setting should have better host keys available.
8
9Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2662
10Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/850614
11Last-Update: 2017-01-16
12
13Patch-Name: no-dsa-host-key-by-default.patch
14---
15 servconf.c | 2 --
16 sshd.8 | 7 +++----
17 sshd_config | 1 -
18 sshd_config.5 | 7 +++----
19 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
20
21diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
22index b0146405..5e996cf8 100644
23--- a/servconf.c
24+++ b/servconf.c
25@@ -205,8 +205,6 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
26 /* fill default hostkeys for protocols */
27 options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
28 _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE;
29- options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
30- _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE;
31 #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
32 options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
33 _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE;
34diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
35index 02c5e1df..8c230657 100644
36--- a/sshd.8
37+++ b/sshd.8
38@@ -164,11 +164,10 @@ This option must be given if
39 is not run as root (as the normal
40 host key files are normally not readable by anyone but root).
41 The default is
42-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key ,
43-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key ,
44-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
45+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key ,
46+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
47 and
48-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key .
49+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key .
50 It is possible to have multiple host key files for
51 the different host key algorithms.
52 .It Fl i
53diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
54index f68edf36..92822959 100644
55--- a/sshd_config
56+++ b/sshd_config
57@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@
58 #ListenAddress ::
59
60 #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
61-#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
62 #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
63 #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
64
65diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
66index 16be4f62..ef520680 100644
67--- a/sshd_config.5
68+++ b/sshd_config.5
69@@ -749,11 +749,10 @@ is not to load any certificates.
70 Specifies a file containing a private host key
71 used by SSH.
72 The defaults are
73-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key ,
74-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key ,
75-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
76+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key ,
77+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
78 and
79-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key .
80+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key .
81 .Pp
82 Note that
83 .Xr sshd 8
diff --git a/debian/patches/no-openssl-version-status.patch b/debian/patches/no-openssl-version-status.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cbfaebfe0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/no-openssl-version-status.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
1From b614a7f9148af821919165be47c6c29f59dc6b44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:14 +0000
4Subject: Don't check the status field of the OpenSSL version
5
6There is no reason to check the version of OpenSSL (in Debian). If it's
7not compatible the soname will change. OpenSSH seems to want to do a
8check for the soname based on the version number, but wants to keep the
9status of the release the same. Remove that check on the status since
10it doesn't tell you anything about how compatible that version is.
11
12Author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
13Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/93581
14Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/664383
15Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/732940
16Forwarded: not-needed
17Last-Update: 2014-10-07
18
19Patch-Name: no-openssl-version-status.patch
20---
21 openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c | 6 +++---
22 openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c | 1 +
23 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
24
25diff --git a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
26index 259fccbe..aaa953f2 100644
27--- a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
28+++ b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
29@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
30 /*
31 * OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
32 * We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0.
33- * After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we
34+ * After that, we accept compatible fix and status versions (so we
35 * allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed
36 * within a patch series.
37 */
38@@ -55,10 +55,10 @@ ssh_compatible_openssl(long headerver, long libver)
39 }
40
41 /*
42- * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor,status must match and library
43+ * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor must match and library
44 * fix version must be equal to or newer than the header.
45 */
46- mask = 0xfff0000fL; /* major,minor,status */
47+ mask = 0xfff00000L; /* major,minor */
48 hfix = (headerver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
49 lfix = (libver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
50 if ( (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask) && lfix >= hfix)
51diff --git a/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c b/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
52index 5d019b59..58474873 100644
53--- a/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
54+++ b/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
55@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ struct version_test {
56
57 /* built with 1.0.1b release headers */
58 { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000101fL, 1},/* exact match */
59+ { 0x1000101fL, 0x10001010L, 1}, /* different status: ok */
60 { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000102fL, 1}, /* newer library patch version: ok */
61 { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000100fL, 1}, /* older library patch version: ok */
62 { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000201fL, 1}, /* newer library fix version: ok */
diff --git a/debian/patches/openbsd-docs.patch b/debian/patches/openbsd-docs.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9297decd6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/openbsd-docs.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
1From 7e53354725eeb002e6126a73fd5f294ed9f9b03e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:09 +0000
4Subject: Adjust various OpenBSD-specific references in manual pages
5
6No single bug reference for this patch, but history includes:
7 http://bugs.debian.org/154434 (login.conf(5))
8 http://bugs.debian.org/513417 (/etc/rc)
9 http://bugs.debian.org/530692 (ssl(8))
10 https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/456660 (ssl(8))
11
12Forwarded: not-needed
13Last-Update: 2017-10-04
14
15Patch-Name: openbsd-docs.patch
16---
17 moduli.5 | 4 ++--
18 ssh-keygen.1 | 12 ++++--------
19 ssh.1 | 4 ++++
20 sshd.8 | 5 ++---
21 sshd_config.5 | 3 +--
22 5 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
23
24diff --git a/moduli.5 b/moduli.5
25index ef0de085..149846c8 100644
26--- a/moduli.5
27+++ b/moduli.5
28@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
29 .Nd Diffie-Hellman moduli
30 .Sh DESCRIPTION
31 The
32-.Pa /etc/moduli
33+.Pa /etc/ssh/moduli
34 file contains prime numbers and generators for use by
35 .Xr sshd 8
36 in the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange key exchange method.
37@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ first estimates the size of the modulus required to produce enough
38 Diffie-Hellman output to sufficiently key the selected symmetric cipher.
39 .Xr sshd 8
40 then randomly selects a modulus from
41-.Fa /etc/moduli
42+.Fa /etc/ssh/moduli
43 that best meets the size requirement.
44 .Sh SEE ALSO
45 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
46diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
47index 5f1ec09b..dfbc65dd 100644
48--- a/ssh-keygen.1
49+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
50@@ -176,9 +176,7 @@ key in
51 .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
52 or
53 .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa .
54-Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys,
55-as seen in
56-.Pa /etc/rc .
57+Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys.
58 .Pp
59 Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which
60 to store the private key.
61@@ -229,9 +227,7 @@ If
62 .Fl f
63 has also been specified, its argument is used as a prefix to the
64 default path for the resulting host key files.
65-This is used by
66-.Pa /etc/rc
67-to generate new host keys.
68+This is used by system administration scripts to generate new host keys.
69 .It Fl a Ar rounds
70 When saving a new-format private key (i.e. an ed25519 key or when the
71 .Fl o
72@@ -676,7 +672,7 @@ option.
73 Valid generator values are 2, 3, and 5.
74 .Pp
75 Screened DH groups may be installed in
76-.Pa /etc/moduli .
77+.Pa /etc/ssh/moduli .
78 It is important that this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths and
79 that both ends of a connection share common moduli.
80 .Sh CERTIFICATES
81@@ -863,7 +859,7 @@ on all machines
82 where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication.
83 There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret.
84 .Pp
85-.It Pa /etc/moduli
86+.It Pa /etc/ssh/moduli
87 Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX.
88 The file format is described in
89 .Xr moduli 5 .
90diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
91index 3cc94688..2a2aab30 100644
92--- a/ssh.1
93+++ b/ssh.1
94@@ -842,6 +842,10 @@ implements public key authentication protocol automatically,
95 using one of the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA algorithms.
96 The HISTORY section of
97 .Xr ssl 8
98+(on non-OpenBSD systems, see
99+.nh
100+http://www.openbsd.org/cgi\-bin/man.cgi?query=ssl&sektion=8#HISTORY)
101+.hy
102 contains a brief discussion of the DSA and RSA algorithms.
103 .Pp
104 The file
105diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
106index 2ed523a2..02c5e1df 100644
107--- a/sshd.8
108+++ b/sshd.8
109@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ over an insecure network.
110 .Nm
111 listens for connections from clients.
112 It is normally started at boot from
113-.Pa /etc/rc .
114+.Pa /etc/init.d/ssh .
115 It forks a new
116 daemon for each incoming connection.
117 The forked daemons handle
118@@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ This file is for host-based authentication (see
119 .Xr ssh 1 ) .
120 It should only be writable by root.
121 .Pp
122-.It Pa /etc/moduli
123+.It Pa /etc/ssh/moduli
124 Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange"
125 key exchange method.
126 The file format is described in
127@@ -950,7 +950,6 @@ The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
128 .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
129 .Xr chroot 2 ,
130 .Xr hosts_access 5 ,
131-.Xr login.conf 5 ,
132 .Xr moduli 5 ,
133 .Xr sshd_config 5 ,
134 .Xr inetd 8 ,
135diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
136index 41e8c939..79676a95 100644
137--- a/sshd_config.5
138+++ b/sshd_config.5
139@@ -382,8 +382,7 @@ then no banner is displayed.
140 By default, no banner is displayed.
141 .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
142 Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
143-PAM or through authentication styles supported in
144-.Xr login.conf 5 )
145+PAM).
146 The default is
147 .Cm yes .
148 .It Cm ChrootDirectory
diff --git a/debian/patches/package-versioning.patch b/debian/patches/package-versioning.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0d851e68c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/package-versioning.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
1From 326b09bce8058629980cc92f289fd7912269eb98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:05 +0000
4Subject: Include the Debian version in our identification
5
6This makes it easier to audit networks for versions patched against security
7vulnerabilities. It has little detrimental effect, as attackers will
8generally just try attacks rather than bothering to scan for
9vulnerable-looking version strings. (However, see debian-banner.patch.)
10
11Forwarded: not-needed
12Last-Update: 2017-10-04
13
14Patch-Name: package-versioning.patch
15---
16 sshconnect.c | 2 +-
17 sshd.c | 2 +-
18 version.h | 7 ++++++-
19 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
20
21diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
22index 7ce2716c..3280b310 100644
23--- a/sshconnect.c
24+++ b/sshconnect.c
25@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ send_client_banner(int connection_out, int minor1)
26 {
27 /* Send our own protocol version identification. */
28 xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\r\n",
29- PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION);
30+ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE);
31 if (atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, client_version_string,
32 strlen(client_version_string)) != strlen(client_version_string))
33 fatal("write: %.100s", strerror(errno));
34diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
35index af1ec337..eccf81bb 100644
36--- a/sshd.c
37+++ b/sshd.c
38@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int sock_in, int sock_out)
39 char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */
40
41 xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n",
42- PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION,
43+ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE,
44 *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
45 options.version_addendum);
46
47diff --git a/version.h b/version.h
48index e093f623..b7c5ad2a 100644
49--- a/version.h
50+++ b/version.h
51@@ -3,4 +3,9 @@
52 #define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_7.6"
53
54 #define SSH_PORTABLE "p1"
55-#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
56+#define SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
57+#ifdef SSH_EXTRAVERSION
58+#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM " " SSH_EXTRAVERSION
59+#else
60+#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM
61+#endif
diff --git a/debian/patches/permitopen-argument-handling.patch b/debian/patches/permitopen-argument-handling.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6369c395c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/permitopen-argument-handling.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
1From e293f21da513a7db59fe1997c9e90e2e9cdbceda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
3Date: Wed, 4 Oct 2017 18:49:30 +0000
4Subject: Fix PermitOpen argument handling
5
6fix (another) problem in PermitOpen introduced during the
7channels.c refactor: the third and subsequent arguments to PermitOpen were
8being silently ignored; ok markus@
9
10Upstream-ID: 067c89f1f53cbc381628012ba776d6861e6782fd
11
12Origin: https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=7c9613fac3371cf65fb07739212cdd1ebf6575da
13Last-Update: 2017-10-07
14
15Patch-Name: permitopen-argument-handling.patch
16---
17 servconf.c | 8 ++++----
18 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
19
20diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
21index 5e996cf8..9daa182c 100644
22--- a/servconf.c
23+++ b/servconf.c
24@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
25
26-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.312 2017/10/02 19:33:20 djm Exp $ */
27+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.313 2017/10/04 18:49:30 djm Exp $ */
28 /*
29 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
30 * All rights reserved
31@@ -1690,9 +1690,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
32 if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
33 fatal("%s line %d: missing PermitOpen specification",
34 filename, linenum);
35- i = options->num_permitted_opens; /* modified later */
36+ value = options->num_permitted_opens; /* modified later */
37 if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) {
38- if (*activep && i == 0) {
39+ if (*activep && value == 0) {
40 options->num_permitted_opens = 1;
41 options->permitted_opens = xcalloc(1,
42 sizeof(*options->permitted_opens));
43@@ -1710,7 +1710,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
44 if (arg == NULL || ((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0))
45 fatal("%s line %d: bad port number in "
46 "PermitOpen", filename, linenum);
47- if (*activep && i == 0) {
48+ if (*activep && value == 0) {
49 options->permitted_opens = xrecallocarray(
50 options->permitted_opens,
51 options->num_permitted_opens,
diff --git a/debian/patches/restore-authorized_keys2.patch b/debian/patches/restore-authorized_keys2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..098f9d681
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/restore-authorized_keys2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
1From 6c2e9847f608cc9c36236eecc58241cd3358dd5b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 5 Mar 2017 02:02:11 +0000
4Subject: Restore reading authorized_keys2 by default
5
6Upstream seems to intend to gradually phase this out, so don't assume
7that this will remain the default forever. However, we were late in
8adopting the upstream sshd_config changes, so it makes sense to extend
9the grace period.
10
11Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/852320
12Forwarded: not-needed
13Last-Update: 2017-03-05
14
15Patch-Name: restore-authorized_keys2.patch
16---
17 sshd_config | 5 ++---
18 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
19
20diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
21index 92822959..a32dc1d4 100644
22--- a/sshd_config
23+++ b/sshd_config
24@@ -36,9 +36,8 @@
25
26 #PubkeyAuthentication yes
27
28-# The default is to check both .ssh/authorized_keys and .ssh/authorized_keys2
29-# but this is overridden so installations will only check .ssh/authorized_keys
30-AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
31+# Expect .ssh/authorized_keys2 to be disregarded by default in future.
32+#AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2
33
34 #AuthorizedPrincipalsFile none
35
diff --git a/debian/patches/restore-tcp-wrappers.patch b/debian/patches/restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5832897d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
1From cdd9076a145a95c21538eedb3f728a897480c5de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Tue, 7 Oct 2014 13:22:41 +0100
4Subject: Restore TCP wrappers support
5
6Support for TCP wrappers was dropped in OpenSSH 6.7. See this message
7and thread:
8
9 https://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/2014-April/032497.html
10
11It is true that this reduces preauth attack surface in sshd. On the
12other hand, this support seems to be quite widely used, and abruptly
13dropping it (from the perspective of users who don't read
14openssh-unix-dev) could easily cause more serious problems in practice.
15
16It's not entirely clear what the right long-term answer for Debian is,
17but it at least probably doesn't involve dropping this feature shortly
18before a freeze.
19
20Forwarded: not-needed
21Last-Update: 2014-10-07
22
23Patch-Name: restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
24---
25 configure.ac | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
26 sshd.8 | 7 +++++++
27 sshd.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
28 3 files changed, 89 insertions(+)
29
30diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
31index 84bfad8c..3b30736b 100644
32--- a/configure.ac
33+++ b/configure.ac
34@@ -1503,6 +1503,62 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([skey],
35 ]
36 )
37
38+# Check whether user wants TCP wrappers support
39+TCPW_MSG="no"
40+AC_ARG_WITH([tcp-wrappers],
41+ [ --with-tcp-wrappers[[=PATH]] Enable tcpwrappers support (optionally in PATH)],
42+ [
43+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
44+ saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
45+ saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
46+ saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
47+ if test -n "${withval}" && \
48+ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
49+ if test -d "${withval}/lib"; then
50+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
51+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
52+ else
53+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
54+ fi
55+ else
56+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
57+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
58+ else
59+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
60+ fi
61+ fi
62+ if test -d "${withval}/include"; then
63+ CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
64+ else
65+ CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
66+ fi
67+ fi
68+ LIBS="-lwrap $LIBS"
69+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libwrap])
70+ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
71+#include <sys/types.h>
72+#include <sys/socket.h>
73+#include <netinet/in.h>
74+#include <tcpd.h>
75+int deny_severity = 0, allow_severity = 0;
76+ ]], [[
77+ hosts_access(0);
78+ ]])], [
79+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
80+ AC_DEFINE([LIBWRAP], [1],
81+ [Define if you want
82+ TCP Wrappers support])
83+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lwrap"
84+ TCPW_MSG="yes"
85+ ], [
86+ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libwrap missing])
87+
88+ ])
89+ LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
90+ fi
91+ ]
92+)
93+
94 # Check whether user wants to use ldns
95 LDNS_MSG="no"
96 AC_ARG_WITH(ldns,
97@@ -5133,6 +5189,7 @@ echo " KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG"
98 echo " SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
99 echo " Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG"
100 echo " S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"
101+echo " TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG"
102 echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
103 echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
104 echo " libldns support: $LDNS_MSG"
105diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
106index a4201146..2ed523a2 100644
107--- a/sshd.8
108+++ b/sshd.8
109@@ -839,6 +839,12 @@ the user's home directory becomes accessible.
110 This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be
111 readable by anyone else.
112 .Pp
113+.It Pa /etc/hosts.allow
114+.It Pa /etc/hosts.deny
115+Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are defined here.
116+Further details are described in
117+.Xr hosts_access 5 .
118+.Pp
119 .It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
120 This file is for host-based authentication (see
121 .Xr ssh 1 ) .
122@@ -943,6 +949,7 @@ The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
123 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
124 .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
125 .Xr chroot 2 ,
126+.Xr hosts_access 5 ,
127 .Xr login.conf 5 ,
128 .Xr moduli 5 ,
129 .Xr sshd_config 5 ,
130diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
131index 45e50fac..a66e9ca6 100644
132--- a/sshd.c
133+++ b/sshd.c
134@@ -126,6 +126,13 @@
135 #include <Security/AuthSession.h>
136 #endif
137
138+#ifdef LIBWRAP
139+#include <tcpd.h>
140+#include <syslog.h>
141+int allow_severity;
142+int deny_severity;
143+#endif /* LIBWRAP */
144+
145 /* Re-exec fds */
146 #define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
147 #define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
148@@ -1987,6 +1994,24 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
149 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
150 audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
151 #endif
152+#ifdef LIBWRAP
153+ allow_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_INFO;
154+ deny_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_WARNING;
155+ /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */
156+ if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
157+ struct request_info req;
158+
159+ request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0);
160+ fromhost(&req);
161+
162+ if (!hosts_access(&req)) {
163+ debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper");
164+ refuse(&req);
165+ /* NOTREACHED */
166+ fatal("libwrap refuse returns");
167+ }
168+ }
169+#endif /* LIBWRAP */
170
171 /* Log the connection. */
172 laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock_in);
diff --git a/debian/patches/scp-quoting.patch b/debian/patches/scp-quoting.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..43153ec04
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/scp-quoting.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
1From ef7aa8189491e0b43f14f7f15fb5e66903f7e185 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: =?UTF-8?q?Nicolas=20Valc=C3=A1rcel?= <nvalcarcel@ubuntu.com>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:59 +0000
4Subject: Adjust scp quoting in verbose mode
5
6Tweak scp's reporting of filenames in verbose mode to be a bit less
7confusing with spaces.
8
9This should be revised to mimic real shell quoting.
10
11Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/89945
12Last-Update: 2010-02-27
13
14Patch-Name: scp-quoting.patch
15---
16 scp.c | 12 ++++++++++--
17 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
18
19diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
20index a533eb09..12e3199d 100644
21--- a/scp.c
22+++ b/scp.c
23@@ -194,8 +194,16 @@ do_local_cmd(arglist *a)
24
25 if (verbose_mode) {
26 fprintf(stderr, "Executing:");
27- for (i = 0; i < a->num; i++)
28- fmprintf(stderr, " %s", a->list[i]);
29+ for (i = 0; i < a->num; i++) {
30+ if (i == 0)
31+ fmprintf(stderr, " %s", a->list[i]);
32+ else
33+ /*
34+ * TODO: misbehaves if a->list[i] contains a
35+ * single quote
36+ */
37+ fmprintf(stderr, " '%s'", a->list[i]);
38+ }
39 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
40 }
41 if ((pid = fork()) == -1)
diff --git a/debian/patches/seccomp-getuid-geteuid.patch b/debian/patches/seccomp-getuid-geteuid.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..41455aa83
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/seccomp-getuid-geteuid.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
1From 8165600205696cca8a080a5cb6746070512174e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
3Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 13:31:05 -0300
4Subject: Allow getuid and geteuid calls
5
6getuid and geteuid are needed when using an openssl engine that calls a
7crypto card, e.g. ICA (libica).
8Those syscalls are also needed by the distros for audit code.
9
10Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
11
12Origin: other, https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2752
13Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2752
14Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1686618
15Last-Update: 2017-08-28
16
17Patch-Name: seccomp-getuid-geteuid.patch
18---
19 sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 12 ++++++++++++
20 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
21
22diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
23index 6e7de311..e86aa2c9 100644
24--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
25+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
26@@ -175,6 +175,18 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
27 #ifdef __NR_getpid
28 SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid),
29 #endif
30+#ifdef __NR_getuid
31+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
32+#endif
33+#ifdef __NR_getuid32
34+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32),
35+#endif
36+#ifdef __NR_geteuid
37+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid),
38+#endif
39+#ifdef __NR_geteuid32
40+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
41+#endif
42 #ifdef __NR_getrandom
43 SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
44 #endif
diff --git a/debian/patches/seccomp-s390-flock-ipc.patch b/debian/patches/seccomp-s390-flock-ipc.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5fb94137d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/seccomp-s390-flock-ipc.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
1From a5a99443e190a90eb511215aa7c1fa940f79b901 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
3Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 10:53:04 -0300
4Subject: Allow flock and ipc syscall for s390 architecture
5
6In order to use the OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11 engine it is needed to allow flock
7and ipc calls, because this engine calls OpenCryptoki (a PKCS#11
8implementation) which calls the libraries that will communicate with the
9crypto cards. OpenCryptoki makes use of flock and ipc and, as of now,
10this is only need on s390 architecture.
11
12Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
13
14Origin: other, https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2752
15Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2752
16Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1686618
17Last-Update: 2017-08-28
18
19Patch-Name: seccomp-s390-flock-ipc.patch
20---
21 sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 6 ++++++
22 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
23
24diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
25index ca75cc71..6e7de311 100644
26--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
27+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
28@@ -166,6 +166,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
29 #ifdef __NR_exit_group
30 SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group),
31 #endif
32+#if defined(__NR_flock) && defined(__s390__)
33+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_flock),
34+#endif
35 #ifdef __NR_getpgid
36 SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpgid),
37 #endif
38@@ -178,6 +181,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
39 #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
40 SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday),
41 #endif
42+#if defined(__NR_ipc) && defined(__s390__)
43+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_ipc),
44+#endif
45 #ifdef __NR_madvise
46 SC_ALLOW(__NR_madvise),
47 #endif
diff --git a/debian/patches/seccomp-s390-ioctl-ep11-crypto.patch b/debian/patches/seccomp-s390-ioctl-ep11-crypto.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..595b3d6ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/seccomp-s390-ioctl-ep11-crypto.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
1From 801a62eedaaf47b20dbf4b426dc3e084bf0c8d49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
3Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 13:33:30 -0300
4Subject: Enable specific ioctl call for EP11 crypto card (s390)
5
6The EP11 crypto card needs to make an ioctl call, which receives an
7specific argument. This crypto card is for s390 only.
8
9Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
10
11Origin: other, https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2752
12Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2752
13Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1686618
14Last-Update: 2017-08-28
15
16Patch-Name: seccomp-s390-ioctl-ep11-crypto.patch
17---
18 sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 2 ++
19 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
20
21diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
22index e86aa2c9..98062f15 100644
23--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
24+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
25@@ -250,6 +250,8 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
26 SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK),
27 SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO),
28 SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT),
29+ /* Allow ioctls for EP11 crypto card on s390 */
30+ SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSENDEP11CPRB),
31 #endif
32 #if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__) && defined(__X32_SYSCALL_BIT)
33 /*
diff --git a/debian/patches/selinux-role.patch b/debian/patches/selinux-role.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1402b9025
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/selinux-role.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,473 @@
1From 4b276122c04aed0726803a92c8ca955e614a4d3a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Manoj Srivastava <srivasta@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:49 +0000
4Subject: Handle SELinux authorisation roles
5
6Rejected upstream due to discomfort with magic usernames; a better approach
7will need an SSH protocol change. In the meantime, this came from Debian's
8SELinux maintainer, so we'll keep it until we have something better.
9
10Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1641
11Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/394795
12Last-Update: 2017-10-04
13
14Patch-Name: selinux-role.patch
15---
16 auth.h | 1 +
17 auth2.c | 10 ++++++++--
18 monitor.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
19 monitor.h | 2 ++
20 monitor_wrap.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++--
21 monitor_wrap.h | 3 ++-
22 openbsd-compat/port-linux.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++-------
23 openbsd-compat/port-linux.h | 4 ++--
24 platform.c | 4 ++--
25 platform.h | 2 +-
26 session.c | 10 +++++-----
27 session.h | 2 +-
28 sshd.c | 2 +-
29 sshpty.c | 4 ++--
30 sshpty.h | 2 +-
31 15 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
32
33diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
34index 29835ae9..27a1a88e 100644
35--- a/auth.h
36+++ b/auth.h
37@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
38 char *service;
39 struct passwd *pw; /* set if 'valid' */
40 char *style;
41+ char *role;
42
43 /* Method lists for multiple authentication */
44 char **auth_methods; /* modified from server config */
45diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
46index 54070e3a..1f9ec632 100644
47--- a/auth2.c
48+++ b/auth2.c
49@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
50 {
51 Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
52 Authmethod *m = NULL;
53- char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL;
54+ char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL, *role = NULL;
55 int authenticated = 0;
56
57 if (authctxt == NULL)
58@@ -233,8 +233,13 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
59 debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
60 debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
61
62+ if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
63+ *role++ = 0;
64+
65 if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
66 *style++ = 0;
67+ else if (role && (style = strchr(role, ':')) != NULL)
68+ *style++ = '\0';
69
70 if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) {
71 /* setup auth context */
72@@ -261,8 +266,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
73 use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
74 authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
75 authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
76+ authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
77 if (use_privsep)
78- mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
79+ mm_inform_authserv(service, style, role);
80 userauth_banner();
81 if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
82 packet_disconnect("no authentication methods enabled");
83diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
84index cabfeb8a..510e3496 100644
85--- a/monitor.c
86+++ b/monitor.c
87@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
88 int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
89 int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
90 int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
91+int mm_answer_authrole(int, Buffer *);
92 int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
93 int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
94 int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
95@@ -204,6 +205,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
96 {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
97 {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
98 {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
99+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole},
100 {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
101 {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
102 #ifdef USE_PAM
103@@ -799,6 +801,7 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
104
105 /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
106 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
107+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1);
108 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
109
110 #ifdef USE_PAM
111@@ -829,14 +832,37 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
112
113 authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
114 authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
115- debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
116- __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
117+ authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
118+ debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s, role=%s",
119+ __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style, authctxt->role);
120
121 if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
122 free(authctxt->style);
123 authctxt->style = NULL;
124 }
125
126+ if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
127+ free(authctxt->role);
128+ authctxt->role = NULL;
129+ }
130+
131+ return (0);
132+}
133+
134+int
135+mm_answer_authrole(int sock, Buffer *m)
136+{
137+ monitor_permit_authentications(1);
138+
139+ authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
140+ debug3("%s: role=%s",
141+ __func__, authctxt->role);
142+
143+ if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
144+ free(authctxt->role);
145+ authctxt->role = NULL;
146+ }
147+
148 return (0);
149 }
150
151@@ -1471,7 +1497,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
152 res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
153 if (res == 0)
154 goto error;
155- pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
156+ pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty, authctxt->role);
157
158 buffer_put_int(m, 1);
159 buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
160diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
161index ec41404c..4c7955d7 100644
162--- a/monitor.h
163+++ b/monitor.h
164@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
165 MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151,
166 MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153,
167
168+ MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 154,
169+
170 };
171
172 struct monitor {
173diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
174index 0e171a6a..d806bb2e 100644
175--- a/monitor_wrap.c
176+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
177@@ -336,10 +336,10 @@ mm_auth2_read_banner(void)
178 return (banner);
179 }
180
181-/* Inform the privileged process about service and style */
182+/* Inform the privileged process about service, style, and role */
183
184 void
185-mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
186+mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style, char *role)
187 {
188 Buffer m;
189
190@@ -348,12 +348,30 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
191 buffer_init(&m);
192 buffer_put_cstring(&m, service);
193 buffer_put_cstring(&m, style ? style : "");
194+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : "");
195
196 mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, &m);
197
198 buffer_free(&m);
199 }
200
201+/* Inform the privileged process about role */
202+
203+void
204+mm_inform_authrole(char *role)
205+{
206+ Buffer m;
207+
208+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
209+
210+ buffer_init(&m);
211+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : "");
212+
213+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, &m);
214+
215+ buffer_free(&m);
216+}
217+
218 /* Do the password authentication */
219 int
220 mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password)
221diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
222index 7b2e8945..a9ccb243 100644
223--- a/monitor_wrap.h
224+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
225@@ -41,7 +41,8 @@ int mm_is_monitor(void);
226 DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
227 int mm_key_sign(struct sshkey *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int,
228 const char *);
229-void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
230+void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *, char *);
231+void mm_inform_authrole(char *);
232 struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *);
233 char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
234 int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *);
235diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
236index e4c5d1b7..e26faf08 100644
237--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
238+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
239@@ -27,6 +27,12 @@
240 #include <string.h>
241 #include <stdio.h>
242
243+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
244+#include "key.h"
245+#include "hostfile.h"
246+#include "auth.h"
247+#endif
248+
249 #include "log.h"
250 #include "xmalloc.h"
251 #include "port-linux.h"
252@@ -56,7 +62,7 @@ ssh_selinux_enabled(void)
253
254 /* Return the default security context for the given username */
255 static security_context_t
256-ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
257+ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, const char *role)
258 {
259 security_context_t sc = NULL;
260 char *sename = NULL, *lvl = NULL;
261@@ -71,9 +77,16 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
262 #endif
263
264 #ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
265- r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
266+ if (role != NULL && role[0])
267+ r = get_default_context_with_rolelevel(sename, role, lvl, NULL,
268+ &sc);
269+ else
270+ r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
271 #else
272- r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
273+ if (role != NULL && role[0])
274+ r = get_default_context_with_role(sename, role, NULL, &sc);
275+ else
276+ r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
277 #endif
278
279 if (r != 0) {
280@@ -103,7 +116,7 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
281
282 /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
283 void
284-ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
285+ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname, const char *role)
286 {
287 security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
288
289@@ -112,7 +125,7 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
290
291 debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
292
293- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
294+ user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, role);
295 if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
296 switch (security_getenforce()) {
297 case -1:
298@@ -134,7 +147,7 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
299
300 /* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
301 void
302-ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
303+ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty, const char *role)
304 {
305 security_context_t new_tty_ctx = NULL;
306 security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
307@@ -145,7 +158,7 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
308
309 debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
310
311- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
312+ user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, role);
313
314 /* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
315
316diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
317index 3c22a854..c8812942 100644
318--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
319+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
320@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@
321
322 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
323 int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
324-void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
325-void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
326+void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *, const char *);
327+void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *, const char *);
328 void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
329 void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
330 #endif
331diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
332index 18c7751d..380ee3a4 100644
333--- a/platform.c
334+++ b/platform.c
335@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
336 * called if sshd is running as root.
337 */
338 void
339-platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
340+platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw, const char *role)
341 {
342 #if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(USE_PAM)
343 /*
344@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
345 }
346 #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
347 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
348- ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
349+ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name, role);
350 #endif
351 }
352
353diff --git a/platform.h b/platform.h
354index ea4f9c58..60d72ffe 100644
355--- a/platform.h
356+++ b/platform.h
357@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ void platform_post_fork_parent(pid_t child_pid);
358 void platform_post_fork_child(void);
359 int platform_privileged_uidswap(void);
360 void platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
361-void platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *);
362+void platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *, const char *);
363 char *platform_get_krb5_client(const char *);
364 char *platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *);
365 int platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t);
366diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
367index 4bccb62d..d40afe4f 100644
368--- a/session.c
369+++ b/session.c
370@@ -1312,7 +1312,7 @@ safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid)
371
372 /* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */
373 void
374-do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
375+do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw, const char *role)
376 {
377 char *chroot_path, *tmp;
378
379@@ -1340,7 +1340,7 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
380 endgrent();
381 #endif
382
383- platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw);
384+ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw, role);
385
386 if (!in_chroot && options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
387 strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
388@@ -1477,7 +1477,7 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
389
390 /* Force a password change */
391 if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
392- do_setusercontext(pw);
393+ do_setusercontext(pw, s->authctxt->role);
394 child_close_fds(ssh);
395 do_pwchange(s);
396 exit(1);
397@@ -1499,7 +1499,7 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
398 /* When PAM is enabled we rely on it to do the nologin check */
399 if (!options.use_pam)
400 do_nologin(pw);
401- do_setusercontext(pw);
402+ do_setusercontext(pw, s->authctxt->role);
403 /*
404 * PAM session modules in do_setusercontext may have
405 * generated messages, so if this in an interactive
406@@ -1891,7 +1891,7 @@ session_pty_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
407 tty_parse_modes(s->ttyfd, &n_bytes);
408
409 if (!use_privsep)
410- pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty);
411+ pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty, s->authctxt->role);
412
413 /* Set window size from the packet. */
414 pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
415diff --git a/session.h b/session.h
416index 54dd1f0c..8535ebce 100644
417--- a/session.h
418+++ b/session.h
419@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *);
420 Session *session_new(void);
421 Session *session_by_tty(char *);
422 void session_close(struct ssh *, Session *);
423-void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
424+void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *, const char *);
425
426 const char *session_get_remote_name_or_ip(struct ssh *, u_int, int);
427
428diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
429index a66e9ca6..af1ec337 100644
430--- a/sshd.c
431+++ b/sshd.c
432@@ -677,7 +677,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
433 reseed_prngs();
434
435 /* Drop privileges */
436- do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
437+ do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw, authctxt->role);
438
439 skip:
440 /* It is safe now to apply the key state */
441diff --git a/sshpty.c b/sshpty.c
442index fe2fb5aa..feb22b06 100644
443--- a/sshpty.c
444+++ b/sshpty.c
445@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ pty_change_window_size(int ptyfd, u_int row, u_int col,
446 }
447
448 void
449-pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty)
450+pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty, const char *role)
451 {
452 struct group *grp;
453 gid_t gid;
454@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty)
455 strerror(errno));
456
457 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
458- ssh_selinux_setup_pty(pw->pw_name, tty);
459+ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(pw->pw_name, tty, role);
460 #endif
461
462 if (st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid || st.st_gid != gid) {
463diff --git a/sshpty.h b/sshpty.h
464index 9ec7e9a1..de7e000a 100644
465--- a/sshpty.h
466+++ b/sshpty.h
467@@ -24,5 +24,5 @@ int pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
468 void pty_release(const char *);
469 void pty_make_controlling_tty(int *, const char *);
470 void pty_change_window_size(int, u_int, u_int, u_int, u_int);
471-void pty_setowner(struct passwd *, const char *);
472+void pty_setowner(struct passwd *, const char *, const char *);
473 void disconnect_controlling_tty(void);
diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..01aa2c87c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/series
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
1gssapi.patch
2restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
3selinux-role.patch
4ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch
5keepalive-extensions.patch
6syslog-level-silent.patch
7user-group-modes.patch
8scp-quoting.patch
9shell-path.patch
10dnssec-sshfp.patch
11auth-log-verbosity.patch
12mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch
13package-versioning.patch
14debian-banner.patch
15authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
16openbsd-docs.patch
17ssh-argv0.patch
18doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
19ssh-agent-setgid.patch
20no-openssl-version-status.patch
21gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
22systemd-readiness.patch
23debian-config.patch
24no-dsa-host-key-by-default.patch
25restore-authorized_keys2.patch
26seccomp-s390-flock-ipc.patch
27seccomp-getuid-geteuid.patch
28seccomp-s390-ioctl-ep11-crypto.patch
29permitopen-argument-handling.patch
30fix-regress-putty-transfer.patch
diff --git a/debian/patches/shell-path.patch b/debian/patches/shell-path.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..29abf10f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/shell-path.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
1From c239ba6fa4560704a237779f82445d5f125847e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:00 +0000
4Subject: Look for $SHELL on the path for ProxyCommand/LocalCommand
5
6There's some debate on the upstream bug about whether POSIX requires this.
7I (Colin Watson) agree with Vincent and think it does.
8
9Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1494
10Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/492728
11Last-Update: 2013-09-14
12
13Patch-Name: shell-path.patch
14---
15 sshconnect.c | 4 ++--
16 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
17
18diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
19index dc7a704d..5eed5880 100644
20--- a/sshconnect.c
21+++ b/sshconnect.c
22@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ ssh_proxy_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, u_short port,
23 /* Execute the proxy command. Note that we gave up any
24 extra privileges above. */
25 signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
26- execv(argv[0], argv);
27+ execvp(argv[0], argv);
28 perror(argv[0]);
29 exit(1);
30 }
31@@ -1435,7 +1435,7 @@ ssh_local_cmd(const char *args)
32 if (pid == 0) {
33 signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
34 debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args);
35- execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
36+ execlp(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
37 error("Couldn't execute %s -c \"%s\": %s",
38 shell, args, strerror(errno));
39 _exit(1);
diff --git a/debian/patches/ssh-agent-setgid.patch b/debian/patches/ssh-agent-setgid.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9ac4977b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/ssh-agent-setgid.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
1From b37d4f364f9c9bfbaf372e903ebbe80ef8ae2264 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:13 +0000
4Subject: Document consequences of ssh-agent being setgid in ssh-agent(1)
5
6Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/711623
7Forwarded: no
8Last-Update: 2013-06-08
9
10Patch-Name: ssh-agent-setgid.patch
11---
12 ssh-agent.1 | 15 +++++++++++++++
13 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
14
15diff --git a/ssh-agent.1 b/ssh-agent.1
16index 83b2b41c..7230704a 100644
17--- a/ssh-agent.1
18+++ b/ssh-agent.1
19@@ -206,6 +206,21 @@ environment variable holds the agent's process ID.
20 .Pp
21 The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command
22 line terminates.
23+.Pp
24+In Debian,
25+.Nm
26+is installed with the set-group-id bit set, to prevent
27+.Xr ptrace 2
28+attacks retrieving private key material.
29+This has the side-effect of causing the run-time linker to remove certain
30+environment variables which might have security implications for set-id
31+programs, including
32+.Ev LD_PRELOAD ,
33+.Ev LD_LIBRARY_PATH ,
34+and
35+.Ev TMPDIR .
36+If you need to set any of these environment variables, you will need to do
37+so in the program executed by ssh-agent.
38 .Sh FILES
39 .Bl -tag -width Ds
40 .It Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.<ppid>
diff --git a/debian/patches/ssh-argv0.patch b/debian/patches/ssh-argv0.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3a560ad78
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/ssh-argv0.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
1From 7e5cf5d27a7be47203280c665ca7311269f53671 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:10 +0000
4Subject: ssh(1): Refer to ssh-argv0(1)
5
6Old versions of OpenSSH (up to 2.5 or thereabouts) allowed creating symlinks
7to ssh with the name of the host you want to connect to. Debian ships an
8ssh-argv0 script restoring this feature; this patch refers to its manual
9page from ssh(1).
10
11Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/111341
12Forwarded: not-needed
13Last-Update: 2013-09-14
14
15Patch-Name: ssh-argv0.patch
16---
17 ssh.1 | 1 +
18 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
19
20diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
21index 2a2aab30..711fe608 100644
22--- a/ssh.1
23+++ b/ssh.1
24@@ -1556,6 +1556,7 @@ if an error occurred.
25 .Xr sftp 1 ,
26 .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
27 .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
28+.Xr ssh-argv0 1 ,
29 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
30 .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
31 .Xr tun 4 ,
diff --git a/debian/patches/ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch b/debian/patches/ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ef1ce4e99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
1From 19971fb92159a621b55f0b9da76dd38a56d7247c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@ubuntu.com>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:50 +0000
4Subject: Accept obsolete ssh-vulnkey configuration options
5
6These options were used as part of Debian's response to CVE-2008-0166.
7Nearly six years later, we no longer need to continue carrying the bulk
8of that patch, but we do need to avoid failing when the associated
9configuration options are still present.
10
11Last-Update: 2014-02-09
12
13Patch-Name: ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch
14---
15 readconf.c | 1 +
16 servconf.c | 1 +
17 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
18
19diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
20index 99e03ee1..d2b28a41 100644
21--- a/readconf.c
22+++ b/readconf.c
23@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ static struct {
24 { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
25 { "globalknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated },
26 { "rhostsauthentication", oDeprecated },
27+ { "useblacklistedkeys", oDeprecated },
28 { "userknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated },
29 { "useroaming", oDeprecated },
30 { "usersh", oDeprecated },
31diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
32index 8ba74517..9889fb0a 100644
33--- a/servconf.c
34+++ b/servconf.c
35@@ -525,6 +525,7 @@ static struct {
36 { "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
37 { "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
38 { "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
39+ { "permitblacklistedkeys", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
40 { "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd, SSHCFG_ALL },
41 { "permituserenvironment", sPermitUserEnvironment, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
42 { "uselogin", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
diff --git a/debian/patches/syslog-level-silent.patch b/debian/patches/syslog-level-silent.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3ed6287a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/syslog-level-silent.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
1From 215bd91f12b0ddb9754483ee6e3c3b4751256dca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Jonathan David Amery <jdamery@ysolde.ucam.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:54 +0000
4Subject: "LogLevel SILENT" compatibility
5
6"LogLevel SILENT" (-qq) was introduced in Debian openssh 1:3.0.1p1-1 to
7match the behaviour of non-free SSH, in which -q does not suppress fatal
8errors. However, this was unintentionally broken in 1:4.6p1-2 and nobody
9complained, so we've dropped most of it. The parts that remain are basic
10configuration file compatibility, and an adjustment to "Pseudo-terminal will
11not be allocated ..." which should be split out into a separate patch.
12
13Author: Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>
14Author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
15Last-Update: 2013-09-14
16
17Patch-Name: syslog-level-silent.patch
18---
19 log.c | 1 +
20 ssh.c | 2 +-
21 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
22
23diff --git a/log.c b/log.c
24index 99450dd1..1559091d 100644
25--- a/log.c
26+++ b/log.c
27@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ static struct {
28 LogLevel val;
29 } log_levels[] =
30 {
31+ { "SILENT", SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET }, /* compatibility */
32 { "QUIET", SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET },
33 { "FATAL", SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL },
34 { "ERROR", SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR },
35diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
36index ae37432b..9cb21171 100644
37--- a/ssh.c
38+++ b/ssh.c
39@@ -1166,7 +1166,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
40 /* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */
41 if ((!isatty(fileno(stdin)) || stdin_null_flag) &&
42 options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_FORCE) {
43- if (tty_flag)
44+ if (tty_flag && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
45 logit("Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because "
46 "stdin is not a terminal.");
47 tty_flag = 0;
diff --git a/debian/patches/systemd-readiness.patch b/debian/patches/systemd-readiness.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..537a5cab6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/systemd-readiness.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
1From ba3f6b85ede72ef42987f0069f5ed2b88ebe69fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Michael Biebl <biebl@debian.org>
3Date: Mon, 21 Dec 2015 16:08:47 +0000
4Subject: Add systemd readiness notification support
5
6Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/778913
7Forwarded: no
8Last-Update: 2017-08-22
9
10Patch-Name: systemd-readiness.patch
11---
12 configure.ac | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
13 sshd.c | 9 +++++++++
14 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+)
15
16diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
17index 3b30736b..483a9038 100644
18--- a/configure.ac
19+++ b/configure.ac
20@@ -4389,6 +4389,29 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
21 AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
22 AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
23
24+# Check whether user wants systemd support
25+SYSTEMD_MSG="no"
26+AC_ARG_WITH(systemd,
27+ [ --with-systemd Enable systemd support],
28+ [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
29+ AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
30+ if test "$PKGCONFIG" != "no"; then
31+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libsystemd])
32+ if $PKGCONFIG --exists libsystemd; then
33+ SYSTEMD_CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags libsystemd`
34+ SYSTEMD_LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libsystemd`
35+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $SYSTEMD_CFLAGS"
36+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $SYSTEMD_LIBS"
37+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
38+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYSTEMD, 1, [Define if you want systemd support.])
39+ SYSTEMD_MSG="yes"
40+ else
41+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
42+ fi
43+ fi
44+ fi ]
45+)
46+
47 # Looking for programs, paths and files
48
49 PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
50@@ -5196,6 +5219,7 @@ echo " libldns support: $LDNS_MSG"
51 echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
52 echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
53 echo " Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
54+echo " systemd support: $SYSTEMD_MSG"
55 echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
56 echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
57 echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
58diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
59index a5a1193d..1fde5a63 100644
60--- a/sshd.c
61+++ b/sshd.c
62@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@
63 #include <prot.h>
64 #endif
65
66+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
67+#include <systemd/sd-daemon.h>
68+#endif
69+
70 #include "xmalloc.h"
71 #include "ssh.h"
72 #include "ssh2.h"
73@@ -1881,6 +1885,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
74 }
75 }
76
77+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
78+ /* Signal systemd that we are ready to accept connections */
79+ sd_notify(0, "READY=1");
80+#endif
81+
82 /* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
83 server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
84 &newsock, config_s);
diff --git a/debian/patches/user-group-modes.patch b/debian/patches/user-group-modes.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..338c7567d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/user-group-modes.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
1From b1033fed87fd9fa24dccab45f00cadcbc7144c47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:58 +0000
4Subject: Allow harmless group-writability
5
6Allow secure files (~/.ssh/config, ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, etc.) to be
7group-writable, provided that the group in question contains only the file's
8owner. Rejected upstream for IMO incorrect reasons (e.g. a misunderstanding
9about the contents of gr->gr_mem). Given that per-user groups and umask 002
10are the default setup in Debian (for good reasons - this makes operating in
11setgid directories with other groups much easier), we need to permit this by
12default.
13
14Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1060
15Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=314347
16Last-Update: 2017-10-04
17
18Patch-Name: user-group-modes.patch
19---
20 auth-rhosts.c | 6 ++----
21 auth.c | 3 +--
22 misc.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
23 misc.h | 2 ++
24 readconf.c | 3 +--
25 ssh.1 | 2 ++
26 ssh_config.5 | 2 ++
27 7 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
28
29diff --git a/auth-rhosts.c b/auth-rhosts.c
30index ecf956f0..4dccd5e6 100644
31--- a/auth-rhosts.c
32+++ b/auth-rhosts.c
33@@ -261,8 +261,7 @@ auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
34 return 0;
35 }
36 if (options.strict_modes &&
37- ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
38- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
39+ !secure_permissions(&st, pw->pw_uid)) {
40 logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
41 "bad ownership or modes for home directory.", pw->pw_name);
42 auth_debug_add("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
43@@ -288,8 +287,7 @@ auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
44 * allowing access to their account by anyone.
45 */
46 if (options.strict_modes &&
47- ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
48- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
49+ !secure_permissions(&st, pw->pw_uid)) {
50 logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: bad modes for %.200s",
51 pw->pw_name, buf);
52 auth_debug_add("Bad file modes for %.200s", buf);
53diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
54index 6aec3605..68a1e4a7 100644
55--- a/auth.c
56+++ b/auth.c
57@@ -467,8 +467,7 @@ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, const char *host,
58 user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
59 if (options.strict_modes &&
60 (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
61- ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
62- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
63+ !secure_permissions(&st, pw->pw_uid)) {
64 logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
65 "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
66 pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
67diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
68index 05950a47..40aeeef3 100644
69--- a/misc.c
70+++ b/misc.c
71@@ -57,8 +57,9 @@
72 #include <netdb.h>
73 #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
74 # include <paths.h>
75-#include <pwd.h>
76 #endif
77+#include <pwd.h>
78+#include <grp.h>
79 #ifdef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD
80 #include <net/if.h>
81 #endif
82@@ -723,6 +724,55 @@ read_keyfile_line(FILE *f, const char *filename, char *buf, size_t bufsz,
83 return -1;
84 }
85
86+int
87+secure_permissions(struct stat *st, uid_t uid)
88+{
89+ if (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st->st_uid) && st->st_uid != uid)
90+ return 0;
91+ if ((st->st_mode & 002) != 0)
92+ return 0;
93+ if ((st->st_mode & 020) != 0) {
94+ /* If the file is group-writable, the group in question must
95+ * have exactly one member, namely the file's owner.
96+ * (Zero-member groups are typically used by setgid
97+ * binaries, and are unlikely to be suitable.)
98+ */
99+ struct passwd *pw;
100+ struct group *gr;
101+ int members = 0;
102+
103+ gr = getgrgid(st->st_gid);
104+ if (!gr)
105+ return 0;
106+
107+ /* Check primary group memberships. */
108+ while ((pw = getpwent()) != NULL) {
109+ if (pw->pw_gid == gr->gr_gid) {
110+ ++members;
111+ if (pw->pw_uid != uid)
112+ return 0;
113+ }
114+ }
115+ endpwent();
116+
117+ pw = getpwuid(st->st_uid);
118+ if (!pw)
119+ return 0;
120+
121+ /* Check supplementary group memberships. */
122+ if (gr->gr_mem[0]) {
123+ ++members;
124+ if (strcmp(pw->pw_name, gr->gr_mem[0]) ||
125+ gr->gr_mem[1])
126+ return 0;
127+ }
128+
129+ if (!members)
130+ return 0;
131+ }
132+ return 1;
133+}
134+
135 int
136 tun_open(int tun, int mode)
137 {
138@@ -1626,8 +1676,7 @@ safe_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
139 snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf);
140 return -1;
141 }
142- if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) ||
143- (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) {
144+ if (!secure_permissions(stp, uid)) {
145 snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
146 buf);
147 return -1;
148@@ -1642,8 +1691,7 @@ safe_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
149 strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
150
151 if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
152- (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) ||
153- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
154+ !secure_permissions(&st, uid)) {
155 snprintf(err, errlen,
156 "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
157 return -1;
158diff --git a/misc.h b/misc.h
159index 153d1137..d8759ab1 100644
160--- a/misc.h
161+++ b/misc.h
162@@ -163,6 +163,8 @@ char *read_passphrase(const char *, int);
163 int ask_permission(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
164 int read_keyfile_line(FILE *, const char *, char *, size_t, u_long *);
165
166+int secure_permissions(struct stat *st, uid_t uid);
167+
168 #define MINIMUM(a, b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b))
169 #define MAXIMUM(a, b) (((a) > (b)) ? (a) : (b))
170 #define ROUNDUP(x, y) ((((x)+((y)-1))/(y))*(y))
171diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
172index 45caa095..be3d5873 100644
173--- a/readconf.c
174+++ b/readconf.c
175@@ -1766,8 +1766,7 @@ read_config_file_depth(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw,
176
177 if (fstat(fileno(f), &sb) == -1)
178 fatal("fstat %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno));
179- if (((sb.st_uid != 0 && sb.st_uid != getuid()) ||
180- (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0))
181+ if (!secure_permissions(&sb, getuid()))
182 fatal("Bad owner or permissions on %s", filename);
183 }
184
185diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
186index 2ab1697f..3cc94688 100644
187--- a/ssh.1
188+++ b/ssh.1
189@@ -1456,6 +1456,8 @@ The file format and configuration options are described in
190 .Xr ssh_config 5 .
191 Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
192 read/write for the user, and not writable by others.
193+It may be group-writable provided that the group in question contains only
194+the user.
195 .Pp
196 .It Pa ~/.ssh/environment
197 Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see
198diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
199index d6f43c2d..7810a418 100644
200--- a/ssh_config.5
201+++ b/ssh_config.5
202@@ -1786,6 +1786,8 @@ The format of this file is described above.
203 This file is used by the SSH client.
204 Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
205 read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
206+It may be group-writable provided that the group in question contains only
207+the user.
208 .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
209 Systemwide configuration file.
210 This file provides defaults for those
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-14 13:40:07 +0000