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-rw-r--r--debian/patches/auth-log-verbosity.patch133
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch26
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/debian-banner.patch111
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/debian-config.patch181
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/dnssec-sshfp.patch94
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/doc-hash-tab-completion.patch28
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/doc-upstart.patch29
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch26
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/gssapi.patch3022
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/helpful-wait-terminate.patch26
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/keepalive-extensions.patch135
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/lintian-symlink-pickiness.patch32
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch42
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/no-openssl-version-status.patch62
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/openbsd-docs.patch148
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/package-versioning.patch65
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/quieter-signals.patch40
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/restore-tcp-wrappers.patch172
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/scp-quoting.patch41
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/selinux-role.patch504
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/series28
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/shell-path.patch39
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/sigstop.patch35
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/ssh-agent-setgid.patch40
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/ssh-argv0.patch31
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch42
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/ssh1-keepalive.patch74
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/syslog-level-silent.patch47
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/user-group-modes.patch266
29 files changed, 5519 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/debian/patches/auth-log-verbosity.patch b/debian/patches/auth-log-verbosity.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e5cbafbfe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/auth-log-verbosity.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
1From 36dac160eeb9000539ca78f9734bb220258df146 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:02 +0000
4Subject: Quieten logs when multiple from= restrictions are used
5
6Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/630606
7Forwarded: no
8Last-Update: 2013-09-14
9
10Patch-Name: auth-log-verbosity.patch
11---
12 auth-options.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
13 auth-options.h | 1 +
14 auth-rsa.c | 2 ++
15 auth2-pubkey.c | 3 +++
16 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
17
18diff --git a/auth-options.c b/auth-options.c
19index e387697..f1e3ddf 100644
20--- a/auth-options.c
21+++ b/auth-options.c
22@@ -58,9 +58,20 @@ int forced_tun_device = -1;
23 /* "principals=" option. */
24 char *authorized_principals = NULL;
25
26+/* Throttle log messages. */
27+int logged_from_hostip = 0;
28+int logged_cert_hostip = 0;
29+
30 extern ServerOptions options;
31
32 void
33+auth_start_parse_options(void)
34+{
35+ logged_from_hostip = 0;
36+ logged_cert_hostip = 0;
37+}
38+
39+void
40 auth_clear_options(void)
41 {
42 no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
43@@ -293,10 +304,13 @@ auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum)
44 /* FALLTHROUGH */
45 case 0:
46 free(patterns);
47- logit("Authentication tried for %.100s with "
48- "correct key but not from a permitted "
49- "host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s).",
50- pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip);
51+ if (!logged_from_hostip) {
52+ logit("Authentication tried for %.100s with "
53+ "correct key but not from a permitted "
54+ "host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s).",
55+ pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip);
56+ logged_from_hostip = 1;
57+ }
58 auth_debug_add("Your host '%.200s' is not "
59 "permitted to use this key for login.",
60 remote_host);
61@@ -519,11 +533,14 @@ parse_option_list(struct sshbuf *oblob, struct passwd *pw,
62 break;
63 case 0:
64 /* no match */
65- logit("Authentication tried for %.100s "
66- "with valid certificate but not "
67- "from a permitted host "
68- "(ip=%.200s).", pw->pw_name,
69- remote_ip);
70+ if (!logged_cert_hostip) {
71+ logit("Authentication tried for %.100s "
72+ "with valid certificate but not "
73+ "from a permitted host "
74+ "(ip=%.200s).", pw->pw_name,
75+ remote_ip);
76+ logged_cert_hostip = 1;
77+ }
78 auth_debug_add("Your address '%.200s' "
79 "is not permitted to use this "
80 "certificate for login.",
81diff --git a/auth-options.h b/auth-options.h
82index 34852e5..1653855 100644
83--- a/auth-options.h
84+++ b/auth-options.h
85@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ extern int forced_tun_device;
86 extern int key_is_cert_authority;
87 extern char *authorized_principals;
88
89+void auth_start_parse_options(void);
90 int auth_parse_options(struct passwd *, char *, char *, u_long);
91 void auth_clear_options(void);
92 int auth_cert_options(struct sshkey *, struct passwd *);
93diff --git a/auth-rsa.c b/auth-rsa.c
94index cbd971b..4cf2163 100644
95--- a/auth-rsa.c
96+++ b/auth-rsa.c
97@@ -181,6 +181,8 @@ rsa_key_allowed_in_file(struct passwd *pw, char *file,
98 if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL)
99 return 0;
100
101+ auth_start_parse_options();
102+
103 /*
104 * Go though the accepted keys, looking for the current key. If
105 * found, perform a challenge-response dialog to verify that the
106diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
107index 5aa319c..1eee161 100644
108--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
109+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
110@@ -561,6 +561,7 @@ process_principals(FILE *f, char *file, struct passwd *pw,
111 u_long linenum = 0;
112 u_int i;
113
114+ auth_start_parse_options();
115 while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
116 /* Skip leading whitespace. */
117 for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
118@@ -726,6 +727,7 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
119 found_key = 0;
120
121 found = NULL;
122+ auth_start_parse_options();
123 while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
124 char *cp, *key_options = NULL;
125 if (found != NULL)
126@@ -872,6 +874,7 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
127 if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1,
128 use_authorized_principals ? NULL : pw->pw_name, &reason) != 0)
129 goto fail_reason;
130+ auth_start_parse_options();
131 if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0)
132 goto out;
133
diff --git a/debian/patches/authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch b/debian/patches/authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b1d1dac27
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
1From ca0198a88f1eaae2962454c228e79437dc6080bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Tomas Pospisek <tpo_deb@sourcepole.ch>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:07 +0000
4Subject: Install authorized_keys(5) as a symlink to sshd(8)
5
6Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1720
7Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/441817
8Last-Update: 2013-09-14
9
10Patch-Name: authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
11---
12 Makefile.in | 1 +
13 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
14
15diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
16index 3d2a328..915c740 100644
17--- a/Makefile.in
18+++ b/Makefile.in
19@@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ install-files:
20 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5
21 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/ssh_config.5
22 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8
23+ ln -s ../$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/authorized_keys.5
24 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
25 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
26 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
diff --git a/debian/patches/debian-banner.patch b/debian/patches/debian-banner.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..59de3b115
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/debian-banner.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
1From e4e2b402150f28abadcd565941ab51c2bcbac8ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Kees Cook <kees@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:06 +0000
4Subject: Add DebianBanner server configuration option
5
6Setting this to "no" causes sshd to omit the Debian revision from its
7initial protocol handshake, for those scared by package-versioning.patch.
8
9Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/562048
10Forwarded: not-needed
11Last-Update: 2015-11-29
12
13Patch-Name: debian-banner.patch
14---
15 servconf.c | 9 +++++++++
16 servconf.h | 2 ++
17 sshd.c | 3 ++-
18 sshd_config.5 | 5 +++++
19 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
20
21diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
22index ed3a88d..a778f44 100644
23--- a/servconf.c
24+++ b/servconf.c
25@@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
26 options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
27 options->version_addendum = NULL;
28 options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
29+ options->debian_banner = -1;
30 }
31
32 /* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */
33@@ -347,6 +348,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
34 options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0;
35 if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1)
36 options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
37+ if (options->debian_banner == -1)
38+ options->debian_banner = 1;
39
40 if (kex_assemble_names(KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, &options->ciphers) != 0 ||
41 kex_assemble_names(KEX_SERVER_MAC, &options->macs) != 0 ||
42@@ -430,6 +433,7 @@ typedef enum {
43 sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC,
44 sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink,
45 sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash,
46+ sDebianBanner,
47 sDeprecated, sUnsupported
48 } ServerOpCodes;
49
50@@ -577,6 +581,7 @@ static struct {
51 { "streamlocalbindunlink", sStreamLocalBindUnlink, SSHCFG_ALL },
52 { "allowstreamlocalforwarding", sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
53 { "fingerprinthash", sFingerprintHash, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
54+ { "debianbanner", sDebianBanner, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
55 { NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
56 };
57
58@@ -1867,6 +1872,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
59 options->fingerprint_hash = value;
60 break;
61
62+ case sDebianBanner:
63+ intptr = &options->debian_banner;
64+ goto parse_int;
65+
66 case sDeprecated:
67 logit("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s",
68 filename, linenum, arg);
69diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
70index 778ba17..161fa37 100644
71--- a/servconf.h
72+++ b/servconf.h
73@@ -197,6 +197,8 @@ typedef struct {
74 char *auth_methods[MAX_AUTH_METHODS];
75
76 int fingerprint_hash;
77+
78+ int debian_banner;
79 } ServerOptions;
80
81 /* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
82diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
83index 0d4fb7f..6024e0e 100644
84--- a/sshd.c
85+++ b/sshd.c
86@@ -443,7 +443,8 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
87 }
88
89 xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s",
90- major, minor, SSH_RELEASE,
91+ major, minor,
92+ options.debian_banner ? SSH_RELEASE : SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM,
93 *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
94 options.version_addendum, newline);
95
96diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
97index c8ee35d..b149bd3 100644
98--- a/sshd_config.5
99+++ b/sshd_config.5
100@@ -533,6 +533,11 @@ or
101 .Dq no .
102 The default is
103 .Dq delayed .
104+.It Cm DebianBanner
105+Specifies whether the distribution-specified extra version suffix is
106+included during initial protocol handshake.
107+The default is
108+.Dq yes .
109 .It Cm DenyGroups
110 This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated
111 by spaces.
diff --git a/debian/patches/debian-config.patch b/debian/patches/debian-config.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ddc9de44a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/debian-config.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
1From 733c4de05612fe398ac3dc7d31d318d7012fda05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:18 +0000
4Subject: Various Debian-specific configuration changes
5
6ssh: Enable ForwardX11Trusted, returning to earlier semantics which cause
7fewer problems with existing setups (http://bugs.debian.org/237021).
8
9ssh: Set 'SendEnv LANG LC_*' by default (http://bugs.debian.org/264024).
10
11ssh: Enable HashKnownHosts by default to try to limit the spread of ssh
12worms.
13
14ssh: Enable GSSAPIAuthentication and disable GSSAPIDelegateCredentials by
15default.
16
17Document all of this, along with several sshd defaults set in
18debian/openssh-server.postinst.
19
20Author: Russ Allbery <rra@debian.org>
21Forwarded: not-needed
22Last-Update: 2015-11-29
23
24Patch-Name: debian-config.patch
25---
26 readconf.c | 2 +-
27 ssh.1 | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
28 ssh_config | 7 ++++++-
29 ssh_config.5 | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
30 sshd_config.5 | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
31 5 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
32
33diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
34index c0ba5a7..e4e1cba 100644
35--- a/readconf.c
36+++ b/readconf.c
37@@ -1749,7 +1749,7 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
38 if (options->forward_x11 == -1)
39 options->forward_x11 = 0;
40 if (options->forward_x11_trusted == -1)
41- options->forward_x11_trusted = 0;
42+ options->forward_x11_trusted = 1;
43 if (options->forward_x11_timeout == -1)
44 options->forward_x11_timeout = 1200;
45 if (options->exit_on_forward_failure == -1)
46diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
47index 05b7f10..649d6c3 100644
48--- a/ssh.1
49+++ b/ssh.1
50@@ -755,6 +755,16 @@ directive in
51 .Xr ssh_config 5
52 for more information.
53 .Pp
54+(Debian-specific: X11 forwarding is not subjected to X11 SECURITY extension
55+restrictions by default, because too many programs currently crash in this
56+mode.
57+Set the
58+.Cm ForwardX11Trusted
59+option to
60+.Dq no
61+to restore the upstream behaviour.
62+This may change in future depending on client-side improvements.)
63+.Pp
64 .It Fl x
65 Disables X11 forwarding.
66 .Pp
67@@ -763,6 +773,17 @@ Enables trusted X11 forwarding.
68 Trusted X11 forwardings are not subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension
69 controls.
70 .Pp
71+(Debian-specific: This option does nothing in the default configuration: it
72+is equivalent to
73+.Dq Cm ForwardX11Trusted No yes ,
74+which is the default as described above.
75+Set the
76+.Cm ForwardX11Trusted
77+option to
78+.Dq no
79+to restore the upstream behaviour.
80+This may change in future depending on client-side improvements.)
81+.Pp
82 .It Fl y
83 Send log information using the
84 .Xr syslog 3
85diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
86index 228e5ab..c9386aa 100644
87--- a/ssh_config
88+++ b/ssh_config
89@@ -17,9 +17,10 @@
90 # list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the
91 # ssh_config(5) man page.
92
93-# Host *
94+Host *
95 # ForwardAgent no
96 # ForwardX11 no
97+# ForwardX11Trusted yes
98 # RhostsRSAAuthentication no
99 # RSAAuthentication yes
100 # PasswordAuthentication yes
101@@ -48,3 +49,7 @@
102 # VisualHostKey no
103 # ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
104 # RekeyLimit 1G 1h
105+ SendEnv LANG LC_*
106+ HashKnownHosts yes
107+ GSSAPIAuthentication yes
108+ GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
109diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
110index 680ca17..981197d 100644
111--- a/ssh_config.5
112+++ b/ssh_config.5
113@@ -74,6 +74,22 @@ Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more
114 host-specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the
115 file, and general defaults at the end.
116 .Pp
117+Note that the Debian
118+.Ic openssh-client
119+package sets several options as standard in
120+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
121+which are not the default in
122+.Xr ssh 1 :
123+.Pp
124+.Bl -bullet -offset indent -compact
125+.It
126+.Cm SendEnv No LANG LC_*
127+.It
128+.Cm HashKnownHosts No yes
129+.It
130+.Cm GSSAPIAuthentication No yes
131+.El
132+.Pp
133 The configuration file has the following format:
134 .Pp
135 Empty lines and lines starting with
136@@ -721,7 +737,8 @@ token used for the session will be set to expire after 20 minutes.
137 Remote clients will be refused access after this time.
138 .Pp
139 The default is
140-.Dq no .
141+.Dq yes
142+(Debian-specific).
143 .Pp
144 See the X11 SECURITY extension specification for full details on
145 the restrictions imposed on untrusted clients.
146diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
147index 0828592..0be7250 100644
148--- a/sshd_config.5
149+++ b/sshd_config.5
150@@ -57,6 +57,31 @@ Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes
151 .Pq \&"
152 in order to represent arguments containing spaces.
153 .Pp
154+Note that the Debian
155+.Ic openssh-server
156+package sets several options as standard in
157+.Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
158+which are not the default in
159+.Xr sshd 8 .
160+The exact list depends on whether the package was installed fresh or
161+upgraded from various possible previous versions, but includes at least the
162+following:
163+.Pp
164+.Bl -bullet -offset indent -compact
165+.It
166+.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication No no
167+.It
168+.Cm X11Forwarding No yes
169+.It
170+.Cm PrintMotd No no
171+.It
172+.Cm AcceptEnv No LANG LC_*
173+.It
174+.Cm Subsystem No sftp /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server
175+.It
176+.Cm UsePAM No yes
177+.El
178+.Pp
179 The possible
180 keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
181 keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
diff --git a/debian/patches/dnssec-sshfp.patch b/debian/patches/dnssec-sshfp.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3d4341ff2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/dnssec-sshfp.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
1From a8e8eba67d79734c2f0b85c54aa5d60132b6e2e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:01 +0000
4Subject: Force use of DNSSEC even if "options edns0" isn't in resolv.conf
5
6This allows SSHFP DNS records to be verified if glibc 2.11 is installed.
7
8Origin: vendor, https://cvs.fedoraproject.org/viewvc/F-12/openssh/openssh-5.2p1-edns.patch?revision=1.1&view=markup
9Bug: http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=572049
10Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=572049
11Last-Update: 2010-04-06
12
13Patch-Name: dnssec-sshfp.patch
14---
15 dns.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
16 openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c | 10 +++++-----
17 openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h | 3 +++
18 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
19
20diff --git a/dns.c b/dns.c
21index e813afe..fce2e30 100644
22--- a/dns.c
23+++ b/dns.c
24@@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address,
25 {
26 u_int counter;
27 int result;
28+ unsigned int rrset_flags = 0;
29 struct rrsetinfo *fingerprints = NULL;
30
31 u_int8_t hostkey_algorithm;
32@@ -229,8 +230,19 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address,
33 return -1;
34 }
35
36+ /*
37+ * Original getrrsetbyname function, found on OpenBSD for example,
38+ * doesn't accept any flag and prerequisite for obtaining AD bit in
39+ * DNS response is set by "options edns0" in resolv.conf.
40+ *
41+ * Our version is more clever and use RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 flag.
42+ */
43+#ifndef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME
44+ rrset_flags |= RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0;
45+#endif
46 result = getrrsetbyname(hostname, DNS_RDATACLASS_IN,
47- DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, 0, &fingerprints);
48+ DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, rrset_flags, &fingerprints);
49+
50 if (result) {
51 verbose("DNS lookup error: %s", dns_result_totext(result));
52 return -1;
53diff --git a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
54index dc6fe05..e061a29 100644
55--- a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
56+++ b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
57@@ -209,8 +209,8 @@ getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, unsigned int rdclass,
58 goto fail;
59 }
60
61- /* don't allow flags yet, unimplemented */
62- if (flags) {
63+ /* Allow RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 flag only. */
64+ if ((flags & !RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0) != 0) {
65 result = ERRSET_INVAL;
66 goto fail;
67 }
68@@ -226,9 +226,9 @@ getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, unsigned int rdclass,
69 #endif /* DEBUG */
70
71 #ifdef RES_USE_DNSSEC
72- /* turn on DNSSEC if EDNS0 is configured */
73- if (_resp->options & RES_USE_EDNS0)
74- _resp->options |= RES_USE_DNSSEC;
75+ /* turn on DNSSEC if required */
76+ if (flags & RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0)
77+ _resp->options |= (RES_USE_EDNS0|RES_USE_DNSSEC);
78 #endif /* RES_USE_DNSEC */
79
80 /* make query */
81diff --git a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
82index 1283f55..dbbc85a 100644
83--- a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
84+++ b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
85@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
86 #ifndef RRSET_VALIDATED
87 # define RRSET_VALIDATED 1
88 #endif
89+#ifndef RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0
90+# define RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 0x0001
91+#endif
92
93 /*
94 * Return codes for getrrsetbyname()
diff --git a/debian/patches/doc-hash-tab-completion.patch b/debian/patches/doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..42d83959b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
1From 133721fc651693820cf41563418d26fccdedd742 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:11 +0000
4Subject: Document that HashKnownHosts may break tab-completion
5
6Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1727
7Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/430154
8Last-Update: 2013-09-14
9
10Patch-Name: doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
11---
12 ssh_config.5 | 3 +++
13 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
14
15diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
16index 37f3ab8..680ca17 100644
17--- a/ssh_config.5
18+++ b/ssh_config.5
19@@ -809,6 +809,9 @@ Note that existing names and addresses in known hosts files
20 will not be converted automatically,
21 but may be manually hashed using
22 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
23+Use of this option may break facilities such as tab-completion that rely
24+on being able to read unhashed host names from
25+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts .
26 .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
27 Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key
28 authentication.
diff --git a/debian/patches/doc-upstart.patch b/debian/patches/doc-upstart.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..357d7318e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/doc-upstart.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
1From fc8c21a1b1b6710b2b41a8daef56d00bfb19885d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@ubuntu.com>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:12 +0000
4Subject: Refer to ssh's Upstart job as well as its init script
5
6Forwarded: not-needed
7Last-Update: 2013-09-14
8
9Patch-Name: doc-upstart.patch
10---
11 sshd.8 | 5 ++++-
12 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
13
14diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
15index 42ba596..17b917c 100644
16--- a/sshd.8
17+++ b/sshd.8
18@@ -67,7 +67,10 @@ over an insecure network.
19 .Nm
20 listens for connections from clients.
21 It is normally started at boot from
22-.Pa /etc/init.d/ssh .
23+.Pa /etc/init.d/ssh
24+(or
25+.Pa /etc/init/ssh.conf
26+on systems using the Upstart init daemon).
27 It forks a new
28 daemon for each incoming connection.
29 The forked daemons handle
diff --git a/debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch b/debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ba9825f40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
1From d45f510086dc79305ea6cfd336908798fbbda563 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Vincent Untz <vuntz@ubuntu.com>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:16 +0000
4Subject: Give the ssh-askpass-gnome window a default icon
5
6Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/27152
7Last-Update: 2010-02-28
8
9Patch-Name: gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
10---
11 contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c | 2 ++
12 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
13
14diff --git a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
15index 9d97c30..04b3a11 100644
16--- a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
17+++ b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
18@@ -209,6 +209,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
19
20 gtk_init(&argc, &argv);
21
22+ gtk_window_set_default_icon_from_file ("/usr/share/pixmaps/ssh-askpass-gnome.png", NULL);
23+
24 if (argc > 1) {
25 message = g_strjoinv(" ", argv + 1);
26 } else {
diff --git a/debian/patches/gssapi.patch b/debian/patches/gssapi.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4ab9ca373
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/gssapi.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,3022 @@
1From 09c4d9b7d41ab3c9973f07e0109e931f57c59c43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Simon Wilkinson <simon@sxw.org.uk>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:48 +0000
4Subject: GSSAPI key exchange support
5
6This patch has been rejected upstream: "None of the OpenSSH developers are
7in favour of adding this, and this situation has not changed for several
8years. This is not a slight on Simon's patch, which is of fine quality, but
9just that a) we don't trust GSSAPI implementations that much and b) we don't
10like adding new KEX since they are pre-auth attack surface. This one is
11particularly scary, since it requires hooks out to typically root-owned
12system resources."
13
14However, quite a lot of people rely on this in Debian, and it's better to
15have it merged into the main openssh package rather than having separate
16-krb5 packages (as we used to have). It seems to have a generally good
17security history.
18
19Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1242
20Last-Updated: 2015-11-29
21
22Patch-Name: gssapi.patch
23---
24 ChangeLog.gssapi | 113 +++++++++++++++++++
25 Makefile.in | 5 +-
26 auth-krb5.c | 17 ++-
27 auth2-gss.c | 48 +++++++-
28 auth2.c | 2 +
29 clientloop.c | 13 +++
30 config.h.in | 6 +
31 configure.ac | 24 ++++
32 gss-genr.c | 275 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
33 gss-serv-krb5.c | 85 ++++++++++++--
34 gss-serv.c | 185 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
35 kex.c | 16 +++
36 kex.h | 14 +++
37 kexgssc.c | 336 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
38 kexgsss.c | 295 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
39 monitor.c | 108 +++++++++++++++++-
40 monitor.h | 3 +
41 monitor_wrap.c | 47 +++++++-
42 monitor_wrap.h | 4 +-
43 readconf.c | 42 +++++++
44 readconf.h | 5 +
45 servconf.c | 28 ++++-
46 servconf.h | 2 +
47 ssh-gss.h | 41 ++++++-
48 ssh_config | 2 +
49 ssh_config.5 | 36 +++++-
50 sshconnect2.c | 124 +++++++++++++++++++-
51 sshd.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++
52 sshd_config | 2 +
53 sshd_config.5 | 11 ++
54 sshkey.c | 3 +-
55 sshkey.h | 1 +
56 32 files changed, 1957 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
57 create mode 100644 ChangeLog.gssapi
58 create mode 100644 kexgssc.c
59 create mode 100644 kexgsss.c
60
61diff --git a/ChangeLog.gssapi b/ChangeLog.gssapi
62new file mode 100644
63index 0000000..f117a33
64--- /dev/null
65+++ b/ChangeLog.gssapi
66@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
67+20110101
68+ - Finally update for OpenSSH 5.6p1
69+ - Add GSSAPIServerIdentity option from Jim Basney
70+
71+20100308
72+ - [ Makefile.in, key.c, key.h ]
73+ Updates for OpenSSH 5.4p1
74+ - [ servconf.c ]
75+ Include GSSAPI options in the sshd -T configuration dump, and flag
76+ some older configuration options as being unsupported. Thanks to Colin
77+ Watson.
78+ -
79+
80+20100124
81+ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
82+ Adapt to deal with additional element in Authmethod structure. Thanks to
83+ Colin Watson
84+
85+20090615
86+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c
87+ sshd.c ]
88+ Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review
89+ Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs
90+ Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled
91+ Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange
92+ Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value
93+ Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust
94+ Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled
95+ Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list
96+ Cast data.length before printing
97+ If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL
98+
99+20090201
100+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h
101+ ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ]
102+ Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user
103+ to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server
104+
105+20080404
106+ - [ gss-serv.c ]
107+ Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow
108+ been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav
109+ Stoichkov
110+
111+20070317
112+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
113+ Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a
114+ function
115+
116+20061220
117+ - [ servconf.c ]
118+ Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and
119+ documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson.
120+
121+20060910
122+ - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c
123+ ssh-gss.h ]
124+ add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms
125+ - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ]
126+ Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of
127+ acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines.
128+ <Bugzilla #928>
129+ - [ sshd_config ssh_config ]
130+ Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample
131+ configuration files
132+ - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ]
133+ Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf()
134+ Limit length of error messages displayed by client
135+
136+20060909
137+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ]
138+ move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server
139+ only, where they belong
140+ <Bugzilla #1225>
141+
142+20060829
143+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
144+ Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment
145+ variable
146+
147+20060828
148+ - [ gss-genr.c ]
149+ Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem
150+ <Fixed upstream 20060829>
151+
152+20060818
153+ - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ]
154+ Make sure that SPENGO is disabled
155+ <Bugzilla #1218 - Fixed upstream 20060818>
156+
157+20060421
158+ - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ]
159+ a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to
160+ fix compiler errors/warnings
161+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
162+ - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ]
163+ fix uninitialized variable warnings
164+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
165+ - [ gssgenr.c ]
166+ pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue)
167+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
168+ <Bugzilla #1220 >
169+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
170+ #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
171+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
172+ <Fixed upstream 20060304>
173+ - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c
174+ add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option
175+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
176+ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
177+ add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic
178+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
179+ <gssapi-with-mic support is Bugzilla #1008>
180diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
181index 40cc7aa..3d2a328 100644
182--- a/Makefile.in
183+++ b/Makefile.in
184@@ -91,7 +91,8 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
185 sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o \
186 kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
187 kexdhc.o kexgexc.o kexecdhc.o kexc25519c.o \
188- kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o
189+ kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o \
190+ kexgssc.o
191
192 SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
193 sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \
194@@ -105,7 +106,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \
195 auth-skey.o auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
196 auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
197 monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
198- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
199+ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
200 loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
201 sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
202 roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o \
203diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
204index 0089b18..ec47869 100644
205--- a/auth-krb5.c
206+++ b/auth-krb5.c
207@@ -183,8 +183,13 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
208
209 len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
210 authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
211+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
212+ snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s",
213+ authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
214+#else
215 snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
216 authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
217+#endif
218
219 #ifdef USE_PAM
220 if (options.use_pam)
221@@ -241,15 +246,22 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
222 #ifndef HEIMDAL
223 krb5_error_code
224 ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
225- int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
226+ int ret, oerrno;
227 char ccname[40];
228 mode_t old_umask;
229+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
230+ char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d";
231+#else
232+ char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX";
233+ int tmpfd;
234+#endif
235
236 ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
237- "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
238+ cctemplate, geteuid());
239 if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
240 return ENOMEM;
241
242+#ifndef USE_CCAPI
243 old_umask = umask(0177);
244 tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
245 oerrno = errno;
246@@ -266,6 +278,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
247 return oerrno;
248 }
249 close(tmpfd);
250+#endif
251
252 return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
253 }
254diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
255index 1ca8357..3b5036d 100644
256--- a/auth2-gss.c
257+++ b/auth2-gss.c
258@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
259 /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.22 2015/01/19 20:07:45 markus Exp $ */
260
261 /*
262- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
263+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
264 *
265 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
266 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
267@@ -53,6 +53,40 @@ static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
268 static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
269 static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
270
271+/*
272+ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
273+ */
274+static int
275+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
276+{
277+ int authenticated = 0;
278+ Buffer b;
279+ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
280+ u_int len;
281+
282+ mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
283+ mic.length = len;
284+
285+ packet_check_eom();
286+
287+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
288+ "gssapi-keyex");
289+
290+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
291+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
292+
293+ /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
294+ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
295+ &gssbuf, &mic))))
296+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
297+ authctxt->pw));
298+
299+ buffer_free(&b);
300+ free(mic.value);
301+
302+ return (authenticated);
303+}
304+
305 /*
306 * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
307 * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
308@@ -238,7 +272,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
309
310 packet_check_eom();
311
312- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
313+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
314+ authctxt->pw));
315
316 authctxt->postponed = 0;
317 dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
318@@ -274,7 +309,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
319 gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
320
321 if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
322- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
323+ authenticated =
324+ PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw));
325 else
326 logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
327
328@@ -290,6 +326,12 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
329 return 0;
330 }
331
332+Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
333+ "gssapi-keyex",
334+ userauth_gsskeyex,
335+ &options.gss_authentication
336+};
337+
338 Authmethod method_gssapi = {
339 "gssapi-with-mic",
340 userauth_gssapi,
341diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
342index 7177962..3f49bdc 100644
343--- a/auth2.c
344+++ b/auth2.c
345@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd;
346 extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
347 extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
348 #ifdef GSSAPI
349+extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex;
350 extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
351 #endif
352
353@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
354 &method_none,
355 &method_pubkey,
356 #ifdef GSSAPI
357+ &method_gsskeyex,
358 &method_gssapi,
359 #endif
360 &method_passwd,
361diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
362index 87ceb3d..fba1b54 100644
363--- a/clientloop.c
364+++ b/clientloop.c
365@@ -115,6 +115,10 @@
366 #include "ssherr.h"
367 #include "hostfile.h"
368
369+#ifdef GSSAPI
370+#include "ssh-gss.h"
371+#endif
372+
373 /* import options */
374 extern Options options;
375
376@@ -1610,6 +1614,15 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id)
377 /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
378 if (!rekeying) {
379 channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
380+
381+#ifdef GSSAPI
382+ if (options.gss_renewal_rekey &&
383+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(NULL)) {
384+ debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey");
385+ need_rekeying = 1;
386+ }
387+#endif
388+
389 if (need_rekeying || packet_need_rekeying()) {
390 debug("need rekeying");
391 active_state->kex->done = 0;
392diff --git a/config.h.in b/config.h.in
393index 7500df5..97accd8 100644
394--- a/config.h.in
395+++ b/config.h.in
396@@ -1623,6 +1623,9 @@
397 /* Use btmp to log bad logins */
398 #undef USE_BTMP
399
400+/* platform uses an in-memory credentials cache */
401+#undef USE_CCAPI
402+
403 /* Use libedit for sftp */
404 #undef USE_LIBEDIT
405
406@@ -1638,6 +1641,9 @@
407 /* Use PIPES instead of a socketpair() */
408 #undef USE_PIPES
409
410+/* platform has the Security Authorization Session API */
411+#undef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
412+
413 /* Define if you have Solaris process contracts */
414 #undef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
415
416diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
417index 9b05c30..7a25603 100644
418--- a/configure.ac
419+++ b/configure.ac
420@@ -625,6 +625,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
421 [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
422 AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
423 [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
424+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have the Security Authorization Session API])
425+ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <Security/AuthSession.h>],
426+ [SessionCreate(0, 0);],
427+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes"
428+ AC_DEFINE([USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API], [1],
429+ [platform has the Security Authorization Session API])
430+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
431+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
432+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no"
433+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])])
434+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have an in-memory credentials cache])
435+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
436+ [#include <Kerberos/Kerberos.h>],
437+ [cc_context_t c;
438+ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);],
439+ [AC_DEFINE([USE_CCAPI], [1],
440+ [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache])
441+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
442+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
443+ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then
444+ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***])
445+ fi],
446+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])]
447+ )
448 m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv])
449 AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [],
450 AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
451diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c
452index d617d60..b4eca3f 100644
453--- a/gss-genr.c
454+++ b/gss-genr.c
455@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
456 /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.23 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */
457
458 /*
459- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
460+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
461 *
462 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
463 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
464@@ -41,12 +41,167 @@
465 #include "buffer.h"
466 #include "log.h"
467 #include "ssh2.h"
468+#include "cipher.h"
469+#include "key.h"
470+#include "kex.h"
471+#include <openssl/evp.h>
472
473 #include "ssh-gss.h"
474
475 extern u_char *session_id2;
476 extern u_int session_id2_len;
477
478+typedef struct {
479+ char *encoded;
480+ gss_OID oid;
481+} ssh_gss_kex_mapping;
482+
483+/*
484+ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the
485+ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines
486+ */
487+
488+Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL;
489+
490+static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL;
491+
492+int
493+ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void) {
494+ return (gss_enc2oid != NULL);
495+}
496+
497+/*
498+ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program
499+ *
500+ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting
501+ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism
502+ */
503+
504+char *
505+ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) {
506+ gss_OID_set gss_supported;
507+ OM_uint32 min_status;
508+
509+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported)))
510+ return NULL;
511+
512+ return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
513+ host, client));
514+}
515+
516+char *
517+ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
518+ const char *host, const char *client) {
519+ Buffer buf;
520+ size_t i;
521+ int oidpos, enclen;
522+ char *mechs, *encoded;
523+ u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
524+ char deroid[2];
525+ const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
526+ EVP_MD_CTX md;
527+
528+ if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
529+ for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++)
530+ free(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded);
531+ free(gss_enc2oid);
532+ }
533+
534+ gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) *
535+ (gss_supported->count + 1));
536+
537+ buffer_init(&buf);
538+
539+ oidpos = 0;
540+ for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
541+ if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
542+ (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
543+
544+ deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
545+ deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
546+
547+ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
548+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2);
549+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,
550+ gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
551+ gss_supported->elements[i].length);
552+ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
553+
554+ encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
555+ enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md),
556+ encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
557+
558+ if (oidpos != 0)
559+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
560+
561+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
562+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1);
563+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
564+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
565+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
566+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1);
567+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
568+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
569+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
570+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1);
571+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
572+
573+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
574+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
575+ oidpos++;
576+ }
577+ }
578+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
579+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
580+
581+ buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0');
582+
583+ mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf));
584+ buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf));
585+ buffer_free(&buf);
586+
587+ if (strlen(mechs) == 0) {
588+ free(mechs);
589+ mechs = NULL;
590+ }
591+
592+ return (mechs);
593+}
594+
595+gss_OID
596+ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) {
597+ int i = 0;
598+
599+ switch (kex_type) {
600+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
601+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID))
602+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
603+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1;
604+ break;
605+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
606+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID))
607+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
608+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1;
609+ break;
610+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
611+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID))
612+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
613+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1;
614+ break;
615+ default:
616+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
617+ }
618+
619+ while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL &&
620+ strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0)
621+ i++;
622+
623+ if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL)
624+ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid);
625+
626+ return gss_enc2oid[i].oid;
627+}
628+
629 /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
630 int
631 ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
632@@ -199,7 +354,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int deleg_creds, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
633 }
634
635 ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
636- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
637+ ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
638 GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
639 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
640
641@@ -229,8 +384,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host)
642 }
643
644 OM_uint32
645+ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name)
646+{
647+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
648+ gss_name_t gssname;
649+ OM_uint32 status;
650+ gss_OID_set oidset;
651+
652+ gssbuf.value = (void *) name;
653+ gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
654+
655+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
656+ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
657+
658+ ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf,
659+ GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname);
660+
661+ if (!ctx->major)
662+ ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
663+ gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE,
664+ &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL);
665+
666+ gss_release_name(&status, &gssname);
667+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
668+
669+ if (ctx->major)
670+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
671+
672+ return(ctx->major);
673+}
674+
675+OM_uint32
676 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
677 {
678+ if (ctx == NULL)
679+ return -1;
680+
681 if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
682 GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
683 ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
684@@ -238,6 +427,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
685 return (ctx->major);
686 }
687
688+/* Priviledged when used by server */
689+OM_uint32
690+ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
691+{
692+ if (ctx == NULL)
693+ return -1;
694+
695+ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
696+ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
697+
698+ return (ctx->major);
699+}
700+
701 void
702 ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
703 const char *context)
704@@ -251,11 +453,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
705 }
706
707 int
708-ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
709+ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host,
710+ const char *client)
711 {
712 gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
713 OM_uint32 major, minor;
714 gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
715+ Gssctxt *intctx = NULL;
716+
717+ if (ctx == NULL)
718+ ctx = &intctx;
719
720 /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
721 if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length &&
722@@ -265,6 +472,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
723 ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
724 ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
725 major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
726+
727+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client)
728+ major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client);
729+
730 if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
731 major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token,
732 NULL);
733@@ -274,10 +485,66 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
734 GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
735 }
736
737- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
738+ if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL)
739 ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
740
741 return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
742 }
743
744+int
745+ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) {
746+ static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
747+ static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0;
748+ static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
749+ static gss_name_t name;
750+ static OM_uint32 last_call = 0;
751+ OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor;
752+ int equal;
753+
754+ now = time(NULL);
755+
756+ if (ctxt) {
757+ debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions");
758+
759+ if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
760+ gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name);
761+
762+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
763+ &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL);
764+
765+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
766+ saved_mech = ctxt->oid;
767+ saved_lifetime+= now;
768+ } else {
769+ /* Handle the error */
770+ }
771+ return 0;
772+ }
773+
774+ if (now - last_call < 10)
775+ return 0;
776+
777+ last_call = now;
778+
779+ if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID)
780+ return 0;
781+
782+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
783+ &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL);
784+ if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED)
785+ return 0;
786+ else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
787+ return 0;
788+
789+ major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal);
790+ gss_release_name(&minor, &name);
791+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
792+ return 0;
793+
794+ if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10))
795+ return 1;
796+
797+ return 0;
798+}
799+
800 #endif /* GSSAPI */
801diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
802index 795992d..fd8b371 100644
803--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
804+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
805@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
806 /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.8 2013/07/20 01:55:13 djm Exp $ */
807
808 /*
809- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
810+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
811 *
812 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
813 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
814@@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
815 krb5_error_code problem;
816 krb5_principal princ;
817 OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
818- int len;
819 const char *errmsg;
820+ const char *new_ccname;
821
822 if (client->creds == NULL) {
823 debug("No credentials stored");
824@@ -181,11 +181,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
825 return;
826 }
827
828- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache));
829+ new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
830+
831 client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
832- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6;
833- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len);
834- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename);
835+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
836+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
837+ client->store.filename = NULL;
838+#else
839+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "FILE:%s", new_ccname);
840+ client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
841+#endif
842
843 #ifdef USE_PAM
844 if (options.use_pam)
845@@ -197,6 +202,71 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
846 return;
847 }
848
849+int
850+ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,
851+ ssh_gssapi_client *client)
852+{
853+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
854+ krb5_principal principal = NULL;
855+ char *name = NULL;
856+ krb5_error_code problem;
857+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
858+
859+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) {
860+ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
861+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
862+ return 0;
863+ }
864+
865+ /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */
866+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache,
867+ &principal))) {
868+ logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s",
869+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
870+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
871+ return 0;
872+ }
873+
874+ if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) {
875+ logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s",
876+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
877+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
878+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
879+ return 0;
880+ }
881+
882+
883+ if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) {
884+ debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing");
885+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
886+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
887+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
888+ return 0;
889+ }
890+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
891+
892+ /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */
893+
894+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) {
895+ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s",
896+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
897+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
898+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
899+ return 0;
900+ }
901+
902+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
903+
904+ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds,
905+ ccache))) {
906+ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!");
907+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
908+ return 0;
909+ }
910+
911+ return 1;
912+}
913+
914 ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
915 "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
916 "Kerberos",
917@@ -204,7 +274,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
918 NULL,
919 &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
920 NULL,
921- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds
922+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds,
923+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds
924 };
925
926 #endif /* KRB5 */
927diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
928index 53993d6..2f6baf7 100644
929--- a/gss-serv.c
930+++ b/gss-serv.c
931@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
932 /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.29 2015/05/22 03:50:02 djm Exp $ */
933
934 /*
935- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
936+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
937 *
938 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
939 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
940@@ -45,17 +45,22 @@
941 #include "session.h"
942 #include "misc.h"
943 #include "servconf.h"
944+#include "uidswap.h"
945
946 #include "ssh-gss.h"
947+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
948+
949+extern ServerOptions options;
950
951 extern ServerOptions options;
952
953 static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
954 { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
955- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}};
956+ GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL,
957+ {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
958
959 ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
960- { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
961+ { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
962
963 #ifdef KRB5
964 extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
965@@ -142,6 +147,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
966 }
967
968 /* Unprivileged */
969+char *
970+ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void) {
971+ gss_OID_set supported;
972+
973+ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported);
974+ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech,
975+ NULL, NULL));
976+}
977+
978+/* Unprivileged */
979+int
980+ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data,
981+ const char *dummy) {
982+ Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
983+ int res;
984+
985+ res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
986+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
987+
988+ return (res);
989+}
990+
991+/* Unprivileged */
992 void
993 ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
994 {
995@@ -151,7 +179,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
996 gss_OID_set supported;
997
998 gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
999- gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
1000+
1001+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported)))
1002+ return;
1003
1004 while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
1005 if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
1006@@ -277,8 +307,48 @@ OM_uint32
1007 ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1008 {
1009 int i = 0;
1010+ int equal = 0;
1011+ gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
1012+ gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1013+
1014+ if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
1015+ if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
1016+ (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements,
1017+ ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) {
1018+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
1019+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1020+ }
1021+
1022+ if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
1023+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name,
1024+ NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
1025+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
1026+ return (ctx->major);
1027+ }
1028+
1029+ ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name,
1030+ new_name, &equal);
1031+
1032+ if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
1033+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
1034+ return (ctx->major);
1035+ }
1036+
1037+ if (!equal) {
1038+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name");
1039+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1040+ }
1041
1042- gss_buffer_desc ename;
1043+ debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
1044+
1045+ gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
1046+ gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds);
1047+ client->name = new_name;
1048+ client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
1049+ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
1050+ client->updated = 1;
1051+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1052+ }
1053
1054 client->mech = NULL;
1055
1056@@ -293,6 +363,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1057 if (client->mech == NULL)
1058 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1059
1060+ if (ctx->client_creds &&
1061+ (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
1062+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
1063+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
1064+ return (ctx->major);
1065+ }
1066+
1067 if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
1068 &client->displayname, NULL))) {
1069 ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
1070@@ -310,6 +387,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1071 return (ctx->major);
1072 }
1073
1074+ gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
1075+
1076 /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
1077 client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
1078 ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
1079@@ -357,7 +436,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep)
1080
1081 /* Privileged */
1082 int
1083-ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
1084+ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
1085 {
1086 OM_uint32 lmin;
1087
1088@@ -367,9 +446,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
1089 return 0;
1090 }
1091 if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
1092- if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
1093+ if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
1094+ gssapi_client.used = 1;
1095+ gssapi_client.store.owner = pw;
1096 return 1;
1097- else {
1098+ } else {
1099 /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
1100 gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
1101 gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
1102@@ -383,14 +464,90 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
1103 return (0);
1104 }
1105
1106-/* Privileged */
1107-OM_uint32
1108-ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
1109+/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running
1110+ * as the user, the monitor is root.
1111+ *
1112+ * In the child, we want to :
1113+ * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify
1114+ * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update
1115+ */
1116+
1117+/* Stuff for PAM */
1118+
1119+#ifdef USE_PAM
1120+static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg,
1121+ struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
1122 {
1123- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
1124- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
1125+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
1126+}
1127+#endif
1128
1129- return (ctx->major);
1130+void
1131+ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) {
1132+ int ok;
1133+ int ret;
1134+#ifdef USE_PAM
1135+ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
1136+ struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
1137+ char *envstr;
1138+#endif
1139+
1140+ if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
1141+ gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
1142+ gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
1143+ return;
1144+
1145+ ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
1146+
1147+ if (!ok)
1148+ return;
1149+
1150+ debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully");
1151+
1152+ /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will
1153+ * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options
1154+ * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
1155+ */
1156+#ifdef USE_PAM
1157+ if (!use_privsep) {
1158+ debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
1159+ return;
1160+ }
1161+
1162+ ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
1163+ &pamconv, &pamh);
1164+ if (ret)
1165+ return;
1166+
1167+ xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
1168+ gssapi_client.store.envval);
1169+
1170+ ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr);
1171+ if (!ret)
1172+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
1173+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
1174+#endif
1175+}
1176+
1177+int
1178+ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) {
1179+ int ok = 0;
1180+
1181+ /* Check we've got credentials to store */
1182+ if (!gssapi_client.updated)
1183+ return 0;
1184+
1185+ gssapi_client.updated = 0;
1186+
1187+ temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner);
1188+ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)
1189+ ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client);
1190+ else
1191+ debug("No update function for this mechanism");
1192+
1193+ restore_uid();
1194+
1195+ return ok;
1196 }
1197
1198 #endif
1199diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
1200index 5100c66..39a6f98 100644
1201--- a/kex.c
1202+++ b/kex.c
1203@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@
1204 #include "sshbuf.h"
1205 #include "digest.h"
1206
1207+#ifdef GSSAPI
1208+#include "ssh-gss.h"
1209+#endif
1210+
1211 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
1212 # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
1213 # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256
1214@@ -97,6 +101,14 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
1215 #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */
1216 { NULL, -1, -1, -1},
1217 };
1218+static const struct kexalg kexalg_prefixes[] = {
1219+#ifdef GSSAPI
1220+ { KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
1221+ { KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
1222+ { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
1223+#endif
1224+ { NULL, -1, -1, -1 },
1225+};
1226
1227 char *
1228 kex_alg_list(char sep)
1229@@ -129,6 +141,10 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
1230 if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
1231 return k;
1232 }
1233+ for (k = kexalg_prefixes; k->name != NULL; k++) {
1234+ if (strncmp(k->name, name, strlen(k->name)) == 0)
1235+ return k;
1236+ }
1237 return NULL;
1238 }
1239
1240diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
1241index d71b532..ee46815 100644
1242--- a/kex.h
1243+++ b/kex.h
1244@@ -93,6 +93,9 @@ enum kex_exchange {
1245 KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
1246 KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
1247 KEX_C25519_SHA256,
1248+ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
1249+ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
1250+ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1,
1251 KEX_MAX
1252 };
1253
1254@@ -139,6 +142,12 @@ struct kex {
1255 u_int flags;
1256 int hash_alg;
1257 int ec_nid;
1258+#ifdef GSSAPI
1259+ int gss_deleg_creds;
1260+ int gss_trust_dns;
1261+ char *gss_host;
1262+ char *gss_client;
1263+#endif
1264 char *client_version_string;
1265 char *server_version_string;
1266 char *failed_choice;
1267@@ -187,6 +196,11 @@ int kexecdh_server(struct ssh *);
1268 int kexc25519_client(struct ssh *);
1269 int kexc25519_server(struct ssh *);
1270
1271+#ifdef GSSAPI
1272+int kexgss_client(struct ssh *);
1273+int kexgss_server(struct ssh *);
1274+#endif
1275+
1276 int kex_dh_hash(const char *, const char *,
1277 const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t,
1278 const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, u_char *, size_t *);
1279diff --git a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c
1280new file mode 100644
1281index 0000000..a49bac2
1282--- /dev/null
1283+++ b/kexgssc.c
1284@@ -0,0 +1,336 @@
1285+/*
1286+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
1287+ *
1288+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
1289+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
1290+ * are met:
1291+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
1292+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
1293+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
1294+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
1295+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
1296+ *
1297+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
1298+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
1299+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
1300+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
1301+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
1302+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
1303+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
1304+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
1305+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
1306+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
1307+ */
1308+
1309+#include "includes.h"
1310+
1311+#ifdef GSSAPI
1312+
1313+#include "includes.h"
1314+
1315+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
1316+#include <openssl/bn.h>
1317+
1318+#include <string.h>
1319+
1320+#include "xmalloc.h"
1321+#include "buffer.h"
1322+#include "ssh2.h"
1323+#include "key.h"
1324+#include "cipher.h"
1325+#include "kex.h"
1326+#include "log.h"
1327+#include "packet.h"
1328+#include "dh.h"
1329+#include "digest.h"
1330+
1331+#include "ssh-gss.h"
1332+
1333+int
1334+kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) {
1335+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1336+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr;
1337+ Gssctxt *ctxt;
1338+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
1339+ u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, strlen;
1340+ DH *dh;
1341+ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
1342+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
1343+ BIGNUM *p = NULL;
1344+ BIGNUM *g = NULL;
1345+ u_char *kbuf;
1346+ u_char *serverhostkey = NULL;
1347+ u_char *empty = "";
1348+ char *msg;
1349+ int type = 0;
1350+ int first = 1;
1351+ int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
1352+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
1353+ size_t hashlen;
1354+
1355+ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */
1356+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
1357+ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, ssh->kex->name, ssh->kex->kex_type)
1358+ == GSS_C_NO_OID)
1359+ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
1360+
1361+ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, ssh->kex->gss_host))
1362+ fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
1363+
1364+ if (ssh->kex->gss_client &&
1365+ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, ssh->kex->gss_client))
1366+ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
1367+
1368+ switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
1369+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
1370+ dh = dh_new_group1();
1371+ break;
1372+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
1373+ dh = dh_new_group14();
1374+ break;
1375+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
1376+ debug("Doing group exchange\n");
1377+ nbits = dh_estimate(ssh->kex->we_need * 8);
1378+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
1379+ packet_put_int(min);
1380+ packet_put_int(nbits);
1381+ packet_put_int(max);
1382+
1383+ packet_send();
1384+
1385+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
1386+
1387+ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
1388+ fatal("BN_new() failed");
1389+ packet_get_bignum2(p);
1390+ if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
1391+ fatal("BN_new() failed");
1392+ packet_get_bignum2(g);
1393+ packet_check_eom();
1394+
1395+ if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
1396+ fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
1397+ min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
1398+
1399+ dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
1400+ break;
1401+ default:
1402+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
1403+ }
1404+
1405+ /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */
1406+ dh_gen_key(dh, ssh->kex->we_need * 8);
1407+
1408+ /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */
1409+ dh_server_pub = BN_new();
1410+ if (dh_server_pub == NULL)
1411+ fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
1412+
1413+ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
1414+
1415+ do {
1416+ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
1417+
1418+ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
1419+ ssh->kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
1420+ &ret_flags);
1421+
1422+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
1423+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
1424+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
1425+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
1426+ send_tok.length);
1427+ }
1428+ fatal("gss_init_context failed");
1429+ }
1430+
1431+ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
1432+ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
1433+ free(recv_tok.value);
1434+
1435+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1436+ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
1437+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
1438+ fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
1439+
1440+ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
1441+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
1442+ fatal("Integrity check failed");
1443+ }
1444+
1445+ /*
1446+ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
1447+ * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
1448+ */
1449+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
1450+ if (first) {
1451+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT);
1452+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
1453+ send_tok.length);
1454+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
1455+ first = 0;
1456+ } else {
1457+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
1458+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
1459+ send_tok.length);
1460+ }
1461+ packet_send();
1462+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
1463+
1464+ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
1465+ do {
1466+ type = packet_read();
1467+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
1468+ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
1469+ if (serverhostkey)
1470+ fatal("Server host key received more than once");
1471+ serverhostkey =
1472+ packet_get_string(&slen);
1473+ }
1474+ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
1475+
1476+ switch (type) {
1477+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
1478+ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
1479+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
1480+ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
1481+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
1482+ recv_tok.length = strlen;
1483+ break;
1484+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
1485+ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
1486+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
1487+ msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
1488+ msg_tok.length = strlen;
1489+
1490+ /* Is there a token included? */
1491+ if (packet_get_char()) {
1492+ recv_tok.value=
1493+ packet_get_string(&strlen);
1494+ recv_tok.length = strlen;
1495+ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */
1496+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
1497+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete");
1498+ } else {
1499+ /* No token included */
1500+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
1501+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token");
1502+ }
1503+ break;
1504+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
1505+ debug("Received Error");
1506+ maj_status = packet_get_int();
1507+ min_status = packet_get_int();
1508+ msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
1509+ (void) packet_get_string_ptr(NULL);
1510+ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg);
1511+ default:
1512+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
1513+ type);
1514+ }
1515+ token_ptr = &recv_tok;
1516+ } else {
1517+ /* No data, and not complete */
1518+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
1519+ fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
1520+ }
1521+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
1522+
1523+ /*
1524+ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the
1525+ * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok
1526+ */
1527+
1528+ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
1529+ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
1530+
1531+ /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */
1532+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
1533+ packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
1534+
1535+ /* compute K=f^x mod p */
1536+ klen = DH_size(dh);
1537+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
1538+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh);
1539+ if (kout < 0)
1540+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
1541+
1542+ shared_secret = BN_new();
1543+ if (shared_secret == NULL)
1544+ fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed");
1545+
1546+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
1547+ fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
1548+
1549+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
1550+ free(kbuf);
1551+
1552+ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
1553+ switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
1554+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
1555+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
1556+ kex_dh_hash( ssh->kex->client_version_string,
1557+ ssh->kex->server_version_string,
1558+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
1559+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
1560+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
1561+ dh->pub_key, /* e */
1562+ dh_server_pub, /* f */
1563+ shared_secret, /* K */
1564+ hash, &hashlen
1565+ );
1566+ break;
1567+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
1568+ kexgex_hash(
1569+ ssh->kex->hash_alg,
1570+ ssh->kex->client_version_string,
1571+ ssh->kex->server_version_string,
1572+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
1573+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
1574+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
1575+ min, nbits, max,
1576+ dh->p, dh->g,
1577+ dh->pub_key,
1578+ dh_server_pub,
1579+ shared_secret,
1580+ hash, &hashlen
1581+ );
1582+ break;
1583+ default:
1584+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
1585+ }
1586+
1587+ gssbuf.value = hash;
1588+ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
1589+
1590+ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
1591+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
1592+ packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify");
1593+
1594+ free(msg_tok.value);
1595+
1596+ DH_free(dh);
1597+ free(serverhostkey);
1598+ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
1599+
1600+ /* save session id */
1601+ if (ssh->kex->session_id == NULL) {
1602+ ssh->kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
1603+ ssh->kex->session_id = xmalloc(ssh->kex->session_id_len);
1604+ memcpy(ssh->kex->session_id, hash, ssh->kex->session_id_len);
1605+ }
1606+
1607+ if (ssh->kex->gss_deleg_creds)
1608+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
1609+
1610+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
1611+ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
1612+ else
1613+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
1614+
1615+ kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
1616+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
1617+ return kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
1618+}
1619+
1620+#endif /* GSSAPI */
1621diff --git a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c
1622new file mode 100644
1623index 0000000..0847469
1624--- /dev/null
1625+++ b/kexgsss.c
1626@@ -0,0 +1,295 @@
1627+/*
1628+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
1629+ *
1630+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
1631+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
1632+ * are met:
1633+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
1634+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
1635+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
1636+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
1637+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
1638+ *
1639+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
1640+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
1641+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
1642+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
1643+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
1644+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
1645+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
1646+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
1647+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
1648+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
1649+ */
1650+
1651+#include "includes.h"
1652+
1653+#ifdef GSSAPI
1654+
1655+#include <string.h>
1656+
1657+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
1658+#include <openssl/bn.h>
1659+
1660+#include "xmalloc.h"
1661+#include "buffer.h"
1662+#include "ssh2.h"
1663+#include "key.h"
1664+#include "cipher.h"
1665+#include "kex.h"
1666+#include "log.h"
1667+#include "packet.h"
1668+#include "dh.h"
1669+#include "ssh-gss.h"
1670+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
1671+#include "misc.h"
1672+#include "servconf.h"
1673+#include "digest.h"
1674+
1675+extern ServerOptions options;
1676+
1677+int
1678+kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
1679+{
1680+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
1681+
1682+ /*
1683+ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
1684+ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific
1685+ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently
1686+ * activating this non-standard behaviour.
1687+ */
1688+
1689+ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
1690+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
1691+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1692+ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
1693+ u_int slen, klen, kout;
1694+ u_char *kbuf;
1695+ DH *dh;
1696+ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
1697+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
1698+ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
1699+ int type = 0;
1700+ gss_OID oid;
1701+ char *mechs;
1702+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
1703+ size_t hashlen;
1704+
1705+ /* Initialise GSSAPI */
1706+
1707+ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures
1708+ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
1709+ * into life
1710+ */
1711+ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) {
1712+ mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
1713+ free(mechs);
1714+ }
1715+
1716+ debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, ssh->kex->name);
1717+ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, ssh->kex->name, ssh->kex->kex_type);
1718+ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
1719+ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
1720+
1721+ debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
1722+
1723+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
1724+ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
1725+
1726+ switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
1727+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
1728+ dh = dh_new_group1();
1729+ break;
1730+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
1731+ dh = dh_new_group14();
1732+ break;
1733+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
1734+ debug("Doing group exchange");
1735+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
1736+ min = packet_get_int();
1737+ nbits = packet_get_int();
1738+ max = packet_get_int();
1739+ min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
1740+ max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
1741+ packet_check_eom();
1742+ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
1743+ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
1744+ min, nbits, max);
1745+ dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
1746+ if (dh == NULL)
1747+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found");
1748+
1749+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
1750+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
1751+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
1752+ packet_send();
1753+
1754+ packet_write_wait();
1755+ break;
1756+ default:
1757+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
1758+ }
1759+
1760+ dh_gen_key(dh, ssh->kex->we_need * 8);
1761+
1762+ do {
1763+ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
1764+ type = packet_read();
1765+ switch(type) {
1766+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
1767+ if (dh_client_pub != NULL)
1768+ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
1769+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
1770+ recv_tok.length = slen;
1771+
1772+ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
1773+ fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
1774+
1775+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
1776+
1777+ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
1778+ break;
1779+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
1780+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
1781+ recv_tok.length = slen;
1782+ break;
1783+ default:
1784+ packet_disconnect(
1785+ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
1786+ type);
1787+ }
1788+
1789+ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
1790+ &send_tok, &ret_flags));
1791+
1792+ free(recv_tok.value);
1793+
1794+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
1795+ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
1796+
1797+ if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
1798+ fatal("No client public key");
1799+
1800+ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
1801+ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
1802+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
1803+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
1804+ packet_send();
1805+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
1806+ }
1807+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
1808+
1809+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
1810+ if (send_tok.length > 0) {
1811+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
1812+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
1813+ packet_send();
1814+ }
1815+ fatal("accept_ctx died");
1816+ }
1817+
1818+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
1819+ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
1820+
1821+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
1822+ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
1823+
1824+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
1825+ packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
1826+
1827+ klen = DH_size(dh);
1828+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
1829+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
1830+ if (kout < 0)
1831+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
1832+
1833+ shared_secret = BN_new();
1834+ if (shared_secret == NULL)
1835+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed");
1836+
1837+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
1838+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
1839+
1840+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
1841+ free(kbuf);
1842+
1843+ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
1844+ switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
1845+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
1846+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
1847+ kex_dh_hash(
1848+ ssh->kex->client_version_string, ssh->kex->server_version_string,
1849+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
1850+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
1851+ NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */
1852+ dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret,
1853+ hash, &hashlen
1854+ );
1855+ break;
1856+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
1857+ kexgex_hash(
1858+ ssh->kex->hash_alg,
1859+ ssh->kex->client_version_string, ssh->kex->server_version_string,
1860+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
1861+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
1862+ NULL, 0,
1863+ min, nbits, max,
1864+ dh->p, dh->g,
1865+ dh_client_pub,
1866+ dh->pub_key,
1867+ shared_secret,
1868+ hash, &hashlen
1869+ );
1870+ break;
1871+ default:
1872+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
1873+ }
1874+
1875+ BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
1876+
1877+ if (ssh->kex->session_id == NULL) {
1878+ ssh->kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
1879+ ssh->kex->session_id = xmalloc(ssh->kex->session_id_len);
1880+ memcpy(ssh->kex->session_id, hash, ssh->kex->session_id_len);
1881+ }
1882+
1883+ gssbuf.value = hash;
1884+ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
1885+
1886+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok))))
1887+ fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
1888+
1889+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE);
1890+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
1891+ packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length);
1892+
1893+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
1894+ packet_put_char(1); /* true */
1895+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
1896+ } else {
1897+ packet_put_char(0); /* false */
1898+ }
1899+ packet_send();
1900+
1901+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
1902+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
1903+
1904+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
1905+ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
1906+ else
1907+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
1908+
1909+ DH_free(dh);
1910+
1911+ kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
1912+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
1913+ kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
1914+
1915+ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
1916+ * just exchanged. */
1917+ if (options.gss_store_rekey)
1918+ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
1919+ return 0;
1920+}
1921+#endif /* GSSAPI */
1922diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
1923index a914209..2658aaa 100644
1924--- a/monitor.c
1925+++ b/monitor.c
1926@@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
1927 int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
1928 int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
1929 int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
1930+int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *);
1931+int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *);
1932 #endif
1933
1934 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
1935@@ -234,11 +236,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
1936 {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
1937 {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
1938 {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
1939+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign},
1940 #endif
1941 {0, 0, NULL}
1942 };
1943
1944 struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
1945+#ifdef GSSAPI
1946+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
1947+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
1948+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
1949+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
1950+#endif
1951 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1952 {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
1953 #endif
1954@@ -353,6 +362,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1955 /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
1956 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
1957 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
1958+#ifdef GSSAPI
1959+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
1960+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
1961+#endif
1962 } else {
1963 mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
1964
1965@@ -461,6 +474,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1966 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
1967 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
1968 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
1969+#ifdef GSSAPI
1970+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
1971+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
1972+#endif
1973 } else {
1974 mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
1975 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
1976@@ -1864,6 +1881,13 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1977 # endif
1978 #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
1979 kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
1980+#ifdef GSSAPI
1981+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
1982+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
1983+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
1984+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
1985+ }
1986+#endif
1987 kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
1988 kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
1989 kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
1990@@ -1963,6 +1987,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1991 OM_uint32 major;
1992 u_int len;
1993
1994+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
1995+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
1996+
1997 goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1998 goid.length = len;
1999
2000@@ -1990,6 +2017,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
2001 OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
2002 u_int len;
2003
2004+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
2005+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
2006+
2007 in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
2008 in.length = len;
2009 major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
2010@@ -2007,6 +2037,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
2011 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
2012 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
2013 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
2014+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1);
2015 }
2016 return (0);
2017 }
2018@@ -2018,6 +2049,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
2019 OM_uint32 ret;
2020 u_int len;
2021
2022+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
2023+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
2024+
2025 gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
2026 gssbuf.length = len;
2027 mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
2028@@ -2044,7 +2078,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
2029 {
2030 int authenticated;
2031
2032- authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
2033+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
2034+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
2035+
2036+ authenticated = authctxt->valid &&
2037+ ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw);
2038
2039 buffer_clear(m);
2040 buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
2041@@ -2057,5 +2095,73 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
2042 /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
2043 return (authenticated);
2044 }
2045+
2046+int
2047+mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
2048+{
2049+ gss_buffer_desc data;
2050+ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
2051+ OM_uint32 major, minor;
2052+ u_int len;
2053+
2054+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
2055+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
2056+
2057+ data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
2058+ data.length = len;
2059+ if (data.length != 20)
2060+ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__,
2061+ (int) data.length);
2062+
2063+ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */
2064+ if (session_id2_len == 0) {
2065+ session_id2_len = data.length;
2066+ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
2067+ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
2068+ }
2069+ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
2070+
2071+ free(data.value);
2072+
2073+ buffer_clear(m);
2074+ buffer_put_int(m, major);
2075+ buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length);
2076+
2077+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
2078+
2079+ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
2080+
2081+ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
2082+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
2083+
2084+ /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */
2085+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1);
2086+
2087+ return (0);
2088+}
2089+
2090+int
2091+mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) {
2092+ ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
2093+ int ok;
2094+
2095+ store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
2096+ store.envvar = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
2097+ store.envval = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
2098+
2099+ ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
2100+
2101+ free(store.filename);
2102+ free(store.envvar);
2103+ free(store.envval);
2104+
2105+ buffer_clear(m);
2106+ buffer_put_int(m, ok);
2107+
2108+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
2109+
2110+ return(0);
2111+}
2112+
2113 #endif /* GSSAPI */
2114
2115diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
2116index 93b8b66..bc50ade 100644
2117--- a/monitor.h
2118+++ b/monitor.h
2119@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
2120 MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
2121 MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
2122
2123+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151,
2124+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153,
2125+
2126 };
2127
2128 struct mm_master;
2129diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
2130index eac421b..81ceddb 100644
2131--- a/monitor_wrap.c
2132+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
2133@@ -1068,7 +1068,7 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
2134 }
2135
2136 int
2137-mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
2138+mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
2139 {
2140 Buffer m;
2141 int authenticated = 0;
2142@@ -1085,5 +1085,50 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
2143 debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
2144 return (authenticated);
2145 }
2146+
2147+OM_uint32
2148+mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
2149+{
2150+ Buffer m;
2151+ OM_uint32 major;
2152+ u_int len;
2153+
2154+ buffer_init(&m);
2155+ buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length);
2156+
2157+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m);
2158+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m);
2159+
2160+ major = buffer_get_int(&m);
2161+ hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
2162+ hash->length = len;
2163+
2164+ buffer_free(&m);
2165+
2166+ return(major);
2167+}
2168+
2169+int
2170+mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store)
2171+{
2172+ Buffer m;
2173+ int ok;
2174+
2175+ buffer_init(&m);
2176+
2177+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : "");
2178+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : "");
2179+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : "");
2180+
2181+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
2182+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
2183+
2184+ ok = buffer_get_int(&m);
2185+
2186+ buffer_free(&m);
2187+
2188+ return (ok);
2189+}
2190+
2191 #endif /* GSSAPI */
2192
2193diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
2194index de4a08f..9758290 100644
2195--- a/monitor_wrap.h
2196+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
2197@@ -58,8 +58,10 @@ BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);
2198 OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
2199 OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
2200 gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
2201-int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
2202+int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *);
2203 OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
2204+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
2205+int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *);
2206 #endif
2207
2208 #ifdef USE_PAM
2209diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
2210index 1d03bdf..43b7570 100644
2211--- a/readconf.c
2212+++ b/readconf.c
2213@@ -147,6 +147,8 @@ typedef enum {
2214 oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
2215 oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
2216 oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
2217+ oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey,
2218+ oGssServerIdentity,
2219 oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
2220 oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
2221 oHashKnownHosts,
2222@@ -192,10 +194,19 @@ static struct {
2223 { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
2224 #if defined(GSSAPI)
2225 { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
2226+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx },
2227 { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
2228+ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
2229+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity },
2230+ { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity },
2231+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey },
2232 #else
2233 { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
2234+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
2235 { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
2236+ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
2237+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported },
2238+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported },
2239 #endif
2240 { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
2241 { "usersh", oDeprecated },
2242@@ -894,10 +905,30 @@ parse_time:
2243 intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
2244 goto parse_flag;
2245
2246+ case oGssKeyEx:
2247+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
2248+ goto parse_flag;
2249+
2250 case oGssDelegateCreds:
2251 intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
2252 goto parse_flag;
2253
2254+ case oGssTrustDns:
2255+ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
2256+ goto parse_flag;
2257+
2258+ case oGssClientIdentity:
2259+ charptr = &options->gss_client_identity;
2260+ goto parse_string;
2261+
2262+ case oGssServerIdentity:
2263+ charptr = &options->gss_server_identity;
2264+ goto parse_string;
2265+
2266+ case oGssRenewalRekey:
2267+ intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey;
2268+ goto parse_flag;
2269+
2270 case oBatchMode:
2271 intptr = &options->batch_mode;
2272 goto parse_flag;
2273@@ -1601,7 +1632,12 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
2274 options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
2275 options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
2276 options->gss_authentication = -1;
2277+ options->gss_keyex = -1;
2278 options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
2279+ options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
2280+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1;
2281+ options->gss_client_identity = NULL;
2282+ options->gss_server_identity = NULL;
2283 options->password_authentication = -1;
2284 options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
2285 options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
2286@@ -1729,8 +1765,14 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
2287 options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
2288 if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
2289 options->gss_authentication = 0;
2290+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
2291+ options->gss_keyex = 0;
2292 if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
2293 options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
2294+ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
2295+ options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
2296+ if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
2297+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0;
2298 if (options->password_authentication == -1)
2299 options->password_authentication = 1;
2300 if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
2301diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
2302index bb2d552..e7e80c3 100644
2303--- a/readconf.h
2304+++ b/readconf.h
2305@@ -45,7 +45,12 @@ typedef struct {
2306 int challenge_response_authentication;
2307 /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
2308 int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */
2309+ int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */
2310 int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */
2311+ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
2312+ int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */
2313+ char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */
2314+ char *gss_server_identity; /* GSSAPI target principal */
2315 int password_authentication; /* Try password
2316 * authentication. */
2317 int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
2318diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
2319index 6c7a91e..cfe7029 100644
2320--- a/servconf.c
2321+++ b/servconf.c
2322@@ -117,8 +117,10 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
2323 options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
2324 options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
2325 options->gss_authentication=-1;
2326+ options->gss_keyex = -1;
2327 options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
2328 options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
2329+ options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
2330 options->password_authentication = -1;
2331 options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
2332 options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
2333@@ -275,10 +277,14 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
2334 options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
2335 if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
2336 options->gss_authentication = 0;
2337+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
2338+ options->gss_keyex = 0;
2339 if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
2340 options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
2341 if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
2342- options->gss_strict_acceptor = 0;
2343+ options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
2344+ if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
2345+ options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
2346 if (options->password_authentication == -1)
2347 options->password_authentication = 1;
2348 if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
2349@@ -412,6 +418,7 @@ typedef enum {
2350 sHostKeyAlgorithms,
2351 sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
2352 sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
2353+ sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey,
2354 sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
2355 sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
2356 sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
2357@@ -485,12 +492,20 @@ static struct {
2358 #ifdef GSSAPI
2359 { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
2360 { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2361+ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2362 { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2363+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2364+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2365 #else
2366 { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
2367 { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2368+ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2369 { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2370+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2371+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2372 #endif
2373+ { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2374+ { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2375 { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
2376 { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
2377 { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2378@@ -1231,6 +1246,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
2379 intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
2380 goto parse_flag;
2381
2382+ case sGssKeyEx:
2383+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
2384+ goto parse_flag;
2385+
2386 case sGssCleanupCreds:
2387 intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
2388 goto parse_flag;
2389@@ -1239,6 +1258,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
2390 intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
2391 goto parse_flag;
2392
2393+ case sGssStoreRekey:
2394+ intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey;
2395+ goto parse_flag;
2396+
2397 case sPasswordAuthentication:
2398 intptr = &options->password_authentication;
2399 goto parse_flag;
2400@@ -2246,7 +2269,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
2401 #endif
2402 #ifdef GSSAPI
2403 dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
2404+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
2405 dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
2406+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
2407+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
2408 #endif
2409 dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
2410 dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
2411diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
2412index f4137af..778ba17 100644
2413--- a/servconf.h
2414+++ b/servconf.h
2415@@ -118,8 +118,10 @@ typedef struct {
2416 int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if
2417 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
2418 int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
2419+ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
2420 int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
2421 int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
2422+ int gss_store_rekey;
2423 int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password
2424 * authentication. */
2425 int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
2426diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
2427index a99d7f0..914701b 100644
2428--- a/ssh-gss.h
2429+++ b/ssh-gss.h
2430@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
2431 /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.11 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */
2432 /*
2433- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
2434+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
2435 *
2436 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
2437 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
2438@@ -61,10 +61,22 @@
2439
2440 #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
2441
2442+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30
2443+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31
2444+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32
2445+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33
2446+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34
2447+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40
2448+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41
2449+#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-"
2450+#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-"
2451+#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-"
2452+
2453 typedef struct {
2454 char *filename;
2455 char *envvar;
2456 char *envval;
2457+ struct passwd *owner;
2458 void *data;
2459 } ssh_gssapi_ccache;
2460
2461@@ -72,8 +84,11 @@ typedef struct {
2462 gss_buffer_desc displayname;
2463 gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
2464 gss_cred_id_t creds;
2465+ gss_name_t name;
2466 struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
2467 ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
2468+ int used;
2469+ int updated;
2470 } ssh_gssapi_client;
2471
2472 typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
2473@@ -84,6 +99,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
2474 int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
2475 int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
2476 void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
2477+ int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
2478 } ssh_gssapi_mech;
2479
2480 typedef struct {
2481@@ -94,10 +110,11 @@ typedef struct {
2482 gss_OID oid; /* client */
2483 gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */
2484 gss_name_t client; /* server */
2485- gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */
2486+ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */
2487 } Gssctxt;
2488
2489 extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
2490+extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context;
2491
2492 int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
2493 void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
2494@@ -119,16 +136,32 @@ void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **);
2495 void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
2496 OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
2497 void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
2498-int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
2499+int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *);
2500+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
2501+int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
2502
2503 /* In the server */
2504+typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *,
2505+ const char *);
2506+char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *);
2507+char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
2508+ const char *);
2509+gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
2510+int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *,
2511+ const char *);
2512 OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
2513-int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
2514+int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *);
2515 OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
2516 void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
2517 void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
2518 void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
2519
2520+char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
2521+int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void);
2522+
2523+int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store);
2524+void ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void);
2525+
2526 #endif /* GSSAPI */
2527
2528 #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
2529diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
2530index 03a228f..228e5ab 100644
2531--- a/ssh_config
2532+++ b/ssh_config
2533@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
2534 # HostbasedAuthentication no
2535 # GSSAPIAuthentication no
2536 # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
2537+# GSSAPIKeyExchange no
2538+# GSSAPITrustDNS no
2539 # BatchMode no
2540 # CheckHostIP yes
2541 # AddressFamily any
2542diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
2543index a47f3ca..cac8cda 100644
2544--- a/ssh_config.5
2545+++ b/ssh_config.5
2546@@ -749,11 +749,45 @@ Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
2547 The default is
2548 .Dq no .
2549 Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
2550+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
2551+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using
2552+GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key.
2553+The default is
2554+.Dq no .
2555+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
2556+.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity
2557+If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when
2558+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default
2559+identity will be used.
2560+.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity
2561+If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when
2562+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the
2563+expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target
2564+hostname.
2565 .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
2566 Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
2567 The default is
2568 .Dq no .
2569-Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
2570+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
2571+.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
2572+If set to
2573+.Dq yes
2574+then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the
2575+ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed
2576+credentials to a session on the server.
2577+The default is
2578+.Dq no .
2579+.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
2580+Set to
2581+.Dq yes
2582+to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
2583+the name of the host being connected to. If
2584+.Dq no ,
2585+the hostname entered on the
2586+command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
2587+The default is
2588+.Dq no .
2589+This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
2590 .It Cm HashKnownHosts
2591 Indicates that
2592 .Xr ssh 1
2593diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
2594index 7751031..e2ea826 100644
2595--- a/sshconnect2.c
2596+++ b/sshconnect2.c
2597@@ -160,9 +160,34 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
2598 struct kex *kex;
2599 int r;
2600
2601+#ifdef GSSAPI
2602+ char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL;
2603+ char *gss_host = NULL;
2604+#endif
2605+
2606 xxx_host = host;
2607 xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
2608
2609+#ifdef GSSAPI
2610+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
2611+ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
2612+ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
2613+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
2614+
2615+ if (options.gss_trust_dns)
2616+ gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1);
2617+ else
2618+ gss_host = host;
2619+
2620+ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity);
2621+ if (gss) {
2622+ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
2623+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
2624+ "%s,%s", gss, orig);
2625+ }
2626+ }
2627+#endif
2628+
2629 myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
2630 options.kex_algorithms);
2631 myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
2632@@ -193,6 +218,17 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
2633 order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port));
2634 }
2635
2636+#ifdef GSSAPI
2637+ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
2638+ * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
2639+ if (options.gss_keyex && gss) {
2640+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
2641+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
2642+ "%s,null", orig);
2643+ free(gss);
2644+ }
2645+#endif
2646+
2647 if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
2648 packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
2649 (time_t)options.rekey_interval);
2650@@ -211,10 +247,30 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
2651 # endif
2652 #endif
2653 kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client;
2654+#ifdef GSSAPI
2655+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
2656+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
2657+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
2658+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
2659+ }
2660+#endif
2661 kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
2662 kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
2663 kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
2664
2665+#ifdef GSSAPI
2666+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
2667+ kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
2668+ kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
2669+ kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity;
2670+ if (options.gss_server_identity) {
2671+ kex->gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
2672+ } else {
2673+ kex->gss_host = gss_host;
2674+ }
2675+ }
2676+#endif
2677+
2678 dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, active_state);
2679
2680 if (options.use_roaming && !kex->roaming) {
2681@@ -306,6 +362,7 @@ int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
2682 int input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
2683 int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
2684 int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
2685+int userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt);
2686 #endif
2687
2688 void userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
2689@@ -321,6 +378,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
2690
2691 Authmethod authmethods[] = {
2692 #ifdef GSSAPI
2693+ {"gssapi-keyex",
2694+ userauth_gsskeyex,
2695+ NULL,
2696+ &options.gss_authentication,
2697+ NULL},
2698 {"gssapi-with-mic",
2699 userauth_gssapi,
2700 NULL,
2701@@ -627,19 +689,31 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
2702 static u_int mech = 0;
2703 OM_uint32 min;
2704 int ok = 0;
2705+ const char *gss_host;
2706+
2707+ if (options.gss_server_identity)
2708+ gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
2709+ else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
2710+ gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1);
2711+ else
2712+ gss_host = authctxt->host;
2713
2714 /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
2715 * once. */
2716
2717 if (gss_supported == NULL)
2718- gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported);
2719+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) {
2720+ gss_supported = NULL;
2721+ return 0;
2722+ }
2723
2724 /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
2725 while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
2726 /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
2727 if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
2728 ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
2729- &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
2730+ &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host,
2731+ options.gss_client_identity)) {
2732 ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
2733 } else {
2734 mech++;
2735@@ -736,8 +810,8 @@ input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
2736 {
2737 Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
2738 Gssctxt *gssctxt;
2739- int oidlen;
2740- char *oidv;
2741+ u_int oidlen;
2742+ u_char *oidv;
2743
2744 if (authctxt == NULL)
2745 fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
2746@@ -850,6 +924,48 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
2747 free(lang);
2748 return 0;
2749 }
2750+
2751+int
2752+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
2753+{
2754+ Buffer b;
2755+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
2756+ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
2757+ OM_uint32 ms;
2758+
2759+ static int attempt = 0;
2760+ if (attempt++ >= 1)
2761+ return (0);
2762+
2763+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
2764+ debug("No valid Key exchange context");
2765+ return (0);
2766+ }
2767+
2768+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
2769+ "gssapi-keyex");
2770+
2771+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
2772+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
2773+
2774+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
2775+ buffer_free(&b);
2776+ return (0);
2777+ }
2778+
2779+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
2780+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
2781+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
2782+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
2783+ packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
2784+ packet_send();
2785+
2786+ buffer_free(&b);
2787+ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
2788+
2789+ return (1);
2790+}
2791+
2792 #endif /* GSSAPI */
2793
2794 int
2795diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
2796index 65ef7e8..839c2e0 100644
2797--- a/sshd.c
2798+++ b/sshd.c
2799@@ -126,6 +126,10 @@
2800 #include "version.h"
2801 #include "ssherr.h"
2802
2803+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
2804+#include <Security/AuthSession.h>
2805+#endif
2806+
2807 #ifndef O_NOCTTY
2808 #define O_NOCTTY 0
2809 #endif
2810@@ -1827,10 +1831,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
2811 logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
2812 options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
2813 }
2814+#ifndef GSSAPI
2815+ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
2816 if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
2817 logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
2818 options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
2819 }
2820+#endif
2821 if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
2822 logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
2823 exit(1);
2824@@ -2145,6 +2152,60 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
2825 remote_ip, remote_port, laddr, get_local_port());
2826 free(laddr);
2827
2828+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
2829+ /*
2830+ * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if
2831+ * the current session is the root session or we are not launched
2832+ * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode). We do not
2833+ * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from
2834+ * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us.
2835+ *
2836+ * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an
2837+ * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating
2838+ * new sessions for us. Then all the users will end up in the
2839+ * same session (bad).
2840+ *
2841+ * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us
2842+ * automatically.
2843+ *
2844+ * We must create the session before any credentials are stored
2845+ * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below).
2846+ */
2847+ {
2848+ OSStatus err = 0;
2849+ SecuritySessionId sid = 0;
2850+ SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0;
2851+
2852+ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs);
2853+ if (err)
2854+ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
2855+ (unsigned) err);
2856+ else
2857+ debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
2858+ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
2859+
2860+ if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot))
2861+ debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... "
2862+ "assuming inetd created the session for us.");
2863+ else {
2864+ debug("Creating new security session...");
2865+ err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote);
2866+ if (err)
2867+ error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X",
2868+ (unsigned) err);
2869+
2870+ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid,
2871+ &sattrs);
2872+ if (err)
2873+ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
2874+ (unsigned) err);
2875+ else
2876+ debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
2877+ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
2878+ }
2879+ }
2880+#endif
2881+
2882 /*
2883 * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
2884 * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
2885@@ -2563,6 +2624,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
2886 myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
2887 list_hostkey_types());
2888
2889+#ifdef GSSAPI
2890+ {
2891+ char *orig;
2892+ char *gss = NULL;
2893+ char *newstr = NULL;
2894+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
2895+
2896+ /*
2897+ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
2898+ * the other key exchange algorithms
2899+ */
2900+
2901+ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
2902+ orig = NULL;
2903+
2904+ if (options.gss_keyex)
2905+ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
2906+ else
2907+ gss = NULL;
2908+
2909+ if (gss && orig)
2910+ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
2911+ else if (gss)
2912+ newstr = gss;
2913+ else if (orig)
2914+ newstr = orig;
2915+
2916+ /*
2917+ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
2918+ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
2919+ * host key algorithm we support
2920+ */
2921+ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
2922+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
2923+
2924+ if (newstr)
2925+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
2926+ else
2927+ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
2928+ }
2929+#endif
2930+
2931 /* start key exchange */
2932 if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0)
2933 fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r));
2934@@ -2577,6 +2680,13 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
2935 # endif
2936 #endif
2937 kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
2938+#ifdef GSSAPI
2939+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
2940+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
2941+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
2942+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
2943+ }
2944+#endif
2945 kex->server = 1;
2946 kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
2947 kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
2948diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
2949index 4d77f05..64786c9 100644
2950--- a/sshd_config
2951+++ b/sshd_config
2952@@ -84,6 +84,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
2953 # GSSAPI options
2954 #GSSAPIAuthentication no
2955 #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
2956+#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
2957+#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
2958
2959 # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
2960 # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
2961diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
2962index b18d340..5491c89 100644
2963--- a/sshd_config.5
2964+++ b/sshd_config.5
2965@@ -621,6 +621,12 @@ Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
2966 The default is
2967 .Dq no .
2968 Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
2969+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
2970+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
2971+doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
2972+The default is
2973+.Dq no .
2974+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
2975 .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
2976 Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
2977 on logout.
2978@@ -642,6 +648,11 @@ machine's default store.
2979 This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines.
2980 The default is
2981 .Dq yes .
2982+.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey
2983+Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a
2984+successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed
2985+or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is
2986+.Dq no .
2987 .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
2988 Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication
2989 as a comma-separated pattern list.
2990diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
2991index 32dd8f2..5368e7c 100644
2992--- a/sshkey.c
2993+++ b/sshkey.c
2994@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] = {
2995 # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
2996 # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
2997 #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
2998+ { "null", "null", KEY_NULL, 0, 0 },
2999 { NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0 }
3000 };
3001
3002@@ -200,7 +201,7 @@ key_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only)
3003 const struct keytype *kt;
3004
3005 for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
3006- if (kt->name == NULL)
3007+ if (kt->name == NULL || kt->type == KEY_NULL)
3008 continue;
3009 if ((certs_only && !kt->cert) || (plain_only && kt->cert))
3010 continue;
3011diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
3012index c8d3cdd..5cf4e5d 100644
3013--- a/sshkey.h
3014+++ b/sshkey.h
3015@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ enum sshkey_types {
3016 KEY_DSA_CERT,
3017 KEY_ECDSA_CERT,
3018 KEY_ED25519_CERT,
3019+ KEY_NULL,
3020 KEY_UNSPEC
3021 };
3022
diff --git a/debian/patches/helpful-wait-terminate.patch b/debian/patches/helpful-wait-terminate.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a5ea56083
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/helpful-wait-terminate.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
1From 4ba040812693f5823bc8643cfb82a581a5e8e5db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:56 +0000
4Subject: Mention ~& when waiting for forwarded connections to terminate
5
6Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/50308
7Last-Update: 2010-02-27
8
9Patch-Name: helpful-wait-terminate.patch
10---
11 serverloop.c | 2 +-
12 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
13
14diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
15index 306ac36..68f0251 100644
16--- a/serverloop.c
17+++ b/serverloop.c
18@@ -687,7 +687,7 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int fdout_arg, int fderr_arg)
19 if (!channel_still_open())
20 break;
21 if (!waiting_termination) {
22- const char *s = "Waiting for forwarded connections to terminate...\r\n";
23+ const char *s = "Waiting for forwarded connections to terminate... (press ~& to background)\r\n";
24 char *cp;
25 waiting_termination = 1;
26 buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, s, strlen(s));
diff --git a/debian/patches/keepalive-extensions.patch b/debian/patches/keepalive-extensions.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..81c8935b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/keepalive-extensions.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
1From 5664b20b9d8ee691d664333b83ebb5e7560933a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Richard Kettlewell <rjk@greenend.org.uk>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:52 +0000
4Subject: Various keepalive extensions
5
6Add compatibility aliases for ProtocolKeepAlives and SetupTimeOut, supported
7in previous versions of Debian's OpenSSH package but since superseded by
8ServerAliveInterval. (We're probably stuck with this bit for
9compatibility.)
10
11In batch mode, default ServerAliveInterval to five minutes.
12
13Adjust documentation to match and to give some more advice on use of
14keepalives.
15
16Author: Ian Jackson <ian@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
17Author: Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>
18Author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
19Last-Update: 2015-11-29
20
21Patch-Name: keepalive-extensions.patch
22---
23 readconf.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
24 ssh_config.5 | 21 +++++++++++++++++++--
25 sshd_config.5 | 3 +++
26 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
27
28diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
29index 522ad37..46c343f 100644
30--- a/readconf.c
31+++ b/readconf.c
32@@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ typedef enum {
33 oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys,
34 oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedKeyTypes,
35 oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes,
36+ oProtocolKeepAlives, oSetupTimeOut,
37 oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported
38 } OpCodes;
39
40@@ -290,6 +291,8 @@ static struct {
41 { "hostbasedkeytypes", oHostbasedKeyTypes },
42 { "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes },
43 { "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown },
44+ { "protocolkeepalives", oProtocolKeepAlives },
45+ { "setuptimeout", oSetupTimeOut },
46
47 { NULL, oBadOption }
48 };
49@@ -1304,6 +1307,8 @@ parse_keytypes:
50 goto parse_flag;
51
52 case oServerAliveInterval:
53+ case oProtocolKeepAlives: /* Debian-specific compatibility alias */
54+ case oSetupTimeOut: /* Debian-specific compatibility alias */
55 intptr = &options->server_alive_interval;
56 goto parse_time;
57
58@@ -1856,8 +1861,13 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
59 options->rekey_interval = 0;
60 if (options->verify_host_key_dns == -1)
61 options->verify_host_key_dns = 0;
62- if (options->server_alive_interval == -1)
63- options->server_alive_interval = 0;
64+ if (options->server_alive_interval == -1) {
65+ /* in batch mode, default is 5mins */
66+ if (options->batch_mode == 1)
67+ options->server_alive_interval = 300;
68+ else
69+ options->server_alive_interval = 0;
70+ }
71 if (options->server_alive_count_max == -1)
72 options->server_alive_count_max = 3;
73 if (options->control_master == -1)
74diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
75index 673d0b7..4e34115 100644
76--- a/ssh_config.5
77+++ b/ssh_config.5
78@@ -233,8 +233,12 @@ Valid arguments are
79 If set to
80 .Dq yes ,
81 passphrase/password querying will be disabled.
82+In addition, the
83+.Cm ServerAliveInterval
84+option will be set to 300 seconds by default.
85 This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no user
86-is present to supply the password.
87+is present to supply the password,
88+and where it is desirable to detect a broken network swiftly.
89 The argument must be
90 .Dq yes
91 or
92@@ -1479,8 +1483,15 @@ from the server,
93 will send a message through the encrypted
94 channel to request a response from the server.
95 The default
96-is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server.
97+is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server,
98+or 300 if the
99+.Cm BatchMode
100+option is set.
101 This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
102+.Cm ProtocolKeepAlives
103+and
104+.Cm SetupTimeOut
105+are Debian-specific compatibility aliases for this option.
106 .It Cm StreamLocalBindMask
107 Sets the octal file creation mode mask
108 .Pq umask
109@@ -1546,6 +1557,12 @@ Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the
110 other side.
111 If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one
112 of the machines will be properly noticed.
113+This option only uses TCP keepalives (as opposed to using ssh level
114+keepalives), so takes a long time to notice when the connection dies.
115+As such, you probably want
116+the
117+.Cm ServerAliveInterval
118+option as well.
119 However, this means that
120 connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people
121 find it annoying.
122diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
123index 5491c89..c8ee35d 100644
124--- a/sshd_config.5
125+++ b/sshd_config.5
126@@ -1510,6 +1510,9 @@ This avoids infinitely hanging sessions.
127 .Pp
128 To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
129 .Dq no .
130+.Pp
131+This option was formerly called
132+.Cm KeepAlive .
133 .It Cm TrustedUserCAKeys
134 Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate authorities that are
135 trusted to sign user certificates for authentication, or
diff --git a/debian/patches/lintian-symlink-pickiness.patch b/debian/patches/lintian-symlink-pickiness.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..14e704132
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/lintian-symlink-pickiness.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
1From 615714e35f934eb8f212070549f396c624a64b26 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:08 +0000
4Subject: Fix picky lintian errors about slogin symlinks
5
6Apparently this breaks some SVR4 packaging systems, so upstream can't win
7either way and opted to keep the status quo. We need this patch anyway.
8
9Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1728
10Last-Update: 2013-09-14
11
12Patch-Name: lintian-symlink-pickiness.patch
13---
14 Makefile.in | 4 ++--
15 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
16
17diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
18index 915c740..e161d0e 100644
19--- a/Makefile.in
20+++ b/Makefile.in
21@@ -330,9 +330,9 @@ install-files:
22 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
23 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
24 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
25- ln -s ./ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
26+ ln -s ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
27 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
28- ln -s ./ssh.1 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
29+ ln -s ssh.1 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
30
31 install-sysconf:
32 if [ ! -d $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir) ]; then \
diff --git a/debian/patches/mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch b/debian/patches/mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..50e128020
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
1From a28ed57e3db85165476dddad441fc55f683fbaf4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Scott Moser <smoser@ubuntu.com>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:03 +0000
4Subject: Mention ssh-keygen in ssh fingerprint changed warning
5
6Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1843
7Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/686607
8Last-Update: 2015-09-08
9
10Patch-Name: mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch
11---
12 sshconnect.c | 8 +++++++-
13 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
14
15diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
16index cd467fd..bbde8af 100644
17--- a/sshconnect.c
18+++ b/sshconnect.c
19@@ -1078,9 +1078,13 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
20 error("%s. This could either mean that", key_msg);
21 error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host");
22 error("and its host key have changed at the same time.");
23- if (ip_status != HOST_NEW)
24+ if (ip_status != HOST_NEW) {
25 error("Offending key for IP in %s:%lu",
26 ip_found->file, ip_found->line);
27+ error(" remove with:");
28+ error(" ssh-keygen -f \"%s\" -R %s",
29+ ip_found->file, ip);
30+ }
31 }
32 /* The host key has changed. */
33 warn_changed_key(host_key);
34@@ -1088,6 +1092,8 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
35 user_hostfiles[0]);
36 error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu", key_type(host_found->key),
37 host_found->file, host_found->line);
38+ error(" remove with:");
39+ error(" ssh-keygen -f \"%s\" -R %s", host_found->file, host);
40
41 /*
42 * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
diff --git a/debian/patches/no-openssl-version-status.patch b/debian/patches/no-openssl-version-status.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ad3164cab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/no-openssl-version-status.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
1From 576cbedac5684f24e6ff61fe70edfc81945fd7dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:14 +0000
4Subject: Don't check the status field of the OpenSSL version
5
6There is no reason to check the version of OpenSSL (in Debian). If it's
7not compatible the soname will change. OpenSSH seems to want to do a
8check for the soname based on the version number, but wants to keep the
9status of the release the same. Remove that check on the status since
10it doesn't tell you anything about how compatible that version is.
11
12Author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
13Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/93581
14Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/664383
15Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/732940
16Forwarded: not-needed
17Last-Update: 2014-10-07
18
19Patch-Name: no-openssl-version-status.patch
20---
21 openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c | 6 +++---
22 openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c | 1 +
23 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
24
25diff --git a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
26index 63a660c..3f62403 100644
27--- a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
28+++ b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
29@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
30 /*
31 * OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
32 * We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0.
33- * After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we
34+ * After that, we accept compatible fix and status versions (so we
35 * allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed
36 * within a patch series.
37 */
38@@ -57,10 +57,10 @@ ssh_compatible_openssl(long headerver, long libver)
39 }
40
41 /*
42- * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor,status must match and library
43+ * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor must match and library
44 * fix version must be equal to or newer than the header.
45 */
46- mask = 0xfff0000fL; /* major,minor,status */
47+ mask = 0xfff00000L; /* major,minor */
48 hfix = (headerver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
49 lfix = (libver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
50 if ( (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask) && lfix >= hfix)
51diff --git a/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c b/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
52index 5d019b5..5847487 100644
53--- a/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
54+++ b/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
55@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ struct version_test {
56
57 /* built with 1.0.1b release headers */
58 { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000101fL, 1},/* exact match */
59+ { 0x1000101fL, 0x10001010L, 1}, /* different status: ok */
60 { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000102fL, 1}, /* newer library patch version: ok */
61 { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000100fL, 1}, /* older library patch version: ok */
62 { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000201fL, 1}, /* newer library fix version: ok */
diff --git a/debian/patches/openbsd-docs.patch b/debian/patches/openbsd-docs.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..887e93aac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/openbsd-docs.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
1From b2f2bca0fb145fbf2ffdfadc3b206f212be0a7dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:09 +0000
4Subject: Adjust various OpenBSD-specific references in manual pages
5
6No single bug reference for this patch, but history includes:
7 http://bugs.debian.org/154434 (login.conf(5))
8 http://bugs.debian.org/513417 (/etc/rc)
9 http://bugs.debian.org/530692 (ssl(8))
10 https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/456660 (ssl(8))
11
12Forwarded: not-needed
13Last-Update: 2014-10-07
14
15Patch-Name: openbsd-docs.patch
16---
17 moduli.5 | 4 ++--
18 ssh-keygen.1 | 12 ++++--------
19 ssh.1 | 4 ++++
20 sshd.8 | 5 ++---
21 sshd_config.5 | 3 +--
22 5 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
23
24diff --git a/moduli.5 b/moduli.5
25index ef0de08..149846c 100644
26--- a/moduli.5
27+++ b/moduli.5
28@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
29 .Nd Diffie-Hellman moduli
30 .Sh DESCRIPTION
31 The
32-.Pa /etc/moduli
33+.Pa /etc/ssh/moduli
34 file contains prime numbers and generators for use by
35 .Xr sshd 8
36 in the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange key exchange method.
37@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ first estimates the size of the modulus required to produce enough
38 Diffie-Hellman output to sufficiently key the selected symmetric cipher.
39 .Xr sshd 8
40 then randomly selects a modulus from
41-.Fa /etc/moduli
42+.Fa /etc/ssh/moduli
43 that best meets the size requirement.
44 .Sh SEE ALSO
45 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
46diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
47index ed17a08..c560179 100644
48--- a/ssh-keygen.1
49+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
50@@ -174,9 +174,7 @@ key in
51 .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
52 or
53 .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa .
54-Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys,
55-as seen in
56-.Pa /etc/rc .
57+Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys.
58 .Pp
59 Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which
60 to store the private key.
61@@ -223,9 +221,7 @@ For each of the key types (rsa1, rsa, dsa, ecdsa and ed25519)
62 for which host keys
63 do not exist, generate the host keys with the default key file path,
64 an empty passphrase, default bits for the key type, and default comment.
65-This is used by
66-.Pa /etc/rc
67-to generate new host keys.
68+This is used by system administration scripts to generate new host keys.
69 .It Fl a Ar rounds
70 When saving a new-format private key (i.e. an ed25519 key or any SSH protocol
71 2 key when the
72@@ -638,7 +634,7 @@ option.
73 Valid generator values are 2, 3, and 5.
74 .Pp
75 Screened DH groups may be installed in
76-.Pa /etc/moduli .
77+.Pa /etc/ssh/moduli .
78 It is important that this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths and
79 that both ends of a connection share common moduli.
80 .Sh CERTIFICATES
81@@ -837,7 +833,7 @@ on all machines
82 where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication.
83 There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret.
84 .Pp
85-.It Pa /etc/moduli
86+.It Pa /etc/ssh/moduli
87 Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX.
88 The file format is described in
89 .Xr moduli 5 .
90diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
91index ff80022..4fba77f 100644
92--- a/ssh.1
93+++ b/ssh.1
94@@ -853,6 +853,10 @@ Protocol 1 is restricted to using only RSA keys,
95 but protocol 2 may use any.
96 The HISTORY section of
97 .Xr ssl 8
98+(on non-OpenBSD systems, see
99+.nh
100+http://www.openbsd.org/cgi\-bin/man.cgi?query=ssl&sektion=8#HISTORY)
101+.hy
102 contains a brief discussion of the DSA and RSA algorithms.
103 .Pp
104 The file
105diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
106index 2105979..42ba596 100644
107--- a/sshd.8
108+++ b/sshd.8
109@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ over an insecure network.
110 .Nm
111 listens for connections from clients.
112 It is normally started at boot from
113-.Pa /etc/rc .
114+.Pa /etc/init.d/ssh .
115 It forks a new
116 daemon for each incoming connection.
117 The forked daemons handle
118@@ -861,7 +861,7 @@ This file is for host-based authentication (see
119 .Xr ssh 1 ) .
120 It should only be writable by root.
121 .Pp
122-.It Pa /etc/moduli
123+.It Pa /etc/ssh/moduli
124 Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange".
125 The file format is described in
126 .Xr moduli 5 .
127@@ -960,7 +960,6 @@ The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
128 .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
129 .Xr chroot 2 ,
130 .Xr hosts_access 5 ,
131-.Xr login.conf 5 ,
132 .Xr moduli 5 ,
133 .Xr sshd_config 5 ,
134 .Xr inetd 8 ,
135diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
136index b149bd3..0828592 100644
137--- a/sshd_config.5
138+++ b/sshd_config.5
139@@ -374,8 +374,7 @@ This option is only available for protocol version 2.
140 By default, no banner is displayed.
141 .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
142 Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
143-PAM or through authentication styles supported in
144-.Xr login.conf 5 )
145+PAM).
146 The default is
147 .Dq yes .
148 .It Cm ChrootDirectory
diff --git a/debian/patches/package-versioning.patch b/debian/patches/package-versioning.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..02f11bec0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/package-versioning.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
1From 40fc1212b3c06063cf3926aa8e8209e1fa05436f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:05 +0000
4Subject: Include the Debian version in our identification
5
6This makes it easier to audit networks for versions patched against security
7vulnerabilities. It has little detrimental effect, as attackers will
8generally just try attacks rather than bothering to scan for
9vulnerable-looking version strings. (However, see debian-banner.patch.)
10
11Forwarded: not-needed
12Last-Update: 2013-09-14
13
14Patch-Name: package-versioning.patch
15---
16 sshconnect.c | 4 ++--
17 sshd.c | 2 +-
18 version.h | 7 ++++++-
19 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
20
21diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
22index bbde8af..0ec1e54 100644
23--- a/sshconnect.c
24+++ b/sshconnect.c
25@@ -524,10 +524,10 @@ send_client_banner(int connection_out, int minor1)
26 /* Send our own protocol version identification. */
27 if (compat20) {
28 xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\r\n",
29- PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION);
30+ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE);
31 } else {
32 xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n",
33- PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, minor1, SSH_VERSION);
34+ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, minor1, SSH_RELEASE);
35 }
36 if (roaming_atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, client_version_string,
37 strlen(client_version_string)) != strlen(client_version_string))
38diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
39index 0537bc9..0d4fb7f 100644
40--- a/sshd.c
41+++ b/sshd.c
42@@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
43 }
44
45 xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s",
46- major, minor, SSH_VERSION,
47+ major, minor, SSH_RELEASE,
48 *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
49 options.version_addendum, newline);
50
51diff --git a/version.h b/version.h
52index d917ca1..5c22d90 100644
53--- a/version.h
54+++ b/version.h
55@@ -3,4 +3,9 @@
56 #define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_7.1"
57
58 #define SSH_PORTABLE "p1"
59-#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
60+#define SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
61+#ifdef SSH_EXTRAVERSION
62+#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM " " SSH_EXTRAVERSION
63+#else
64+#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM
65+#endif
diff --git a/debian/patches/quieter-signals.patch b/debian/patches/quieter-signals.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cc10ef7b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/quieter-signals.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
1From f7d2bb35f07cfcab63fc8cf3cd9bef646065482c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Peter Samuelson <peter@p12n.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:55 +0000
4Subject: Reduce severity of "Killed by signal %d"
5
6This produces irritating messages when using ProxyCommand or other programs
7that use ssh under the covers (e.g. Subversion). These messages are more
8normally printed by the calling program, such as the shell.
9
10According to the upstream bug, the right way to avoid this is to use the -q
11option, so we may drop this patch after further investigation into whether
12any software in Debian is still relying on it.
13
14Author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
15Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1118
16Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/313371
17Last-Update: 2013-09-14
18
19Patch-Name: quieter-signals.patch
20---
21 clientloop.c | 6 ++++--
22 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
23
24diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
25index 9e45d24..5c2b721 100644
26--- a/clientloop.c
27+++ b/clientloop.c
28@@ -1721,8 +1721,10 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id)
29 exit_status = 0;
30 }
31
32- if (received_signal)
33- fatal("Killed by signal %d.", (int) received_signal);
34+ if (received_signal) {
35+ debug("Killed by signal %d.", (int) received_signal);
36+ cleanup_exit((int) received_signal + 128);
37+ }
38
39 /*
40 * In interactive mode (with pseudo tty) display a message indicating
diff --git a/debian/patches/restore-tcp-wrappers.patch b/debian/patches/restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5778440b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
1From 2cd06c4a70dfb22fd1d54779173b5e086c52e08f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Tue, 7 Oct 2014 13:22:41 +0100
4Subject: Restore TCP wrappers support
5
6Support for TCP wrappers was dropped in OpenSSH 6.7. See this message
7and thread:
8
9 https://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/2014-April/032497.html
10
11It is true that this reduces preauth attack surface in sshd. On the
12other hand, this support seems to be quite widely used, and abruptly
13dropping it (from the perspective of users who don't read
14openssh-unix-dev) could easily cause more serious problems in practice.
15
16It's not entirely clear what the right long-term answer for Debian is,
17but it at least probably doesn't involve dropping this feature shortly
18before a freeze.
19
20Forwarded: not-needed
21Last-Update: 2014-10-07
22
23Patch-Name: restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
24---
25 configure.ac | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
26 sshd.8 | 7 +++++++
27 sshd.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
28 3 files changed, 89 insertions(+)
29
30diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
31index 7a25603..128889a 100644
32--- a/configure.ac
33+++ b/configure.ac
34@@ -1448,6 +1448,62 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([skey],
35 ]
36 )
37
38+# Check whether user wants TCP wrappers support
39+TCPW_MSG="no"
40+AC_ARG_WITH([tcp-wrappers],
41+ [ --with-tcp-wrappers[[=PATH]] Enable tcpwrappers support (optionally in PATH)],
42+ [
43+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
44+ saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
45+ saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
46+ saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
47+ if test -n "${withval}" && \
48+ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
49+ if test -d "${withval}/lib"; then
50+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
51+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
52+ else
53+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
54+ fi
55+ else
56+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
57+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
58+ else
59+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
60+ fi
61+ fi
62+ if test -d "${withval}/include"; then
63+ CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
64+ else
65+ CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
66+ fi
67+ fi
68+ LIBS="-lwrap $LIBS"
69+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libwrap])
70+ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
71+#include <sys/types.h>
72+#include <sys/socket.h>
73+#include <netinet/in.h>
74+#include <tcpd.h>
75+int deny_severity = 0, allow_severity = 0;
76+ ]], [[
77+ hosts_access(0);
78+ ]])], [
79+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
80+ AC_DEFINE([LIBWRAP], [1],
81+ [Define if you want
82+ TCP Wrappers support])
83+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lwrap"
84+ TCPW_MSG="yes"
85+ ], [
86+ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libwrap missing])
87+
88+ ])
89+ LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
90+ fi
91+ ]
92+)
93+
94 # Check whether user wants to use ldns
95 LDNS_MSG="no"
96 AC_ARG_WITH(ldns,
97@@ -4953,6 +5009,7 @@ echo " KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG"
98 echo " SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
99 echo " Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG"
100 echo " S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"
101+echo " TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG"
102 echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
103 echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
104 echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
105diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
106index 213b5fc..2105979 100644
107--- a/sshd.8
108+++ b/sshd.8
109@@ -850,6 +850,12 @@ the user's home directory becomes accessible.
110 This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be
111 readable by anyone else.
112 .Pp
113+.It Pa /etc/hosts.allow
114+.It Pa /etc/hosts.deny
115+Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are defined here.
116+Further details are described in
117+.Xr hosts_access 5 .
118+.Pp
119 .It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
120 This file is for host-based authentication (see
121 .Xr ssh 1 ) .
122@@ -953,6 +959,7 @@ The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
123 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
124 .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
125 .Xr chroot 2 ,
126+.Xr hosts_access 5 ,
127 .Xr login.conf 5 ,
128 .Xr moduli 5 ,
129 .Xr sshd_config 5 ,
130diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
131index 839c2e0..0e30e6e 100644
132--- a/sshd.c
133+++ b/sshd.c
134@@ -130,6 +130,13 @@
135 #include <Security/AuthSession.h>
136 #endif
137
138+#ifdef LIBWRAP
139+#include <tcpd.h>
140+#include <syslog.h>
141+int allow_severity;
142+int deny_severity;
143+#endif /* LIBWRAP */
144+
145 #ifndef O_NOCTTY
146 #define O_NOCTTY 0
147 #endif
148@@ -2145,6 +2152,24 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
149 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
150 audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
151 #endif
152+#ifdef LIBWRAP
153+ allow_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_INFO;
154+ deny_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_WARNING;
155+ /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */
156+ if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
157+ struct request_info req;
158+
159+ request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0);
160+ fromhost(&req);
161+
162+ if (!hosts_access(&req)) {
163+ debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper");
164+ refuse(&req);
165+ /* NOTREACHED */
166+ fatal("libwrap refuse returns");
167+ }
168+ }
169+#endif /* LIBWRAP */
170
171 /* Log the connection. */
172 laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock_in);
diff --git a/debian/patches/scp-quoting.patch b/debian/patches/scp-quoting.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c45aad58f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/scp-quoting.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
1From a4fade6aaf7df4c6a01fc353a5cd689e0073e367 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: =?UTF-8?q?Nicolas=20Valc=C3=A1rcel?= <nvalcarcel@ubuntu.com>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:59 +0000
4Subject: Adjust scp quoting in verbose mode
5
6Tweak scp's reporting of filenames in verbose mode to be a bit less
7confusing with spaces.
8
9This should be revised to mimic real shell quoting.
10
11Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/89945
12Last-Update: 2010-02-27
13
14Patch-Name: scp-quoting.patch
15---
16 scp.c | 12 ++++++++++--
17 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
18
19diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
20index 593fe89..e39294e 100644
21--- a/scp.c
22+++ b/scp.c
23@@ -190,8 +190,16 @@ do_local_cmd(arglist *a)
24
25 if (verbose_mode) {
26 fprintf(stderr, "Executing:");
27- for (i = 0; i < a->num; i++)
28- fprintf(stderr, " %s", a->list[i]);
29+ for (i = 0; i < a->num; i++) {
30+ if (i == 0)
31+ fprintf(stderr, " %s", a->list[i]);
32+ else
33+ /*
34+ * TODO: misbehaves if a->list[i] contains a
35+ * single quote
36+ */
37+ fprintf(stderr, " '%s'", a->list[i]);
38+ }
39 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
40 }
41 if ((pid = fork()) == -1)
diff --git a/debian/patches/selinux-role.patch b/debian/patches/selinux-role.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..aee443d87
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/selinux-role.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,504 @@
1From d55bc528ac450324522f02d90a2bdc4832d1eef8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Manoj Srivastava <srivasta@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:49 +0000
4Subject: Handle SELinux authorisation roles
5
6Rejected upstream due to discomfort with magic usernames; a better approach
7will need an SSH protocol change. In the meantime, this came from Debian's
8SELinux maintainer, so we'll keep it until we have something better.
9
10Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1641
11Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/394795
12Last-Update: 2015-08-19
13
14Patch-Name: selinux-role.patch
15---
16 auth.h | 1 +
17 auth1.c | 8 +++++++-
18 auth2.c | 10 ++++++++--
19 monitor.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
20 monitor.h | 2 ++
21 monitor_wrap.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++--
22 monitor_wrap.h | 3 ++-
23 openbsd-compat/port-linux.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++-------
24 openbsd-compat/port-linux.h | 4 ++--
25 platform.c | 4 ++--
26 platform.h | 2 +-
27 session.c | 10 +++++-----
28 session.h | 2 +-
29 sshd.c | 2 +-
30 sshpty.c | 4 ++--
31 sshpty.h | 2 +-
32 16 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
33
34diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
35index 8b27575..3c2222f 100644
36--- a/auth.h
37+++ b/auth.h
38@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
39 char *service;
40 struct passwd *pw; /* set if 'valid' */
41 char *style;
42+ char *role;
43 void *kbdintctxt;
44 char *info; /* Extra info for next auth_log */
45 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
46diff --git a/auth1.c b/auth1.c
47index 5073c49..dd00648 100644
48--- a/auth1.c
49+++ b/auth1.c
50@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ void
51 do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
52 {
53 u_int ulen;
54- char *user, *style = NULL;
55+ char *user, *style = NULL, *role = NULL;
56
57 /* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */
58 packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_USER);
59@@ -392,11 +392,17 @@ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
60 user = packet_get_cstring(&ulen);
61 packet_check_eom();
62
63+ if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
64+ *role++ = '\0';
65+
66 if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
67 *style++ = '\0';
68+ else if (role && (style = strchr(role, ':')) != NULL)
69+ *style++ = '\0';
70
71 authctxt->user = user;
72 authctxt->style = style;
73+ authctxt->role = role;
74
75 /* Verify that the user is a valid user. */
76 if ((authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user))) != NULL)
77diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
78index 3f49bdc..6eb3cc7 100644
79--- a/auth2.c
80+++ b/auth2.c
81@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
82 {
83 Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
84 Authmethod *m = NULL;
85- char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL;
86+ char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL, *role = NULL;
87 int authenticated = 0;
88
89 if (authctxt == NULL)
90@@ -228,8 +228,13 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
91 debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
92 debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
93
94+ if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
95+ *role++ = 0;
96+
97 if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
98 *style++ = 0;
99+ else if (role && (style = strchr(role, ':')) != NULL)
100+ *style++ = '\0';
101
102 if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) {
103 /* setup auth context */
104@@ -253,8 +258,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
105 use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
106 authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
107 authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
108+ authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
109 if (use_privsep)
110- mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
111+ mm_inform_authserv(service, style, role);
112 userauth_banner();
113 if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
114 packet_disconnect("no authentication methods enabled");
115diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
116index 2658aaa..c063ad1 100644
117--- a/monitor.c
118+++ b/monitor.c
119@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
120 int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
121 int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
122 int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
123+int mm_answer_authrole(int, Buffer *);
124 int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
125 int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
126 int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
127@@ -208,6 +209,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
128 {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
129 {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
130 {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
131+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole},
132 {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
133 {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
134 #ifdef USE_PAM
135@@ -879,6 +881,7 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
136 else {
137 /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
138 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
139+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1);
140 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
141 }
142 #ifdef USE_PAM
143@@ -909,14 +912,37 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
144
145 authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
146 authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
147- debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
148- __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
149+ authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
150+ debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s, role=%s",
151+ __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style, authctxt->role);
152
153 if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
154 free(authctxt->style);
155 authctxt->style = NULL;
156 }
157
158+ if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
159+ free(authctxt->role);
160+ authctxt->role = NULL;
161+ }
162+
163+ return (0);
164+}
165+
166+int
167+mm_answer_authrole(int sock, Buffer *m)
168+{
169+ monitor_permit_authentications(1);
170+
171+ authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
172+ debug3("%s: role=%s",
173+ __func__, authctxt->role);
174+
175+ if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
176+ free(authctxt->role);
177+ authctxt->role = NULL;
178+ }
179+
180 return (0);
181 }
182
183@@ -1544,7 +1570,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
184 res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
185 if (res == 0)
186 goto error;
187- pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
188+ pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty, authctxt->role);
189
190 buffer_put_int(m, 1);
191 buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
192diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
193index bc50ade..2d82b8b 100644
194--- a/monitor.h
195+++ b/monitor.h
196@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
197 MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151,
198 MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153,
199
200+ MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 154,
201+
202 };
203
204 struct mm_master;
205diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
206index 81ceddb..6799911 100644
207--- a/monitor_wrap.c
208+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
209@@ -327,10 +327,10 @@ mm_auth2_read_banner(void)
210 return (banner);
211 }
212
213-/* Inform the privileged process about service and style */
214+/* Inform the privileged process about service, style, and role */
215
216 void
217-mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
218+mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style, char *role)
219 {
220 Buffer m;
221
222@@ -339,12 +339,30 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
223 buffer_init(&m);
224 buffer_put_cstring(&m, service);
225 buffer_put_cstring(&m, style ? style : "");
226+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : "");
227
228 mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, &m);
229
230 buffer_free(&m);
231 }
232
233+/* Inform the privileged process about role */
234+
235+void
236+mm_inform_authrole(char *role)
237+{
238+ Buffer m;
239+
240+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
241+
242+ buffer_init(&m);
243+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : "");
244+
245+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, &m);
246+
247+ buffer_free(&m);
248+}
249+
250 /* Do the password authentication */
251 int
252 mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password)
253diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
254index 9758290..57e740f 100644
255--- a/monitor_wrap.h
256+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
257@@ -41,7 +41,8 @@ void mm_log_handler(LogLevel, const char *, void *);
258 int mm_is_monitor(void);
259 DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
260 int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int);
261-void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
262+void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *, char *);
263+void mm_inform_authrole(char *);
264 struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *);
265 char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
266 int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *);
267diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
268index f36999d..f9cdc15 100644
269--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
270+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
271@@ -29,6 +29,12 @@
272 #include <string.h>
273 #include <stdio.h>
274
275+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
276+#include "key.h"
277+#include "hostfile.h"
278+#include "auth.h"
279+#endif
280+
281 #include "log.h"
282 #include "xmalloc.h"
283 #include "port-linux.h"
284@@ -58,7 +64,7 @@ ssh_selinux_enabled(void)
285
286 /* Return the default security context for the given username */
287 static security_context_t
288-ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
289+ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, const char *role)
290 {
291 security_context_t sc = NULL;
292 char *sename = NULL, *lvl = NULL;
293@@ -73,9 +79,16 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
294 #endif
295
296 #ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
297- r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
298+ if (role != NULL && role[0])
299+ r = get_default_context_with_rolelevel(sename, role, lvl, NULL,
300+ &sc);
301+ else
302+ r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
303 #else
304- r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
305+ if (role != NULL && role[0])
306+ r = get_default_context_with_role(sename, role, NULL, &sc);
307+ else
308+ r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
309 #endif
310
311 if (r != 0) {
312@@ -105,7 +118,7 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
313
314 /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
315 void
316-ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
317+ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname, const char *role)
318 {
319 security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
320
321@@ -114,7 +127,7 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
322
323 debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
324
325- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
326+ user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, role);
327 if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
328 switch (security_getenforce()) {
329 case -1:
330@@ -136,7 +149,7 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
331
332 /* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
333 void
334-ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
335+ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty, const char *role)
336 {
337 security_context_t new_tty_ctx = NULL;
338 security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
339@@ -147,7 +160,7 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
340
341 debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
342
343- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
344+ user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, role);
345
346 /* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
347
348diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
349index e3d1004..80ce13a 100644
350--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
351+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
352@@ -21,8 +21,8 @@
353
354 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
355 int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
356-void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
357-void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
358+void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *, const char *);
359+void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *, const char *);
360 void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
361 void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
362 #endif
363diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
364index ee313da..f35ec39 100644
365--- a/platform.c
366+++ b/platform.c
367@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
368 * called if sshd is running as root.
369 */
370 void
371-platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
372+platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw, const char *role)
373 {
374 #if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(USE_PAM)
375 /*
376@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
377 }
378 #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
379 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
380- ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
381+ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name, role);
382 #endif
383 }
384
385diff --git a/platform.h b/platform.h
386index 1c7a45d..436ae7c 100644
387--- a/platform.h
388+++ b/platform.h
389@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ void platform_post_fork_parent(pid_t child_pid);
390 void platform_post_fork_child(void);
391 int platform_privileged_uidswap(void);
392 void platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
393-void platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *);
394+void platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *, const char *);
395 char *platform_get_krb5_client(const char *);
396 char *platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *);
397 int platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t);
398diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
399index 5a64715..afac4a5 100644
400--- a/session.c
401+++ b/session.c
402@@ -1487,7 +1487,7 @@ safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid)
403
404 /* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */
405 void
406-do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
407+do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw, const char *role)
408 {
409 char *chroot_path, *tmp;
410 #ifdef USE_LIBIAF
411@@ -1518,7 +1518,7 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
412 endgrent();
413 #endif
414
415- platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw);
416+ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw, role);
417
418 if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
419 strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
420@@ -1677,7 +1677,7 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
421
422 /* Force a password change */
423 if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
424- do_setusercontext(pw);
425+ do_setusercontext(pw, s->authctxt->role);
426 child_close_fds();
427 do_pwchange(s);
428 exit(1);
429@@ -1704,7 +1704,7 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
430 /* When PAM is enabled we rely on it to do the nologin check */
431 if (!options.use_pam)
432 do_nologin(pw);
433- do_setusercontext(pw);
434+ do_setusercontext(pw, s->authctxt->role);
435 /*
436 * PAM session modules in do_setusercontext may have
437 * generated messages, so if this in an interactive
438@@ -2115,7 +2115,7 @@ session_pty_req(Session *s)
439 tty_parse_modes(s->ttyfd, &n_bytes);
440
441 if (!use_privsep)
442- pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty);
443+ pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty, s->authctxt->role);
444
445 /* Set window size from the packet. */
446 pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
447diff --git a/session.h b/session.h
448index 6a2f35e..ef6593c 100644
449--- a/session.h
450+++ b/session.h
451@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *);
452 Session *session_new(void);
453 Session *session_by_tty(char *);
454 void session_close(Session *);
455-void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
456+void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *, const char *);
457 void child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
458 const char *value);
459
460diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
461index 0e30e6e..0537bc9 100644
462--- a/sshd.c
463+++ b/sshd.c
464@@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
465 explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
466
467 /* Drop privileges */
468- do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
469+ do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw, authctxt->role);
470
471 skip:
472 /* It is safe now to apply the key state */
473diff --git a/sshpty.c b/sshpty.c
474index 15da8c6..e89efb7 100644
475--- a/sshpty.c
476+++ b/sshpty.c
477@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ pty_change_window_size(int ptyfd, u_int row, u_int col,
478 }
479
480 void
481-pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty)
482+pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty, const char *role)
483 {
484 struct group *grp;
485 gid_t gid;
486@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty)
487 strerror(errno));
488
489 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
490- ssh_selinux_setup_pty(pw->pw_name, tty);
491+ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(pw->pw_name, tty, role);
492 #endif
493
494 if (st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid || st.st_gid != gid) {
495diff --git a/sshpty.h b/sshpty.h
496index cfa3224..edf2436 100644
497--- a/sshpty.h
498+++ b/sshpty.h
499@@ -24,4 +24,4 @@ int pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
500 void pty_release(const char *);
501 void pty_make_controlling_tty(int *, const char *);
502 void pty_change_window_size(int, u_int, u_int, u_int, u_int);
503-void pty_setowner(struct passwd *, const char *);
504+void pty_setowner(struct passwd *, const char *, const char *);
diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b37955563
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/series
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
1gssapi.patch
2restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
3selinux-role.patch
4ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch
5ssh1-keepalive.patch
6keepalive-extensions.patch
7syslog-level-silent.patch
8quieter-signals.patch
9helpful-wait-terminate.patch
10user-group-modes.patch
11scp-quoting.patch
12shell-path.patch
13dnssec-sshfp.patch
14auth-log-verbosity.patch
15mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch
16package-versioning.patch
17debian-banner.patch
18authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
19lintian-symlink-pickiness.patch
20openbsd-docs.patch
21ssh-argv0.patch
22doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
23doc-upstart.patch
24ssh-agent-setgid.patch
25no-openssl-version-status.patch
26gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
27sigstop.patch
28debian-config.patch
diff --git a/debian/patches/shell-path.patch b/debian/patches/shell-path.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..56f85c14e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/shell-path.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
1From e4ba682033c1e53b52cf4b03924b69f54945f1b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:00 +0000
4Subject: Look for $SHELL on the path for ProxyCommand/LocalCommand
5
6There's some debate on the upstream bug about whether POSIX requires this.
7I (Colin Watson) agree with Vincent and think it does.
8
9Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1494
10Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/492728
11Last-Update: 2013-09-14
12
13Patch-Name: shell-path.patch
14---
15 sshconnect.c | 4 ++--
16 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
17
18diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
19index 17fbe39..cd467fd 100644
20--- a/sshconnect.c
21+++ b/sshconnect.c
22@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command)
23 /* Execute the proxy command. Note that we gave up any
24 extra privileges above. */
25 signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
26- execv(argv[0], argv);
27+ execvp(argv[0], argv);
28 perror(argv[0]);
29 exit(1);
30 }
31@@ -1471,7 +1471,7 @@ ssh_local_cmd(const char *args)
32 if (pid == 0) {
33 signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
34 debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args);
35- execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
36+ execlp(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
37 error("Couldn't execute %s -c \"%s\": %s",
38 shell, args, strerror(errno));
39 _exit(1);
diff --git a/debian/patches/sigstop.patch b/debian/patches/sigstop.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4873a0527
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/sigstop.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
1From 7ce7aa96b03196d9d799f4caf6e4c7c6c2bed7da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:17 +0000
4Subject: Support synchronisation with service supervisor using SIGSTOP
5
6Author: Robie Basak <robie.basak@ubuntu.com>
7Forwarded: no
8Last-Update: 2014-04-14
9
10Patch-Name: sigstop.patch
11---
12 sshd.c | 10 ++++++++++
13 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
14
15diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
16index 6024e0e..7e72b9b 100644
17--- a/sshd.c
18+++ b/sshd.c
19@@ -2042,6 +2042,16 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
20 }
21 }
22
23+ if (getenv("SSH_SIGSTOP")) {
24+ /* Tell service supervisor that we are ready. */
25+ kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP);
26+ /* The service supervisor only ever expects a single
27+ * STOP signal, so do not ever signal it again, even
28+ * in the case of a re-exec or future children.
29+ */
30+ unsetenv("SSH_SIGSTOP");
31+ }
32+
33 /* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
34 server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
35 &newsock, config_s);
diff --git a/debian/patches/ssh-agent-setgid.patch b/debian/patches/ssh-agent-setgid.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8d40231f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/ssh-agent-setgid.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
1From 76ec1a4c34296f1485ce98e301a3d35c9779c2ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:13 +0000
4Subject: Document consequences of ssh-agent being setgid in ssh-agent(1)
5
6Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/711623
7Forwarded: no
8Last-Update: 2013-06-08
9
10Patch-Name: ssh-agent-setgid.patch
11---
12 ssh-agent.1 | 15 +++++++++++++++
13 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
14
15diff --git a/ssh-agent.1 b/ssh-agent.1
16index d0aa712..2a940d9 100644
17--- a/ssh-agent.1
18+++ b/ssh-agent.1
19@@ -186,6 +186,21 @@ environment variable holds the agent's process ID.
20 .Pp
21 The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command
22 line terminates.
23+.Pp
24+In Debian,
25+.Nm
26+is installed with the set-group-id bit set, to prevent
27+.Xr ptrace 2
28+attacks retrieving private key material.
29+This has the side-effect of causing the run-time linker to remove certain
30+environment variables which might have security implications for set-id
31+programs, including
32+.Ev LD_PRELOAD ,
33+.Ev LD_LIBRARY_PATH ,
34+and
35+.Ev TMPDIR .
36+If you need to set any of these environment variables, you will need to do
37+so in the program executed by ssh-agent.
38 .Sh FILES
39 .Bl -tag -width Ds
40 .It Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt
diff --git a/debian/patches/ssh-argv0.patch b/debian/patches/ssh-argv0.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8e77dadb4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/ssh-argv0.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
1From 80872a9a228eee6b7f189e9770fcf89fb8bca7fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:10 +0000
4Subject: ssh(1): Refer to ssh-argv0(1)
5
6Old versions of OpenSSH (up to 2.5 or thereabouts) allowed creating symlinks
7to ssh with the name of the host you want to connect to. Debian ships an
8ssh-argv0 script restoring this feature; this patch refers to its manual
9page from ssh(1).
10
11Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/111341
12Forwarded: not-needed
13Last-Update: 2013-09-14
14
15Patch-Name: ssh-argv0.patch
16---
17 ssh.1 | 1 +
18 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
19
20diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
21index 4fba77f..05b7f10 100644
22--- a/ssh.1
23+++ b/ssh.1
24@@ -1574,6 +1574,7 @@ if an error occurred.
25 .Xr sftp 1 ,
26 .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
27 .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
28+.Xr ssh-argv0 1 ,
29 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
30 .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
31 .Xr tun 4 ,
diff --git a/debian/patches/ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch b/debian/patches/ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f9736f7d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
1From 250d744e08a4f88cd547023cb2f036b2cdfd569b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@ubuntu.com>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:50 +0000
4Subject: Accept obsolete ssh-vulnkey configuration options
5
6These options were used as part of Debian's response to CVE-2008-0166.
7Nearly six years later, we no longer need to continue carrying the bulk
8of that patch, but we do need to avoid failing when the associated
9configuration options are still present.
10
11Last-Update: 2014-02-09
12
13Patch-Name: ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch
14---
15 readconf.c | 1 +
16 servconf.c | 1 +
17 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
18
19diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
20index 43b7570..522ad37 100644
21--- a/readconf.c
22+++ b/readconf.c
23@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ static struct {
24 { "passwordauthentication", oPasswordAuthentication },
25 { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication },
26 { "kbdinteractivedevices", oKbdInteractiveDevices },
27+ { "useblacklistedkeys", oDeprecated },
28 { "rsaauthentication", oRSAAuthentication },
29 { "pubkeyauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication },
30 { "dsaauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication }, /* alias */
31diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
32index cfe7029..ed3a88d 100644
33--- a/servconf.c
34+++ b/servconf.c
35@@ -522,6 +522,7 @@ static struct {
36 { "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
37 { "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
38 { "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
39+ { "permitblacklistedkeys", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
40 { "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd, SSHCFG_ALL },
41 { "permituserenvironment", sPermitUserEnvironment, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
42 { "uselogin", sUseLogin, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
diff --git a/debian/patches/ssh1-keepalive.patch b/debian/patches/ssh1-keepalive.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e58de3d56
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/ssh1-keepalive.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
1From 5e3b425ba1e334c987c5e15abf3d90e9eb776ab3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:51 +0000
4Subject: Partial server keep-alive implementation for SSH1
5
6Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1712
7Last-Update: 2013-09-14
8
9Patch-Name: ssh1-keepalive.patch
10---
11 clientloop.c | 25 +++++++++++++++----------
12 ssh_config.5 | 5 ++++-
13 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
14
15diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
16index fba1b54..9e45d24 100644
17--- a/clientloop.c
18+++ b/clientloop.c
19@@ -578,16 +578,21 @@ client_global_request_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
20 static void
21 server_alive_check(void)
22 {
23- if (packet_inc_alive_timeouts() > options.server_alive_count_max) {
24- logit("Timeout, server %s not responding.", host);
25- cleanup_exit(255);
26+ if (compat20) {
27+ if (packet_inc_alive_timeouts() > options.server_alive_count_max) {
28+ logit("Timeout, server %s not responding.", host);
29+ cleanup_exit(255);
30+ }
31+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
32+ packet_put_cstring("keepalive@openssh.com");
33+ packet_put_char(1); /* boolean: want reply */
34+ packet_send();
35+ /* Insert an empty placeholder to maintain ordering */
36+ client_register_global_confirm(NULL, NULL);
37+ } else {
38+ packet_send_ignore(0);
39+ packet_send();
40 }
41- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
42- packet_put_cstring("keepalive@openssh.com");
43- packet_put_char(1); /* boolean: want reply */
44- packet_send();
45- /* Insert an empty placeholder to maintain ordering */
46- client_register_global_confirm(NULL, NULL);
47 }
48
49 /*
50@@ -649,7 +654,7 @@ client_wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp,
51 */
52
53 timeout_secs = INT_MAX; /* we use INT_MAX to mean no timeout */
54- if (options.server_alive_interval > 0 && compat20) {
55+ if (options.server_alive_interval > 0) {
56 timeout_secs = options.server_alive_interval;
57 server_alive_time = now + options.server_alive_interval;
58 }
59diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
60index cac8cda..673d0b7 100644
61--- a/ssh_config.5
62+++ b/ssh_config.5
63@@ -1468,7 +1468,10 @@ If, for example,
64 .Cm ServerAliveCountMax
65 is left at the default, if the server becomes unresponsive,
66 ssh will disconnect after approximately 45 seconds.
67-This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
68+This option applies to protocol version 2 only; in protocol version
69+1 there is no mechanism to request a response from the server to the
70+server alive messages, so disconnection is the responsibility of the TCP
71+stack.
72 .It Cm ServerAliveInterval
73 Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received
74 from the server,
diff --git a/debian/patches/syslog-level-silent.patch b/debian/patches/syslog-level-silent.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..18efd6804
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/syslog-level-silent.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
1From 063fd3991309c88df5ea2625d663c3958e79b841 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Jonathan David Amery <jdamery@ysolde.ucam.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:54 +0000
4Subject: "LogLevel SILENT" compatibility
5
6"LogLevel SILENT" (-qq) was introduced in Debian openssh 1:3.0.1p1-1 to
7match the behaviour of non-free SSH, in which -q does not suppress fatal
8errors. However, this was unintentionally broken in 1:4.6p1-2 and nobody
9complained, so we've dropped most of it. The parts that remain are basic
10configuration file compatibility, and an adjustment to "Pseudo-terminal will
11not be allocated ..." which should be split out into a separate patch.
12
13Author: Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>
14Author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
15Last-Update: 2013-09-14
16
17Patch-Name: syslog-level-silent.patch
18---
19 log.c | 1 +
20 ssh.c | 2 +-
21 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
22
23diff --git a/log.c b/log.c
24index ad12930..e68b84a 100644
25--- a/log.c
26+++ b/log.c
27@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ static struct {
28 LogLevel val;
29 } log_levels[] =
30 {
31+ { "SILENT", SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET }, /* compatibility */
32 { "QUIET", SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET },
33 { "FATAL", SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL },
34 { "ERROR", SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR },
35diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
36index 59c1f93..712ea0e 100644
37--- a/ssh.c
38+++ b/ssh.c
39@@ -1106,7 +1106,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
40 /* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */
41 if ((!isatty(fileno(stdin)) || stdin_null_flag) &&
42 options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_FORCE) {
43- if (tty_flag)
44+ if (tty_flag && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
45 logit("Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because "
46 "stdin is not a terminal.");
47 tty_flag = 0;
diff --git a/debian/patches/user-group-modes.patch b/debian/patches/user-group-modes.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d70822b79
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/user-group-modes.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
1From 68538f6919550b36ae9d812a1c2c52dbe9354608 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:58 +0000
4Subject: Allow harmless group-writability
5
6Allow secure files (~/.ssh/config, ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, etc.) to be
7group-writable, provided that the group in question contains only the file's
8owner. Rejected upstream for IMO incorrect reasons (e.g. a misunderstanding
9about the contents of gr->gr_mem). Given that per-user groups and umask 002
10are the default setup in Debian (for good reasons - this makes operating in
11setgid directories with other groups much easier), we need to permit this by
12default.
13
14Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1060
15Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=314347
16Last-Update: 2013-09-14
17
18Patch-Name: user-group-modes.patch
19---
20 auth-rhosts.c | 6 ++----
21 auth.c | 9 +++-----
22 misc.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
23 misc.h | 2 ++
24 platform.c | 16 --------------
25 readconf.c | 5 +++--
26 ssh.1 | 2 ++
27 ssh_config.5 | 2 ++
28 8 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
29
30diff --git a/auth-rhosts.c b/auth-rhosts.c
31index ee9e827..2ff2cff 100644
32--- a/auth-rhosts.c
33+++ b/auth-rhosts.c
34@@ -271,8 +271,7 @@ auth_rhosts2_raw(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostnam
35 return 0;
36 }
37 if (options.strict_modes &&
38- ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
39- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
40+ !secure_permissions(&st, pw->pw_uid)) {
41 logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
42 "bad ownership or modes for home directory.", pw->pw_name);
43 auth_debug_add("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
44@@ -298,8 +297,7 @@ auth_rhosts2_raw(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostnam
45 * allowing access to their account by anyone.
46 */
47 if (options.strict_modes &&
48- ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
49- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
50+ !secure_permissions(&st, pw->pw_uid)) {
51 logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: bad modes for %.200s",
52 pw->pw_name, buf);
53 auth_debug_add("Bad file modes for %.200s", buf);
54diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
55index 214c2c7..25be632 100644
56--- a/auth.c
57+++ b/auth.c
58@@ -424,8 +424,7 @@ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
59 user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
60 if (options.strict_modes &&
61 (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
62- ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
63- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
64+ !secure_permissions(&st, pw->pw_uid)) {
65 logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
66 "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
67 pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
68@@ -487,8 +486,7 @@ auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
69 snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf);
70 return -1;
71 }
72- if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) ||
73- (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) {
74+ if (!secure_permissions(stp, uid)) {
75 snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
76 buf);
77 return -1;
78@@ -503,8 +501,7 @@ auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
79 strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
80
81 if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
82- (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) ||
83- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
84+ !secure_permissions(&st, uid)) {
85 snprintf(err, errlen,
86 "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
87 return -1;
88diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
89index ddd2b2d..1c063ea 100644
90--- a/misc.c
91+++ b/misc.c
92@@ -50,8 +50,9 @@
93 #include <netdb.h>
94 #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
95 # include <paths.h>
96-#include <pwd.h>
97 #endif
98+#include <pwd.h>
99+#include <grp.h>
100 #ifdef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD
101 #include <net/if.h>
102 #endif
103@@ -60,6 +61,7 @@
104 #include "misc.h"
105 #include "log.h"
106 #include "ssh.h"
107+#include "platform.h"
108
109 /* remove newline at end of string */
110 char *
111@@ -644,6 +646,71 @@ read_keyfile_line(FILE *f, const char *filename, char *buf, size_t bufsz,
112 return -1;
113 }
114
115+/*
116+ * return 1 if the specified uid is a uid that may own a system directory
117+ * otherwise 0.
118+ */
119+int
120+platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t uid)
121+{
122+ if (uid == 0)
123+ return 1;
124+#ifdef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID
125+ if (uid == PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID)
126+ return 1;
127+#endif
128+ return 0;
129+}
130+
131+int
132+secure_permissions(struct stat *st, uid_t uid)
133+{
134+ if (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st->st_uid) && st->st_uid != uid)
135+ return 0;
136+ if ((st->st_mode & 002) != 0)
137+ return 0;
138+ if ((st->st_mode & 020) != 0) {
139+ /* If the file is group-writable, the group in question must
140+ * have exactly one member, namely the file's owner.
141+ * (Zero-member groups are typically used by setgid
142+ * binaries, and are unlikely to be suitable.)
143+ */
144+ struct passwd *pw;
145+ struct group *gr;
146+ int members = 0;
147+
148+ gr = getgrgid(st->st_gid);
149+ if (!gr)
150+ return 0;
151+
152+ /* Check primary group memberships. */
153+ while ((pw = getpwent()) != NULL) {
154+ if (pw->pw_gid == gr->gr_gid) {
155+ ++members;
156+ if (pw->pw_uid != uid)
157+ return 0;
158+ }
159+ }
160+ endpwent();
161+
162+ pw = getpwuid(st->st_uid);
163+ if (!pw)
164+ return 0;
165+
166+ /* Check supplementary group memberships. */
167+ if (gr->gr_mem[0]) {
168+ ++members;
169+ if (strcmp(pw->pw_name, gr->gr_mem[0]) ||
170+ gr->gr_mem[1])
171+ return 0;
172+ }
173+
174+ if (!members)
175+ return 0;
176+ }
177+ return 1;
178+}
179+
180 int
181 tun_open(int tun, int mode)
182 {
183diff --git a/misc.h b/misc.h
184index 374c33c..89e1f75 100644
185--- a/misc.h
186+++ b/misc.h
187@@ -135,4 +135,6 @@ char *read_passphrase(const char *, int);
188 int ask_permission(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
189 int read_keyfile_line(FILE *, const char *, char *, size_t, u_long *);
190
191+int secure_permissions(struct stat *st, uid_t uid);
192+
193 #endif /* _MISC_H */
194diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
195index f35ec39..9a23e6e 100644
196--- a/platform.c
197+++ b/platform.c
198@@ -197,19 +197,3 @@ platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *pw_name)
199 return NULL;
200 #endif
201 }
202-
203-/*
204- * return 1 if the specified uid is a uid that may own a system directory
205- * otherwise 0.
206- */
207-int
208-platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t uid)
209-{
210- if (uid == 0)
211- return 1;
212-#ifdef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID
213- if (uid == PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID)
214- return 1;
215-#endif
216- return 0;
217-}
218diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
219index 46c343f..c0ba5a7 100644
220--- a/readconf.c
221+++ b/readconf.c
222@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@
223 #include <stdio.h>
224 #include <string.h>
225 #include <unistd.h>
226+#include <pwd.h>
227+#include <grp.h>
228 #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
229 #include <util.h>
230 #endif
231@@ -1579,8 +1581,7 @@ read_config_file(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
232
233 if (fstat(fileno(f), &sb) == -1)
234 fatal("fstat %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno));
235- if (((sb.st_uid != 0 && sb.st_uid != getuid()) ||
236- (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0))
237+ if (!secure_permissions(&sb, getuid()))
238 fatal("Bad owner or permissions on %s", filename);
239 }
240
241diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
242index 2ea0a20..ff80022 100644
243--- a/ssh.1
244+++ b/ssh.1
245@@ -1458,6 +1458,8 @@ The file format and configuration options are described in
246 .Xr ssh_config 5 .
247 Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
248 read/write for the user, and not writable by others.
249+It may be group-writable provided that the group in question contains only
250+the user.
251 .Pp
252 .It Pa ~/.ssh/environment
253 Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see
254diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
255index 4e34115..37f3ab8 100644
256--- a/ssh_config.5
257+++ b/ssh_config.5
258@@ -1760,6 +1760,8 @@ The format of this file is described above.
259 This file is used by the SSH client.
260 Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
261 read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
262+It may be group-writable provided that the group in question contains only
263+the user.
264 .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
265 Systemwide configuration file.
266 This file provides defaults for those
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-07-17 20:18:26 +0000