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-rw-r--r--debian/patches/auth-log-verbosity.patch133
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch26
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/debian-banner.patch111
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/debian-config.patch195
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/dnssec-sshfp.patch94
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/doc-hash-tab-completion.patch28
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/doc-upstart.patch29
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch26
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/gssapi.patch3267
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/helpful-wait-terminate.patch26
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/keepalive-extensions.patch134
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch42
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/no-openssl-version-status.patch62
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/openbsd-docs.patch148
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/package-versioning.patch65
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/quieter-signals.patch40
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/restore-tcp-wrappers.patch172
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/scp-quoting.patch41
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/selinux-role.patch504
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/series27
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/shell-path.patch39
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/sigstop.patch35
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/ssh-agent-setgid.patch40
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/ssh-argv0.patch31
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch42
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/syslog-level-silent.patch47
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/systemd-readiness.patch84
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/user-group-modes.patch257
28 files changed, 5745 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/debian/patches/auth-log-verbosity.patch b/debian/patches/auth-log-verbosity.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7abed3704
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/auth-log-verbosity.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
1From b4b79ae5a16f73426b54c6394a29b2b49da4dc16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:02 +0000
4Subject: Quieten logs when multiple from= restrictions are used
5
6Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/630606
7Forwarded: no
8Last-Update: 2013-09-14
9
10Patch-Name: auth-log-verbosity.patch
11---
12 auth-options.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
13 auth-options.h | 1 +
14 auth-rsa.c | 2 ++
15 auth2-pubkey.c | 3 +++
16 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
17
18diff --git a/auth-options.c b/auth-options.c
19index b399b91..a9d9a81 100644
20--- a/auth-options.c
21+++ b/auth-options.c
22@@ -59,9 +59,20 @@ int forced_tun_device = -1;
23 /* "principals=" option. */
24 char *authorized_principals = NULL;
25
26+/* Throttle log messages. */
27+int logged_from_hostip = 0;
28+int logged_cert_hostip = 0;
29+
30 extern ServerOptions options;
31
32 void
33+auth_start_parse_options(void)
34+{
35+ logged_from_hostip = 0;
36+ logged_cert_hostip = 0;
37+}
38+
39+void
40 auth_clear_options(void)
41 {
42 no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
43@@ -316,10 +327,13 @@ auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum)
44 /* FALLTHROUGH */
45 case 0:
46 free(patterns);
47- logit("Authentication tried for %.100s with "
48- "correct key but not from a permitted "
49- "host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s).",
50- pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip);
51+ if (!logged_from_hostip) {
52+ logit("Authentication tried for %.100s with "
53+ "correct key but not from a permitted "
54+ "host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s).",
55+ pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip);
56+ logged_from_hostip = 1;
57+ }
58 auth_debug_add("Your host '%.200s' is not "
59 "permitted to use this key for login.",
60 remote_host);
61@@ -543,11 +557,14 @@ parse_option_list(struct sshbuf *oblob, struct passwd *pw,
62 break;
63 case 0:
64 /* no match */
65- logit("Authentication tried for %.100s "
66- "with valid certificate but not "
67- "from a permitted host "
68- "(ip=%.200s).", pw->pw_name,
69- remote_ip);
70+ if (!logged_cert_hostip) {
71+ logit("Authentication tried for %.100s "
72+ "with valid certificate but not "
73+ "from a permitted host "
74+ "(ip=%.200s).", pw->pw_name,
75+ remote_ip);
76+ logged_cert_hostip = 1;
77+ }
78 auth_debug_add("Your address '%.200s' "
79 "is not permitted to use this "
80 "certificate for login.",
81diff --git a/auth-options.h b/auth-options.h
82index 34852e5..1653855 100644
83--- a/auth-options.h
84+++ b/auth-options.h
85@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ extern int forced_tun_device;
86 extern int key_is_cert_authority;
87 extern char *authorized_principals;
88
89+void auth_start_parse_options(void);
90 int auth_parse_options(struct passwd *, char *, char *, u_long);
91 void auth_clear_options(void);
92 int auth_cert_options(struct sshkey *, struct passwd *);
93diff --git a/auth-rsa.c b/auth-rsa.c
94index cbd971b..4cf2163 100644
95--- a/auth-rsa.c
96+++ b/auth-rsa.c
97@@ -181,6 +181,8 @@ rsa_key_allowed_in_file(struct passwd *pw, char *file,
98 if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL)
99 return 0;
100
101+ auth_start_parse_options();
102+
103 /*
104 * Go though the accepted keys, looking for the current key. If
105 * found, perform a challenge-response dialog to verify that the
106diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
107index 41b34ae..aace7ca 100644
108--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
109+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
110@@ -566,6 +566,7 @@ process_principals(FILE *f, char *file, struct passwd *pw,
111 u_long linenum = 0;
112 u_int i;
113
114+ auth_start_parse_options();
115 while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
116 /* Skip leading whitespace. */
117 for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
118@@ -731,6 +732,7 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
119 found_key = 0;
120
121 found = NULL;
122+ auth_start_parse_options();
123 while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
124 char *cp, *key_options = NULL;
125 if (found != NULL)
126@@ -878,6 +880,7 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
127 if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1,
128 use_authorized_principals ? NULL : pw->pw_name, &reason) != 0)
129 goto fail_reason;
130+ auth_start_parse_options();
131 if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0)
132 goto out;
133
diff --git a/debian/patches/authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch b/debian/patches/authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d75494fa6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
1From 724283a55e8928a5564722ebe9c133033b51809d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Tomas Pospisek <tpo_deb@sourcepole.ch>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:07 +0000
4Subject: Install authorized_keys(5) as a symlink to sshd(8)
5
6Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1720
7Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/441817
8Last-Update: 2013-09-14
9
10Patch-Name: authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
11---
12 Makefile.in | 1 +
13 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
14
15diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
16index 51817df..21948dd 100644
17--- a/Makefile.in
18+++ b/Makefile.in
19@@ -327,6 +327,7 @@ install-files:
20 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5
21 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/ssh_config.5
22 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8
23+ ln -s ../$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/authorized_keys.5
24 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
25 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
26 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
diff --git a/debian/patches/debian-banner.patch b/debian/patches/debian-banner.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cf4bfad50
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/debian-banner.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
1From 277ad2acedde81dce324e711da116d100b47f445 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Kees Cook <kees@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:06 +0000
4Subject: Add DebianBanner server configuration option
5
6Setting this to "no" causes sshd to omit the Debian revision from its
7initial protocol handshake, for those scared by package-versioning.patch.
8
9Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/562048
10Forwarded: not-needed
11Last-Update: 2015-11-29
12
13Patch-Name: debian-banner.patch
14---
15 servconf.c | 9 +++++++++
16 servconf.h | 2 ++
17 sshd.c | 3 ++-
18 sshd_config.5 | 5 +++++
19 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
20
21diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
22index bf9f8f7..a98b309 100644
23--- a/servconf.c
24+++ b/servconf.c
25@@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
26 options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
27 options->version_addendum = NULL;
28 options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
29+ options->debian_banner = -1;
30 }
31
32 /* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */
33@@ -359,6 +360,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
34 options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0;
35 if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1)
36 options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
37+ if (options->debian_banner == -1)
38+ options->debian_banner = 1;
39
40 assemble_algorithms(options);
41
42@@ -445,6 +448,7 @@ typedef enum {
43 sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC,
44 sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink,
45 sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash,
46+ sDebianBanner,
47 sDeprecated, sUnsupported
48 } ServerOpCodes;
49
50@@ -596,6 +600,7 @@ static struct {
51 { "streamlocalbindunlink", sStreamLocalBindUnlink, SSHCFG_ALL },
52 { "allowstreamlocalforwarding", sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
53 { "fingerprinthash", sFingerprintHash, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
54+ { "debianbanner", sDebianBanner, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
55 { NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
56 };
57
58@@ -1903,6 +1908,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
59 options->fingerprint_hash = value;
60 break;
61
62+ case sDebianBanner:
63+ intptr = &options->debian_banner;
64+ goto parse_int;
65+
66 case sDeprecated:
67 logit("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s",
68 filename, linenum, arg);
69diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
70index 778ba17..161fa37 100644
71--- a/servconf.h
72+++ b/servconf.h
73@@ -197,6 +197,8 @@ typedef struct {
74 char *auth_methods[MAX_AUTH_METHODS];
75
76 int fingerprint_hash;
77+
78+ int debian_banner;
79 } ServerOptions;
80
81 /* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
82diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
83index e873557..71fad9e 100644
84--- a/sshd.c
85+++ b/sshd.c
86@@ -443,7 +443,8 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int sock_in, int sock_out)
87 }
88
89 xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s",
90- major, minor, SSH_RELEASE,
91+ major, minor,
92+ options.debian_banner ? SSH_RELEASE : SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM,
93 *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
94 options.version_addendum, newline);
95
96diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
97index e05cdbe..ac9b1f0 100644
98--- a/sshd_config.5
99+++ b/sshd_config.5
100@@ -541,6 +541,11 @@ or
101 .Dq no .
102 The default is
103 .Dq delayed .
104+.It Cm DebianBanner
105+Specifies whether the distribution-specified extra version suffix is
106+included during initial protocol handshake.
107+The default is
108+.Dq yes .
109 .It Cm DenyGroups
110 This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated
111 by spaces.
diff --git a/debian/patches/debian-config.patch b/debian/patches/debian-config.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1d9efcbbf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/debian-config.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
1From 4c914ccd85bbf391c4dc61b85e3c178fef465e3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:18 +0000
4Subject: Various Debian-specific configuration changes
5
6ssh: Enable ForwardX11Trusted, returning to earlier semantics which cause
7fewer problems with existing setups (http://bugs.debian.org/237021).
8
9ssh: Set 'SendEnv LANG LC_*' by default (http://bugs.debian.org/264024).
10
11ssh: Enable HashKnownHosts by default to try to limit the spread of ssh
12worms.
13
14ssh: Enable GSSAPIAuthentication and disable GSSAPIDelegateCredentials by
15default.
16
17Document all of this, along with several sshd defaults set in
18debian/openssh-server.postinst.
19
20Author: Russ Allbery <rra@debian.org>
21Forwarded: not-needed
22Last-Update: 2015-12-07
23
24Patch-Name: debian-config.patch
25---
26 readconf.c | 2 +-
27 ssh.1 | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
28 ssh_config | 7 ++++++-
29 ssh_config.5 | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
30 sshd_config | 2 +-
31 sshd_config.5 | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
32 6 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
33
34diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
35index f6b4c8f..5cd51f3 100644
36--- a/readconf.c
37+++ b/readconf.c
38@@ -1928,7 +1928,7 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
39 if (options->forward_x11 == -1)
40 options->forward_x11 = 0;
41 if (options->forward_x11_trusted == -1)
42- options->forward_x11_trusted = 0;
43+ options->forward_x11_trusted = 1;
44 if (options->forward_x11_timeout == -1)
45 options->forward_x11_timeout = 1200;
46 /*
47diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
48index 22e56a7..6aa57c4 100644
49--- a/ssh.1
50+++ b/ssh.1
51@@ -785,6 +785,16 @@ directive in
52 .Xr ssh_config 5
53 for more information.
54 .Pp
55+(Debian-specific: X11 forwarding is not subjected to X11 SECURITY extension
56+restrictions by default, because too many programs currently crash in this
57+mode.
58+Set the
59+.Cm ForwardX11Trusted
60+option to
61+.Dq no
62+to restore the upstream behaviour.
63+This may change in future depending on client-side improvements.)
64+.Pp
65 .It Fl x
66 Disables X11 forwarding.
67 .Pp
68@@ -793,6 +803,17 @@ Enables trusted X11 forwarding.
69 Trusted X11 forwardings are not subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension
70 controls.
71 .Pp
72+(Debian-specific: This option does nothing in the default configuration: it
73+is equivalent to
74+.Dq Cm ForwardX11Trusted No yes ,
75+which is the default as described above.
76+Set the
77+.Cm ForwardX11Trusted
78+option to
79+.Dq no
80+to restore the upstream behaviour.
81+This may change in future depending on client-side improvements.)
82+.Pp
83 .It Fl y
84 Send log information using the
85 .Xr syslog 3
86diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
87index 4e879cd..5190b06 100644
88--- a/ssh_config
89+++ b/ssh_config
90@@ -17,9 +17,10 @@
91 # list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the
92 # ssh_config(5) man page.
93
94-# Host *
95+Host *
96 # ForwardAgent no
97 # ForwardX11 no
98+# ForwardX11Trusted yes
99 # RhostsRSAAuthentication no
100 # RSAAuthentication yes
101 # PasswordAuthentication yes
102@@ -50,3 +51,7 @@
103 # VisualHostKey no
104 # ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
105 # RekeyLimit 1G 1h
106+ SendEnv LANG LC_*
107+ HashKnownHosts yes
108+ GSSAPIAuthentication yes
109+ GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
110diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
111index 30c97a9..c967258 100644
112--- a/ssh_config.5
113+++ b/ssh_config.5
114@@ -74,6 +74,22 @@ Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more
115 host-specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the
116 file, and general defaults at the end.
117 .Pp
118+Note that the Debian
119+.Ic openssh-client
120+package sets several options as standard in
121+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
122+which are not the default in
123+.Xr ssh 1 :
124+.Pp
125+.Bl -bullet -offset indent -compact
126+.It
127+.Cm SendEnv No LANG LC_*
128+.It
129+.Cm HashKnownHosts No yes
130+.It
131+.Cm GSSAPIAuthentication No yes
132+.El
133+.Pp
134 The configuration file has the following format:
135 .Pp
136 Empty lines and lines starting with
137@@ -799,7 +815,8 @@ token used for the session will be set to expire after 20 minutes.
138 Remote clients will be refused access after this time.
139 .Pp
140 The default is
141-.Dq no .
142+.Dq yes
143+(Debian-specific).
144 .Pp
145 See the X11 SECURITY extension specification for full details on
146 the restrictions imposed on untrusted clients.
147diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
148index 3fe3e01..ec8ff8f 100644
149--- a/sshd_config
150+++ b/sshd_config
151@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
152 #Banner none
153
154 # override default of no subsystems
155-Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server
156+Subsystem sftp /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server
157
158 # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
159 #Match User anoncvs
160diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
161index b2b349e..79f2d61 100644
162--- a/sshd_config.5
163+++ b/sshd_config.5
164@@ -57,6 +57,31 @@ Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes
165 .Pq \&"
166 in order to represent arguments containing spaces.
167 .Pp
168+Note that the Debian
169+.Ic openssh-server
170+package sets several options as standard in
171+.Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
172+which are not the default in
173+.Xr sshd 8 .
174+The exact list depends on whether the package was installed fresh or
175+upgraded from various possible previous versions, but includes at least the
176+following:
177+.Pp
178+.Bl -bullet -offset indent -compact
179+.It
180+.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication No no
181+.It
182+.Cm X11Forwarding No yes
183+.It
184+.Cm PrintMotd No no
185+.It
186+.Cm AcceptEnv No LANG LC_*
187+.It
188+.Cm Subsystem No sftp /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server
189+.It
190+.Cm UsePAM No yes
191+.El
192+.Pp
193 The possible
194 keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
195 keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
diff --git a/debian/patches/dnssec-sshfp.patch b/debian/patches/dnssec-sshfp.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e4498fb48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/dnssec-sshfp.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
1From 9d9a37bb0c2d7546253ff2b0b67e314d8475bfc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:01 +0000
4Subject: Force use of DNSSEC even if "options edns0" isn't in resolv.conf
5
6This allows SSHFP DNS records to be verified if glibc 2.11 is installed.
7
8Origin: vendor, https://cvs.fedoraproject.org/viewvc/F-12/openssh/openssh-5.2p1-edns.patch?revision=1.1&view=markup
9Bug: http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=572049
10Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=572049
11Last-Update: 2010-04-06
12
13Patch-Name: dnssec-sshfp.patch
14---
15 dns.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
16 openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c | 10 +++++-----
17 openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h | 3 +++
18 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
19
20diff --git a/dns.c b/dns.c
21index e813afe..fce2e30 100644
22--- a/dns.c
23+++ b/dns.c
24@@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address,
25 {
26 u_int counter;
27 int result;
28+ unsigned int rrset_flags = 0;
29 struct rrsetinfo *fingerprints = NULL;
30
31 u_int8_t hostkey_algorithm;
32@@ -229,8 +230,19 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address,
33 return -1;
34 }
35
36+ /*
37+ * Original getrrsetbyname function, found on OpenBSD for example,
38+ * doesn't accept any flag and prerequisite for obtaining AD bit in
39+ * DNS response is set by "options edns0" in resolv.conf.
40+ *
41+ * Our version is more clever and use RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 flag.
42+ */
43+#ifndef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME
44+ rrset_flags |= RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0;
45+#endif
46 result = getrrsetbyname(hostname, DNS_RDATACLASS_IN,
47- DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, 0, &fingerprints);
48+ DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, rrset_flags, &fingerprints);
49+
50 if (result) {
51 verbose("DNS lookup error: %s", dns_result_totext(result));
52 return -1;
53diff --git a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
54index dc6fe05..e061a29 100644
55--- a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
56+++ b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
57@@ -209,8 +209,8 @@ getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, unsigned int rdclass,
58 goto fail;
59 }
60
61- /* don't allow flags yet, unimplemented */
62- if (flags) {
63+ /* Allow RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 flag only. */
64+ if ((flags & !RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0) != 0) {
65 result = ERRSET_INVAL;
66 goto fail;
67 }
68@@ -226,9 +226,9 @@ getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, unsigned int rdclass,
69 #endif /* DEBUG */
70
71 #ifdef RES_USE_DNSSEC
72- /* turn on DNSSEC if EDNS0 is configured */
73- if (_resp->options & RES_USE_EDNS0)
74- _resp->options |= RES_USE_DNSSEC;
75+ /* turn on DNSSEC if required */
76+ if (flags & RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0)
77+ _resp->options |= (RES_USE_EDNS0|RES_USE_DNSSEC);
78 #endif /* RES_USE_DNSEC */
79
80 /* make query */
81diff --git a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
82index 1283f55..dbbc85a 100644
83--- a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
84+++ b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
85@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
86 #ifndef RRSET_VALIDATED
87 # define RRSET_VALIDATED 1
88 #endif
89+#ifndef RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0
90+# define RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 0x0001
91+#endif
92
93 /*
94 * Return codes for getrrsetbyname()
diff --git a/debian/patches/doc-hash-tab-completion.patch b/debian/patches/doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5f91cadfe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
1From bfea780bba64294541d98efcc26b01392ff64c60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:11 +0000
4Subject: Document that HashKnownHosts may break tab-completion
5
6Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1727
7Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/430154
8Last-Update: 2013-09-14
9
10Patch-Name: doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
11---
12 ssh_config.5 | 3 +++
13 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
14
15diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
16index 5dd26bc..30c97a9 100644
17--- a/ssh_config.5
18+++ b/ssh_config.5
19@@ -883,6 +883,9 @@ Note that existing names and addresses in known hosts files
20 will not be converted automatically,
21 but may be manually hashed using
22 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
23+Use of this option may break facilities such as tab-completion that rely
24+on being able to read unhashed host names from
25+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts .
26 .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
27 Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key
28 authentication.
diff --git a/debian/patches/doc-upstart.patch b/debian/patches/doc-upstart.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8f093d80c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/doc-upstart.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
1From e4ba4e1616d372522de9e18f0973ed49a5521b95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@ubuntu.com>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:12 +0000
4Subject: Refer to ssh's Upstart job as well as its init script
5
6Forwarded: not-needed
7Last-Update: 2013-09-14
8
9Patch-Name: doc-upstart.patch
10---
11 sshd.8 | 5 ++++-
12 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
13
14diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
15index 58eefe9..4e75567 100644
16--- a/sshd.8
17+++ b/sshd.8
18@@ -67,7 +67,10 @@ over an insecure network.
19 .Nm
20 listens for connections from clients.
21 It is normally started at boot from
22-.Pa /etc/init.d/ssh .
23+.Pa /etc/init.d/ssh
24+(or
25+.Pa /etc/init/ssh.conf
26+on systems using the Upstart init daemon).
27 It forks a new
28 daemon for each incoming connection.
29 The forked daemons handle
diff --git a/debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch b/debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c34441df3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
1From db85bf41862b80b0447777d942a091cd3ac5f1c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Vincent Untz <vuntz@ubuntu.com>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:16 +0000
4Subject: Give the ssh-askpass-gnome window a default icon
5
6Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/27152
7Last-Update: 2010-02-28
8
9Patch-Name: gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
10---
11 contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c | 2 ++
12 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
13
14diff --git a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
15index 9d97c30..04b3a11 100644
16--- a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
17+++ b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
18@@ -209,6 +209,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
19
20 gtk_init(&argc, &argv);
21
22+ gtk_window_set_default_icon_from_file ("/usr/share/pixmaps/ssh-askpass-gnome.png", NULL);
23+
24 if (argc > 1) {
25 message = g_strjoinv(" ", argv + 1);
26 } else {
diff --git a/debian/patches/gssapi.patch b/debian/patches/gssapi.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8e946aa88
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/gssapi.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,3267 @@
1From eecddf8b72fcad83ccca43b1badb03782704f6b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Simon Wilkinson <simon@sxw.org.uk>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:48 +0000
4Subject: GSSAPI key exchange support
5
6This patch has been rejected upstream: "None of the OpenSSH developers are
7in favour of adding this, and this situation has not changed for several
8years. This is not a slight on Simon's patch, which is of fine quality, but
9just that a) we don't trust GSSAPI implementations that much and b) we don't
10like adding new KEX since they are pre-auth attack surface. This one is
11particularly scary, since it requires hooks out to typically root-owned
12system resources."
13
14However, quite a lot of people rely on this in Debian, and it's better to
15have it merged into the main openssh package rather than having separate
16-krb5 packages (as we used to have). It seems to have a generally good
17security history.
18
19Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1242
20Last-Updated: 2016-08-07
21
22Patch-Name: gssapi.patch
23---
24 ChangeLog.gssapi | 113 +++++++++++++++++++
25 Makefile.in | 3 +-
26 auth-krb5.c | 17 ++-
27 auth.c | 96 +---------------
28 auth2-gss.c | 48 +++++++-
29 auth2.c | 2 +
30 canohost.c | 93 +++++++++++++++
31 canohost.h | 3 +
32 clientloop.c | 15 ++-
33 config.h.in | 6 +
34 configure.ac | 24 ++++
35 gss-genr.c | 275 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
36 gss-serv-krb5.c | 85 ++++++++++++--
37 gss-serv.c | 185 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
38 kex.c | 19 ++++
39 kex.h | 14 +++
40 kexgssc.c | 338 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
41 kexgsss.c | 295 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
42 monitor.c | 108 +++++++++++++++++-
43 monitor.h | 3 +
44 monitor_wrap.c | 47 +++++++-
45 monitor_wrap.h | 4 +-
46 readconf.c | 42 +++++++
47 readconf.h | 5 +
48 servconf.c | 28 ++++-
49 servconf.h | 2 +
50 ssh-gss.h | 41 ++++++-
51 ssh_config | 2 +
52 ssh_config.5 | 32 ++++++
53 sshconnect2.c | 122 +++++++++++++++++++-
54 sshd.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++
55 sshd_config | 2 +
56 sshd_config.5 | 10 ++
57 sshkey.c | 3 +-
58 sshkey.h | 1 +
59 35 files changed, 2054 insertions(+), 139 deletions(-)
60 create mode 100644 ChangeLog.gssapi
61 create mode 100644 kexgssc.c
62 create mode 100644 kexgsss.c
63
64diff --git a/ChangeLog.gssapi b/ChangeLog.gssapi
65new file mode 100644
66index 0000000..f117a33
67--- /dev/null
68+++ b/ChangeLog.gssapi
69@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
70+20110101
71+ - Finally update for OpenSSH 5.6p1
72+ - Add GSSAPIServerIdentity option from Jim Basney
73+
74+20100308
75+ - [ Makefile.in, key.c, key.h ]
76+ Updates for OpenSSH 5.4p1
77+ - [ servconf.c ]
78+ Include GSSAPI options in the sshd -T configuration dump, and flag
79+ some older configuration options as being unsupported. Thanks to Colin
80+ Watson.
81+ -
82+
83+20100124
84+ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
85+ Adapt to deal with additional element in Authmethod structure. Thanks to
86+ Colin Watson
87+
88+20090615
89+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c
90+ sshd.c ]
91+ Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review
92+ Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs
93+ Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled
94+ Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange
95+ Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value
96+ Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust
97+ Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled
98+ Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list
99+ Cast data.length before printing
100+ If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL
101+
102+20090201
103+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h
104+ ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ]
105+ Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user
106+ to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server
107+
108+20080404
109+ - [ gss-serv.c ]
110+ Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow
111+ been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav
112+ Stoichkov
113+
114+20070317
115+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
116+ Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a
117+ function
118+
119+20061220
120+ - [ servconf.c ]
121+ Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and
122+ documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson.
123+
124+20060910
125+ - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c
126+ ssh-gss.h ]
127+ add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms
128+ - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ]
129+ Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of
130+ acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines.
131+ <Bugzilla #928>
132+ - [ sshd_config ssh_config ]
133+ Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample
134+ configuration files
135+ - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ]
136+ Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf()
137+ Limit length of error messages displayed by client
138+
139+20060909
140+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ]
141+ move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server
142+ only, where they belong
143+ <Bugzilla #1225>
144+
145+20060829
146+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
147+ Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment
148+ variable
149+
150+20060828
151+ - [ gss-genr.c ]
152+ Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem
153+ <Fixed upstream 20060829>
154+
155+20060818
156+ - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ]
157+ Make sure that SPENGO is disabled
158+ <Bugzilla #1218 - Fixed upstream 20060818>
159+
160+20060421
161+ - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ]
162+ a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to
163+ fix compiler errors/warnings
164+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
165+ - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ]
166+ fix uninitialized variable warnings
167+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
168+ - [ gssgenr.c ]
169+ pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue)
170+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
171+ <Bugzilla #1220 >
172+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
173+ #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
174+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
175+ <Fixed upstream 20060304>
176+ - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c
177+ add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option
178+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
179+ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
180+ add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic
181+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
182+ <gssapi-with-mic support is Bugzilla #1008>
183diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
184index 12991cd..51817df 100644
185--- a/Makefile.in
186+++ b/Makefile.in
187@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
188 kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
189 kexdhc.o kexgexc.o kexecdhc.o kexc25519c.o \
190 kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o \
191+ kexgssc.o \
192 platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o
193
194 SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
195@@ -105,7 +106,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \
196 auth-skey.o auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
197 auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
198 monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
199- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
200+ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
201 loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
202 sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
203 sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
204diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
205index a5a81ed..38e7fee 100644
206--- a/auth-krb5.c
207+++ b/auth-krb5.c
208@@ -182,8 +182,13 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
209
210 len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
211 authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
212+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
213+ snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s",
214+ authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
215+#else
216 snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
217 authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
218+#endif
219
220 #ifdef USE_PAM
221 if (options.use_pam)
222@@ -240,15 +245,22 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
223 #ifndef HEIMDAL
224 krb5_error_code
225 ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
226- int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
227+ int ret, oerrno;
228 char ccname[40];
229 mode_t old_umask;
230+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
231+ char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d";
232+#else
233+ char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX";
234+ int tmpfd;
235+#endif
236
237 ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
238- "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
239+ cctemplate, geteuid());
240 if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
241 return ENOMEM;
242
243+#ifndef USE_CCAPI
244 old_umask = umask(0177);
245 tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
246 oerrno = errno;
247@@ -265,6 +277,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
248 return oerrno;
249 }
250 close(tmpfd);
251+#endif
252
253 return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
254 }
255diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
256index 24527dd..f56dcc6 100644
257--- a/auth.c
258+++ b/auth.c
259@@ -363,7 +363,8 @@ auth_root_allowed(const char *method)
260 case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
261 if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
262 strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
263- strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0)
264+ strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0 ||
265+ strcmp(method, "gssapi-keyex") == 0)
266 return 1;
267 break;
268 case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
269@@ -786,99 +787,6 @@ fakepw(void)
270 }
271
272 /*
273- * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
274- * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
275- * called.
276- * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
277- * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
278- * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
279- * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
280- */
281-
282-static char *
283-remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
284-{
285- struct sockaddr_storage from;
286- socklen_t fromlen;
287- struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
288- char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
289- const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
290-
291- /* Get IP address of client. */
292- fromlen = sizeof(from);
293- memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
294- if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
295- (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
296- debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
297- return strdup(ntop);
298- }
299-
300- ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
301- if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
302- fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
303-
304- debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
305- /* Map the IP address to a host name. */
306- if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
307- NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
308- /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */
309- return strdup(ntop);
310- }
311-
312- /*
313- * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
314- * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
315- * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5
316- */
317- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
318- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
319- hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
320- if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
321- logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
322- name, ntop);
323- freeaddrinfo(ai);
324- return strdup(ntop);
325- }
326-
327- /* Names are stored in lowercase. */
328- lowercase(name);
329-
330- /*
331- * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
332- * address actually is an address of this host. This is
333- * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
334- * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
335- * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
336- * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
337- * the domain).
338- */
339- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
340- hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
341- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
342- if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
343- logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
344- "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
345- return strdup(ntop);
346- }
347- /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
348- for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
349- if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
350- sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
351- (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
352- break;
353- }
354- freeaddrinfo(aitop);
355- /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
356- if (ai == NULL) {
357- /* Address not found for the host name. */
358- logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
359- "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
360- return strdup(ntop);
361- }
362- return strdup(name);
363-}
364-
365-/*
366 * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
367 * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
368 * several times.
369diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
370index 1ca8357..3b5036d 100644
371--- a/auth2-gss.c
372+++ b/auth2-gss.c
373@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
374 /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.22 2015/01/19 20:07:45 markus Exp $ */
375
376 /*
377- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
378+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
379 *
380 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
381 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
382@@ -53,6 +53,40 @@ static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
383 static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
384 static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
385
386+/*
387+ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
388+ */
389+static int
390+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
391+{
392+ int authenticated = 0;
393+ Buffer b;
394+ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
395+ u_int len;
396+
397+ mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
398+ mic.length = len;
399+
400+ packet_check_eom();
401+
402+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
403+ "gssapi-keyex");
404+
405+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
406+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
407+
408+ /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
409+ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
410+ &gssbuf, &mic))))
411+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
412+ authctxt->pw));
413+
414+ buffer_free(&b);
415+ free(mic.value);
416+
417+ return (authenticated);
418+}
419+
420 /*
421 * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
422 * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
423@@ -238,7 +272,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
424
425 packet_check_eom();
426
427- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
428+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
429+ authctxt->pw));
430
431 authctxt->postponed = 0;
432 dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
433@@ -274,7 +309,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
434 gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
435
436 if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
437- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
438+ authenticated =
439+ PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw));
440 else
441 logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
442
443@@ -290,6 +326,12 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
444 return 0;
445 }
446
447+Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
448+ "gssapi-keyex",
449+ userauth_gsskeyex,
450+ &options.gss_authentication
451+};
452+
453 Authmethod method_gssapi = {
454 "gssapi-with-mic",
455 userauth_gssapi,
456diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
457index 9108b86..ce0d376 100644
458--- a/auth2.c
459+++ b/auth2.c
460@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd;
461 extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
462 extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
463 #ifdef GSSAPI
464+extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex;
465 extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
466 #endif
467
468@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
469 &method_none,
470 &method_pubkey,
471 #ifdef GSSAPI
472+ &method_gsskeyex,
473 &method_gssapi,
474 #endif
475 &method_passwd,
476diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c
477index f71a085..404731d 100644
478--- a/canohost.c
479+++ b/canohost.c
480@@ -35,6 +35,99 @@
481 #include "canohost.h"
482 #include "misc.h"
483
484+/*
485+ * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
486+ * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
487+ * called.
488+ * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
489+ * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
490+ * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
491+ * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
492+ */
493+
494+char *
495+remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
496+{
497+ struct sockaddr_storage from;
498+ socklen_t fromlen;
499+ struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
500+ char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
501+ const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
502+
503+ /* Get IP address of client. */
504+ fromlen = sizeof(from);
505+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
506+ if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
507+ (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
508+ debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
509+ return strdup(ntop);
510+ }
511+
512+ ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
513+ if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
514+ fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
515+
516+ debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
517+ /* Map the IP address to a host name. */
518+ if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
519+ NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
520+ /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */
521+ return strdup(ntop);
522+ }
523+
524+ /*
525+ * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
526+ * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
527+ * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5
528+ */
529+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
530+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
531+ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
532+ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
533+ logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
534+ name, ntop);
535+ freeaddrinfo(ai);
536+ return strdup(ntop);
537+ }
538+
539+ /* Names are stored in lowercase. */
540+ lowercase(name);
541+
542+ /*
543+ * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
544+ * address actually is an address of this host. This is
545+ * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
546+ * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
547+ * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
548+ * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
549+ * the domain).
550+ */
551+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
552+ hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
553+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
554+ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
555+ logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
556+ "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
557+ return strdup(ntop);
558+ }
559+ /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
560+ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
561+ if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
562+ sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
563+ (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
564+ break;
565+ }
566+ freeaddrinfo(aitop);
567+ /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
568+ if (ai == NULL) {
569+ /* Address not found for the host name. */
570+ logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
571+ "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
572+ return strdup(ntop);
573+ }
574+ return strdup(name);
575+}
576+
577 void
578 ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *addr, socklen_t *len)
579 {
580diff --git a/canohost.h b/canohost.h
581index 26d6285..0cadc9f 100644
582--- a/canohost.h
583+++ b/canohost.h
584@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@
585 #ifndef _CANOHOST_H
586 #define _CANOHOST_H
587
588+struct ssh;
589+
590+char *remote_hostname(struct ssh *);
591 char *get_peer_ipaddr(int);
592 int get_peer_port(int);
593 char *get_local_ipaddr(int);
594diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
595index 2c44f5d..421241f 100644
596--- a/clientloop.c
597+++ b/clientloop.c
598@@ -114,6 +114,10 @@
599 #include "ssherr.h"
600 #include "hostfile.h"
601
602+#ifdef GSSAPI
603+#include "ssh-gss.h"
604+#endif
605+
606 /* import options */
607 extern Options options;
608
609@@ -1666,9 +1670,18 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id)
610 break;
611
612 /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
613- if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state))
614+ if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state)) {
615 channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
616
617+#ifdef GSSAPI
618+ if (options.gss_renewal_rekey &&
619+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(NULL)) {
620+ debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey");
621+ need_rekeying = 1;
622+ }
623+#endif
624+ }
625+
626 /* Buffer input from the connection. */
627 client_process_net_input(readset);
628
629diff --git a/config.h.in b/config.h.in
630index 39d018f..d7caf9a 100644
631--- a/config.h.in
632+++ b/config.h.in
633@@ -1668,6 +1668,9 @@
634 /* Use btmp to log bad logins */
635 #undef USE_BTMP
636
637+/* platform uses an in-memory credentials cache */
638+#undef USE_CCAPI
639+
640 /* Use libedit for sftp */
641 #undef USE_LIBEDIT
642
643@@ -1683,6 +1686,9 @@
644 /* Use PIPES instead of a socketpair() */
645 #undef USE_PIPES
646
647+/* platform has the Security Authorization Session API */
648+#undef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
649+
650 /* Define if you have Solaris privileges */
651 #undef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS
652
653diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
654index 373d21b..894ec3b 100644
655--- a/configure.ac
656+++ b/configure.ac
657@@ -632,6 +632,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
658 [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
659 AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
660 [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
661+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have the Security Authorization Session API])
662+ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <Security/AuthSession.h>],
663+ [SessionCreate(0, 0);],
664+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes"
665+ AC_DEFINE([USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API], [1],
666+ [platform has the Security Authorization Session API])
667+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
668+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
669+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no"
670+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])])
671+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have an in-memory credentials cache])
672+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
673+ [#include <Kerberos/Kerberos.h>],
674+ [cc_context_t c;
675+ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);],
676+ [AC_DEFINE([USE_CCAPI], [1],
677+ [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache])
678+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
679+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
680+ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then
681+ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***])
682+ fi],
683+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])]
684+ )
685 m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv])
686 AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [],
687 AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
688diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c
689index d617d60..b4eca3f 100644
690--- a/gss-genr.c
691+++ b/gss-genr.c
692@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
693 /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.23 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */
694
695 /*
696- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
697+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
698 *
699 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
700 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
701@@ -41,12 +41,167 @@
702 #include "buffer.h"
703 #include "log.h"
704 #include "ssh2.h"
705+#include "cipher.h"
706+#include "key.h"
707+#include "kex.h"
708+#include <openssl/evp.h>
709
710 #include "ssh-gss.h"
711
712 extern u_char *session_id2;
713 extern u_int session_id2_len;
714
715+typedef struct {
716+ char *encoded;
717+ gss_OID oid;
718+} ssh_gss_kex_mapping;
719+
720+/*
721+ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the
722+ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines
723+ */
724+
725+Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL;
726+
727+static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL;
728+
729+int
730+ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void) {
731+ return (gss_enc2oid != NULL);
732+}
733+
734+/*
735+ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program
736+ *
737+ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting
738+ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism
739+ */
740+
741+char *
742+ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) {
743+ gss_OID_set gss_supported;
744+ OM_uint32 min_status;
745+
746+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported)))
747+ return NULL;
748+
749+ return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
750+ host, client));
751+}
752+
753+char *
754+ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
755+ const char *host, const char *client) {
756+ Buffer buf;
757+ size_t i;
758+ int oidpos, enclen;
759+ char *mechs, *encoded;
760+ u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
761+ char deroid[2];
762+ const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
763+ EVP_MD_CTX md;
764+
765+ if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
766+ for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++)
767+ free(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded);
768+ free(gss_enc2oid);
769+ }
770+
771+ gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) *
772+ (gss_supported->count + 1));
773+
774+ buffer_init(&buf);
775+
776+ oidpos = 0;
777+ for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
778+ if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
779+ (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
780+
781+ deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
782+ deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
783+
784+ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
785+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2);
786+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,
787+ gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
788+ gss_supported->elements[i].length);
789+ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
790+
791+ encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
792+ enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md),
793+ encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
794+
795+ if (oidpos != 0)
796+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
797+
798+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
799+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1);
800+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
801+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
802+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
803+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1);
804+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
805+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
806+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
807+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1);
808+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
809+
810+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
811+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
812+ oidpos++;
813+ }
814+ }
815+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
816+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
817+
818+ buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0');
819+
820+ mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf));
821+ buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf));
822+ buffer_free(&buf);
823+
824+ if (strlen(mechs) == 0) {
825+ free(mechs);
826+ mechs = NULL;
827+ }
828+
829+ return (mechs);
830+}
831+
832+gss_OID
833+ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) {
834+ int i = 0;
835+
836+ switch (kex_type) {
837+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
838+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID))
839+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
840+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1;
841+ break;
842+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
843+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID))
844+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
845+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1;
846+ break;
847+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
848+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID))
849+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
850+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1;
851+ break;
852+ default:
853+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
854+ }
855+
856+ while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL &&
857+ strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0)
858+ i++;
859+
860+ if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL)
861+ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid);
862+
863+ return gss_enc2oid[i].oid;
864+}
865+
866 /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
867 int
868 ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
869@@ -199,7 +354,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int deleg_creds, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
870 }
871
872 ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
873- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
874+ ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
875 GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
876 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
877
878@@ -229,8 +384,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host)
879 }
880
881 OM_uint32
882+ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name)
883+{
884+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
885+ gss_name_t gssname;
886+ OM_uint32 status;
887+ gss_OID_set oidset;
888+
889+ gssbuf.value = (void *) name;
890+ gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
891+
892+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
893+ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
894+
895+ ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf,
896+ GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname);
897+
898+ if (!ctx->major)
899+ ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
900+ gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE,
901+ &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL);
902+
903+ gss_release_name(&status, &gssname);
904+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
905+
906+ if (ctx->major)
907+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
908+
909+ return(ctx->major);
910+}
911+
912+OM_uint32
913 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
914 {
915+ if (ctx == NULL)
916+ return -1;
917+
918 if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
919 GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
920 ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
921@@ -238,6 +427,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
922 return (ctx->major);
923 }
924
925+/* Priviledged when used by server */
926+OM_uint32
927+ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
928+{
929+ if (ctx == NULL)
930+ return -1;
931+
932+ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
933+ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
934+
935+ return (ctx->major);
936+}
937+
938 void
939 ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
940 const char *context)
941@@ -251,11 +453,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
942 }
943
944 int
945-ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
946+ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host,
947+ const char *client)
948 {
949 gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
950 OM_uint32 major, minor;
951 gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
952+ Gssctxt *intctx = NULL;
953+
954+ if (ctx == NULL)
955+ ctx = &intctx;
956
957 /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
958 if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length &&
959@@ -265,6 +472,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
960 ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
961 ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
962 major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
963+
964+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client)
965+ major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client);
966+
967 if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
968 major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token,
969 NULL);
970@@ -274,10 +485,66 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
971 GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
972 }
973
974- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
975+ if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL)
976 ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
977
978 return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
979 }
980
981+int
982+ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) {
983+ static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
984+ static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0;
985+ static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
986+ static gss_name_t name;
987+ static OM_uint32 last_call = 0;
988+ OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor;
989+ int equal;
990+
991+ now = time(NULL);
992+
993+ if (ctxt) {
994+ debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions");
995+
996+ if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
997+ gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name);
998+
999+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
1000+ &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL);
1001+
1002+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
1003+ saved_mech = ctxt->oid;
1004+ saved_lifetime+= now;
1005+ } else {
1006+ /* Handle the error */
1007+ }
1008+ return 0;
1009+ }
1010+
1011+ if (now - last_call < 10)
1012+ return 0;
1013+
1014+ last_call = now;
1015+
1016+ if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID)
1017+ return 0;
1018+
1019+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
1020+ &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL);
1021+ if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED)
1022+ return 0;
1023+ else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
1024+ return 0;
1025+
1026+ major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal);
1027+ gss_release_name(&minor, &name);
1028+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
1029+ return 0;
1030+
1031+ if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10))
1032+ return 1;
1033+
1034+ return 0;
1035+}
1036+
1037 #endif /* GSSAPI */
1038diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
1039index 795992d..fd8b371 100644
1040--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
1041+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
1042@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
1043 /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.8 2013/07/20 01:55:13 djm Exp $ */
1044
1045 /*
1046- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
1047+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
1048 *
1049 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
1050 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
1051@@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1052 krb5_error_code problem;
1053 krb5_principal princ;
1054 OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
1055- int len;
1056 const char *errmsg;
1057+ const char *new_ccname;
1058
1059 if (client->creds == NULL) {
1060 debug("No credentials stored");
1061@@ -181,11 +181,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1062 return;
1063 }
1064
1065- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache));
1066+ new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
1067+
1068 client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
1069- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6;
1070- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len);
1071- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename);
1072+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
1073+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
1074+ client->store.filename = NULL;
1075+#else
1076+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "FILE:%s", new_ccname);
1077+ client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
1078+#endif
1079
1080 #ifdef USE_PAM
1081 if (options.use_pam)
1082@@ -197,6 +202,71 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1083 return;
1084 }
1085
1086+int
1087+ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,
1088+ ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1089+{
1090+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
1091+ krb5_principal principal = NULL;
1092+ char *name = NULL;
1093+ krb5_error_code problem;
1094+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
1095+
1096+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) {
1097+ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
1098+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
1099+ return 0;
1100+ }
1101+
1102+ /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */
1103+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache,
1104+ &principal))) {
1105+ logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s",
1106+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
1107+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
1108+ return 0;
1109+ }
1110+
1111+ if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) {
1112+ logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s",
1113+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
1114+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
1115+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
1116+ return 0;
1117+ }
1118+
1119+
1120+ if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) {
1121+ debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing");
1122+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
1123+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
1124+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
1125+ return 0;
1126+ }
1127+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
1128+
1129+ /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */
1130+
1131+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) {
1132+ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s",
1133+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
1134+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
1135+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
1136+ return 0;
1137+ }
1138+
1139+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
1140+
1141+ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds,
1142+ ccache))) {
1143+ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!");
1144+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
1145+ return 0;
1146+ }
1147+
1148+ return 1;
1149+}
1150+
1151 ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
1152 "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
1153 "Kerberos",
1154@@ -204,7 +274,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
1155 NULL,
1156 &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
1157 NULL,
1158- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds
1159+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds,
1160+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds
1161 };
1162
1163 #endif /* KRB5 */
1164diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
1165index 53993d6..2f6baf7 100644
1166--- a/gss-serv.c
1167+++ b/gss-serv.c
1168@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
1169 /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.29 2015/05/22 03:50:02 djm Exp $ */
1170
1171 /*
1172- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
1173+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
1174 *
1175 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
1176 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
1177@@ -45,17 +45,22 @@
1178 #include "session.h"
1179 #include "misc.h"
1180 #include "servconf.h"
1181+#include "uidswap.h"
1182
1183 #include "ssh-gss.h"
1184+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
1185+
1186+extern ServerOptions options;
1187
1188 extern ServerOptions options;
1189
1190 static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
1191 { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
1192- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}};
1193+ GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL,
1194+ {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
1195
1196 ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
1197- { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
1198+ { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
1199
1200 #ifdef KRB5
1201 extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
1202@@ -142,6 +147,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
1203 }
1204
1205 /* Unprivileged */
1206+char *
1207+ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void) {
1208+ gss_OID_set supported;
1209+
1210+ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported);
1211+ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech,
1212+ NULL, NULL));
1213+}
1214+
1215+/* Unprivileged */
1216+int
1217+ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data,
1218+ const char *dummy) {
1219+ Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
1220+ int res;
1221+
1222+ res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
1223+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
1224+
1225+ return (res);
1226+}
1227+
1228+/* Unprivileged */
1229 void
1230 ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
1231 {
1232@@ -151,7 +179,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
1233 gss_OID_set supported;
1234
1235 gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
1236- gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
1237+
1238+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported)))
1239+ return;
1240
1241 while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
1242 if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
1243@@ -277,8 +307,48 @@ OM_uint32
1244 ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1245 {
1246 int i = 0;
1247+ int equal = 0;
1248+ gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
1249+ gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1250+
1251+ if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
1252+ if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
1253+ (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements,
1254+ ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) {
1255+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
1256+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1257+ }
1258+
1259+ if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
1260+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name,
1261+ NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
1262+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
1263+ return (ctx->major);
1264+ }
1265+
1266+ ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name,
1267+ new_name, &equal);
1268+
1269+ if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
1270+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
1271+ return (ctx->major);
1272+ }
1273+
1274+ if (!equal) {
1275+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name");
1276+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1277+ }
1278
1279- gss_buffer_desc ename;
1280+ debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
1281+
1282+ gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
1283+ gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds);
1284+ client->name = new_name;
1285+ client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
1286+ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
1287+ client->updated = 1;
1288+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1289+ }
1290
1291 client->mech = NULL;
1292
1293@@ -293,6 +363,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1294 if (client->mech == NULL)
1295 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1296
1297+ if (ctx->client_creds &&
1298+ (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
1299+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
1300+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
1301+ return (ctx->major);
1302+ }
1303+
1304 if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
1305 &client->displayname, NULL))) {
1306 ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
1307@@ -310,6 +387,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1308 return (ctx->major);
1309 }
1310
1311+ gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
1312+
1313 /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
1314 client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
1315 ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
1316@@ -357,7 +436,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep)
1317
1318 /* Privileged */
1319 int
1320-ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
1321+ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
1322 {
1323 OM_uint32 lmin;
1324
1325@@ -367,9 +446,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
1326 return 0;
1327 }
1328 if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
1329- if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
1330+ if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
1331+ gssapi_client.used = 1;
1332+ gssapi_client.store.owner = pw;
1333 return 1;
1334- else {
1335+ } else {
1336 /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
1337 gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
1338 gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
1339@@ -383,14 +464,90 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
1340 return (0);
1341 }
1342
1343-/* Privileged */
1344-OM_uint32
1345-ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
1346+/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running
1347+ * as the user, the monitor is root.
1348+ *
1349+ * In the child, we want to :
1350+ * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify
1351+ * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update
1352+ */
1353+
1354+/* Stuff for PAM */
1355+
1356+#ifdef USE_PAM
1357+static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg,
1358+ struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
1359 {
1360- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
1361- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
1362+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
1363+}
1364+#endif
1365
1366- return (ctx->major);
1367+void
1368+ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) {
1369+ int ok;
1370+ int ret;
1371+#ifdef USE_PAM
1372+ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
1373+ struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
1374+ char *envstr;
1375+#endif
1376+
1377+ if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
1378+ gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
1379+ gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
1380+ return;
1381+
1382+ ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
1383+
1384+ if (!ok)
1385+ return;
1386+
1387+ debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully");
1388+
1389+ /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will
1390+ * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options
1391+ * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
1392+ */
1393+#ifdef USE_PAM
1394+ if (!use_privsep) {
1395+ debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
1396+ return;
1397+ }
1398+
1399+ ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
1400+ &pamconv, &pamh);
1401+ if (ret)
1402+ return;
1403+
1404+ xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
1405+ gssapi_client.store.envval);
1406+
1407+ ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr);
1408+ if (!ret)
1409+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
1410+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
1411+#endif
1412+}
1413+
1414+int
1415+ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) {
1416+ int ok = 0;
1417+
1418+ /* Check we've got credentials to store */
1419+ if (!gssapi_client.updated)
1420+ return 0;
1421+
1422+ gssapi_client.updated = 0;
1423+
1424+ temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner);
1425+ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)
1426+ ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client);
1427+ else
1428+ debug("No update function for this mechanism");
1429+
1430+ restore_uid();
1431+
1432+ return ok;
1433 }
1434
1435 #endif
1436diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
1437index 50c7a0f..c17d652 100644
1438--- a/kex.c
1439+++ b/kex.c
1440@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@
1441 #include "sshbuf.h"
1442 #include "digest.h"
1443
1444+#ifdef GSSAPI
1445+#include "ssh-gss.h"
1446+#endif
1447+
1448 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
1449 # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
1450 # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256
1451@@ -113,6 +117,14 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
1452 #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */
1453 { NULL, -1, -1, -1},
1454 };
1455+static const struct kexalg kexalg_prefixes[] = {
1456+#ifdef GSSAPI
1457+ { KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
1458+ { KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
1459+ { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
1460+#endif
1461+ { NULL, -1, -1, -1 },
1462+};
1463
1464 char *
1465 kex_alg_list(char sep)
1466@@ -145,6 +157,10 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
1467 if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
1468 return k;
1469 }
1470+ for (k = kexalg_prefixes; k->name != NULL; k++) {
1471+ if (strncmp(k->name, name, strlen(k->name)) == 0)
1472+ return k;
1473+ }
1474 return NULL;
1475 }
1476
1477@@ -587,6 +603,9 @@ kex_free(struct kex *kex)
1478 sshbuf_free(kex->peer);
1479 sshbuf_free(kex->my);
1480 free(kex->session_id);
1481+#ifdef GSSAPI
1482+ free(kex->gss_host);
1483+#endif /* GSSAPI */
1484 free(kex->client_version_string);
1485 free(kex->server_version_string);
1486 free(kex->failed_choice);
1487diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
1488index c351955..8ed459a 100644
1489--- a/kex.h
1490+++ b/kex.h
1491@@ -98,6 +98,9 @@ enum kex_exchange {
1492 KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
1493 KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
1494 KEX_C25519_SHA256,
1495+ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
1496+ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
1497+ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1,
1498 KEX_MAX
1499 };
1500
1501@@ -146,6 +149,12 @@ struct kex {
1502 u_int flags;
1503 int hash_alg;
1504 int ec_nid;
1505+#ifdef GSSAPI
1506+ int gss_deleg_creds;
1507+ int gss_trust_dns;
1508+ char *gss_host;
1509+ char *gss_client;
1510+#endif
1511 char *client_version_string;
1512 char *server_version_string;
1513 char *failed_choice;
1514@@ -196,6 +205,11 @@ int kexecdh_server(struct ssh *);
1515 int kexc25519_client(struct ssh *);
1516 int kexc25519_server(struct ssh *);
1517
1518+#ifdef GSSAPI
1519+int kexgss_client(struct ssh *);
1520+int kexgss_server(struct ssh *);
1521+#endif
1522+
1523 int kex_dh_hash(int, const char *, const char *,
1524 const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t,
1525 const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, u_char *, size_t *);
1526diff --git a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c
1527new file mode 100644
1528index 0000000..10447f2
1529--- /dev/null
1530+++ b/kexgssc.c
1531@@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
1532+/*
1533+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
1534+ *
1535+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
1536+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
1537+ * are met:
1538+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
1539+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
1540+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
1541+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
1542+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
1543+ *
1544+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
1545+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
1546+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
1547+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
1548+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
1549+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
1550+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
1551+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
1552+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
1553+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
1554+ */
1555+
1556+#include "includes.h"
1557+
1558+#ifdef GSSAPI
1559+
1560+#include "includes.h"
1561+
1562+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
1563+#include <openssl/bn.h>
1564+
1565+#include <string.h>
1566+
1567+#include "xmalloc.h"
1568+#include "buffer.h"
1569+#include "ssh2.h"
1570+#include "key.h"
1571+#include "cipher.h"
1572+#include "kex.h"
1573+#include "log.h"
1574+#include "packet.h"
1575+#include "dh.h"
1576+#include "digest.h"
1577+
1578+#include "ssh-gss.h"
1579+
1580+int
1581+kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) {
1582+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1583+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr;
1584+ Gssctxt *ctxt;
1585+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
1586+ u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, strlen;
1587+ DH *dh;
1588+ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
1589+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
1590+ BIGNUM *p = NULL;
1591+ BIGNUM *g = NULL;
1592+ u_char *kbuf;
1593+ u_char *serverhostkey = NULL;
1594+ u_char *empty = "";
1595+ char *msg;
1596+ int type = 0;
1597+ int first = 1;
1598+ int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
1599+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
1600+ size_t hashlen;
1601+
1602+ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */
1603+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
1604+ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, ssh->kex->name, ssh->kex->kex_type)
1605+ == GSS_C_NO_OID)
1606+ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
1607+
1608+ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, ssh->kex->gss_host))
1609+ fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
1610+
1611+ if (ssh->kex->gss_client &&
1612+ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, ssh->kex->gss_client))
1613+ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
1614+
1615+ switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
1616+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
1617+ dh = dh_new_group1();
1618+ break;
1619+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
1620+ dh = dh_new_group14();
1621+ break;
1622+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
1623+ debug("Doing group exchange\n");
1624+ nbits = dh_estimate(ssh->kex->we_need * 8);
1625+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
1626+ packet_put_int(min);
1627+ packet_put_int(nbits);
1628+ packet_put_int(max);
1629+
1630+ packet_send();
1631+
1632+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
1633+
1634+ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
1635+ fatal("BN_new() failed");
1636+ packet_get_bignum2(p);
1637+ if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
1638+ fatal("BN_new() failed");
1639+ packet_get_bignum2(g);
1640+ packet_check_eom();
1641+
1642+ if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
1643+ fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
1644+ min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
1645+
1646+ dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
1647+ break;
1648+ default:
1649+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
1650+ }
1651+
1652+ /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */
1653+ dh_gen_key(dh, ssh->kex->we_need * 8);
1654+
1655+ /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */
1656+ dh_server_pub = BN_new();
1657+ if (dh_server_pub == NULL)
1658+ fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
1659+
1660+ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
1661+
1662+ do {
1663+ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
1664+
1665+ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
1666+ ssh->kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
1667+ &ret_flags);
1668+
1669+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
1670+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
1671+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
1672+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
1673+ send_tok.length);
1674+ }
1675+ fatal("gss_init_context failed");
1676+ }
1677+
1678+ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
1679+ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
1680+ free(recv_tok.value);
1681+
1682+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1683+ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
1684+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
1685+ fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
1686+
1687+ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
1688+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
1689+ fatal("Integrity check failed");
1690+ }
1691+
1692+ /*
1693+ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
1694+ * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
1695+ */
1696+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
1697+ if (first) {
1698+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT);
1699+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
1700+ send_tok.length);
1701+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
1702+ first = 0;
1703+ } else {
1704+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
1705+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
1706+ send_tok.length);
1707+ }
1708+ packet_send();
1709+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
1710+
1711+ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
1712+ do {
1713+ type = packet_read();
1714+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
1715+ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
1716+ if (serverhostkey)
1717+ fatal("Server host key received more than once");
1718+ serverhostkey =
1719+ packet_get_string(&slen);
1720+ }
1721+ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
1722+
1723+ switch (type) {
1724+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
1725+ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
1726+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
1727+ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
1728+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
1729+ recv_tok.length = strlen;
1730+ break;
1731+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
1732+ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
1733+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
1734+ msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
1735+ msg_tok.length = strlen;
1736+
1737+ /* Is there a token included? */
1738+ if (packet_get_char()) {
1739+ recv_tok.value=
1740+ packet_get_string(&strlen);
1741+ recv_tok.length = strlen;
1742+ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */
1743+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
1744+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete");
1745+ } else {
1746+ /* No token included */
1747+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
1748+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token");
1749+ }
1750+ break;
1751+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
1752+ debug("Received Error");
1753+ maj_status = packet_get_int();
1754+ min_status = packet_get_int();
1755+ msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
1756+ (void) packet_get_string_ptr(NULL);
1757+ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg);
1758+ default:
1759+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
1760+ type);
1761+ }
1762+ token_ptr = &recv_tok;
1763+ } else {
1764+ /* No data, and not complete */
1765+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
1766+ fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
1767+ }
1768+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
1769+
1770+ /*
1771+ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the
1772+ * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok
1773+ */
1774+
1775+ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
1776+ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
1777+
1778+ /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */
1779+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
1780+ packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
1781+
1782+ /* compute K=f^x mod p */
1783+ klen = DH_size(dh);
1784+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
1785+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh);
1786+ if (kout < 0)
1787+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
1788+
1789+ shared_secret = BN_new();
1790+ if (shared_secret == NULL)
1791+ fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed");
1792+
1793+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
1794+ fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
1795+
1796+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
1797+ free(kbuf);
1798+
1799+ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
1800+ switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
1801+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
1802+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
1803+ kex_dh_hash(
1804+ ssh->kex->hash_alg,
1805+ ssh->kex->client_version_string,
1806+ ssh->kex->server_version_string,
1807+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
1808+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
1809+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
1810+ dh->pub_key, /* e */
1811+ dh_server_pub, /* f */
1812+ shared_secret, /* K */
1813+ hash, &hashlen
1814+ );
1815+ break;
1816+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
1817+ kexgex_hash(
1818+ ssh->kex->hash_alg,
1819+ ssh->kex->client_version_string,
1820+ ssh->kex->server_version_string,
1821+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
1822+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
1823+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
1824+ min, nbits, max,
1825+ dh->p, dh->g,
1826+ dh->pub_key,
1827+ dh_server_pub,
1828+ shared_secret,
1829+ hash, &hashlen
1830+ );
1831+ break;
1832+ default:
1833+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
1834+ }
1835+
1836+ gssbuf.value = hash;
1837+ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
1838+
1839+ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
1840+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
1841+ packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify");
1842+
1843+ free(msg_tok.value);
1844+
1845+ DH_free(dh);
1846+ free(serverhostkey);
1847+ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
1848+
1849+ /* save session id */
1850+ if (ssh->kex->session_id == NULL) {
1851+ ssh->kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
1852+ ssh->kex->session_id = xmalloc(ssh->kex->session_id_len);
1853+ memcpy(ssh->kex->session_id, hash, ssh->kex->session_id_len);
1854+ }
1855+
1856+ if (ssh->kex->gss_deleg_creds)
1857+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
1858+
1859+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
1860+ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
1861+ else
1862+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
1863+
1864+ kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
1865+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
1866+ return kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
1867+}
1868+
1869+#endif /* GSSAPI */
1870diff --git a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c
1871new file mode 100644
1872index 0000000..38ca082
1873--- /dev/null
1874+++ b/kexgsss.c
1875@@ -0,0 +1,295 @@
1876+/*
1877+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
1878+ *
1879+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
1880+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
1881+ * are met:
1882+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
1883+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
1884+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
1885+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
1886+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
1887+ *
1888+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
1889+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
1890+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
1891+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
1892+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
1893+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
1894+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
1895+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
1896+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
1897+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
1898+ */
1899+
1900+#include "includes.h"
1901+
1902+#ifdef GSSAPI
1903+
1904+#include <string.h>
1905+
1906+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
1907+#include <openssl/bn.h>
1908+
1909+#include "xmalloc.h"
1910+#include "buffer.h"
1911+#include "ssh2.h"
1912+#include "key.h"
1913+#include "cipher.h"
1914+#include "kex.h"
1915+#include "log.h"
1916+#include "packet.h"
1917+#include "dh.h"
1918+#include "ssh-gss.h"
1919+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
1920+#include "misc.h"
1921+#include "servconf.h"
1922+#include "digest.h"
1923+
1924+extern ServerOptions options;
1925+
1926+int
1927+kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
1928+{
1929+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
1930+
1931+ /*
1932+ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
1933+ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific
1934+ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently
1935+ * activating this non-standard behaviour.
1936+ */
1937+
1938+ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
1939+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
1940+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1941+ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
1942+ u_int slen, klen, kout;
1943+ u_char *kbuf;
1944+ DH *dh;
1945+ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
1946+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
1947+ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
1948+ int type = 0;
1949+ gss_OID oid;
1950+ char *mechs;
1951+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
1952+ size_t hashlen;
1953+
1954+ /* Initialise GSSAPI */
1955+
1956+ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures
1957+ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
1958+ * into life
1959+ */
1960+ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) {
1961+ mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
1962+ free(mechs);
1963+ }
1964+
1965+ debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, ssh->kex->name);
1966+ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, ssh->kex->name, ssh->kex->kex_type);
1967+ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
1968+ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
1969+
1970+ debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
1971+
1972+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
1973+ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
1974+
1975+ switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
1976+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
1977+ dh = dh_new_group1();
1978+ break;
1979+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
1980+ dh = dh_new_group14();
1981+ break;
1982+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
1983+ debug("Doing group exchange");
1984+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
1985+ min = packet_get_int();
1986+ nbits = packet_get_int();
1987+ max = packet_get_int();
1988+ packet_check_eom();
1989+ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
1990+ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
1991+ min, nbits, max);
1992+ dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min),
1993+ nbits, MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max)));
1994+ if (dh == NULL)
1995+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found");
1996+
1997+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
1998+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
1999+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
2000+ packet_send();
2001+
2002+ packet_write_wait();
2003+ break;
2004+ default:
2005+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
2006+ }
2007+
2008+ dh_gen_key(dh, ssh->kex->we_need * 8);
2009+
2010+ do {
2011+ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
2012+ type = packet_read();
2013+ switch(type) {
2014+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
2015+ if (dh_client_pub != NULL)
2016+ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
2017+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
2018+ recv_tok.length = slen;
2019+
2020+ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
2021+ fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
2022+
2023+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
2024+
2025+ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
2026+ break;
2027+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
2028+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
2029+ recv_tok.length = slen;
2030+ break;
2031+ default:
2032+ packet_disconnect(
2033+ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
2034+ type);
2035+ }
2036+
2037+ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
2038+ &send_tok, &ret_flags));
2039+
2040+ free(recv_tok.value);
2041+
2042+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
2043+ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
2044+
2045+ if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
2046+ fatal("No client public key");
2047+
2048+ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
2049+ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
2050+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
2051+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
2052+ packet_send();
2053+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
2054+ }
2055+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
2056+
2057+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
2058+ if (send_tok.length > 0) {
2059+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
2060+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
2061+ packet_send();
2062+ }
2063+ fatal("accept_ctx died");
2064+ }
2065+
2066+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
2067+ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
2068+
2069+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
2070+ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
2071+
2072+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
2073+ packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
2074+
2075+ klen = DH_size(dh);
2076+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
2077+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
2078+ if (kout < 0)
2079+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
2080+
2081+ shared_secret = BN_new();
2082+ if (shared_secret == NULL)
2083+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed");
2084+
2085+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
2086+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
2087+
2088+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
2089+ free(kbuf);
2090+
2091+ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
2092+ switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
2093+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
2094+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
2095+ kex_dh_hash(
2096+ ssh->kex->hash_alg,
2097+ ssh->kex->client_version_string, ssh->kex->server_version_string,
2098+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
2099+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
2100+ NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */
2101+ dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret,
2102+ hash, &hashlen
2103+ );
2104+ break;
2105+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
2106+ kexgex_hash(
2107+ ssh->kex->hash_alg,
2108+ ssh->kex->client_version_string, ssh->kex->server_version_string,
2109+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
2110+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
2111+ NULL, 0,
2112+ min, nbits, max,
2113+ dh->p, dh->g,
2114+ dh_client_pub,
2115+ dh->pub_key,
2116+ shared_secret,
2117+ hash, &hashlen
2118+ );
2119+ break;
2120+ default:
2121+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
2122+ }
2123+
2124+ BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
2125+
2126+ if (ssh->kex->session_id == NULL) {
2127+ ssh->kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
2128+ ssh->kex->session_id = xmalloc(ssh->kex->session_id_len);
2129+ memcpy(ssh->kex->session_id, hash, ssh->kex->session_id_len);
2130+ }
2131+
2132+ gssbuf.value = hash;
2133+ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
2134+
2135+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok))))
2136+ fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
2137+
2138+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE);
2139+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
2140+ packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length);
2141+
2142+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
2143+ packet_put_char(1); /* true */
2144+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
2145+ } else {
2146+ packet_put_char(0); /* false */
2147+ }
2148+ packet_send();
2149+
2150+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
2151+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
2152+
2153+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
2154+ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
2155+ else
2156+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
2157+
2158+ DH_free(dh);
2159+
2160+ kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
2161+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
2162+ kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
2163+
2164+ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
2165+ * just exchanged. */
2166+ if (options.gss_store_rekey)
2167+ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
2168+ return 0;
2169+}
2170+#endif /* GSSAPI */
2171diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
2172index cb57bd0..05bb48a 100644
2173--- a/monitor.c
2174+++ b/monitor.c
2175@@ -158,6 +158,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
2176 int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
2177 int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
2178 int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
2179+int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *);
2180+int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *);
2181 #endif
2182
2183 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
2184@@ -235,11 +237,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
2185 {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
2186 {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
2187 {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
2188+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign},
2189 #endif
2190 {0, 0, NULL}
2191 };
2192
2193 struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
2194+#ifdef GSSAPI
2195+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
2196+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
2197+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
2198+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
2199+#endif
2200 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
2201 {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
2202 #endif
2203@@ -354,6 +363,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
2204 /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
2205 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
2206 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
2207+#ifdef GSSAPI
2208+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
2209+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
2210+#endif
2211 } else {
2212 mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
2213
2214@@ -462,6 +475,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
2215 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
2216 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
2217 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
2218+#ifdef GSSAPI
2219+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
2220+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
2221+#endif
2222 } else {
2223 mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
2224 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
2225@@ -1876,6 +1893,13 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
2226 # endif
2227 #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
2228 kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
2229+#ifdef GSSAPI
2230+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
2231+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
2232+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
2233+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
2234+ }
2235+#endif
2236 kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
2237 kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
2238 kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
2239@@ -1975,6 +1999,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
2240 OM_uint32 major;
2241 u_int len;
2242
2243+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
2244+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
2245+
2246 goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
2247 goid.length = len;
2248
2249@@ -2002,6 +2029,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
2250 OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
2251 u_int len;
2252
2253+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
2254+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
2255+
2256 in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
2257 in.length = len;
2258 major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
2259@@ -2019,6 +2049,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
2260 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
2261 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
2262 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
2263+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1);
2264 }
2265 return (0);
2266 }
2267@@ -2030,6 +2061,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
2268 OM_uint32 ret;
2269 u_int len;
2270
2271+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
2272+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
2273+
2274 gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
2275 gssbuf.length = len;
2276 mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
2277@@ -2056,7 +2090,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
2278 {
2279 int authenticated;
2280
2281- authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
2282+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
2283+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
2284+
2285+ authenticated = authctxt->valid &&
2286+ ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw);
2287
2288 buffer_clear(m);
2289 buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
2290@@ -2069,5 +2107,73 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
2291 /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
2292 return (authenticated);
2293 }
2294+
2295+int
2296+mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
2297+{
2298+ gss_buffer_desc data;
2299+ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
2300+ OM_uint32 major, minor;
2301+ u_int len;
2302+
2303+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
2304+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
2305+
2306+ data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
2307+ data.length = len;
2308+ if (data.length != 20)
2309+ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__,
2310+ (int) data.length);
2311+
2312+ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */
2313+ if (session_id2_len == 0) {
2314+ session_id2_len = data.length;
2315+ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
2316+ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
2317+ }
2318+ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
2319+
2320+ free(data.value);
2321+
2322+ buffer_clear(m);
2323+ buffer_put_int(m, major);
2324+ buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length);
2325+
2326+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
2327+
2328+ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
2329+
2330+ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
2331+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
2332+
2333+ /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */
2334+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1);
2335+
2336+ return (0);
2337+}
2338+
2339+int
2340+mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) {
2341+ ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
2342+ int ok;
2343+
2344+ store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
2345+ store.envvar = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
2346+ store.envval = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
2347+
2348+ ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
2349+
2350+ free(store.filename);
2351+ free(store.envvar);
2352+ free(store.envval);
2353+
2354+ buffer_clear(m);
2355+ buffer_put_int(m, ok);
2356+
2357+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
2358+
2359+ return(0);
2360+}
2361+
2362 #endif /* GSSAPI */
2363
2364diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
2365index 93b8b66..bc50ade 100644
2366--- a/monitor.h
2367+++ b/monitor.h
2368@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
2369 MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
2370 MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
2371
2372+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151,
2373+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153,
2374+
2375 };
2376
2377 struct mm_master;
2378diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
2379index 99dc13b..5a9f1b5 100644
2380--- a/monitor_wrap.c
2381+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
2382@@ -1073,7 +1073,7 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
2383 }
2384
2385 int
2386-mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
2387+mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
2388 {
2389 Buffer m;
2390 int authenticated = 0;
2391@@ -1090,5 +1090,50 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
2392 debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
2393 return (authenticated);
2394 }
2395+
2396+OM_uint32
2397+mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
2398+{
2399+ Buffer m;
2400+ OM_uint32 major;
2401+ u_int len;
2402+
2403+ buffer_init(&m);
2404+ buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length);
2405+
2406+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m);
2407+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m);
2408+
2409+ major = buffer_get_int(&m);
2410+ hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
2411+ hash->length = len;
2412+
2413+ buffer_free(&m);
2414+
2415+ return(major);
2416+}
2417+
2418+int
2419+mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store)
2420+{
2421+ Buffer m;
2422+ int ok;
2423+
2424+ buffer_init(&m);
2425+
2426+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : "");
2427+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : "");
2428+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : "");
2429+
2430+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
2431+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
2432+
2433+ ok = buffer_get_int(&m);
2434+
2435+ buffer_free(&m);
2436+
2437+ return (ok);
2438+}
2439+
2440 #endif /* GSSAPI */
2441
2442diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
2443index 9fd02b3..b5414c2 100644
2444--- a/monitor_wrap.h
2445+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
2446@@ -60,8 +60,10 @@ BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);
2447 OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
2448 OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
2449 gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
2450-int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
2451+int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *);
2452 OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
2453+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
2454+int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *);
2455 #endif
2456
2457 #ifdef USE_PAM
2458diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
2459index c177202..e019195 100644
2460--- a/readconf.c
2461+++ b/readconf.c
2462@@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ typedef enum {
2463 oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
2464 oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
2465 oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
2466+ oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey,
2467+ oGssServerIdentity,
2468 oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
2469 oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
2470 oHashKnownHosts,
2471@@ -205,10 +207,19 @@ static struct {
2472 { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
2473 #if defined(GSSAPI)
2474 { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
2475+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx },
2476 { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
2477+ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
2478+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity },
2479+ { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity },
2480+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey },
2481 #else
2482 { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
2483+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
2484 { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
2485+ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
2486+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported },
2487+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported },
2488 #endif
2489 { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
2490 { "usersh", oDeprecated },
2491@@ -962,10 +973,30 @@ parse_time:
2492 intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
2493 goto parse_flag;
2494
2495+ case oGssKeyEx:
2496+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
2497+ goto parse_flag;
2498+
2499 case oGssDelegateCreds:
2500 intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
2501 goto parse_flag;
2502
2503+ case oGssTrustDns:
2504+ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
2505+ goto parse_flag;
2506+
2507+ case oGssClientIdentity:
2508+ charptr = &options->gss_client_identity;
2509+ goto parse_string;
2510+
2511+ case oGssServerIdentity:
2512+ charptr = &options->gss_server_identity;
2513+ goto parse_string;
2514+
2515+ case oGssRenewalRekey:
2516+ intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey;
2517+ goto parse_flag;
2518+
2519 case oBatchMode:
2520 intptr = &options->batch_mode;
2521 goto parse_flag;
2522@@ -1777,7 +1808,12 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
2523 options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
2524 options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
2525 options->gss_authentication = -1;
2526+ options->gss_keyex = -1;
2527 options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
2528+ options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
2529+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1;
2530+ options->gss_client_identity = NULL;
2531+ options->gss_server_identity = NULL;
2532 options->password_authentication = -1;
2533 options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
2534 options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
2535@@ -1921,8 +1957,14 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
2536 options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
2537 if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
2538 options->gss_authentication = 0;
2539+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
2540+ options->gss_keyex = 0;
2541 if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
2542 options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
2543+ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
2544+ options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
2545+ if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
2546+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0;
2547 if (options->password_authentication == -1)
2548 options->password_authentication = 1;
2549 if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
2550diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
2551index cef55f7..fd3d7c7 100644
2552--- a/readconf.h
2553+++ b/readconf.h
2554@@ -45,7 +45,12 @@ typedef struct {
2555 int challenge_response_authentication;
2556 /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
2557 int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */
2558+ int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */
2559 int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */
2560+ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
2561+ int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */
2562+ char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */
2563+ char *gss_server_identity; /* GSSAPI target principal */
2564 int password_authentication; /* Try password
2565 * authentication. */
2566 int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
2567diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
2568index 873b0d0..9b06281 100644
2569--- a/servconf.c
2570+++ b/servconf.c
2571@@ -117,8 +117,10 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
2572 options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
2573 options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
2574 options->gss_authentication=-1;
2575+ options->gss_keyex = -1;
2576 options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
2577 options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
2578+ options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
2579 options->password_authentication = -1;
2580 options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
2581 options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
2582@@ -287,10 +289,14 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
2583 options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
2584 if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
2585 options->gss_authentication = 0;
2586+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
2587+ options->gss_keyex = 0;
2588 if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
2589 options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
2590 if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
2591- options->gss_strict_acceptor = 0;
2592+ options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
2593+ if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
2594+ options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
2595 if (options->password_authentication == -1)
2596 options->password_authentication = 1;
2597 if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
2598@@ -427,6 +433,7 @@ typedef enum {
2599 sHostKeyAlgorithms,
2600 sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
2601 sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
2602+ sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey,
2603 sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
2604 sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
2605 sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
2606@@ -500,12 +507,20 @@ static struct {
2607 #ifdef GSSAPI
2608 { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
2609 { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2610+ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2611 { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2612+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2613+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2614 #else
2615 { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
2616 { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2617+ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2618 { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2619+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2620+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2621 #endif
2622+ { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2623+ { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2624 { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
2625 { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
2626 { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2627@@ -1251,6 +1266,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
2628 intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
2629 goto parse_flag;
2630
2631+ case sGssKeyEx:
2632+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
2633+ goto parse_flag;
2634+
2635 case sGssCleanupCreds:
2636 intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
2637 goto parse_flag;
2638@@ -1259,6 +1278,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
2639 intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
2640 goto parse_flag;
2641
2642+ case sGssStoreRekey:
2643+ intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey;
2644+ goto parse_flag;
2645+
2646 case sPasswordAuthentication:
2647 intptr = &options->password_authentication;
2648 goto parse_flag;
2649@@ -2308,7 +2331,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
2650 #endif
2651 #ifdef GSSAPI
2652 dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
2653+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
2654 dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
2655+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
2656+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
2657 #endif
2658 dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
2659 dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
2660diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
2661index f4137af..778ba17 100644
2662--- a/servconf.h
2663+++ b/servconf.h
2664@@ -118,8 +118,10 @@ typedef struct {
2665 int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if
2666 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
2667 int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
2668+ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
2669 int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
2670 int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
2671+ int gss_store_rekey;
2672 int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password
2673 * authentication. */
2674 int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
2675diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
2676index a99d7f0..914701b 100644
2677--- a/ssh-gss.h
2678+++ b/ssh-gss.h
2679@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
2680 /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.11 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */
2681 /*
2682- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
2683+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
2684 *
2685 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
2686 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
2687@@ -61,10 +61,22 @@
2688
2689 #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
2690
2691+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30
2692+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31
2693+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32
2694+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33
2695+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34
2696+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40
2697+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41
2698+#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-"
2699+#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-"
2700+#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-"
2701+
2702 typedef struct {
2703 char *filename;
2704 char *envvar;
2705 char *envval;
2706+ struct passwd *owner;
2707 void *data;
2708 } ssh_gssapi_ccache;
2709
2710@@ -72,8 +84,11 @@ typedef struct {
2711 gss_buffer_desc displayname;
2712 gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
2713 gss_cred_id_t creds;
2714+ gss_name_t name;
2715 struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
2716 ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
2717+ int used;
2718+ int updated;
2719 } ssh_gssapi_client;
2720
2721 typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
2722@@ -84,6 +99,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
2723 int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
2724 int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
2725 void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
2726+ int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
2727 } ssh_gssapi_mech;
2728
2729 typedef struct {
2730@@ -94,10 +110,11 @@ typedef struct {
2731 gss_OID oid; /* client */
2732 gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */
2733 gss_name_t client; /* server */
2734- gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */
2735+ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */
2736 } Gssctxt;
2737
2738 extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
2739+extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context;
2740
2741 int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
2742 void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
2743@@ -119,16 +136,32 @@ void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **);
2744 void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
2745 OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
2746 void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
2747-int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
2748+int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *);
2749+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
2750+int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
2751
2752 /* In the server */
2753+typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *,
2754+ const char *);
2755+char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *);
2756+char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
2757+ const char *);
2758+gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
2759+int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *,
2760+ const char *);
2761 OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
2762-int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
2763+int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *);
2764 OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
2765 void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
2766 void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
2767 void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
2768
2769+char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
2770+int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void);
2771+
2772+int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store);
2773+void ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void);
2774+
2775 #endif /* GSSAPI */
2776
2777 #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
2778diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
2779index 90fb63f..4e879cd 100644
2780--- a/ssh_config
2781+++ b/ssh_config
2782@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
2783 # HostbasedAuthentication no
2784 # GSSAPIAuthentication no
2785 # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
2786+# GSSAPIKeyExchange no
2787+# GSSAPITrustDNS no
2788 # BatchMode no
2789 # CheckHostIP yes
2790 # AddressFamily any
2791diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
2792index 7630e7b..707d0e1 100644
2793--- a/ssh_config.5
2794+++ b/ssh_config.5
2795@@ -826,10 +826,42 @@ The default is
2796 Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
2797 The default is
2798 .Dq no .
2799+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
2800+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using
2801+GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key.
2802+The default is
2803+.Dq no .
2804+.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity
2805+If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when
2806+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default
2807+identity will be used.
2808+.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity
2809+If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when
2810+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the
2811+expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target
2812+hostname.
2813 .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
2814 Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
2815 The default is
2816 .Dq no .
2817+.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
2818+If set to
2819+.Dq yes
2820+then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the
2821+ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed
2822+credentials to a session on the server.
2823+The default is
2824+.Dq no .
2825+.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
2826+Set to
2827+.Dq yes
2828+to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
2829+the name of the host being connected to. If
2830+.Dq no ,
2831+the hostname entered on the
2832+command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
2833+The default is
2834+.Dq no .
2835 .It Cm HashKnownHosts
2836 Indicates that
2837 .Xr ssh 1
2838diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
2839index fae8b0f..34b9d30 100644
2840--- a/sshconnect2.c
2841+++ b/sshconnect2.c
2842@@ -162,6 +162,11 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
2843 struct kex *kex;
2844 int r;
2845
2846+#ifdef GSSAPI
2847+ char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL;
2848+ char *gss_host = NULL;
2849+#endif
2850+
2851 xxx_host = host;
2852 xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
2853
2854@@ -192,6 +197,36 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
2855 order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port));
2856 }
2857
2858+#ifdef GSSAPI
2859+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
2860+ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
2861+ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
2862+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
2863+
2864+ if (options.gss_server_identity)
2865+ gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
2866+ else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
2867+ gss_host = remote_hostname(active_state);
2868+ else
2869+ gss_host = xstrdup(host);
2870+
2871+ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
2872+ options.gss_client_identity);
2873+ if (gss) {
2874+ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
2875+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
2876+ "%s,%s", gss, orig);
2877+
2878+ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also
2879+ * support the 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
2880+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
2881+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
2882+ "%s,null", orig);
2883+ free(gss);
2884+ }
2885+ }
2886+#endif
2887+
2888 if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
2889 packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
2890 (time_t)options.rekey_interval);
2891@@ -213,10 +248,26 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
2892 # endif
2893 #endif
2894 kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client;
2895+#ifdef GSSAPI
2896+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
2897+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
2898+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
2899+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
2900+ }
2901+#endif
2902 kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
2903 kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
2904 kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
2905
2906+#ifdef GSSAPI
2907+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
2908+ kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
2909+ kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
2910+ kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity;
2911+ kex->gss_host = gss_host;
2912+ }
2913+#endif
2914+
2915 dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, active_state);
2916
2917 /* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */
2918@@ -311,6 +362,7 @@ int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
2919 int input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
2920 int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
2921 int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
2922+int userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt);
2923 #endif
2924
2925 void userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
2926@@ -326,6 +378,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
2927
2928 Authmethod authmethods[] = {
2929 #ifdef GSSAPI
2930+ {"gssapi-keyex",
2931+ userauth_gsskeyex,
2932+ NULL,
2933+ &options.gss_authentication,
2934+ NULL},
2935 {"gssapi-with-mic",
2936 userauth_gssapi,
2937 NULL,
2938@@ -650,25 +707,40 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
2939 static u_int mech = 0;
2940 OM_uint32 min;
2941 int ok = 0;
2942+ char *gss_host;
2943+
2944+ if (options.gss_server_identity)
2945+ gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
2946+ else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
2947+ gss_host = remote_hostname(active_state);
2948+ else
2949+ gss_host = xstrdup(authctxt->host);
2950
2951 /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
2952 * once. */
2953
2954 if (gss_supported == NULL)
2955- gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported);
2956+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) {
2957+ gss_supported = NULL;
2958+ free(gss_host);
2959+ return 0;
2960+ }
2961
2962 /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
2963 while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
2964 /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
2965 if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
2966 ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
2967- &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
2968+ &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host,
2969+ options.gss_client_identity)) {
2970 ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
2971 } else {
2972 mech++;
2973 }
2974 }
2975
2976+ free(gss_host);
2977+
2978 if (!ok)
2979 return 0;
2980
2981@@ -759,8 +831,8 @@ input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
2982 {
2983 Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
2984 Gssctxt *gssctxt;
2985- int oidlen;
2986- char *oidv;
2987+ u_int oidlen;
2988+ u_char *oidv;
2989
2990 if (authctxt == NULL)
2991 fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
2992@@ -873,6 +945,48 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
2993 free(lang);
2994 return 0;
2995 }
2996+
2997+int
2998+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
2999+{
3000+ Buffer b;
3001+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
3002+ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
3003+ OM_uint32 ms;
3004+
3005+ static int attempt = 0;
3006+ if (attempt++ >= 1)
3007+ return (0);
3008+
3009+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
3010+ debug("No valid Key exchange context");
3011+ return (0);
3012+ }
3013+
3014+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
3015+ "gssapi-keyex");
3016+
3017+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
3018+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
3019+
3020+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
3021+ buffer_free(&b);
3022+ return (0);
3023+ }
3024+
3025+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
3026+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
3027+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
3028+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
3029+ packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
3030+ packet_send();
3031+
3032+ buffer_free(&b);
3033+ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
3034+
3035+ return (1);
3036+}
3037+
3038 #endif /* GSSAPI */
3039
3040 int
3041diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
3042index 799c771..ebb88c7 100644
3043--- a/sshd.c
3044+++ b/sshd.c
3045@@ -125,6 +125,10 @@
3046 #include "version.h"
3047 #include "ssherr.h"
3048
3049+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
3050+#include <Security/AuthSession.h>
3051+#endif
3052+
3053 #ifndef O_NOCTTY
3054 #define O_NOCTTY 0
3055 #endif
3056@@ -1892,10 +1896,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
3057 logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
3058 options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
3059 }
3060+#ifndef GSSAPI
3061+ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
3062 if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
3063 logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
3064 options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
3065 }
3066+#endif
3067 if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
3068 logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
3069 exit(1);
3070@@ -2207,6 +2214,60 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
3071 remote_ip, remote_port, laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh));
3072 free(laddr);
3073
3074+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
3075+ /*
3076+ * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if
3077+ * the current session is the root session or we are not launched
3078+ * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode). We do not
3079+ * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from
3080+ * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us.
3081+ *
3082+ * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an
3083+ * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating
3084+ * new sessions for us. Then all the users will end up in the
3085+ * same session (bad).
3086+ *
3087+ * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us
3088+ * automatically.
3089+ *
3090+ * We must create the session before any credentials are stored
3091+ * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below).
3092+ */
3093+ {
3094+ OSStatus err = 0;
3095+ SecuritySessionId sid = 0;
3096+ SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0;
3097+
3098+ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs);
3099+ if (err)
3100+ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
3101+ (unsigned) err);
3102+ else
3103+ debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
3104+ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
3105+
3106+ if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot))
3107+ debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... "
3108+ "assuming inetd created the session for us.");
3109+ else {
3110+ debug("Creating new security session...");
3111+ err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote);
3112+ if (err)
3113+ error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X",
3114+ (unsigned) err);
3115+
3116+ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid,
3117+ &sattrs);
3118+ if (err)
3119+ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
3120+ (unsigned) err);
3121+ else
3122+ debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
3123+ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
3124+ }
3125+ }
3126+#endif
3127+
3128 /*
3129 * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
3130 * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
3131@@ -2631,6 +2692,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
3132 myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
3133 list_hostkey_types());
3134
3135+#ifdef GSSAPI
3136+ {
3137+ char *orig;
3138+ char *gss = NULL;
3139+ char *newstr = NULL;
3140+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
3141+
3142+ /*
3143+ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
3144+ * the other key exchange algorithms
3145+ */
3146+
3147+ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
3148+ orig = NULL;
3149+
3150+ if (options.gss_keyex)
3151+ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
3152+ else
3153+ gss = NULL;
3154+
3155+ if (gss && orig)
3156+ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
3157+ else if (gss)
3158+ newstr = gss;
3159+ else if (orig)
3160+ newstr = orig;
3161+
3162+ /*
3163+ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
3164+ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
3165+ * host key algorithm we support
3166+ */
3167+ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
3168+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
3169+
3170+ if (newstr)
3171+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
3172+ else
3173+ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
3174+ }
3175+#endif
3176+
3177 /* start key exchange */
3178 if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0)
3179 fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r));
3180@@ -2648,6 +2751,13 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
3181 # endif
3182 #endif
3183 kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
3184+#ifdef GSSAPI
3185+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
3186+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
3187+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
3188+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
3189+ }
3190+#endif
3191 kex->server = 1;
3192 kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
3193 kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
3194diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
3195index 75ae8e7..3fe3e01 100644
3196--- a/sshd_config
3197+++ b/sshd_config
3198@@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
3199 # GSSAPI options
3200 #GSSAPIAuthentication no
3201 #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
3202+#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
3203+#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
3204
3205 # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
3206 # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
3207diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
3208index 1bc26ec..3b4cba9 100644
3209--- a/sshd_config.5
3210+++ b/sshd_config.5
3211@@ -632,6 +632,11 @@ The default is
3212 Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
3213 The default is
3214 .Dq no .
3215+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
3216+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
3217+doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
3218+The default is
3219+.Dq no .
3220 .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
3221 Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
3222 on logout.
3223@@ -652,6 +657,11 @@ machine's default store.
3224 This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines.
3225 The default is
3226 .Dq yes .
3227+.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey
3228+Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a
3229+successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed
3230+or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is
3231+.Dq no .
3232 .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
3233 Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication
3234 as a comma-separated pattern list.
3235diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
3236index c9f04cd..558bbbe 100644
3237--- a/sshkey.c
3238+++ b/sshkey.c
3239@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] = {
3240 # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
3241 # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
3242 #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
3243+ { "null", "null", KEY_NULL, 0, 0, 0 },
3244 { NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0 }
3245 };
3246
3247@@ -203,7 +204,7 @@ key_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only)
3248 const struct keytype *kt;
3249
3250 for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
3251- if (kt->name == NULL || kt->sigonly)
3252+ if (kt->name == NULL || kt->sigonly || kt->type == KEY_NULL)
3253 continue;
3254 if ((certs_only && !kt->cert) || (plain_only && kt->cert))
3255 continue;
3256diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
3257index 8c3d866..e0caa37 100644
3258--- a/sshkey.h
3259+++ b/sshkey.h
3260@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ enum sshkey_types {
3261 KEY_DSA_CERT,
3262 KEY_ECDSA_CERT,
3263 KEY_ED25519_CERT,
3264+ KEY_NULL,
3265 KEY_UNSPEC
3266 };
3267
diff --git a/debian/patches/helpful-wait-terminate.patch b/debian/patches/helpful-wait-terminate.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a990ca1ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/helpful-wait-terminate.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
1From 173d65e72989cba82502604da3f1336766c0cf0f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:56 +0000
4Subject: Mention ~& when waiting for forwarded connections to terminate
5
6Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/50308
7Last-Update: 2010-02-27
8
9Patch-Name: helpful-wait-terminate.patch
10---
11 serverloop.c | 2 +-
12 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
13
14diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
15index 3563e5d..c4e1d1d 100644
16--- a/serverloop.c
17+++ b/serverloop.c
18@@ -687,7 +687,7 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int fdout_arg, int fderr_arg)
19 if (!channel_still_open())
20 break;
21 if (!waiting_termination) {
22- const char *s = "Waiting for forwarded connections to terminate...\r\n";
23+ const char *s = "Waiting for forwarded connections to terminate... (press ~& to background)\r\n";
24 char *cp;
25 waiting_termination = 1;
26 buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, s, strlen(s));
diff --git a/debian/patches/keepalive-extensions.patch b/debian/patches/keepalive-extensions.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..14ab7d34f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/keepalive-extensions.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
1From 67c34f23edbcd0f39ebc2aadae9d33950bd1f98a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Richard Kettlewell <rjk@greenend.org.uk>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:52 +0000
4Subject: Various keepalive extensions
5
6Add compatibility aliases for ProtocolKeepAlives and SetupTimeOut, supported
7in previous versions of Debian's OpenSSH package but since superseded by
8ServerAliveInterval. (We're probably stuck with this bit for
9compatibility.)
10
11In batch mode, default ServerAliveInterval to five minutes.
12
13Adjust documentation to match and to give some more advice on use of
14keepalives.
15
16Author: Ian Jackson <ian@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
17Author: Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>
18Author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
19Last-Update: 2015-11-29
20
21Patch-Name: keepalive-extensions.patch
22---
23 readconf.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
24 ssh_config.5 | 21 +++++++++++++++++++--
25 sshd_config.5 | 3 +++
26 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
27
28diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
29index c0b7822..3a6c67b 100644
30--- a/readconf.c
31+++ b/readconf.c
32@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ typedef enum {
33 oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys,
34 oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedKeyTypes,
35 oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, oProxyJump,
36+ oProtocolKeepAlives, oSetupTimeOut,
37 oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported
38 } OpCodes;
39
40@@ -308,6 +309,8 @@ static struct {
41 { "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes },
42 { "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown },
43 { "proxyjump", oProxyJump },
44+ { "protocolkeepalives", oProtocolKeepAlives },
45+ { "setuptimeout", oSetupTimeOut },
46
47 { NULL, oBadOption }
48 };
49@@ -1403,6 +1406,8 @@ parse_keytypes:
50 goto parse_flag;
51
52 case oServerAliveInterval:
53+ case oProtocolKeepAlives: /* Debian-specific compatibility alias */
54+ case oSetupTimeOut: /* Debian-specific compatibility alias */
55 intptr = &options->server_alive_interval;
56 goto parse_time;
57
58@@ -2048,8 +2053,13 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
59 options->rekey_interval = 0;
60 if (options->verify_host_key_dns == -1)
61 options->verify_host_key_dns = 0;
62- if (options->server_alive_interval == -1)
63- options->server_alive_interval = 0;
64+ if (options->server_alive_interval == -1) {
65+ /* in batch mode, default is 5mins */
66+ if (options->batch_mode == 1)
67+ options->server_alive_interval = 300;
68+ else
69+ options->server_alive_interval = 0;
70+ }
71 if (options->server_alive_count_max == -1)
72 options->server_alive_count_max = 3;
73 if (options->control_master == -1)
74diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
75index 707d0e1..efc265a 100644
76--- a/ssh_config.5
77+++ b/ssh_config.5
78@@ -268,8 +268,12 @@ The default is
79 If set to
80 .Dq yes ,
81 passphrase/password querying will be disabled.
82+In addition, the
83+.Cm ServerAliveInterval
84+option will be set to 300 seconds by default.
85 This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no user
86-is present to supply the password.
87+is present to supply the password,
88+and where it is desirable to detect a broken network swiftly.
89 The argument must be
90 .Dq yes
91 or
92@@ -1624,7 +1628,14 @@ from the server,
93 will send a message through the encrypted
94 channel to request a response from the server.
95 The default
96-is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server.
97+is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server,
98+or 300 if the
99+.Cm BatchMode
100+option is set.
101+.Cm ProtocolKeepAlives
102+and
103+.Cm SetupTimeOut
104+are Debian-specific compatibility aliases for this option.
105 .It Cm StreamLocalBindMask
106 Sets the octal file creation mode mask
107 .Pq umask
108@@ -1690,6 +1701,12 @@ Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the
109 other side.
110 If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one
111 of the machines will be properly noticed.
112+This option only uses TCP keepalives (as opposed to using ssh level
113+keepalives), so takes a long time to notice when the connection dies.
114+As such, you probably want
115+the
116+.Cm ServerAliveInterval
117+option as well.
118 However, this means that
119 connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people
120 find it annoying.
121diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
122index 3b4cba9..e05cdbe 100644
123--- a/sshd_config.5
124+++ b/sshd_config.5
125@@ -1530,6 +1530,9 @@ This avoids infinitely hanging sessions.
126 .Pp
127 To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
128 .Dq no .
129+.Pp
130+This option was formerly called
131+.Cm KeepAlive .
132 .It Cm TrustedUserCAKeys
133 Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate authorities that are
134 trusted to sign user certificates for authentication, or
diff --git a/debian/patches/mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch b/debian/patches/mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..12dbaf853
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
1From 6a1979d97fbde734a745b5123130fed669bfb145 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Scott Moser <smoser@ubuntu.com>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:03 +0000
4Subject: Mention ssh-keygen in ssh fingerprint changed warning
5
6Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1843
7Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/686607
8Last-Update: 2015-09-08
9
10Patch-Name: mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch
11---
12 sshconnect.c | 8 +++++++-
13 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
14
15diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
16index 8b8e760..fd67727 100644
17--- a/sshconnect.c
18+++ b/sshconnect.c
19@@ -1081,9 +1081,13 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
20 error("%s. This could either mean that", key_msg);
21 error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host");
22 error("and its host key have changed at the same time.");
23- if (ip_status != HOST_NEW)
24+ if (ip_status != HOST_NEW) {
25 error("Offending key for IP in %s:%lu",
26 ip_found->file, ip_found->line);
27+ error(" remove with:");
28+ error(" ssh-keygen -f \"%s\" -R %s",
29+ ip_found->file, ip);
30+ }
31 }
32 /* The host key has changed. */
33 warn_changed_key(host_key);
34@@ -1091,6 +1095,8 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
35 user_hostfiles[0]);
36 error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu", key_type(host_found->key),
37 host_found->file, host_found->line);
38+ error(" remove with:");
39+ error(" ssh-keygen -f \"%s\" -R %s", host_found->file, host);
40
41 /*
42 * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
diff --git a/debian/patches/no-openssl-version-status.patch b/debian/patches/no-openssl-version-status.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8503c5854
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/no-openssl-version-status.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
1From e7d4050d9077603c20a93bdfd6b99cd419d69f1c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:14 +0000
4Subject: Don't check the status field of the OpenSSL version
5
6There is no reason to check the version of OpenSSL (in Debian). If it's
7not compatible the soname will change. OpenSSH seems to want to do a
8check for the soname based on the version number, but wants to keep the
9status of the release the same. Remove that check on the status since
10it doesn't tell you anything about how compatible that version is.
11
12Author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
13Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/93581
14Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/664383
15Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/732940
16Forwarded: not-needed
17Last-Update: 2014-10-07
18
19Patch-Name: no-openssl-version-status.patch
20---
21 openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c | 6 +++---
22 openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c | 1 +
23 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
24
25diff --git a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
26index 63a660c..3f62403 100644
27--- a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
28+++ b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
29@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
30 /*
31 * OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
32 * We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0.
33- * After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we
34+ * After that, we accept compatible fix and status versions (so we
35 * allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed
36 * within a patch series.
37 */
38@@ -57,10 +57,10 @@ ssh_compatible_openssl(long headerver, long libver)
39 }
40
41 /*
42- * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor,status must match and library
43+ * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor must match and library
44 * fix version must be equal to or newer than the header.
45 */
46- mask = 0xfff0000fL; /* major,minor,status */
47+ mask = 0xfff00000L; /* major,minor */
48 hfix = (headerver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
49 lfix = (libver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
50 if ( (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask) && lfix >= hfix)
51diff --git a/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c b/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
52index 5d019b5..5847487 100644
53--- a/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
54+++ b/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
55@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ struct version_test {
56
57 /* built with 1.0.1b release headers */
58 { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000101fL, 1},/* exact match */
59+ { 0x1000101fL, 0x10001010L, 1}, /* different status: ok */
60 { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000102fL, 1}, /* newer library patch version: ok */
61 { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000100fL, 1}, /* older library patch version: ok */
62 { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000201fL, 1}, /* newer library fix version: ok */
diff --git a/debian/patches/openbsd-docs.patch b/debian/patches/openbsd-docs.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..771e77216
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/openbsd-docs.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
1From ab7ae820a882c8a51b06ec0b3522813b4e90eeff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:09 +0000
4Subject: Adjust various OpenBSD-specific references in manual pages
5
6No single bug reference for this patch, but history includes:
7 http://bugs.debian.org/154434 (login.conf(5))
8 http://bugs.debian.org/513417 (/etc/rc)
9 http://bugs.debian.org/530692 (ssl(8))
10 https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/456660 (ssl(8))
11
12Forwarded: not-needed
13Last-Update: 2014-10-07
14
15Patch-Name: openbsd-docs.patch
16---
17 moduli.5 | 4 ++--
18 ssh-keygen.1 | 12 ++++--------
19 ssh.1 | 4 ++++
20 sshd.8 | 5 ++---
21 sshd_config.5 | 3 +--
22 5 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
23
24diff --git a/moduli.5 b/moduli.5
25index ef0de08..149846c 100644
26--- a/moduli.5
27+++ b/moduli.5
28@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
29 .Nd Diffie-Hellman moduli
30 .Sh DESCRIPTION
31 The
32-.Pa /etc/moduli
33+.Pa /etc/ssh/moduli
34 file contains prime numbers and generators for use by
35 .Xr sshd 8
36 in the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange key exchange method.
37@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ first estimates the size of the modulus required to produce enough
38 Diffie-Hellman output to sufficiently key the selected symmetric cipher.
39 .Xr sshd 8
40 then randomly selects a modulus from
41-.Fa /etc/moduli
42+.Fa /etc/ssh/moduli
43 that best meets the size requirement.
44 .Sh SEE ALSO
45 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
46diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
47index ce2213c..01711df 100644
48--- a/ssh-keygen.1
49+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
50@@ -178,9 +178,7 @@ key in
51 .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
52 or
53 .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa .
54-Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys,
55-as seen in
56-.Pa /etc/rc .
57+Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys.
58 .Pp
59 Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which
60 to store the private key.
61@@ -227,9 +225,7 @@ For each of the key types (rsa1, rsa, dsa, ecdsa and ed25519)
62 for which host keys
63 do not exist, generate the host keys with the default key file path,
64 an empty passphrase, default bits for the key type, and default comment.
65-This is used by
66-.Pa /etc/rc
67-to generate new host keys.
68+This is used by system administration scripts to generate new host keys.
69 .It Fl a Ar rounds
70 When saving a new-format private key (i.e. an ed25519 key or any SSH protocol
71 2 key when the
72@@ -644,7 +640,7 @@ option.
73 Valid generator values are 2, 3, and 5.
74 .Pp
75 Screened DH groups may be installed in
76-.Pa /etc/moduli .
77+.Pa /etc/ssh/moduli .
78 It is important that this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths and
79 that both ends of a connection share common moduli.
80 .Sh CERTIFICATES
81@@ -843,7 +839,7 @@ on all machines
82 where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication.
83 There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret.
84 .Pp
85-.It Pa /etc/moduli
86+.It Pa /etc/ssh/moduli
87 Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX.
88 The file format is described in
89 .Xr moduli 5 .
90diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
91index feef81a..b1f128c 100644
92--- a/ssh.1
93+++ b/ssh.1
94@@ -877,6 +877,10 @@ implements public key authentication protocol automatically,
95 using one of the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA algorithms.
96 The HISTORY section of
97 .Xr ssl 8
98+(on non-OpenBSD systems, see
99+.nh
100+http://www.openbsd.org/cgi\-bin/man.cgi?query=ssl&sektion=8#HISTORY)
101+.hy
102 contains a brief discussion of the DSA and RSA algorithms.
103 .Pp
104 The file
105diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
106index 589841f..58eefe9 100644
107--- a/sshd.8
108+++ b/sshd.8
109@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ over an insecure network.
110 .Nm
111 listens for connections from clients.
112 It is normally started at boot from
113-.Pa /etc/rc .
114+.Pa /etc/init.d/ssh .
115 It forks a new
116 daemon for each incoming connection.
117 The forked daemons handle
118@@ -891,7 +891,7 @@ This file is for host-based authentication (see
119 .Xr ssh 1 ) .
120 It should only be writable by root.
121 .Pp
122-.It Pa /etc/moduli
123+.It Pa /etc/ssh/moduli
124 Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange"
125 key exchange method.
126 The file format is described in
127@@ -993,7 +993,6 @@ The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
128 .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
129 .Xr chroot 2 ,
130 .Xr hosts_access 5 ,
131-.Xr login.conf 5 ,
132 .Xr moduli 5 ,
133 .Xr sshd_config 5 ,
134 .Xr inetd 8 ,
135diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
136index ac9b1f0..b2b349e 100644
137--- a/sshd_config.5
138+++ b/sshd_config.5
139@@ -382,8 +382,7 @@ then no banner is displayed.
140 By default, no banner is displayed.
141 .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
142 Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
143-PAM or through authentication styles supported in
144-.Xr login.conf 5 )
145+PAM).
146 The default is
147 .Dq yes .
148 .It Cm ChrootDirectory
diff --git a/debian/patches/package-versioning.patch b/debian/patches/package-versioning.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..efc629b71
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/package-versioning.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
1From c8105413361d3c97b6a2f72c9f1c85da830bed2c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:05 +0000
4Subject: Include the Debian version in our identification
5
6This makes it easier to audit networks for versions patched against security
7vulnerabilities. It has little detrimental effect, as attackers will
8generally just try attacks rather than bothering to scan for
9vulnerable-looking version strings. (However, see debian-banner.patch.)
10
11Forwarded: not-needed
12Last-Update: 2013-09-14
13
14Patch-Name: package-versioning.patch
15---
16 sshconnect.c | 4 ++--
17 sshd.c | 2 +-
18 version.h | 7 ++++++-
19 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
20
21diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
22index fd67727..07dfc9d 100644
23--- a/sshconnect.c
24+++ b/sshconnect.c
25@@ -527,10 +527,10 @@ send_client_banner(int connection_out, int minor1)
26 /* Send our own protocol version identification. */
27 if (compat20) {
28 xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\r\n",
29- PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION);
30+ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE);
31 } else {
32 xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n",
33- PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, minor1, SSH_VERSION);
34+ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, minor1, SSH_RELEASE);
35 }
36 if (atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, client_version_string,
37 strlen(client_version_string)) != strlen(client_version_string))
38diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
39index 76306da..e873557 100644
40--- a/sshd.c
41+++ b/sshd.c
42@@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int sock_in, int sock_out)
43 }
44
45 xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s",
46- major, minor, SSH_VERSION,
47+ major, minor, SSH_RELEASE,
48 *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
49 options.version_addendum, newline);
50
51diff --git a/version.h b/version.h
52index 617ab62..fb81655 100644
53--- a/version.h
54+++ b/version.h
55@@ -3,4 +3,9 @@
56 #define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_7.3"
57
58 #define SSH_PORTABLE "p1"
59-#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
60+#define SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
61+#ifdef SSH_EXTRAVERSION
62+#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM " " SSH_EXTRAVERSION
63+#else
64+#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM
65+#endif
diff --git a/debian/patches/quieter-signals.patch b/debian/patches/quieter-signals.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..36c366d95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/quieter-signals.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
1From 8eeec10866f78acd021824225e9d62e4a18fc2c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Peter Samuelson <peter@p12n.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:55 +0000
4Subject: Reduce severity of "Killed by signal %d"
5
6This produces irritating messages when using ProxyCommand or other programs
7that use ssh under the covers (e.g. Subversion). These messages are more
8normally printed by the calling program, such as the shell.
9
10According to the upstream bug, the right way to avoid this is to use the -q
11option, so we may drop this patch after further investigation into whether
12any software in Debian is still relying on it.
13
14Author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
15Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1118
16Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/313371
17Last-Update: 2013-09-14
18
19Patch-Name: quieter-signals.patch
20---
21 clientloop.c | 6 ++++--
22 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
23
24diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
25index 421241f..e5cc3f8 100644
26--- a/clientloop.c
27+++ b/clientloop.c
28@@ -1757,8 +1757,10 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id)
29 exit_status = 0;
30 }
31
32- if (received_signal)
33- fatal("Killed by signal %d.", (int) received_signal);
34+ if (received_signal) {
35+ debug("Killed by signal %d.", (int) received_signal);
36+ cleanup_exit((int) received_signal + 128);
37+ }
38
39 /*
40 * In interactive mode (with pseudo tty) display a message indicating
diff --git a/debian/patches/restore-tcp-wrappers.patch b/debian/patches/restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bf3a575ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
1From c027de5eb3e6cb1718990841c2a9cbc89fd53151 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Tue, 7 Oct 2014 13:22:41 +0100
4Subject: Restore TCP wrappers support
5
6Support for TCP wrappers was dropped in OpenSSH 6.7. See this message
7and thread:
8
9 https://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/2014-April/032497.html
10
11It is true that this reduces preauth attack surface in sshd. On the
12other hand, this support seems to be quite widely used, and abruptly
13dropping it (from the perspective of users who don't read
14openssh-unix-dev) could easily cause more serious problems in practice.
15
16It's not entirely clear what the right long-term answer for Debian is,
17but it at least probably doesn't involve dropping this feature shortly
18before a freeze.
19
20Forwarded: not-needed
21Last-Update: 2014-10-07
22
23Patch-Name: restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
24---
25 configure.ac | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
26 sshd.8 | 7 +++++++
27 sshd.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
28 3 files changed, 89 insertions(+)
29
30diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
31index 894ec3b..f822fb3 100644
32--- a/configure.ac
33+++ b/configure.ac
34@@ -1510,6 +1510,62 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([skey],
35 ]
36 )
37
38+# Check whether user wants TCP wrappers support
39+TCPW_MSG="no"
40+AC_ARG_WITH([tcp-wrappers],
41+ [ --with-tcp-wrappers[[=PATH]] Enable tcpwrappers support (optionally in PATH)],
42+ [
43+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
44+ saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
45+ saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
46+ saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
47+ if test -n "${withval}" && \
48+ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
49+ if test -d "${withval}/lib"; then
50+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
51+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
52+ else
53+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
54+ fi
55+ else
56+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
57+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
58+ else
59+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
60+ fi
61+ fi
62+ if test -d "${withval}/include"; then
63+ CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
64+ else
65+ CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
66+ fi
67+ fi
68+ LIBS="-lwrap $LIBS"
69+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libwrap])
70+ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
71+#include <sys/types.h>
72+#include <sys/socket.h>
73+#include <netinet/in.h>
74+#include <tcpd.h>
75+int deny_severity = 0, allow_severity = 0;
76+ ]], [[
77+ hosts_access(0);
78+ ]])], [
79+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
80+ AC_DEFINE([LIBWRAP], [1],
81+ [Define if you want
82+ TCP Wrappers support])
83+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lwrap"
84+ TCPW_MSG="yes"
85+ ], [
86+ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libwrap missing])
87+
88+ ])
89+ LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
90+ fi
91+ ]
92+)
93+
94 # Check whether user wants to use ldns
95 LDNS_MSG="no"
96 AC_ARG_WITH(ldns,
97@@ -5059,6 +5115,7 @@ echo " KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG"
98 echo " SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
99 echo " Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG"
100 echo " S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"
101+echo " TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG"
102 echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
103 echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
104 echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
105diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
106index 6c521f2..589841f 100644
107--- a/sshd.8
108+++ b/sshd.8
109@@ -880,6 +880,12 @@ the user's home directory becomes accessible.
110 This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be
111 readable by anyone else.
112 .Pp
113+.It Pa /etc/hosts.allow
114+.It Pa /etc/hosts.deny
115+Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are defined here.
116+Further details are described in
117+.Xr hosts_access 5 .
118+.Pp
119 .It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
120 This file is for host-based authentication (see
121 .Xr ssh 1 ) .
122@@ -986,6 +992,7 @@ The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
123 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
124 .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
125 .Xr chroot 2 ,
126+.Xr hosts_access 5 ,
127 .Xr login.conf 5 ,
128 .Xr moduli 5 ,
129 .Xr sshd_config 5 ,
130diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
131index ebb88c7..982e545 100644
132--- a/sshd.c
133+++ b/sshd.c
134@@ -129,6 +129,13 @@
135 #include <Security/AuthSession.h>
136 #endif
137
138+#ifdef LIBWRAP
139+#include <tcpd.h>
140+#include <syslog.h>
141+int allow_severity;
142+int deny_severity;
143+#endif /* LIBWRAP */
144+
145 #ifndef O_NOCTTY
146 #define O_NOCTTY 0
147 #endif
148@@ -2207,6 +2214,24 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
149 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
150 audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
151 #endif
152+#ifdef LIBWRAP
153+ allow_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_INFO;
154+ deny_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_WARNING;
155+ /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */
156+ if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
157+ struct request_info req;
158+
159+ request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0);
160+ fromhost(&req);
161+
162+ if (!hosts_access(&req)) {
163+ debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper");
164+ refuse(&req);
165+ /* NOTREACHED */
166+ fatal("libwrap refuse returns");
167+ }
168+ }
169+#endif /* LIBWRAP */
170
171 /* Log the connection. */
172 laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock_in);
diff --git a/debian/patches/scp-quoting.patch b/debian/patches/scp-quoting.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2efc40e07
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/scp-quoting.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
1From 119936d7b64829f81cbc84c2e81bf23373c6ed37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: =?UTF-8?q?Nicolas=20Valc=C3=A1rcel?= <nvalcarcel@ubuntu.com>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:59 +0000
4Subject: Adjust scp quoting in verbose mode
5
6Tweak scp's reporting of filenames in verbose mode to be a bit less
7confusing with spaces.
8
9This should be revised to mimic real shell quoting.
10
11Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/89945
12Last-Update: 2010-02-27
13
14Patch-Name: scp-quoting.patch
15---
16 scp.c | 12 ++++++++++--
17 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
18
19diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
20index 43ca3fa..4a7f73a 100644
21--- a/scp.c
22+++ b/scp.c
23@@ -192,8 +192,16 @@ do_local_cmd(arglist *a)
24
25 if (verbose_mode) {
26 fprintf(stderr, "Executing:");
27- for (i = 0; i < a->num; i++)
28- fmprintf(stderr, " %s", a->list[i]);
29+ for (i = 0; i < a->num; i++) {
30+ if (i == 0)
31+ fmprintf(stderr, " %s", a->list[i]);
32+ else
33+ /*
34+ * TODO: misbehaves if a->list[i] contains a
35+ * single quote
36+ */
37+ fmprintf(stderr, " '%s'", a->list[i]);
38+ }
39 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
40 }
41 if ((pid = fork()) == -1)
diff --git a/debian/patches/selinux-role.patch b/debian/patches/selinux-role.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bcb61480d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/selinux-role.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,504 @@
1From 7a7851c903e5dbb58a85014deb2c88cb718068c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Manoj Srivastava <srivasta@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:49 +0000
4Subject: Handle SELinux authorisation roles
5
6Rejected upstream due to discomfort with magic usernames; a better approach
7will need an SSH protocol change. In the meantime, this came from Debian's
8SELinux maintainer, so we'll keep it until we have something better.
9
10Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1641
11Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/394795
12Last-Update: 2015-08-19
13
14Patch-Name: selinux-role.patch
15---
16 auth.h | 1 +
17 auth1.c | 8 +++++++-
18 auth2.c | 10 ++++++++--
19 monitor.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
20 monitor.h | 2 ++
21 monitor_wrap.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++--
22 monitor_wrap.h | 3 ++-
23 openbsd-compat/port-linux.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++-------
24 openbsd-compat/port-linux.h | 4 ++--
25 platform.c | 4 ++--
26 platform.h | 2 +-
27 session.c | 10 +++++-----
28 session.h | 2 +-
29 sshd.c | 2 +-
30 sshpty.c | 4 ++--
31 sshpty.h | 2 +-
32 16 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
33
34diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
35index 55170af..50baeaa 100644
36--- a/auth.h
37+++ b/auth.h
38@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
39 char *service;
40 struct passwd *pw; /* set if 'valid' */
41 char *style;
42+ char *role;
43 void *kbdintctxt;
44 char *info; /* Extra info for next auth_log */
45 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
46diff --git a/auth1.c b/auth1.c
47index 5073c49..dd00648 100644
48--- a/auth1.c
49+++ b/auth1.c
50@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ void
51 do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
52 {
53 u_int ulen;
54- char *user, *style = NULL;
55+ char *user, *style = NULL, *role = NULL;
56
57 /* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */
58 packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_USER);
59@@ -392,11 +392,17 @@ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
60 user = packet_get_cstring(&ulen);
61 packet_check_eom();
62
63+ if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
64+ *role++ = '\0';
65+
66 if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
67 *style++ = '\0';
68+ else if (role && (style = strchr(role, ':')) != NULL)
69+ *style++ = '\0';
70
71 authctxt->user = user;
72 authctxt->style = style;
73+ authctxt->role = role;
74
75 /* Verify that the user is a valid user. */
76 if ((authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user))) != NULL)
77diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
78index ce0d376..461311b 100644
79--- a/auth2.c
80+++ b/auth2.c
81@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
82 {
83 Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
84 Authmethod *m = NULL;
85- char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL;
86+ char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL, *role = NULL;
87 int authenticated = 0;
88
89 if (authctxt == NULL)
90@@ -228,8 +228,13 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
91 debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
92 debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
93
94+ if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
95+ *role++ = 0;
96+
97 if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
98 *style++ = 0;
99+ else if (role && (style = strchr(role, ':')) != NULL)
100+ *style++ = '\0';
101
102 if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) {
103 /* setup auth context */
104@@ -253,8 +258,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
105 use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
106 authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
107 authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
108+ authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
109 if (use_privsep)
110- mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
111+ mm_inform_authserv(service, style, role);
112 userauth_banner();
113 if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
114 packet_disconnect("no authentication methods enabled");
115diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
116index 05bb48a..e91054e 100644
117--- a/monitor.c
118+++ b/monitor.c
119@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
120 int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
121 int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
122 int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
123+int mm_answer_authrole(int, Buffer *);
124 int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
125 int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
126 int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
127@@ -209,6 +210,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
128 {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
129 {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
130 {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
131+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole},
132 {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
133 {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
134 #ifdef USE_PAM
135@@ -880,6 +882,7 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
136 else {
137 /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
138 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
139+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1);
140 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
141 }
142 #ifdef USE_PAM
143@@ -910,14 +913,37 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
144
145 authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
146 authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
147- debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
148- __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
149+ authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
150+ debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s, role=%s",
151+ __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style, authctxt->role);
152
153 if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
154 free(authctxt->style);
155 authctxt->style = NULL;
156 }
157
158+ if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
159+ free(authctxt->role);
160+ authctxt->role = NULL;
161+ }
162+
163+ return (0);
164+}
165+
166+int
167+mm_answer_authrole(int sock, Buffer *m)
168+{
169+ monitor_permit_authentications(1);
170+
171+ authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
172+ debug3("%s: role=%s",
173+ __func__, authctxt->role);
174+
175+ if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
176+ free(authctxt->role);
177+ authctxt->role = NULL;
178+ }
179+
180 return (0);
181 }
182
183@@ -1553,7 +1579,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
184 res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
185 if (res == 0)
186 goto error;
187- pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
188+ pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty, authctxt->role);
189
190 buffer_put_int(m, 1);
191 buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
192diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
193index bc50ade..2d82b8b 100644
194--- a/monitor.h
195+++ b/monitor.h
196@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
197 MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151,
198 MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153,
199
200+ MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 154,
201+
202 };
203
204 struct mm_master;
205diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
206index 5a9f1b5..11e3a69 100644
207--- a/monitor_wrap.c
208+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
209@@ -328,10 +328,10 @@ mm_auth2_read_banner(void)
210 return (banner);
211 }
212
213-/* Inform the privileged process about service and style */
214+/* Inform the privileged process about service, style, and role */
215
216 void
217-mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
218+mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style, char *role)
219 {
220 Buffer m;
221
222@@ -340,12 +340,30 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
223 buffer_init(&m);
224 buffer_put_cstring(&m, service);
225 buffer_put_cstring(&m, style ? style : "");
226+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : "");
227
228 mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, &m);
229
230 buffer_free(&m);
231 }
232
233+/* Inform the privileged process about role */
234+
235+void
236+mm_inform_authrole(char *role)
237+{
238+ Buffer m;
239+
240+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
241+
242+ buffer_init(&m);
243+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : "");
244+
245+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, &m);
246+
247+ buffer_free(&m);
248+}
249+
250 /* Do the password authentication */
251 int
252 mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password)
253diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
254index b5414c2..d5b3334 100644
255--- a/monitor_wrap.h
256+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
257@@ -41,7 +41,8 @@ void mm_log_handler(LogLevel, const char *, void *);
258 int mm_is_monitor(void);
259 DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
260 int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int, const char *);
261-void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
262+void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *, char *);
263+void mm_inform_authrole(char *);
264 struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *);
265 char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
266 int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *);
267diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
268index f36999d..f9cdc15 100644
269--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
270+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
271@@ -29,6 +29,12 @@
272 #include <string.h>
273 #include <stdio.h>
274
275+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
276+#include "key.h"
277+#include "hostfile.h"
278+#include "auth.h"
279+#endif
280+
281 #include "log.h"
282 #include "xmalloc.h"
283 #include "port-linux.h"
284@@ -58,7 +64,7 @@ ssh_selinux_enabled(void)
285
286 /* Return the default security context for the given username */
287 static security_context_t
288-ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
289+ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, const char *role)
290 {
291 security_context_t sc = NULL;
292 char *sename = NULL, *lvl = NULL;
293@@ -73,9 +79,16 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
294 #endif
295
296 #ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
297- r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
298+ if (role != NULL && role[0])
299+ r = get_default_context_with_rolelevel(sename, role, lvl, NULL,
300+ &sc);
301+ else
302+ r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
303 #else
304- r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
305+ if (role != NULL && role[0])
306+ r = get_default_context_with_role(sename, role, NULL, &sc);
307+ else
308+ r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
309 #endif
310
311 if (r != 0) {
312@@ -105,7 +118,7 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
313
314 /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
315 void
316-ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
317+ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname, const char *role)
318 {
319 security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
320
321@@ -114,7 +127,7 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
322
323 debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
324
325- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
326+ user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, role);
327 if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
328 switch (security_getenforce()) {
329 case -1:
330@@ -136,7 +149,7 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
331
332 /* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
333 void
334-ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
335+ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty, const char *role)
336 {
337 security_context_t new_tty_ctx = NULL;
338 security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
339@@ -147,7 +160,7 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
340
341 debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
342
343- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
344+ user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, role);
345
346 /* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
347
348diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
349index e3d1004..80ce13a 100644
350--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
351+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
352@@ -21,8 +21,8 @@
353
354 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
355 int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
356-void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
357-void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
358+void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *, const char *);
359+void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *, const char *);
360 void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
361 void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
362 #endif
363diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
364index acf8554..4831706 100644
365--- a/platform.c
366+++ b/platform.c
367@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
368 * called if sshd is running as root.
369 */
370 void
371-platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
372+platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw, const char *role)
373 {
374 #if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(USE_PAM)
375 /*
376@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
377 }
378 #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
379 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
380- ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
381+ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name, role);
382 #endif
383 }
384
385diff --git a/platform.h b/platform.h
386index e97ecd9..5b72304 100644
387--- a/platform.h
388+++ b/platform.h
389@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ void platform_post_fork_parent(pid_t child_pid);
390 void platform_post_fork_child(void);
391 int platform_privileged_uidswap(void);
392 void platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
393-void platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *);
394+void platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *, const char *);
395 char *platform_get_krb5_client(const char *);
396 char *platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *);
397 int platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t);
398diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
399index 2235f26..6dfcf84 100644
400--- a/session.c
401+++ b/session.c
402@@ -1517,7 +1517,7 @@ safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid)
403
404 /* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */
405 void
406-do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
407+do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw, const char *role)
408 {
409 char *chroot_path, *tmp;
410
411@@ -1545,7 +1545,7 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
412 endgrent();
413 #endif
414
415- platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw);
416+ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw, role);
417
418 if (!in_chroot && options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
419 strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
420@@ -1703,7 +1703,7 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
421
422 /* Force a password change */
423 if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
424- do_setusercontext(pw);
425+ do_setusercontext(pw, s->authctxt->role);
426 child_close_fds();
427 do_pwchange(s);
428 exit(1);
429@@ -1730,7 +1730,7 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
430 /* When PAM is enabled we rely on it to do the nologin check */
431 if (!options.use_pam)
432 do_nologin(pw);
433- do_setusercontext(pw);
434+ do_setusercontext(pw, s->authctxt->role);
435 /*
436 * PAM session modules in do_setusercontext may have
437 * generated messages, so if this in an interactive
438@@ -2141,7 +2141,7 @@ session_pty_req(Session *s)
439 tty_parse_modes(s->ttyfd, &n_bytes);
440
441 if (!use_privsep)
442- pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty);
443+ pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty, s->authctxt->role);
444
445 /* Set window size from the packet. */
446 pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
447diff --git a/session.h b/session.h
448index f18eaf3..2b7d939 100644
449--- a/session.h
450+++ b/session.h
451@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *);
452 Session *session_new(void);
453 Session *session_by_tty(char *);
454 void session_close(Session *);
455-void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
456+void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *, const char *);
457 void child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
458 const char *value);
459
460diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
461index 982e545..76306da 100644
462--- a/sshd.c
463+++ b/sshd.c
464@@ -787,7 +787,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
465 explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
466
467 /* Drop privileges */
468- do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
469+ do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw, authctxt->role);
470
471 skip:
472 /* It is safe now to apply the key state */
473diff --git a/sshpty.c b/sshpty.c
474index 15da8c6..e89efb7 100644
475--- a/sshpty.c
476+++ b/sshpty.c
477@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ pty_change_window_size(int ptyfd, u_int row, u_int col,
478 }
479
480 void
481-pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty)
482+pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty, const char *role)
483 {
484 struct group *grp;
485 gid_t gid;
486@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty)
487 strerror(errno));
488
489 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
490- ssh_selinux_setup_pty(pw->pw_name, tty);
491+ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(pw->pw_name, tty, role);
492 #endif
493
494 if (st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid || st.st_gid != gid) {
495diff --git a/sshpty.h b/sshpty.h
496index cfa3224..edf2436 100644
497--- a/sshpty.h
498+++ b/sshpty.h
499@@ -24,4 +24,4 @@ int pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
500 void pty_release(const char *);
501 void pty_make_controlling_tty(int *, const char *);
502 void pty_change_window_size(int, u_int, u_int, u_int, u_int);
503-void pty_setowner(struct passwd *, const char *);
504+void pty_setowner(struct passwd *, const char *, const char *);
diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e5821f627
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/series
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
1gssapi.patch
2restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
3selinux-role.patch
4ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch
5keepalive-extensions.patch
6syslog-level-silent.patch
7quieter-signals.patch
8helpful-wait-terminate.patch
9user-group-modes.patch
10scp-quoting.patch
11shell-path.patch
12dnssec-sshfp.patch
13auth-log-verbosity.patch
14mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch
15package-versioning.patch
16debian-banner.patch
17authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
18openbsd-docs.patch
19ssh-argv0.patch
20doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
21doc-upstart.patch
22ssh-agent-setgid.patch
23no-openssl-version-status.patch
24gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
25sigstop.patch
26systemd-readiness.patch
27debian-config.patch
diff --git a/debian/patches/shell-path.patch b/debian/patches/shell-path.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..506ba3f7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/shell-path.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
1From ac283605e244f9dab676b039986f137f86284291 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:00 +0000
4Subject: Look for $SHELL on the path for ProxyCommand/LocalCommand
5
6There's some debate on the upstream bug about whether POSIX requires this.
7I (Colin Watson) agree with Vincent and think it does.
8
9Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1494
10Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/492728
11Last-Update: 2013-09-14
12
13Patch-Name: shell-path.patch
14---
15 sshconnect.c | 4 ++--
16 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
17
18diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
19index 356ec79..8b8e760 100644
20--- a/sshconnect.c
21+++ b/sshconnect.c
22@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command)
23 /* Execute the proxy command. Note that we gave up any
24 extra privileges above. */
25 signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
26- execv(argv[0], argv);
27+ execvp(argv[0], argv);
28 perror(argv[0]);
29 exit(1);
30 }
31@@ -1499,7 +1499,7 @@ ssh_local_cmd(const char *args)
32 if (pid == 0) {
33 signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
34 debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args);
35- execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
36+ execlp(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
37 error("Couldn't execute %s -c \"%s\": %s",
38 shell, args, strerror(errno));
39 _exit(1);
diff --git a/debian/patches/sigstop.patch b/debian/patches/sigstop.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7ae7f3558
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/sigstop.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
1From 8d765e441787d024e76369496316105fe736d3ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:17 +0000
4Subject: Support synchronisation with service supervisor using SIGSTOP
5
6Author: Robie Basak <robie.basak@ubuntu.com>
7Forwarded: no
8Last-Update: 2014-04-14
9
10Patch-Name: sigstop.patch
11---
12 sshd.c | 10 ++++++++++
13 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
14
15diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
16index 71fad9e..837409b 100644
17--- a/sshd.c
18+++ b/sshd.c
19@@ -2107,6 +2107,16 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
20 }
21 }
22
23+ if (getenv("SSH_SIGSTOP")) {
24+ /* Tell service supervisor that we are ready. */
25+ kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP);
26+ /* The service supervisor only ever expects a single
27+ * STOP signal, so do not ever signal it again, even
28+ * in the case of a re-exec or future children.
29+ */
30+ unsetenv("SSH_SIGSTOP");
31+ }
32+
33 /* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
34 server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
35 &newsock, config_s);
diff --git a/debian/patches/ssh-agent-setgid.patch b/debian/patches/ssh-agent-setgid.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2d1dabfd3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/ssh-agent-setgid.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
1From 172bb48ec4cb3b65d26d4f3bd8bc0e82ddaf6ca1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:13 +0000
4Subject: Document consequences of ssh-agent being setgid in ssh-agent(1)
5
6Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/711623
7Forwarded: no
8Last-Update: 2013-06-08
9
10Patch-Name: ssh-agent-setgid.patch
11---
12 ssh-agent.1 | 15 +++++++++++++++
13 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
14
15diff --git a/ssh-agent.1 b/ssh-agent.1
16index c4b50bb..2fe2201 100644
17--- a/ssh-agent.1
18+++ b/ssh-agent.1
19@@ -193,6 +193,21 @@ environment variable holds the agent's process ID.
20 .Pp
21 The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command
22 line terminates.
23+.Pp
24+In Debian,
25+.Nm
26+is installed with the set-group-id bit set, to prevent
27+.Xr ptrace 2
28+attacks retrieving private key material.
29+This has the side-effect of causing the run-time linker to remove certain
30+environment variables which might have security implications for set-id
31+programs, including
32+.Ev LD_PRELOAD ,
33+.Ev LD_LIBRARY_PATH ,
34+and
35+.Ev TMPDIR .
36+If you need to set any of these environment variables, you will need to do
37+so in the program executed by ssh-agent.
38 .Sh FILES
39 .Bl -tag -width Ds
40 .It Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt
diff --git a/debian/patches/ssh-argv0.patch b/debian/patches/ssh-argv0.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..614ed8195
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/ssh-argv0.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
1From ccfb71ca70b73f6d5a2873b31d0140c7cb5f4430 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:10 +0000
4Subject: ssh(1): Refer to ssh-argv0(1)
5
6Old versions of OpenSSH (up to 2.5 or thereabouts) allowed creating symlinks
7to ssh with the name of the host you want to connect to. Debian ships an
8ssh-argv0 script restoring this feature; this patch refers to its manual
9page from ssh(1).
10
11Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/111341
12Forwarded: not-needed
13Last-Update: 2013-09-14
14
15Patch-Name: ssh-argv0.patch
16---
17 ssh.1 | 1 +
18 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
19
20diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
21index b1f128c..22e56a7 100644
22--- a/ssh.1
23+++ b/ssh.1
24@@ -1586,6 +1586,7 @@ if an error occurred.
25 .Xr sftp 1 ,
26 .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
27 .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
28+.Xr ssh-argv0 1 ,
29 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
30 .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
31 .Xr tun 4 ,
diff --git a/debian/patches/ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch b/debian/patches/ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0492c84fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
1From e35c0bb4c3997b8ef885c6afdcc600b403eb878b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@ubuntu.com>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:50 +0000
4Subject: Accept obsolete ssh-vulnkey configuration options
5
6These options were used as part of Debian's response to CVE-2008-0166.
7Nearly six years later, we no longer need to continue carrying the bulk
8of that patch, but we do need to avoid failing when the associated
9configuration options are still present.
10
11Last-Update: 2014-02-09
12
13Patch-Name: ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch
14---
15 readconf.c | 1 +
16 servconf.c | 1 +
17 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
18
19diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
20index e019195..c0b7822 100644
21--- a/readconf.c
22+++ b/readconf.c
23@@ -194,6 +194,7 @@ static struct {
24 { "passwordauthentication", oPasswordAuthentication },
25 { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication },
26 { "kbdinteractivedevices", oKbdInteractiveDevices },
27+ { "useblacklistedkeys", oDeprecated },
28 { "rsaauthentication", oRSAAuthentication },
29 { "pubkeyauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication },
30 { "dsaauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication }, /* alias */
31diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
32index 9b06281..bf9f8f7 100644
33--- a/servconf.c
34+++ b/servconf.c
35@@ -541,6 +541,7 @@ static struct {
36 { "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
37 { "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
38 { "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
39+ { "permitblacklistedkeys", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
40 { "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd, SSHCFG_ALL },
41 { "permituserenvironment", sPermitUserEnvironment, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
42 { "uselogin", sUseLogin, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
diff --git a/debian/patches/syslog-level-silent.patch b/debian/patches/syslog-level-silent.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3e46d03c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/syslog-level-silent.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
1From 21fb55231ad0422fa0e5f0c2f67093cb5f29dd47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Jonathan David Amery <jdamery@ysolde.ucam.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:54 +0000
4Subject: "LogLevel SILENT" compatibility
5
6"LogLevel SILENT" (-qq) was introduced in Debian openssh 1:3.0.1p1-1 to
7match the behaviour of non-free SSH, in which -q does not suppress fatal
8errors. However, this was unintentionally broken in 1:4.6p1-2 and nobody
9complained, so we've dropped most of it. The parts that remain are basic
10configuration file compatibility, and an adjustment to "Pseudo-terminal will
11not be allocated ..." which should be split out into a separate patch.
12
13Author: Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>
14Author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
15Last-Update: 2013-09-14
16
17Patch-Name: syslog-level-silent.patch
18---
19 log.c | 1 +
20 ssh.c | 2 +-
21 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
22
23diff --git a/log.c b/log.c
24index 2b59c42..ffc8ffb 100644
25--- a/log.c
26+++ b/log.c
27@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ static struct {
28 LogLevel val;
29 } log_levels[] =
30 {
31+ { "SILENT", SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET }, /* compatibility */
32 { "QUIET", SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET },
33 { "FATAL", SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL },
34 { "ERROR", SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR },
35diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
36index 03a23fb..1febb04 100644
37--- a/ssh.c
38+++ b/ssh.c
39@@ -1167,7 +1167,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
40 /* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */
41 if ((!isatty(fileno(stdin)) || stdin_null_flag) &&
42 options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_FORCE) {
43- if (tty_flag)
44+ if (tty_flag && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
45 logit("Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because "
46 "stdin is not a terminal.");
47 tty_flag = 0;
diff --git a/debian/patches/systemd-readiness.patch b/debian/patches/systemd-readiness.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..deee48460
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/systemd-readiness.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
1From fe97848e044743f0bac019a491ddf0138f84e14a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Michael Biebl <biebl@debian.org>
3Date: Mon, 21 Dec 2015 16:08:47 +0000
4Subject: Add systemd readiness notification support
5
6Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/778913
7Forwarded: no
8Last-Update: 2016-01-04
9
10Patch-Name: systemd-readiness.patch
11---
12 configure.ac | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
13 sshd.c | 9 +++++++++
14 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+)
15
16diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
17index f822fb3..6cafb15 100644
18--- a/configure.ac
19+++ b/configure.ac
20@@ -4319,6 +4319,29 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
21 AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
22 AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
23
24+# Check whether user wants systemd support
25+SYSTEMD_MSG="no"
26+AC_ARG_WITH(systemd,
27+ [ --with-systemd Enable systemd support],
28+ [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
29+ AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
30+ if test "$PKGCONFIG" != "no"; then
31+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libsystemd])
32+ if $PKGCONFIG --exists libsystemd; then
33+ SYSTEMD_CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags libsystemd`
34+ SYSTEMD_LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libsystemd`
35+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $SYSTEMD_CFLAGS"
36+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $SYSTEMD_LIBS"
37+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
38+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYSTEMD, 1, [Define if you want systemd support.])
39+ SYSTEMD_MSG="yes"
40+ else
41+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
42+ fi
43+ fi
44+ fi ]
45+)
46+
47 # Looking for programs, paths and files
48
49 PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
50@@ -5121,6 +5144,7 @@ echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
51 echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
52 echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
53 echo " Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
54+echo " systemd support: $SYSTEMD_MSG"
55 echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
56 echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
57 echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
58diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
59index 837409b..868df9e 100644
60--- a/sshd.c
61+++ b/sshd.c
62@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@
63 #include <prot.h>
64 #endif
65
66+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
67+#include <systemd/sd-daemon.h>
68+#endif
69+
70 #include "xmalloc.h"
71 #include "ssh.h"
72 #include "ssh1.h"
73@@ -2117,6 +2121,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
74 unsetenv("SSH_SIGSTOP");
75 }
76
77+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
78+ /* Signal systemd that we are ready to accept connections */
79+ sd_notify(0, "READY=1");
80+#endif
81+
82 /* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
83 server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
84 &newsock, config_s);
diff --git a/debian/patches/user-group-modes.patch b/debian/patches/user-group-modes.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3bd2fd91f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/user-group-modes.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
1From 563974a78e937c4844e1198b5f6d79b8b2b5c600 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:58 +0000
4Subject: Allow harmless group-writability
5
6Allow secure files (~/.ssh/config, ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, etc.) to be
7group-writable, provided that the group in question contains only the file's
8owner. Rejected upstream for IMO incorrect reasons (e.g. a misunderstanding
9about the contents of gr->gr_mem). Given that per-user groups and umask 002
10are the default setup in Debian (for good reasons - this makes operating in
11setgid directories with other groups much easier), we need to permit this by
12default.
13
14Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1060
15Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=314347
16Last-Update: 2013-09-14
17
18Patch-Name: user-group-modes.patch
19---
20 auth-rhosts.c | 6 ++----
21 auth.c | 9 +++-----
22 misc.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
23 misc.h | 2 ++
24 platform.c | 16 --------------
25 readconf.c | 3 +--
26 ssh.1 | 2 ++
27 ssh_config.5 | 2 ++
28 8 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
29
30diff --git a/auth-rhosts.c b/auth-rhosts.c
31index 0ef3447..c17c13c 100644
32--- a/auth-rhosts.c
33+++ b/auth-rhosts.c
34@@ -273,8 +273,7 @@ auth_rhosts2_raw(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostnam
35 return 0;
36 }
37 if (options.strict_modes &&
38- ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
39- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
40+ !secure_permissions(&st, pw->pw_uid)) {
41 logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
42 "bad ownership or modes for home directory.", pw->pw_name);
43 auth_debug_add("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
44@@ -300,8 +299,7 @@ auth_rhosts2_raw(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostnam
45 * allowing access to their account by anyone.
46 */
47 if (options.strict_modes &&
48- ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
49- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
50+ !secure_permissions(&st, pw->pw_uid)) {
51 logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: bad modes for %.200s",
52 pw->pw_name, buf);
53 auth_debug_add("Bad file modes for %.200s", buf);
54diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
55index f56dcc6..3f8b348 100644
56--- a/auth.c
57+++ b/auth.c
58@@ -435,8 +435,7 @@ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
59 user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
60 if (options.strict_modes &&
61 (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
62- ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
63- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
64+ !secure_permissions(&st, pw->pw_uid)) {
65 logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
66 "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
67 pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
68@@ -498,8 +497,7 @@ auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
69 snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf);
70 return -1;
71 }
72- if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) ||
73- (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) {
74+ if (!secure_permissions(stp, uid)) {
75 snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
76 buf);
77 return -1;
78@@ -514,8 +512,7 @@ auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
79 strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
80
81 if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
82- (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) ||
83- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
84+ !secure_permissions(&st, uid)) {
85 snprintf(err, errlen,
86 "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
87 return -1;
88diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
89index 9421b4d..68efb2b 100644
90--- a/misc.c
91+++ b/misc.c
92@@ -51,8 +51,9 @@
93 #include <netdb.h>
94 #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
95 # include <paths.h>
96-#include <pwd.h>
97 #endif
98+#include <pwd.h>
99+#include <grp.h>
100 #ifdef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD
101 #include <net/if.h>
102 #endif
103@@ -61,6 +62,7 @@
104 #include "misc.h"
105 #include "log.h"
106 #include "ssh.h"
107+#include "platform.h"
108
109 /* remove newline at end of string */
110 char *
111@@ -708,6 +710,71 @@ read_keyfile_line(FILE *f, const char *filename, char *buf, size_t bufsz,
112 return -1;
113 }
114
115+/*
116+ * return 1 if the specified uid is a uid that may own a system directory
117+ * otherwise 0.
118+ */
119+int
120+platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t uid)
121+{
122+ if (uid == 0)
123+ return 1;
124+#ifdef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID
125+ if (uid == PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID)
126+ return 1;
127+#endif
128+ return 0;
129+}
130+
131+int
132+secure_permissions(struct stat *st, uid_t uid)
133+{
134+ if (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st->st_uid) && st->st_uid != uid)
135+ return 0;
136+ if ((st->st_mode & 002) != 0)
137+ return 0;
138+ if ((st->st_mode & 020) != 0) {
139+ /* If the file is group-writable, the group in question must
140+ * have exactly one member, namely the file's owner.
141+ * (Zero-member groups are typically used by setgid
142+ * binaries, and are unlikely to be suitable.)
143+ */
144+ struct passwd *pw;
145+ struct group *gr;
146+ int members = 0;
147+
148+ gr = getgrgid(st->st_gid);
149+ if (!gr)
150+ return 0;
151+
152+ /* Check primary group memberships. */
153+ while ((pw = getpwent()) != NULL) {
154+ if (pw->pw_gid == gr->gr_gid) {
155+ ++members;
156+ if (pw->pw_uid != uid)
157+ return 0;
158+ }
159+ }
160+ endpwent();
161+
162+ pw = getpwuid(st->st_uid);
163+ if (!pw)
164+ return 0;
165+
166+ /* Check supplementary group memberships. */
167+ if (gr->gr_mem[0]) {
168+ ++members;
169+ if (strcmp(pw->pw_name, gr->gr_mem[0]) ||
170+ gr->gr_mem[1])
171+ return 0;
172+ }
173+
174+ if (!members)
175+ return 0;
176+ }
177+ return 1;
178+}
179+
180 int
181 tun_open(int tun, int mode)
182 {
183diff --git a/misc.h b/misc.h
184index 7c76a6a..42cd95e 100644
185--- a/misc.h
186+++ b/misc.h
187@@ -139,4 +139,6 @@ char *read_passphrase(const char *, int);
188 int ask_permission(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
189 int read_keyfile_line(FILE *, const char *, char *, size_t, u_long *);
190
191+int secure_permissions(struct stat *st, uid_t uid);
192+
193 #endif /* _MISC_H */
194diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
195index 4831706..2ce4dbf 100644
196--- a/platform.c
197+++ b/platform.c
198@@ -199,19 +199,3 @@ platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *pw_name)
199 return NULL;
200 #endif
201 }
202-
203-/*
204- * return 1 if the specified uid is a uid that may own a system directory
205- * otherwise 0.
206- */
207-int
208-platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t uid)
209-{
210- if (uid == 0)
211- return 1;
212-#ifdef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID
213- if (uid == PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID)
214- return 1;
215-#endif
216- return 0;
217-}
218diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
219index 3a6c67b..f6b4c8f 100644
220--- a/readconf.c
221+++ b/readconf.c
222@@ -1753,8 +1753,7 @@ read_config_file_depth(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw,
223
224 if (fstat(fileno(f), &sb) == -1)
225 fatal("fstat %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno));
226- if (((sb.st_uid != 0 && sb.st_uid != getuid()) ||
227- (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0))
228+ if (!secure_permissions(&sb, getuid()))
229 fatal("Bad owner or permissions on %s", filename);
230 }
231
232diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
233index 4011c65..feef81a 100644
234--- a/ssh.1
235+++ b/ssh.1
236@@ -1484,6 +1484,8 @@ The file format and configuration options are described in
237 .Xr ssh_config 5 .
238 Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
239 read/write for the user, and not writable by others.
240+It may be group-writable provided that the group in question contains only
241+the user.
242 .Pp
243 .It Pa ~/.ssh/environment
244 Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see
245diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
246index efc265a..5dd26bc 100644
247--- a/ssh_config.5
248+++ b/ssh_config.5
249@@ -1903,6 +1903,8 @@ The format of this file is described above.
250 This file is used by the SSH client.
251 Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
252 read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
253+It may be group-writable provided that the group in question contains only
254+the user.
255 .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
256 Systemwide configuration file.
257 This file provides defaults for those
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-07-18 10:28:27 +0000