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-rw-r--r--debian/patches/auth-log-verbosity.patch118
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch26
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/debian-banner.patch111
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/debian-config.patch238
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/dnssec-sshfp.patch94
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/doc-hash-tab-completion.patch28
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/fix-incoming-compression-statistics.patch27
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch26
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/gssapi.patch3298
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/keepalive-extensions.patch134
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch44
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/no-dsa-host-key-by-default.patch83
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/no-openssl-version-status.patch62
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/openbsd-docs.patch148
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/package-versioning.patch65
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/quieter-signals.patch40
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/regress-integrity-robust.patch40
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/restore-authorized_keys2.patch35
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/restore-tcp-wrappers.patch172
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/s390-missing-header.patch29
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/scp-quoting.patch41
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/seccomp-getuid-geteuid.patch44
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/seccomp-s390-flock-ipc.patch47
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/seccomp-s390-ioctl-ep11-crypto.patch33
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/selinux-role.patch473
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/series33
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/shell-path.patch39
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/ssh-agent-setgid.patch40
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/ssh-argv0.patch31
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch42
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/syslog-level-silent.patch47
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/systemd-readiness.patch84
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/user-group-modes.patch259
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/x32-syntax-error.patch28
34 files changed, 6059 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/debian/patches/auth-log-verbosity.patch b/debian/patches/auth-log-verbosity.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fb3855f9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/auth-log-verbosity.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
1From e08f96cf1105a3ee9a23de7102d593443e031e0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:02 +0000
4Subject: Quieten logs when multiple from= restrictions are used
5
6Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/630606
7Forwarded: no
8Last-Update: 2013-09-14
9
10Patch-Name: auth-log-verbosity.patch
11---
12 auth-options.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
13 auth-options.h | 1 +
14 auth2-pubkey.c | 3 +++
15 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
16
17diff --git a/auth-options.c b/auth-options.c
18index 57b49f7f..7eb87b35 100644
19--- a/auth-options.c
20+++ b/auth-options.c
21@@ -59,8 +59,19 @@ int forced_tun_device = -1;
22 /* "principals=" option. */
23 char *authorized_principals = NULL;
24
25+/* Throttle log messages. */
26+int logged_from_hostip = 0;
27+int logged_cert_hostip = 0;
28+
29 extern ServerOptions options;
30
31+void
32+auth_start_parse_options(void)
33+{
34+ logged_from_hostip = 0;
35+ logged_cert_hostip = 0;
36+}
37+
38 void
39 auth_clear_options(void)
40 {
41@@ -316,10 +327,13 @@ auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum)
42 /* FALLTHROUGH */
43 case 0:
44 free(patterns);
45- logit("Authentication tried for %.100s with "
46- "correct key but not from a permitted "
47- "host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s).",
48- pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip);
49+ if (!logged_from_hostip) {
50+ logit("Authentication tried for %.100s with "
51+ "correct key but not from a permitted "
52+ "host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s).",
53+ pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip);
54+ logged_from_hostip = 1;
55+ }
56 auth_debug_add("Your host '%.200s' is not "
57 "permitted to use this key for login.",
58 remote_host);
59@@ -543,11 +557,14 @@ parse_option_list(struct sshbuf *oblob, struct passwd *pw,
60 break;
61 case 0:
62 /* no match */
63- logit("Authentication tried for %.100s "
64- "with valid certificate but not "
65- "from a permitted host "
66- "(ip=%.200s).", pw->pw_name,
67- remote_ip);
68+ if (!logged_cert_hostip) {
69+ logit("Authentication tried for %.100s "
70+ "with valid certificate but not "
71+ "from a permitted host "
72+ "(ip=%.200s).", pw->pw_name,
73+ remote_ip);
74+ logged_cert_hostip = 1;
75+ }
76 auth_debug_add("Your address '%.200s' "
77 "is not permitted to use this "
78 "certificate for login.",
79diff --git a/auth-options.h b/auth-options.h
80index 52cbb42a..82355276 100644
81--- a/auth-options.h
82+++ b/auth-options.h
83@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ extern int forced_tun_device;
84 extern int key_is_cert_authority;
85 extern char *authorized_principals;
86
87+void auth_start_parse_options(void);
88 int auth_parse_options(struct passwd *, char *, char *, u_long);
89 void auth_clear_options(void);
90 int auth_cert_options(struct sshkey *, struct passwd *, const char **);
91diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
92index 3e5706f4..6dc5076e 100644
93--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
94+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
95@@ -566,6 +566,7 @@ process_principals(FILE *f, char *file, struct passwd *pw,
96 u_long linenum = 0;
97 u_int i, found_principal = 0;
98
99+ auth_start_parse_options();
100 while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
101 /* Always consume entire input */
102 if (found_principal)
103@@ -771,6 +772,7 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
104 found_key = 0;
105
106 found = NULL;
107+ auth_start_parse_options();
108 while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
109 char *cp, *key_options = NULL, *fp = NULL;
110 const char *reason = NULL;
111@@ -921,6 +923,7 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
112 if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1,
113 use_authorized_principals ? NULL : pw->pw_name, &reason) != 0)
114 goto fail_reason;
115+ auth_start_parse_options();
116 if (auth_cert_options(key, pw, &reason) != 0)
117 goto fail_reason;
118
diff --git a/debian/patches/authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch b/debian/patches/authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9287f84e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
1From 603fd07727100d4d95d4ac2853a160878cf16b66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Tomas Pospisek <tpo_deb@sourcepole.ch>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:07 +0000
4Subject: Install authorized_keys(5) as a symlink to sshd(8)
5
6Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1720
7Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/441817
8Last-Update: 2013-09-14
9
10Patch-Name: authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
11---
12 Makefile.in | 1 +
13 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
14
15diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
16index 6b774c1a..0577a6c4 100644
17--- a/Makefile.in
18+++ b/Makefile.in
19@@ -339,6 +339,7 @@ install-files:
20 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5
21 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/ssh_config.5
22 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8
23+ ln -s ../$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/authorized_keys.5
24 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
25 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
26 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
diff --git a/debian/patches/debian-banner.patch b/debian/patches/debian-banner.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0939035cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/debian-banner.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
1From 0eb0f49c5c32940fd192ef98e0d13bf5407da27b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Kees Cook <kees@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:06 +0000
4Subject: Add DebianBanner server configuration option
5
6Setting this to "no" causes sshd to omit the Debian revision from its
7initial protocol handshake, for those scared by package-versioning.patch.
8
9Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/562048
10Forwarded: not-needed
11Last-Update: 2015-11-29
12
13Patch-Name: debian-banner.patch
14---
15 servconf.c | 9 +++++++++
16 servconf.h | 2 ++
17 sshd.c | 3 ++-
18 sshd_config.5 | 5 +++++
19 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
20
21diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
22index ca73f7c5..a391cf4b 100644
23--- a/servconf.c
24+++ b/servconf.c
25@@ -166,6 +166,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
26 options->version_addendum = NULL;
27 options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
28 options->disable_forwarding = -1;
29+ options->debian_banner = -1;
30 }
31
32 /* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */
33@@ -339,6 +340,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
34 options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
35 if (options->disable_forwarding == -1)
36 options->disable_forwarding = 0;
37+ if (options->debian_banner == -1)
38+ options->debian_banner = 1;
39
40 assemble_algorithms(options);
41
42@@ -425,6 +428,7 @@ typedef enum {
43 sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC,
44 sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink,
45 sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash, sDisableForwarding,
46+ sDebianBanner,
47 sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported
48 } ServerOpCodes;
49
50@@ -577,6 +581,7 @@ static struct {
51 { "allowstreamlocalforwarding", sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
52 { "fingerprinthash", sFingerprintHash, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
53 { "disableforwarding", sDisableForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
54+ { "debianbanner", sDebianBanner, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
55 { NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
56 };
57
58@@ -1866,6 +1871,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
59 options->fingerprint_hash = value;
60 break;
61
62+ case sDebianBanner:
63+ intptr = &options->debian_banner;
64+ goto parse_int;
65+
66 case sDeprecated:
67 case sIgnore:
68 case sUnsupported:
69diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
70index 90dfa4c2..913a21b3 100644
71--- a/servconf.h
72+++ b/servconf.h
73@@ -191,6 +191,8 @@ typedef struct {
74 char *auth_methods[MAX_AUTH_METHODS];
75
76 int fingerprint_hash;
77+
78+ int debian_banner;
79 } ServerOptions;
80
81 /* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
82diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
83index 602f4740..f2f54b51 100644
84--- a/sshd.c
85+++ b/sshd.c
86@@ -378,7 +378,8 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int sock_in, int sock_out)
87 char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */
88
89 xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n",
90- PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE,
91+ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2,
92+ options.debian_banner ? SSH_RELEASE : SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM,
93 *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
94 options.version_addendum);
95
96diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
97index 41ec6688..5f316481 100644
98--- a/sshd_config.5
99+++ b/sshd_config.5
100@@ -530,6 +530,11 @@ or
101 .Cm no .
102 The default is
103 .Cm yes .
104+.It Cm DebianBanner
105+Specifies whether the distribution-specified extra version suffix is
106+included during initial protocol handshake.
107+The default is
108+.Cm yes .
109 .It Cm DenyGroups
110 This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated
111 by spaces.
diff --git a/debian/patches/debian-config.patch b/debian/patches/debian-config.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d65ed45fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/debian-config.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
1From cf60afd3438c444e20b114fbd799168002c74aae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:18 +0000
4Subject: Various Debian-specific configuration changes
5
6ssh: Enable ForwardX11Trusted, returning to earlier semantics which cause
7fewer problems with existing setups (http://bugs.debian.org/237021).
8
9ssh: Set 'SendEnv LANG LC_*' by default (http://bugs.debian.org/264024).
10
11ssh: Enable HashKnownHosts by default to try to limit the spread of ssh
12worms.
13
14ssh: Enable GSSAPIAuthentication by default.
15
16sshd: Enable PAM, disable ChallengeResponseAuthentication, and disable
17PrintMotd.
18
19sshd: Enable X11Forwarding.
20
21sshd: Set 'AcceptEnv LANG LC_*' by default.
22
23sshd: Change sftp subsystem path to /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server.
24
25Document all of this.
26
27Author: Russ Allbery <rra@debian.org>
28Forwarded: not-needed
29Last-Update: 2016-12-26
30
31Patch-Name: debian-config.patch
32---
33 readconf.c | 2 +-
34 ssh.1 | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
35 ssh_config | 6 +++++-
36 ssh_config.5 | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
37 sshd_config | 16 ++++++++++------
38 sshd_config.5 | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
39 6 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
40
41diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
42index 70fac682..4d92d174 100644
43--- a/readconf.c
44+++ b/readconf.c
45@@ -1950,7 +1950,7 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
46 if (options->forward_x11 == -1)
47 options->forward_x11 = 0;
48 if (options->forward_x11_trusted == -1)
49- options->forward_x11_trusted = 0;
50+ options->forward_x11_trusted = 1;
51 if (options->forward_x11_timeout == -1)
52 options->forward_x11_timeout = 1200;
53 /*
54diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
55index 22e56a7b..6aa57c46 100644
56--- a/ssh.1
57+++ b/ssh.1
58@@ -785,6 +785,16 @@ directive in
59 .Xr ssh_config 5
60 for more information.
61 .Pp
62+(Debian-specific: X11 forwarding is not subjected to X11 SECURITY extension
63+restrictions by default, because too many programs currently crash in this
64+mode.
65+Set the
66+.Cm ForwardX11Trusted
67+option to
68+.Dq no
69+to restore the upstream behaviour.
70+This may change in future depending on client-side improvements.)
71+.Pp
72 .It Fl x
73 Disables X11 forwarding.
74 .Pp
75@@ -793,6 +803,17 @@ Enables trusted X11 forwarding.
76 Trusted X11 forwardings are not subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension
77 controls.
78 .Pp
79+(Debian-specific: This option does nothing in the default configuration: it
80+is equivalent to
81+.Dq Cm ForwardX11Trusted No yes ,
82+which is the default as described above.
83+Set the
84+.Cm ForwardX11Trusted
85+option to
86+.Dq no
87+to restore the upstream behaviour.
88+This may change in future depending on client-side improvements.)
89+.Pp
90 .It Fl y
91 Send log information using the
92 .Xr syslog 3
93diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
94index 4e879cd2..093c8366 100644
95--- a/ssh_config
96+++ b/ssh_config
97@@ -17,9 +17,10 @@
98 # list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the
99 # ssh_config(5) man page.
100
101-# Host *
102+Host *
103 # ForwardAgent no
104 # ForwardX11 no
105+# ForwardX11Trusted yes
106 # RhostsRSAAuthentication no
107 # RSAAuthentication yes
108 # PasswordAuthentication yes
109@@ -50,3 +51,6 @@
110 # VisualHostKey no
111 # ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
112 # RekeyLimit 1G 1h
113+ SendEnv LANG LC_*
114+ HashKnownHosts yes
115+ GSSAPIAuthentication yes
116diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
117index 093ea8a7..fc13fa51 100644
118--- a/ssh_config.5
119+++ b/ssh_config.5
120@@ -74,6 +74,22 @@ Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more
121 host-specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the
122 file, and general defaults at the end.
123 .Pp
124+Note that the Debian
125+.Ic openssh-client
126+package sets several options as standard in
127+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
128+which are not the default in
129+.Xr ssh 1 :
130+.Pp
131+.Bl -bullet -offset indent -compact
132+.It
133+.Cm SendEnv No LANG LC_*
134+.It
135+.Cm HashKnownHosts No yes
136+.It
137+.Cm GSSAPIAuthentication No yes
138+.El
139+.Pp
140 The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line.
141 Lines starting with
142 .Ql #
143@@ -715,11 +731,12 @@ elapsed.
144 .It Cm ForwardX11Trusted
145 If this option is set to
146 .Cm yes ,
147+(the Debian-specific default),
148 remote X11 clients will have full access to the original X11 display.
149 .Pp
150 If this option is set to
151 .Cm no
152-(the default),
153+(the upstream default),
154 remote X11 clients will be considered untrusted and prevented
155 from stealing or tampering with data belonging to trusted X11
156 clients.
157diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
158index c01dd656..f68edf36 100644
159--- a/sshd_config
160+++ b/sshd_config
161@@ -58,8 +58,9 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
162 #PasswordAuthentication yes
163 #PermitEmptyPasswords no
164
165-# Change to no to disable s/key passwords
166-#ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes
167+# Change to yes to enable challenge-response passwords (beware issues with
168+# some PAM modules and threads)
169+ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
170
171 # Kerberos options
172 #KerberosAuthentication no
173@@ -82,16 +83,16 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
174 # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
175 # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
176 # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
177-#UsePAM no
178+UsePAM yes
179
180 #AllowAgentForwarding yes
181 #AllowTcpForwarding yes
182 #GatewayPorts no
183-#X11Forwarding no
184+X11Forwarding yes
185 #X11DisplayOffset 10
186 #X11UseLocalhost yes
187 #PermitTTY yes
188-#PrintMotd yes
189+PrintMotd no
190 #PrintLastLog yes
191 #TCPKeepAlive yes
192 #UseLogin no
193@@ -109,8 +110,11 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
194 # no default banner path
195 #Banner none
196
197+# Allow client to pass locale environment variables
198+AcceptEnv LANG LC_*
199+
200 # override default of no subsystems
201-Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server
202+Subsystem sftp /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server
203
204 # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
205 #Match User anoncvs
206diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
207index 603c2ba7..cc5d9fb0 100644
208--- a/sshd_config.5
209+++ b/sshd_config.5
210@@ -57,6 +57,28 @@ Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes
211 .Pq \&"
212 in order to represent arguments containing spaces.
213 .Pp
214+Note that the Debian
215+.Ic openssh-server
216+package sets several options as standard in
217+.Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
218+which are not the default in
219+.Xr sshd 8 :
220+.Pp
221+.Bl -bullet -offset indent -compact
222+.It
223+.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication No no
224+.It
225+.Cm X11Forwarding No yes
226+.It
227+.Cm PrintMotd No no
228+.It
229+.Cm AcceptEnv No LANG LC_*
230+.It
231+.Cm Subsystem No sftp /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server
232+.It
233+.Cm UsePAM No yes
234+.El
235+.Pp
236 The possible
237 keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
238 keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
diff --git a/debian/patches/dnssec-sshfp.patch b/debian/patches/dnssec-sshfp.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8f1f9bada
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/dnssec-sshfp.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
1From 1e06dfb99d3a59ef0b0a804ed1c2a590b3fab71c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:01 +0000
4Subject: Force use of DNSSEC even if "options edns0" isn't in resolv.conf
5
6This allows SSHFP DNS records to be verified if glibc 2.11 is installed.
7
8Origin: vendor, https://cvs.fedoraproject.org/viewvc/F-12/openssh/openssh-5.2p1-edns.patch?revision=1.1&view=markup
9Bug: http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=572049
10Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=572049
11Last-Update: 2010-04-06
12
13Patch-Name: dnssec-sshfp.patch
14---
15 dns.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
16 openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c | 10 +++++-----
17 openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h | 3 +++
18 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
19
20diff --git a/dns.c b/dns.c
21index e813afea..fce2e308 100644
22--- a/dns.c
23+++ b/dns.c
24@@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address,
25 {
26 u_int counter;
27 int result;
28+ unsigned int rrset_flags = 0;
29 struct rrsetinfo *fingerprints = NULL;
30
31 u_int8_t hostkey_algorithm;
32@@ -229,8 +230,19 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address,
33 return -1;
34 }
35
36+ /*
37+ * Original getrrsetbyname function, found on OpenBSD for example,
38+ * doesn't accept any flag and prerequisite for obtaining AD bit in
39+ * DNS response is set by "options edns0" in resolv.conf.
40+ *
41+ * Our version is more clever and use RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 flag.
42+ */
43+#ifndef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME
44+ rrset_flags |= RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0;
45+#endif
46 result = getrrsetbyname(hostname, DNS_RDATACLASS_IN,
47- DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, 0, &fingerprints);
48+ DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, rrset_flags, &fingerprints);
49+
50 if (result) {
51 verbose("DNS lookup error: %s", dns_result_totext(result));
52 return -1;
53diff --git a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
54index dc6fe053..e061a290 100644
55--- a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
56+++ b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
57@@ -209,8 +209,8 @@ getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, unsigned int rdclass,
58 goto fail;
59 }
60
61- /* don't allow flags yet, unimplemented */
62- if (flags) {
63+ /* Allow RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 flag only. */
64+ if ((flags & !RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0) != 0) {
65 result = ERRSET_INVAL;
66 goto fail;
67 }
68@@ -226,9 +226,9 @@ getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, unsigned int rdclass,
69 #endif /* DEBUG */
70
71 #ifdef RES_USE_DNSSEC
72- /* turn on DNSSEC if EDNS0 is configured */
73- if (_resp->options & RES_USE_EDNS0)
74- _resp->options |= RES_USE_DNSSEC;
75+ /* turn on DNSSEC if required */
76+ if (flags & RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0)
77+ _resp->options |= (RES_USE_EDNS0|RES_USE_DNSSEC);
78 #endif /* RES_USE_DNSEC */
79
80 /* make query */
81diff --git a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
82index 1283f550..dbbc85a2 100644
83--- a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
84+++ b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
85@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
86 #ifndef RRSET_VALIDATED
87 # define RRSET_VALIDATED 1
88 #endif
89+#ifndef RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0
90+# define RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 0x0001
91+#endif
92
93 /*
94 * Return codes for getrrsetbyname()
diff --git a/debian/patches/doc-hash-tab-completion.patch b/debian/patches/doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cc30ec4b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
1From b0c0c72ecdbef4ae020bbe17b47f1f616253722d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:11 +0000
4Subject: Document that HashKnownHosts may break tab-completion
5
6Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1727
7Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/430154
8Last-Update: 2013-09-14
9
10Patch-Name: doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
11---
12 ssh_config.5 | 3 +++
13 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
14
15diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
16index a04e5757..093ea8a7 100644
17--- a/ssh_config.5
18+++ b/ssh_config.5
19@@ -809,6 +809,9 @@ Note that existing names and addresses in known hosts files
20 will not be converted automatically,
21 but may be manually hashed using
22 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
23+Use of this option may break facilities such as tab-completion that rely
24+on being able to read unhashed host names from
25+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts .
26 .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
27 Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key
28 authentication.
diff --git a/debian/patches/fix-incoming-compression-statistics.patch b/debian/patches/fix-incoming-compression-statistics.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d948d67bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/fix-incoming-compression-statistics.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
1From cda04ac1f5c69710187e602043758063479c3c65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
3Date: Tue, 6 Jun 2017 15:00:20 +0100
4Subject: Fix incoming compression statistics
5
6Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/797964
7Forwarded: https://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/2017-June/036077.html
8Last-Update: 2017-06-06
9
10Patch-Name: fix-incoming-compression-statistics.patch
11---
12 packet.c | 2 +-
13 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
14
15diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
16index 2f3a2ec7..6492b66f 100644
17--- a/packet.c
18+++ b/packet.c
19@@ -606,7 +606,7 @@ ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *ssh)
20 deflateEnd(stream);
21 }
22 if (state->compression_in_started) {
23- z_streamp stream = &state->compression_out_stream;
24+ z_streamp stream = &state->compression_in_stream;
25 debug("compress incoming: "
26 "raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f",
27 (unsigned long long)stream->total_out,
diff --git a/debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch b/debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5bfea56e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
1From 28b830b6c22317c039ec2b2070fcd94bc3cf0477 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Vincent Untz <vuntz@ubuntu.com>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:16 +0000
4Subject: Give the ssh-askpass-gnome window a default icon
5
6Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/27152
7Last-Update: 2010-02-28
8
9Patch-Name: gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
10---
11 contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c | 2 ++
12 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
13
14diff --git a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
15index 535a6927..e37a1338 100644
16--- a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
17+++ b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
18@@ -211,6 +211,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
19
20 gtk_init(&argc, &argv);
21
22+ gtk_window_set_default_icon_from_file ("/usr/share/pixmaps/ssh-askpass-gnome.png", NULL);
23+
24 if (argc > 1) {
25 message = g_strjoinv(" ", argv + 1);
26 } else {
diff --git a/debian/patches/gssapi.patch b/debian/patches/gssapi.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..deddbcb80
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/gssapi.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,3298 @@
1From d51c7ac3328464dec21514fb398ab5c140a0664f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Simon Wilkinson <simon@sxw.org.uk>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:48 +0000
4Subject: GSSAPI key exchange support
5
6This patch has been rejected upstream: "None of the OpenSSH developers are
7in favour of adding this, and this situation has not changed for several
8years. This is not a slight on Simon's patch, which is of fine quality, but
9just that a) we don't trust GSSAPI implementations that much and b) we don't
10like adding new KEX since they are pre-auth attack surface. This one is
11particularly scary, since it requires hooks out to typically root-owned
12system resources."
13
14However, quite a lot of people rely on this in Debian, and it's better to
15have it merged into the main openssh package rather than having separate
16-krb5 packages (as we used to have). It seems to have a generally good
17security history.
18
19Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1242
20Last-Updated: 2017-01-16
21
22Patch-Name: gssapi.patch
23---
24 ChangeLog.gssapi | 113 +++++++++++++++++++
25 Makefile.in | 3 +-
26 auth-krb5.c | 17 ++-
27 auth.c | 96 +---------------
28 auth2-gss.c | 48 +++++++-
29 auth2.c | 2 +
30 canohost.c | 93 +++++++++++++++
31 canohost.h | 3 +
32 clientloop.c | 15 ++-
33 config.h.in | 6 +
34 configure.ac | 24 ++++
35 gss-genr.c | 275 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
36 gss-serv-krb5.c | 85 ++++++++++++--
37 gss-serv.c | 184 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
38 kex.c | 19 ++++
39 kex.h | 14 +++
40 kexgssc.c | 338 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
41 kexgsss.c | 295 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
42 monitor.c | 115 +++++++++++++++++--
43 monitor.h | 3 +
44 monitor_wrap.c | 47 +++++++-
45 monitor_wrap.h | 4 +-
46 readconf.c | 43 +++++++
47 readconf.h | 5 +
48 servconf.c | 26 +++++
49 servconf.h | 2 +
50 ssh-gss.h | 41 ++++++-
51 ssh_config | 2 +
52 ssh_config.5 | 32 ++++++
53 sshconnect2.c | 131 ++++++++++++++++++++-
54 sshd.c | 112 +++++++++++++++++-
55 sshd_config | 2 +
56 sshd_config.5 | 10 ++
57 sshkey.c | 3 +-
58 sshkey.h | 1 +
59 35 files changed, 2062 insertions(+), 147 deletions(-)
60 create mode 100644 ChangeLog.gssapi
61 create mode 100644 kexgssc.c
62 create mode 100644 kexgsss.c
63
64diff --git a/ChangeLog.gssapi b/ChangeLog.gssapi
65new file mode 100644
66index 00000000..f117a336
67--- /dev/null
68+++ b/ChangeLog.gssapi
69@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
70+20110101
71+ - Finally update for OpenSSH 5.6p1
72+ - Add GSSAPIServerIdentity option from Jim Basney
73+
74+20100308
75+ - [ Makefile.in, key.c, key.h ]
76+ Updates for OpenSSH 5.4p1
77+ - [ servconf.c ]
78+ Include GSSAPI options in the sshd -T configuration dump, and flag
79+ some older configuration options as being unsupported. Thanks to Colin
80+ Watson.
81+ -
82+
83+20100124
84+ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
85+ Adapt to deal with additional element in Authmethod structure. Thanks to
86+ Colin Watson
87+
88+20090615
89+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c
90+ sshd.c ]
91+ Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review
92+ Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs
93+ Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled
94+ Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange
95+ Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value
96+ Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust
97+ Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled
98+ Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list
99+ Cast data.length before printing
100+ If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL
101+
102+20090201
103+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h
104+ ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ]
105+ Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user
106+ to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server
107+
108+20080404
109+ - [ gss-serv.c ]
110+ Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow
111+ been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav
112+ Stoichkov
113+
114+20070317
115+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
116+ Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a
117+ function
118+
119+20061220
120+ - [ servconf.c ]
121+ Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and
122+ documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson.
123+
124+20060910
125+ - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c
126+ ssh-gss.h ]
127+ add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms
128+ - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ]
129+ Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of
130+ acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines.
131+ <Bugzilla #928>
132+ - [ sshd_config ssh_config ]
133+ Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample
134+ configuration files
135+ - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ]
136+ Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf()
137+ Limit length of error messages displayed by client
138+
139+20060909
140+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ]
141+ move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server
142+ only, where they belong
143+ <Bugzilla #1225>
144+
145+20060829
146+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
147+ Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment
148+ variable
149+
150+20060828
151+ - [ gss-genr.c ]
152+ Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem
153+ <Fixed upstream 20060829>
154+
155+20060818
156+ - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ]
157+ Make sure that SPENGO is disabled
158+ <Bugzilla #1218 - Fixed upstream 20060818>
159+
160+20060421
161+ - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ]
162+ a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to
163+ fix compiler errors/warnings
164+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
165+ - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ]
166+ fix uninitialized variable warnings
167+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
168+ - [ gssgenr.c ]
169+ pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue)
170+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
171+ <Bugzilla #1220 >
172+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
173+ #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
174+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
175+ <Fixed upstream 20060304>
176+ - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c
177+ add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option
178+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
179+ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
180+ add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic
181+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
182+ <gssapi-with-mic support is Bugzilla #1008>
183diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
184index 5870e9e6..6b774c1a 100644
185--- a/Makefile.in
186+++ b/Makefile.in
187@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
188 kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
189 kexdhc.o kexgexc.o kexecdhc.o kexc25519c.o \
190 kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o \
191+ kexgssc.o \
192 platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o
193
194 SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
195@@ -105,7 +106,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \
196 auth-skey.o auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
197 auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
198 monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
199- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
200+ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
201 loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
202 sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
203 sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
204diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
205index a5a81ed2..38e7fee2 100644
206--- a/auth-krb5.c
207+++ b/auth-krb5.c
208@@ -182,8 +182,13 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
209
210 len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
211 authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
212+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
213+ snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s",
214+ authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
215+#else
216 snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
217 authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
218+#endif
219
220 #ifdef USE_PAM
221 if (options.use_pam)
222@@ -240,15 +245,22 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
223 #ifndef HEIMDAL
224 krb5_error_code
225 ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
226- int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
227+ int ret, oerrno;
228 char ccname[40];
229 mode_t old_umask;
230+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
231+ char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d";
232+#else
233+ char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX";
234+ int tmpfd;
235+#endif
236
237 ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
238- "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
239+ cctemplate, geteuid());
240 if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
241 return ENOMEM;
242
243+#ifndef USE_CCAPI
244 old_umask = umask(0177);
245 tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
246 oerrno = errno;
247@@ -265,6 +277,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
248 return oerrno;
249 }
250 close(tmpfd);
251+#endif
252
253 return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
254 }
255diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
256index 6ee6116d..c6390687 100644
257--- a/auth.c
258+++ b/auth.c
259@@ -372,7 +372,8 @@ auth_root_allowed(const char *method)
260 case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
261 if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
262 strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
263- strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0)
264+ strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0 ||
265+ strcmp(method, "gssapi-keyex") == 0)
266 return 1;
267 break;
268 case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
269@@ -794,99 +795,6 @@ fakepw(void)
270 return (&fake);
271 }
272
273-/*
274- * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
275- * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
276- * called.
277- * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
278- * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
279- * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
280- * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
281- */
282-
283-static char *
284-remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
285-{
286- struct sockaddr_storage from;
287- socklen_t fromlen;
288- struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
289- char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
290- const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
291-
292- /* Get IP address of client. */
293- fromlen = sizeof(from);
294- memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
295- if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
296- (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
297- debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
298- return strdup(ntop);
299- }
300-
301- ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
302- if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
303- fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
304-
305- debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
306- /* Map the IP address to a host name. */
307- if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
308- NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
309- /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */
310- return strdup(ntop);
311- }
312-
313- /*
314- * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
315- * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
316- * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5
317- */
318- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
319- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
320- hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
321- if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
322- logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
323- name, ntop);
324- freeaddrinfo(ai);
325- return strdup(ntop);
326- }
327-
328- /* Names are stored in lowercase. */
329- lowercase(name);
330-
331- /*
332- * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
333- * address actually is an address of this host. This is
334- * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
335- * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
336- * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
337- * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
338- * the domain).
339- */
340- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
341- hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
342- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
343- if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
344- logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
345- "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
346- return strdup(ntop);
347- }
348- /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
349- for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
350- if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
351- sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
352- (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
353- break;
354- }
355- freeaddrinfo(aitop);
356- /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
357- if (ai == NULL) {
358- /* Address not found for the host name. */
359- logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
360- "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
361- return strdup(ntop);
362- }
363- return strdup(name);
364-}
365-
366 /*
367 * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
368 * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
369diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
370index 1ca83577..3b5036df 100644
371--- a/auth2-gss.c
372+++ b/auth2-gss.c
373@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
374 /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.22 2015/01/19 20:07:45 markus Exp $ */
375
376 /*
377- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
378+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
379 *
380 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
381 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
382@@ -53,6 +53,40 @@ static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
383 static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
384 static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
385
386+/*
387+ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
388+ */
389+static int
390+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
391+{
392+ int authenticated = 0;
393+ Buffer b;
394+ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
395+ u_int len;
396+
397+ mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
398+ mic.length = len;
399+
400+ packet_check_eom();
401+
402+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
403+ "gssapi-keyex");
404+
405+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
406+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
407+
408+ /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
409+ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
410+ &gssbuf, &mic))))
411+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
412+ authctxt->pw));
413+
414+ buffer_free(&b);
415+ free(mic.value);
416+
417+ return (authenticated);
418+}
419+
420 /*
421 * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
422 * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
423@@ -238,7 +272,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
424
425 packet_check_eom();
426
427- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
428+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
429+ authctxt->pw));
430
431 authctxt->postponed = 0;
432 dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
433@@ -274,7 +309,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
434 gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
435
436 if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
437- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
438+ authenticated =
439+ PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw));
440 else
441 logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
442
443@@ -290,6 +326,12 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
444 return 0;
445 }
446
447+Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
448+ "gssapi-keyex",
449+ userauth_gsskeyex,
450+ &options.gss_authentication
451+};
452+
453 Authmethod method_gssapi = {
454 "gssapi-with-mic",
455 userauth_gssapi,
456diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
457index 97dd2ef0..946e9235 100644
458--- a/auth2.c
459+++ b/auth2.c
460@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd;
461 extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
462 extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
463 #ifdef GSSAPI
464+extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex;
465 extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
466 #endif
467
468@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
469 &method_none,
470 &method_pubkey,
471 #ifdef GSSAPI
472+ &method_gsskeyex,
473 &method_gssapi,
474 #endif
475 &method_passwd,
476diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c
477index f71a0856..404731d2 100644
478--- a/canohost.c
479+++ b/canohost.c
480@@ -35,6 +35,99 @@
481 #include "canohost.h"
482 #include "misc.h"
483
484+/*
485+ * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
486+ * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
487+ * called.
488+ * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
489+ * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
490+ * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
491+ * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
492+ */
493+
494+char *
495+remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
496+{
497+ struct sockaddr_storage from;
498+ socklen_t fromlen;
499+ struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
500+ char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
501+ const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
502+
503+ /* Get IP address of client. */
504+ fromlen = sizeof(from);
505+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
506+ if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
507+ (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
508+ debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
509+ return strdup(ntop);
510+ }
511+
512+ ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
513+ if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
514+ fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
515+
516+ debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
517+ /* Map the IP address to a host name. */
518+ if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
519+ NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
520+ /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */
521+ return strdup(ntop);
522+ }
523+
524+ /*
525+ * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
526+ * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
527+ * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5
528+ */
529+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
530+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
531+ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
532+ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
533+ logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
534+ name, ntop);
535+ freeaddrinfo(ai);
536+ return strdup(ntop);
537+ }
538+
539+ /* Names are stored in lowercase. */
540+ lowercase(name);
541+
542+ /*
543+ * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
544+ * address actually is an address of this host. This is
545+ * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
546+ * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
547+ * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
548+ * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
549+ * the domain).
550+ */
551+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
552+ hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
553+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
554+ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
555+ logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
556+ "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
557+ return strdup(ntop);
558+ }
559+ /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
560+ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
561+ if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
562+ sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
563+ (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
564+ break;
565+ }
566+ freeaddrinfo(aitop);
567+ /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
568+ if (ai == NULL) {
569+ /* Address not found for the host name. */
570+ logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
571+ "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
572+ return strdup(ntop);
573+ }
574+ return strdup(name);
575+}
576+
577 void
578 ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *addr, socklen_t *len)
579 {
580diff --git a/canohost.h b/canohost.h
581index 26d62855..0cadc9f1 100644
582--- a/canohost.h
583+++ b/canohost.h
584@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@
585 #ifndef _CANOHOST_H
586 #define _CANOHOST_H
587
588+struct ssh;
589+
590+char *remote_hostname(struct ssh *);
591 char *get_peer_ipaddr(int);
592 int get_peer_port(int);
593 char *get_local_ipaddr(int);
594diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
595index 06481623..38b0330e 100644
596--- a/clientloop.c
597+++ b/clientloop.c
598@@ -113,6 +113,10 @@
599 #include "ssherr.h"
600 #include "hostfile.h"
601
602+#ifdef GSSAPI
603+#include "ssh-gss.h"
604+#endif
605+
606 /* import options */
607 extern Options options;
608
609@@ -1664,9 +1668,18 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id)
610 break;
611
612 /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
613- if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state))
614+ if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state)) {
615 channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
616
617+#ifdef GSSAPI
618+ if (options.gss_renewal_rekey &&
619+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(NULL)) {
620+ debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey");
621+ need_rekeying = 1;
622+ }
623+#endif
624+ }
625+
626 /* Buffer input from the connection. */
627 client_process_net_input(readset);
628
629diff --git a/config.h.in b/config.h.in
630index b65420e4..fd8a73f1 100644
631--- a/config.h.in
632+++ b/config.h.in
633@@ -1670,6 +1670,9 @@
634 /* Use btmp to log bad logins */
635 #undef USE_BTMP
636
637+/* platform uses an in-memory credentials cache */
638+#undef USE_CCAPI
639+
640 /* Use libedit for sftp */
641 #undef USE_LIBEDIT
642
643@@ -1685,6 +1688,9 @@
644 /* Use PIPES instead of a socketpair() */
645 #undef USE_PIPES
646
647+/* platform has the Security Authorization Session API */
648+#undef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
649+
650 /* Define if you have Solaris privileges */
651 #undef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS
652
653diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
654index c2878e3d..ead34acf 100644
655--- a/configure.ac
656+++ b/configure.ac
657@@ -623,6 +623,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
658 [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
659 AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
660 [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
661+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have the Security Authorization Session API])
662+ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <Security/AuthSession.h>],
663+ [SessionCreate(0, 0);],
664+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes"
665+ AC_DEFINE([USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API], [1],
666+ [platform has the Security Authorization Session API])
667+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
668+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
669+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no"
670+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])])
671+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have an in-memory credentials cache])
672+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
673+ [#include <Kerberos/Kerberos.h>],
674+ [cc_context_t c;
675+ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);],
676+ [AC_DEFINE([USE_CCAPI], [1],
677+ [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache])
678+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
679+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
680+ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then
681+ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***])
682+ fi],
683+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])]
684+ )
685 m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv])
686 AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [],
687 AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
688diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c
689index 62559ed9..0b3ae073 100644
690--- a/gss-genr.c
691+++ b/gss-genr.c
692@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
693 /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.24 2016/09/12 01:22:38 deraadt Exp $ */
694
695 /*
696- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
697+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
698 *
699 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
700 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
701@@ -40,12 +40,167 @@
702 #include "buffer.h"
703 #include "log.h"
704 #include "ssh2.h"
705+#include "cipher.h"
706+#include "key.h"
707+#include "kex.h"
708+#include <openssl/evp.h>
709
710 #include "ssh-gss.h"
711
712 extern u_char *session_id2;
713 extern u_int session_id2_len;
714
715+typedef struct {
716+ char *encoded;
717+ gss_OID oid;
718+} ssh_gss_kex_mapping;
719+
720+/*
721+ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the
722+ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines
723+ */
724+
725+Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL;
726+
727+static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL;
728+
729+int
730+ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void) {
731+ return (gss_enc2oid != NULL);
732+}
733+
734+/*
735+ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program
736+ *
737+ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting
738+ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism
739+ */
740+
741+char *
742+ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) {
743+ gss_OID_set gss_supported;
744+ OM_uint32 min_status;
745+
746+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported)))
747+ return NULL;
748+
749+ return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
750+ host, client));
751+}
752+
753+char *
754+ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
755+ const char *host, const char *client) {
756+ Buffer buf;
757+ size_t i;
758+ int oidpos, enclen;
759+ char *mechs, *encoded;
760+ u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
761+ char deroid[2];
762+ const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
763+ EVP_MD_CTX md;
764+
765+ if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
766+ for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++)
767+ free(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded);
768+ free(gss_enc2oid);
769+ }
770+
771+ gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) *
772+ (gss_supported->count + 1));
773+
774+ buffer_init(&buf);
775+
776+ oidpos = 0;
777+ for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
778+ if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
779+ (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
780+
781+ deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
782+ deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
783+
784+ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
785+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2);
786+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,
787+ gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
788+ gss_supported->elements[i].length);
789+ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
790+
791+ encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
792+ enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md),
793+ encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
794+
795+ if (oidpos != 0)
796+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
797+
798+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
799+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1);
800+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
801+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
802+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
803+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1);
804+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
805+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
806+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
807+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1);
808+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
809+
810+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
811+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
812+ oidpos++;
813+ }
814+ }
815+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
816+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
817+
818+ buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0');
819+
820+ mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf));
821+ buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf));
822+ buffer_free(&buf);
823+
824+ if (strlen(mechs) == 0) {
825+ free(mechs);
826+ mechs = NULL;
827+ }
828+
829+ return (mechs);
830+}
831+
832+gss_OID
833+ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) {
834+ int i = 0;
835+
836+ switch (kex_type) {
837+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
838+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID))
839+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
840+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1;
841+ break;
842+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
843+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID))
844+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
845+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1;
846+ break;
847+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
848+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID))
849+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
850+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1;
851+ break;
852+ default:
853+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
854+ }
855+
856+ while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL &&
857+ strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0)
858+ i++;
859+
860+ if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL)
861+ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid);
862+
863+ return gss_enc2oid[i].oid;
864+}
865+
866 /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
867 int
868 ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
869@@ -198,7 +353,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int deleg_creds, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
870 }
871
872 ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
873- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
874+ ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
875 GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
876 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
877
878@@ -227,9 +382,43 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host)
879 return (ctx->major);
880 }
881
882+OM_uint32
883+ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name)
884+{
885+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
886+ gss_name_t gssname;
887+ OM_uint32 status;
888+ gss_OID_set oidset;
889+
890+ gssbuf.value = (void *) name;
891+ gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
892+
893+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
894+ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
895+
896+ ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf,
897+ GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname);
898+
899+ if (!ctx->major)
900+ ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
901+ gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE,
902+ &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL);
903+
904+ gss_release_name(&status, &gssname);
905+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
906+
907+ if (ctx->major)
908+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
909+
910+ return(ctx->major);
911+}
912+
913 OM_uint32
914 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
915 {
916+ if (ctx == NULL)
917+ return -1;
918+
919 if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
920 GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
921 ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
922@@ -237,6 +426,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
923 return (ctx->major);
924 }
925
926+/* Priviledged when used by server */
927+OM_uint32
928+ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
929+{
930+ if (ctx == NULL)
931+ return -1;
932+
933+ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
934+ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
935+
936+ return (ctx->major);
937+}
938+
939 void
940 ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
941 const char *context)
942@@ -250,11 +452,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
943 }
944
945 int
946-ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
947+ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host,
948+ const char *client)
949 {
950 gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
951 OM_uint32 major, minor;
952 gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
953+ Gssctxt *intctx = NULL;
954+
955+ if (ctx == NULL)
956+ ctx = &intctx;
957
958 /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
959 if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length &&
960@@ -264,6 +471,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
961 ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
962 ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
963 major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
964+
965+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client)
966+ major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client);
967+
968 if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
969 major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token,
970 NULL);
971@@ -273,10 +484,66 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
972 GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
973 }
974
975- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
976+ if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL)
977 ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
978
979 return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
980 }
981
982+int
983+ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) {
984+ static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
985+ static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0;
986+ static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
987+ static gss_name_t name;
988+ static OM_uint32 last_call = 0;
989+ OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor;
990+ int equal;
991+
992+ now = time(NULL);
993+
994+ if (ctxt) {
995+ debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions");
996+
997+ if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
998+ gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name);
999+
1000+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
1001+ &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL);
1002+
1003+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
1004+ saved_mech = ctxt->oid;
1005+ saved_lifetime+= now;
1006+ } else {
1007+ /* Handle the error */
1008+ }
1009+ return 0;
1010+ }
1011+
1012+ if (now - last_call < 10)
1013+ return 0;
1014+
1015+ last_call = now;
1016+
1017+ if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID)
1018+ return 0;
1019+
1020+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
1021+ &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL);
1022+ if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED)
1023+ return 0;
1024+ else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
1025+ return 0;
1026+
1027+ major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal);
1028+ gss_release_name(&minor, &name);
1029+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
1030+ return 0;
1031+
1032+ if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10))
1033+ return 1;
1034+
1035+ return 0;
1036+}
1037+
1038 #endif /* GSSAPI */
1039diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
1040index 795992d9..fd8b3718 100644
1041--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
1042+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
1043@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
1044 /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.8 2013/07/20 01:55:13 djm Exp $ */
1045
1046 /*
1047- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
1048+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
1049 *
1050 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
1051 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
1052@@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1053 krb5_error_code problem;
1054 krb5_principal princ;
1055 OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
1056- int len;
1057 const char *errmsg;
1058+ const char *new_ccname;
1059
1060 if (client->creds == NULL) {
1061 debug("No credentials stored");
1062@@ -181,11 +181,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1063 return;
1064 }
1065
1066- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache));
1067+ new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
1068+
1069 client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
1070- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6;
1071- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len);
1072- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename);
1073+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
1074+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
1075+ client->store.filename = NULL;
1076+#else
1077+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "FILE:%s", new_ccname);
1078+ client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
1079+#endif
1080
1081 #ifdef USE_PAM
1082 if (options.use_pam)
1083@@ -197,6 +202,71 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1084 return;
1085 }
1086
1087+int
1088+ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,
1089+ ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1090+{
1091+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
1092+ krb5_principal principal = NULL;
1093+ char *name = NULL;
1094+ krb5_error_code problem;
1095+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
1096+
1097+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) {
1098+ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
1099+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
1100+ return 0;
1101+ }
1102+
1103+ /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */
1104+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache,
1105+ &principal))) {
1106+ logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s",
1107+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
1108+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
1109+ return 0;
1110+ }
1111+
1112+ if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) {
1113+ logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s",
1114+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
1115+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
1116+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
1117+ return 0;
1118+ }
1119+
1120+
1121+ if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) {
1122+ debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing");
1123+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
1124+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
1125+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
1126+ return 0;
1127+ }
1128+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
1129+
1130+ /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */
1131+
1132+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) {
1133+ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s",
1134+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
1135+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
1136+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
1137+ return 0;
1138+ }
1139+
1140+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
1141+
1142+ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds,
1143+ ccache))) {
1144+ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!");
1145+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
1146+ return 0;
1147+ }
1148+
1149+ return 1;
1150+}
1151+
1152 ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
1153 "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
1154 "Kerberos",
1155@@ -204,7 +274,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
1156 NULL,
1157 &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
1158 NULL,
1159- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds
1160+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds,
1161+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds
1162 };
1163
1164 #endif /* KRB5 */
1165diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
1166index 53993d67..2e27cbf9 100644
1167--- a/gss-serv.c
1168+++ b/gss-serv.c
1169@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
1170 /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.29 2015/05/22 03:50:02 djm Exp $ */
1171
1172 /*
1173- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
1174+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
1175 *
1176 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
1177 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
1178@@ -45,17 +45,22 @@
1179 #include "session.h"
1180 #include "misc.h"
1181 #include "servconf.h"
1182+#include "uidswap.h"
1183
1184 #include "ssh-gss.h"
1185+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
1186+
1187+extern ServerOptions options;
1188
1189 extern ServerOptions options;
1190
1191 static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
1192 { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
1193- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}};
1194+ GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL,
1195+ {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
1196
1197 ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
1198- { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
1199+ { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
1200
1201 #ifdef KRB5
1202 extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
1203@@ -141,6 +146,28 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
1204 return (ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(*ctx));
1205 }
1206
1207+/* Unprivileged */
1208+char *
1209+ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void) {
1210+ if (supported_oids == NULL)
1211+ ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
1212+ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported_oids,
1213+ &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech, NULL, NULL));
1214+}
1215+
1216+/* Unprivileged */
1217+int
1218+ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data,
1219+ const char *dummy) {
1220+ Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
1221+ int res;
1222+
1223+ res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
1224+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
1225+
1226+ return (res);
1227+}
1228+
1229 /* Unprivileged */
1230 void
1231 ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
1232@@ -151,7 +178,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
1233 gss_OID_set supported;
1234
1235 gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
1236- gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
1237+
1238+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported)))
1239+ return;
1240
1241 while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
1242 if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
1243@@ -277,8 +306,48 @@ OM_uint32
1244 ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1245 {
1246 int i = 0;
1247+ int equal = 0;
1248+ gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
1249+ gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1250+
1251+ if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
1252+ if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
1253+ (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements,
1254+ ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) {
1255+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
1256+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1257+ }
1258+
1259+ if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
1260+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name,
1261+ NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
1262+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
1263+ return (ctx->major);
1264+ }
1265+
1266+ ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name,
1267+ new_name, &equal);
1268+
1269+ if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
1270+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
1271+ return (ctx->major);
1272+ }
1273+
1274+ if (!equal) {
1275+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name");
1276+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1277+ }
1278
1279- gss_buffer_desc ename;
1280+ debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
1281+
1282+ gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
1283+ gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds);
1284+ client->name = new_name;
1285+ client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
1286+ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
1287+ client->updated = 1;
1288+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1289+ }
1290
1291 client->mech = NULL;
1292
1293@@ -293,6 +362,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1294 if (client->mech == NULL)
1295 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
1296
1297+ if (ctx->client_creds &&
1298+ (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
1299+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
1300+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
1301+ return (ctx->major);
1302+ }
1303+
1304 if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
1305 &client->displayname, NULL))) {
1306 ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
1307@@ -310,6 +386,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
1308 return (ctx->major);
1309 }
1310
1311+ gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
1312+
1313 /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
1314 client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
1315 ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
1316@@ -357,7 +435,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep)
1317
1318 /* Privileged */
1319 int
1320-ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
1321+ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
1322 {
1323 OM_uint32 lmin;
1324
1325@@ -367,9 +445,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
1326 return 0;
1327 }
1328 if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
1329- if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
1330+ if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
1331+ gssapi_client.used = 1;
1332+ gssapi_client.store.owner = pw;
1333 return 1;
1334- else {
1335+ } else {
1336 /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
1337 gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
1338 gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
1339@@ -383,14 +463,90 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
1340 return (0);
1341 }
1342
1343-/* Privileged */
1344-OM_uint32
1345-ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
1346+/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running
1347+ * as the user, the monitor is root.
1348+ *
1349+ * In the child, we want to :
1350+ * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify
1351+ * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update
1352+ */
1353+
1354+/* Stuff for PAM */
1355+
1356+#ifdef USE_PAM
1357+static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg,
1358+ struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
1359 {
1360- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
1361- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
1362+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
1363+}
1364+#endif
1365
1366- return (ctx->major);
1367+void
1368+ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) {
1369+ int ok;
1370+ int ret;
1371+#ifdef USE_PAM
1372+ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
1373+ struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
1374+ char *envstr;
1375+#endif
1376+
1377+ if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
1378+ gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
1379+ gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
1380+ return;
1381+
1382+ ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
1383+
1384+ if (!ok)
1385+ return;
1386+
1387+ debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully");
1388+
1389+ /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will
1390+ * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options
1391+ * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
1392+ */
1393+#ifdef USE_PAM
1394+ if (!use_privsep) {
1395+ debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
1396+ return;
1397+ }
1398+
1399+ ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
1400+ &pamconv, &pamh);
1401+ if (ret)
1402+ return;
1403+
1404+ xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
1405+ gssapi_client.store.envval);
1406+
1407+ ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr);
1408+ if (!ret)
1409+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
1410+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
1411+#endif
1412+}
1413+
1414+int
1415+ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) {
1416+ int ok = 0;
1417+
1418+ /* Check we've got credentials to store */
1419+ if (!gssapi_client.updated)
1420+ return 0;
1421+
1422+ gssapi_client.updated = 0;
1423+
1424+ temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner);
1425+ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)
1426+ ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client);
1427+ else
1428+ debug("No update function for this mechanism");
1429+
1430+ restore_uid();
1431+
1432+ return ok;
1433 }
1434
1435 #endif
1436diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
1437index cf4ac0dc..556a32e9 100644
1438--- a/kex.c
1439+++ b/kex.c
1440@@ -54,6 +54,10 @@
1441 #include "sshbuf.h"
1442 #include "digest.h"
1443
1444+#ifdef GSSAPI
1445+#include "ssh-gss.h"
1446+#endif
1447+
1448 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
1449 # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
1450 # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256
1451@@ -113,6 +117,14 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
1452 #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */
1453 { NULL, -1, -1, -1},
1454 };
1455+static const struct kexalg kexalg_prefixes[] = {
1456+#ifdef GSSAPI
1457+ { KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
1458+ { KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
1459+ { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
1460+#endif
1461+ { NULL, -1, -1, -1 },
1462+};
1463
1464 char *
1465 kex_alg_list(char sep)
1466@@ -145,6 +157,10 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
1467 if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
1468 return k;
1469 }
1470+ for (k = kexalg_prefixes; k->name != NULL; k++) {
1471+ if (strncmp(k->name, name, strlen(k->name)) == 0)
1472+ return k;
1473+ }
1474 return NULL;
1475 }
1476
1477@@ -605,6 +621,9 @@ kex_free(struct kex *kex)
1478 sshbuf_free(kex->peer);
1479 sshbuf_free(kex->my);
1480 free(kex->session_id);
1481+#ifdef GSSAPI
1482+ free(kex->gss_host);
1483+#endif /* GSSAPI */
1484 free(kex->client_version_string);
1485 free(kex->server_version_string);
1486 free(kex->failed_choice);
1487diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
1488index 3794f212..fd56171d 100644
1489--- a/kex.h
1490+++ b/kex.h
1491@@ -99,6 +99,9 @@ enum kex_exchange {
1492 KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
1493 KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
1494 KEX_C25519_SHA256,
1495+ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
1496+ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
1497+ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1,
1498 KEX_MAX
1499 };
1500
1501@@ -147,6 +150,12 @@ struct kex {
1502 u_int flags;
1503 int hash_alg;
1504 int ec_nid;
1505+#ifdef GSSAPI
1506+ int gss_deleg_creds;
1507+ int gss_trust_dns;
1508+ char *gss_host;
1509+ char *gss_client;
1510+#endif
1511 char *client_version_string;
1512 char *server_version_string;
1513 char *failed_choice;
1514@@ -197,6 +206,11 @@ int kexecdh_server(struct ssh *);
1515 int kexc25519_client(struct ssh *);
1516 int kexc25519_server(struct ssh *);
1517
1518+#ifdef GSSAPI
1519+int kexgss_client(struct ssh *);
1520+int kexgss_server(struct ssh *);
1521+#endif
1522+
1523 int kex_dh_hash(int, const char *, const char *,
1524 const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t,
1525 const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, u_char *, size_t *);
1526diff --git a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c
1527new file mode 100644
1528index 00000000..10447f2b
1529--- /dev/null
1530+++ b/kexgssc.c
1531@@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
1532+/*
1533+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
1534+ *
1535+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
1536+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
1537+ * are met:
1538+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
1539+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
1540+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
1541+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
1542+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
1543+ *
1544+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
1545+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
1546+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
1547+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
1548+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
1549+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
1550+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
1551+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
1552+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
1553+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
1554+ */
1555+
1556+#include "includes.h"
1557+
1558+#ifdef GSSAPI
1559+
1560+#include "includes.h"
1561+
1562+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
1563+#include <openssl/bn.h>
1564+
1565+#include <string.h>
1566+
1567+#include "xmalloc.h"
1568+#include "buffer.h"
1569+#include "ssh2.h"
1570+#include "key.h"
1571+#include "cipher.h"
1572+#include "kex.h"
1573+#include "log.h"
1574+#include "packet.h"
1575+#include "dh.h"
1576+#include "digest.h"
1577+
1578+#include "ssh-gss.h"
1579+
1580+int
1581+kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) {
1582+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1583+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr;
1584+ Gssctxt *ctxt;
1585+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
1586+ u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, strlen;
1587+ DH *dh;
1588+ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
1589+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
1590+ BIGNUM *p = NULL;
1591+ BIGNUM *g = NULL;
1592+ u_char *kbuf;
1593+ u_char *serverhostkey = NULL;
1594+ u_char *empty = "";
1595+ char *msg;
1596+ int type = 0;
1597+ int first = 1;
1598+ int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
1599+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
1600+ size_t hashlen;
1601+
1602+ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */
1603+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
1604+ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, ssh->kex->name, ssh->kex->kex_type)
1605+ == GSS_C_NO_OID)
1606+ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
1607+
1608+ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, ssh->kex->gss_host))
1609+ fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
1610+
1611+ if (ssh->kex->gss_client &&
1612+ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, ssh->kex->gss_client))
1613+ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
1614+
1615+ switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
1616+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
1617+ dh = dh_new_group1();
1618+ break;
1619+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
1620+ dh = dh_new_group14();
1621+ break;
1622+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
1623+ debug("Doing group exchange\n");
1624+ nbits = dh_estimate(ssh->kex->we_need * 8);
1625+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
1626+ packet_put_int(min);
1627+ packet_put_int(nbits);
1628+ packet_put_int(max);
1629+
1630+ packet_send();
1631+
1632+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
1633+
1634+ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
1635+ fatal("BN_new() failed");
1636+ packet_get_bignum2(p);
1637+ if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
1638+ fatal("BN_new() failed");
1639+ packet_get_bignum2(g);
1640+ packet_check_eom();
1641+
1642+ if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
1643+ fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
1644+ min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
1645+
1646+ dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
1647+ break;
1648+ default:
1649+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
1650+ }
1651+
1652+ /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */
1653+ dh_gen_key(dh, ssh->kex->we_need * 8);
1654+
1655+ /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */
1656+ dh_server_pub = BN_new();
1657+ if (dh_server_pub == NULL)
1658+ fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
1659+
1660+ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
1661+
1662+ do {
1663+ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
1664+
1665+ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
1666+ ssh->kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
1667+ &ret_flags);
1668+
1669+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
1670+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
1671+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
1672+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
1673+ send_tok.length);
1674+ }
1675+ fatal("gss_init_context failed");
1676+ }
1677+
1678+ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
1679+ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
1680+ free(recv_tok.value);
1681+
1682+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1683+ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
1684+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
1685+ fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
1686+
1687+ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
1688+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
1689+ fatal("Integrity check failed");
1690+ }
1691+
1692+ /*
1693+ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
1694+ * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
1695+ */
1696+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
1697+ if (first) {
1698+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT);
1699+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
1700+ send_tok.length);
1701+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
1702+ first = 0;
1703+ } else {
1704+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
1705+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
1706+ send_tok.length);
1707+ }
1708+ packet_send();
1709+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
1710+
1711+ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
1712+ do {
1713+ type = packet_read();
1714+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
1715+ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
1716+ if (serverhostkey)
1717+ fatal("Server host key received more than once");
1718+ serverhostkey =
1719+ packet_get_string(&slen);
1720+ }
1721+ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
1722+
1723+ switch (type) {
1724+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
1725+ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
1726+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
1727+ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
1728+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
1729+ recv_tok.length = strlen;
1730+ break;
1731+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
1732+ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
1733+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
1734+ msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
1735+ msg_tok.length = strlen;
1736+
1737+ /* Is there a token included? */
1738+ if (packet_get_char()) {
1739+ recv_tok.value=
1740+ packet_get_string(&strlen);
1741+ recv_tok.length = strlen;
1742+ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */
1743+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
1744+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete");
1745+ } else {
1746+ /* No token included */
1747+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
1748+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token");
1749+ }
1750+ break;
1751+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
1752+ debug("Received Error");
1753+ maj_status = packet_get_int();
1754+ min_status = packet_get_int();
1755+ msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
1756+ (void) packet_get_string_ptr(NULL);
1757+ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg);
1758+ default:
1759+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
1760+ type);
1761+ }
1762+ token_ptr = &recv_tok;
1763+ } else {
1764+ /* No data, and not complete */
1765+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
1766+ fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
1767+ }
1768+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
1769+
1770+ /*
1771+ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the
1772+ * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok
1773+ */
1774+
1775+ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
1776+ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
1777+
1778+ /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */
1779+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
1780+ packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
1781+
1782+ /* compute K=f^x mod p */
1783+ klen = DH_size(dh);
1784+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
1785+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh);
1786+ if (kout < 0)
1787+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
1788+
1789+ shared_secret = BN_new();
1790+ if (shared_secret == NULL)
1791+ fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed");
1792+
1793+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
1794+ fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
1795+
1796+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
1797+ free(kbuf);
1798+
1799+ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
1800+ switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
1801+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
1802+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
1803+ kex_dh_hash(
1804+ ssh->kex->hash_alg,
1805+ ssh->kex->client_version_string,
1806+ ssh->kex->server_version_string,
1807+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
1808+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
1809+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
1810+ dh->pub_key, /* e */
1811+ dh_server_pub, /* f */
1812+ shared_secret, /* K */
1813+ hash, &hashlen
1814+ );
1815+ break;
1816+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
1817+ kexgex_hash(
1818+ ssh->kex->hash_alg,
1819+ ssh->kex->client_version_string,
1820+ ssh->kex->server_version_string,
1821+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
1822+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
1823+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
1824+ min, nbits, max,
1825+ dh->p, dh->g,
1826+ dh->pub_key,
1827+ dh_server_pub,
1828+ shared_secret,
1829+ hash, &hashlen
1830+ );
1831+ break;
1832+ default:
1833+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
1834+ }
1835+
1836+ gssbuf.value = hash;
1837+ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
1838+
1839+ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
1840+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
1841+ packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify");
1842+
1843+ free(msg_tok.value);
1844+
1845+ DH_free(dh);
1846+ free(serverhostkey);
1847+ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
1848+
1849+ /* save session id */
1850+ if (ssh->kex->session_id == NULL) {
1851+ ssh->kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
1852+ ssh->kex->session_id = xmalloc(ssh->kex->session_id_len);
1853+ memcpy(ssh->kex->session_id, hash, ssh->kex->session_id_len);
1854+ }
1855+
1856+ if (ssh->kex->gss_deleg_creds)
1857+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
1858+
1859+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
1860+ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
1861+ else
1862+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
1863+
1864+ kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
1865+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
1866+ return kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
1867+}
1868+
1869+#endif /* GSSAPI */
1870diff --git a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c
1871new file mode 100644
1872index 00000000..38ca082b
1873--- /dev/null
1874+++ b/kexgsss.c
1875@@ -0,0 +1,295 @@
1876+/*
1877+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
1878+ *
1879+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
1880+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
1881+ * are met:
1882+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
1883+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
1884+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
1885+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
1886+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
1887+ *
1888+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
1889+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
1890+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
1891+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
1892+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
1893+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
1894+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
1895+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
1896+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
1897+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
1898+ */
1899+
1900+#include "includes.h"
1901+
1902+#ifdef GSSAPI
1903+
1904+#include <string.h>
1905+
1906+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
1907+#include <openssl/bn.h>
1908+
1909+#include "xmalloc.h"
1910+#include "buffer.h"
1911+#include "ssh2.h"
1912+#include "key.h"
1913+#include "cipher.h"
1914+#include "kex.h"
1915+#include "log.h"
1916+#include "packet.h"
1917+#include "dh.h"
1918+#include "ssh-gss.h"
1919+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
1920+#include "misc.h"
1921+#include "servconf.h"
1922+#include "digest.h"
1923+
1924+extern ServerOptions options;
1925+
1926+int
1927+kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
1928+{
1929+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
1930+
1931+ /*
1932+ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
1933+ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific
1934+ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently
1935+ * activating this non-standard behaviour.
1936+ */
1937+
1938+ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
1939+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
1940+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1941+ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
1942+ u_int slen, klen, kout;
1943+ u_char *kbuf;
1944+ DH *dh;
1945+ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
1946+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
1947+ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
1948+ int type = 0;
1949+ gss_OID oid;
1950+ char *mechs;
1951+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
1952+ size_t hashlen;
1953+
1954+ /* Initialise GSSAPI */
1955+
1956+ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures
1957+ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
1958+ * into life
1959+ */
1960+ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) {
1961+ mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
1962+ free(mechs);
1963+ }
1964+
1965+ debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, ssh->kex->name);
1966+ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, ssh->kex->name, ssh->kex->kex_type);
1967+ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
1968+ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
1969+
1970+ debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
1971+
1972+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
1973+ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
1974+
1975+ switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
1976+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
1977+ dh = dh_new_group1();
1978+ break;
1979+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
1980+ dh = dh_new_group14();
1981+ break;
1982+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
1983+ debug("Doing group exchange");
1984+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
1985+ min = packet_get_int();
1986+ nbits = packet_get_int();
1987+ max = packet_get_int();
1988+ packet_check_eom();
1989+ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
1990+ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
1991+ min, nbits, max);
1992+ dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min),
1993+ nbits, MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max)));
1994+ if (dh == NULL)
1995+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found");
1996+
1997+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
1998+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
1999+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
2000+ packet_send();
2001+
2002+ packet_write_wait();
2003+ break;
2004+ default:
2005+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
2006+ }
2007+
2008+ dh_gen_key(dh, ssh->kex->we_need * 8);
2009+
2010+ do {
2011+ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
2012+ type = packet_read();
2013+ switch(type) {
2014+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
2015+ if (dh_client_pub != NULL)
2016+ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
2017+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
2018+ recv_tok.length = slen;
2019+
2020+ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
2021+ fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
2022+
2023+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
2024+
2025+ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
2026+ break;
2027+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
2028+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
2029+ recv_tok.length = slen;
2030+ break;
2031+ default:
2032+ packet_disconnect(
2033+ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
2034+ type);
2035+ }
2036+
2037+ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
2038+ &send_tok, &ret_flags));
2039+
2040+ free(recv_tok.value);
2041+
2042+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
2043+ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
2044+
2045+ if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
2046+ fatal("No client public key");
2047+
2048+ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
2049+ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
2050+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
2051+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
2052+ packet_send();
2053+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
2054+ }
2055+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
2056+
2057+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
2058+ if (send_tok.length > 0) {
2059+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
2060+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
2061+ packet_send();
2062+ }
2063+ fatal("accept_ctx died");
2064+ }
2065+
2066+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
2067+ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
2068+
2069+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
2070+ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
2071+
2072+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
2073+ packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
2074+
2075+ klen = DH_size(dh);
2076+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
2077+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
2078+ if (kout < 0)
2079+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
2080+
2081+ shared_secret = BN_new();
2082+ if (shared_secret == NULL)
2083+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed");
2084+
2085+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
2086+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
2087+
2088+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
2089+ free(kbuf);
2090+
2091+ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
2092+ switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
2093+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
2094+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
2095+ kex_dh_hash(
2096+ ssh->kex->hash_alg,
2097+ ssh->kex->client_version_string, ssh->kex->server_version_string,
2098+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
2099+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
2100+ NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */
2101+ dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret,
2102+ hash, &hashlen
2103+ );
2104+ break;
2105+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
2106+ kexgex_hash(
2107+ ssh->kex->hash_alg,
2108+ ssh->kex->client_version_string, ssh->kex->server_version_string,
2109+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
2110+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
2111+ NULL, 0,
2112+ min, nbits, max,
2113+ dh->p, dh->g,
2114+ dh_client_pub,
2115+ dh->pub_key,
2116+ shared_secret,
2117+ hash, &hashlen
2118+ );
2119+ break;
2120+ default:
2121+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
2122+ }
2123+
2124+ BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
2125+
2126+ if (ssh->kex->session_id == NULL) {
2127+ ssh->kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
2128+ ssh->kex->session_id = xmalloc(ssh->kex->session_id_len);
2129+ memcpy(ssh->kex->session_id, hash, ssh->kex->session_id_len);
2130+ }
2131+
2132+ gssbuf.value = hash;
2133+ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
2134+
2135+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok))))
2136+ fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
2137+
2138+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE);
2139+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
2140+ packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length);
2141+
2142+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
2143+ packet_put_char(1); /* true */
2144+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
2145+ } else {
2146+ packet_put_char(0); /* false */
2147+ }
2148+ packet_send();
2149+
2150+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
2151+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
2152+
2153+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
2154+ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
2155+ else
2156+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
2157+
2158+ DH_free(dh);
2159+
2160+ kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
2161+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
2162+ kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
2163+
2164+ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
2165+ * just exchanged. */
2166+ if (options.gss_store_rekey)
2167+ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
2168+ return 0;
2169+}
2170+#endif /* GSSAPI */
2171diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
2172index 96d22b7e..506645c7 100644
2173--- a/monitor.c
2174+++ b/monitor.c
2175@@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
2176 int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
2177 int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
2178 int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
2179+int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *);
2180+int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *);
2181 #endif
2182
2183 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
2184@@ -230,11 +232,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
2185 {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
2186 {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok},
2187 {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
2188+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign},
2189 #endif
2190 {0, 0, NULL}
2191 };
2192
2193 struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
2194+#ifdef GSSAPI
2195+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
2196+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
2197+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
2198+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
2199+#endif
2200 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
2201 {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
2202 #endif
2203@@ -302,6 +311,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
2204 /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
2205 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
2206 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
2207+#ifdef GSSAPI
2208+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
2209+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
2210+#endif
2211
2212 /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
2213 while (!authenticated) {
2214@@ -402,6 +415,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
2215 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
2216 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
2217 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
2218+#ifdef GSSAPI
2219+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
2220+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
2221+#endif
2222
2223 if (!no_pty_flag) {
2224 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
2225@@ -1606,6 +1623,13 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
2226 # endif
2227 #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
2228 kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
2229+#ifdef GSSAPI
2230+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
2231+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
2232+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
2233+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
2234+ }
2235+#endif
2236 kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
2237 kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
2238 kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
2239@@ -1685,8 +1709,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
2240 OM_uint32 major;
2241 u_int len;
2242
2243- if (!options.gss_authentication)
2244- fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
2245+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
2246+ fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
2247
2248 goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
2249 goid.length = len;
2250@@ -1715,8 +1739,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
2251 OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
2252 u_int len;
2253
2254- if (!options.gss_authentication)
2255- fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
2256+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
2257+ fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
2258
2259 in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
2260 in.length = len;
2261@@ -1735,6 +1759,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
2262 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
2263 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
2264 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
2265+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1);
2266 }
2267 return (0);
2268 }
2269@@ -1746,8 +1771,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
2270 OM_uint32 ret;
2271 u_int len;
2272
2273- if (!options.gss_authentication)
2274- fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
2275+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
2276+ fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
2277
2278 gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
2279 gssbuf.length = len;
2280@@ -1775,10 +1800,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
2281 {
2282 int authenticated;
2283
2284- if (!options.gss_authentication)
2285- fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
2286+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
2287+ fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
2288
2289- authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
2290+ authenticated = authctxt->valid &&
2291+ ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw);
2292
2293 buffer_clear(m);
2294 buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
2295@@ -1791,5 +1817,76 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
2296 /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
2297 return (authenticated);
2298 }
2299+
2300+int
2301+mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
2302+{
2303+ gss_buffer_desc data;
2304+ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
2305+ OM_uint32 major, minor;
2306+ u_int len;
2307+
2308+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
2309+ fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
2310+
2311+ data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
2312+ data.length = len;
2313+ if (data.length != 20)
2314+ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__,
2315+ (int) data.length);
2316+
2317+ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */
2318+ if (session_id2_len == 0) {
2319+ session_id2_len = data.length;
2320+ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
2321+ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
2322+ }
2323+ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
2324+
2325+ free(data.value);
2326+
2327+ buffer_clear(m);
2328+ buffer_put_int(m, major);
2329+ buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length);
2330+
2331+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
2332+
2333+ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
2334+
2335+ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
2336+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
2337+
2338+ /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */
2339+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1);
2340+
2341+ return (0);
2342+}
2343+
2344+int
2345+mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) {
2346+ ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
2347+ int ok;
2348+
2349+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
2350+ fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
2351+
2352+ store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
2353+ store.envvar = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
2354+ store.envval = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
2355+
2356+ ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
2357+
2358+ free(store.filename);
2359+ free(store.envvar);
2360+ free(store.envval);
2361+
2362+ buffer_clear(m);
2363+ buffer_put_int(m, ok);
2364+
2365+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
2366+
2367+ return(0);
2368+}
2369+
2370 #endif /* GSSAPI */
2371
2372diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
2373index d68f6745..ec41404c 100644
2374--- a/monitor.h
2375+++ b/monitor.h
2376@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
2377 MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
2378 MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
2379
2380+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151,
2381+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153,
2382+
2383 };
2384
2385 struct monitor {
2386diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
2387index 64ff9288..d5cb640a 100644
2388--- a/monitor_wrap.c
2389+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
2390@@ -924,7 +924,7 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
2391 }
2392
2393 int
2394-mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
2395+mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
2396 {
2397 Buffer m;
2398 int authenticated = 0;
2399@@ -941,5 +941,50 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
2400 debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
2401 return (authenticated);
2402 }
2403+
2404+OM_uint32
2405+mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
2406+{
2407+ Buffer m;
2408+ OM_uint32 major;
2409+ u_int len;
2410+
2411+ buffer_init(&m);
2412+ buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length);
2413+
2414+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m);
2415+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m);
2416+
2417+ major = buffer_get_int(&m);
2418+ hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
2419+ hash->length = len;
2420+
2421+ buffer_free(&m);
2422+
2423+ return(major);
2424+}
2425+
2426+int
2427+mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store)
2428+{
2429+ Buffer m;
2430+ int ok;
2431+
2432+ buffer_init(&m);
2433+
2434+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : "");
2435+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : "");
2436+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : "");
2437+
2438+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
2439+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
2440+
2441+ ok = buffer_get_int(&m);
2442+
2443+ buffer_free(&m);
2444+
2445+ return (ok);
2446+}
2447+
2448 #endif /* GSSAPI */
2449
2450diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
2451index db5902f5..8f9dd896 100644
2452--- a/monitor_wrap.h
2453+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
2454@@ -55,8 +55,10 @@ int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
2455 OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
2456 OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
2457 gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
2458-int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
2459+int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *);
2460 OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
2461+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
2462+int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *);
2463 #endif
2464
2465 #ifdef USE_PAM
2466diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
2467index 9d59493f..00d9cc30 100644
2468--- a/readconf.c
2469+++ b/readconf.c
2470@@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ typedef enum {
2471 oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
2472 oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
2473 oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
2474+ oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey,
2475+ oGssServerIdentity,
2476 oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
2477 oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
2478 oHashKnownHosts,
2479@@ -196,10 +198,20 @@ static struct {
2480 /* Sometimes-unsupported options */
2481 #if defined(GSSAPI)
2482 { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
2483+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx },
2484 { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
2485+ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
2486+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity },
2487+ { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity },
2488+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey },
2489 # else
2490 { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
2491+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
2492 { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
2493+ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
2494+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported },
2495+ { "gssapiserveridentity", oUnsupported },
2496+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported },
2497 #endif
2498 #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
2499 { "smartcarddevice", oPKCS11Provider },
2500@@ -973,10 +985,30 @@ parse_time:
2501 intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
2502 goto parse_flag;
2503
2504+ case oGssKeyEx:
2505+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
2506+ goto parse_flag;
2507+
2508 case oGssDelegateCreds:
2509 intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
2510 goto parse_flag;
2511
2512+ case oGssTrustDns:
2513+ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
2514+ goto parse_flag;
2515+
2516+ case oGssClientIdentity:
2517+ charptr = &options->gss_client_identity;
2518+ goto parse_string;
2519+
2520+ case oGssServerIdentity:
2521+ charptr = &options->gss_server_identity;
2522+ goto parse_string;
2523+
2524+ case oGssRenewalRekey:
2525+ intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey;
2526+ goto parse_flag;
2527+
2528 case oBatchMode:
2529 intptr = &options->batch_mode;
2530 goto parse_flag;
2531@@ -1798,7 +1830,12 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
2532 options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
2533 options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
2534 options->gss_authentication = -1;
2535+ options->gss_keyex = -1;
2536 options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
2537+ options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
2538+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1;
2539+ options->gss_client_identity = NULL;
2540+ options->gss_server_identity = NULL;
2541 options->password_authentication = -1;
2542 options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
2543 options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
2544@@ -1942,8 +1979,14 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
2545 options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
2546 if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
2547 options->gss_authentication = 0;
2548+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
2549+ options->gss_keyex = 0;
2550 if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
2551 options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
2552+ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
2553+ options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
2554+ if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
2555+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0;
2556 if (options->password_authentication == -1)
2557 options->password_authentication = 1;
2558 if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
2559diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
2560index cef55f71..fd3d7c75 100644
2561--- a/readconf.h
2562+++ b/readconf.h
2563@@ -45,7 +45,12 @@ typedef struct {
2564 int challenge_response_authentication;
2565 /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
2566 int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */
2567+ int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */
2568 int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */
2569+ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
2570+ int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */
2571+ char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */
2572+ char *gss_server_identity; /* GSSAPI target principal */
2573 int password_authentication; /* Try password
2574 * authentication. */
2575 int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
2576diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
2577index 56b83165..d796b7c8 100644
2578--- a/servconf.c
2579+++ b/servconf.c
2580@@ -113,8 +113,10 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
2581 options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
2582 options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
2583 options->gss_authentication=-1;
2584+ options->gss_keyex = -1;
2585 options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
2586 options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
2587+ options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
2588 options->password_authentication = -1;
2589 options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
2590 options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
2591@@ -267,10 +269,14 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
2592 options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
2593 if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
2594 options->gss_authentication = 0;
2595+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
2596+ options->gss_keyex = 0;
2597 if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
2598 options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
2599 if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
2600 options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
2601+ if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
2602+ options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
2603 if (options->password_authentication == -1)
2604 options->password_authentication = 1;
2605 if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
2606@@ -407,6 +413,7 @@ typedef enum {
2607 sHostKeyAlgorithms,
2608 sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
2609 sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
2610+ sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey,
2611 sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
2612 sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
2613 sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
2614@@ -480,12 +487,20 @@ static struct {
2615 #ifdef GSSAPI
2616 { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
2617 { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2618+ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2619 { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2620+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2621+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2622 #else
2623 { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
2624 { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2625+ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2626 { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2627+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2628+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2629 #endif
2630+ { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2631+ { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2632 { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
2633 { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
2634 { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
2635@@ -1217,6 +1232,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
2636 intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
2637 goto parse_flag;
2638
2639+ case sGssKeyEx:
2640+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
2641+ goto parse_flag;
2642+
2643 case sGssCleanupCreds:
2644 intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
2645 goto parse_flag;
2646@@ -1225,6 +1244,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
2647 intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
2648 goto parse_flag;
2649
2650+ case sGssStoreRekey:
2651+ intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey;
2652+ goto parse_flag;
2653+
2654 case sPasswordAuthentication:
2655 intptr = &options->password_authentication;
2656 goto parse_flag;
2657@@ -2250,7 +2273,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
2658 #endif
2659 #ifdef GSSAPI
2660 dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
2661+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
2662 dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
2663+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
2664+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
2665 #endif
2666 dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
2667 dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
2668diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
2669index 5853a974..90dfa4c2 100644
2670--- a/servconf.h
2671+++ b/servconf.h
2672@@ -112,8 +112,10 @@ typedef struct {
2673 int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if
2674 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
2675 int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
2676+ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
2677 int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
2678 int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
2679+ int gss_store_rekey;
2680 int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password
2681 * authentication. */
2682 int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
2683diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
2684index a99d7f08..914701bc 100644
2685--- a/ssh-gss.h
2686+++ b/ssh-gss.h
2687@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
2688 /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.11 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */
2689 /*
2690- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
2691+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
2692 *
2693 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
2694 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
2695@@ -61,10 +61,22 @@
2696
2697 #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
2698
2699+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30
2700+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31
2701+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32
2702+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33
2703+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34
2704+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40
2705+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41
2706+#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-"
2707+#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-"
2708+#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-"
2709+
2710 typedef struct {
2711 char *filename;
2712 char *envvar;
2713 char *envval;
2714+ struct passwd *owner;
2715 void *data;
2716 } ssh_gssapi_ccache;
2717
2718@@ -72,8 +84,11 @@ typedef struct {
2719 gss_buffer_desc displayname;
2720 gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
2721 gss_cred_id_t creds;
2722+ gss_name_t name;
2723 struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
2724 ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
2725+ int used;
2726+ int updated;
2727 } ssh_gssapi_client;
2728
2729 typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
2730@@ -84,6 +99,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
2731 int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
2732 int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
2733 void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
2734+ int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
2735 } ssh_gssapi_mech;
2736
2737 typedef struct {
2738@@ -94,10 +110,11 @@ typedef struct {
2739 gss_OID oid; /* client */
2740 gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */
2741 gss_name_t client; /* server */
2742- gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */
2743+ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */
2744 } Gssctxt;
2745
2746 extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
2747+extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context;
2748
2749 int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
2750 void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
2751@@ -119,16 +136,32 @@ void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **);
2752 void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
2753 OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
2754 void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
2755-int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
2756+int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *);
2757+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
2758+int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
2759
2760 /* In the server */
2761+typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *,
2762+ const char *);
2763+char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *);
2764+char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
2765+ const char *);
2766+gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
2767+int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *,
2768+ const char *);
2769 OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
2770-int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
2771+int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *);
2772 OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
2773 void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
2774 void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
2775 void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
2776
2777+char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
2778+int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void);
2779+
2780+int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store);
2781+void ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void);
2782+
2783 #endif /* GSSAPI */
2784
2785 #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
2786diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
2787index 90fb63f0..4e879cd2 100644
2788--- a/ssh_config
2789+++ b/ssh_config
2790@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
2791 # HostbasedAuthentication no
2792 # GSSAPIAuthentication no
2793 # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
2794+# GSSAPIKeyExchange no
2795+# GSSAPITrustDNS no
2796 # BatchMode no
2797 # CheckHostIP yes
2798 # AddressFamily any
2799diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
2800index 532745b2..ec60273e 100644
2801--- a/ssh_config.5
2802+++ b/ssh_config.5
2803@@ -752,10 +752,42 @@ The default is
2804 Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
2805 The default is
2806 .Cm no .
2807+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
2808+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using
2809+GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key.
2810+The default is
2811+.Cm no .
2812+.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity
2813+If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when
2814+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default
2815+identity will be used.
2816+.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity
2817+If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when
2818+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the
2819+expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target
2820+hostname.
2821 .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
2822 Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
2823 The default is
2824 .Cm no .
2825+.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
2826+If set to
2827+.Cm yes
2828+then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the
2829+ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed
2830+credentials to a session on the server.
2831+The default is
2832+.Cm no .
2833+.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
2834+Set to
2835+.Cm yes
2836+to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
2837+the name of the host being connected to. If
2838+.Cm no ,
2839+the hostname entered on the
2840+command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
2841+The default is
2842+.Cm no .
2843 .It Cm HashKnownHosts
2844 Indicates that
2845 .Xr ssh 1
2846diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
2847index f8a54bee..5743c2c4 100644
2848--- a/sshconnect2.c
2849+++ b/sshconnect2.c
2850@@ -162,6 +162,11 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
2851 struct kex *kex;
2852 int r;
2853
2854+#ifdef GSSAPI
2855+ char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL;
2856+ char *gss_host = NULL;
2857+#endif
2858+
2859 xxx_host = host;
2860 xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
2861
2862@@ -192,6 +197,35 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
2863 order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port));
2864 }
2865
2866+#ifdef GSSAPI
2867+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
2868+ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
2869+ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
2870+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
2871+
2872+ if (options.gss_server_identity)
2873+ gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
2874+ else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
2875+ gss_host = remote_hostname(active_state);
2876+ else
2877+ gss_host = xstrdup(host);
2878+
2879+ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
2880+ options.gss_client_identity);
2881+ if (gss) {
2882+ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
2883+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
2884+ "%s,%s", gss, orig);
2885+
2886+ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also
2887+ * support the 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
2888+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
2889+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
2890+ "%s,null", orig);
2891+ }
2892+ }
2893+#endif
2894+
2895 if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
2896 packet_set_rekey_limits(options.rekey_limit,
2897 options.rekey_interval);
2898@@ -213,15 +247,41 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
2899 # endif
2900 #endif
2901 kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client;
2902+#ifdef GSSAPI
2903+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
2904+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
2905+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
2906+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
2907+ }
2908+#endif
2909 kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
2910 kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
2911 kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
2912
2913+#ifdef GSSAPI
2914+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
2915+ kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
2916+ kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
2917+ kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity;
2918+ kex->gss_host = gss_host;
2919+ }
2920+#endif
2921+
2922 dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, active_state);
2923
2924 /* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */
2925 myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] =
2926 compat_kex_proposal(options.kex_algorithms);
2927+#ifdef GSSAPI
2928+ /* repair myproposal after it was crumpled by the */
2929+ /* ext-info removal above */
2930+ if (gss) {
2931+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
2932+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
2933+ "%s,%s", gss, orig);
2934+ free(gss);
2935+ }
2936+#endif
2937 if ((r = kex_prop2buf(kex->my, myproposal)) != 0)
2938 fatal("kex_prop2buf: %s", ssh_err(r));
2939
2940@@ -311,6 +371,7 @@ int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
2941 int input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
2942 int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
2943 int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
2944+int userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt);
2945 #endif
2946
2947 void userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
2948@@ -327,6 +388,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
2949
2950 Authmethod authmethods[] = {
2951 #ifdef GSSAPI
2952+ {"gssapi-keyex",
2953+ userauth_gsskeyex,
2954+ NULL,
2955+ &options.gss_authentication,
2956+ NULL},
2957 {"gssapi-with-mic",
2958 userauth_gssapi,
2959 NULL,
2960@@ -652,25 +718,40 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
2961 static u_int mech = 0;
2962 OM_uint32 min;
2963 int ok = 0;
2964+ char *gss_host;
2965+
2966+ if (options.gss_server_identity)
2967+ gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
2968+ else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
2969+ gss_host = remote_hostname(active_state);
2970+ else
2971+ gss_host = xstrdup(authctxt->host);
2972
2973 /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
2974 * once. */
2975
2976 if (gss_supported == NULL)
2977- gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported);
2978+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) {
2979+ gss_supported = NULL;
2980+ free(gss_host);
2981+ return 0;
2982+ }
2983
2984 /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
2985 while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
2986 /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
2987 if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
2988 ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
2989- &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
2990+ &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host,
2991+ options.gss_client_identity)) {
2992 ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
2993 } else {
2994 mech++;
2995 }
2996 }
2997
2998+ free(gss_host);
2999+
3000 if (!ok)
3001 return 0;
3002
3003@@ -761,8 +842,8 @@ input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
3004 {
3005 Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
3006 Gssctxt *gssctxt;
3007- int oidlen;
3008- char *oidv;
3009+ u_int oidlen;
3010+ u_char *oidv;
3011
3012 if (authctxt == NULL)
3013 fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
3014@@ -875,6 +956,48 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
3015 free(lang);
3016 return 0;
3017 }
3018+
3019+int
3020+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
3021+{
3022+ Buffer b;
3023+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
3024+ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
3025+ OM_uint32 ms;
3026+
3027+ static int attempt = 0;
3028+ if (attempt++ >= 1)
3029+ return (0);
3030+
3031+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
3032+ debug("No valid Key exchange context");
3033+ return (0);
3034+ }
3035+
3036+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
3037+ "gssapi-keyex");
3038+
3039+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
3040+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
3041+
3042+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
3043+ buffer_free(&b);
3044+ return (0);
3045+ }
3046+
3047+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
3048+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
3049+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
3050+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
3051+ packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
3052+ packet_send();
3053+
3054+ buffer_free(&b);
3055+ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
3056+
3057+ return (1);
3058+}
3059+
3060 #endif /* GSSAPI */
3061
3062 int
3063diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
3064index 010a2c38..20a7a5f3 100644
3065--- a/sshd.c
3066+++ b/sshd.c
3067@@ -123,6 +123,10 @@
3068 #include "version.h"
3069 #include "ssherr.h"
3070
3071+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
3072+#include <Security/AuthSession.h>
3073+#endif
3074+
3075 /* Re-exec fds */
3076 #define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
3077 #define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
3078@@ -531,7 +535,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
3079
3080 #ifdef GSSAPI
3081 /* Cache supported mechanism OIDs for later use */
3082- if (options.gss_authentication)
3083+ if (options.gss_authentication || options.gss_keyex)
3084 ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
3085 #endif
3086
3087@@ -1719,10 +1723,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
3088 key ? "private" : "agent", i, sshkey_ssh_name(pubkey), fp);
3089 free(fp);
3090 }
3091+#ifndef GSSAPI
3092+ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
3093 if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
3094 logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
3095 exit(1);
3096 }
3097+#endif
3098
3099 /*
3100 * Load certificates. They are stored in an array at identical
3101@@ -1992,6 +1999,60 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
3102 remote_ip, remote_port, laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh));
3103 free(laddr);
3104
3105+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
3106+ /*
3107+ * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if
3108+ * the current session is the root session or we are not launched
3109+ * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode). We do not
3110+ * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from
3111+ * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us.
3112+ *
3113+ * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an
3114+ * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating
3115+ * new sessions for us. Then all the users will end up in the
3116+ * same session (bad).
3117+ *
3118+ * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us
3119+ * automatically.
3120+ *
3121+ * We must create the session before any credentials are stored
3122+ * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below).
3123+ */
3124+ {
3125+ OSStatus err = 0;
3126+ SecuritySessionId sid = 0;
3127+ SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0;
3128+
3129+ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs);
3130+ if (err)
3131+ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
3132+ (unsigned) err);
3133+ else
3134+ debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
3135+ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
3136+
3137+ if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot))
3138+ debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... "
3139+ "assuming inetd created the session for us.");
3140+ else {
3141+ debug("Creating new security session...");
3142+ err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote);
3143+ if (err)
3144+ error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X",
3145+ (unsigned) err);
3146+
3147+ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid,
3148+ &sattrs);
3149+ if (err)
3150+ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
3151+ (unsigned) err);
3152+ else
3153+ debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
3154+ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
3155+ }
3156+ }
3157+#endif
3158+
3159 /*
3160 * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
3161 * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
3162@@ -2173,6 +2234,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
3163 myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
3164 list_hostkey_types());
3165
3166+#ifdef GSSAPI
3167+ {
3168+ char *orig;
3169+ char *gss = NULL;
3170+ char *newstr = NULL;
3171+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
3172+
3173+ /*
3174+ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
3175+ * the other key exchange algorithms
3176+ */
3177+
3178+ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
3179+ orig = NULL;
3180+
3181+ if (options.gss_keyex)
3182+ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
3183+ else
3184+ gss = NULL;
3185+
3186+ if (gss && orig)
3187+ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
3188+ else if (gss)
3189+ newstr = gss;
3190+ else if (orig)
3191+ newstr = orig;
3192+
3193+ /*
3194+ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
3195+ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
3196+ * host key algorithm we support
3197+ */
3198+ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
3199+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
3200+
3201+ if (newstr)
3202+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
3203+ else
3204+ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
3205+ }
3206+#endif
3207+
3208 /* start key exchange */
3209 if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0)
3210 fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r));
3211@@ -2190,6 +2293,13 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
3212 # endif
3213 #endif
3214 kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
3215+#ifdef GSSAPI
3216+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
3217+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
3218+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
3219+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
3220+ }
3221+#endif
3222 kex->server = 1;
3223 kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
3224 kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
3225diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
3226index 4eb2e02e..c01dd656 100644
3227--- a/sshd_config
3228+++ b/sshd_config
3229@@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
3230 # GSSAPI options
3231 #GSSAPIAuthentication no
3232 #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
3233+#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
3234+#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
3235
3236 # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
3237 # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
3238diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
3239index ac6ccc79..3f819c76 100644
3240--- a/sshd_config.5
3241+++ b/sshd_config.5
3242@@ -627,6 +627,11 @@ The default is
3243 Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
3244 The default is
3245 .Cm no .
3246+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
3247+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
3248+doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
3249+The default is
3250+.Cm no .
3251 .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
3252 Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
3253 on logout.
3254@@ -646,6 +651,11 @@ machine's default store.
3255 This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines.
3256 The default is
3257 .Cm yes .
3258+.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey
3259+Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a
3260+successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed
3261+or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is
3262+.Cm no .
3263 .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
3264 Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication
3265 as a comma-separated pattern list.
3266diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
3267index 53a7674b..54001989 100644
3268--- a/sshkey.c
3269+++ b/sshkey.c
3270@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] = {
3271 # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
3272 # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
3273 #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
3274+ { "null", "null", KEY_NULL, 0, 0, 0 },
3275 { NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0 }
3276 };
3277
3278@@ -204,7 +205,7 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep)
3279 const struct keytype *kt;
3280
3281 for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
3282- if (kt->name == NULL)
3283+ if (kt->name == NULL || kt->type == KEY_NULL)
3284 continue;
3285 if (!include_sigonly && kt->sigonly)
3286 continue;
3287diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
3288index 1b9e42f4..f91e4a08 100644
3289--- a/sshkey.h
3290+++ b/sshkey.h
3291@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ enum sshkey_types {
3292 KEY_DSA_CERT,
3293 KEY_ECDSA_CERT,
3294 KEY_ED25519_CERT,
3295+ KEY_NULL,
3296 KEY_UNSPEC
3297 };
3298
diff --git a/debian/patches/keepalive-extensions.patch b/debian/patches/keepalive-extensions.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8748ac286
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/keepalive-extensions.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
1From 74415628b380db26961259a25dcc47c4f02e8703 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Richard Kettlewell <rjk@greenend.org.uk>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:52 +0000
4Subject: Various keepalive extensions
5
6Add compatibility aliases for ProtocolKeepAlives and SetupTimeOut, supported
7in previous versions of Debian's OpenSSH package but since superseded by
8ServerAliveInterval. (We're probably stuck with this bit for
9compatibility.)
10
11In batch mode, default ServerAliveInterval to five minutes.
12
13Adjust documentation to match and to give some more advice on use of
14keepalives.
15
16Author: Ian Jackson <ian@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
17Author: Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>
18Author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
19Last-Update: 2016-12-26
20
21Patch-Name: keepalive-extensions.patch
22---
23 readconf.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
24 ssh_config.5 | 21 +++++++++++++++++++--
25 sshd_config.5 | 3 +++
26 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
27
28diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
29index 32a72957..0b1370a8 100644
30--- a/readconf.c
31+++ b/readconf.c
32@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ typedef enum {
33 oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys,
34 oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedKeyTypes,
35 oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, oProxyJump,
36+ oProtocolKeepAlives, oSetupTimeOut,
37 oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported
38 } OpCodes;
39
40@@ -321,6 +322,8 @@ static struct {
41 { "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes },
42 { "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown },
43 { "proxyjump", oProxyJump },
44+ { "protocolkeepalives", oProtocolKeepAlives },
45+ { "setuptimeout", oSetupTimeOut },
46
47 { NULL, oBadOption }
48 };
49@@ -1417,6 +1420,8 @@ parse_keytypes:
50 goto parse_flag;
51
52 case oServerAliveInterval:
53+ case oProtocolKeepAlives: /* Debian-specific compatibility alias */
54+ case oSetupTimeOut: /* Debian-specific compatibility alias */
55 intptr = &options->server_alive_interval;
56 goto parse_time;
57
58@@ -2070,8 +2075,13 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
59 options->rekey_interval = 0;
60 if (options->verify_host_key_dns == -1)
61 options->verify_host_key_dns = 0;
62- if (options->server_alive_interval == -1)
63- options->server_alive_interval = 0;
64+ if (options->server_alive_interval == -1) {
65+ /* in batch mode, default is 5mins */
66+ if (options->batch_mode == 1)
67+ options->server_alive_interval = 300;
68+ else
69+ options->server_alive_interval = 0;
70+ }
71 if (options->server_alive_count_max == -1)
72 options->server_alive_count_max = 3;
73 if (options->control_master == -1)
74diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
75index ec60273e..e4eaa5ae 100644
76--- a/ssh_config.5
77+++ b/ssh_config.5
78@@ -250,8 +250,12 @@ Valid arguments are
79 If set to
80 .Cm yes ,
81 passphrase/password querying will be disabled.
82+In addition, the
83+.Cm ServerAliveInterval
84+option will be set to 300 seconds by default (Debian-specific).
85 This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no user
86-is present to supply the password.
87+is present to supply the password,
88+and where it is desirable to detect a broken network swiftly.
89 The argument must be
90 .Cm yes
91 or
92@@ -1509,7 +1513,14 @@ from the server,
93 will send a message through the encrypted
94 channel to request a response from the server.
95 The default
96-is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server.
97+is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server,
98+or 300 if the
99+.Cm BatchMode
100+option is set (Debian-specific).
101+.Cm ProtocolKeepAlives
102+and
103+.Cm SetupTimeOut
104+are Debian-specific compatibility aliases for this option.
105 .It Cm StreamLocalBindMask
106 Sets the octal file creation mode mask
107 .Pq umask
108@@ -1568,6 +1579,12 @@ Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the
109 other side.
110 If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one
111 of the machines will be properly noticed.
112+This option only uses TCP keepalives (as opposed to using ssh level
113+keepalives), so takes a long time to notice when the connection dies.
114+As such, you probably want
115+the
116+.Cm ServerAliveInterval
117+option as well.
118 However, this means that
119 connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people
120 find it annoying.
121diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
122index 3f819c76..41ec6688 100644
123--- a/sshd_config.5
124+++ b/sshd_config.5
125@@ -1447,6 +1447,9 @@ This avoids infinitely hanging sessions.
126 .Pp
127 To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
128 .Cm no .
129+.Pp
130+This option was formerly called
131+.Cm KeepAlive .
132 .It Cm TrustedUserCAKeys
133 Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate authorities that are
134 trusted to sign user certificates for authentication, or
diff --git a/debian/patches/mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch b/debian/patches/mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a425efa55
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
1From 78963ce671198209cadd01ebb0aa20ae4fac22d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Scott Moser <smoser@ubuntu.com>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:03 +0000
4Subject: Mention ssh-keygen in ssh fingerprint changed warning
5
6Author: Chris Lamb <lamby@debian.org>
7Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1843
8Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/686607
9Last-Update: 2017-08-22
10
11Patch-Name: mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch
12---
13 sshconnect.c | 9 ++++++++-
14 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
15
16diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
17index 7f169a8f..881b0886 100644
18--- a/sshconnect.c
19+++ b/sshconnect.c
20@@ -1080,9 +1080,13 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
21 error("%s. This could either mean that", key_msg);
22 error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host");
23 error("and its host key have changed at the same time.");
24- if (ip_status != HOST_NEW)
25+ if (ip_status != HOST_NEW) {
26 error("Offending key for IP in %s:%lu",
27 ip_found->file, ip_found->line);
28+ error(" remove with:");
29+ error(" ssh-keygen -f \"%s\" -R \"%s\"",
30+ ip_found->file, ip);
31+ }
32 }
33 /* The host key has changed. */
34 warn_changed_key(host_key);
35@@ -1090,6 +1094,9 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
36 user_hostfiles[0]);
37 error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu", key_type(host_found->key),
38 host_found->file, host_found->line);
39+ error(" remove with:");
40+ error(" ssh-keygen -f \"%s\" -R \"%s\"",
41+ host_found->file, host);
42
43 /*
44 * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
diff --git a/debian/patches/no-dsa-host-key-by-default.patch b/debian/patches/no-dsa-host-key-by-default.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..92f9d7c61
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/no-dsa-host-key-by-default.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
1From 5fc5168dde0c840bf743058d235193fc27e61cab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Mon, 16 Jan 2017 13:53:04 +0000
4Subject: Remove ssh_host_dsa_key from HostKey default
5
6The client no longer accepts DSA host keys, and servers using the
7default HostKey setting should have better host keys available.
8
9Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2662
10Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/850614
11Last-Update: 2017-01-16
12
13Patch-Name: no-dsa-host-key-by-default.patch
14---
15 servconf.c | 2 --
16 sshd.8 | 7 +++----
17 sshd_config | 1 -
18 sshd_config.5 | 7 +++----
19 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
20
21diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
22index a391cf4b..1a7a5f18 100644
23--- a/servconf.c
24+++ b/servconf.c
25@@ -204,8 +204,6 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
26 /* fill default hostkeys for protocols */
27 options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
28 _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE;
29- options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
30- _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE;
31 #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
32 options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
33 _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE;
34diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
35index 6355178f..f038fb82 100644
36--- a/sshd.8
37+++ b/sshd.8
38@@ -164,11 +164,10 @@ This option must be given if
39 is not run as root (as the normal
40 host key files are normally not readable by anyone but root).
41 The default is
42-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key ,
43-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key ,
44-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
45+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key ,
46+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
47 and
48-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key .
49+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key .
50 It is possible to have multiple host key files for
51 the different host key algorithms.
52 .It Fl i
53diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
54index f68edf36..92822959 100644
55--- a/sshd_config
56+++ b/sshd_config
57@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@
58 #ListenAddress ::
59
60 #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
61-#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
62 #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
63 #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
64
65diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
66index cc5d9fb0..0747cc8b 100644
67--- a/sshd_config.5
68+++ b/sshd_config.5
69@@ -741,11 +741,10 @@ is not to load any certificates.
70 Specifies a file containing a private host key
71 used by SSH.
72 The defaults are
73-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key ,
74-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key ,
75-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
76+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key ,
77+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
78 and
79-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key .
80+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key .
81 .Pp
82 Note that
83 .Xr sshd 8
diff --git a/debian/patches/no-openssl-version-status.patch b/debian/patches/no-openssl-version-status.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..63a226284
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/no-openssl-version-status.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
1From 1780065057642803e173730f6e2162943ae54302 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:14 +0000
4Subject: Don't check the status field of the OpenSSL version
5
6There is no reason to check the version of OpenSSL (in Debian). If it's
7not compatible the soname will change. OpenSSH seems to want to do a
8check for the soname based on the version number, but wants to keep the
9status of the release the same. Remove that check on the status since
10it doesn't tell you anything about how compatible that version is.
11
12Author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
13Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/93581
14Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/664383
15Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/732940
16Forwarded: not-needed
17Last-Update: 2014-10-07
18
19Patch-Name: no-openssl-version-status.patch
20---
21 openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c | 6 +++---
22 openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c | 1 +
23 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
24
25diff --git a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
26index 259fccbe..aaa953f2 100644
27--- a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
28+++ b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
29@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
30 /*
31 * OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
32 * We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0.
33- * After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we
34+ * After that, we accept compatible fix and status versions (so we
35 * allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed
36 * within a patch series.
37 */
38@@ -55,10 +55,10 @@ ssh_compatible_openssl(long headerver, long libver)
39 }
40
41 /*
42- * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor,status must match and library
43+ * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor must match and library
44 * fix version must be equal to or newer than the header.
45 */
46- mask = 0xfff0000fL; /* major,minor,status */
47+ mask = 0xfff00000L; /* major,minor */
48 hfix = (headerver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
49 lfix = (libver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
50 if ( (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask) && lfix >= hfix)
51diff --git a/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c b/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
52index 5d019b59..58474873 100644
53--- a/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
54+++ b/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
55@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ struct version_test {
56
57 /* built with 1.0.1b release headers */
58 { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000101fL, 1},/* exact match */
59+ { 0x1000101fL, 0x10001010L, 1}, /* different status: ok */
60 { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000102fL, 1}, /* newer library patch version: ok */
61 { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000100fL, 1}, /* older library patch version: ok */
62 { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000201fL, 1}, /* newer library fix version: ok */
diff --git a/debian/patches/openbsd-docs.patch b/debian/patches/openbsd-docs.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2a5a2e466
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/openbsd-docs.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
1From 10138a01a89b20e851d85bd040e289d47b9815b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:09 +0000
4Subject: Adjust various OpenBSD-specific references in manual pages
5
6No single bug reference for this patch, but history includes:
7 http://bugs.debian.org/154434 (login.conf(5))
8 http://bugs.debian.org/513417 (/etc/rc)
9 http://bugs.debian.org/530692 (ssl(8))
10 https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/456660 (ssl(8))
11
12Forwarded: not-needed
13Last-Update: 2014-10-07
14
15Patch-Name: openbsd-docs.patch
16---
17 moduli.5 | 4 ++--
18 ssh-keygen.1 | 12 ++++--------
19 ssh.1 | 4 ++++
20 sshd.8 | 5 ++---
21 sshd_config.5 | 3 +--
22 5 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
23
24diff --git a/moduli.5 b/moduli.5
25index ef0de085..149846c8 100644
26--- a/moduli.5
27+++ b/moduli.5
28@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
29 .Nd Diffie-Hellman moduli
30 .Sh DESCRIPTION
31 The
32-.Pa /etc/moduli
33+.Pa /etc/ssh/moduli
34 file contains prime numbers and generators for use by
35 .Xr sshd 8
36 in the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange key exchange method.
37@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ first estimates the size of the modulus required to produce enough
38 Diffie-Hellman output to sufficiently key the selected symmetric cipher.
39 .Xr sshd 8
40 then randomly selects a modulus from
41-.Fa /etc/moduli
42+.Fa /etc/ssh/moduli
43 that best meets the size requirement.
44 .Sh SEE ALSO
45 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
46diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
47index ce2213c7..01711dff 100644
48--- a/ssh-keygen.1
49+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
50@@ -178,9 +178,7 @@ key in
51 .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
52 or
53 .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa .
54-Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys,
55-as seen in
56-.Pa /etc/rc .
57+Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys.
58 .Pp
59 Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which
60 to store the private key.
61@@ -227,9 +225,7 @@ For each of the key types (rsa1, rsa, dsa, ecdsa and ed25519)
62 for which host keys
63 do not exist, generate the host keys with the default key file path,
64 an empty passphrase, default bits for the key type, and default comment.
65-This is used by
66-.Pa /etc/rc
67-to generate new host keys.
68+This is used by system administration scripts to generate new host keys.
69 .It Fl a Ar rounds
70 When saving a new-format private key (i.e. an ed25519 key or any SSH protocol
71 2 key when the
72@@ -644,7 +640,7 @@ option.
73 Valid generator values are 2, 3, and 5.
74 .Pp
75 Screened DH groups may be installed in
76-.Pa /etc/moduli .
77+.Pa /etc/ssh/moduli .
78 It is important that this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths and
79 that both ends of a connection share common moduli.
80 .Sh CERTIFICATES
81@@ -843,7 +839,7 @@ on all machines
82 where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication.
83 There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret.
84 .Pp
85-.It Pa /etc/moduli
86+.It Pa /etc/ssh/moduli
87 Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX.
88 The file format is described in
89 .Xr moduli 5 .
90diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
91index feef81a5..b1f128c2 100644
92--- a/ssh.1
93+++ b/ssh.1
94@@ -877,6 +877,10 @@ implements public key authentication protocol automatically,
95 using one of the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA algorithms.
96 The HISTORY section of
97 .Xr ssl 8
98+(on non-OpenBSD systems, see
99+.nh
100+http://www.openbsd.org/cgi\-bin/man.cgi?query=ssl&sektion=8#HISTORY)
101+.hy
102 contains a brief discussion of the DSA and RSA algorithms.
103 .Pp
104 The file
105diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
106index 989dd4bf..6355178f 100644
107--- a/sshd.8
108+++ b/sshd.8
109@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ over an insecure network.
110 .Nm
111 listens for connections from clients.
112 It is normally started at boot from
113-.Pa /etc/rc .
114+.Pa /etc/init.d/ssh .
115 It forks a new
116 daemon for each incoming connection.
117 The forked daemons handle
118@@ -836,7 +836,7 @@ This file is for host-based authentication (see
119 .Xr ssh 1 ) .
120 It should only be writable by root.
121 .Pp
122-.It Pa /etc/moduli
123+.It Pa /etc/ssh/moduli
124 Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange"
125 key exchange method.
126 The file format is described in
127@@ -936,7 +936,6 @@ The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
128 .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
129 .Xr chroot 2 ,
130 .Xr hosts_access 5 ,
131-.Xr login.conf 5 ,
132 .Xr moduli 5 ,
133 .Xr sshd_config 5 ,
134 .Xr inetd 8 ,
135diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
136index 5f316481..603c2ba7 100644
137--- a/sshd_config.5
138+++ b/sshd_config.5
139@@ -372,8 +372,7 @@ then no banner is displayed.
140 By default, no banner is displayed.
141 .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
142 Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
143-PAM or through authentication styles supported in
144-.Xr login.conf 5 )
145+PAM).
146 The default is
147 .Cm yes .
148 .It Cm ChrootDirectory
diff --git a/debian/patches/package-versioning.patch b/debian/patches/package-versioning.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..566761b3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/package-versioning.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
1From 24262015f741a40c9374b15d24c23b8e98b7b7ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:05 +0000
4Subject: Include the Debian version in our identification
5
6This makes it easier to audit networks for versions patched against security
7vulnerabilities. It has little detrimental effect, as attackers will
8generally just try attacks rather than bothering to scan for
9vulnerable-looking version strings. (However, see debian-banner.patch.)
10
11Forwarded: not-needed
12Last-Update: 2013-09-14
13
14Patch-Name: package-versioning.patch
15---
16 sshconnect.c | 4 ++--
17 sshd.c | 2 +-
18 version.h | 7 ++++++-
19 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
20
21diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
22index 881b0886..d9ed5910 100644
23--- a/sshconnect.c
24+++ b/sshconnect.c
25@@ -526,10 +526,10 @@ send_client_banner(int connection_out, int minor1)
26 /* Send our own protocol version identification. */
27 if (compat20) {
28 xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\r\n",
29- PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION);
30+ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE);
31 } else {
32 xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n",
33- PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, minor1, SSH_VERSION);
34+ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, minor1, SSH_RELEASE);
35 }
36 if (atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, client_version_string,
37 strlen(client_version_string)) != strlen(client_version_string))
38diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
39index 9221632e..602f4740 100644
40--- a/sshd.c
41+++ b/sshd.c
42@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int sock_in, int sock_out)
43 char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */
44
45 xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n",
46- PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION,
47+ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE,
48 *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
49 options.version_addendum);
50
51diff --git a/version.h b/version.h
52index c86e2097..f4d8b13a 100644
53--- a/version.h
54+++ b/version.h
55@@ -3,4 +3,9 @@
56 #define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_7.5"
57
58 #define SSH_PORTABLE "p1"
59-#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
60+#define SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
61+#ifdef SSH_EXTRAVERSION
62+#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM " " SSH_EXTRAVERSION
63+#else
64+#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM
65+#endif
diff --git a/debian/patches/quieter-signals.patch b/debian/patches/quieter-signals.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..55dd37fb9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/quieter-signals.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
1From 980646a9f7f03b43b678272b2a56e30906c6ddec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Peter Samuelson <peter@p12n.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:55 +0000
4Subject: Reduce severity of "Killed by signal %d"
5
6This produces irritating messages when using ProxyCommand or other programs
7that use ssh under the covers (e.g. Subversion). These messages are more
8normally printed by the calling program, such as the shell.
9
10According to the upstream bug, the right way to avoid this is to use the -q
11option, so we may drop this patch after further investigation into whether
12any software in Debian is still relying on it.
13
14Author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
15Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1118
16Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/313371
17Last-Update: 2013-09-14
18
19Patch-Name: quieter-signals.patch
20---
21 clientloop.c | 6 ++++--
22 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
23
24diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
25index 38b0330e..06845280 100644
26--- a/clientloop.c
27+++ b/clientloop.c
28@@ -1755,8 +1755,10 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id)
29 exit_status = 0;
30 }
31
32- if (received_signal)
33- fatal("Killed by signal %d.", (int) received_signal);
34+ if (received_signal) {
35+ debug("Killed by signal %d.", (int) received_signal);
36+ cleanup_exit((int) received_signal + 128);
37+ }
38
39 /*
40 * In interactive mode (with pseudo tty) display a message indicating
diff --git a/debian/patches/regress-integrity-robust.patch b/debian/patches/regress-integrity-robust.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fe8a321c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/regress-integrity-robust.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
1From 11f55875afff41aa1f1732ff138c9f76dc2a0afa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 1 Jan 2017 15:21:10 +0000
4Subject: Make integrity tests more robust against timeouts
5
6If the first test in a series for a given MAC happens to modify the low
7bytes of a packet length, then ssh will time out and this will be
8interpreted as a test failure. Handle this failure mode.
9
10Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2658
11Patch-Name: regress-integrity-robust.patch
12
13Last-Update: 2017-01-01
14---
15 regress/integrity.sh | 6 ++++--
16 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
17
18diff --git a/regress/integrity.sh b/regress/integrity.sh
19index 1df2924f..ed378337 100644
20--- a/regress/integrity.sh
21+++ b/regress/integrity.sh
22@@ -60,14 +60,16 @@ for m in $macs; do
23 Corrupted?MAC* | *message?authentication?code?incorrect*)
24 emac=`expr $emac + 1`; skip=0;;
25 padding*) epad=`expr $epad + 1`; skip=0;;
26+ *Timeout,?server*)
27+ etmo=`expr $etmo + 1`; skip=0;;
28 *) fail "unexpected error mac $m at $off: $out";;
29 esac
30 done
31- verbose "test $tid: $ecnt errors: mac $emac padding $epad length $elen"
32+ verbose "test $tid: $ecnt errors: mac $emac padding $epad length $elen timeout $etmo"
33 if [ $emac -eq 0 ]; then
34 fail "$m: no mac errors"
35 fi
36- expect=`expr $ecnt - $epad - $elen`
37+ expect=`expr $ecnt - $epad - $elen - $etmo`
38 if [ $emac -ne $expect ]; then
39 fail "$m: expected $expect mac errors, got $emac"
40 fi
diff --git a/debian/patches/restore-authorized_keys2.patch b/debian/patches/restore-authorized_keys2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8ef01fe57
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/restore-authorized_keys2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
1From 91dbdb5e4e0a34acdf8dbc79ef70c7f3942d4a95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 5 Mar 2017 02:02:11 +0000
4Subject: Restore reading authorized_keys2 by default
5
6Upstream seems to intend to gradually phase this out, so don't assume
7that this will remain the default forever. However, we were late in
8adopting the upstream sshd_config changes, so it makes sense to extend
9the grace period.
10
11Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/852320
12Forwarded: not-needed
13Last-Update: 2017-03-05
14
15Patch-Name: restore-authorized_keys2.patch
16---
17 sshd_config | 5 ++---
18 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
19
20diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
21index 92822959..a32dc1d4 100644
22--- a/sshd_config
23+++ b/sshd_config
24@@ -36,9 +36,8 @@
25
26 #PubkeyAuthentication yes
27
28-# The default is to check both .ssh/authorized_keys and .ssh/authorized_keys2
29-# but this is overridden so installations will only check .ssh/authorized_keys
30-AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
31+# Expect .ssh/authorized_keys2 to be disregarded by default in future.
32+#AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2
33
34 #AuthorizedPrincipalsFile none
35
diff --git a/debian/patches/restore-tcp-wrappers.patch b/debian/patches/restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..67711c5f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
1From 9d91ede3c03c99b6584038aa07d095d7c277ad3a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Tue, 7 Oct 2014 13:22:41 +0100
4Subject: Restore TCP wrappers support
5
6Support for TCP wrappers was dropped in OpenSSH 6.7. See this message
7and thread:
8
9 https://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/2014-April/032497.html
10
11It is true that this reduces preauth attack surface in sshd. On the
12other hand, this support seems to be quite widely used, and abruptly
13dropping it (from the perspective of users who don't read
14openssh-unix-dev) could easily cause more serious problems in practice.
15
16It's not entirely clear what the right long-term answer for Debian is,
17but it at least probably doesn't involve dropping this feature shortly
18before a freeze.
19
20Forwarded: not-needed
21Last-Update: 2014-10-07
22
23Patch-Name: restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
24---
25 configure.ac | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
26 sshd.8 | 7 +++++++
27 sshd.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
28 3 files changed, 89 insertions(+)
29
30diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
31index ead34acf..a92425db 100644
32--- a/configure.ac
33+++ b/configure.ac
34@@ -1494,6 +1494,62 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([skey],
35 ]
36 )
37
38+# Check whether user wants TCP wrappers support
39+TCPW_MSG="no"
40+AC_ARG_WITH([tcp-wrappers],
41+ [ --with-tcp-wrappers[[=PATH]] Enable tcpwrappers support (optionally in PATH)],
42+ [
43+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
44+ saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
45+ saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
46+ saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
47+ if test -n "${withval}" && \
48+ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
49+ if test -d "${withval}/lib"; then
50+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
51+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
52+ else
53+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
54+ fi
55+ else
56+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
57+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
58+ else
59+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
60+ fi
61+ fi
62+ if test -d "${withval}/include"; then
63+ CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
64+ else
65+ CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
66+ fi
67+ fi
68+ LIBS="-lwrap $LIBS"
69+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libwrap])
70+ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
71+#include <sys/types.h>
72+#include <sys/socket.h>
73+#include <netinet/in.h>
74+#include <tcpd.h>
75+int deny_severity = 0, allow_severity = 0;
76+ ]], [[
77+ hosts_access(0);
78+ ]])], [
79+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
80+ AC_DEFINE([LIBWRAP], [1],
81+ [Define if you want
82+ TCP Wrappers support])
83+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lwrap"
84+ TCPW_MSG="yes"
85+ ], [
86+ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libwrap missing])
87+
88+ ])
89+ LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
90+ fi
91+ ]
92+)
93+
94 # Check whether user wants to use ldns
95 LDNS_MSG="no"
96 AC_ARG_WITH(ldns,
97@@ -5117,6 +5173,7 @@ echo " KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG"
98 echo " SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
99 echo " Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG"
100 echo " S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"
101+echo " TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG"
102 echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
103 echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
104 echo " libldns support: $LDNS_MSG"
105diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
106index 7725a692..989dd4bf 100644
107--- a/sshd.8
108+++ b/sshd.8
109@@ -825,6 +825,12 @@ the user's home directory becomes accessible.
110 This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be
111 readable by anyone else.
112 .Pp
113+.It Pa /etc/hosts.allow
114+.It Pa /etc/hosts.deny
115+Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are defined here.
116+Further details are described in
117+.Xr hosts_access 5 .
118+.Pp
119 .It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
120 This file is for host-based authentication (see
121 .Xr ssh 1 ) .
122@@ -929,6 +935,7 @@ The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
123 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
124 .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
125 .Xr chroot 2 ,
126+.Xr hosts_access 5 ,
127 .Xr login.conf 5 ,
128 .Xr moduli 5 ,
129 .Xr sshd_config 5 ,
130diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
131index 20a7a5f3..38cf9b49 100644
132--- a/sshd.c
133+++ b/sshd.c
134@@ -127,6 +127,13 @@
135 #include <Security/AuthSession.h>
136 #endif
137
138+#ifdef LIBWRAP
139+#include <tcpd.h>
140+#include <syslog.h>
141+int allow_severity;
142+int deny_severity;
143+#endif /* LIBWRAP */
144+
145 /* Re-exec fds */
146 #define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
147 #define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
148@@ -1992,6 +1999,24 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
149 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
150 audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
151 #endif
152+#ifdef LIBWRAP
153+ allow_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_INFO;
154+ deny_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_WARNING;
155+ /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */
156+ if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
157+ struct request_info req;
158+
159+ request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0);
160+ fromhost(&req);
161+
162+ if (!hosts_access(&req)) {
163+ debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper");
164+ refuse(&req);
165+ /* NOTREACHED */
166+ fatal("libwrap refuse returns");
167+ }
168+ }
169+#endif /* LIBWRAP */
170
171 /* Log the connection. */
172 laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock_in);
diff --git a/debian/patches/s390-missing-header.patch b/debian/patches/s390-missing-header.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..be7c511b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/s390-missing-header.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
1From 735a04bf257744fc490581e9d5d7e607e4419579 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
3Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2017 12:43:02 +1100
4Subject: Missing header on Linux/s390
5
6Patch from Jakub Jelen
7
8Origin: https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=58b8cfa2a062b72139d7229ae8de567f55776f24
9Last-Update: 2017-04-02
10
11Patch-Name: s390-missing-header.patch
12---
13 sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 3 +++
14 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
15
16diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
17index 3a1aedce..08dc3a8b 100644
18--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
19+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
20@@ -50,6 +50,9 @@
21 #include <elf.h>
22
23 #include <asm/unistd.h>
24+#ifdef __s390__
25+#include <asm/zcrypt.h>
26+#endif
27
28 #include <errno.h>
29 #include <signal.h>
diff --git a/debian/patches/scp-quoting.patch b/debian/patches/scp-quoting.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f48709864
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/scp-quoting.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
1From 17d18d2f87eaa6c781356a78800ee17ccd12218b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: =?UTF-8?q?Nicolas=20Valc=C3=A1rcel?= <nvalcarcel@ubuntu.com>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:59 +0000
4Subject: Adjust scp quoting in verbose mode
5
6Tweak scp's reporting of filenames in verbose mode to be a bit less
7confusing with spaces.
8
9This should be revised to mimic real shell quoting.
10
11Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/89945
12Last-Update: 2010-02-27
13
14Patch-Name: scp-quoting.patch
15---
16 scp.c | 12 ++++++++++--
17 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
18
19diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
20index b4db8519..18c27720 100644
21--- a/scp.c
22+++ b/scp.c
23@@ -191,8 +191,16 @@ do_local_cmd(arglist *a)
24
25 if (verbose_mode) {
26 fprintf(stderr, "Executing:");
27- for (i = 0; i < a->num; i++)
28- fmprintf(stderr, " %s", a->list[i]);
29+ for (i = 0; i < a->num; i++) {
30+ if (i == 0)
31+ fmprintf(stderr, " %s", a->list[i]);
32+ else
33+ /*
34+ * TODO: misbehaves if a->list[i] contains a
35+ * single quote
36+ */
37+ fmprintf(stderr, " '%s'", a->list[i]);
38+ }
39 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
40 }
41 if ((pid = fork()) == -1)
diff --git a/debian/patches/seccomp-getuid-geteuid.patch b/debian/patches/seccomp-getuid-geteuid.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c829abaa9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/seccomp-getuid-geteuid.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
1From b2195f2116754f99fff8ceae026931be3aa3cd3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
3Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 13:31:05 -0300
4Subject: Allow getuid and geteuid calls
5
6getuid and geteuid are needed when using an openssl engine that calls a
7crypto card, e.g. ICA (libica).
8Those syscalls are also needed by the distros for audit code.
9
10Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
11
12Origin: other, https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2752
13Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2752
14Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1686618
15Last-Update: 2017-08-28
16
17Patch-Name: seccomp-getuid-geteuid.patch
18---
19 sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 12 ++++++++++++
20 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
21
22diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
23index 997b66ff..4cbaaa2e 100644
24--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
25+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
26@@ -175,6 +175,18 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
27 #ifdef __NR_getpid
28 SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid),
29 #endif
30+#ifdef __NR_getuid
31+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
32+#endif
33+#ifdef __NR_getuid32
34+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32),
35+#endif
36+#ifdef __NR_geteuid
37+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid),
38+#endif
39+#ifdef __NR_geteuid32
40+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
41+#endif
42 #ifdef __NR_getrandom
43 SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
44 #endif
diff --git a/debian/patches/seccomp-s390-flock-ipc.patch b/debian/patches/seccomp-s390-flock-ipc.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7b5ed1098
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/seccomp-s390-flock-ipc.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
1From 057d62d148428cf0411cf37d00feb8741e5a424c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
3Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 10:53:04 -0300
4Subject: Allow flock and ipc syscall for s390 architecture
5
6In order to use the OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11 engine it is needed to allow flock
7and ipc calls, because this engine calls OpenCryptoki (a PKCS#11
8implementation) which calls the libraries that will communicate with the
9crypto cards. OpenCryptoki makes use of flock and ipc and, as of now,
10this is only need on s390 architecture.
11
12Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
13
14Origin: other, https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2752
15Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2752
16Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1686618
17Last-Update: 2017-08-28
18
19Patch-Name: seccomp-s390-flock-ipc.patch
20---
21 sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 6 ++++++
22 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
23
24diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
25index 2831e9d1..997b66ff 100644
26--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
27+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
28@@ -166,6 +166,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
29 #ifdef __NR_exit_group
30 SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group),
31 #endif
32+#if defined(__NR_flock) && defined(__s390__)
33+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_flock),
34+#endif
35 #ifdef __NR_getpgid
36 SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpgid),
37 #endif
38@@ -178,6 +181,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
39 #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
40 SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday),
41 #endif
42+#if defined(__NR_ipc) && defined(__s390__)
43+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_ipc),
44+#endif
45 #ifdef __NR_madvise
46 SC_ALLOW(__NR_madvise),
47 #endif
diff --git a/debian/patches/seccomp-s390-ioctl-ep11-crypto.patch b/debian/patches/seccomp-s390-ioctl-ep11-crypto.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..83997695e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/seccomp-s390-ioctl-ep11-crypto.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
1From 375f99251da3754666750fe1ed63575ba909f397 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
3Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 13:33:30 -0300
4Subject: Enable specific ioctl call for EP11 crypto card (s390)
5
6The EP11 crypto card needs to make an ioctl call, which receives an
7specific argument. This crypto card is for s390 only.
8
9Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
10
11Origin: other, https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2752
12Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2752
13Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1686618
14Last-Update: 2017-08-28
15
16Patch-Name: seccomp-s390-ioctl-ep11-crypto.patch
17---
18 sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 2 ++
19 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
20
21diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
22index 4cbaaa2e..3833424b 100644
23--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
24+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
25@@ -249,6 +249,8 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
26 SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK),
27 SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO),
28 SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT),
29+ /* Allow ioctls for EP11 crypto card on s390 */
30+ SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSENDEP11CPRB),
31 #endif
32 #if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__) && defined(__X32_SYSCALL_BIT)
33 /*
diff --git a/debian/patches/selinux-role.patch b/debian/patches/selinux-role.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ae83d23b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/selinux-role.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,473 @@
1From e5d3ea2ca423a54b1d53d45252cb7173a15600eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Manoj Srivastava <srivasta@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:49 +0000
4Subject: Handle SELinux authorisation roles
5
6Rejected upstream due to discomfort with magic usernames; a better approach
7will need an SSH protocol change. In the meantime, this came from Debian's
8SELinux maintainer, so we'll keep it until we have something better.
9
10Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1641
11Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/394795
12Last-Update: 2015-08-19
13
14Patch-Name: selinux-role.patch
15---
16 auth.h | 1 +
17 auth2.c | 10 ++++++++--
18 monitor.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
19 monitor.h | 2 ++
20 monitor_wrap.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++--
21 monitor_wrap.h | 3 ++-
22 openbsd-compat/port-linux.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++-------
23 openbsd-compat/port-linux.h | 4 ++--
24 platform.c | 4 ++--
25 platform.h | 2 +-
26 session.c | 10 +++++-----
27 session.h | 2 +-
28 sshd.c | 2 +-
29 sshpty.c | 4 ++--
30 sshpty.h | 2 +-
31 15 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
32
33diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
34index 338a62da..8c658d16 100644
35--- a/auth.h
36+++ b/auth.h
37@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
38 char *service;
39 struct passwd *pw; /* set if 'valid' */
40 char *style;
41+ char *role;
42 void *kbdintctxt;
43 char *info; /* Extra info for next auth_log */
44 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
45diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
46index 946e9235..2f51be23 100644
47--- a/auth2.c
48+++ b/auth2.c
49@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
50 struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
51 Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
52 Authmethod *m = NULL;
53- char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL;
54+ char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL, *role = NULL;
55 int authenticated = 0;
56
57 if (authctxt == NULL)
58@@ -229,8 +229,13 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
59 debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
60 debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
61
62+ if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
63+ *role++ = 0;
64+
65 if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
66 *style++ = 0;
67+ else if (role && (style = strchr(role, ':')) != NULL)
68+ *style++ = '\0';
69
70 if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) {
71 /* setup auth context */
72@@ -257,8 +262,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
73 use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
74 authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
75 authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
76+ authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
77 if (use_privsep)
78- mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
79+ mm_inform_authserv(service, style, role);
80 userauth_banner();
81 if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
82 packet_disconnect("no authentication methods enabled");
83diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
84index 506645c7..7452e20e 100644
85--- a/monitor.c
86+++ b/monitor.c
87@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
88 int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
89 int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
90 int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
91+int mm_answer_authrole(int, Buffer *);
92 int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
93 int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
94 int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
95@@ -204,6 +205,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
96 {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
97 {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
98 {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
99+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole},
100 {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
101 {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
102 #ifdef USE_PAM
103@@ -791,6 +793,7 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
104
105 /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
106 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
107+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1);
108 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
109
110 #ifdef USE_PAM
111@@ -821,14 +824,37 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
112
113 authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
114 authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
115- debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
116- __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
117+ authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
118+ debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s, role=%s",
119+ __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style, authctxt->role);
120
121 if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
122 free(authctxt->style);
123 authctxt->style = NULL;
124 }
125
126+ if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
127+ free(authctxt->role);
128+ authctxt->role = NULL;
129+ }
130+
131+ return (0);
132+}
133+
134+int
135+mm_answer_authrole(int sock, Buffer *m)
136+{
137+ monitor_permit_authentications(1);
138+
139+ authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
140+ debug3("%s: role=%s",
141+ __func__, authctxt->role);
142+
143+ if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
144+ free(authctxt->role);
145+ authctxt->role = NULL;
146+ }
147+
148 return (0);
149 }
150
151@@ -1463,7 +1489,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
152 res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
153 if (res == 0)
154 goto error;
155- pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
156+ pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty, authctxt->role);
157
158 buffer_put_int(m, 1);
159 buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
160diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
161index ec41404c..4c7955d7 100644
162--- a/monitor.h
163+++ b/monitor.h
164@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
165 MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151,
166 MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153,
167
168+ MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 154,
169+
170 };
171
172 struct monitor {
173diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
174index d5cb640a..2ff8064a 100644
175--- a/monitor_wrap.c
176+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
177@@ -327,10 +327,10 @@ mm_auth2_read_banner(void)
178 return (banner);
179 }
180
181-/* Inform the privileged process about service and style */
182+/* Inform the privileged process about service, style, and role */
183
184 void
185-mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
186+mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style, char *role)
187 {
188 Buffer m;
189
190@@ -339,12 +339,30 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
191 buffer_init(&m);
192 buffer_put_cstring(&m, service);
193 buffer_put_cstring(&m, style ? style : "");
194+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : "");
195
196 mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, &m);
197
198 buffer_free(&m);
199 }
200
201+/* Inform the privileged process about role */
202+
203+void
204+mm_inform_authrole(char *role)
205+{
206+ Buffer m;
207+
208+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
209+
210+ buffer_init(&m);
211+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : "");
212+
213+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, &m);
214+
215+ buffer_free(&m);
216+}
217+
218 /* Do the password authentication */
219 int
220 mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password)
221diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
222index 8f9dd896..3e75867c 100644
223--- a/monitor_wrap.h
224+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
225@@ -41,7 +41,8 @@ void mm_log_handler(LogLevel, const char *, void *);
226 int mm_is_monitor(void);
227 DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
228 int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int, const char *);
229-void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
230+void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *, char *);
231+void mm_inform_authrole(char *);
232 struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *);
233 char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
234 int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *);
235diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
236index e4c5d1b7..e26faf08 100644
237--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
238+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
239@@ -27,6 +27,12 @@
240 #include <string.h>
241 #include <stdio.h>
242
243+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
244+#include "key.h"
245+#include "hostfile.h"
246+#include "auth.h"
247+#endif
248+
249 #include "log.h"
250 #include "xmalloc.h"
251 #include "port-linux.h"
252@@ -56,7 +62,7 @@ ssh_selinux_enabled(void)
253
254 /* Return the default security context for the given username */
255 static security_context_t
256-ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
257+ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, const char *role)
258 {
259 security_context_t sc = NULL;
260 char *sename = NULL, *lvl = NULL;
261@@ -71,9 +77,16 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
262 #endif
263
264 #ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
265- r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
266+ if (role != NULL && role[0])
267+ r = get_default_context_with_rolelevel(sename, role, lvl, NULL,
268+ &sc);
269+ else
270+ r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
271 #else
272- r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
273+ if (role != NULL && role[0])
274+ r = get_default_context_with_role(sename, role, NULL, &sc);
275+ else
276+ r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
277 #endif
278
279 if (r != 0) {
280@@ -103,7 +116,7 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
281
282 /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
283 void
284-ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
285+ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname, const char *role)
286 {
287 security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
288
289@@ -112,7 +125,7 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
290
291 debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
292
293- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
294+ user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, role);
295 if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
296 switch (security_getenforce()) {
297 case -1:
298@@ -134,7 +147,7 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
299
300 /* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
301 void
302-ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
303+ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty, const char *role)
304 {
305 security_context_t new_tty_ctx = NULL;
306 security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
307@@ -145,7 +158,7 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
308
309 debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
310
311- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
312+ user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, role);
313
314 /* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
315
316diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
317index 3c22a854..c8812942 100644
318--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
319+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
320@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@
321
322 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
323 int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
324-void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
325-void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
326+void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *, const char *);
327+void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *, const char *);
328 void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
329 void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
330 #endif
331diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
332index 973a63e4..cd7bf566 100644
333--- a/platform.c
334+++ b/platform.c
335@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
336 * called if sshd is running as root.
337 */
338 void
339-platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
340+platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw, const char *role)
341 {
342 #if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(USE_PAM)
343 /*
344@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
345 }
346 #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
347 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
348- ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
349+ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name, role);
350 #endif
351 }
352
353diff --git a/platform.h b/platform.h
354index ea4f9c58..60d72ffe 100644
355--- a/platform.h
356+++ b/platform.h
357@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ void platform_post_fork_parent(pid_t child_pid);
358 void platform_post_fork_child(void);
359 int platform_privileged_uidswap(void);
360 void platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
361-void platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *);
362+void platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *, const char *);
363 char *platform_get_krb5_client(const char *);
364 char *platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *);
365 int platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t);
366diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
367index a08aa69d..ea3871eb 100644
368--- a/session.c
369+++ b/session.c
370@@ -1325,7 +1325,7 @@ safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid)
371
372 /* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */
373 void
374-do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
375+do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw, const char *role)
376 {
377 char *chroot_path, *tmp;
378
379@@ -1353,7 +1353,7 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
380 endgrent();
381 #endif
382
383- platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw);
384+ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw, role);
385
386 if (!in_chroot && options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
387 strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
388@@ -1489,7 +1489,7 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
389
390 /* Force a password change */
391 if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
392- do_setusercontext(pw);
393+ do_setusercontext(pw, s->authctxt->role);
394 child_close_fds();
395 do_pwchange(s);
396 exit(1);
397@@ -1511,7 +1511,7 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
398 /* When PAM is enabled we rely on it to do the nologin check */
399 if (!options.use_pam)
400 do_nologin(pw);
401- do_setusercontext(pw);
402+ do_setusercontext(pw, s->authctxt->role);
403 /*
404 * PAM session modules in do_setusercontext may have
405 * generated messages, so if this in an interactive
406@@ -1903,7 +1903,7 @@ session_pty_req(Session *s)
407 tty_parse_modes(s->ttyfd, &n_bytes);
408
409 if (!use_privsep)
410- pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty);
411+ pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty, s->authctxt->role);
412
413 /* Set window size from the packet. */
414 pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
415diff --git a/session.h b/session.h
416index 98e1dafe..0a31dce4 100644
417--- a/session.h
418+++ b/session.h
419@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *);
420 Session *session_new(void);
421 Session *session_by_tty(char *);
422 void session_close(Session *);
423-void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
424+void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *, const char *);
425 void child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
426 const char *value);
427
428diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
429index 38cf9b49..9221632e 100644
430--- a/sshd.c
431+++ b/sshd.c
432@@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
433 reseed_prngs();
434
435 /* Drop privileges */
436- do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
437+ do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw, authctxt->role);
438
439 skip:
440 /* It is safe now to apply the key state */
441diff --git a/sshpty.c b/sshpty.c
442index fe2fb5aa..feb22b06 100644
443--- a/sshpty.c
444+++ b/sshpty.c
445@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ pty_change_window_size(int ptyfd, u_int row, u_int col,
446 }
447
448 void
449-pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty)
450+pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty, const char *role)
451 {
452 struct group *grp;
453 gid_t gid;
454@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty)
455 strerror(errno));
456
457 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
458- ssh_selinux_setup_pty(pw->pw_name, tty);
459+ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(pw->pw_name, tty, role);
460 #endif
461
462 if (st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid || st.st_gid != gid) {
463diff --git a/sshpty.h b/sshpty.h
464index 9ec7e9a1..de7e000a 100644
465--- a/sshpty.h
466+++ b/sshpty.h
467@@ -24,5 +24,5 @@ int pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
468 void pty_release(const char *);
469 void pty_make_controlling_tty(int *, const char *);
470 void pty_change_window_size(int, u_int, u_int, u_int, u_int);
471-void pty_setowner(struct passwd *, const char *);
472+void pty_setowner(struct passwd *, const char *, const char *);
473 void disconnect_controlling_tty(void);
diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c9d79be6a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/series
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
1gssapi.patch
2restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
3selinux-role.patch
4ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch
5keepalive-extensions.patch
6syslog-level-silent.patch
7quieter-signals.patch
8user-group-modes.patch
9scp-quoting.patch
10shell-path.patch
11dnssec-sshfp.patch
12auth-log-verbosity.patch
13mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch
14package-versioning.patch
15debian-banner.patch
16authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
17openbsd-docs.patch
18ssh-argv0.patch
19doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
20ssh-agent-setgid.patch
21no-openssl-version-status.patch
22gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
23systemd-readiness.patch
24debian-config.patch
25regress-integrity-robust.patch
26no-dsa-host-key-by-default.patch
27restore-authorized_keys2.patch
28s390-missing-header.patch
29x32-syntax-error.patch
30fix-incoming-compression-statistics.patch
31seccomp-s390-flock-ipc.patch
32seccomp-getuid-geteuid.patch
33seccomp-s390-ioctl-ep11-crypto.patch
diff --git a/debian/patches/shell-path.patch b/debian/patches/shell-path.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1fecd756e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/shell-path.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
1From ce9a126fdaa8ef6488364107cc66d04ecabc8cc4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:00 +0000
4Subject: Look for $SHELL on the path for ProxyCommand/LocalCommand
5
6There's some debate on the upstream bug about whether POSIX requires this.
7I (Colin Watson) agree with Vincent and think it does.
8
9Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1494
10Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/492728
11Last-Update: 2013-09-14
12
13Patch-Name: shell-path.patch
14---
15 sshconnect.c | 4 ++--
16 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
17
18diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
19index 948b638a..7f169a8f 100644
20--- a/sshconnect.c
21+++ b/sshconnect.c
22@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command)
23 /* Execute the proxy command. Note that we gave up any
24 extra privileges above. */
25 signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
26- execv(argv[0], argv);
27+ execvp(argv[0], argv);
28 perror(argv[0]);
29 exit(1);
30 }
31@@ -1498,7 +1498,7 @@ ssh_local_cmd(const char *args)
32 if (pid == 0) {
33 signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
34 debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args);
35- execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
36+ execlp(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
37 error("Couldn't execute %s -c \"%s\": %s",
38 shell, args, strerror(errno));
39 _exit(1);
diff --git a/debian/patches/ssh-agent-setgid.patch b/debian/patches/ssh-agent-setgid.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..188869fe2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/ssh-agent-setgid.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
1From 8c1482336efd745a72cbd27ac07977ccb6d8b35b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:13 +0000
4Subject: Document consequences of ssh-agent being setgid in ssh-agent(1)
5
6Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/711623
7Forwarded: no
8Last-Update: 2013-06-08
9
10Patch-Name: ssh-agent-setgid.patch
11---
12 ssh-agent.1 | 15 +++++++++++++++
13 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
14
15diff --git a/ssh-agent.1 b/ssh-agent.1
16index 83b2b41c..7230704a 100644
17--- a/ssh-agent.1
18+++ b/ssh-agent.1
19@@ -206,6 +206,21 @@ environment variable holds the agent's process ID.
20 .Pp
21 The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command
22 line terminates.
23+.Pp
24+In Debian,
25+.Nm
26+is installed with the set-group-id bit set, to prevent
27+.Xr ptrace 2
28+attacks retrieving private key material.
29+This has the side-effect of causing the run-time linker to remove certain
30+environment variables which might have security implications for set-id
31+programs, including
32+.Ev LD_PRELOAD ,
33+.Ev LD_LIBRARY_PATH ,
34+and
35+.Ev TMPDIR .
36+If you need to set any of these environment variables, you will need to do
37+so in the program executed by ssh-agent.
38 .Sh FILES
39 .Bl -tag -width Ds
40 .It Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.<ppid>
diff --git a/debian/patches/ssh-argv0.patch b/debian/patches/ssh-argv0.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f07a061a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/ssh-argv0.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
1From 5be45fb4b0459bbff7b4b5a67c2f754c601155df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:10 +0000
4Subject: ssh(1): Refer to ssh-argv0(1)
5
6Old versions of OpenSSH (up to 2.5 or thereabouts) allowed creating symlinks
7to ssh with the name of the host you want to connect to. Debian ships an
8ssh-argv0 script restoring this feature; this patch refers to its manual
9page from ssh(1).
10
11Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/111341
12Forwarded: not-needed
13Last-Update: 2013-09-14
14
15Patch-Name: ssh-argv0.patch
16---
17 ssh.1 | 1 +
18 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
19
20diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
21index b1f128c2..22e56a7b 100644
22--- a/ssh.1
23+++ b/ssh.1
24@@ -1586,6 +1586,7 @@ if an error occurred.
25 .Xr sftp 1 ,
26 .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
27 .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
28+.Xr ssh-argv0 1 ,
29 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
30 .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
31 .Xr tun 4 ,
diff --git a/debian/patches/ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch b/debian/patches/ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d8f4ec973
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
1From fb7c3c37876359b7a110e1386a6b7887cd2c8ca2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@ubuntu.com>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:50 +0000
4Subject: Accept obsolete ssh-vulnkey configuration options
5
6These options were used as part of Debian's response to CVE-2008-0166.
7Nearly six years later, we no longer need to continue carrying the bulk
8of that patch, but we do need to avoid failing when the associated
9configuration options are still present.
10
11Last-Update: 2014-02-09
12
13Patch-Name: ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch
14---
15 readconf.c | 1 +
16 servconf.c | 1 +
17 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
18
19diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
20index 00d9cc30..32a72957 100644
21--- a/readconf.c
22+++ b/readconf.c
23@@ -186,6 +186,7 @@ static struct {
24 { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
25 { "globalknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated },
26 { "rhostsauthentication", oDeprecated },
27+ { "useblacklistedkeys", oDeprecated },
28 { "userknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated },
29 { "useroaming", oDeprecated },
30 { "usersh", oDeprecated },
31diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
32index d796b7c8..ca73f7c5 100644
33--- a/servconf.c
34+++ b/servconf.c
35@@ -521,6 +521,7 @@ static struct {
36 { "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
37 { "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
38 { "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
39+ { "permitblacklistedkeys", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
40 { "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd, SSHCFG_ALL },
41 { "permituserenvironment", sPermitUserEnvironment, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
42 { "uselogin", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
diff --git a/debian/patches/syslog-level-silent.patch b/debian/patches/syslog-level-silent.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3f012c99c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/syslog-level-silent.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
1From b5695a565e466477305d2ae0059b09e94ae6f44e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Jonathan David Amery <jdamery@ysolde.ucam.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:54 +0000
4Subject: "LogLevel SILENT" compatibility
5
6"LogLevel SILENT" (-qq) was introduced in Debian openssh 1:3.0.1p1-1 to
7match the behaviour of non-free SSH, in which -q does not suppress fatal
8errors. However, this was unintentionally broken in 1:4.6p1-2 and nobody
9complained, so we've dropped most of it. The parts that remain are basic
10configuration file compatibility, and an adjustment to "Pseudo-terminal will
11not be allocated ..." which should be split out into a separate patch.
12
13Author: Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>
14Author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
15Last-Update: 2013-09-14
16
17Patch-Name: syslog-level-silent.patch
18---
19 log.c | 1 +
20 ssh.c | 2 +-
21 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
22
23diff --git a/log.c b/log.c
24index d0f86cf6..0e515e26 100644
25--- a/log.c
26+++ b/log.c
27@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ static struct {
28 LogLevel val;
29 } log_levels[] =
30 {
31+ { "SILENT", SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET }, /* compatibility */
32 { "QUIET", SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET },
33 { "FATAL", SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL },
34 { "ERROR", SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR },
35diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
36index 32b27bbc..b65f35ac 100644
37--- a/ssh.c
38+++ b/ssh.c
39@@ -1167,7 +1167,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
40 /* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */
41 if ((!isatty(fileno(stdin)) || stdin_null_flag) &&
42 options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_FORCE) {
43- if (tty_flag)
44+ if (tty_flag && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
45 logit("Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because "
46 "stdin is not a terminal.");
47 tty_flag = 0;
diff --git a/debian/patches/systemd-readiness.patch b/debian/patches/systemd-readiness.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bddc781f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/systemd-readiness.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
1From 49ea641997b0dce73df3271f10a875cb702729b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Michael Biebl <biebl@debian.org>
3Date: Mon, 21 Dec 2015 16:08:47 +0000
4Subject: Add systemd readiness notification support
5
6Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/778913
7Forwarded: no
8Last-Update: 2017-08-22
9
10Patch-Name: systemd-readiness.patch
11---
12 configure.ac | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
13 sshd.c | 9 +++++++++
14 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+)
15
16diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
17index a92425db..9d89bc35 100644
18--- a/configure.ac
19+++ b/configure.ac
20@@ -4376,6 +4376,29 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
21 AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
22 AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
23
24+# Check whether user wants systemd support
25+SYSTEMD_MSG="no"
26+AC_ARG_WITH(systemd,
27+ [ --with-systemd Enable systemd support],
28+ [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
29+ AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
30+ if test "$PKGCONFIG" != "no"; then
31+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libsystemd])
32+ if $PKGCONFIG --exists libsystemd; then
33+ SYSTEMD_CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags libsystemd`
34+ SYSTEMD_LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libsystemd`
35+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $SYSTEMD_CFLAGS"
36+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $SYSTEMD_LIBS"
37+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
38+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYSTEMD, 1, [Define if you want systemd support.])
39+ SYSTEMD_MSG="yes"
40+ else
41+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
42+ fi
43+ fi
44+ fi ]
45+)
46+
47 # Looking for programs, paths and files
48
49 PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
50@@ -5180,6 +5203,7 @@ echo " libldns support: $LDNS_MSG"
51 echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
52 echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
53 echo " Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
54+echo " systemd support: $SYSTEMD_MSG"
55 echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
56 echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
57 echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
58diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
59index f2f54b51..44772c6d 100644
60--- a/sshd.c
61+++ b/sshd.c
62@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@
63 #include <prot.h>
64 #endif
65
66+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
67+#include <systemd/sd-daemon.h>
68+#endif
69+
70 #include "xmalloc.h"
71 #include "ssh.h"
72 #include "ssh2.h"
73@@ -1892,6 +1896,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
74 }
75 }
76
77+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
78+ /* Signal systemd that we are ready to accept connections */
79+ sd_notify(0, "READY=1");
80+#endif
81+
82 /* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
83 server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
84 &newsock, config_s);
diff --git a/debian/patches/user-group-modes.patch b/debian/patches/user-group-modes.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..17e7126ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/user-group-modes.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
1From 0b9c0482cbff9ce16384e4247d955676d4d77df3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:58 +0000
4Subject: Allow harmless group-writability
5
6Allow secure files (~/.ssh/config, ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, etc.) to be
7group-writable, provided that the group in question contains only the file's
8owner. Rejected upstream for IMO incorrect reasons (e.g. a misunderstanding
9about the contents of gr->gr_mem). Given that per-user groups and umask 002
10are the default setup in Debian (for good reasons - this makes operating in
11setgid directories with other groups much easier), we need to permit this by
12default.
13
14Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1060
15Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=314347
16Last-Update: 2013-09-14
17
18Patch-Name: user-group-modes.patch
19---
20 auth-rhosts.c | 6 ++----
21 auth.c | 9 +++-----
22 misc.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
23 misc.h | 2 ++
24 platform.c | 16 --------------
25 readconf.c | 3 +--
26 ssh.1 | 2 ++
27 ssh_config.5 | 2 ++
28 8 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
29
30diff --git a/auth-rhosts.c b/auth-rhosts.c
31index ecf956f0..4dccd5e6 100644
32--- a/auth-rhosts.c
33+++ b/auth-rhosts.c
34@@ -261,8 +261,7 @@ auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
35 return 0;
36 }
37 if (options.strict_modes &&
38- ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
39- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
40+ !secure_permissions(&st, pw->pw_uid)) {
41 logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
42 "bad ownership or modes for home directory.", pw->pw_name);
43 auth_debug_add("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
44@@ -288,8 +287,7 @@ auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
45 * allowing access to their account by anyone.
46 */
47 if (options.strict_modes &&
48- ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
49- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
50+ !secure_permissions(&st, pw->pw_uid)) {
51 logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: bad modes for %.200s",
52 pw->pw_name, buf);
53 auth_debug_add("Bad file modes for %.200s", buf);
54diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
55index c6390687..90390724 100644
56--- a/auth.c
57+++ b/auth.c
58@@ -444,8 +444,7 @@ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
59 user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
60 if (options.strict_modes &&
61 (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
62- ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
63- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
64+ !secure_permissions(&st, pw->pw_uid)) {
65 logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
66 "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
67 pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
68@@ -507,8 +506,7 @@ auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
69 snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf);
70 return -1;
71 }
72- if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) ||
73- (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) {
74+ if (!secure_permissions(stp, uid)) {
75 snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
76 buf);
77 return -1;
78@@ -523,8 +521,7 @@ auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
79 strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
80
81 if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
82- (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) ||
83- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
84+ !secure_permissions(&st, uid)) {
85 snprintf(err, errlen,
86 "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
87 return -1;
88diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
89index cfd32729..6e972f56 100644
90--- a/misc.c
91+++ b/misc.c
92@@ -51,8 +51,9 @@
93 #include <netdb.h>
94 #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
95 # include <paths.h>
96-#include <pwd.h>
97 #endif
98+#include <pwd.h>
99+#include <grp.h>
100 #ifdef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD
101 #include <net/if.h>
102 #endif
103@@ -61,6 +62,7 @@
104 #include "misc.h"
105 #include "log.h"
106 #include "ssh.h"
107+#include "platform.h"
108
109 /* remove newline at end of string */
110 char *
111@@ -713,6 +715,71 @@ read_keyfile_line(FILE *f, const char *filename, char *buf, size_t bufsz,
112 return -1;
113 }
114
115+/*
116+ * return 1 if the specified uid is a uid that may own a system directory
117+ * otherwise 0.
118+ */
119+int
120+platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t uid)
121+{
122+ if (uid == 0)
123+ return 1;
124+#ifdef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID
125+ if (uid == PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID)
126+ return 1;
127+#endif
128+ return 0;
129+}
130+
131+int
132+secure_permissions(struct stat *st, uid_t uid)
133+{
134+ if (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st->st_uid) && st->st_uid != uid)
135+ return 0;
136+ if ((st->st_mode & 002) != 0)
137+ return 0;
138+ if ((st->st_mode & 020) != 0) {
139+ /* If the file is group-writable, the group in question must
140+ * have exactly one member, namely the file's owner.
141+ * (Zero-member groups are typically used by setgid
142+ * binaries, and are unlikely to be suitable.)
143+ */
144+ struct passwd *pw;
145+ struct group *gr;
146+ int members = 0;
147+
148+ gr = getgrgid(st->st_gid);
149+ if (!gr)
150+ return 0;
151+
152+ /* Check primary group memberships. */
153+ while ((pw = getpwent()) != NULL) {
154+ if (pw->pw_gid == gr->gr_gid) {
155+ ++members;
156+ if (pw->pw_uid != uid)
157+ return 0;
158+ }
159+ }
160+ endpwent();
161+
162+ pw = getpwuid(st->st_uid);
163+ if (!pw)
164+ return 0;
165+
166+ /* Check supplementary group memberships. */
167+ if (gr->gr_mem[0]) {
168+ ++members;
169+ if (strcmp(pw->pw_name, gr->gr_mem[0]) ||
170+ gr->gr_mem[1])
171+ return 0;
172+ }
173+
174+ if (!members)
175+ return 0;
176+ }
177+ return 1;
178+}
179+
180 int
181 tun_open(int tun, int mode)
182 {
183diff --git a/misc.h b/misc.h
184index c242f901..8b223b55 100644
185--- a/misc.h
186+++ b/misc.h
187@@ -143,6 +143,8 @@ char *read_passphrase(const char *, int);
188 int ask_permission(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
189 int read_keyfile_line(FILE *, const char *, char *, size_t, u_long *);
190
191+int secure_permissions(struct stat *st, uid_t uid);
192+
193 #define MINIMUM(a, b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b))
194 #define MAXIMUM(a, b) (((a) > (b)) ? (a) : (b))
195 #define ROUNDUP(x, y) ((((x)+((y)-1))/(y))*(y))
196diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
197index cd7bf566..380ee3a4 100644
198--- a/platform.c
199+++ b/platform.c
200@@ -197,19 +197,3 @@ platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *pw_name)
201 return NULL;
202 #endif
203 }
204-
205-/*
206- * return 1 if the specified uid is a uid that may own a system directory
207- * otherwise 0.
208- */
209-int
210-platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t uid)
211-{
212- if (uid == 0)
213- return 1;
214-#ifdef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID
215- if (uid == PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID)
216- return 1;
217-#endif
218- return 0;
219-}
220diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
221index 0b1370a8..70fac682 100644
222--- a/readconf.c
223+++ b/readconf.c
224@@ -1773,8 +1773,7 @@ read_config_file_depth(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw,
225
226 if (fstat(fileno(f), &sb) == -1)
227 fatal("fstat %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno));
228- if (((sb.st_uid != 0 && sb.st_uid != getuid()) ||
229- (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0))
230+ if (!secure_permissions(&sb, getuid()))
231 fatal("Bad owner or permissions on %s", filename);
232 }
233
234diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
235index 4011c65a..feef81a5 100644
236--- a/ssh.1
237+++ b/ssh.1
238@@ -1484,6 +1484,8 @@ The file format and configuration options are described in
239 .Xr ssh_config 5 .
240 Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
241 read/write for the user, and not writable by others.
242+It may be group-writable provided that the group in question contains only
243+the user.
244 .Pp
245 .It Pa ~/.ssh/environment
246 Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see
247diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
248index e4eaa5ae..a04e5757 100644
249--- a/ssh_config.5
250+++ b/ssh_config.5
251@@ -1827,6 +1827,8 @@ The format of this file is described above.
252 This file is used by the SSH client.
253 Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
254 read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
255+It may be group-writable provided that the group in question contains only
256+the user.
257 .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
258 Systemwide configuration file.
259 This file provides defaults for those
diff --git a/debian/patches/x32-syntax-error.patch b/debian/patches/x32-syntax-error.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c7b7a0a94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/x32-syntax-error.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
1From 4a6a0dd530022333dccf0e54a4c2827662b14109 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
3Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2017 08:47:55 +1100
4Subject: Fix syntax error on Linux/X32
5
6Patch from Mike Frysinger
7
8Origin: https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=6b853c6f8ba5eecc50f3b57af8e63f8184eb0fa6
9Last-Update: 2017-04-02
10
11Patch-Name: x32-syntax-error.patch
12---
13 sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 2 +-
14 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
15
16diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
17index 08dc3a8b..2831e9d1 100644
18--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
19+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
20@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
21 * x86-64 syscall under some circumstances, e.g.
22 * https://bugs.debian.org/849923
23 */
24- SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime & ~__X32_SYSCALL_BIT);
25+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime & ~__X32_SYSCALL_BIT),
26 #endif
27
28 /* Default deny */
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-06-29 07:22:58 +0000