31 files changed, 5931 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/debian/patches/auth-log-verbosity.patch b/debian/patches/auth-log-verbosity.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ba7642d83
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/auth-log-verbosity.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+From 50e9edb57b6808cbbf63fe3433febb103baac1e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:02 +0000
+Subject: Quieten logs when multiple from= restrictions are used
+Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/630606
+Forwarded: no
+Last-Update: 2017-10-04
+Patch-Name: auth-log-verbosity.patch
+---
+ auth-options.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ auth-options.h |  1 +
+ auth2-pubkey.c |  3 +++
+ 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+diff --git a/auth-options.c b/auth-options.c
+index bed00eef..ccdd0b20 100644
+--- a/auth-options.c
+++ b/auth-options.c
+@@ -59,10 +59,21 @@ int forced_tun_device = -1;
+ /* "principals=" option. */
+ char *authorized_principals = NULL;
+ 
+/* Throttle log messages. */
+int logged_from_hostip = 0;
+int logged_cert_hostip = 0;
+
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+ 
+ /* XXX refactor to be stateless */
+ 
+void
+auth_start_parse_options(void)
+{
+       logged_from_hostip = 0;
+       logged_cert_hostip = 0;
+}
+
+ void
+ auth_clear_options(void)
+ {
+@@ -322,10 +333,13 @@ auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, const char *file,
+                                /* FALLTHROUGH */
+                        case 0:
+                                free(patterns);
+-                               logit("Authentication tried for %.100s with "
+-                                   "correct key but not from a permitted "
+-                                   "host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s).",
+-                                   pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip);
+                               if (!logged_from_hostip) {
+                                       logit("Authentication tried for %.100s with "
+                                           "correct key but not from a permitted "
+                                           "host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s).",
+                                           pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip);
+                                       logged_from_hostip = 1;
+                               }
+                                auth_debug_add("Your host '%.200s' is not "
+                                    "permitted to use this key for login.",
+                                    remote_host);
+@@ -549,11 +563,14 @@ parse_option_list(struct sshbuf *oblob, struct passwd *pw,
+                                        break;
+                                case 0:
+                                        /* no match */
+-                                       logit("Authentication tried for %.100s "
+-                                           "with valid certificate but not "
+-                                           "from a permitted host "
+-                                           "(ip=%.200s).", pw->pw_name,
+-                                           remote_ip);
+                                       if (!logged_cert_hostip) {
+                                               logit("Authentication tried for %.100s "
+                                                   "with valid certificate but not "
+                                                   "from a permitted host "
+                                                   "(ip=%.200s).", pw->pw_name,
+                                                   remote_ip);
+                                               logged_cert_hostip = 1;
+                                       }
+                                        auth_debug_add("Your address '%.200s' "
+                                            "is not permitted to use this "
+                                            "certificate for login.",
+diff --git a/auth-options.h b/auth-options.h
+index 547f0163..4de0f14d 100644
+--- a/auth-options.h
+++ b/auth-options.h
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ extern int forced_tun_device;
+ extern int key_is_cert_authority;
+ extern char *authorized_principals;
+ 
+void   auth_start_parse_options(void);
+ int    auth_parse_options(struct passwd *, char *, const char *, u_long);
+ void   auth_clear_options(void);
+ int    auth_cert_options(struct sshkey *, struct passwd *, const char **);
+diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
+index 169839b0..43f880b6 100644
+--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
+@@ -269,6 +269,7 @@ process_principals(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
+        u_long linenum = 0;
+        u_int i, found_principal = 0;
+ 
+       auth_start_parse_options();
+        while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
+                /* Always consume entire input */
+                if (found_principal)
+@@ -471,6 +472,7 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, struct sshkey *key, struct passwd *pw)
+        u_long linenum = 0;
+        struct sshkey *found = NULL;
+ 
+       auth_start_parse_options();
+        while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
+                char *cp, *key_options = NULL, *fp = NULL;
+                const char *reason = NULL;
+@@ -624,6 +626,7 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key)
+        if (sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1,
+            use_authorized_principals ? NULL : pw->pw_name, &reason) != 0)
+                goto fail_reason;
+       auth_start_parse_options();
+        if (auth_cert_options(key, pw, &reason) != 0)
+                goto fail_reason;
+ 
diff --git a/debian/patches/authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch b/debian/patches/authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..56f6de37f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+From 312eb64a9faf4e8cdb95f2ae147ecbfa6c0efd83 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Pospisek <tpo_deb@sourcepole.ch>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:07 +0000
+Subject: Install authorized_keys(5) as a symlink to sshd(8)
+Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1720
+Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/441817
+Last-Update: 2013-09-14
+Patch-Name: authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
+---
+ Makefile.in | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
+index f6e9fe4c..08b989a4 100644
+--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
+@@ -340,6 +340,7 @@ install-files:
+        $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5
+        $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/ssh_config.5
+        $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8
+       ln -s ../$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/authorized_keys.5
+        $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
+        $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
+        $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
diff --git a/debian/patches/debian-banner.patch b/debian/patches/debian-banner.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8134afba4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/debian-banner.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+From ae96c03ce51af2c529bfa2f2de57f4fa938ea552 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kees Cook <kees@debian.org>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:06 +0000
+Subject: Add DebianBanner server configuration option
+Setting this to "no" causes sshd to omit the Debian revision from its
+initial protocol handshake, for those scared by package-versioning.patch.
+Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/562048
+Forwarded: not-needed
+Last-Update: 2017-10-04
+Patch-Name: debian-banner.patch
+---
+ servconf.c    | 9 +++++++++
+ servconf.h    | 2 ++
+ sshd.c        | 3 ++-
+ sshd_config.5 | 5 +++++
+ 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 9889fb0a..b0146405 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -167,6 +167,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+        options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
+        options->disable_forwarding = -1;
+        options->expose_userauth_info = -1;
+       options->debian_banner = -1;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */
+@@ -342,6 +343,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+                options->disable_forwarding = 0;
+        if (options->expose_userauth_info == -1)
+                options->expose_userauth_info = 0;
+       if (options->debian_banner == -1)
+               options->debian_banner = 1;
+ 
+        assemble_algorithms(options);
+ 
+@@ -429,6 +432,7 @@ typedef enum {
+        sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink,
+        sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash, sDisableForwarding,
+        sExposeAuthInfo,
+       sDebianBanner,
+        sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported
+ } ServerOpCodes;
+ 
+@@ -582,6 +586,7 @@ static struct {
+        { "fingerprinthash", sFingerprintHash, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { "disableforwarding", sDisableForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
+        { "exposeauthinfo", sExposeAuthInfo, SSHCFG_ALL },
+       { "debianbanner", sDebianBanner, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+@@ -1907,6 +1912,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+                intptr = &options->expose_userauth_info;
+                goto parse_flag;
+ 
+       case sDebianBanner:
+               intptr = &options->debian_banner;
+               goto parse_int;
+
+        case sDeprecated:
+        case sIgnore:
+        case sUnsupported:
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index 641e93c8..410c4275 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
+++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -200,6 +200,8 @@ typedef struct {
+ 
+        int     fingerprint_hash;
+        int     expose_userauth_info;
+
+       int     debian_banner;
+ }       ServerOptions;
+ 
+ /* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index eccf81bb..a5a1193d 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -378,7 +378,8 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int sock_in, int sock_out)
+        char remote_version[256];       /* Must be at least as big as buf. */
+ 
+        xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n",
+-           PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE,
+           PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2,
+           options.debian_banner ? SSH_RELEASE : SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM,
+            *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
+            options.version_addendum);
+ 
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 7db25552..41e8c939 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -530,6 +530,11 @@ or
+ .Cm no .
+ The default is
+ .Cm yes .
+.It Cm DebianBanner
+Specifies whether the distribution-specified extra version suffix is
+included during initial protocol handshake.
+The default is
+.Cm yes .
+ .It Cm DenyGroups
+ This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated
+ by spaces.
diff --git a/debian/patches/debian-config.patch b/debian/patches/debian-config.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a3f595752
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/debian-config.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+From 4847e512c0b94c615b838904a5f139a761bee284 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:18 +0000
+Subject: Various Debian-specific configuration changes
+ssh: Enable ForwardX11Trusted, returning to earlier semantics which cause
+fewer problems with existing setups (http://bugs.debian.org/237021).
+ssh: Set 'SendEnv LANG LC_*' by default (http://bugs.debian.org/264024).
+ssh: Enable HashKnownHosts by default to try to limit the spread of ssh
+worms.
+ssh: Enable GSSAPIAuthentication by default.
+sshd: Enable PAM, disable ChallengeResponseAuthentication, and disable
+PrintMotd.
+sshd: Enable X11Forwarding.
+sshd: Set 'AcceptEnv LANG LC_*' by default.
+sshd: Change sftp subsystem path to /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server.
+Document all of this.
+Author: Russ Allbery <rra@debian.org>
+Forwarded: not-needed
+Last-Update: 2017-10-04
+Patch-Name: debian-config.patch
+---
+ readconf.c    |  2 +-
+ ssh.1         | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
+ ssh_config    |  6 +++++-
+ ssh_config.5  | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
+ sshd_config   | 16 ++++++++++------
+ sshd_config.5 | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 6 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index be3d5873..41f36aa8 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -1940,7 +1940,7 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+        if (options->forward_x11 == -1)
+                options->forward_x11 = 0;
+        if (options->forward_x11_trusted == -1)
+-               options->forward_x11_trusted = 0;
+               options->forward_x11_trusted = 1;
+        if (options->forward_x11_timeout == -1)
+                options->forward_x11_timeout = 1200;
+        /*
+diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
+index 711fe608..f1b01c56 100644
+--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
+@@ -764,6 +764,16 @@ directive in
+ .Xr ssh_config 5
+ for more information.
+ .Pp
+(Debian-specific: X11 forwarding is not subjected to X11 SECURITY extension
+restrictions by default, because too many programs currently crash in this
+mode.
+Set the
+.Cm ForwardX11Trusted
+option to
+.Dq no
+to restore the upstream behaviour.
+This may change in future depending on client-side improvements.)
+.Pp
+ .It Fl x
+ Disables X11 forwarding.
+ .Pp
+@@ -772,6 +782,17 @@ Enables trusted X11 forwarding.
+ Trusted X11 forwardings are not subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension
+ controls.
+ .Pp
+(Debian-specific: This option does nothing in the default configuration: it
+is equivalent to
+.Dq Cm ForwardX11Trusted No yes ,
+which is the default as described above.
+Set the
+.Cm ForwardX11Trusted
+option to
+.Dq no
+to restore the upstream behaviour.
+This may change in future depending on client-side improvements.)
+.Pp
+ .It Fl y
+ Send log information using the
+ .Xr syslog 3
+diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
+index bcb9f153..1b676fb2 100644
+--- a/ssh_config
+++ b/ssh_config
+@@ -17,9 +17,10 @@
+ # list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the
+ # ssh_config(5) man page.
+ 
+-# Host *
+Host *
+ #   ForwardAgent no
+ #   ForwardX11 no
+#   ForwardX11Trusted yes
+ #   PasswordAuthentication yes
+ #   HostbasedAuthentication no
+ #   GSSAPIAuthentication no
+@@ -46,3 +47,6 @@
+ #   VisualHostKey no
+ #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
+ #   RekeyLimit 1G 1h
+    SendEnv LANG LC_*
+    HashKnownHosts yes
+    GSSAPIAuthentication yes
+diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+index 1edfe761..2da7029a 100644
+--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -71,6 +71,22 @@ Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more
+ host-specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the
+ file, and general defaults at the end.
+ .Pp
+Note that the Debian
+.Ic openssh-client
+package sets several options as standard in
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+which are not the default in
+.Xr ssh 1 :
+.Pp
+.Bl -bullet -offset indent -compact
+.It
+.Cm SendEnv No LANG LC_*
+.It
+.Cm HashKnownHosts No yes
+.It
+.Cm GSSAPIAuthentication No yes
+.El
+.Pp
+ The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line.
+ Lines starting with
+ .Ql #
+@@ -683,11 +699,12 @@ elapsed.
+ .It Cm ForwardX11Trusted
+ If this option is set to
+ .Cm yes ,
+(the Debian-specific default),
+ remote X11 clients will have full access to the original X11 display.
+ .Pp
+ If this option is set to
+ .Cm no
+-(the default),
+(the upstream default),
+ remote X11 clients will be considered untrusted and prevented
+ from stealing or tampering with data belonging to trusted X11
+ clients.
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+index c01dd656..f68edf36 100644
+--- a/sshd_config
+++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -58,8 +58,9 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile    .ssh/authorized_keys
+ #PasswordAuthentication yes
+ #PermitEmptyPasswords no
+ 
+-# Change to no to disable s/key passwords
+-#ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes
+# Change to yes to enable challenge-response passwords (beware issues with
+# some PAM modules and threads)
+ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
+ 
+ # Kerberos options
+ #KerberosAuthentication no
+@@ -82,16 +83,16 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile  .ssh/authorized_keys
+ # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
+ # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
+ # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
+-#UsePAM no
+UsePAM yes
+ 
+ #AllowAgentForwarding yes
+ #AllowTcpForwarding yes
+ #GatewayPorts no
+-#X11Forwarding no
+X11Forwarding yes
+ #X11DisplayOffset 10
+ #X11UseLocalhost yes
+ #PermitTTY yes
+-#PrintMotd yes
+PrintMotd no
+ #PrintLastLog yes
+ #TCPKeepAlive yes
+ #UseLogin no
+@@ -109,8 +110,11 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
+ # no default banner path
+ #Banner none
+ 
+# Allow client to pass locale environment variables
+AcceptEnv LANG LC_*
+
+ # override default of no subsystems
+-Subsystem      sftp    /usr/libexec/sftp-server
+Subsystem      sftp    /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server
+ 
+ # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
+ #Match User anoncvs
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 79676a95..16be4f62 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -55,6 +55,28 @@ Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes
+ .Pq \&"
+ in order to represent arguments containing spaces.
+ .Pp
+Note that the Debian
+.Ic openssh-server
+package sets several options as standard in
+.Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+which are not the default in
+.Xr sshd 8 :
+.Pp
+.Bl -bullet -offset indent -compact
+.It
+.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication No no
+.It
+.Cm X11Forwarding No yes
+.It
+.Cm PrintMotd No no
+.It
+.Cm AcceptEnv No LANG LC_*
+.It
+.Cm Subsystem No sftp /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server
+.It
+.Cm UsePAM No yes
+.El
+.Pp
+ The possible
+ keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
+ keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
diff --git a/debian/patches/dnssec-sshfp.patch b/debian/patches/dnssec-sshfp.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a8d98855a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/dnssec-sshfp.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+From f500e89e2310f6308a998357d72d767e3b01553c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:01 +0000
+Subject: Force use of DNSSEC even if "options edns0" isn't in resolv.conf
+This allows SSHFP DNS records to be verified if glibc 2.11 is installed.
+Origin: vendor, https://cvs.fedoraproject.org/viewvc/F-12/openssh/openssh-5.2p1-edns.patch?revision=1.1&view=markup
+Bug: http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=572049
+Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=572049
+Last-Update: 2010-04-06
+Patch-Name: dnssec-sshfp.patch
+---
+ dns.c                           | 14 +++++++++++++-
+ openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c | 10 +++++-----
+ openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h |  3 +++
+ 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+diff --git a/dns.c b/dns.c
+index 6e1abb53..8e0ca691 100644
+--- a/dns.c
+++ b/dns.c
+@@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address,
+ {
+        u_int counter;
+        int result;
+       unsigned int rrset_flags = 0;
+        struct rrsetinfo *fingerprints = NULL;
+ 
+        u_int8_t hostkey_algorithm;
+@@ -229,8 +230,19 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address,
+                return -1;
+        }
+ 
+       /*
+        * Original getrrsetbyname function, found on OpenBSD for example,
+        * doesn't accept any flag and prerequisite for obtaining AD bit in
+        * DNS response is set by "options edns0" in resolv.conf.
+        *
+        * Our version is more clever and use RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 flag.
+        */
+#ifndef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME
+       rrset_flags |= RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0;
+#endif
+        result = getrrsetbyname(hostname, DNS_RDATACLASS_IN,
+-           DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, 0, &fingerprints);
+           DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, rrset_flags, &fingerprints);
+
+        if (result) {
+                verbose("DNS lookup error: %s", dns_result_totext(result));
+                return -1;
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
+index dc6fe053..e061a290 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
+@@ -209,8 +209,8 @@ getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, unsigned int rdclass,
+                goto fail;
+        }
+ 
+-       /* don't allow flags yet, unimplemented */
+-       if (flags) {
+       /* Allow RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 flag only. */
+       if ((flags & !RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0) != 0) {
+                result = ERRSET_INVAL;
+                goto fail;
+        }
+@@ -226,9 +226,9 @@ getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, unsigned int rdclass,
+ #endif /* DEBUG */
+ 
+ #ifdef RES_USE_DNSSEC
+-       /* turn on DNSSEC if EDNS0 is configured */
+-       if (_resp->options & RES_USE_EDNS0)
+-               _resp->options |= RES_USE_DNSSEC;
+       /* turn on DNSSEC if required  */
+       if (flags & RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0)
+               _resp->options |= (RES_USE_EDNS0|RES_USE_DNSSEC);
+ #endif /* RES_USE_DNSEC */
+ 
+        /* make query */
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
+index 1283f550..dbbc85a2 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
+@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
+ #ifndef RRSET_VALIDATED
+ # define RRSET_VALIDATED       1
+ #endif
+#ifndef RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0
+# define RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0     0x0001
+#endif
+ 
+ /*
+  * Return codes for getrrsetbyname()
diff --git a/debian/patches/doc-hash-tab-completion.patch b/debian/patches/doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c4342181d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+From a07f7c1fe9d8dc3bfe4cb8bbe6bb5a27b638d024 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:11 +0000
+Subject: Document that HashKnownHosts may break tab-completion
+Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1727
+Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/430154
+Last-Update: 2013-09-14
+Patch-Name: doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
+---
+ ssh_config.5 | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+index 7810a418..1edfe761 100644
+--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -777,6 +777,9 @@ Note that existing names and addresses in known hosts files
+ will not be converted automatically,
+ but may be manually hashed using
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+Use of this option may break facilities such as tab-completion that rely
+on being able to read unhashed host names from
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts .
+ .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
+ Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key
+ authentication.
diff --git a/debian/patches/fix-regress-putty-transfer.patch b/debian/patches/fix-regress-putty-transfer.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cfec3a9d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/fix-regress-putty-transfer.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From bd081a1ae125c7c6b2cfec89746d1298a306ad78 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2018 17:38:36 +0000
+Subject: Fix putty-transfer regression test
+The test key file is still called putty.rsa2, not putty.rsa.
+Forwarded: no
+Last-Update: 2018-01-16
+Patch-Name: fix-regress-putty-transfer.patch
+---
+ regress/putty-transfer.sh | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+diff --git a/regress/putty-transfer.sh b/regress/putty-transfer.sh
+index 32c79f9e..57e46540 100644
+--- a/regress/putty-transfer.sh
+++ b/regress/putty-transfer.sh
+@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ for c in 0 1 ; do
+            ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/compression_$c
+        echo "Compression=$c" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/kex_$k
+        env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load compression_$c -batch \
+-           -i putty.rsa cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+           -i putty.rsa2 cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+        if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+                fail "ssh cat $DATA failed"
+        fi
+@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ for c in 0 1 ; do
+                rm -f ${COPY}
+                dd if=$DATA obs=${s} 2> /dev/null | \
+                        env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load compression_$c \
+-                           -batch -i putty.rsa \
+                           -batch -i putty.rsa2 \
+                            "cat > ${COPY}"
+                if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+                        fail "ssh cat $DATA failed"
diff --git a/debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch b/debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e46c0f8b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+From 18950b79898be885c6b77d463367639647e54e28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Vincent Untz <vuntz@ubuntu.com>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:16 +0000
+Subject: Give the ssh-askpass-gnome window a default icon
+Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/27152
+Last-Update: 2010-02-28
+Patch-Name: gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
+---
+ contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+diff --git a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+index 535a6927..e37a1338 100644
+--- a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+++ b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+@@ -211,6 +211,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 
+        gtk_init(&argc, &argv);
+ 
+       gtk_window_set_default_icon_from_file ("/usr/share/pixmaps/ssh-askpass-gnome.png", NULL);
+
+        if (argc > 1) {
+                message = g_strjoinv(" ", argv + 1);
+        } else {
diff --git a/debian/patches/gssapi.patch b/debian/patches/gssapi.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0726a5020
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/gssapi.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,3300 @@
+From 4e70490950e5c5134df48848affaf73685bf0284 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon Wilkinson <simon@sxw.org.uk>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:48 +0000
+Subject: GSSAPI key exchange support
+This patch has been rejected upstream: "None of the OpenSSH developers are
+in favour of adding this, and this situation has not changed for several
+years.  This is not a slight on Simon's patch, which is of fine quality, but
+just that a) we don't trust GSSAPI implementations that much and b) we don't
+like adding new KEX since they are pre-auth attack surface.  This one is
+particularly scary, since it requires hooks out to typically root-owned
+system resources."
+However, quite a lot of people rely on this in Debian, and it's better to
+have it merged into the main openssh package rather than having separate
+-krb5 packages (as we used to have).  It seems to have a generally good
+security history.
+Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1242
+Last-Updated: 2017-10-04
+Patch-Name: gssapi.patch
+---
+ ChangeLog.gssapi | 113 +++++++++++++++++++
+ Makefile.in      |   3 +-
+ auth-krb5.c      |  17 ++-
+ auth.c           |  96 +---------------
+ auth2-gss.c      |  49 +++++++-
+ auth2.c          |   2 +
+ canohost.c       |  93 +++++++++++++++
+ canohost.h       |   3 +
+ clientloop.c     |  15 ++-
+ config.h.in      |   6 +
+ configure.ac     |  24 ++++
+ gss-genr.c       | 275 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ gss-serv-krb5.c  |  85 ++++++++++++--
+ gss-serv.c       | 184 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ kex.c            |  19 ++++
+ kex.h            |  14 +++
+ kexgssc.c        | 338 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ kexgsss.c        | 295 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ monitor.c        | 115 +++++++++++++++++--
+ monitor.h        |   3 +
+ monitor_wrap.c   |  47 +++++++-
+ monitor_wrap.h   |   4 +-
+ readconf.c       |  43 +++++++
+ readconf.h       |   5 +
+ servconf.c       |  26 +++++
+ servconf.h       |   2 +
+ ssh-gss.h        |  41 ++++++-
+ ssh_config       |   2 +
+ ssh_config.5     |  32 ++++++
+ sshconnect2.c    | 131 ++++++++++++++++++++-
+ sshd.c           | 112 +++++++++++++++++-
+ sshd_config      |   2 +
+ sshd_config.5    |  10 ++
+ sshkey.c         |   3 +-
+ sshkey.h         |   1 +
+ 35 files changed, 2063 insertions(+), 147 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 ChangeLog.gssapi
+ create mode 100644 kexgssc.c
+ create mode 100644 kexgsss.c
+diff --git a/ChangeLog.gssapi b/ChangeLog.gssapi
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..f117a336
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.gssapi
+@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+20110101
+  - Finally update for OpenSSH 5.6p1
+  - Add GSSAPIServerIdentity option from Jim Basney
+ 
+20100308
+  - [ Makefile.in, key.c, key.h ]
+    Updates for OpenSSH 5.4p1
+  - [ servconf.c ]
+    Include GSSAPI options in the sshd -T configuration dump, and flag
+    some older configuration options as being unsupported. Thanks to Colin 
+    Watson.
+  -
+
+20100124
+  - [ sshconnect2.c ]
+    Adapt to deal with additional element in Authmethod structure. Thanks to
+    Colin Watson
+
+20090615
+  - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c
+      sshd.c ]
+    Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review
+       Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs
+       Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled
+       Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange
+       Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value
+       Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust
+       Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled
+       Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list
+       Cast data.length before printing
+       If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL
+
+20090201
+  - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h
+      ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ]
+    Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user
+    to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server
+
+20080404
+  - [ gss-serv.c ]
+    Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow
+    been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav
+    Stoichkov
+
+20070317
+  - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
+    Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a 
+    function
+
+20061220
+  - [ servconf.c ]
+    Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and 
+    documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson.
+
+20060910
+  - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c
+      ssh-gss.h ]
+    add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms
+  - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ]
+    Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of
+    acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines.
+    <Bugzilla #928>
+  - [ sshd_config ssh_config ]
+    Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample
+    configuration files
+  - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ]
+    Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf()
+    Limit length of error messages displayed by client
+
+20060909
+  - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ]
+    move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server
+    only, where they belong 
+    <Bugzilla #1225>
+
+20060829
+  - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
+    Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment 
+    variable
+
+20060828
+  - [ gss-genr.c ]
+    Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem
+    <Fixed upstream 20060829>
+
+20060818
+  - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ]
+    Make sure that SPENGO is disabled 
+    <Bugzilla #1218 - Fixed upstream 20060818>
+
+20060421
+  - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ]
+    a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to
+    fix compiler errors/warnings 
+    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
+  - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ]
+    fix uninitialized variable warnings
+    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
+  - [ gssgenr.c ]
+    pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue)
+    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
+    <Bugzilla #1220 >
+  - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
+    #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
+    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
+    <Fixed upstream 20060304>
+  - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c 
+    add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option
+    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
+  - [ sshconnect2.c ]
+    add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic
+    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
+    <gssapi-with-mic support is Bugzilla #1008>
+diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
+index c52ce191..f6e9fe4c 100644
+--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
+@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
+        kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
+        kexdhc.o kexgexc.o kexecdhc.o kexc25519c.o \
+        kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o \
+       kexgssc.o \
+        platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o
+ 
+ SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
+@@ -105,7 +106,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \
+        auth-skey.o auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
+        auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
+        monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
+-       auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
+       auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
+        loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
+        sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+        sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
+diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
+index a5a81ed2..38e7fee2 100644
+--- a/auth-krb5.c
+++ b/auth-krb5.c
+@@ -182,8 +182,13 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+ 
+        len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
+        authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
+       snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s",
+           authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
+#else
+        snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
+            authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
+#endif
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+        if (options.use_pam)
+@@ -240,15 +245,22 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ #ifndef HEIMDAL
+ krb5_error_code
+ ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+-       int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
+       int ret, oerrno;
+        char ccname[40];
+        mode_t old_umask;
+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
+       char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d";
+#else
+       char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX";
+       int tmpfd;
+#endif
+ 
+        ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
+-           "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
+           cctemplate, geteuid());
+        if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
+                return ENOMEM;
+ 
+#ifndef USE_CCAPI
+        old_umask = umask(0177);
+        tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
+        oerrno = errno;
+@@ -265,6 +277,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+                return oerrno;
+        }
+        close(tmpfd);
+#endif
+ 
+        return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
+ }
+diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
+index a4490617..6aec3605 100644
+--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
+@@ -395,7 +395,8 @@ auth_root_allowed(const char *method)
+        case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
+                if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
+                    strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
+-                   strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0)
+                   strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0 ||
+                   strcmp(method, "gssapi-keyex") == 0)
+                        return 1;
+                break;
+        case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
+@@ -727,99 +728,6 @@ fakepw(void)
+        return (&fake);
+ }
+ 
+-/*
+- * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
+- * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
+- * called.
+- * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
+- * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
+- * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
+- * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
+- */
+-
+-static char *
+-remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
+-{
+-       struct sockaddr_storage from;
+-       socklen_t fromlen;
+-       struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+-       char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
+-       const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+-
+-       /* Get IP address of client. */
+-       fromlen = sizeof(from);
+-       memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+-       if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
+-           (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+-               debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+-               return strdup(ntop);
+-       }
+-
+-       ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
+-       if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
+-               fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+-
+-       debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
+-       /* Map the IP address to a host name. */
+-       if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
+-           NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
+-               /* Host name not found.  Use ip address. */
+-               return strdup(ntop);
+-       }
+-
+-       /*
+-        * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
+-        * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
+-        *      1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.  IN PTR  2.3.4.5
+-        */
+-       memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+-       hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
+-       hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+-       if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
+-               logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
+-                   name, ntop);
+-               freeaddrinfo(ai);
+-               return strdup(ntop);
+-       }
+-
+-       /* Names are stored in lowercase. */
+-       lowercase(name);
+-
+-       /*
+-        * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
+-        * address actually is an address of this host.  This is
+-        * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
+-        * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
+-        * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
+-        * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
+-        * the domain).
+-        */
+-       memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+-       hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
+-       hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+-       if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
+-               logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
+-                   "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
+-               return strdup(ntop);
+-       }
+-       /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
+-       for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+-               if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
+-                   sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
+-                   (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
+-                               break;
+-       }
+-       freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+-       /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
+-       if (ai == NULL) {
+-               /* Address not found for the host name. */
+-               logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
+-                   "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
+-               return strdup(ntop);
+-       }
+-       return strdup(name);
+-}
+-
+ /*
+  * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
+  * connection.  The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
+diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
+index 589283b7..fd411d3a 100644
+--- a/auth2-gss.c
+++ b/auth2-gss.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.26 2017/06/24 06:34:38 djm Exp $ */
+ 
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+  *
+  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -53,6 +53,41 @@ static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
+ static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
+ static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ 
+/* 
+ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
+ */
+static int
+userauth_gsskeyex(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+       Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+       int authenticated = 0;
+       Buffer b;
+       gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
+       u_int len;
+
+       mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
+       mic.length = len;
+
+       packet_check_eom();
+
+       ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
+           "gssapi-keyex");
+
+       gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
+       gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
+
+       /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
+       if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context, 
+           &gssbuf, &mic))))
+               authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
+                   authctxt->pw));
+       
+       buffer_free(&b);
+       free(mic.value);
+
+       return (authenticated);
+}
+
+ /*
+  * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
+  * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
+@@ -240,7 +275,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 
+        packet_check_eom();
+ 
+-       authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
+       authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
+           authctxt->pw));
+ 
+        if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
+            (displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
+@@ -281,7 +317,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+        gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
+ 
+        if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
+-               authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
+               authenticated = 
+                   PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw));
+        else
+                logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
+ 
+@@ -301,6 +338,12 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+        return 0;
+ }
+ 
+Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
+       "gssapi-keyex",
+       userauth_gsskeyex,
+       &options.gss_authentication
+};
+
+ Authmethod method_gssapi = {
+        "gssapi-with-mic",
+        userauth_gssapi,
+diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
+index 862e0996..54070e3a 100644
+--- a/auth2.c
+++ b/auth2.c
+@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd;
+ extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
+ extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex;
+ extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -79,6 +80,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
+        &method_none,
+        &method_pubkey,
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+       &method_gsskeyex,
+        &method_gssapi,
+ #endif
+        &method_passwd,
+diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c
+index f71a0856..404731d2 100644
+--- a/canohost.c
+++ b/canohost.c
+@@ -35,6 +35,99 @@
+ #include "canohost.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ 
+/*
+ * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
+ * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
+ * called.
+ * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
+ * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
+ * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
+ * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
+ */
+
+char *
+remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+       struct sockaddr_storage from;
+       socklen_t fromlen;
+       struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+       char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
+       const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+
+       /* Get IP address of client. */
+       fromlen = sizeof(from);
+       memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+       if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
+           (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+               debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+               return strdup(ntop);
+       }
+
+       ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
+       if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
+               fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+
+       debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
+       /* Map the IP address to a host name. */
+       if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
+           NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
+               /* Host name not found.  Use ip address. */
+               return strdup(ntop);
+       }
+
+       /*
+        * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
+        * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
+        *      1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.  IN PTR  2.3.4.5
+        */
+       memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+       hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
+       hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+       if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
+               logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
+                   name, ntop);
+               freeaddrinfo(ai);
+               return strdup(ntop);
+       }
+
+       /* Names are stored in lowercase. */
+       lowercase(name);
+
+       /*
+        * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
+        * address actually is an address of this host.  This is
+        * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
+        * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
+        * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
+        * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
+        * the domain).
+        */
+       memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+       hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
+       hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+       if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
+               logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
+                   "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
+               return strdup(ntop);
+       }
+       /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
+       for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+               if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
+                   sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
+                   (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
+                               break;
+       }
+       freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+       /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
+       if (ai == NULL) {
+               /* Address not found for the host name. */
+               logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
+                   "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
+               return strdup(ntop);
+       }
+       return strdup(name);
+}
+
+ void
+ ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *addr, socklen_t *len)
+ {
+diff --git a/canohost.h b/canohost.h
+index 26d62855..0cadc9f1 100644
+--- a/canohost.h
+++ b/canohost.h
+@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@
+ #ifndef _CANOHOST_H
+ #define _CANOHOST_H
+ 
+struct ssh;
+
+char           *remote_hostname(struct ssh *);
+ char           *get_peer_ipaddr(int);
+ int             get_peer_port(int);
+ char           *get_local_ipaddr(int);
+diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
+index 791d336e..0010b833 100644
+--- a/clientloop.c
+++ b/clientloop.c
+@@ -112,6 +112,10 @@
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "hostfile.h"
+ 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+
+ /* import options */
+ extern Options options;
+ 
+@@ -1349,9 +1353,18 @@ client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pty, int escape_char_arg,
+                        break;
+ 
+                /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
+-               if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh))
+               if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) {
+                        channel_after_select(ssh, readset, writeset);
+ 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+                       if (options.gss_renewal_rekey &&
+                           ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(NULL)) {
+                               debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey");
+                               need_rekeying = 1;
+                       }
+#endif
+               }
+
+                /* Buffer input from the connection.  */
+                client_process_net_input(readset);
+ 
+diff --git a/config.h.in b/config.h.in
+index 63fc548b..0b244fd5 100644
+--- a/config.h.in
+++ b/config.h.in
+@@ -1696,6 +1696,9 @@
+ /* Use btmp to log bad logins */
+ #undef USE_BTMP
+ 
+/* platform uses an in-memory credentials cache */
+#undef USE_CCAPI
+
+ /* Use libedit for sftp */
+ #undef USE_LIBEDIT
+ 
+@@ -1711,6 +1714,9 @@
+ /* Use PIPES instead of a socketpair() */
+ #undef USE_PIPES
+ 
+/* platform has the Security Authorization Session API */
+#undef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
+
+ /* Define if you have Solaris privileges */
+ #undef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS
+ 
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 889f5063..84bfad8c 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -621,6 +621,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
+            [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
+        AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
+            [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
+       AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have the Security Authorization Session API])
+       AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <Security/AuthSession.h>],
+               [SessionCreate(0, 0);],
+               [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes"
+                AC_DEFINE([USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API], [1], 
+                       [platform has the Security Authorization Session API])
+                LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
+                AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
+               [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no"
+                AC_MSG_RESULT([no])])
+       AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have an in-memory credentials cache])
+       AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+               [#include <Kerberos/Kerberos.h>],
+               [cc_context_t c;
+                (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);],
+               [AC_DEFINE([USE_CCAPI], [1], 
+                       [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache])
+                LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
+                AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+                if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then
+                       AC_MSG_ERROR([*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***])
+               fi],
+               [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])]
+       )
+        m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv])
+        AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [],
+            AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
+diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c
+index 62559ed9..0b3ae073 100644
+--- a/gss-genr.c
+++ b/gss-genr.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.24 2016/09/12 01:22:38 deraadt Exp $ */
+ 
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+  *
+  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -40,12 +40,167 @@
+ #include "buffer.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+ 
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+ 
+ extern u_char *session_id2;
+ extern u_int session_id2_len;
+ 
+typedef struct {
+       char *encoded;
+       gss_OID oid;
+} ssh_gss_kex_mapping;
+
+/*
+ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the
+ * XXX   passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines
+ */
+
+Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL;
+
+static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL;
+
+int 
+ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void) {
+       return (gss_enc2oid != NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program
+ *
+ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting
+ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism
+ */
+
+char *
+ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) {
+       gss_OID_set gss_supported;
+       OM_uint32 min_status;
+
+       if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported)))
+               return NULL;
+
+       return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
+           host, client));
+}
+
+char *
+ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
+    const char *host, const char *client) {
+       Buffer buf;
+       size_t i;
+       int oidpos, enclen;
+       char *mechs, *encoded;
+       u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+       char deroid[2];
+       const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
+       EVP_MD_CTX md;
+
+       if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
+               for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++)
+                       free(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded);
+               free(gss_enc2oid);
+       }
+
+       gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) *
+           (gss_supported->count + 1));
+
+       buffer_init(&buf);
+
+       oidpos = 0;
+       for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
+               if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
+                   (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
+
+                       deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
+                       deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
+
+                       EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
+                       EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2);
+                       EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,
+                           gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
+                           gss_supported->elements[i].length);
+                       EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
+
+                       encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
+                       enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md),
+                           encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
+
+                       if (oidpos != 0)
+                               buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
+
+                       buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
+                           sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1);
+                       buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
+                       buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
+                       buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, 
+                           sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1);
+                       buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
+                       buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
+                       buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
+                           sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1);
+                       buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
+
+                       gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
+                       gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
+                       oidpos++;
+               }
+       }
+       gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
+       gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
+
+       buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0');
+
+       mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf));
+       buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf));
+       buffer_free(&buf);
+
+       if (strlen(mechs) == 0) {
+               free(mechs);
+               mechs = NULL;
+       }
+       
+       return (mechs);
+}
+
+gss_OID
+ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) {
+       int i = 0;
+       
+       switch (kex_type) {
+       case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
+               if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID))
+                       return GSS_C_NO_OID;
+               name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1;
+               break;
+       case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
+               if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID))
+                       return GSS_C_NO_OID;
+               name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1;
+               break;
+       case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
+               if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID))
+                       return GSS_C_NO_OID;
+               name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1;
+               break;
+       default:
+               return GSS_C_NO_OID;
+       }
+
+       while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL &&
+           strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0)
+               i++;
+
+       if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL)
+               ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid);
+
+       return gss_enc2oid[i].oid;
+}
+
+ /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
+ int
+ ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
+@@ -198,7 +353,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int deleg_creds, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
+        }
+ 
+        ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
+-           GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
+           ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
+            GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
+            0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
+ 
+@@ -227,9 +382,43 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host)
+        return (ctx->major);
+ }
+ 
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name)
+{
+       gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
+       gss_name_t gssname;
+       OM_uint32 status;
+       gss_OID_set oidset;
+
+       gssbuf.value = (void *) name;
+       gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
+
+       gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+       gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
+
+       ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf,
+           GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname);
+
+       if (!ctx->major)
+               ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, 
+                   gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE, 
+                   &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL);
+
+       gss_release_name(&status, &gssname);
+       gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+
+       if (ctx->major)
+               ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+
+       return(ctx->major);
+}
+
+ OM_uint32
+ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
+ {
+       if (ctx == NULL) 
+               return -1;
+
+        if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+            GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
+                ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+@@ -237,6 +426,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
+        return (ctx->major);
+ }
+ 
+/* Priviledged when used by server */
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
+{
+       if (ctx == NULL)
+               return -1;
+
+       ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+           gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
+
+       return (ctx->major);
+}
+
+ void
+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
+     const char *context)
+@@ -250,11 +452,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
+ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host, 
+    const char *client)
+ {
+        gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+        OM_uint32 major, minor;
+        gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
+       Gssctxt *intctx = NULL;
+
+       if (ctx == NULL)
+               ctx = &intctx;
+ 
+        /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
+        if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length && 
+@@ -264,6 +471,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
+        ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
+        ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
+        major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
+
+       if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client)
+               major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client);
+
+        if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+                major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, 
+                    NULL);
+@@ -273,10 +484,66 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
+                            GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+        }
+ 
+-       if (GSS_ERROR(major)) 
+       if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL) 
+                ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
+ 
+        return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
+ }
+ 
+int
+ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) {
+       static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+       static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0;
+       static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
+       static gss_name_t name;
+       static OM_uint32 last_call = 0;
+       OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor;
+       int equal;
+       
+       now = time(NULL);
+
+       if (ctxt) {
+               debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions");
+
+               if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
+                       gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name);
+
+               major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
+                   &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL);
+
+               if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+                       saved_mech = ctxt->oid;
+                       saved_lifetime+= now;
+               } else {
+                       /* Handle the error */
+               }
+               return 0;
+       }
+
+       if (now - last_call < 10)
+               return 0;
+
+       last_call = now;
+
+       if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID)
+               return 0;
+       
+       major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, 
+           &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL);
+       if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED)
+               return 0;
+       else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+               return 0;
+
+       major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal);
+       gss_release_name(&minor, &name);
+       if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+               return 0;
+
+       if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10))
+               return 1;
+
+       return 0;
+}
+
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+index 795992d9..fd8b3718 100644
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.8 2013/07/20 01:55:13 djm Exp $ */
+ 
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+  *
+  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+        krb5_error_code problem;
+        krb5_principal princ;
+        OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+-       int len;
+        const char *errmsg;
+       const char *new_ccname;
+ 
+        if (client->creds == NULL) {
+                debug("No credentials stored");
+@@ -181,11 +181,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+                return;
+        }
+ 
+-       client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache));
+       new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
+
+        client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
+-       len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6;
+-       client->store.envval = xmalloc(len);
+-       snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename);
+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
+       xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
+       client->store.filename = NULL;
+#else
+       xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "FILE:%s", new_ccname);
+       client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
+#endif
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+        if (options.use_pam)
+@@ -197,6 +202,71 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+        return;
+ }
+ 
+int
+ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store, 
+    ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+{
+       krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
+       krb5_principal principal = NULL;
+       char *name = NULL;
+       krb5_error_code problem;
+       OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+
+       if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) {
+                logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
+                    krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+                return 0;
+               }
+       
+       /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */
+       if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache, 
+           &principal))) {
+               logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s",
+                   krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+               krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+               return 0;
+       }
+
+       if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) {
+               logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s",
+                   krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+               krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
+               krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+               return 0;
+       }
+
+
+       if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) {
+               debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing");
+               krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
+               krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+               krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
+               return 0;
+       }
+       krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
+
+       /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */
+
+       if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) {
+               logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s",
+                   krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+               krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
+               krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+               return 0;
+       }
+
+       krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
+
+       if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds,
+           ccache))) {
+               logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!");
+               krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+               return 0;
+       }
+
+       return 1;
+}
+
+ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
+        "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
+        "Kerberos",
+@@ -204,7 +274,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
+        NULL,
+        &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
+        NULL,
+-       &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds
+       &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds,
+       &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds
+ };
+ 
+ #endif /* KRB5 */
+diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
+index 6cae720e..967c6cfb 100644
+--- a/gss-serv.c
+++ b/gss-serv.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.30 2017/06/24 06:34:38 djm Exp $ */
+ 
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+  *
+  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -45,17 +45,22 @@
+ #include "session.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "servconf.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+ 
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+ 
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+ 
+ static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
+     { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
+-    GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}};
+    GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME,  NULL,
+    {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
+ 
+ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
+-    { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
+    { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
+ 
+ #ifdef KRB5
+ extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
+@@ -141,6 +146,28 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
+        return (ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(*ctx));
+ }
+ 
+/* Unprivileged */
+char *
+ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void) {
+       if (supported_oids == NULL)
+               ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
+       return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported_oids,
+           &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech, NULL, NULL));
+}
+
+/* Unprivileged */
+int
+ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data,
+    const char *dummy) {
+       Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
+       int res;
+ 
+       res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
+       ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
+
+       return (res);
+}
+
+ /* Unprivileged */
+ void
+ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
+@@ -151,7 +178,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
+        gss_OID_set supported;
+ 
+        gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
+-       gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
+
+       if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported)))
+               return;
+ 
+        while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
+                if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
+@@ -277,8 +306,48 @@ OM_uint32
+ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ {
+        int i = 0;
+       int equal = 0;
+       gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+       gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+
+       if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
+               if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
+                   (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements,
+                    ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) {
+                       debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
+                       return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+               }
+
+               if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, 
+                   ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name, 
+                   NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
+                       ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+                       return (ctx->major);
+               }
+
+               ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name, 
+                   new_name, &equal);
+
+               if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
+                       ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+                       return (ctx->major);
+               }
+ 
+               if (!equal) {
+                       debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name");
+                       return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+               }
+ 
+-       gss_buffer_desc ename;
+               debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
+
+               gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
+               gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds);
+               client->name = new_name;
+               client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
+               ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+               client->updated = 1;
+               return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+       }
+ 
+        client->mech = NULL;
+ 
+@@ -293,6 +362,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+        if (client->mech == NULL)
+                return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ 
+       if (ctx->client_creds &&
+           (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
+            ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
+               ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+               return (ctx->major);
+       }
+
+        if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
+            &client->displayname, NULL))) {
+                ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+@@ -310,6 +386,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+                return (ctx->major);
+        }
+ 
+       gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
+
+        /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
+        client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
+        ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+@@ -357,7 +435,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep)
+ 
+ /* Privileged */
+ int
+-ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
+ {
+        OM_uint32 lmin;
+ 
+@@ -367,9 +445,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+                return 0;
+        }
+        if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
+-               if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
+               if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
+                       gssapi_client.used = 1;
+                       gssapi_client.store.owner = pw;
+                        return 1;
+-               else {
+               } else {
+                        /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
+                        gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
+                        gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
+@@ -383,14 +463,90 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+        return (0);
+ }
+ 
+-/* Privileged */
+-OM_uint32
+-ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
+/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running 
+ * as the user, the monitor is root.
+ *
+ * In the child, we want to :
+ *    *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify
+ *    *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update
+ */
+
+/* Stuff for PAM */
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg, 
+    struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+ {
+-       ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+-           gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
+       return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+}
+#endif
+ 
+-       return (ctx->major);
+void
+ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) {
+       int ok;
+       int ret;
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+       pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
+       struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
+       char *envstr;
+#endif
+
+       if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL && 
+           gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
+           gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
+               return;
+ 
+       ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
+
+       if (!ok)
+               return;
+
+       debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully");
+
+       /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will
+        * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options
+        * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
+        */
+#ifdef USE_PAM 
+       if (!use_privsep) {
+               debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
+               return;
+       }
+
+       ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
+           &pamconv, &pamh);
+       if (ret)
+               return;
+
+       xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar, 
+           gssapi_client.store.envval);
+
+       ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr);
+       if (!ret)
+               pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
+       pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
+#endif
+}
+
+int 
+ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) {
+       int ok = 0;
+
+       /* Check we've got credentials to store */
+       if (!gssapi_client.updated)
+               return 0;
+
+       gssapi_client.updated = 0;
+
+       temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner);
+       if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)
+               ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client);
+       else
+               debug("No update function for this mechanism");
+
+       restore_uid();
+
+       return ok;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Privileged */
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index d5d5a9da..bb1bd661 100644
+--- a/kex.c
+++ b/kex.c
+@@ -54,6 +54,10 @@
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
+ 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+
+ /* prototype */
+ static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *);
+ static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+@@ -105,6 +109,14 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
+ #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */
+        { NULL, -1, -1, -1},
+ };
+static const struct kexalg kexalg_prefixes[] = {
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       { KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
+       { KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
+       { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
+#endif
+       { NULL, -1, -1, -1 },
+};
+ 
+ char *
+ kex_alg_list(char sep)
+@@ -137,6 +149,10 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
+                if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
+                        return k;
+        }
+       for (k = kexalg_prefixes; k->name != NULL; k++) {
+               if (strncmp(k->name, name, strlen(k->name)) == 0)
+                       return k;
+       }
+        return NULL;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -601,6 +617,9 @@ kex_free(struct kex *kex)
+        sshbuf_free(kex->peer);
+        sshbuf_free(kex->my);
+        free(kex->session_id);
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       free(kex->gss_host);
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
+        free(kex->client_version_string);
+        free(kex->server_version_string);
+        free(kex->failed_choice);
+diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
+index 01bb3986..a708e486 100644
+--- a/kex.h
+++ b/kex.h
+@@ -99,6 +99,9 @@ enum kex_exchange {
+        KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
+        KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
+        KEX_C25519_SHA256,
+       KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
+       KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
+       KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1,
+        KEX_MAX
+ };
+ 
+@@ -147,6 +150,12 @@ struct kex {
+        u_int   flags;
+        int     hash_alg;
+        int     ec_nid;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       int     gss_deleg_creds;
+       int     gss_trust_dns;
+       char    *gss_host;
+       char    *gss_client;
+#endif
+        char    *client_version_string;
+        char    *server_version_string;
+        char    *failed_choice;
+@@ -197,6 +206,11 @@ int         kexecdh_server(struct ssh *);
+ int     kexc25519_client(struct ssh *);
+ int     kexc25519_server(struct ssh *);
+ 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+int     kexgss_client(struct ssh *);
+int     kexgss_server(struct ssh *);
+#endif
+
+ int     kex_dh_hash(int, const char *, const char *,
+     const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t,
+     const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, u_char *, size_t *);
+diff --git a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..10447f2b
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/kexgssc.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+
+int
+kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) {
+       gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+       gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr;
+       Gssctxt *ctxt;
+       OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
+       u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, strlen;
+       DH *dh; 
+       BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
+       BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
+       BIGNUM *p = NULL;
+       BIGNUM *g = NULL;       
+       u_char *kbuf;
+       u_char *serverhostkey = NULL;
+       u_char *empty = "";
+       char *msg;
+       int type = 0;
+       int first = 1;
+       int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
+       u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+       size_t hashlen;
+
+       /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */       
+       ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
+       if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, ssh->kex->name, ssh->kex->kex_type) 
+           == GSS_C_NO_OID)
+               fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
+
+       if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, ssh->kex->gss_host))
+               fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
+
+       if (ssh->kex->gss_client && 
+           ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, ssh->kex->gss_client))
+               fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
+
+       switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
+       case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
+               dh = dh_new_group1();
+               break;
+       case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
+               dh = dh_new_group14();
+               break;
+       case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
+               debug("Doing group exchange\n");
+               nbits = dh_estimate(ssh->kex->we_need * 8);
+               packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
+               packet_put_int(min);
+               packet_put_int(nbits);
+               packet_put_int(max);
+
+               packet_send();
+
+               packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
+
+               if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
+                       fatal("BN_new() failed");
+               packet_get_bignum2(p);
+               if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
+                       fatal("BN_new() failed");
+               packet_get_bignum2(g);
+               packet_check_eom();
+
+               if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
+                       fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
+                           min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
+
+               dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
+               break;
+       default:
+               fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
+       }
+       
+       /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */
+       dh_gen_key(dh, ssh->kex->we_need * 8);
+
+       /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */
+       dh_server_pub = BN_new();
+       if (dh_server_pub == NULL)
+               fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
+
+       token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
+                        
+       do {
+               debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
+               
+               maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
+                   ssh->kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
+                   &ret_flags);
+
+               if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
+                       if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+                               packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
+                               packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
+                                   send_tok.length);
+                       }
+                       fatal("gss_init_context failed");
+               }
+
+               /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
+               if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
+                       free(recv_tok.value);
+
+               if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+                       /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
+                       if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
+                               fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
+
+                       /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
+                       if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
+                               fatal("Integrity check failed");
+               }
+
+               /* 
+                * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
+                * received cannot have been a 'complete'. 
+                */
+               if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+                       if (first) {
+                               packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT);
+                               packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
+                                   send_tok.length);
+                               packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
+                               first = 0;
+                       } else {
+                               packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
+                               packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
+                                   send_tok.length);
+                       }
+                       packet_send();
+                       gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
+
+                       /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
+                       do {    
+                               type = packet_read();
+                               if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
+                                       debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
+                                       if (serverhostkey)
+                                               fatal("Server host key received more than once");
+                                       serverhostkey = 
+                                           packet_get_string(&slen);
+                               }
+                       } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
+
+                       switch (type) {
+                       case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
+                               debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
+                               if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) 
+                                       fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
+                               recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
+                               recv_tok.length = strlen; 
+                               break;
+                       case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
+                               debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
+                               packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
+                               msg_tok.value =  packet_get_string(&strlen);
+                               msg_tok.length = strlen; 
+
+                               /* Is there a token included? */
+                               if (packet_get_char()) {
+                                       recv_tok.value=
+                                           packet_get_string(&strlen);
+                                       recv_tok.length = strlen;
+                                       /* If we're already complete - protocol error */
+                                       if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+                                               packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete");
+                                       } else {
+                                               /* No token included */
+                                               if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+                                                       packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token");
+                               }
+                               break;
+                       case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
+                               debug("Received Error");
+                               maj_status = packet_get_int();
+                               min_status = packet_get_int();
+                               msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
+                               (void) packet_get_string_ptr(NULL);
+                               fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg);
+                       default:
+                               packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
+                               type);
+                       }
+                       token_ptr = &recv_tok;
+               } else {
+                       /* No data, and not complete */
+                       if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+                               fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
+               }
+       } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+
+       /* 
+        * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the 
+        * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok 
+        */
+
+       if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
+               fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
+
+       /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */
+       if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
+               packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
+
+       /* compute K=f^x mod p */
+       klen = DH_size(dh);
+       kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
+       kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh);
+       if (kout < 0)
+               fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
+
+       shared_secret = BN_new();
+       if (shared_secret == NULL)
+               fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed");
+
+       if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
+               fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
+
+       memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
+       free(kbuf);
+
+       hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+       switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
+       case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
+       case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
+               kex_dh_hash(
+                   ssh->kex->hash_alg,
+                   ssh->kex->client_version_string,
+                   ssh->kex->server_version_string,
+                   buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
+                   buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
+                   (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
+                   dh->pub_key,        /* e */
+                   dh_server_pub,      /* f */
+                   shared_secret,      /* K */
+                   hash, &hashlen
+               );
+               break;
+       case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
+               kexgex_hash(
+                   ssh->kex->hash_alg,
+                   ssh->kex->client_version_string,
+                   ssh->kex->server_version_string,
+                   buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
+                   buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
+                   (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
+                   min, nbits, max,
+                   dh->p, dh->g,
+                   dh->pub_key,
+                   dh_server_pub,
+                   shared_secret,
+                   hash, &hashlen
+               );
+               break;
+       default:
+               fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
+       }
+
+       gssbuf.value = hash;
+       gssbuf.length = hashlen;
+
+       /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
+       if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
+               packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify");
+
+       free(msg_tok.value);
+
+       DH_free(dh);
+       free(serverhostkey);
+       BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
+
+       /* save session id */
+       if (ssh->kex->session_id == NULL) {
+               ssh->kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
+               ssh->kex->session_id = xmalloc(ssh->kex->session_id_len);
+               memcpy(ssh->kex->session_id, hash, ssh->kex->session_id_len);
+       }
+
+       if (ssh->kex->gss_deleg_creds)
+               ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
+
+       if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
+               gss_kex_context = ctxt;
+       else
+               ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
+
+       kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
+       BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+       return kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
+}
+
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
+diff --git a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..38ca082b
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/kexgsss.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,295 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+int
+kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+       OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+       
+       /* 
+        * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
+        * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific 
+        * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently 
+        * activating this non-standard behaviour.
+        */
+
+       OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
+       gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
+       gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+       Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
+       u_int slen, klen, kout;
+       u_char *kbuf;
+       DH *dh;
+       int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
+       BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
+       BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
+       int type = 0;
+       gss_OID oid;
+       char *mechs;
+       u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+       size_t hashlen;
+
+       /* Initialise GSSAPI */
+
+       /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures
+        * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
+        * into life
+        */
+       if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) {
+               mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
+               free(mechs);
+       }
+
+       debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, ssh->kex->name);
+       oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, ssh->kex->name, ssh->kex->kex_type);
+       if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
+          fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
+
+       debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
+
+       if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
+               fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
+
+       switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
+       case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
+               dh = dh_new_group1();
+               break;
+       case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
+               dh = dh_new_group14();
+               break;
+       case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
+               debug("Doing group exchange");
+               packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
+               min = packet_get_int();
+               nbits = packet_get_int();
+               max = packet_get_int();
+               packet_check_eom();
+               if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
+                       fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
+                           min, nbits, max);
+               dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min),
+                   nbits, MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max)));
+               if (dh == NULL)
+                       packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found");
+
+               packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
+               packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
+               packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
+               packet_send();
+
+               packet_write_wait();
+               break;
+       default:
+               fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
+       }
+
+       dh_gen_key(dh, ssh->kex->we_need * 8);
+
+       do {
+               debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
+               type = packet_read();
+               switch(type) {
+               case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
+                       if (dh_client_pub != NULL) 
+                               fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
+                       recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
+                       recv_tok.length = slen; 
+
+                       if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
+                               fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
+
+                       packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
+
+                       /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
+                       break;
+               case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
+                       recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
+                       recv_tok.length = slen; 
+                       break;
+               default:
+                       packet_disconnect(
+                           "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
+                           type);
+               }
+
+               maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok, 
+                   &send_tok, &ret_flags));
+
+               free(recv_tok.value);
+
+               if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
+                       fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
+
+               if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
+                       fatal("No client public key");
+               
+               if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
+                       debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
+                       packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
+                       packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
+                       packet_send();
+                       gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
+               }
+       } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+
+       if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
+               if (send_tok.length > 0) {
+                       packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
+                       packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
+                       packet_send();
+               }
+               fatal("accept_ctx died");
+       }
+
+       if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
+               fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
+
+       if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
+               fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
+       
+       if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
+               packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
+
+       klen = DH_size(dh);
+       kbuf = xmalloc(klen); 
+       kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
+       if (kout < 0)
+               fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
+
+       shared_secret = BN_new();
+       if (shared_secret == NULL)
+               fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed");
+
+       if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
+               fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
+
+       memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
+       free(kbuf);
+
+       hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+       switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
+       case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
+       case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
+               kex_dh_hash(
+                   ssh->kex->hash_alg,
+                   ssh->kex->client_version_string, ssh->kex->server_version_string,
+                   buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
+                   buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
+                   NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */
+                   dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret,
+                   hash, &hashlen
+               );
+               break;
+       case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
+               kexgex_hash(
+                   ssh->kex->hash_alg,
+                   ssh->kex->client_version_string, ssh->kex->server_version_string,
+                   buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
+                   buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
+                   NULL, 0,
+                   min, nbits, max,
+                   dh->p, dh->g,
+                   dh_client_pub,
+                   dh->pub_key,
+                   shared_secret,
+                   hash, &hashlen
+               );
+               break;
+       default:
+               fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
+       }
+
+       BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
+
+       if (ssh->kex->session_id == NULL) {
+               ssh->kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
+               ssh->kex->session_id = xmalloc(ssh->kex->session_id_len);
+               memcpy(ssh->kex->session_id, hash, ssh->kex->session_id_len);
+       }
+
+       gssbuf.value = hash;
+       gssbuf.length = hashlen;
+
+       if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok))))
+               fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
+
+       packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE);
+       packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
+       packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length);
+
+       if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+               packet_put_char(1); /* true */
+               packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
+       } else {
+               packet_put_char(0); /* false */
+       }
+       packet_send();
+
+       gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
+       gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
+
+       if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
+               gss_kex_context = ctxt;
+       else 
+               ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
+
+       DH_free(dh);
+
+       kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
+       BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+       kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
+
+       /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
+        * just exchanged.  */
+       if (options.gss_store_rekey)
+               ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
+       return 0;
+}
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index f517da48..cabfeb8a 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+@@ -230,11 +232,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
+     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign},
+ #endif
+     {0, 0, NULL}
+ };
+ 
+ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
+#endif
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+     {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
+ #endif
+@@ -302,6 +311,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+        /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+        monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+        monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
+       monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
+#endif
+ 
+        /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
+        while (!authenticated) {
+@@ -408,6 +421,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+        monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+        monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+        monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
+       monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
+#endif         
+ 
+        if (!no_pty_flag) {
+                monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
+@@ -1626,6 +1643,13 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+ # endif
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+                kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+               if (options.gss_keyex) {
+                       kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+                       kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+                       kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+               }
+#endif
+                kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
+                kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
+                kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
+@@ -1714,8 +1738,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
+        OM_uint32 major;
+        u_int len;
+ 
+-       if (!options.gss_authentication)
+-               fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+       if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+               fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
+ 
+        goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+        goid.length = len;
+@@ -1744,8 +1768,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
+        OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
+        u_int len;
+ 
+-       if (!options.gss_authentication)
+-               fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+       if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+               fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
+ 
+        in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+        in.length = len;
+@@ -1764,6 +1788,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
+                monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
+                monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
+                monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
+               monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1);
+        }
+        return (0);
+ }
+@@ -1775,8 +1800,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
+        OM_uint32 ret;
+        u_int len;
+ 
+-       if (!options.gss_authentication)
+-               fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+       if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+               fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
+ 
+        gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+        gssbuf.length = len;
+@@ -1805,10 +1830,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
+        int authenticated;
+        const char *displayname;
+ 
+-       if (!options.gss_authentication)
+-               fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+       if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+               fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
+ 
+-       authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
+       authenticated = authctxt->valid && 
+           ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw);
+ 
+        buffer_clear(m);
+        buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
+@@ -1824,5 +1850,76 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
+        /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
+        return (authenticated);
+ }
+
+int 
+mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+       gss_buffer_desc data;
+       gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+       OM_uint32 major, minor;
+       u_int len;
+
+       if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+               fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
+
+       data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+       data.length = len;
+       if (data.length != 20) 
+               fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__, 
+                   (int) data.length);
+
+       /* Save the session ID on the first time around */
+       if (session_id2_len == 0) {
+               session_id2_len = data.length;
+               session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
+               memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
+       }
+       major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
+
+       free(data.value);
+
+       buffer_clear(m);
+       buffer_put_int(m, major);
+       buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length);
+
+       mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
+
+       gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
+
+       /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
+       monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
+       
+       /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */
+       monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1);
+
+       return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) {
+       ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
+       int ok;
+
+       if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+               fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
+
+       store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+       store.envvar   = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+       store.envval   = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+
+       ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
+
+       free(store.filename);
+       free(store.envvar);
+       free(store.envval);
+
+       buffer_clear(m);
+       buffer_put_int(m, ok);
+
+       mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
+
+       return(0);
+}
+
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+ 
+diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
+index d68f6745..ec41404c 100644
+--- a/monitor.h
+++ b/monitor.h
+@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
+        MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
+        MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
+ 
+       MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151,
+       MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153,
+
+ };
+ 
+ struct monitor {
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
+index 69212aaf..0e171a6a 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
+@@ -937,7 +937,7 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
+ {
+        Buffer m;
+        int authenticated = 0;
+@@ -954,5 +954,50 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+        debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
+        return (authenticated);
+ }
+
+OM_uint32
+mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
+{
+       Buffer m;
+       OM_uint32 major;
+       u_int len;
+
+       buffer_init(&m);
+       buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length);
+
+       mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m);
+       mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m);
+
+       major = buffer_get_int(&m);
+       hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
+       hash->length = len;
+
+       buffer_free(&m);
+
+       return(major);
+}
+
+int
+mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store)
+{
+       Buffer m;
+       int ok;
+
+       buffer_init(&m);
+
+       buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : "");
+       buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : "");
+       buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : "");
+       
+       mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
+       mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
+
+       ok = buffer_get_int(&m);
+
+       buffer_free(&m);
+       
+       return (ok);
+}
+
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+ 
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
+index 9e032d20..7b2e8945 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
+@@ -57,8 +57,10 @@ int mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
+    gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
+-int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
+int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *);
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index f63894f9..99e03ee1 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ typedef enum {
+        oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
+        oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
+        oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
+       oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey,
+       oGssServerIdentity, 
+        oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
+        oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
+        oHashKnownHosts,
+@@ -199,10 +201,20 @@ static struct {
+        /* Sometimes-unsupported options */
+ #if defined(GSSAPI)
+        { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
+       { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx },
+        { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
+       { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
+       { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity },
+       { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity },
+       { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey },
+ # else
+        { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
+       { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
+        { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
+       { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
+       { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported },
+       { "gssapiserveridentity", oUnsupported },
+       { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported },
+ #endif
+ #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+        { "smartcarddevice", oPKCS11Provider },
+@@ -976,10 +988,30 @@ parse_time:
+                intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+                goto parse_flag;
+ 
+       case oGssKeyEx:
+               intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
+               goto parse_flag;
+
+        case oGssDelegateCreds:
+                intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
+                goto parse_flag;
+ 
+       case oGssTrustDns:
+               intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
+               goto parse_flag;
+
+       case oGssClientIdentity:
+               charptr = &options->gss_client_identity;
+               goto parse_string;
+
+       case oGssServerIdentity:
+               charptr = &options->gss_server_identity;
+               goto parse_string;
+
+       case oGssRenewalRekey:
+               intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey;
+               goto parse_flag;
+
+        case oBatchMode:
+                intptr = &options->batch_mode;
+                goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1790,7 +1822,12 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
+        options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
+        options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+        options->gss_authentication = -1;
+       options->gss_keyex = -1;
+        options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
+       options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
+       options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1;
+       options->gss_client_identity = NULL;
+       options->gss_server_identity = NULL;
+        options->password_authentication = -1;
+        options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+        options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
+@@ -1930,8 +1967,14 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+                options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
+        if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+                options->gss_authentication = 0;
+       if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
+               options->gss_keyex = 0;
+        if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
+                options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
+       if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
+               options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
+       if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
+               options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0;
+        if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+                options->password_authentication = 1;
+        if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
+index 22fe5c18..d61161a8 100644
+--- a/readconf.h
+++ b/readconf.h
+@@ -42,7 +42,12 @@ typedef struct {
+        int     challenge_response_authentication;
+                                        /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
+        int     gss_authentication;     /* Try GSS authentication */
+       int     gss_keyex;              /* Try GSS key exchange */
+        int     gss_deleg_creds;        /* Delegate GSS credentials */
+       int     gss_trust_dns;          /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
+       int     gss_renewal_rekey;      /* Credential renewal forces rekey */
+       char    *gss_client_identity;   /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */
+       char    *gss_server_identity;   /* GSSAPI target principal */
+        int     password_authentication;        /* Try password
+                                                 * authentication. */
+        int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 2c321a4a..8ba74517 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -113,8 +113,10 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+        options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
+        options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
+        options->gss_authentication=-1;
+       options->gss_keyex = -1;
+        options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
+        options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
+       options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
+        options->password_authentication = -1;
+        options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+        options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+@@ -268,10 +270,14 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+                options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
+        if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+                options->gss_authentication = 0;
+       if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
+               options->gss_keyex = 0;
+        if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
+                options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
+        if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
+                options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
+       if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
+               options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
+        if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+                options->password_authentication = 1;
+        if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+@@ -410,6 +416,7 @@ typedef enum {
+        sHostKeyAlgorithms,
+        sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
+        sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
+       sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey,
+        sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+        sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+        sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
+@@ -484,12 +491,20 @@ static struct {
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+        { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+        { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+       { "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+       { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+       { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #else
+        { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+        { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+       { "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+       { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+       { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
+       { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+       { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+        { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+        { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1253,6 +1268,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+                intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+                goto parse_flag;
+ 
+       case sGssKeyEx:
+               intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
+               goto parse_flag;
+
+        case sGssCleanupCreds:
+                intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
+                goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1261,6 +1280,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+                intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
+                goto parse_flag;
+ 
+       case sGssStoreRekey:
+               intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey;
+               goto parse_flag;
+
+        case sPasswordAuthentication:
+                intptr = &options->password_authentication;
+                goto parse_flag;
+@@ -2301,7 +2324,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ #endif
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+        dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
+       dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
+        dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
+       dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
+       dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
+ #endif
+        dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
+        dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index 1dca702e..641e93c8 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
+++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -119,8 +119,10 @@ typedef struct {
+        int     kerberos_get_afs_token;         /* If true, try to get AFS token if
+                                                 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
+        int     gss_authentication;     /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
+       int     gss_keyex;              /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
+        int     gss_cleanup_creds;      /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
+        int     gss_strict_acceptor;    /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
+       int     gss_store_rekey;
+        int     password_authentication;        /* If true, permit password
+                                                 * authentication. */
+        int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
+diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
+index 6593e422..919660a0 100644
+--- a/ssh-gss.h
+++ b/ssh-gss.h
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.12 2017/06/24 06:34:38 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+  *
+  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -61,10 +61,22 @@
+ 
+ #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
+ 
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT                            30
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE                        31
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE                        32
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY                         33
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR                           34
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ                       40
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP                          41
+#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID                           "gss-group1-sha1-"
+#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID                          "gss-group14-sha1-"
+#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID                            "gss-gex-sha1-"
+
+ typedef struct {
+        char *filename;
+        char *envvar;
+        char *envval;
+       struct passwd *owner;
+        void *data;
+ } ssh_gssapi_ccache;
+ 
+@@ -72,8 +84,11 @@ typedef struct {
+        gss_buffer_desc displayname;
+        gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
+        gss_cred_id_t creds;
+       gss_name_t name;
+        struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
+        ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
+       int used;
+       int updated;
+ } ssh_gssapi_client;
+ 
+ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+@@ -84,6 +99,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+        int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
+        int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
+        void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+       int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ } ssh_gssapi_mech;
+ 
+ typedef struct {
+@@ -94,10 +110,11 @@ typedef struct {
+        gss_OID         oid; /* client */
+        gss_cred_id_t   creds; /* server */
+        gss_name_t      client; /* server */
+-       gss_cred_id_t   client_creds; /* server */
+       gss_cred_id_t   client_creds; /* both */
+ } Gssctxt;
+ 
+ extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
+extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context;
+ 
+ int  ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
+@@ -119,17 +136,33 @@ void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **);
+ void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+-int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
+int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *);
+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
+int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
+ 
+ /* In the server */
+typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, 
+    const char *);
+char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *);
+char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
+    const char *);
+gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
+int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *, 
+    const char *);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+-int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
+int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
+ void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
+ void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
+ const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
+ 
+char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
+int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void);
+
+int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store);
+void ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void);
+
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+ 
+ #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
+diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
+index c12f5ef5..bcb9f153 100644
+--- a/ssh_config
+++ b/ssh_config
+@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
+ #   HostbasedAuthentication no
+ #   GSSAPIAuthentication no
+ #   GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
+#   GSSAPIKeyExchange no
+#   GSSAPITrustDNS no
+ #   BatchMode no
+ #   CheckHostIP yes
+ #   AddressFamily any
+diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+index eab8dd01..9a06a757 100644
+--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -720,10 +720,42 @@ The default is
+ Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
+ The default is
+ .Cm no .
+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using
+GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key.
+The default is
+.Cm no .
+.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity
+If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when 
+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default 
+identity will be used.
+.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity
+If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when 
+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the
+expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target
+hostname.
+ .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+ Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
+ The default is
+ .Cm no .
+.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
+If set to 
+.Cm yes
+then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the
+ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed 
+credentials to a session on the server.
+The default is
+.Cm no .
+.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
+Set to 
+.Cm yes
+to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
+the name of the host being connected to. If 
+.Cm no ,
+the hostname entered on the
+command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
+The default is
+.Cm no .
+ .It Cm HashKnownHosts
+ Indicates that
+ .Xr ssh 1
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index be9397e4..c22477f5 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -162,6 +162,11 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
+        struct kex *kex;
+        int r;
+ 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL;
+       char *gss_host = NULL;
+#endif
+
+        xxx_host = host;
+        xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
+ 
+@@ -192,6 +197,35 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
+                    order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port));
+        }
+ 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       if (options.gss_keyex) {
+               /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
+                * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
+               orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+
+               if (options.gss_server_identity)
+                       gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
+               else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
+                       gss_host = remote_hostname(active_state);
+               else
+                       gss_host = xstrdup(host);
+
+               gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
+                   options.gss_client_identity);
+               if (gss) {
+                       debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
+                       xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
+                           "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+
+                       /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also
+                        * support the 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
+                       orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
+                       xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
+                           "%s,null", orig);
+               }
+       }
+#endif
+
+        if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
+                packet_set_rekey_limits(options.rekey_limit,
+                    options.rekey_interval);
+@@ -213,15 +247,41 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
+ # endif
+ #endif
+        kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       if (options.gss_keyex) {
+               kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
+               kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
+               kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
+       }
+#endif
+        kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+        kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+        kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
+ 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       if (options.gss_keyex) {
+               kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
+               kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
+               kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity;
+               kex->gss_host = gss_host;
+       }
+#endif
+
+        ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(active_state, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done);
+ 
+        /* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */
+        myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] =
+            compat_kex_proposal(options.kex_algorithms);
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       /* repair myproposal after it was crumpled by the */
+       /* ext-info removal above */
+       if (gss) {
+               orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+               xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
+                   "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+               free(gss);
+       }
+#endif
+        if ((r = kex_prop2buf(kex->my, myproposal)) != 0)
+                fatal("kex_prop2buf: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ 
+@@ -311,6 +371,7 @@ int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ int    input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ int    input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ int    input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+int    userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt);
+ #endif
+ 
+ void   userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
+@@ -327,6 +388,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
+ 
+ Authmethod authmethods[] = {
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+       {"gssapi-keyex",
+               userauth_gsskeyex,
+               NULL,
+               &options.gss_authentication,
+               NULL},
+        {"gssapi-with-mic",
+                userauth_gssapi,
+                NULL,
+@@ -654,25 +720,40 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
+        static u_int mech = 0;
+        OM_uint32 min;
+        int ok = 0;
+       char *gss_host;
+
+       if (options.gss_server_identity)
+               gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
+       else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
+               gss_host = remote_hostname(active_state);
+       else
+               gss_host = xstrdup(authctxt->host);
+ 
+        /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
+         * once. */
+ 
+        if (gss_supported == NULL)
+-               gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported);
+               if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) {
+                       gss_supported = NULL;
+                       free(gss_host);
+                       return 0;
+               }
+ 
+        /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
+        while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
+                /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
+                if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
+                    ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, 
+-                   &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
+                   &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host, 
+                    options.gss_client_identity)) {
+                        ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
+                } else {
+                        mech++;
+                }
+        }
+ 
+       free(gss_host);
+
+        if (!ok)
+                return 0;
+ 
+@@ -763,8 +844,8 @@ input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+        Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+        Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+-       int oidlen;
+-       char *oidv;
+       u_int oidlen;
+       u_char *oidv;
+ 
+        if (authctxt == NULL)
+                fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
+@@ -877,6 +958,48 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+        free(lang);
+        return 0;
+ }
+
+int
+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+       Buffer b;
+       gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
+       gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+       OM_uint32 ms;
+
+       static int attempt = 0;
+       if (attempt++ >= 1)
+               return (0);
+
+       if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
+               debug("No valid Key exchange context"); 
+               return (0);
+       }
+
+       ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
+           "gssapi-keyex");
+
+       gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
+       gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
+
+       if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
+               buffer_free(&b);
+               return (0);
+       }
+
+       packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+       packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+       packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
+       packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
+       packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
+       packet_send();
+
+       buffer_free(&b);
+       gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
+
+       return (1);
+}
+
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+ 
+ int
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index 51a1aaf6..45e50fac 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -122,6 +122,10 @@
+ #include "version.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ 
+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
+#include <Security/AuthSession.h>
+#endif
+
+ /* Re-exec fds */
+ #define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD   (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
+ #define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD         (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
+@@ -529,7 +533,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
+ 
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+        /* Cache supported mechanism OIDs for later use */
+-       if (options.gss_authentication)
+       if (options.gss_authentication || options.gss_keyex)
+                ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -1708,10 +1712,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+                    key ? "private" : "agent", i, sshkey_ssh_name(pubkey), fp);
+                free(fp);
+        }
+#ifndef GSSAPI
+       /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
+        if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
+                logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
+                exit(1);
+        }
+#endif
+ 
+        /*
+         * Load certificates. They are stored in an array at identical
+@@ -1987,6 +1994,60 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+            remote_ip, remote_port, laddr,  ssh_local_port(ssh));
+        free(laddr);
+ 
+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
+       /*
+        * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if
+        * the current session is the root session or we are not launched
+        * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode).  We do not
+        * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from
+        * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us.
+        *
+        * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an
+        * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating
+        * new sessions for us.  Then all the users will end up in the
+        * same session (bad).
+        *
+        * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us
+        * automatically.
+        *
+        * We must create the session before any credentials are stored
+        * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below).
+        */
+       {
+               OSStatus err = 0;
+               SecuritySessionId sid = 0;
+               SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0;
+
+               err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs);
+               if (err)
+                       error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
+                           (unsigned) err);
+               else
+                       debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
+                           (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
+
+               if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot))
+                       debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... "
+                           "assuming inetd created the session for us.");
+               else {
+                       debug("Creating new security session...");
+                       err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote);
+                       if (err)
+                               error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X",
+                                   (unsigned) err);
+
+                       err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, 
+                           &sattrs);
+                       if (err)
+                               error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
+                                   (unsigned) err);
+                       else
+                               debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
+                                   (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
+               }
+       }
+#endif
+
+        /*
+         * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
+         * successfully authenticates itself.  So we set up an alarm which is
+@@ -2170,6 +2231,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
+        myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
+            list_hostkey_types());
+ 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       {
+       char *orig;
+       char *gss = NULL;
+       char *newstr = NULL;
+       orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+
+       /* 
+        * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
+        * the other key exchange algorithms
+        */
+
+       if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
+               orig = NULL;
+
+       if (options.gss_keyex)
+               gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
+       else
+               gss = NULL;
+
+       if (gss && orig)
+               xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+       else if (gss)
+               newstr = gss;
+       else if (orig)
+               newstr = orig;
+
+       /* 
+        * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
+        * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
+        * host key algorithm we support
+        */
+       if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
+               myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
+
+       if (newstr)
+               myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
+       else
+               fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
+       }
+#endif
+
+        /* start key exchange */
+        if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0)
+                fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r));
+@@ -2187,6 +2290,13 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
+ # endif
+ #endif
+        kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       if (options.gss_keyex) {
+               kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+               kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+               kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+       }
+#endif
+        kex->server = 1;
+        kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+        kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+index 4eb2e02e..c01dd656 100644
+--- a/sshd_config
+++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile    .ssh/authorized_keys
+ # GSSAPI options
+ #GSSAPIAuthentication no
+ #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
+#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
+#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
+ 
+ # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
+ # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 251b7467..0dbcb8da 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -635,6 +635,11 @@ The default is
+ Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
+ The default is
+ .Cm no .
+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
+doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
+The default is
+.Cm no .
+ .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
+ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
+ on logout.
+@@ -654,6 +659,11 @@ machine's default store.
+ This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines.
+ The default is
+ .Cm yes .
+.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey
+Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a 
+successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed 
+or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is
+.Cm no .
+ .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
+ Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication
+ as a comma-separated pattern list.
+diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
+index e91c54f5..c2cf0e03 100644
+--- a/sshkey.c
+++ b/sshkey.c
+@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] = {
+ #  endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
+ # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+       { "null", "null", KEY_NULL, 0, 0, 0 },
+        { NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+@@ -200,7 +201,7 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep)
+        const struct keytype *kt;
+ 
+        for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
+-               if (kt->name == NULL)
+               if (kt->name == NULL || kt->type == KEY_NULL)
+                        continue;
+                if (!include_sigonly && kt->sigonly)
+                        continue;
+diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
+index 9093eac5..b5d020cb 100644
+--- a/sshkey.h
+++ b/sshkey.h
+@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ enum sshkey_types {
+        KEY_DSA_CERT,
+        KEY_ECDSA_CERT,
+        KEY_ED25519_CERT,
+       KEY_NULL,
+        KEY_UNSPEC
+ };
+ 
diff --git a/debian/patches/keepalive-extensions.patch b/debian/patches/keepalive-extensions.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d3eca5924
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/keepalive-extensions.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+From c147d4dbab74e0dbf738beb9d9f4220534ae9da6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Richard Kettlewell <rjk@greenend.org.uk>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:52 +0000
+Subject: Various keepalive extensions
+Add compatibility aliases for ProtocolKeepAlives and SetupTimeOut, supported
+in previous versions of Debian's OpenSSH package but since superseded by
+ServerAliveInterval.  (We're probably stuck with this bit for
+compatibility.)
+In batch mode, default ServerAliveInterval to five minutes.
+Adjust documentation to match and to give some more advice on use of
+keepalives.
+Author: Ian Jackson <ian@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
+Author: Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>
+Author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+Last-Update: 2017-10-04
+Patch-Name: keepalive-extensions.patch
+---
+ readconf.c    | 14 ++++++++++++--
+ ssh_config.5  | 21 +++++++++++++++++++--
+ sshd_config.5 |  3 +++
+ 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index d2b28a41..45caa095 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ typedef enum {
+        oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys,
+        oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedKeyTypes,
+        oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, oProxyJump,
+       oProtocolKeepAlives, oSetupTimeOut,
+        oIgnore, oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported
+ } OpCodes;
+ 
+@@ -318,6 +319,8 @@ static struct {
+        { "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes },
+        { "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown },
+        { "proxyjump", oProxyJump },
+       { "protocolkeepalives", oProtocolKeepAlives },
+       { "setuptimeout", oSetupTimeOut },
+ 
+        { NULL, oBadOption }
+ };
+@@ -1406,6 +1409,8 @@ parse_keytypes:
+                goto parse_flag;
+ 
+        case oServerAliveInterval:
+       case oProtocolKeepAlives: /* Debian-specific compatibility alias */
+       case oSetupTimeOut:       /* Debian-specific compatibility alias */
+                intptr = &options->server_alive_interval;
+                goto parse_time;
+ 
+@@ -2042,8 +2047,13 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+                options->rekey_interval = 0;
+        if (options->verify_host_key_dns == -1)
+                options->verify_host_key_dns = 0;
+-       if (options->server_alive_interval == -1)
+-               options->server_alive_interval = 0;
+       if (options->server_alive_interval == -1) {
+               /* in batch mode, default is 5mins */
+               if (options->batch_mode == 1)
+                       options->server_alive_interval = 300;
+               else
+                       options->server_alive_interval = 0;
+       }
+        if (options->server_alive_count_max == -1)
+                options->server_alive_count_max = 3;
+        if (options->control_master == -1)
+diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+index 9a06a757..d6f43c2d 100644
+--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -247,8 +247,12 @@ Valid arguments are
+ If set to
+ .Cm yes ,
+ passphrase/password querying will be disabled.
+In addition, the
+.Cm ServerAliveInterval
+option will be set to 300 seconds by default (Debian-specific).
+ This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no user
+-is present to supply the password.
+is present to supply the password,
+and where it is desirable to detect a broken network swiftly.
+ The argument must be
+ .Cm yes
+ or
+@@ -1455,7 +1459,14 @@ from the server,
+ will send a message through the encrypted
+ channel to request a response from the server.
+ The default
+-is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server.
+is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server,
+or 300 if the
+.Cm BatchMode
+option is set (Debian-specific).
+.Cm ProtocolKeepAlives
+and
+.Cm SetupTimeOut
+are Debian-specific compatibility aliases for this option.
+ .It Cm StreamLocalBindMask
+ Sets the octal file creation mode mask
+ .Pq umask
+@@ -1529,6 +1540,12 @@ Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the
+ other side.
+ If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one
+ of the machines will be properly noticed.
+This option only uses TCP keepalives (as opposed to using ssh level
+keepalives), so takes a long time to notice when the connection dies.
+As such, you probably want
+the
+.Cm ServerAliveInterval
+option as well.
+ However, this means that
+ connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people
+ find it annoying.
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 0dbcb8da..7db25552 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -1454,6 +1454,9 @@ This avoids infinitely hanging sessions.
+ .Pp
+ To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
+ .Cm no .
+.Pp
+This option was formerly called
+.Cm KeepAlive .
+ .It Cm TrustedUserCAKeys
+ Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate authorities that are
+ trusted to sign user certificates for authentication, or
diff --git a/debian/patches/mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch b/debian/patches/mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3edb37705
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From 19be4218cdb262f7b584b0104ee430de0e24eeb8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Scott Moser <smoser@ubuntu.com>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:03 +0000
+Subject: Mention ssh-keygen in ssh fingerprint changed warning
+Author: Chris Lamb <lamby@debian.org>
+Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1843
+Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/686607
+Last-Update: 2017-08-22
+Patch-Name: mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch
+---
+ sshconnect.c | 9 ++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
+index 5eed5880..7ce2716c 100644
+--- a/sshconnect.c
+++ b/sshconnect.c
+@@ -1022,9 +1022,13 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+                        error("%s. This could either mean that", key_msg);
+                        error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host");
+                        error("and its host key have changed at the same time.");
+-                       if (ip_status != HOST_NEW)
+                       if (ip_status != HOST_NEW) {
+                                error("Offending key for IP in %s:%lu",
+                                    ip_found->file, ip_found->line);
+                               error("  remove with:");
+                               error("  ssh-keygen -f \"%s\" -R \"%s\"",
+                                   ip_found->file, ip);
+                       }
+                }
+                /* The host key has changed. */
+                warn_changed_key(host_key);
+@@ -1033,6 +1037,9 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+                error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu",
+                    sshkey_type(host_found->key),
+                    host_found->file, host_found->line);
+               error("  remove with:");
+               error("  ssh-keygen -f \"%s\" -R \"%s\"",
+                   host_found->file, host);
+ 
+                /*
+                 * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
diff --git a/debian/patches/no-dsa-host-key-by-default.patch b/debian/patches/no-dsa-host-key-by-default.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c24ff4e3f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/no-dsa-host-key-by-default.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+From 922f3a7599d03234b6bb2ffb22a33624e7cf1953 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+Date: Mon, 16 Jan 2017 13:53:04 +0000
+Subject: Remove ssh_host_dsa_key from HostKey default
+The client no longer accepts DSA host keys, and servers using the
+default HostKey setting should have better host keys available.
+Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2662
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/850614
+Last-Update: 2017-01-16
+Patch-Name: no-dsa-host-key-by-default.patch
+---
+ servconf.c    | 2 --
+ sshd.8        | 7 +++----
+ sshd_config   | 1 -
+ sshd_config.5 | 7 +++----
+ 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index b0146405..5e996cf8 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -205,8 +205,6 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+                /* fill default hostkeys for protocols */
+                options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
+                    _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE;
+-               options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
+-                   _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE;
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+                options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
+                    _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE;
+diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
+index 02c5e1df..8c230657 100644
+--- a/sshd.8
+++ b/sshd.8
+@@ -164,11 +164,10 @@ This option must be given if
+ is not run as root (as the normal
+ host key files are normally not readable by anyone but root).
+ The default is
+-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key ,
+-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key ,
+-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key ,
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+ and
+-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key .
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key .
+ It is possible to have multiple host key files for
+ the different host key algorithms.
+ .It Fl i
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+index f68edf36..92822959 100644
+--- a/sshd_config
+++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@
+ #ListenAddress ::
+ 
+ #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+-#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+ #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+ #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+ 
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 16be4f62..ef520680 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -749,11 +749,10 @@ is not to load any certificates.
+ Specifies a file containing a private host key
+ used by SSH.
+ The defaults are
+-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key ,
+-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key ,
+-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key ,
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+ and
+-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key .
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key .
+ .Pp
+ Note that
+ .Xr sshd 8
diff --git a/debian/patches/no-openssl-version-status.patch b/debian/patches/no-openssl-version-status.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cbfaebfe0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/no-openssl-version-status.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+From b614a7f9148af821919165be47c6c29f59dc6b44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:14 +0000
+Subject: Don't check the status field of the OpenSSL version
+There is no reason to check the version of OpenSSL (in Debian).  If it's
+not compatible the soname will change.  OpenSSH seems to want to do a
+check for the soname based on the version number, but wants to keep the
+status of the release the same.  Remove that check on the status since
+it doesn't tell you anything about how compatible that version is.
+Author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/93581
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/664383
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/732940
+Forwarded: not-needed
+Last-Update: 2014-10-07
+Patch-Name: no-openssl-version-status.patch
+---
+ openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c         | 6 +++---
+ openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c | 1 +
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
+index 259fccbe..aaa953f2 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
+@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
+ /*
+  * OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
+  * We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0.
+- * After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we
+ * After that, we accept compatible fix and status versions (so we
+  * allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed
+  * within a patch series.
+  */
+@@ -55,10 +55,10 @@ ssh_compatible_openssl(long headerver, long libver)
+        }
+ 
+        /*
+-        * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor,status must match and library
+        * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor must match and library
+         * fix version must be equal to or newer than the header.
+         */
+-       mask = 0xfff0000fL; /* major,minor,status */
+       mask = 0xfff00000L; /* major,minor */
+        hfix = (headerver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
+        lfix = (libver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
+        if ( (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask) && lfix >= hfix)
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c b/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
+index 5d019b59..58474873 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
+@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ struct version_test {
+ 
+        /* built with 1.0.1b release headers */
+        { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000101fL, 1},/* exact match */
+       { 0x1000101fL, 0x10001010L, 1}, /* different status: ok */
+        { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000102fL, 1}, /* newer library patch version: ok */
+        { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000100fL, 1}, /* older library patch version: ok */
+        { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000201fL, 1}, /* newer library fix version: ok */
diff --git a/debian/patches/openbsd-docs.patch b/debian/patches/openbsd-docs.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9297decd6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/openbsd-docs.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+From 7e53354725eeb002e6126a73fd5f294ed9f9b03e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:09 +0000
+Subject: Adjust various OpenBSD-specific references in manual pages
+No single bug reference for this patch, but history includes:
+ http://bugs.debian.org/154434 (login.conf(5))
+ http://bugs.debian.org/513417 (/etc/rc)
+ http://bugs.debian.org/530692 (ssl(8))
+ https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/456660 (ssl(8))
+Forwarded: not-needed
+Last-Update: 2017-10-04
+Patch-Name: openbsd-docs.patch
+---
+ moduli.5      |  4 ++--
+ ssh-keygen.1  | 12 ++++--------
+ ssh.1         |  4 ++++
+ sshd.8        |  5 ++---
+ sshd_config.5 |  3 +--
+ 5 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+diff --git a/moduli.5 b/moduli.5
+index ef0de085..149846c8 100644
+--- a/moduli.5
+++ b/moduli.5
+@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
+ .Nd Diffie-Hellman moduli
+ .Sh DESCRIPTION
+ The
+-.Pa /etc/moduli
+.Pa /etc/ssh/moduli
+ file contains prime numbers and generators for use by
+ .Xr sshd 8
+ in the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange key exchange method.
+@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ first estimates the size of the modulus required to produce enough
+ Diffie-Hellman output to sufficiently key the selected symmetric cipher.
+ .Xr sshd 8
+ then randomly selects a modulus from
+-.Fa /etc/moduli
+.Fa /etc/ssh/moduli
+ that best meets the size requirement.
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
+index 5f1ec09b..dfbc65dd 100644
+--- a/ssh-keygen.1
+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
+@@ -176,9 +176,7 @@ key in
+ .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+ or
+ .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa .
+-Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys,
+-as seen in
+-.Pa /etc/rc .
+Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys.
+ .Pp
+ Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which
+ to store the private key.
+@@ -229,9 +227,7 @@ If
+ .Fl f
+ has also been specified, its argument is used as a prefix to the
+ default path for the resulting host key files.
+-This is used by
+-.Pa /etc/rc
+-to generate new host keys.
+This is used by system administration scripts to generate new host keys.
+ .It Fl a Ar rounds
+ When saving a new-format private key (i.e. an ed25519 key or when the
+ .Fl o
+@@ -676,7 +672,7 @@ option.
+ Valid generator values are 2, 3, and 5.
+ .Pp
+ Screened DH groups may be installed in
+-.Pa /etc/moduli .
+.Pa /etc/ssh/moduli .
+ It is important that this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths and
+ that both ends of a connection share common moduli.
+ .Sh CERTIFICATES
+@@ -863,7 +859,7 @@ on all machines
+ where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication.
+ There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret.
+ .Pp
+-.It Pa /etc/moduli
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/moduli
+ Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX.
+ The file format is described in
+ .Xr moduli 5 .
+diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
+index 3cc94688..2a2aab30 100644
+--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
+@@ -842,6 +842,10 @@ implements public key authentication protocol automatically,
+ using one of the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA algorithms.
+ The HISTORY section of
+ .Xr ssl 8
+(on non-OpenBSD systems, see
+.nh
+http://www.openbsd.org/cgi\-bin/man.cgi?query=ssl&sektion=8#HISTORY)
+.hy
+ contains a brief discussion of the DSA and RSA algorithms.
+ .Pp
+ The file
+diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
+index 2ed523a2..02c5e1df 100644
+--- a/sshd.8
+++ b/sshd.8
+@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ over an insecure network.
+ .Nm
+ listens for connections from clients.
+ It is normally started at boot from
+-.Pa /etc/rc .
+.Pa /etc/init.d/ssh .
+ It forks a new
+ daemon for each incoming connection.
+ The forked daemons handle
+@@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ This file is for host-based authentication (see
+ .Xr ssh 1 ) .
+ It should only be writable by root.
+ .Pp
+-.It Pa /etc/moduli
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/moduli
+ Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange"
+ key exchange method.
+ The file format is described in
+@@ -950,7 +950,6 @@ The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
+ .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
+ .Xr chroot 2 ,
+ .Xr hosts_access 5 ,
+-.Xr login.conf 5 ,
+ .Xr moduli 5 ,
+ .Xr sshd_config 5 ,
+ .Xr inetd 8 ,
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 41e8c939..79676a95 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -382,8 +382,7 @@ then no banner is displayed.
+ By default, no banner is displayed.
+ .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+ Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
+-PAM or through authentication styles supported in
+-.Xr login.conf 5 )
+PAM).
+ The default is
+ .Cm yes .
+ .It Cm ChrootDirectory
diff --git a/debian/patches/package-versioning.patch b/debian/patches/package-versioning.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0d851e68c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/package-versioning.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From 326b09bce8058629980cc92f289fd7912269eb98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:05 +0000
+Subject: Include the Debian version in our identification
+This makes it easier to audit networks for versions patched against security
+vulnerabilities.  It has little detrimental effect, as attackers will
+generally just try attacks rather than bothering to scan for
+vulnerable-looking version strings.  (However, see debian-banner.patch.)
+Forwarded: not-needed
+Last-Update: 2017-10-04
+Patch-Name: package-versioning.patch
+---
+ sshconnect.c | 2 +-
+ sshd.c       | 2 +-
+ version.h    | 7 ++++++-
+ 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
+index 7ce2716c..3280b310 100644
+--- a/sshconnect.c
+++ b/sshconnect.c
+@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ send_client_banner(int connection_out, int minor1)
+ {
+        /* Send our own protocol version identification. */
+        xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\r\n",
+-           PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION);
+           PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE);
+        if (atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, client_version_string,
+            strlen(client_version_string)) != strlen(client_version_string))
+                fatal("write: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index af1ec337..eccf81bb 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int sock_in, int sock_out)
+        char remote_version[256];       /* Must be at least as big as buf. */
+ 
+        xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n",
+-           PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION,
+           PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE,
+            *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
+            options.version_addendum);
+ 
+diff --git a/version.h b/version.h
+index e093f623..b7c5ad2a 100644
+--- a/version.h
+++ b/version.h
+@@ -3,4 +3,9 @@
+ #define SSH_VERSION    "OpenSSH_7.6"
+ 
+ #define SSH_PORTABLE   "p1"
+-#define SSH_RELEASE    SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
+#define SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM    SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
+#ifdef SSH_EXTRAVERSION
+#define SSH_RELEASE    SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM " " SSH_EXTRAVERSION
+#else
+#define SSH_RELEASE    SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM
+#endif
diff --git a/debian/patches/permitopen-argument-handling.patch b/debian/patches/permitopen-argument-handling.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6369c395c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/permitopen-argument-handling.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From e293f21da513a7db59fe1997c9e90e2e9cdbceda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed, 4 Oct 2017 18:49:30 +0000
+Subject: Fix PermitOpen argument handling
+fix (another) problem in PermitOpen introduced during the
+channels.c refactor: the third and subsequent arguments to PermitOpen were
+being silently ignored; ok markus@
+Upstream-ID: 067c89f1f53cbc381628012ba776d6861e6782fd
+Origin: https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=7c9613fac3371cf65fb07739212cdd1ebf6575da
+Last-Update: 2017-10-07
+Patch-Name: permitopen-argument-handling.patch
+---
+ servconf.c | 8 ++++----
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 5e996cf8..9daa182c 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
+ 
+-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.312 2017/10/02 19:33:20 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.313 2017/10/04 18:49:30 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+  *                    All rights reserved
+@@ -1690,9 +1690,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+                if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+                        fatal("%s line %d: missing PermitOpen specification",
+                            filename, linenum);
+-               i = options->num_permitted_opens;       /* modified later */
+               value = options->num_permitted_opens;   /* modified later */
+                if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) {
+-                       if (*activep && i == 0) {
+                       if (*activep && value == 0) {
+                                options->num_permitted_opens = 1;
+                                options->permitted_opens = xcalloc(1,
+                                    sizeof(*options->permitted_opens));
+@@ -1710,7 +1710,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+                        if (arg == NULL || ((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0))
+                                fatal("%s line %d: bad port number in "
+                                    "PermitOpen", filename, linenum);
+-                       if (*activep && i == 0) {
+                       if (*activep && value == 0) {
+                                options->permitted_opens = xrecallocarray(
+                                    options->permitted_opens,
+                                    options->num_permitted_opens,
diff --git a/debian/patches/restore-authorized_keys2.patch b/debian/patches/restore-authorized_keys2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..098f9d681
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/restore-authorized_keys2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 6c2e9847f608cc9c36236eecc58241cd3358dd5b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+Date: Sun, 5 Mar 2017 02:02:11 +0000
+Subject: Restore reading authorized_keys2 by default
+Upstream seems to intend to gradually phase this out, so don't assume
+that this will remain the default forever.  However, we were late in
+adopting the upstream sshd_config changes, so it makes sense to extend
+the grace period.
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/852320
+Forwarded: not-needed
+Last-Update: 2017-03-05
+Patch-Name: restore-authorized_keys2.patch
+---
+ sshd_config | 5 ++---
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+index 92822959..a32dc1d4 100644
+--- a/sshd_config
+++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -36,9 +36,8 @@
+ 
+ #PubkeyAuthentication yes
+ 
+-# The default is to check both .ssh/authorized_keys and .ssh/authorized_keys2
+-# but this is overridden so installations will only check .ssh/authorized_keys
+-AuthorizedKeysFile     .ssh/authorized_keys
+# Expect .ssh/authorized_keys2 to be disregarded by default in future.
+#AuthorizedKeysFile    .ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2
+ 
+ #AuthorizedPrincipalsFile none
+ 
diff --git a/debian/patches/restore-tcp-wrappers.patch b/debian/patches/restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5832897d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+From cdd9076a145a95c21538eedb3f728a897480c5de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+Date: Tue, 7 Oct 2014 13:22:41 +0100
+Subject: Restore TCP wrappers support
+Support for TCP wrappers was dropped in OpenSSH 6.7.  See this message
+and thread:
+  https://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/2014-April/032497.html
+It is true that this reduces preauth attack surface in sshd.  On the
+other hand, this support seems to be quite widely used, and abruptly
+dropping it (from the perspective of users who don't read
+openssh-unix-dev) could easily cause more serious problems in practice.
+It's not entirely clear what the right long-term answer for Debian is,
+but it at least probably doesn't involve dropping this feature shortly
+before a freeze.
+Forwarded: not-needed
+Last-Update: 2014-10-07
+Patch-Name: restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
+---
+ configure.ac | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ sshd.8       |  7 +++++++
+ sshd.c       | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 89 insertions(+)
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 84bfad8c..3b30736b 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -1503,6 +1503,62 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([skey],
+        ]
+ )
+ 
+# Check whether user wants TCP wrappers support
+TCPW_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH([tcp-wrappers],
+       [  --with-tcp-wrappers[[=PATH]] Enable tcpwrappers support (optionally in PATH)],
+       [
+               if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+                       saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+                       saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+                       saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
+                       if test -n "${withval}" && \
+                           test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+                               if test -d "${withval}/lib"; then
+                                       if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
+                                               LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+                                       else
+                                               LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+                                       fi
+                               else
+                                       if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
+                                               LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
+                                       else
+                                               LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
+                                       fi
+                               fi
+                               if test -d "${withval}/include"; then
+                                       CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
+                               else
+                                       CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
+                               fi
+                       fi
+                       LIBS="-lwrap $LIBS"
+                       AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libwrap])
+                       AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <tcpd.h>
+int deny_severity = 0, allow_severity = 0;
+                               ]], [[
+       hosts_access(0);
+                               ]])], [
+                                       AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+                                       AC_DEFINE([LIBWRAP], [1],
+                                               [Define if you want
+                                               TCP Wrappers support])
+                                       SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lwrap"
+                                       TCPW_MSG="yes"
+                               ], [
+                                       AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libwrap missing])
+                               
+                       ])
+                       LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+               fi
+       ]
+)
+
+ # Check whether user wants to use ldns
+ LDNS_MSG="no"
+ AC_ARG_WITH(ldns,
+@@ -5133,6 +5189,7 @@ echo "                 KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG"
+ echo "                   SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
+ echo "                 Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG"
+ echo "                     S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"
+echo "              TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG"
+ echo "              MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
+ echo "                   libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
+ echo "                   libldns support: $LDNS_MSG"
+diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
+index a4201146..2ed523a2 100644
+--- a/sshd.8
+++ b/sshd.8
+@@ -839,6 +839,12 @@ the user's home directory becomes accessible.
+ This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be
+ readable by anyone else.
+ .Pp
+.It Pa /etc/hosts.allow
+.It Pa /etc/hosts.deny
+Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are defined here.
+Further details are described in
+.Xr hosts_access 5 .
+.Pp
+ .It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
+ This file is for host-based authentication (see
+ .Xr ssh 1 ) .
+@@ -943,6 +949,7 @@ The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
+ .Xr chroot 2 ,
+.Xr hosts_access 5 ,
+ .Xr login.conf 5 ,
+ .Xr moduli 5 ,
+ .Xr sshd_config 5 ,
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index 45e50fac..a66e9ca6 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -126,6 +126,13 @@
+ #include <Security/AuthSession.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+#ifdef LIBWRAP
+#include <tcpd.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+int allow_severity;
+int deny_severity;
+#endif /* LIBWRAP */
+
+ /* Re-exec fds */
+ #define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD   (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
+ #define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD         (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
+@@ -1987,6 +1994,24 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+        audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
+ #endif
+#ifdef LIBWRAP
+       allow_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_INFO;
+       deny_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_WARNING;
+       /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */
+       if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
+               struct request_info req;
+
+               request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0);
+               fromhost(&req);
+
+               if (!hosts_access(&req)) {
+                       debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper");
+                       refuse(&req);
+                       /* NOTREACHED */
+                       fatal("libwrap refuse returns");
+               }
+       }
+#endif /* LIBWRAP */
+ 
+        /* Log the connection. */
+        laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock_in);
diff --git a/debian/patches/scp-quoting.patch b/debian/patches/scp-quoting.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..43153ec04
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/scp-quoting.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From ef7aa8189491e0b43f14f7f15fb5e66903f7e185 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Nicolas=20Valc=C3=A1rcel?= <nvalcarcel@ubuntu.com>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:59 +0000
+Subject: Adjust scp quoting in verbose mode
+Tweak scp's reporting of filenames in verbose mode to be a bit less
+confusing with spaces.
+This should be revised to mimic real shell quoting.
+Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/89945
+Last-Update: 2010-02-27
+Patch-Name: scp-quoting.patch
+---
+ scp.c | 12 ++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index a533eb09..12e3199d 100644
+--- a/scp.c
+++ b/scp.c
+@@ -194,8 +194,16 @@ do_local_cmd(arglist *a)
+ 
+        if (verbose_mode) {
+                fprintf(stderr, "Executing:");
+-               for (i = 0; i < a->num; i++)
+-                       fmprintf(stderr, " %s", a->list[i]);
+               for (i = 0; i < a->num; i++) {
+                       if (i == 0)
+                               fmprintf(stderr, " %s", a->list[i]);
+                       else
+                               /*
+                                * TODO: misbehaves if a->list[i] contains a
+                                * single quote
+                                */
+                               fmprintf(stderr, " '%s'", a->list[i]);
+               }
+                fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+        }
+        if ((pid = fork()) == -1)
diff --git a/debian/patches/seccomp-getuid-geteuid.patch b/debian/patches/seccomp-getuid-geteuid.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..41455aa83
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/seccomp-getuid-geteuid.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From 8165600205696cca8a080a5cb6746070512174e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 13:31:05 -0300
+Subject: Allow getuid and geteuid calls
+getuid and geteuid are needed when using an openssl engine that calls a
+crypto card, e.g. ICA (libica).
+Those syscalls are also needed by the distros for audit code.
+Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Origin: other, https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2752
+Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2752
+Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1686618
+Last-Update: 2017-08-28
+Patch-Name: seccomp-getuid-geteuid.patch
+---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index 6e7de311..e86aa2c9 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -175,6 +175,18 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_getpid
+        SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid),
+ #endif
+#ifdef __NR_getuid
+       SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_getuid32
+       SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_geteuid
+       SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_geteuid32
+       SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
+#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getrandom
+        SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
+ #endif
diff --git a/debian/patches/seccomp-s390-flock-ipc.patch b/debian/patches/seccomp-s390-flock-ipc.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5fb94137d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/seccomp-s390-flock-ipc.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From a5a99443e190a90eb511215aa7c1fa940f79b901 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 10:53:04 -0300
+Subject: Allow flock and ipc syscall for s390 architecture
+In order to use the OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11 engine it is needed to allow flock
+and ipc calls, because this engine calls OpenCryptoki (a PKCS#11
+implementation) which calls the libraries that will communicate with the
+crypto cards. OpenCryptoki makes use of flock and ipc and, as of now,
+this is only need on s390 architecture.
+Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Origin: other, https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2752
+Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2752
+Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1686618
+Last-Update: 2017-08-28
+Patch-Name: seccomp-s390-flock-ipc.patch
+---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index ca75cc71..6e7de311 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -166,6 +166,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_exit_group
+        SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group),
+ #endif
+#if defined(__NR_flock) && defined(__s390__)
+       SC_ALLOW(__NR_flock),
+#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getpgid
+        SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpgid),
+ #endif
+@@ -178,6 +181,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
+        SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday),
+ #endif
+#if defined(__NR_ipc) && defined(__s390__)
+       SC_ALLOW(__NR_ipc),
+#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_madvise
+        SC_ALLOW(__NR_madvise),
+ #endif
diff --git a/debian/patches/seccomp-s390-ioctl-ep11-crypto.patch b/debian/patches/seccomp-s390-ioctl-ep11-crypto.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..595b3d6ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/seccomp-s390-ioctl-ep11-crypto.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 801a62eedaaf47b20dbf4b426dc3e084bf0c8d49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 13:33:30 -0300
+Subject: Enable specific ioctl call for EP11 crypto card (s390)
+The EP11 crypto card needs to make an ioctl call, which receives an
+specific argument. This crypto card is for s390 only.
+Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Origin: other, https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2752
+Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2752
+Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1686618
+Last-Update: 2017-08-28
+Patch-Name: seccomp-s390-ioctl-ep11-crypto.patch
+---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index e86aa2c9..98062f15 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -250,6 +250,8 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+        SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK),
+        SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO),
+        SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT),
+       /* Allow ioctls for EP11 crypto card on s390 */
+       SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSENDEP11CPRB),
+ #endif
+ #if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__) && defined(__X32_SYSCALL_BIT)
+        /*
diff --git a/debian/patches/selinux-role.patch b/debian/patches/selinux-role.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1402b9025
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/selinux-role.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,473 @@
+From 4b276122c04aed0726803a92c8ca955e614a4d3a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Manoj Srivastava <srivasta@debian.org>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:49 +0000
+Subject: Handle SELinux authorisation roles
+Rejected upstream due to discomfort with magic usernames; a better approach
+will need an SSH protocol change.  In the meantime, this came from Debian's
+SELinux maintainer, so we'll keep it until we have something better.
+Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1641
+Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/394795
+Last-Update: 2017-10-04
+Patch-Name: selinux-role.patch
+---
+ auth.h                      |  1 +
+ auth2.c                     | 10 ++++++++--
+ monitor.c                   | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ monitor.h                   |  2 ++
+ monitor_wrap.c              | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++--
+ monitor_wrap.h              |  3 ++-
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux.h |  4 ++--
+ platform.c                  |  4 ++--
+ platform.h                  |  2 +-
+ session.c                   | 10 +++++-----
+ session.h                   |  2 +-
+ sshd.c                      |  2 +-
+ sshpty.c                    |  4 ++--
+ sshpty.h                    |  2 +-
+ 15 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
+diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
+index 29835ae9..27a1a88e 100644
+--- a/auth.h
+++ b/auth.h
+@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
+        char            *service;
+        struct passwd   *pw;            /* set if 'valid' */
+        char            *style;
+       char            *role;
+ 
+        /* Method lists for multiple authentication */
+        char            **auth_methods; /* modified from server config */
+diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
+index 54070e3a..1f9ec632 100644
+--- a/auth2.c
+++ b/auth2.c
+@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+        Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+        Authmethod *m = NULL;
+-       char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL;
+       char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL, *role = NULL;
+        int authenticated = 0;
+ 
+        if (authctxt == NULL)
+@@ -233,8 +233,13 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+        debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
+        debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
+ 
+       if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
+               *role++ = 0;
+
+        if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
+                *style++ = 0;
+       else if (role && (style = strchr(role, ':')) != NULL)
+               *style++ = '\0';
+ 
+        if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) {
+                /* setup auth context */
+@@ -261,8 +266,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+                    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
+                authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
+                authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
+               authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
+                if (use_privsep)
+-                       mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
+                       mm_inform_authserv(service, style, role);
+                userauth_banner();
+                if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
+                        packet_disconnect("no authentication methods enabled");
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index cabfeb8a..510e3496 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_authrole(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
+@@ -204,6 +205,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
+     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+@@ -799,6 +801,7 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ 
+        /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
+        monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
+       monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1);
+        monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+@@ -829,14 +832,37 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ 
+        authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+        authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+-       debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
+-           __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
+       authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+       debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s, role=%s",
+           __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style, authctxt->role);
+ 
+        if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
+                free(authctxt->style);
+                authctxt->style = NULL;
+        }
+ 
+       if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
+               free(authctxt->role);
+               authctxt->role = NULL;
+       }
+
+       return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_authrole(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+       monitor_permit_authentications(1);
+
+       authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+       debug3("%s: role=%s",
+           __func__, authctxt->role);
+
+       if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
+               free(authctxt->role);
+               authctxt->role = NULL;
+       }
+
+        return (0);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1471,7 +1497,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
+        res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
+        if (res == 0)
+                goto error;
+-       pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
+       pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty, authctxt->role);
+ 
+        buffer_put_int(m, 1);
+        buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
+diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
+index ec41404c..4c7955d7 100644
+--- a/monitor.h
+++ b/monitor.h
+@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
+        MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151,
+        MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153,
+ 
+       MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 154,
+
+ };
+ 
+ struct monitor {
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
+index 0e171a6a..d806bb2e 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
+@@ -336,10 +336,10 @@ mm_auth2_read_banner(void)
+        return (banner);
+ }
+ 
+-/* Inform the privileged process about service and style */
+/* Inform the privileged process about service, style, and role */
+ 
+ void
+-mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
+mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style, char *role)
+ {
+        Buffer m;
+ 
+@@ -348,12 +348,30 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
+        buffer_init(&m);
+        buffer_put_cstring(&m, service);
+        buffer_put_cstring(&m, style ? style : "");
+       buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : "");
+ 
+        mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, &m);
+ 
+        buffer_free(&m);
+ }
+ 
+/* Inform the privileged process about role */
+
+void
+mm_inform_authrole(char *role)
+{
+       Buffer m;
+
+       debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+       buffer_init(&m);
+       buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : "");
+
+       mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, &m);
+
+       buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+ /* Do the password authentication */
+ int
+ mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password)
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
+index 7b2e8945..a9ccb243 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
+@@ -41,7 +41,8 @@ int mm_is_monitor(void);
+ DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
+ int mm_key_sign(struct sshkey *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int,
+     const char *);
+-void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
+void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *, char *);
+void mm_inform_authrole(char *);
+ struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *);
+ char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
+ int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *);
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+index e4c5d1b7..e26faf08 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+@@ -27,6 +27,12 @@
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ 
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#endif
+
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "port-linux.h"
+@@ -56,7 +62,7 @@ ssh_selinux_enabled(void)
+ 
+ /* Return the default security context for the given username */
+ static security_context_t
+-ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
+ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, const char *role)
+ {
+        security_context_t sc = NULL;
+        char *sename = NULL, *lvl = NULL;
+@@ -71,9 +77,16 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
+-       r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
+       if (role != NULL && role[0])
+               r = get_default_context_with_rolelevel(sename, role, lvl, NULL,
+                                                      &sc);
+       else
+               r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
+ #else
+-       r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
+       if (role != NULL && role[0])
+               r = get_default_context_with_role(sename, role, NULL, &sc);
+       else
+               r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
+ #endif
+ 
+        if (r != 0) {
+@@ -103,7 +116,7 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
+ 
+ /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
+ void
+-ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname, const char *role)
+ {
+        security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+ 
+@@ -112,7 +125,7 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+ 
+        debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+ 
+-       user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+       user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, role);
+        if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
+                switch (security_getenforce()) {
+                case -1:
+@@ -134,7 +147,7 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+ 
+ /* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
+ void
+-ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
+ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty, const char *role)
+ {
+        security_context_t new_tty_ctx = NULL;
+        security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+@@ -145,7 +158,7 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
+ 
+        debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
+ 
+-       user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+       user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, role);
+ 
+        /* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
+ 
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+index 3c22a854..c8812942 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
+-void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
+-void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *, const char *);
+void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *, const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+ #endif
+diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
+index 18c7751d..380ee3a4 100644
+--- a/platform.c
+++ b/platform.c
+@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+  * called if sshd is running as root.
+  */
+ void
+-platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
+platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw, const char *role)
+ {
+ #if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(USE_PAM)
+        /*
+@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
+        }
+ #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-       ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
+       ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name, role);
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/platform.h b/platform.h
+index ea4f9c58..60d72ffe 100644
+--- a/platform.h
+++ b/platform.h
+@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ void platform_post_fork_parent(pid_t child_pid);
+ void platform_post_fork_child(void);
+ int  platform_privileged_uidswap(void);
+ void platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
+-void platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *);
+void platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *, const char *);
+ char *platform_get_krb5_client(const char *);
+ char *platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *);
+ int platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t);
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index 4bccb62d..d40afe4f 100644
+--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
+@@ -1312,7 +1312,7 @@ safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid)
+ 
+ /* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */
+ void
+-do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw, const char *role)
+ {
+        char *chroot_path, *tmp;
+ 
+@@ -1340,7 +1340,7 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+                endgrent();
+ #endif
+ 
+-               platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw);
+               platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw, role);
+ 
+                if (!in_chroot && options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
+                    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
+@@ -1477,7 +1477,7 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+ 
+        /* Force a password change */
+        if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
+-               do_setusercontext(pw);
+               do_setusercontext(pw, s->authctxt->role);
+                child_close_fds(ssh);
+                do_pwchange(s);
+                exit(1);
+@@ -1499,7 +1499,7 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+        /* When PAM is enabled we rely on it to do the nologin check */
+        if (!options.use_pam)
+                do_nologin(pw);
+-       do_setusercontext(pw);
+       do_setusercontext(pw, s->authctxt->role);
+        /*
+         * PAM session modules in do_setusercontext may have
+         * generated messages, so if this in an interactive
+@@ -1891,7 +1891,7 @@ session_pty_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
+        tty_parse_modes(s->ttyfd, &n_bytes);
+ 
+        if (!use_privsep)
+-               pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty);
+               pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty, s->authctxt->role);
+ 
+        /* Set window size from the packet. */
+        pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
+diff --git a/session.h b/session.h
+index 54dd1f0c..8535ebce 100644
+--- a/session.h
+++ b/session.h
+@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ void   session_pty_cleanup2(Session *);
+ Session        *session_new(void);
+ Session        *session_by_tty(char *);
+ void    session_close(struct ssh *, Session *);
+-void    do_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
+void    do_setusercontext(struct passwd *, const char *);
+ 
+ const char     *session_get_remote_name_or_ip(struct ssh *, u_int, int);
+ 
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index a66e9ca6..af1ec337 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -677,7 +677,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+        reseed_prngs();
+ 
+        /* Drop privileges */
+-       do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
+       do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw, authctxt->role);
+ 
+  skip:
+        /* It is safe now to apply the key state */
+diff --git a/sshpty.c b/sshpty.c
+index fe2fb5aa..feb22b06 100644
+--- a/sshpty.c
+++ b/sshpty.c
+@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ pty_change_window_size(int ptyfd, u_int row, u_int col,
+ }
+ 
+ void
+-pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty)
+pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty, const char *role)
+ {
+        struct group *grp;
+        gid_t gid;
+@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty)
+                    strerror(errno));
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-       ssh_selinux_setup_pty(pw->pw_name, tty);
+       ssh_selinux_setup_pty(pw->pw_name, tty, role);
+ #endif
+ 
+        if (st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid || st.st_gid != gid) {
+diff --git a/sshpty.h b/sshpty.h
+index 9ec7e9a1..de7e000a 100644
+--- a/sshpty.h
+++ b/sshpty.h
+@@ -24,5 +24,5 @@ int    pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
+ void    pty_release(const char *);
+ void    pty_make_controlling_tty(int *, const char *);
+ void    pty_change_window_size(int, u_int, u_int, u_int, u_int);
+-void    pty_setowner(struct passwd *, const char *);
+void    pty_setowner(struct passwd *, const char *, const char *);
+ void    disconnect_controlling_tty(void);
diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..01aa2c87c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/series
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+gssapi.patch
+restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
+selinux-role.patch
+ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch
+keepalive-extensions.patch
+syslog-level-silent.patch
+user-group-modes.patch
+scp-quoting.patch
+shell-path.patch
+dnssec-sshfp.patch
+auth-log-verbosity.patch
+mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch
+package-versioning.patch
+debian-banner.patch
+authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
+openbsd-docs.patch
+ssh-argv0.patch
+doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
+ssh-agent-setgid.patch
+no-openssl-version-status.patch
+gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
+systemd-readiness.patch
+debian-config.patch
+no-dsa-host-key-by-default.patch
+restore-authorized_keys2.patch
+seccomp-s390-flock-ipc.patch
+seccomp-getuid-geteuid.patch
+seccomp-s390-ioctl-ep11-crypto.patch
+permitopen-argument-handling.patch
+fix-regress-putty-transfer.patch
diff --git a/debian/patches/shell-path.patch b/debian/patches/shell-path.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..29abf10f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/shell-path.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From c239ba6fa4560704a237779f82445d5f125847e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:00 +0000
+Subject: Look for $SHELL on the path for ProxyCommand/LocalCommand
+There's some debate on the upstream bug about whether POSIX requires this.
+I (Colin Watson) agree with Vincent and think it does.
+Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1494
+Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/492728
+Last-Update: 2013-09-14
+Patch-Name: shell-path.patch
+---
+ sshconnect.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
+index dc7a704d..5eed5880 100644
+--- a/sshconnect.c
+++ b/sshconnect.c
+@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ ssh_proxy_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, u_short port,
+                /* Execute the proxy command.  Note that we gave up any
+                   extra privileges above. */
+                signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
+-               execv(argv[0], argv);
+               execvp(argv[0], argv);
+                perror(argv[0]);
+                exit(1);
+        }
+@@ -1435,7 +1435,7 @@ ssh_local_cmd(const char *args)
+        if (pid == 0) {
+                signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
+                debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args);
+-               execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
+               execlp(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
+                error("Couldn't execute %s -c \"%s\": %s",
+                    shell, args, strerror(errno));
+                _exit(1);
diff --git a/debian/patches/ssh-agent-setgid.patch b/debian/patches/ssh-agent-setgid.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9ac4977b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/ssh-agent-setgid.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From b37d4f364f9c9bfbaf372e903ebbe80ef8ae2264 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:13 +0000
+Subject: Document consequences of ssh-agent being setgid in ssh-agent(1)
+Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/711623
+Forwarded: no
+Last-Update: 2013-06-08
+Patch-Name: ssh-agent-setgid.patch
+---
+ ssh-agent.1 | 15 +++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
+diff --git a/ssh-agent.1 b/ssh-agent.1
+index 83b2b41c..7230704a 100644
+--- a/ssh-agent.1
+++ b/ssh-agent.1
+@@ -206,6 +206,21 @@ environment variable holds the agent's process ID.
+ .Pp
+ The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command
+ line terminates.
+.Pp
+In Debian,
+.Nm
+is installed with the set-group-id bit set, to prevent
+.Xr ptrace 2
+attacks retrieving private key material.
+This has the side-effect of causing the run-time linker to remove certain
+environment variables which might have security implications for set-id
+programs, including
+.Ev LD_PRELOAD ,
+.Ev LD_LIBRARY_PATH ,
+and
+.Ev TMPDIR .
+If you need to set any of these environment variables, you will need to do
+so in the program executed by ssh-agent.
+ .Sh FILES
+ .Bl -tag -width Ds
+ .It Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.<ppid>
diff --git a/debian/patches/ssh-argv0.patch b/debian/patches/ssh-argv0.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3a560ad78
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/ssh-argv0.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From 7e5cf5d27a7be47203280c665ca7311269f53671 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:10 +0000
+Subject: ssh(1): Refer to ssh-argv0(1)
+Old versions of OpenSSH (up to 2.5 or thereabouts) allowed creating symlinks
+to ssh with the name of the host you want to connect to.  Debian ships an
+ssh-argv0 script restoring this feature; this patch refers to its manual
+page from ssh(1).
+Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/111341
+Forwarded: not-needed
+Last-Update: 2013-09-14
+Patch-Name: ssh-argv0.patch
+---
+ ssh.1 | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
+index 2a2aab30..711fe608 100644
+--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
+@@ -1556,6 +1556,7 @@ if an error occurred.
+ .Xr sftp 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-argv0 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
+ .Xr tun 4 ,
diff --git a/debian/patches/ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch b/debian/patches/ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ef1ce4e99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From 19971fb92159a621b55f0b9da76dd38a56d7247c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@ubuntu.com>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:50 +0000
+Subject: Accept obsolete ssh-vulnkey configuration options
+These options were used as part of Debian's response to CVE-2008-0166.
+Nearly six years later, we no longer need to continue carrying the bulk
+of that patch, but we do need to avoid failing when the associated
+configuration options are still present.
+Last-Update: 2014-02-09
+Patch-Name: ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch
+---
+ readconf.c | 1 +
+ servconf.c | 1 +
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index 99e03ee1..d2b28a41 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ static struct {
+        { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
+        { "globalknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated },
+        { "rhostsauthentication", oDeprecated },
+       { "useblacklistedkeys", oDeprecated },
+        { "userknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated },
+        { "useroaming", oDeprecated },
+        { "usersh", oDeprecated },
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 8ba74517..9889fb0a 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -525,6 +525,7 @@ static struct {
+        { "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
+        { "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+       { "permitblacklistedkeys", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd, SSHCFG_ALL },
+        { "permituserenvironment", sPermitUserEnvironment, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { "uselogin", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
diff --git a/debian/patches/syslog-level-silent.patch b/debian/patches/syslog-level-silent.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3ed6287a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/syslog-level-silent.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 215bd91f12b0ddb9754483ee6e3c3b4751256dca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jonathan David Amery <jdamery@ysolde.ucam.org>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:54 +0000
+Subject: "LogLevel SILENT" compatibility
+"LogLevel SILENT" (-qq) was introduced in Debian openssh 1:3.0.1p1-1 to
+match the behaviour of non-free SSH, in which -q does not suppress fatal
+errors.  However, this was unintentionally broken in 1:4.6p1-2 and nobody
+complained, so we've dropped most of it.  The parts that remain are basic
+configuration file compatibility, and an adjustment to "Pseudo-terminal will
+not be allocated ..." which should be split out into a separate patch.
+Author: Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>
+Author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+Last-Update: 2013-09-14
+Patch-Name: syslog-level-silent.patch
+---
+ log.c | 1 +
+ ssh.c | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+diff --git a/log.c b/log.c
+index 99450dd1..1559091d 100644
+--- a/log.c
+++ b/log.c
+@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ static struct {
+        LogLevel val;
+ } log_levels[] =
+ {
+       { "SILENT",     SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET }, /* compatibility */
+        { "QUIET",      SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET },
+        { "FATAL",      SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL },
+        { "ERROR",      SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR },
+diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
+index ae37432b..9cb21171 100644
+--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
+@@ -1166,7 +1166,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+        /* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */
+        if ((!isatty(fileno(stdin)) || stdin_null_flag) &&
+            options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_FORCE) {
+-               if (tty_flag)
+               if (tty_flag && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
+                        logit("Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because "
+                            "stdin is not a terminal.");
+                tty_flag = 0;
diff --git a/debian/patches/systemd-readiness.patch b/debian/patches/systemd-readiness.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..537a5cab6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/systemd-readiness.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+From ba3f6b85ede72ef42987f0069f5ed2b88ebe69fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michael Biebl <biebl@debian.org>
+Date: Mon, 21 Dec 2015 16:08:47 +0000
+Subject: Add systemd readiness notification support
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/778913
+Forwarded: no
+Last-Update: 2017-08-22
+Patch-Name: systemd-readiness.patch
+---
+ configure.ac | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ sshd.c       |  9 +++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+)
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 3b30736b..483a9038 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -4389,6 +4389,29 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
+ AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
+ AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
+ 
+# Check whether user wants systemd support
+SYSTEMD_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH(systemd,
+       [  --with-systemd          Enable systemd support],
+       [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+               AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
+               if test "$PKGCONFIG" != "no"; then
+                       AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libsystemd])
+                       if $PKGCONFIG --exists libsystemd; then
+                               SYSTEMD_CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags libsystemd`
+                               SYSTEMD_LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libsystemd`
+                               CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $SYSTEMD_CFLAGS"
+                               SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $SYSTEMD_LIBS"
+                               AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+                               AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYSTEMD, 1, [Define if you want systemd support.])
+                               SYSTEMD_MSG="yes"
+                       else
+                               AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+                       fi
+               fi
+       fi ]
+)
+
+ # Looking for programs, paths and files
+ 
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
+@@ -5196,6 +5219,7 @@ echo "                   libldns support: $LDNS_MSG"
+ echo "  Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
+ echo "           Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
+ echo "         Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
+echo "                   systemd support: $SYSTEMD_MSG"
+ echo "       IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
+ echo "           Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
+ echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index a5a1193d..1fde5a63 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@
+ #include <prot.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
+#include <systemd/sd-daemon.h>
+#endif
+
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "ssh.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+@@ -1881,6 +1885,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+                        }
+                }
+ 
+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
+               /* Signal systemd that we are ready to accept connections */
+               sd_notify(0, "READY=1");
+#endif
+
+                /* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
+                server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
+                    &newsock, config_s);
diff --git a/debian/patches/user-group-modes.patch b/debian/patches/user-group-modes.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..338c7567d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/user-group-modes.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+From b1033fed87fd9fa24dccab45f00cadcbc7144c47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:58 +0000
+Subject: Allow harmless group-writability
+Allow secure files (~/.ssh/config, ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, etc.) to be
+group-writable, provided that the group in question contains only the file's
+owner.  Rejected upstream for IMO incorrect reasons (e.g. a misunderstanding
+about the contents of gr->gr_mem).  Given that per-user groups and umask 002
+are the default setup in Debian (for good reasons - this makes operating in
+setgid directories with other groups much easier), we need to permit this by
+default.
+Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1060
+Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=314347
+Last-Update: 2017-10-04
+Patch-Name: user-group-modes.patch
+---
+ auth-rhosts.c |  6 ++----
+ auth.c        |  3 +--
+ misc.c        | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
+ misc.h        |  2 ++
+ readconf.c    |  3 +--
+ ssh.1         |  2 ++
+ ssh_config.5  |  2 ++
+ 7 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+diff --git a/auth-rhosts.c b/auth-rhosts.c
+index ecf956f0..4dccd5e6 100644
+--- a/auth-rhosts.c
+++ b/auth-rhosts.c
+@@ -261,8 +261,7 @@ auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
+                return 0;
+        }
+        if (options.strict_modes &&
+-           ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
+-           (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
+           !secure_permissions(&st, pw->pw_uid)) {
+                logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
+                    "bad ownership or modes for home directory.", pw->pw_name);
+                auth_debug_add("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
+@@ -288,8 +287,7 @@ auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
+                 * allowing access to their account by anyone.
+                 */
+                if (options.strict_modes &&
+-                   ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
+-                   (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
+                   !secure_permissions(&st, pw->pw_uid)) {
+                        logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: bad modes for %.200s",
+                            pw->pw_name, buf);
+                        auth_debug_add("Bad file modes for %.200s", buf);
+diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
+index 6aec3605..68a1e4a7 100644
+--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
+@@ -467,8 +467,7 @@ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, const char *host,
+                user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
+                if (options.strict_modes &&
+                    (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
+-                   ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
+-                   (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
+                   !secure_permissions(&st, pw->pw_uid)) {
+                        logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
+                            "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
+                            pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
+diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
+index 05950a47..40aeeef3 100644
+--- a/misc.c
+++ b/misc.c
+@@ -57,8 +57,9 @@
+ #include <netdb.h>
+ #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+ # include <paths.h>
+-#include <pwd.h>
+ #endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+ #ifdef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD
+ #include <net/if.h>
+ #endif
+@@ -723,6 +724,55 @@ read_keyfile_line(FILE *f, const char *filename, char *buf, size_t bufsz,
+        return -1;
+ }
+ 
+int
+secure_permissions(struct stat *st, uid_t uid)
+{
+       if (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st->st_uid) && st->st_uid != uid)
+               return 0;
+       if ((st->st_mode & 002) != 0)
+               return 0;
+       if ((st->st_mode & 020) != 0) {
+               /* If the file is group-writable, the group in question must
+                * have exactly one member, namely the file's owner.
+                * (Zero-member groups are typically used by setgid
+                * binaries, and are unlikely to be suitable.)
+                */
+               struct passwd *pw;
+               struct group *gr;
+               int members = 0;
+
+               gr = getgrgid(st->st_gid);
+               if (!gr)
+                       return 0;
+
+               /* Check primary group memberships. */
+               while ((pw = getpwent()) != NULL) {
+                       if (pw->pw_gid == gr->gr_gid) {
+                               ++members;
+                               if (pw->pw_uid != uid)
+                                       return 0;
+                       }
+               }
+               endpwent();
+
+               pw = getpwuid(st->st_uid);
+               if (!pw)
+                       return 0;
+
+               /* Check supplementary group memberships. */
+               if (gr->gr_mem[0]) {
+                       ++members;
+                       if (strcmp(pw->pw_name, gr->gr_mem[0]) ||
+                           gr->gr_mem[1])
+                               return 0;
+               }
+
+               if (!members)
+                       return 0;
+       }
+       return 1;
+}
+
+ int
+ tun_open(int tun, int mode)
+ {
+@@ -1626,8 +1676,7 @@ safe_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
+                snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf);
+                return -1;
+        }
+-       if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) ||
+-           (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) {
+       if (!secure_permissions(stp, uid)) {
+                snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
+                    buf);
+                return -1;
+@@ -1642,8 +1691,7 @@ safe_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
+                strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
+ 
+                if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
+-                   (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) ||
+-                   (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
+                   !secure_permissions(&st, uid)) {
+                        snprintf(err, errlen,
+                            "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
+                        return -1;
+diff --git a/misc.h b/misc.h
+index 153d1137..d8759ab1 100644
+--- a/misc.h
+++ b/misc.h
+@@ -163,6 +163,8 @@ char        *read_passphrase(const char *, int);
+ int     ask_permission(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+ int     read_keyfile_line(FILE *, const char *, char *, size_t, u_long *);
+ 
+int     secure_permissions(struct stat *st, uid_t uid);
+
+ #define MINIMUM(a, b)  (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b))
+ #define MAXIMUM(a, b)  (((a) > (b)) ? (a) : (b))
+ #define ROUNDUP(x, y)   ((((x)+((y)-1))/(y))*(y))
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index 45caa095..be3d5873 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -1766,8 +1766,7 @@ read_config_file_depth(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw,
+ 
+                if (fstat(fileno(f), &sb) == -1)
+                        fatal("fstat %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno));
+-               if (((sb.st_uid != 0 && sb.st_uid != getuid()) ||
+-                   (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0))
+               if (!secure_permissions(&sb, getuid()))
+                        fatal("Bad owner or permissions on %s", filename);
+        }
+ 
+diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
+index 2ab1697f..3cc94688 100644
+--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
+@@ -1456,6 +1456,8 @@ The file format and configuration options are described in
+ .Xr ssh_config 5 .
+ Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
+ read/write for the user, and not writable by others.
+It may be group-writable provided that the group in question contains only
+the user.
+ .Pp
+ .It Pa ~/.ssh/environment
+ Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see
+diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+index d6f43c2d..7810a418 100644
+--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -1786,6 +1786,8 @@ The format of this file is described above.
+ This file is used by the SSH client.
+ Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
+ read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
+It may be group-writable provided that the group in question contains only
+the user.
+ .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+ Systemwide configuration file.
+ This file provides defaults for those