1 files changed, 468 insertions, 18 deletions

diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
index 6e972f563..40aeeef36 100644
--- a/misc.c
+++ b/misc.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.109 2017/03/14 00:55:37 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.113 2017/08/18 05:48:04 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2005,2006 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -29,10 +29,16 @@
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/ioctl.h>
 #include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
 #include <sys/un.h>
 
 #include <limits.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
+# include <libgen.h>
+#endif
+#include <signal.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -62,6 +68,9 @@
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
 #include "platform.h"
 
 /* remove newline at end of string */
@@ -541,7 +550,7 @@ addargs(arglist *args, char *fmt, ...)
         } else if (args->num+2 >= nalloc)
                 nalloc *= 2;
 
-        args->list = xreallocarray(args->list, nalloc, sizeof(char *));
+        args->list = xrecallocarray(args->list, args->nalloc, nalloc, sizeof(char *));
         args->nalloc = nalloc;
         args->list[args->num++] = cp;
         args->list[args->num] = NULL;
@@ -715,22 +724,6 @@ read_keyfile_line(FILE *f, const char *filename, char *buf, size_t bufsz,
         return -1;
 }
 
-/*
- * return 1 if the specified uid is a uid that may own a system directory
- * otherwise 0.
- */
-int
-platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t uid)
-{
-        if (uid == 0)
-                return 1;
-#ifdef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID
-        if (uid == PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID)
-                return 1;
-#endif
-        return 0;
-}
-
 int
 secure_permissions(struct stat *st, uid_t uid)
 {
@@ -1152,6 +1145,7 @@ static const struct {
         const char *name;
         int value;
 } ipqos[] = {
+        { "none", INT_MAX },            /* can't use 0 here; that's CS0 */
         { "af11", IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 },
         { "af12", IPTOS_DSCP_AF12 },
         { "af13", IPTOS_DSCP_AF13 },
@@ -1341,3 +1335,459 @@ daemonized(void)
         debug3("already daemonized");
         return 1;
 }
+
+
+/*
+ * Splits 's' into an argument vector. Handles quoted string and basic
+ * escape characters (\\, \", \'). Caller must free the argument vector
+ * and its members.
+ */
+int
+argv_split(const char *s, int *argcp, char ***argvp)
+{
+        int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        int argc = 0, quote, i, j;
+        char *arg, **argv = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*argv));
+
+        *argvp = NULL;
+        *argcp = 0;
+
+        for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
+                /* Skip leading whitespace */
+                if (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t')
+                        continue;
+
+                /* Start of a token */
+                quote = 0;
+                if (s[i] == '\\' &&
+                    (s[i + 1] == '\'' || s[i + 1] == '\"' || s[i + 1] == '\\'))
+                        i++;
+                else if (s[i] == '\'' || s[i] == '"')
+                        quote = s[i++];
+
+                argv = xreallocarray(argv, (argc + 2), sizeof(*argv));
+                arg = argv[argc++] = xcalloc(1, strlen(s + i) + 1);
+                argv[argc] = NULL;
+
+                /* Copy the token in, removing escapes */
+                for (j = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
+                        if (s[i] == '\\') {
+                                if (s[i + 1] == '\'' ||
+                                    s[i + 1] == '\"' ||
+                                    s[i + 1] == '\\') {
+                                        i++; /* Skip '\' */
+                                        arg[j++] = s[i];
+                                } else {
+                                        /* Unrecognised escape */
+                                        arg[j++] = s[i];
+                                }
+                        } else if (quote == 0 && (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t'))
+                                break; /* done */
+                        else if (quote != 0 && s[i] == quote)
+                                break; /* done */
+                        else
+                                arg[j++] = s[i];
+                }
+                if (s[i] == '\0') {
+                        if (quote != 0) {
+                                /* Ran out of string looking for close quote */
+                                r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+                                goto out;
+                        }
+                        break;
+                }
+        }
+        /* Success */
+        *argcp = argc;
+        *argvp = argv;
+        argc = 0;
+        argv = NULL;
+        r = 0;
+ out:
+        if (argc != 0 && argv != NULL) {
+                for (i = 0; i < argc; i++)
+                        free(argv[i]);
+                free(argv);
+        }
+        return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reassemble an argument vector into a string, quoting and escaping as
+ * necessary. Caller must free returned string.
+ */
+char *
+argv_assemble(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+        int i, j, ws, r;
+        char c, *ret;
+        struct sshbuf *buf, *arg;
+
+        if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (arg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+                fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+
+        for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+                ws = 0;
+                sshbuf_reset(arg);
+                for (j = 0; argv[i][j] != '\0'; j++) {
+                        r = 0;
+                        c = argv[i][j];
+                        switch (c) {
+                        case ' ':
+                        case '\t':
+                                ws = 1;
+                                r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c);
+                                break;
+                        case '\\':
+                        case '\'':
+                        case '"':
+                                if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, '\\')) != 0)
+                                        break;
+                                /* FALLTHROUGH */
+                        default:
+                                r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c);
+                                break;
+                        }
+                        if (r != 0)
+                                fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u8: %s",
+                                    __func__, ssh_err(r));
+                }
+                if ((i != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ' ')) != 0) ||
+                    (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0) ||
+                    (r = sshbuf_putb(buf, arg)) != 0 ||
+                    (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0))
+                        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+        }
+        if ((ret = malloc(sshbuf_len(buf) + 1)) == NULL)
+                fatal("%s: malloc failed", __func__);
+        memcpy(ret, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+        ret[sshbuf_len(buf)] = '\0';
+        sshbuf_free(buf);
+        sshbuf_free(arg);
+        return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Runs command in a subprocess wuth a minimal environment.
+ * Returns pid on success, 0 on failure.
+ * The child stdout and stderr maybe captured, left attached or sent to
+ * /dev/null depending on the contents of flags.
+ * "tag" is prepended to log messages.
+ * NB. "command" is only used for logging; the actual command executed is
+ * av[0].
+ */
+pid_t
+subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command,
+    int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags)
+{
+        FILE *f = NULL;
+        struct stat st;
+        int fd, devnull, p[2], i;
+        pid_t pid;
+        char *cp, errmsg[512];
+        u_int envsize;
+        char **child_env;
+
+        if (child != NULL)
+                *child = NULL;
+
+        debug3("%s: %s command \"%s\" running as %s (flags 0x%x)", __func__,
+            tag, command, pw->pw_name, flags);
+
+        /* Check consistency */
+        if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0 &&
+            (flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) != 0) {
+                error("%s: inconsistent flags", __func__);
+                return 0;
+        }
+        if (((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) == 0) != (child == NULL)) {
+                error("%s: inconsistent flags/output", __func__);
+                return 0;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * If executing an explicit binary, then verify the it exists
+         * and appears safe-ish to execute
+         */
+        if (*av[0] != '/') {
+                error("%s path is not absolute", tag);
+                return 0;
+        }
+        temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+        if (stat(av[0], &st) < 0) {
+                error("Could not stat %s \"%s\": %s", tag,
+                    av[0], strerror(errno));
+                restore_uid();
+                return 0;
+        }
+        if (safe_path(av[0], &st, NULL, 0, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
+                error("Unsafe %s \"%s\": %s", tag, av[0], errmsg);
+                restore_uid();
+                return 0;
+        }
+        /* Prepare to keep the child's stdout if requested */
+        if (pipe(p) != 0) {
+                error("%s: pipe: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+                restore_uid();
+                return 0;
+        }
+        restore_uid();
+
+        switch ((pid = fork())) {
+        case -1: /* error */
+                error("%s: fork: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+                close(p[0]);
+                close(p[1]);
+                return 0;
+        case 0: /* child */
+                /* Prepare a minimal environment for the child. */
+                envsize = 5;
+                child_env = xcalloc(sizeof(*child_env), envsize);
+                child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
+                child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
+                child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
+                child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
+                if ((cp = getenv("LANG")) != NULL)
+                        child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LANG", cp);
+
+                for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
+                        signal(i, SIG_DFL);
+
+                if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+                        error("%s: open %s: %s", tag, _PATH_DEVNULL,
+                            strerror(errno));
+                        _exit(1);
+                }
+                if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) {
+                        error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+                        _exit(1);
+                }
+
+                /* Set up stdout as requested; leave stderr in place for now. */
+                fd = -1;
+                if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) != 0)
+                        fd = p[1];
+                else if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0)
+                        fd = devnull;
+                if (fd != -1 && dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
+                        error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+                        _exit(1);
+                }
+                closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+
+                /* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
+                if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
+                        error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
+                            strerror(errno));
+                        _exit(1);
+                }
+                if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
+                        error("%s: setresuid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
+                            strerror(errno));
+                        _exit(1);
+                }
+                /* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */
+                if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0 &&
+                    dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
+                        error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+                        _exit(1);
+                }
+
+                execve(av[0], av, child_env);
+                error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno));
+                _exit(127);
+        default: /* parent */
+                break;
+        }
+
+        close(p[1]);
+        if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) == 0)
+                close(p[0]);
+        else if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
+                error("%s: fdopen: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+                close(p[0]);
+                /* Don't leave zombie child */
+                kill(pid, SIGTERM);
+                while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
+                        ;
+                return 0;
+        }
+        /* Success */
+        debug3("%s: %s pid %ld", __func__, tag, (long)pid);
+        if (child != NULL)
+                *child = f;
+        return pid;
+}
+
+/* Returns 0 if pid exited cleanly, non-zero otherwise */
+int
+exited_cleanly(pid_t pid, const char *tag, const char *cmd, int quiet)
+{
+        int status;
+
+        while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
+                if (errno != EINTR) {
+                        error("%s: waitpid: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+                        return -1;
+                }
+        }
+        if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
+                error("%s %s exited on signal %d", tag, cmd, WTERMSIG(status));
+                return -1;
+        } else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
+                do_log2(quiet ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO,
+                    "%s %s failed, status %d", tag, cmd, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+                return -1;
+        }
+        return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check a given path for security. This is defined as all components
+ * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of
+ * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
+ *
+ * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
+ *
+ * Takes a file name, its stat information (preferably from fstat() to
+ * avoid races), the uid of the expected owner, their home directory and an
+ * error buffer plus max size as arguments.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
+ */
+int
+safe_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
+    uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen)
+{
+        char buf[PATH_MAX], homedir[PATH_MAX];
+        char *cp;
+        int comparehome = 0;
+        struct stat st;
+
+        if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
+                snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
+                    strerror(errno));
+                return -1;
+        }
+        if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
+                comparehome = 1;
+
+        if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) {
+                snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf);
+                return -1;
+        }
+        if (!secure_permissions(stp, uid)) {
+                snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
+                    buf);
+                return -1;
+        }
+
+        /* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
+        for (;;) {
+                if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
+                        snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
+                        return -1;
+                }
+                strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
+
+                if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
+                    !secure_permissions(&st, uid)) {
+                        snprintf(err, errlen,
+                            "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
+                        return -1;
+                }
+
+                /* If are past the homedir then we can stop */
+                if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0)
+                        break;
+
+                /*
+                 * dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
+                 * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too
+                 */
+                if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0))
+                        break;
+        }
+        return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Version of safe_path() that accepts an open file descriptor to
+ * avoid races.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
+ */
+int
+safe_path_fd(int fd, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
+    char *err, size_t errlen)
+{
+        struct stat st;
+
+        /* check the open file to avoid races */
+        if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
+                snprintf(err, errlen, "cannot stat file %s: %s",
+                    file, strerror(errno));
+                return -1;
+        }
+        return safe_path(file, &st, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_uid, err, errlen);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sets the value of the given variable in the environment.  If the variable
+ * already exists, its value is overridden.
+ */
+void
+child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
+        const char *value)
+{
+        char **env;
+        u_int envsize;
+        u_int i, namelen;
+
+        if (strchr(name, '=') != NULL) {
+                error("Invalid environment variable \"%.100s\"", name);
+                return;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * If we're passed an uninitialized list, allocate a single null
+         * entry before continuing.
+         */
+        if (*envp == NULL && *envsizep == 0) {
+                *envp = xmalloc(sizeof(char *));
+                *envp[0] = NULL;
+                *envsizep = 1;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Find the slot where the value should be stored.  If the variable
+         * already exists, we reuse the slot; otherwise we append a new slot
+         * at the end of the array, expanding if necessary.
+         */
+        env = *envp;
+        namelen = strlen(name);
+        for (i = 0; env[i]; i++)
+                if (strncmp(env[i], name, namelen) == 0 && env[i][namelen] == '=')
+                        break;
+        if (env[i]) {
+                /* Reuse the slot. */
+                free(env[i]);
+        } else {
+                /* New variable.  Expand if necessary. */
+                envsize = *envsizep;
+                if (i >= envsize - 1) {
+                        if (envsize >= 1000)
+                                fatal("child_set_env: too many env vars");
+                        envsize += 50;
+                        env = (*envp) = xreallocarray(env, envsize, sizeof(char *));
+                        *envsizep = envsize;
+                }
+                /* Need to set the NULL pointer at end of array beyond the new slot. */
+                env[i + 1] = NULL;
+        }
+
+        /* Allocate space and format the variable in the appropriate slot. */
+        env[i] = xmalloc(strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1);
+        snprintf(env[i], strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1, "%s=%s", name, value);
+}
+