1 files changed, 68 insertions, 35 deletions

diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index 7452e20e2..510e3496e 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.167 2017/02/03 23:05:57 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.174 2017/10/02 19:33:20 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -323,6 +323,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
                 partial = 0;
                 auth_method = "unknown";
                 auth_submethod = NULL;
+                auth2_authctxt_reset_info(authctxt);
+
                 authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
 
                 /* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
@@ -362,6 +364,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
                             auth_method, auth_submethod);
                         if (!partial && !authenticated)
                                 authctxt->failures++;
+                        if (authenticated || partial) {
+                                auth2_update_session_info(authctxt,
+                                    auth_method, auth_submethod);
+                        }
                 }
         }
 
@@ -773,10 +779,12 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
                 for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) \
                         buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x[i]); \
         } while (0)
+#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT_ALLOC(x, nx) M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx)
         /* See comment in servconf.h */
         COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
 #undef M_CP_STROPT
 #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
+#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT_ALLOC
 
         /* Create valid auth method lists */
         if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
@@ -1162,7 +1170,7 @@ mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
 int
 mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
 {
-        Key *key;
+        struct sshkey *key;
         char *cuser, *chost;
         u_char *blob;
         u_int bloblen, pubkey_auth_attempt;
@@ -1190,12 +1198,11 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
                 switch (type) {
                 case MM_USERKEY:
                         allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
-                            !auth2_userkey_already_used(authctxt, key) &&
+                            !auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key) &&
                             match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
                             options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1 &&
                             user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key,
                             pubkey_auth_attempt);
-                        pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
                         auth_method = "publickey";
                         if (options.pubkey_authentication &&
                             (!pubkey_auth_attempt || allowed != 1))
@@ -1203,11 +1210,12 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
                         break;
                 case MM_HOSTKEY:
                         allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
+                            !auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key) &&
                             match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
                             options.hostbased_key_types, 0) == 1 &&
                             hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
                             cuser, chost, key);
-                        pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key,
+                        auth2_record_info(authctxt,
                             "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"",
                             cuser, chost);
                         auth_method = "hostbased";
@@ -1218,11 +1226,10 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
                 }
         }
 
-        debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
-            __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
+        debug3("%s: key is %s", __func__, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
 
-        if (key != NULL)
-                key_free(key);
+        auth2_record_key(authctxt, 0, key);
+        sshkey_free(key);
 
         /* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
         monitor_reset_key_state();
@@ -1373,33 +1380,35 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
 }
 
 int
-mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
 {
-        Key *key;
+        struct sshkey *key;
         u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
-        u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
-        int verified = 0;
-        int valid_data = 0;
+        size_t signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
+        int r, ret, valid_data = 0, encoded_ret;
 
-        blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
-        signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
-        data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
+        if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 ||
+            (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &signature, &signaturelen)) != 0 ||
+            (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &data, &datalen)) != 0)
+                fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 
         if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
           !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
                 fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
 
-        key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
-        if (key == NULL)
-                fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__);
+        /* XXX use sshkey_froms here; need to change key_blob, etc. */
+        if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, bloblen, &key)) != 0)
+                fatal("%s: bad public key blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 
         switch (key_blobtype) {
         case MM_USERKEY:
                 valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
+                auth_method = "publickey";
                 break;
         case MM_HOSTKEY:
                 valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
                     hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
+                auth_method = "hostbased";
                 break;
         default:
                 valid_data = 0;
@@ -1408,29 +1417,28 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
         if (!valid_data)
                 fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
 
-        verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
-        debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
-            __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
-
-        /* If auth was successful then record key to ensure it isn't reused */
-        if (verified == 1 && key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY)
-                auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key);
-        else
-                key_free(key);
+        ret = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen,
+            active_state->compat);
+        debug3("%s: %s %p signature %s", __func__, auth_method, key,
+            (ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified");
+        auth2_record_key(authctxt, ret == 0, key);
 
         free(blob);
         free(signature);
         free(data);
 
-        auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased";
-
         monitor_reset_key_state();
 
-        buffer_clear(m);
-        buffer_put_int(m, verified);
+        sshkey_free(key);
+        sshbuf_reset(m);
+
+        /* encode ret != 0 as positive integer, since we're sending u32 */
+        encoded_ret = (ret != 0);
+        if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, encoded_ret)) != 0)
+                fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
         mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
 
-        return (verified == 1);
+        return ret == 0;
 }
 
 static void
@@ -1556,13 +1564,14 @@ mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, Buffer *m)
 int
 mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
 {
+        struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
         extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
         int res, status;
 
         debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__);
 
         /* The child is terminating */
-        session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close);
+        session_destroy_all(ssh, &mm_session_close);
 
 #ifdef USE_PAM
         if (options.use_pam)
@@ -1622,6 +1631,17 @@ mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buffer *m)
 #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
 
 void
+monitor_clear_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+{
+        struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+
+        ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN);
+        ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT);
+        sshbuf_free(child_state);
+        child_state = NULL;
+}
+
+void
 monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
 {
         struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
@@ -1689,9 +1709,18 @@ static void
 monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds)
 {
         int pair[2];
+#ifdef SO_ZEROIZE
+        int on = 1;
+#endif
 
         if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
                 fatal("%s: socketpair: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+#ifdef SO_ZEROIZE
+        if (setsockopt(pair[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
+                error("setsockopt SO_ZEROIZE(0): %.100s", strerror(errno));
+        if (setsockopt(pair[1], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
+                error("setsockopt SO_ZEROIZE(1): %.100s", strerror(errno));
+#endif
         FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
         FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
         mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
@@ -1825,6 +1854,7 @@ int
 mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
 {
         int authenticated;
+        const char *displayname;
 
         if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
                 fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
@@ -1840,6 +1870,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
 
         auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
 
+        if ((displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
+                auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname);
+
         /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
         return (authenticated);
 }