Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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These options were used as part of Debian's response to CVE-2008-0166.
Nearly six years later, we no longer need to continue carrying the bulk
of that patch, but we do need to avoid failing when the associated
configuration options are still present.
Last-Update: 2014-02-09
Patch-Name: ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch
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Rejected upstream due to discomfort with magic usernames; a better approach
will need an SSH protocol change. In the meantime, this came from Debian's
SELinux maintainer, so we'll keep it until we have something better.
Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1641
Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/394795
Last-Update: 2015-08-19
Patch-Name: selinux-role.patch
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Support for TCP wrappers was dropped in OpenSSH 6.7. See this message
and thread:
https://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/2014-April/032497.html
It is true that this reduces preauth attack surface in sshd. On the
other hand, this support seems to be quite widely used, and abruptly
dropping it (from the perspective of users who don't read
openssh-unix-dev) could easily cause more serious problems in practice.
It's not entirely clear what the right long-term answer for Debian is,
but it at least probably doesn't involve dropping this feature shortly
before a freeze.
Forwarded: not-needed
Last-Update: 2014-10-07
Patch-Name: restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
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This patch has been rejected upstream: "None of the OpenSSH developers are
in favour of adding this, and this situation has not changed for several
years. This is not a slight on Simon's patch, which is of fine quality, but
just that a) we don't trust GSSAPI implementations that much and b) we don't
like adding new KEX since they are pre-auth attack surface. This one is
particularly scary, since it requires hooks out to typically root-owned
system resources."
However, quite a lot of people rely on this in Debian, and it's better to
have it merged into the main openssh package rather than having separate
-krb5 packages (as we used to have). It seems to have a generally good
security history.
Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1242
Last-Updated: 2016-08-07
Patch-Name: gssapi.patch
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Report by and debugged with Hisashi T Fujinaka, dtucker nailed
the problem (lack of prototype causing return type confusion).
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get_remote_ipaddr() was replaced with ssh_remote_ipaddr()
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openssh-7.3
Upstream-ID: af106a7eb665f642648cf1993e162c899f358718
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Patch from vinschen at redhat.com.
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fix pledge violation with ssh -f; reported by Valentin
Kozamernik ok dtucker@
Upstream-ID: a61db7988db88d9dac3c4dd70e18876a8edf84aa
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improve wording; suggested by jmc@
Upstream-ID: 55cb0a24c8e0618b3ceec80998dc82c85db2d2f8
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Lower loglevel for "Authenticated with partial success"
message similar to other similar level. bz#2599, patch from cgallek at
gmail.com, ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 3faab814e947dc7b2e292edede23e94c608cb4dd
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patch from Jakub Jelen on bz#2581; ok dtucker@
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constify a few functions' arguments; patch from Jakub
Jelen bz#2581
Upstream-ID: f2043f51454ea37830ff6ad60c8b32b4220f448d
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move debug("%p", key) to before key is free'd; probable
undefined behaviour on strict compilers; reported by Jakub Jelen bz#2581
Upstream-ID: 767f323e1f5819508a0e35e388ec241bac2f953a
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reverse the order in which -J/JumpHost proxies are visited to
be more intuitive and document
reported by and manpage bits naddy@
Upstream-ID: 3a68fd6a841fd6cf8cedf6552a9607ba99df179a
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Skip passwords longer than 1k in length so clients can't
easily DoS sshd by sending very long passwords, causing it to spend CPU
hashing them. feedback djm@, ok markus@.
Brought to our attention by tomas.kuthan at oracle.com, shilei-c at
360.cn and coredump at autistici.org
Upstream-ID: d0af7d4a2190b63ba1d38eec502bc4be0be9e333
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Do not clobber the global jump_host variables when
parsing an inactive configuration. ok djm@
Upstream-ID: 5362210944d91417d5976346d41ac0b244350d31
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tweak previous;
Upstream-ID: f3c1a5b3f05dff366f60c028728a2b43f15ff534
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Allow wildcard for PermitOpen hosts as well as ports.
bz#2582, patch from openssh at mzpqnxow.com and jjelen at redhat.com. ok
markus@
Upstream-ID: af0294e9b9394c4e16e991424ca0a47a7cc605f2
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Reduce timing attack against obsolete CBC modes by always
computing the MAC over a fixed size of data. Reported by Jean Paul
Degabriele, Kenny Paterson, Torben Hansen and Martin Albrecht. ok djm@
Upstream-ID: f20a13279b00ba0afbacbcc1f04e62e9d41c2912
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If the root account is locked (eg password "!!" or "*LK*") keep looking
until we find a user with a valid salt to use for crypting passwords of
invalid users. ok djm@
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Since adding $(REGRESSLIBS), $? is wrong because it includes only the
changed source files. $< seems like it'd be right however it doesn't
seem to work on some non-GNU makes, so do what works everywhere.
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We now have a shared implementation in libopenbsd-compat.
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Add some unsigned overflow checks for extra_pad. None of
these are reachable with the amount of padding that we use internally.
bz#2566, pointed out by Torben Hansen. ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 4d4be8450ab2fc1b852d5884339f8e8c31c3fd76
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Makes "./configure && make tests" work again. ok djm@
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bz#2249: handle the case where PAM returns PAM_MAXTRIES by ceasing to offer
password and keyboard-interative authentication methods. Should prevent
"sshd ignoring max retries" warnings in the log. ok djm@
It probably won't trigger with keyboard-interactive in the default
configuration because the retry counter is stored in module-private
storage which goes away with the sshd PAM process (see bz#688). On the
other hand, those cases probably won't log a warning either.
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support UTF-8 characters in ssh(1) banners using
schwarze@'s safe fmprintf printer; bz#2058
feedback schwarze@ ok dtucker@
Upstream-ID: a72ce4e3644c957643c9524eea2959e41b91eea7
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- add proxyjump to the options list - formatting fixes -
update usage()
ok djm
Upstream-ID: 43d318e14ce677a2eec8f21ef5ba2f9f68a59457
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Reduce the syslog level of some relatively common protocol
events from LOG_CRIT by replacing fatal() calls with logdie(). Part of
bz#2585, ok djm@
Upstream-ID: 9005805227c94edf6ac02a160f0e199638d288e5
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Some AIX compilers unconditionally undefine va_copy but don't set it back
to an internal function, causing link errors. In some compat code we
already use VA_COPY instead so move the two existing instances into the
shared header and use for sshbuf-getput-basic.c too. Should fix building
with at lease some versions of AIX's compiler. bz#2589, ok djm@
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bz#2466 ok dtucker@
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The hmac-ripemd160 was incorrect and could lead to broken
Makefiles on systems that lacked support for it, but I made
all the others consistent too.
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Add a ProxyJump ssh_config(5) option and corresponding -J
ssh(1) command-line flag to allow simplified indirection through a SSH
bastion or "jump host".
These options construct a proxy command that connects to the
specified jump host(s) (more than one may be specified) and uses
port-forwarding to establish a connection to the next destination.
This codifies the safest way of indirecting connections through SSH
servers and makes it easy to use.
ok markus@
Upstream-ID: fa899cb8b26d889da8f142eb9774c1ea36b04397
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Prevents size mismatch linker warnings on Solaris 11.
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When sshd decides to not allow a login (eg PermitRootLogin=no) and
it's using PAM, it sends a fake password to PAM so that the timing for
the failure is not noticeably different whether or not the password
is correct. This behaviour can be detected by sending a very long
password string which is slower to hash than the fake password.
Mitigate by constructing an invalid password that is the same length
as the one from the client and thus takes the same time to hash.
Diff from djm@
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When sshd is processing a non-PAM login for a non-existent user it uses
the string from the fakepw structure as the salt for crypt(3)ing the
password supplied by the client. That string has a Blowfish prefix, so on
systems that don't understand that crypt will fail fast due to an invalid
salt, and even on those that do it may have significantly different timing
from the hash methods used for real accounts (eg sha512). This allows
user enumeration by, eg, sending large password strings. This was noted
by EddieEzra.Harari at verint.com (CVE-2016-6210).
To mitigate, use the same hash algorithm that root uses for hashing
passwords for users that do not exist on the system. ok djm@
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If we don't have it, set BROKEN_STRNVIS to activate the compat replacement.
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Correct equal in test.
Upstream-Regress-ID: 4e32f7a5c57a619c4e8766cb193be2a1327ec37a
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Add missing "recvfd" pledge promise: Raf Czlonka reported
ssh coredumps when Control* keywords were set in ssh_config. This patch also
fixes similar problems with scp and sftp.
ok deraadt, looks good to millert
Upstream-ID: ca2099eade1ef3e87a79614fefa26a0297ad8a3b
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obsolete note about fascistloggin is obsolete. ok djm
dtucker
Upstream-ID: dae60df23b2bb0e89f42661ddd96a7b0d1b7215a
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