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itoama at live.jp via github PR#172.
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 166ee8f93a7201fef431b9001725ab8b269d5874
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OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 132471eeb0df658210afd27852fe65131b26e900
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OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 40d839db0977b4e7ac8b647b16d5411d4faf2f60
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While I'm here, describe and link to the remaining local PROTOCOL.*
docs that weren't already mentioned (PROTOCOL.key, PROTOCOL.krl and
PROTOCOL.mux)
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2a900f9b994ba4d53e7aeb467d44d75829fd1231
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OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bc7a1764dff23fa4c5ff0e3379c9c4d5b63c9596
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that the client may not support, and that the client should simply disregard
such keys (this is what ssh does already).
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 65f8ffbc32ac8d12be8f913d7c0ea55bef8622bf
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fix references to obsolete v00 cert format; spotted by
Jakub Jelen
Upstream-ID: 7600ce193ab8fd19451acfe24fc2eb39d46b2c4f
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www.openssh.com now supports https and ftp.openbsd.org no longer
supports ftp. Make all links to these https.
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We accidentally send an empty string and a zero uint32 with
every direct-streamlocal@openssh.com channel open, in contravention of our
own spec.
Fixing this is too hard wrt existing versions that expect these
fields to be present and fatal() if they aren't, so document them
as "reserved" fields in the PROTOCOL spec as though we always
intended this and let us never speak of it again.
bz#2529, reported by Ron Frederick
Upstream-ID: 34cd326a4d236ca6e39084c4ff796bd97ab833e7
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direct-streamlocal@openssh.com Unix domain foward
messages do not contain a "reserved for future use" field and in fact,
serverloop.c checks that there isn't one. Remove erroneous mention from
PROTOCOL description. bz#2421 from Daniel Black
Upstream-ID: 3d51a19e64f72f764682f1b08f35a8aa810a43ac
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whitespace at EOL
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UpdateHostKeys fixes:
I accidentally changed the format of the hostkeys@openssh.com messages
last week without changing the extension name, and this has been causing
connection failures for people who are running -current. First reported
by sthen@
s/hostkeys@openssh.com/hostkeys-00@openssh.com/
Change the name of the proof message too, and reorder it a little.
Also, UpdateHostKeys=ask is incompatible with ControlPersist (no TTY
available to read the response) so disable UpdateHostKeys if it is in
ask mode and ControlPersist is active (and document this)
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Revise hostkeys@openssh.com hostkey learning extension.
The client will not ask the server to prove ownership of the private
halves of any hitherto-unseen hostkeys it offers to the client.
Allow UpdateHostKeys option to take an 'ask' argument to let the
user manually review keys offered.
ok markus@
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Host key rotation support.
Add a hostkeys@openssh.com protocol extension (global request) for
a server to inform a client of all its available host key after
authentication has completed. The client may record the keys in
known_hosts, allowing it to upgrade to better host key algorithms
and a server to gracefully rotate its keys.
The client side of this is controlled by a UpdateHostkeys config
option (default on).
ok markus@
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[PROTOCOL auth-options.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c]
[auth-rsa.c auth.c auth1.c auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c]
[auth2-passwd.c auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c canohost.c channels.c channels.h]
[clientloop.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c mux.c packet.c readconf.c]
[readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h serverloop.c session.c ssh-agent.c]
[ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
[sshd_config.5 sshlogin.c]
Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding. A remote TCP port
may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and vice versa or
both ends may be a Unix domain socket. This is a reimplementation
of the streamlocal patches by William Ahern from:
http://www.25thandclement.com/~william/projects/streamlocal.html
OK djm@ markus@
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[PROTOCOL]
mention curve25519-sha256@libssh.org key exchange algorithm
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[Makefile.in PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 authfile.c chacha.c]
[chacha.h cipher-chachapoly.c cipher-chachapoly.h cipher.c cipher.h]
[dh.c myproposal.h packet.c poly1305.c poly1305.h servconf.c ssh.1]
[ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5] Add a new protocol 2 transport
cipher "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" that combines Daniel
Bernstein's ChaCha20 stream cipher and Poly1305 MAC to build an
authenticated encryption mode.
Inspired by and similar to Adam Langley's proposal for TLS:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-03
but differs in layout used for the MAC calculation and the use of a
second ChaCha20 instance to separately encrypt packet lengths.
Details are in the PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 file.
Feedback markus@, naddy@; manpage bits Loganden Velvindron @ AfriNIC
ok markus@ naddy@
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[PROTOCOL sftp-client.c sftp-client.h sftp-server.c sftp.1 sftp.c]
fsync@openssh.com protocol extension for sftp-server
client support to allow calling fsync() faster successful transfer
patch mostly by imorgan AT nas.nasa.gov; bz#1798
"fine" markus@ "grumble OK" deraadt@ "doesn't sound bad to me" millert@
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[PROTOCOL authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h monitor_wrap.c]
[myproposal.h packet.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5]
support AES-GCM as defined in RFC 5647 (but with simpler KEX handling)
ok and feedback djm@
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[PROTOCOL]
fix description of MAC calculation for EtM modes; ok markus@
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[PROTOCOL authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.h mac.c myproposal.h]
[packet.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5]
add encrypt-then-mac (EtM) modes to openssh by defining new mac algorithms
that change the packet format and compute the MAC over the encrypted
message (including the packet size) instead of the plaintext data;
these EtM modes are considered more secure and used by default.
feedback and ok djm@
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[sftp-server.c sftp.1 sftp-client.h sftp.c PROTOCOL sftp-client.c]
add a protocol extension to support a hard link operation. It is
available through the "ln" command in the client. The old "ln"
behaviour of creating a symlink is available using its "-s" option
or through the preexisting "symlink" command; based on a patch from
miklos AT szeredi.hu in bz#1555; ok markus@
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[PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys auth2-jpake.c authfd.c]
[authfile.c buffer.h dns.c kex.c kex.h key.c key.h monitor.c]
[monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c packet.h pathnames.h readconf.c]
[ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1 ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
[ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.8 ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h]
[ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5]
[uuencode.c uuencode.h bufec.c kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c ssh-ecdsa.c]
Implement Elliptic Curve Cryptography modes for key exchange (ECDH) and
host/user keys (ECDSA) as specified by RFC5656. ECDH and ECDSA offer
better performance than plain DH and DSA at the same equivalent symmetric
key length, as well as much shorter keys.
Only the mandatory sections of RFC5656 are implemented, specifically the
three REQUIRED curves nistp256, nistp384 and nistp521 and only ECDH and
ECDSA. Point compression (optional in RFC5656 is NOT implemented).
Certificate host and user keys using the new ECDSA key types are supported.
Note that this code has not been tested for interoperability and may be
subject to change.
feedback and ok markus@
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- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/02/26 20:29:54
[PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys addrmatch.c auth-options.c]
[auth-options.h auth.h auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c dns.c dns.h hostfile.c]
[hostfile.h kex.h kexdhs.c kexgexs.c key.c key.h match.h monitor.c]
[myproposal.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c]
[ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h sshconnect.c]
[sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5]
Add support for certificate key types for users and hosts.
OpenSSH certificate key types are not X.509 certificates, but a much
simpler format that encodes a public key, identity information and
some validity constraints and signs it with a CA key. CA keys are
regular SSH keys. This certificate style avoids the attack surface
of X.509 certificates and is very easy to deploy.
Certified host keys allow automatic acceptance of new host keys
when a CA certificate is marked as sh/known_hosts.
see VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1) for details.
Certified user keys allow authentication of users when the signing
CA key is marked as trusted in authorized_keys. See "AUTHORIZED_KEYS
FILE FORMAT" in sshd(8) for details.
Certificates are minted using ssh-keygen(1), documentation is in
the "CERTIFICATES" section of that manpage.
Documentation on the format of certificates is in the file
PROTOCOL.certkeys
feedback and ok markus@
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[PROTOCOL]
tweak language
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[PROTOCOL]
fix an incorrect magic number and typo in PROTOCOL; bz#1688
report and fix from ueno AT unixuser.org
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[PROTOCOL]
mention that eow and no-more-sessions extensions are sent only to
OpenSSH peers
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[PROTOCOL]
grammar
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[PROTOCOL]
clarify that eow@openssh.com is only sent on session channels
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[PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent]
document the protocol used by ssh-agent; "looks ok" markus@
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[PROTOCOL]
spelling fixes
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[PROTOCOL]
document tun@openssh.com forwarding method
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[PROTOCOL ssh.c serverloop.c]
Add a no-more-sessions@openssh.com global request extension that the
client sends when it knows that it will never request another session
(i.e. when session multiplexing is disabled). This allows a server to
disallow further session requests and terminate the session.
Why would a non-multiplexing client ever issue additional session
requests? It could have been attacked with something like SSH'jack:
http://www.storm.net.nz/projects/7
feedback & ok markus
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[PROTOCOL]
Use a $OpenBSD tag so our scripts will sync changes.
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[PROTOCOL]
Have the sftp client store the statvfs replies in wire format,
which prevents problems when the server's native sizes exceed the
client's.
Also extends the sizes of the remaining 32bit wire format to 64bit,
they're specified as unsigned long in the standard.
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[PROTOCOL]
statvfs member fsid needs to be wider, increase it to 64 bits and
crank extension revision number to 2; prodded and ok dtucker@
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[PROTOCOL]
document our protocol extensions and deviations; ok markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/05/17 01:31:56
[PROTOCOL]
grammar and correctness fixes from stevesk@
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