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first test in a series for a given MAC happens to modify the low bytes of a packet length.
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the privsep monitor.
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upstream default), and document that setting ServerAliveInterval to 300 by default if BatchMode is set is Debian-specific (closes: #765630).
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* Start handling /etc/ssh/sshd_config using ucf. The immediate motivation
for this is to deal with deprecations of options related to protocol 1,
but something like this has been needed for a long time (closes:
#419574, #848089):
- sshd_config is now a slightly-patched version of upstream's, and only
contains non-default settings (closes: #147201).
- I've included as many historical md5sums of default versions of
sshd_config as I could reconstruct from version control, but I'm sure
I've missed some.
- Explicitly synchronise the debconf database with the current
configuration file state in openssh-server.config, to ensure that the
PermitRootLogin setting is properly preserved.
- UsePrivilegeSeparation now defaults to the stronger "sandbox" rather
than "yes", per upstream.
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received (closes: #841884).
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when not in debug mode or when logging to a file or syslog (closes: #714526).
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keys in ssh-agent: when attempting pubkey auth with a certificate, if no separate private key is found among the keys then try with the certificate key itself (thanks, Paul Querna; LP: #1575961).
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server end than the client (thanks, Damien Miller; closes: #817870, LP: #1558576).
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ssh_kex2 so that it's actually effective (closes: #809696).
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prohibit-password" (closes: #809695).
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first_kex_follows (LP: #1526357).
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been rejected upstream and there isn't much point carrying it any more.
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Ubuntu, which no longer needs it (LP: #1334916, #1502045).
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#799271).
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onto a separate line to make it easier to copy and paste (LP: #1491532).
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ForwardX11Trusted in ssh(1) (closes: #781469).
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keyboard-interactive authentication (closes: #793616).
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- sshd(8): Fixed a privilege separation weakness related to PAM support.
Attackers who could successfully compromise the pre-authentication
process for remote code execution and who had valid credentials on the
host could impersonate other users. Reported by Moritz Jodeit.
- sshd(8): Fixed a use-after-free bug related to PAM support that was
reachable by attackers who could compromise the pre-authentication
process for remote code execution (closes: #795711). Also reported by
Moritz Jodeit.
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world-writable. Local attackers may be able to write arbitrary messages to logged-in users, including terminal escape sequences. Reported by Nikolay Edigaryev.
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(closes: #765633).
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* New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.7):
- sshd(8): The default set of ciphers and MACs has been altered to
remove unsafe algorithms. In particular, CBC ciphers and arcfour* are
disabled by default. The full set of algorithms remains available if
configured explicitly via the Ciphers and MACs sshd_config options.
- ssh(1), sshd(8): Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding. A
remote TCP port may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and
vice versa or both ends may be a Unix domain socket (closes: #236718).
- ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Add support for SSHFP DNS records for ED25519
key types.
- sftp(1): Allow resumption of interrupted uploads.
- ssh(1): When rekeying, skip file/DNS lookups of the hostkey if it is
the same as the one sent during initial key exchange.
- sshd(8): Allow explicit ::1 and 127.0.0.1 forwarding bind addresses
when GatewayPorts=no; allows client to choose address family.
- sshd(8): Add a sshd_config PermitUserRC option to control whether
~/.ssh/rc is executed, mirroring the no-user-rc authorized_keys
option.
- ssh(1): Add a %C escape sequence for LocalCommand and ControlPath that
expands to a unique identifer based on a hash of the tuple of (local
host, remote user, hostname, port). Helps avoid exceeding miserly
pathname limits for Unix domain sockets in multiplexing control paths.
- sshd(8): Make the "Too many authentication failures" message include
the user, source address, port and protocol in a format similar to the
authentication success / failure messages.
- Use CLOCK_BOOTTIME in preference to CLOCK_MONOTONIC when it is
available. It considers time spent suspended, thereby ensuring
timeouts (e.g. for expiring agent keys) fire correctly (closes:
#734553).
- Use prctl() to prevent sftp-server from accessing
/proc/self/{mem,maps}.
* Restore TCP wrappers support, removed upstream in 6.7. It is true that
dropping this reduces preauth attack surface in sshd. On the other
hand, this support seems to be quite widely used, and abruptly dropping
it (from the perspective of users who don't read openssh-unix-dev) could
easily cause more serious problems in practice. It's not entirely clear
what the right long-term answer for Debian is, but it at least probably
doesn't involve dropping this feature shortly before a freeze.
* Replace patch to disable OpenSSL version check with an updated version
of Kurt Roeckx's patch from #732940 to just avoid checking the status
field.
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curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, fixing occasional key exchange failures.
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prevent a hang on re-exec (thanks, Robie Basak; LP: #1306877).
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* New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.6).
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from Damien Miller.
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