| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
* New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.7):
- sshd(8): The default set of ciphers and MACs has been altered to
remove unsafe algorithms. In particular, CBC ciphers and arcfour* are
disabled by default. The full set of algorithms remains available if
configured explicitly via the Ciphers and MACs sshd_config options.
- ssh(1), sshd(8): Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding. A
remote TCP port may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and
vice versa or both ends may be a Unix domain socket (closes: #236718).
- ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Add support for SSHFP DNS records for ED25519
key types.
- sftp(1): Allow resumption of interrupted uploads.
- ssh(1): When rekeying, skip file/DNS lookups of the hostkey if it is
the same as the one sent during initial key exchange.
- sshd(8): Allow explicit ::1 and 127.0.0.1 forwarding bind addresses
when GatewayPorts=no; allows client to choose address family.
- sshd(8): Add a sshd_config PermitUserRC option to control whether
~/.ssh/rc is executed, mirroring the no-user-rc authorized_keys
option.
- ssh(1): Add a %C escape sequence for LocalCommand and ControlPath that
expands to a unique identifer based on a hash of the tuple of (local
host, remote user, hostname, port). Helps avoid exceeding miserly
pathname limits for Unix domain sockets in multiplexing control paths.
- sshd(8): Make the "Too many authentication failures" message include
the user, source address, port and protocol in a format similar to the
authentication success / failure messages.
- Use CLOCK_BOOTTIME in preference to CLOCK_MONOTONIC when it is
available. It considers time spent suspended, thereby ensuring
timeouts (e.g. for expiring agent keys) fire correctly (closes:
#734553).
- Use prctl() to prevent sftp-server from accessing
/proc/self/{mem,maps}.
* Restore TCP wrappers support, removed upstream in 6.7. It is true that
dropping this reduces preauth attack surface in sshd. On the other
hand, this support seems to be quite widely used, and abruptly dropping
it (from the perspective of users who don't read openssh-unix-dev) could
easily cause more serious problems in practice. It's not entirely clear
what the right long-term answer for Debian is, but it at least probably
doesn't involve dropping this feature shortly before a freeze.
* Replace patch to disable OpenSSL version check with an updated version
of Kurt Roeckx's patch from #732940 to just avoid checking the status
field.
|
|
prevent a hang on re-exec (thanks, Robie Basak; LP: #1306877).
|
|
|
|
* New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.6).
|
|
from Damien Miller.
|
|
* New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.5,
LP: #1275068):
- ssh(1): Add support for client-side hostname canonicalisation using a
set of DNS suffixes and rules in ssh_config(5). This allows
unqualified names to be canonicalised to fully-qualified domain names
to eliminate ambiguity when looking up keys in known_hosts or checking
host certificate names (closes: #115286).
|
|
Drop ssh-vulnkey and the associated ssh/ssh-add/sshd integration
code, leaving only basic configuration file compatibility, since it
has been nearly six years since the original vulnerability and this
code is not likely to be of much value any more. See
https://lists.debian.org/debian-devel/2013/09/msg00240.html for my
full reasoning.
|
|
|
|
- Enable pre-auth sandboxing by default for new installs.
- Allow "PermitOpen none" to refuse all port-forwarding requests
(closes: #543683).
|
|
|
|
|
