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allow some extra syscalls for crypto cards on s390x (LP: #1686618).
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regression introduced in 1:7.4p1-8.
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LP: #1670745).
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already-hashed entries (closes: #851734, LP: #1668093).
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Upstream seems to intend to gradually phase this out, so don't assume
that this will remain the default forever. However, we were late in
adopting the upstream sshd_config changes, so it makes sense to extend
the grace period (closes: #852320).
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first test in a series for a given MAC happens to modify the low bytes of a packet length.
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received (closes: #841884).
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when not in debug mode or when logging to a file or syslog (closes: #714526).
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keys in ssh-agent: when attempting pubkey auth with a certificate, if no separate private key is found among the keys then try with the certificate key itself (thanks, Paul Querna; LP: #1575961).
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first_kex_follows (LP: #1526357).
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been rejected upstream and there isn't much point carrying it any more.
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Ubuntu, which no longer needs it (LP: #1334916, #1502045).
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keyboard-interactive authentication (closes: #793616).
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- sshd(8): Fixed a privilege separation weakness related to PAM support.
Attackers who could successfully compromise the pre-authentication
process for remote code execution and who had valid credentials on the
host could impersonate other users. Reported by Moritz Jodeit.
- sshd(8): Fixed a use-after-free bug related to PAM support that was
reachable by attackers who could compromise the pre-authentication
process for remote code execution (closes: #795711). Also reported by
Moritz Jodeit.
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world-writable. Local attackers may be able to write arbitrary messages to logged-in users, including terminal escape sequences. Reported by Nikolay Edigaryev.
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* New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.7):
- sshd(8): The default set of ciphers and MACs has been altered to
remove unsafe algorithms. In particular, CBC ciphers and arcfour* are
disabled by default. The full set of algorithms remains available if
configured explicitly via the Ciphers and MACs sshd_config options.
- ssh(1), sshd(8): Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding. A
remote TCP port may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and
vice versa or both ends may be a Unix domain socket (closes: #236718).
- ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Add support for SSHFP DNS records for ED25519
key types.
- sftp(1): Allow resumption of interrupted uploads.
- ssh(1): When rekeying, skip file/DNS lookups of the hostkey if it is
the same as the one sent during initial key exchange.
- sshd(8): Allow explicit ::1 and 127.0.0.1 forwarding bind addresses
when GatewayPorts=no; allows client to choose address family.
- sshd(8): Add a sshd_config PermitUserRC option to control whether
~/.ssh/rc is executed, mirroring the no-user-rc authorized_keys
option.
- ssh(1): Add a %C escape sequence for LocalCommand and ControlPath that
expands to a unique identifer based on a hash of the tuple of (local
host, remote user, hostname, port). Helps avoid exceeding miserly
pathname limits for Unix domain sockets in multiplexing control paths.
- sshd(8): Make the "Too many authentication failures" message include
the user, source address, port and protocol in a format similar to the
authentication success / failure messages.
- Use CLOCK_BOOTTIME in preference to CLOCK_MONOTONIC when it is
available. It considers time spent suspended, thereby ensuring
timeouts (e.g. for expiring agent keys) fire correctly (closes:
#734553).
- Use prctl() to prevent sftp-server from accessing
/proc/self/{mem,maps}.
* Restore TCP wrappers support, removed upstream in 6.7. It is true that
dropping this reduces preauth attack surface in sshd. On the other
hand, this support seems to be quite widely used, and abruptly dropping
it (from the perspective of users who don't read openssh-unix-dev) could
easily cause more serious problems in practice. It's not entirely clear
what the right long-term answer for Debian is, but it at least probably
doesn't involve dropping this feature shortly before a freeze.
* Replace patch to disable OpenSSL version check with an updated version
of Kurt Roeckx's patch from #732940 to just avoid checking the status
field.
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curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, fixing occasional key exchange failures.
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* New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.6).
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(closes: #738619).
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Drop ssh-vulnkey and the associated ssh/ssh-add/sshd integration
code, leaving only basic configuration file compatibility, since it
has been nearly six years since the original vulnerability and this
code is not likely to be of much value any more. See
https://lists.debian.org/debian-devel/2013/09/msg00240.html for my
full reasoning.
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- sftp(1): add support for resuming partial downloads using the "reget"
command and on the sftp commandline or on the "get" commandline using
the "-a" (append) option (closes: #158590).
- ssh(1): add an "IgnoreUnknown" configuration option to selectively
suppress errors arising from unknown configuration directives (closes:
#436052).
- sftp(1): update progressmeter when data is acknowledged, not when it's
sent (partially addresses #708372).
- ssh(1): do not fatally exit when attempting to cleanup multiplexing-
created channels that are incompletely opened (closes: #651357).
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ready to accept connections (by raising SIGSTOP at that point and using
"expect stop").
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#711623.
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