| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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[bufaux.c bufaux.h cipher.c cipher.h hostfile.c hostfile.h key.c]
[key.h sftp-common.c sftp-common.h sftp-server.c sshconnect.c sshd.c]
[ssh-dss.c ssh-rsa.c uuencode.c uuencode.h]
constify. ok markus@ & djm@
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[auth-krb5.c auth1.c hostfile.h monitor_wrap.c sftp-client.c sftp-int.c ssh-add.c ssh-rsa.c
sshconnect.c]
KNF
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- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/08 20:24:08
[hostfile.h]
no comma at end of enumerator list
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[hostfile.c hostfile.h sshconnect.c]
print out all known keys for a host if we get a unknown host key,
see discussion at http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?t=101069210100016&r=1&w=4
the ssharp mitm tool attacks users in a similar way, so i'd like to
pointed out again:
A MITM attack is always possible if the ssh client prints:
The authenticity of host 'bla' can't be established.
(protocol version 2 with pubkey authentication allows you to detect
MITM attacks)
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[auth.h hostfile.c hostfile.h]
remove auth_rsa_read_key, make hostfile_ready_key non static; ok markus@
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[authfd.h authfile.h auth.h auth-options.h bufaux.h buffer.h
canohost.h channels.h cipher.h clientloop.h compat.h compress.h
crc32.h deattack.h dh.h dispatch.h groupaccess.c groupaccess.h
hostfile.h kex.h key.h log.c log.h mac.h misc.c misc.h mpaux.h
packet.h radix.h readconf.h readpass.h rsa.h servconf.h serverloop.h
session.h sftp-common.c sftp-common.h sftp-glob.h sftp-int.h
sshconnect.h ssh-dss.h sshlogin.h sshpty.h ssh-rsa.h sshtty.h
tildexpand.h uidswap.h uuencode.h xmalloc.h]
remove comments from .h, since they are cut&paste from the .c files
and out of sync
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[atomicio.h authfd.h authfile.h auth.h auth-options.h bufaux.h
buffer.h canohost.h channels.h cipher.h clientloop.h compat.h
compress.h crc32.h deattack.h dh.h dispatch.h groupaccess.h
hostfile.h kex.h key.h log.h mac.h match.h misc.h mpaux.h packet.h
radix.h readconf.h readpass.h rsa.h]
prototype pedant. not very creative...
- () -> (void)
- no variable names
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sync with netbsd tree changes.
- more strict prototypes, include necessary headers
- use paths.h/pathnames.h decls
- size_t typecase to int -> u_long
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[atomicio.h canohost.h clientloop.h deattack.h dh.h dispatch.h
groupaccess.c groupaccess.h hmac.h hostfile.h includes.h kex.h
key.h log.h login.h match.h misc.h myproposal.h nchan.ms pathnames.h
radix.h readpass.h rijndael.h serverloop.h session.h sftp.h ssh-add.1
ssh-dss.h ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-rsa.h ssh1.h ssh_config
sshconnect.h sshd_config tildexpand.h uidswap.h uuencode.h]
$OpenBSD$
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And I think I have all the bits right from the OpenBSD tree.
20001222
- Updated RCSID for pty.c
- (bal) OpenBSD CVS Updates:
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/21 15:10:16
[auth-rh-rsa.c hostfile.c hostfile.h sshconnect.c]
print keyfile:line for changed hostkeys, for deraadt@, ok deraadt@
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/20 19:26:56
[authfile.c]
allow ssh -i userkey for root
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/20 19:37:21
[authfd.c authfd.h kex.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c uidswap.c uidswap.h]
fix prototypes; from stevesk@pobox.com
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/20 19:32:08
[sshd.c]
init pointer to NULL; report from Jan.Ivan@cern.ch
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/19 23:17:54
[auth-krb4.c auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c
auth1.c auth2-skey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c
bufaux.h buffer.c canohost.c channels.c clientloop.c compress.c
crc32.c deattack.c getput.h hmac.c hmac.h hostfile.c kex.c kex.h
key.c key.h log.c login.c match.c match.h mpaux.c mpaux.h packet.c
packet.h radix.c readconf.c rsa.c scp.c servconf.c servconf.h
serverloop.c session.c sftp-server.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-dss.h
ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-rsa.c ssh-rsa.h ssh.c ssh.h uuencode.c
uuencode.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c tildexpand.c]
replace 'unsigned bla' with 'u_bla' everywhere. also replace 'char
unsigned' with u_char.
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- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 02:59:57
[session.c]
print hostname (not hushlogin)
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 13:18:48
[authfile.c ssh-add.c]
enable ssh-add -d for DSA keys
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 13:20:49
[sftp-server.c]
cleanup
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/06 03:46:41
[authfile.h]
prototype
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:27:56
[ALL]
cleanup copyright notices on all files. I have attempted to be
accurate with the details. everything is now under Tatu's licence
(which I copied from his readme), and/or the core-sdi bsd-ish thing
for deattack, or various openbsd developers under a 2-term bsd
licence. We're not changing any rules, just being accurate.
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:40:30
[channels.c channels.h clientloop.c serverloop.c ssh.c]
cleanup window and packet sizes for ssh2 flow control; ok niels
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:53:00
[scp.c]
typo
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 15:13:37
[auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rsa.c auth.c]
[authfile.h canohost.c channels.h compat.c hostfile.h log.c match.h]
[pty.c readconf.c]
some more Copyright fixes
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/08 03:02:51
[README.openssh2]
bye bye
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/11 18:38:33
[LICENCE cipher.c]
a few more comments about it being ARC4 not RC4
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/12 14:53:11
[log-client.c log-server.c log.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh.h sshd.8 sshd.c]
multiple debug levels
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/14 14:25:15
[clientloop.c]
typo
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/15 01:13:51
[ssh-agent.c]
check return value for setenv(3) for failure, and deal appropriately
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[ssh.1 ssh.c]
- ssh -2
[auth.c channels.c clientloop.c packet.c packet.h serverloop.c]
[session.c sshconnect.c]
- check payload for (illegal) extra data
[ALL]
- whitespace cleanup
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- [auth-krb4.c]
-Wall
- [auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rsa.c hostfile.c hostfile.h key.c key.h match.c]
[match.h ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshd.c]
initial support for DSA keys. ok deraadt@, niels@
- [cipher.c cipher.h]
remove unused cipher_attack_detected code
- [scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh.1 sshd.8]
Fix some formatting problems I missed before.
- [ssh.1 sshd.8]
fix spelling errors, From: FreeBSD
- [ssh.c]
switch to raw mode only if he _get_ a pty (not if we _want_ a pty).
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