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implement SHA2-{256,512} for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signatures
(user and host auth) based on draft-rsa-dsa-sha2-256-03.txt and
draft-ssh-ext-info-04.txt; with & ok djm@
Upstream-ID: cf82ce532b2733e5c4b34bb7b7c94835632db309
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delete support for legacy v00 certificates; "sure"
markus@ dtucker@
Upstream-ID: b5b9bb5f9202d09e88f912989d74928601b6636f
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update to new API (key_fingerprint => sshkey_fingerprint)
check sshkey_fingerprint return values; ok markus
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Reduce use of <sys/param.h> and transition to <limits.h>
throughout. ok djm markus
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deprecate key_load_private_pem() and
sshkey_load_private_pem() interfaces. Refactor the generic key loading API to
not require pathnames to be specified (they weren't really used).
Fixes a few other things en passant:
Makes ed25519 keys work for hostbased authentication (ssh-keysign
previously used the PEM-only routines).
Fixes key comment regression bz#2306: key pathnames were being lost as
comment fields.
ok markus@
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Add FingerprintHash option to control algorithm used for
key fingerprints. Default changes from MD5 to SHA256 and format from hex to
base64.
Feedback and ok naddy@ markus@
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key_in_file() wrapper is no longer used
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[key.c]
Prevent spam from key_load_private_pem during hostbased auth. ok djm@
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[key.c]
silence "incorrect passphrase" error spam; reported and ok dtucker@
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[key.c]
downgrade more error() to debug() to better match what old authfile.c
did; suppresses spurious errors with hostbased authentication enabled
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[Makefile.in auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-options.c auth-rsa.c
[auth2-none.c auth2-pubkey.c authfile.c authfile.h cipher-3des1.c
[cipher-chachapoly.c cipher-chachapoly.h cipher.c cipher.h
[digest-libc.c digest-openssl.c digest.h dns.c entropy.c hmac.h
[hostfile.c key.c key.h krl.c monitor.c packet.c rsa.c rsa.h
[ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c
[ssh-keygen.c ssh-pkcs11-client.c ssh-pkcs11-helper.c ssh-pkcs11.c
[ssh-rsa.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.h sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c
[sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshkey.c sshkey.h
[openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h]
New key API: refactor key-related functions to be more library-like,
existing API is offered as a set of wrappers.
with and ok markus@
Thanks also to Ben Hawkes, David Tomaschik, Ivan Fratric, Matthew
Dempsky and Ron Bowes for a detailed review a few months ago.
NB. This commit also removes portable OpenSSH support for OpenSSL
<0.9.8e.
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[auth.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c cipher.c cipher.h hostfile.c]
[kex.c key.c mac.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c]
[roaming_client.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c]
[ssh-pkcs11.h ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
make compiling against OpenSSL optional (make OPENSSL=no);
reduces algorithms to curve25519, aes-ctr, chacha, ed25519;
allows us to explore further options; with and ok djm
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[auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-passwd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c]
[buffer.c cipher-3des1.c cipher.c clientloop.c gss-serv.c kex.c]
[kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexecdhc.c kexgexc.c kexecdhs.c kexgexs.c key.c]
[monitor.c monitor_wrap.c packet.c readpass.c rsa.c serverloop.c]
[ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c]
[ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c]
[sshd.c]
convert memset of potentially-private data to explicit_bzero()
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[digest.c digest.h hostfile.c kex.c kex.h kexc25519.c kexc25519c.c]
[kexc25519s.c kexdh.c kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c]
[kexgexs.c key.c key.h roaming_client.c roaming_common.c schnorr.c]
[schnorr.h ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-rsa.c sshconnect2.c]
Introduce digest API and use it to perform all hashing operations
rather than calling OpenSSL EVP_Digest* directly. Will make it easier
to build a reduced-feature OpenSSH without OpenSSL in future;
feedback, ok markus@
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[key.c]
to make sure we don't omit any key types as valid CA keys again,
factor the valid key type check into a key_type_is_valid_ca()
function
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[key.c]
correct comment for key_drop_cert()
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[key.c]
correct comment for key_to_certified()
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[key.c]
allow ed25519 keys to appear as certificate authorities
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[key.c]
set k->cert = NULL after freeing it
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[authfd.c authfile.c key.c key.h myproposal.h pathnames.h readconf.c]
[servconf.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c]
[ssh-keysign.c ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshd.8 sshd.c verify.c ssh-ed25519.c]
[sc25519.h sc25519.c hash.c ge25519_base.data ge25519.h ge25519.c]
[fe25519.h fe25519.c ed25519.c crypto_api.h blocks.c]
support ed25519 keys (hostkeys and user identities) using the public
domain ed25519 reference code from SUPERCOP, see
http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/software.html
feedback, help & ok djm@
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[authfile.c authfile.h cipher.c cipher.h key.c packet.c ssh-agent.c]
[ssh-keygen.c PROTOCOL.key] new private key format, bcrypt as KDF by
default; details in PROTOCOL.key; feedback and lots help from djm;
ok djm@
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[authfd.c key.c key.h ssh-agent.c]
move private key (de)serialization to key.c; ok djm
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[key.c]
make key_to_blob() return a NULL blob on failure; part of
bz#2175 from Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC
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NID_X9_62_prime256v1, NID_secp384r1 and NID_secp521r1 and test that the
latter actually works before using it. Fedora (at least) has NID_secp521r1
that doesn't work (see https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1021897).
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[key.c key.h]
fix potential stack exhaustion caused by nested certificates;
report by Mateusz Kocielski; ok dtucker@ markus@
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[auth.h auth.c key.c monitor.c auth-rsa.c auth2.c auth1.c key.h]
Standardise logging of supplemental information during userauth. Keys
and ruser is now logged in the auth success/failure message alongside
the local username, remote host/port and protocol in use. Certificates
contents and CA are logged too.
Pushing all logging onto a single line simplifies log analysis as it is
no longer necessary to relate information scattered across multiple log
entries. "I like it" markus@
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[xmalloc.h cipher.c sftp-glob.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c sftp-common.c
ssh-ecdsa.c auth2-chall.c compat.c readconf.c kexgexs.c monitor.c
gss-genr.c cipher-3des1.c kex.c monitor_wrap.c ssh-pkcs11-client.c
auth-options.c rsa.c auth2-pubkey.c sftp.c hostfile.c auth2.c
servconf.c auth.c authfile.c xmalloc.c uuencode.c sftp-client.c
auth2-gss.c sftp-server.c bufaux.c mac.c session.c jpake.c kexgexc.c
sshconnect.c auth-chall.c auth2-passwd.c sshconnect1.c buffer.c
kexecdhs.c kexdhs.c ssh-rsa.c auth1.c ssh-pkcs11.c auth2-kbdint.c
kexdhc.c sshd.c umac.c ssh-dss.c auth2-jpake.c bufbn.c clientloop.c
monitor_mm.c scp.c roaming_client.c serverloop.c key.c auth-rsa.c
ssh-pkcs11-helper.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-keygen.c match.c channels.c
sshconnect2.c addrmatch.c mux.c canohost.c kexecdhc.c schnorr.c
ssh-add.c misc.c auth2-hostbased.c ssh-agent.c bufec.c groupaccess.c
dns.c packet.c readpass.c authfd.c moduli.c]
bye, bye xfree(); ok markus@
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[key.c]
memleak in cert_free(), wasn't actually freeing the struct;
bz#2096 from shm AT digitalsun.pl
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[authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c]
[key.c key.h mac.c mac.h packet.c ssh.1 ssh.c]
add the ability to query supported ciphers, MACs, key type and KEX
algorithms to ssh. Includes some refactoring of KEX and key type handling
to be table-driven; ok markus@
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[auth.c key.c key.h ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c sshd_config.5]
[krl.c krl.h PROTOCOL.krl]
add support for Key Revocation Lists (KRLs). These are a compact way to
represent lists of revoked keys and certificates, taking as little as
a single bit of incremental cost to revoke a certificate by serial number.
KRLs are loaded via the existing RevokedKeys sshd_config option.
feedback and ok markus@
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the required functions in libcrypto.
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[dns.c dns.h key.c key.h ssh-keygen.c]
add support for RFC6594 SSHFP DNS records for ECDSA key types.
patch from bugzilla-m67 AT nulld.me in bz#1978; ok + tweak markus@
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[auth-options.c key.c]
remove explict search for \0 in packet strings, this job is now done
implicitly by buffer_get_cstring; ok markus
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[key.c]
fatal() if asked to generate a legacy ECDSA cert (these don't exist)
and fix the regress test that was trying to generate them :)
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[key.c]
fix uninitialised nonce variable; reported by Mateusz Kocielski
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[kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c moduli.c]
use only libcrypto APIs that are retained with OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED.
these have been around for years by this time. ok markus
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[authfile.c key.c key.h ssh-keygen.c]
fix a possible NULL deref on loading a corrupt ECDH key
store ECDH group information in private keys files as "named groups"
rather than as a set of explicit group parameters (by setting
the OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE flag). This makes for shorter key files and
retrieves the group's OpenSSL NID that we need for various things.
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for missing headers and compiler warnings.
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[kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c key.c key.h myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c]
[ssh-agent.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] Disable ECDH and ECDSA on
platforms that don't have the requisite OpenSSL support. ok dtucker@
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[kex.c kex.h kexecdh.c key.c key.h monitor.c ssh-ecdsa.c]
ECDH/ECDSA compliance fix: these methods vary the hash function they use
(SHA256/384/512) depending on the length of the curve in use. The previous
code incorrectly used SHA256 in all cases.
This fix will cause authentication failure when using 384 or 521-bit curve
keys if one peer hasn't been upgraded and the other has. (256-bit curve
keys work ok). In particular you may need to specify HostkeyAlgorithms
when connecting to a server that has not been upgraded from an upgraded
client.
ok naddy@
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[PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys auth2-jpake.c authfd.c]
[authfile.c buffer.h dns.c kex.c kex.h key.c key.h monitor.c]
[monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c packet.h pathnames.h readconf.c]
[ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1 ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
[ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.8 ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h]
[ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5]
[uuencode.c uuencode.h bufec.c kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c ssh-ecdsa.c]
Implement Elliptic Curve Cryptography modes for key exchange (ECDH) and
host/user keys (ECDSA) as specified by RFC5656. ECDH and ECDSA offer
better performance than plain DH and DSA at the same equivalent symmetric
key length, as well as much shorter keys.
Only the mandatory sections of RFC5656 are implemented, specifically the
three REQUIRED curves nistp256, nistp384 and nistp521 and only ECDH and
ECDSA. Point compression (optional in RFC5656 is NOT implemented).
Certificate host and user keys using the new ECDSA key types are supported.
Note that this code has not been tested for interoperability and may be
subject to change.
feedback and ok markus@
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[auth-options.c auth1.c auth2.c bufaux.c buffer.h kex.c key.c packet.c]
[packet.h ssh-dss.c ssh-rsa.c]
Add buffer_get_cstring() and related functions that verify that the
string extracted from the buffer contains no embedded \0 characters*
This prevents random (possibly malicious) crap from being appended to
strings where it would not be noticed if the string is used with
a string(3) function.
Use the new API in a few sensitive places.
* actually, we allow a single one at the end of the string for now because
we don't know how many deployed implementations get this wrong, but don't
count on this to remain indefinitely.
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[auth-rsa.c channels.c jpake.c key.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c packet.c]
[ssh-rsa.c]
s/timing_safe_cmp/timingsafe_bcmp/g
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[auth-rsa.c channels.c jpake.c key.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c]
[packet.c ssh-rsa.c]
implement a timing_safe_cmp() function to compare memory without leaking
timing information by short-circuiting like memcmp() and use it for
some of the more sensitive comparisons (though nothing high-value was
readily attackable anyway); "looks ok" markus@
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[auth-options.c auth-options.h auth.c auth.h auth2-pubkey.c]
[key.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd.8 sshd_config.5]
add some optional indirection to matching of principal names listed
in certificates. Currently, a certificate must include the a user's name
to be accepted for authentication. This change adds the ability to
specify a list of certificate principal names that are acceptable.
When authenticating using a CA trusted through ~/.ssh/authorized_keys,
this adds a new principals="name1[,name2,...]" key option.
For CAs listed through sshd_config's TrustedCAKeys option, a new config
option "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile" specifies a per-user file containing
the list of acceptable names.
If either option is absent, the current behaviour of requiring the
username to appear in principals continues to apply.
These options are useful for role accounts, disjoint account namespaces
and "user@realm"-style naming policies in certificates.
feedback and ok markus@
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[PROTOCOL.certkeys auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rsa.c]
[auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c key.c key.h myproposal.h ssh-add.c]
[ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c]
[sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
revised certificate format ssh-{dss,rsa}-cert-v01@openssh.com with the
following changes:
move the nonce field to the beginning of the certificate where it can
better protect against chosen-prefix attacks on the signature hash
Rename "constraints" field to "critical options"
Add a new non-critical "extensions" field
Add a serial number
The older format is still support for authentication and cert generation
(use "ssh-keygen -t v00 -s ca_key ..." to generate a v00 certificate)
ok markus@
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[key.c key.h ssh-keygen.c]
also print certificate type (user or host) for ssh-keygen -L
ok djm kettenis
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[key.c]
use buffer_get_string_ptr_ret() where we are checking the return
value explicitly instead of the fatal()-causing buffer_get_string_ptr()
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