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2014-07-02 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/24 01:13:21Damien Miller
[Makefile.in auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-options.c auth-rsa.c [auth2-none.c auth2-pubkey.c authfile.c authfile.h cipher-3des1.c [cipher-chachapoly.c cipher-chachapoly.h cipher.c cipher.h [digest-libc.c digest-openssl.c digest.h dns.c entropy.c hmac.h [hostfile.c key.c key.h krl.c monitor.c packet.c rsa.c rsa.h [ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c [ssh-keygen.c ssh-pkcs11-client.c ssh-pkcs11-helper.c ssh-pkcs11.c [ssh-rsa.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.h sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c [sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshkey.c sshkey.h [openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] New key API: refactor key-related functions to be more library-like, existing API is offered as a set of wrappers. with and ok markus@ Thanks also to Ben Hawkes, David Tomaschik, Ivan Fratric, Matthew Dempsky and Ron Bowes for a detailed review a few months ago. NB. This commit also removes portable OpenSSH support for OpenSSL <0.9.8e.
2014-05-15 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 18:01:49Damien Miller
[auth.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c cipher.c cipher.h hostfile.c] [kex.c key.c mac.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c] [roaming_client.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c] [ssh-pkcs11.h ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] make compiling against OpenSSL optional (make OPENSSL=no); reduces algorithms to curve25519, aes-ctr, chacha, ed25519; allows us to explore further options; with and ok djm
2014-02-04 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/02 03:44:32Damien Miller
[auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-passwd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c] [buffer.c cipher-3des1.c cipher.c clientloop.c gss-serv.c kex.c] [kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexecdhc.c kexgexc.c kexecdhs.c kexgexs.c key.c] [monitor.c monitor_wrap.c packet.c readpass.c rsa.c serverloop.c] [ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c] [ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c] convert memset of potentially-private data to explicit_bzero()
2014-01-10 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/09 23:20:00Damien Miller
[digest.c digest.h hostfile.c kex.c kex.h kexc25519.c kexc25519c.c] [kexc25519s.c kexdh.c kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c] [kexgexs.c key.c key.h roaming_client.c roaming_common.c schnorr.c] [schnorr.h ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-rsa.c sshconnect2.c] Introduce digest API and use it to perform all hashing operations rather than calling OpenSSL EVP_Digest* directly. Will make it easier to build a reduced-feature OpenSSH without OpenSSL in future; feedback, ok markus@
2013-12-29 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 04:20:04Damien Miller
[key.c] to make sure we don't omit any key types as valid CA keys again, factor the valid key type check into a key_type_is_valid_ca() function
2013-12-29 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 02:49:52Damien Miller
[key.c] correct comment for key_drop_cert()
2013-12-29 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 02:37:04Damien Miller
[key.c] correct comment for key_to_certified()
2013-12-29 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 02:28:10Damien Miller
[key.c] allow ed25519 keys to appear as certificate authorities
2013-12-07 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/07 00:19:15Damien Miller
[key.c] set k->cert = NULL after freeing it
2013-12-07 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/06 13:39:49Damien Miller
[authfd.c authfile.c key.c key.h myproposal.h pathnames.h readconf.c] [servconf.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c] [ssh-keysign.c ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshd.8 sshd.c verify.c ssh-ed25519.c] [sc25519.h sc25519.c hash.c ge25519_base.data ge25519.h ge25519.c] [fe25519.h fe25519.c ed25519.c crypto_api.h blocks.c] support ed25519 keys (hostkeys and user identities) using the public domain ed25519 reference code from SUPERCOP, see http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/software.html feedback, help & ok djm@
2013-12-07 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/06 13:34:54Damien Miller
[authfile.c authfile.h cipher.c cipher.h key.c packet.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh-keygen.c PROTOCOL.key] new private key format, bcrypt as KDF by default; details in PROTOCOL.key; feedback and lots help from djm; ok djm@
2013-12-07 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/06 13:30:08Damien Miller
[authfd.c key.c key.h ssh-agent.c] move private key (de)serialization to key.c; ok djm
2013-12-05 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/02 03:09:22Damien Miller
[key.c] make key_to_blob() return a NULL blob on failure; part of bz#2175 from Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC
2013-11-10 - (dtucker) [key.c] Check for the correct defines for NID_secp521r1.Darren Tucker
2013-11-09 - (dtucker) [configure.ac kex.c key.c myproposal.h] Test for the presence ofDarren Tucker
NID_X9_62_prime256v1, NID_secp384r1 and NID_secp521r1 and test that the latter actually works before using it. Fedora (at least) has NID_secp521r1 that doesn't work (see https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1021897).
2013-10-30 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/29 09:42:11Damien Miller
[key.c key.h] fix potential stack exhaustion caused by nested certificates; report by Mateusz Kocielski; ok dtucker@ markus@
2013-06-02 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/19 02:42:42Darren Tucker
[auth.h auth.c key.c monitor.c auth-rsa.c auth2.c auth1.c key.h] Standardise logging of supplemental information during userauth. Keys and ruser is now logged in the auth success/failure message alongside the local username, remote host/port and protocol in use. Certificates contents and CA are logged too. Pushing all logging onto a single line simplifies log analysis as it is no longer necessary to relate information scattered across multiple log entries. "I like it" markus@
2013-06-02 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 00:13:13Darren Tucker
[xmalloc.h cipher.c sftp-glob.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c sftp-common.c ssh-ecdsa.c auth2-chall.c compat.c readconf.c kexgexs.c monitor.c gss-genr.c cipher-3des1.c kex.c monitor_wrap.c ssh-pkcs11-client.c auth-options.c rsa.c auth2-pubkey.c sftp.c hostfile.c auth2.c servconf.c auth.c authfile.c xmalloc.c uuencode.c sftp-client.c auth2-gss.c sftp-server.c bufaux.c mac.c session.c jpake.c kexgexc.c sshconnect.c auth-chall.c auth2-passwd.c sshconnect1.c buffer.c kexecdhs.c kexdhs.c ssh-rsa.c auth1.c ssh-pkcs11.c auth2-kbdint.c kexdhc.c sshd.c umac.c ssh-dss.c auth2-jpake.c bufbn.c clientloop.c monitor_mm.c scp.c roaming_client.c serverloop.c key.c auth-rsa.c ssh-pkcs11-helper.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-keygen.c match.c channels.c sshconnect2.c addrmatch.c mux.c canohost.c kexecdhc.c schnorr.c ssh-add.c misc.c auth2-hostbased.c ssh-agent.c bufec.c groupaccess.c dns.c packet.c readpass.c authfd.c moduli.c] bye, bye xfree(); ok markus@
2013-05-16 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/10 04:08:01Darren Tucker
[key.c] memleak in cert_free(), wasn't actually freeing the struct; bz#2096 from shm AT digitalsun.pl
2013-04-23 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/19 01:06:50Damien Miller
[authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c] [key.c key.h mac.c mac.h packet.c ssh.1 ssh.c] add the ability to query supported ciphers, MACs, key type and KEX algorithms to ssh. Includes some refactoring of KEX and key type handling to be table-driven; ok markus@
2013-01-18 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/17 23:00:01Damien Miller
[auth.c key.c key.h ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c sshd_config.5] [krl.c krl.h PROTOCOL.krl] add support for Key Revocation Lists (KRLs). These are a compact way to represent lists of revoked keys and certificates, taking as little as a single bit of incremental cost to revoke a certificate by serial number. KRLs are loaded via the existing RevokedKeys sshd_config option. feedback and ok markus@
2012-06-30 - (dtucker) [key.c] ifdef out sha256 key types on platforms that don't haveDarren Tucker
the required functions in libcrypto.
2012-06-20 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/05/23 03:28:28Damien Miller
[dns.c dns.h key.c key.h ssh-keygen.c] add support for RFC6594 SSHFP DNS records for ECDSA key types. patch from bugzilla-m67 AT nulld.me in bz#1978; ok + tweak markus@
2011-10-18 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2011/10/18 04:58:26Damien Miller
[auth-options.c key.c] remove explict search for \0 in packet strings, this job is now done implicitly by buffer_get_cstring; ok markus
2011-05-20 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2011/05/17 07:13:31Damien Miller
[key.c] fatal() if asked to generate a legacy ECDSA cert (these don't exist) and fix the regress test that was trying to generate them :)
2011-02-04 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2011/02/04 00:44:21Damien Miller
[key.c] fix uninitialised nonce variable; reported by Mateusz Kocielski
2010-11-20 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/11/10 01:33:07Damien Miller
[kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c moduli.c] use only libcrypto APIs that are retained with OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED. these have been around for years by this time. ok markus
2010-11-05 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/10/28 11:22:09Damien Miller
[authfile.c key.c key.h ssh-keygen.c] fix a possible NULL deref on loading a corrupt ECDH key store ECDH group information in private keys files as "named groups" rather than as a set of explicit group parameters (by setting the OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE flag). This makes for shorter key files and retrieves the group's OpenSSL NID that we need for various things.
2010-09-10 - (dtucker) [kex.h key.c packet.h ssh-agent.c ssh.c] A few more ECC ifdefsDarren Tucker
for missing headers and compiler warnings.
2010-09-10 - (djm) [authfd.c authfile.c bufec.c buffer.h configure.ac kex.h kexecdh.c]Damien Miller
[kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c key.c key.h myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c] [ssh-agent.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] Disable ECDH and ECDSA on platforms that don't have the requisite OpenSSL support. ok dtucker@
2010-09-10 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/09/09 10:45:45Damien Miller
[kex.c kex.h kexecdh.c key.c key.h monitor.c ssh-ecdsa.c] ECDH/ECDSA compliance fix: these methods vary the hash function they use (SHA256/384/512) depending on the length of the curve in use. The previous code incorrectly used SHA256 in all cases. This fix will cause authentication failure when using 384 or 521-bit curve keys if one peer hasn't been upgraded and the other has. (256-bit curve keys work ok). In particular you may need to specify HostkeyAlgorithms when connecting to a server that has not been upgraded from an upgraded client. ok naddy@
2010-08-31 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/08/31 11:54:45Damien Miller
[PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys auth2-jpake.c authfd.c] [authfile.c buffer.h dns.c kex.c kex.h key.c key.h monitor.c] [monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c packet.h pathnames.h readconf.c] [ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1 ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c] [ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.8 ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h] [ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5] [uuencode.c uuencode.h bufec.c kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c ssh-ecdsa.c] Implement Elliptic Curve Cryptography modes for key exchange (ECDH) and host/user keys (ECDSA) as specified by RFC5656. ECDH and ECDSA offer better performance than plain DH and DSA at the same equivalent symmetric key length, as well as much shorter keys. Only the mandatory sections of RFC5656 are implemented, specifically the three REQUIRED curves nistp256, nistp384 and nistp521 and only ECDH and ECDSA. Point compression (optional in RFC5656 is NOT implemented). Certificate host and user keys using the new ECDSA key types are supported. Note that this code has not been tested for interoperability and may be subject to change. feedback and ok markus@
2010-08-31 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/08/31 09:58:37Damien Miller
[auth-options.c auth1.c auth2.c bufaux.c buffer.h kex.c key.c packet.c] [packet.h ssh-dss.c ssh-rsa.c] Add buffer_get_cstring() and related functions that verify that the string extracted from the buffer contains no embedded \0 characters* This prevents random (possibly malicious) crap from being appended to strings where it would not be noticed if the string is used with a string(3) function. Use the new API in a few sensitive places. * actually, we allow a single one at the end of the string for now because we don't know how many deployed implementations get this wrong, but don't count on this to remain indefinitely.
2010-07-16 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/13 23:13:16Damien Miller
[auth-rsa.c channels.c jpake.c key.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c packet.c] [ssh-rsa.c] s/timing_safe_cmp/timingsafe_bcmp/g
2010-07-16 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/13 11:52:06Damien Miller
[auth-rsa.c channels.c jpake.c key.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c] [packet.c ssh-rsa.c] implement a timing_safe_cmp() function to compare memory without leaking timing information by short-circuiting like memcmp() and use it for some of the more sensitive comparisons (though nothing high-value was readily attackable anyway); "looks ok" markus@
2010-05-10 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/05/07 11:30:30Damien Miller
[auth-options.c auth-options.h auth.c auth.h auth2-pubkey.c] [key.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd.8 sshd_config.5] add some optional indirection to matching of principal names listed in certificates. Currently, a certificate must include the a user's name to be accepted for authentication. This change adds the ability to specify a list of certificate principal names that are acceptable. When authenticating using a CA trusted through ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, this adds a new principals="name1[,name2,...]" key option. For CAs listed through sshd_config's TrustedCAKeys option, a new config option "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile" specifies a per-user file containing the list of acceptable names. If either option is absent, the current behaviour of requiring the username to appear in principals continues to apply. These options are useful for role accounts, disjoint account namespaces and "user@realm"-style naming policies in certificates. feedback and ok markus@
2010-04-16 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/04/16 01:47:26Damien Miller
[PROTOCOL.certkeys auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rsa.c] [auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c key.c key.h myproposal.h ssh-add.c] [ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c] [sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] revised certificate format ssh-{dss,rsa}-cert-v01@openssh.com with the following changes: move the nonce field to the beginning of the certificate where it can better protect against chosen-prefix attacks on the signature hash Rename "constraints" field to "critical options" Add a new non-critical "extensions" field Add a serial number The older format is still support for authentication and cert generation (use "ssh-keygen -t v00 -s ca_key ..." to generate a v00 certificate) ok markus@
2010-03-22 - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/15 19:40:02Damien Miller
[key.c key.h ssh-keygen.c] also print certificate type (user or host) for ssh-keygen -L ok djm kettenis
2010-03-04 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/04 01:44:57Damien Miller
[key.c] use buffer_get_string_ptr_ret() where we are checking the return value explicitly instead of the fatal()-causing buffer_get_string_ptr()
2010-03-04 - OpenBSD CVS SyncDamien Miller
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/03 01:44:36 [auth-options.c key.c] reject strings with embedded ASCII nul chars in certificate key IDs, principal names and constraints
2010-02-27 - OpenBSD CVS SyncDamien Miller
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/02/26 20:29:54 [PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys addrmatch.c auth-options.c] [auth-options.h auth.h auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c dns.c dns.h hostfile.c] [hostfile.h kex.h kexdhs.c kexgexs.c key.c key.h match.h monitor.c] [myproposal.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c] [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h sshconnect.c] [sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5] Add support for certificate key types for users and hosts. OpenSSH certificate key types are not X.509 certificates, but a much simpler format that encodes a public key, identity information and some validity constraints and signs it with a CA key. CA keys are regular SSH keys. This certificate style avoids the attack surface of X.509 certificates and is very easy to deploy. Certified host keys allow automatic acceptance of new host keys when a CA certificate is marked as sh/known_hosts. see VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1) for details. Certified user keys allow authentication of users when the signing CA key is marked as trusted in authorized_keys. See "AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT" in sshd(8) for details. Certificates are minted using ssh-keygen(1), documentation is in the "CERTIFICATES" section of that manpage. Documentation on the format of certificates is in the file PROTOCOL.certkeys feedback and ok markus@
2010-01-13 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/01/13 01:10:56Darren Tucker
[key.c] Ignore and log any Protocol 1 keys where the claimed size is not equal to the actual size. Noted by Derek Martin, ok djm@
2010-01-08 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/12/11 18:16:33Darren Tucker
[key.c] switch from 35 to the more common value of RSA_F4 == (2**16)+1 == 65537 for the RSA public exponent; discussed with provos; ok djm@
2008-11-03 - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/10/10 05:00:12Damien Miller
[key.c] typo in error message; ok djm@
2008-11-03 - grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/25 07:05:16Damien Miller
[key.c] In random art visualization, make sure to use the end marker only at the end. Initial diff by Dirk Loss, tweaks and ok djm@
2008-07-11 - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/07 23:32:51Damien Miller
[key.c] /*NOTREACHED*/ for lint warning: warning: function key_equal falls off bottom without returning value ok djm@
2008-06-29 - otto@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/25 11:13:43Damien Miller
[key.c] add key length to visual fingerprint; zap magical constants; ok grunk@ djm@
2008-06-13 - grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 22:03:36Darren Tucker
[key.c] add my copyright, ok djm@
2008-06-13 - grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 06:32:59Darren Tucker
[key.c] We already mark the start of the worm, now also mark the end of the worm in our random art drawings. ok djm@
2008-06-13 - grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 05:42:46Darren Tucker
[key.c] supply the key type (rsa1, rsa, dsa) as a caption in the frame of the random art. while there, stress the fact that the field base should at least be 8 characters for the pictures to make sense. comment and ok djm@