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2012-06-30 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/22 12:30:26Damien Miller
[monitor.c sshconnect2.c] remove dead code following 'for (;;)' loops. From Steve.McClellan at radisys com, ok markus@
2012-02-11 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/01/05 00:16:56Damien Miller
[monitor.c] memleak on error path
2011-08-06 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2011/06/23 23:35:42Damien Miller
[monitor.c] ignore EINTR errors from poll()
2011-06-20 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2011/06/17 21:44:31Damien Miller
[log.c log.h monitor.c monitor.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h sshd.c] make the pre-auth privsep slave log via a socketpair shared with the monitor rather than /var/empty/dev/log; ok dtucker@ deraadt@ markus@
2011-06-03Remove the !HAVE_SOCKETPAIR case. We use socketpair unconditionally in otherDarren Tucker
places and the survey data we have does not show any systems that use it. "nuke it" djm@
2011-05-29OpenBSD CVS SyncDamien Miller
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2011/05/23 03:30:07 [auth-rsa.c auth.c auth.h auth2-pubkey.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c pathnames.h servconf.c servconf.h sshd.8 sshd_config sshd_config.5] allow AuthorizedKeysFile to specify multiple files, separated by spaces. Bring back authorized_keys2 as a default search path (to avoid breaking existing users of this file), but override this in sshd_config so it will be no longer used on fresh installs. Maybe in 2015 we can remove it entierly :) feedback and ok markus@ dtucker@
2011-05-20 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2011/05/20 03:25:45Damien Miller
[monitor.c monitor_wrap.c servconf.c servconf.h] use a macro to define which string options to copy between configs for Match. This avoids problems caused by forgetting to keep three code locations in perfect sync and ordering "this is at once beautiful and horrible" + ok dtucker@
2011-05-20 - OpenBSD CVS SyncDamien Miller
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2011/05/15 08:09:01 [authfd.c monitor.c serverloop.c] use FD_CLOEXEC consistently; patch from zion AT x96.org
2010-09-10 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/09/09 10:45:45Damien Miller
[kex.c kex.h kexecdh.c key.c key.h monitor.c ssh-ecdsa.c] ECDH/ECDSA compliance fix: these methods vary the hash function they use (SHA256/384/512) depending on the length of the curve in use. The previous code incorrectly used SHA256 in all cases. This fix will cause authentication failure when using 384 or 521-bit curve keys if one peer hasn't been upgraded and the other has. (256-bit curve keys work ok). In particular you may need to specify HostkeyAlgorithms when connecting to a server that has not been upgraded from an upgraded client. ok naddy@
2010-08-31 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/08/31 11:54:45Damien Miller
[PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys auth2-jpake.c authfd.c] [authfile.c buffer.h dns.c kex.c kex.h key.c key.h monitor.c] [monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c packet.h pathnames.h readconf.c] [ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1 ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c] [ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.8 ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h] [ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5] [uuencode.c uuencode.h bufec.c kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c ssh-ecdsa.c] Implement Elliptic Curve Cryptography modes for key exchange (ECDH) and host/user keys (ECDSA) as specified by RFC5656. ECDH and ECDSA offer better performance than plain DH and DSA at the same equivalent symmetric key length, as well as much shorter keys. Only the mandatory sections of RFC5656 are implemented, specifically the three REQUIRED curves nistp256, nistp384 and nistp521 and only ECDH and ECDSA. Point compression (optional in RFC5656 is NOT implemented). Certificate host and user keys using the new ECDSA key types are supported. Note that this code has not been tested for interoperability and may be subject to change. feedback and ok markus@
2010-08-03 - (dtucker) [monitor.c] Bug #1795: Initialize the values to be returned fromDarren Tucker
PAM to sane values in case the PAM method doesn't write to them. Spotted by Bitman Zhou, ok djm@.
2010-07-16 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/13 23:13:16Damien Miller
[auth-rsa.c channels.c jpake.c key.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c packet.c] [ssh-rsa.c] s/timing_safe_cmp/timingsafe_bcmp/g
2010-07-16 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/13 11:52:06Damien Miller
[auth-rsa.c channels.c jpake.c key.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c] [packet.c ssh-rsa.c] implement a timing_safe_cmp() function to compare memory without leaking timing information by short-circuiting like memcmp() and use it for some of the more sensitive comparisons (though nothing high-value was readily attackable anyway); "looks ok" markus@
2010-03-07 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/07 11:57:13Darren Tucker
[auth-rhosts.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c session.c auth-options.c sshd.c] Hold authentication debug messages until after successful authentication. Fixes an info leak of environment variables specified in authorized_keys, reported by Jacob Appelbaum. ok djm@
2010-02-27 - OpenBSD CVS SyncDamien Miller
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/02/26 20:29:54 [PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys addrmatch.c auth-options.c] [auth-options.h auth.h auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c dns.c dns.h hostfile.c] [hostfile.h kex.h kexdhs.c kexgexs.c key.c key.h match.h monitor.c] [myproposal.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c] [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h sshconnect.c] [sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5] Add support for certificate key types for users and hosts. OpenSSH certificate key types are not X.509 certificates, but a much simpler format that encodes a public key, identity information and some validity constraints and signs it with a CA key. CA keys are regular SSH keys. This certificate style avoids the attack surface of X.509 certificates and is very easy to deploy. Certified host keys allow automatic acceptance of new host keys when a CA certificate is marked as sh/known_hosts. see VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1) for details. Certified user keys allow authentication of users when the signing CA key is marked as trusted in authorized_keys. See "AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT" in sshd(8) for details. Certificates are minted using ssh-keygen(1), documentation is in the "CERTIFICATES" section of that manpage. Documentation on the format of certificates is in the file PROTOCOL.certkeys feedback and ok markus@
2009-06-21 - andreas@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/06/12 20:43:22Darren Tucker
[monitor.c packet.c] Fix warnings found by chl@ and djm@ and change roaming_atomicio's return type to match atomicio's Diff from djm@, ok markus@
2009-06-21 - andreas@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/05/28 16:50:16Darren Tucker
[sshd.c packet.c serverloop.c monitor_wrap.c clientloop.c sshconnect.c monitor.c Added roaming.h roaming_common.c roaming_dummy.c] Keep track of number of bytes read and written. Needed for upcoming changes. Most code from Martin Forssen, maf at appgate dot com. ok markus@ Also, applied appropriate changes to Makefile.in
2009-06-21 - andreas@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/05/27 06:31:25Darren Tucker
[canohost.h canohost.c] Add clear_cached_addr(), needed for upcoming changes allowing the peer address to change. ok markus@
2009-02-14 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/02/12 03:26:22Damien Miller
[monitor.c] some paranoia: check that the serialised key is really KEY_RSA before diddling its internals
2008-11-05 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/11/04 08:22:13Damien Miller
[auth.h auth2.c monitor.c monitor.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h] [readconf.c readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh2.h ssh_config.5] [sshconnect2.c sshd_config.5 jpake.c jpake.h schnorr.c auth2-jpake.c] [Makefile.in] Add support for an experimental zero-knowledge password authentication method using the J-PAKE protocol described in F. Hao, P. Ryan, "Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling", 16th Workshop on Security Protocols, Cambridge, April 2008. This method allows password-based authentication without exposing the password to the server. Instead, the client and server exchange cryptographic proofs to demonstrate of knowledge of the password while revealing nothing useful to an attacker or compromised endpoint. This is experimental, work-in-progress code and is presently compiled-time disabled (turn on -DJPAKE in Makefile.inc). "just commit it. It isn't too intrusive." deraadt@
2008-07-11 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/10 18:08:11Damien Miller
[clientloop.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c packet.c packet.h sshd.c] sync v1 and v2 traffic accounting; add it to sshd, too; ok djm@, dtucker@
2008-07-04 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/04 03:47:02Darren Tucker
[monitor.c] Make debug a little clearer. ok djm@
2008-06-14 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/13 13:56:59Darren Tucker
[monitor.c] Clear key options in the monitor on failed authentication, prevents applying additional restrictions to non-pubkey authentications in the case where pubkey fails but another method subsequently succeeds. bz #1472, found by Colin Watson, ok markus@ djm
2008-05-19 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/05/08 12:21:16Damien Miller
[monitor.c monitor_wrap.c session.h servconf.c servconf.h session.c] [sshd_config sshd_config.5] Make the maximum number of sessions run-time controllable via a sshd_config MaxSessions knob. This is useful for disabling login/shell/subsystem access while leaving port-forwarding working (MaxSessions 0), disabling connection multiplexing (MaxSessions 1) or simply increasing the number of allows multiplexed sessions. Because some bozos are sure to configure MaxSessions in excess of the number of available file descriptors in sshd (which, at peak, might be as many as 9*MaxSessions), audit sshd to ensure that it doesn't leak fds on error paths, and make it fail gracefully on out-of-fd conditions - sending channel errors instead of than exiting with fatal(). bz#1090; MaxSessions config bits and manpage from junyer AT gmail.com ok markus@
2008-05-19 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/05/08 12:02:23Damien Miller
[auth-options.c auth1.c channels.c channels.h clientloop.c gss-serv.c] [monitor.c monitor_wrap.c nchan.c servconf.c serverloop.c session.c] [ssh.c sshd.c] Implement a channel success/failure status confirmation callback mechanism. Each channel maintains a queue of callbacks, which will be drained in order (RFC4253 guarantees confirm messages are not reordered within an channel). Also includes a abandonment callback to clean up if a channel is closed without sending confirmation messages. This probably shouldn't happen in compliant implementations, but it could be abused to leak memory. ok markus@ (as part of a larger diff)
2008-03-11 - (dtucker) [auth-pam.c monitor.c session.c sshd.c] Bug #926: MoveDarren Tucker
pam_open_session and pam_close_session into the privsep monitor, which will ensure that pam_session_close is called as root. Patch from Tomas Mraz.
2007-12-02 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/10/29 04:08:08Darren Tucker
[monitor_wrap.c monitor.c] Send config block back to slave for invalid users too so options set by a Match block (eg Banner) behave the same for non-existent users. Found by and ok djm@
2007-10-26 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/09/21 08:15:29Damien Miller
[auth-bsdauth.c auth-passwd.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c] [monitor.c monitor_wrap.c] unifdef -DBSD_AUTH unifdef -USKEY These options have been in use for some years; ok markus@ "no objection" millert@ (NB. RCD ID sync only for portable)
2007-09-17 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/09/04 03:21:03Damien Miller
[clientloop.c monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_fdpass.h] [monitor_wrap.c ssh.c] make file descriptor passing code return an error rather than call fatal() when it encounters problems, and use this to make session multiplexing masters survive slaves failing to pass all stdio FDs; ok markus@
2007-05-20 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/05/17 20:52:13Darren Tucker
[monitor.c] pass received SIGINT from monitor to postauth child so it can clean up properly. bz#1196, patch from senthilkumar_sen AT hotpop.com; ok markus@
2007-02-19 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/02/19 10:45:58Darren Tucker
[monitor_wrap.c servconf.c servconf.h monitor.c sshd_config.5] Teach Match how handle config directives that are used before authentication. This allows configurations such as permitting password authentication from the local net only while requiring pubkey from offsite. ok djm@, man page bits ok jmc@
2006-11-07 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/11/07 10:31:31Darren Tucker
[monitor.c version.h] correctly check for bad signatures in the monitor, otherwise the monitor and the unpriv process can get out of sync. with dtucker@, ok djm@, dtucker@
2006-09-17 - (dtucker) [monitor.c] Correctly handle auditing of single commands whenDarren Tucker
using Protocol 1. From jhb at freebsd.
2006-09-01 - (djm) [includes.h monitor.c openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c]Damien Miller
[openbsd-compat/rresvport.c] Some more headers: netinet/in.h sys/socket.h and unistd.h in various places
2006-09-01 - (djm) [audit-bsm.c audit.c auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-pam.c]Damien Miller
[auth-rsa.c auth-shadow.c auth-sia.c auth1.c auth2-chall.c] [auth2-gss.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c authfd.c authfile.c] [cipher-3des1.c cipher-aes.c cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c clientloop.c] [dh.c dns.c entropy.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c] [kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c loginrec.c mac.c] [md5crypt.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c readconf.c rsa.c] [scard-opensc.c scard.c session.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c] [ssh-keygen.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c sshconnect.c] [sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c rc4.diff] [openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c openbsd-compat/port-aix.c] [openbsd-compat/port-linux.c openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c] [openbsd-compat/port-uw.c] Lots of headers for SCO OSR6, mainly adding stdarg.h for log.h; compile problems reported by rac AT tenzing.org
2006-08-19 - miod@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/12 20:46:46Damien Miller
[monitor.c monitor_wrap.c] Revert previous include file ordering change, for ssh to compile under gcc2 (or until openssl include files are cleaned of parameter names in function prototypes)
2006-08-19 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS SyncDamien Miller
- stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/06 01:13:32 [compress.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c] "zlib.h" can be <zlib.h>; ok djm@ markus@
2006-08-05 - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/04 20:46:05Damien Miller
[monitor.c session.c ssh-agent.c] spaces
2006-08-05 - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/03 03:34:42Damien Miller
[OVERVIEW atomicio.c atomicio.h auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c] [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c] [auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c] [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c ] [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c] [buffer.c buffer.h canohost.c channels.c channels.h cipher-3des1.c] [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c] [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c dns.h fatal.c groupaccess.c] [groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c] [kex.h kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c] [key.h log.c log.h mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c] [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.c] [monitor_wrap.h msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c] [readconf.h readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scard.h scp.c servconf.c servconf.h] [serverloop.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-common.c] [sftp-common.h sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh-dss.c ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c] [ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshlogin.h sshpty.c sshpty.h sshtty.c ttymodes.c] [uidswap.c uidswap.h uuencode.c uuencode.h xmalloc.c xmalloc.h] [loginrec.c loginrec.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.h] almost entirely get rid of the culture of ".h files that include .h files" ok djm, sort of ok stevesk makes the pain stop in one easy step NB. portable commit contains everything *except* removing includes.h, as that will take a fair bit more work as we move headers that are required for portability workarounds to defines.h. (also, this step wasn't "easy")
2006-08-05 - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/26 13:57:17Damien Miller
[authfd.c authfile.c dh.c canohost.c channels.c clientloop.c compat.c] [hostfile.c kex.c log.c misc.c moduli.c monitor.c packet.c readpass.c] [scp.c servconf.c session.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh.c sshconnect.c] [sshconnect1.c sshd.c xmalloc.c] move #include <stdlib.h> out of includes.h
2006-08-05 - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/26 02:35:17Damien Miller
[atomicio.c auth.c dh.c authfile.c buffer.c clientloop.c kex.c] [groupaccess.c gss-genr.c kexgexs.c misc.c monitor.c monitor_mm.c] [packet.c scp.c serverloop.c session.c sftp-client.c sftp-common.c] [sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c sshlogin.c] [uidswap.c xmalloc.c] move #include <sys/param.h> out of includes.h
2006-07-24 - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/22 20:48:23Damien Miller
[atomicio.c auth-options.c auth-passwd.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c] [auth.c auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-hostbased.c auth2-passwd.c auth2.c] [authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c buffer.c canohost.c channels.c] [cipher-3des1.c cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c clientloop.c] [compat.c deattack.c dh.c dns.c gss-genr.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c] [includes.h kex.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c log.c] [mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c moduli.c monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c] [monitor_mm.c monitor_wrap.c msg.c nchan.c packet.c rsa.c] [progressmeter.c readconf.c readpass.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c] [session.c sftp-client.c sftp-common.c sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c] [ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c] [ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshpty.c ttymodes.c uidswap.c xmalloc.c] move #include <string.h> out of includes.h
2006-07-12 - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/11 20:07:25Darren Tucker
[scp.c auth.c monitor.c serverloop.c sftp-server.c sshpty.c readpass.c sshd.c monitor_wrap.c monitor_fdpass.c ssh-agent.c ttymodes.c atomicio.c includes.h session.c sshlogin.c monitor_mm.c packet.c sshconnect2.c sftp-client.c nchan.c clientloop.c sftp.c misc.c canohost.c channels.c ssh-keygen.c progressmeter.c uidswap.c msg.c readconf.c sshconnect.c] move #include <errno.h> out of includes.h; ok markus@
2006-07-10 - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/09 15:15:11Damien Miller
[auth2-none.c authfd.c authfile.c includes.h misc.c monitor.c] [readpass.c scp.c serverloop.c sftp-client.c sftp-server.c] [ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keysign.c ssh.c sshd.c] [sshlogin.c sshpty.c] move #include <fcntl.h> out of includes.h
2006-07-10 - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/08 23:30:06Damien Miller
[log.c] move user includes after /usr/include files
2006-07-10 - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/08 21:48:53Damien Miller
[monitor.c session.c] missed these from last commit: move #include <sys/socket.h> out of includes.h
2006-07-10 - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/08 21:47:12Damien Miller
[authfd.c canohost.c clientloop.c dns.c dns.h includes.h] [monitor_fdpass.c nchan.c packet.c servconf.c sftp.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c sshconnect.h sshd.c sshlogin.h] move #include <sys/socket.h> out of includes.h
2006-07-10 - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/06 16:03:53Damien Miller
[auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c] [auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth.c auth.h auth2-hostbased.c] [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c includes.h misc.c misc.h monitor.c] [monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h scp.c serverloop.c session.c] [session.h sftp-common.c ssh-add.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keysign.c] [ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshd.c sshpty.c sshpty.h uidswap.c] [uidswap.h] move #include <pwd.h> out of includes.h; ok markus@
2006-05-21 - (dtucker) [auth.c monitor.c] Now that we don't log from both the monitorDarren Tucker
and slave, we can remove the special-case handling in the audit hook in auth_log.
2006-05-04 - (dtucker) [auth-pam.c groupaccess.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c scard-opensc.cDarren Tucker
session.c ssh-rand-helper.c sshd.c openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c] Convert malloc(foo*bar) -> calloc(foo,bar) in Portable-only code; since calloc zeros, remove now-redundant memsets. Also add a couple of sanity checks. With & ok djm@