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2018-09-12upstream: add SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS - the default list ofdjm@openbsd.org
signature algorithms that are allowed for CA signatures. Notably excludes ssh-dsa. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1628e4181dc8ab71909378eafe5d06159a22deb4
2018-07-03upstream: Improve strictness and control over RSA-SHA2 signaturedjm@openbsd.org
In ssh, when an agent fails to return a RSA-SHA2 signature when requested and falls back to RSA-SHA1 instead, retry the signature to ensure that the public key algorithm sent in the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH matches the one in the signature itself. In sshd, strictly enforce that the public key algorithm sent in the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH message matches what appears in the signature. Make the sshd_config PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes options control accepted signature algorithms (previously they selected supported key types). This allows these options to ban RSA-SHA1 in favour of RSA-SHA2. Add new signature algorithms "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com" and "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com" to force use of RSA-SHA2 signatures with certificate keys. feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c6e9f6d45eed8962ad502d315d7eaef32c419dde
2017-05-08upstream commitdjm@openbsd.org
Don't offer CBC ciphers by default in the client. ok markus@ Upstream-ID: 94c9ce8d0d1a085052e11c7f3307950fdc0901ef
2016-09-29upstream commitdjm@openbsd.org
Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf. multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface. Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the required attack surface considerably larger. Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security check in the shared memory manager found by Stack (http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@ NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd for >10 years. Upstream-ID: 32af9771788d45a0779693b41d06ec199d849caf
2016-09-24upstream commitdjm@openbsd.org
support plain curve25519-sha256 KEX algorithm now that it is approaching standardisation (same algorithm is currently supported as curve25519-sha256@libssh.org) Upstream-ID: 5e2b6db2e72667048cf426da43c0ee3fc777baa2
2016-09-12upstream commitdjm@openbsd.org
remove 3des-cbc from the client's default proposal; 64-bit block ciphers are not safe in 2016 and we don't want to wait until attacks like sweet32 are extended to SSH. As 3des-cbc was the only mandatory cipher in the SSH RFCs, this may cause problems connecting to older devices using the defaults, but it's highly likely that such devices already need explicit configuration for KEX and hostkeys anyway. ok deraadt, markus, dtucker Upstream-ID: a505dfe65c6733af0f751b64cbc4bb7e0761bc2f
2016-05-02upstream commitdjm@openbsd.org
add support for additional fixed DH groups from draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-03 diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 (2K group) diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 (4K group) diffie-hellman-group18-sha512 (8K group) based on patch from Mark D. Baushke and Darren Tucker ok markus@ Upstream-ID: ac00406ada4f0dfec41585ca0839f039545bc46f
2016-02-09upstream commitdjm@openbsd.org
turn off more old crypto in the client: hmac-md5, ripemd, truncated HMACs, RC4, blowfish. ok markus@ dtucker@ Upstream-ID: 96aa11c2c082be45267a690c12f1d2aae6acd46e
2015-12-07upstream commitmarkus@openbsd.org
prefer rsa-sha2-512 over -256 for hostkeys, too; noticed by naddy@ Upstream-ID: 685f55f7ec566a8caca587750672723a0faf3ffe
2015-12-07upstream commitmarkus@openbsd.org
implement SHA2-{256,512} for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signatures (user and host auth) based on draft-rsa-dsa-sha2-256-03.txt and draft-ssh-ext-info-04.txt; with & ok djm@ Upstream-ID: cf82ce532b2733e5c4b34bb7b7c94835632db309
2015-07-15upstream commitmarkus@openbsd.org
Turn off DSA by default; add HostKeyAlgorithms to the server and PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes to the client side, so it still can be tested or turned back on; feedback and ok djm@ Upstream-ID: 8450a9e6d83f80c9bfed864ff061dfc9323cec21
2015-07-15upstream commitdjm@openbsd.org
turn off 1024 bit diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 key exchange method (already off in server, this turns it off in the client by default too) ok dtucker@ Upstream-ID: f59b88f449210ab7acf7d9d88f20f1daee97a4fa
2015-07-15upstream commitdjm@openbsd.org
delete support for legacy v00 certificates; "sure" markus@ dtucker@ Upstream-ID: b5b9bb5f9202d09e88f912989d74928601b6636f
2015-05-29fix merge botch that left ",," in KEX algsDamien Miller
2015-05-28upstream commitdtucker@openbsd.org
Reorder client proposal to prefer diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 over diffie-hellman-group14-sha1. ok djm@ Upstream-ID: 552c08d47347c3ee1a9a57d88441ab50abe17058
2015-04-29upstream commitjsg@openbsd.org
Add back a backslash removed in rev 1.42 so KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT will include aes again. ok deraadt@
2015-03-27upstream commitdjm@openbsd.org
promote chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com to be the default cipher; ok markus
2014-08-19 - (djm) [myproposal.h] Make curve25519 KEX dependent onDamien Miller
HAVE_EVP_SHA256 instead of OPENSSL_HAS_ECC.
2014-07-17 - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/11 13:54:34Damien Miller
[myproposal.h] by popular demand, add back hamc-sha1 to server proposal for better compat with many clients still in use. ok deraadt
2014-06-11 - (dtucker) [myprosal.h] Don't include curve25519-sha256@libssh.org inDarren Tucker
the proposal if the version of OpenSSL we're using doesn't support ECC.
2014-05-15 - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/30 19:07:48Damien Miller
[mac.c myproposal.h umac.c] UMAC can use our local fallback implementation of AES when OpenSSL isn't available. Glue code straight from Ted Krovetz's original umac.c. ok markus@
2014-05-15 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 18:01:49Damien Miller
[auth.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c cipher.c cipher.h hostfile.c] [kex.c key.c mac.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c] [roaming_client.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c] [ssh-pkcs11.h ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] make compiling against OpenSSL optional (make OPENSSL=no); reduces algorithms to curve25519, aes-ctr, chacha, ed25519; allows us to explore further options; with and ok djm
2014-04-20Three commits in one (since they touch the same heavily-diverged fileDamien Miller
repeatedly): - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/25 09:40:03 [myproposal.h] trimm default proposals. This commit removes the weaker pre-SHA2 hashes, the broken ciphers (arcfour), and the broken modes (CBC) from the default configuration (the patch only changes the default, all the modes are still available for the config files). ok djm@, reminded by tedu@ & naddy@ and discussed with many - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 17:16:26 [myproposal.h] The current sharing of myproposal[] between both client and server code makes the previous diff highly unpallatable. We want to go in that direction for the server, but not for the client. Sigh. Brought up by naddy. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/27 23:01:27 [myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] disable weak proposals in sshd, but keep them in ssh; ok djm@
2013-12-07 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/06 13:39:49Damien Miller
[authfd.c authfile.c key.c key.h myproposal.h pathnames.h readconf.c] [servconf.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c] [ssh-keysign.c ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshd.8 sshd.c verify.c ssh-ed25519.c] [sc25519.h sc25519.c hash.c ge25519_base.data ge25519.h ge25519.c] [fe25519.h fe25519.c ed25519.c crypto_api.h blocks.c] support ed25519 keys (hostkeys and user identities) using the public domain ed25519 reference code from SUPERCOP, see http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/software.html feedback, help & ok djm@
2013-11-21 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/21 00:45:44Damien Miller
[Makefile.in PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 authfile.c chacha.c] [chacha.h cipher-chachapoly.c cipher-chachapoly.h cipher.c cipher.h] [dh.c myproposal.h packet.c poly1305.c poly1305.h servconf.c ssh.1] [ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5] Add a new protocol 2 transport cipher "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" that combines Daniel Bernstein's ChaCha20 stream cipher and Poly1305 MAC to build an authenticated encryption mode. Inspired by and similar to Adam Langley's proposal for TLS: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-03 but differs in layout used for the MAC calculation and the use of a second ChaCha20 instance to separately encrypt packet lengths. Details are in the PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 file. Feedback markus@, naddy@; manpage bits Loganden Velvindron @ AfriNIC ok markus@ naddy@
2013-11-09 - (dtucker) [configure.ac kex.c key.c myproposal.h] Test for the presence ofDarren Tucker
NID_X9_62_prime256v1, NID_secp384r1 and NID_secp521r1 and test that the latter actually works before using it. Fedora (at least) has NID_secp521r1 that doesn't work (see https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1021897).
2013-11-08 - (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Conditionally enable CURVE25519_SHA256.Darren Tucker
2013-11-04 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/02 21:59:15Damien Miller
[kex.c kex.h myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] use curve25519 for default key exchange (curve25519-sha256@libssh.org); initial patch from Aris Adamantiadis; ok djm@
2013-06-11 - (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Make the conditional algorithm support consistentDarren Tucker
and add some comments so it's clear what goes where.
2013-06-11 - (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Do not advertise AES GSM ciphers if we don't haveDarren Tucker
the required OpenSSL support. Patch from naddy at freebsd.
2013-06-05 - (dtucker) Enable sha256 kex methods based on the presence of the necessaryDarren Tucker
functions, not from the openssl version.
2013-01-09 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/08 18:49:04Damien Miller
[PROTOCOL authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h monitor_wrap.c] [myproposal.h packet.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5] support AES-GCM as defined in RFC 5647 (but with simpler KEX handling) ok and feedback djm@
2012-12-12 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/11 22:31:18Damien Miller
[PROTOCOL authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.h mac.c myproposal.h] [packet.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5] add encrypt-then-mac (EtM) modes to openssh by defining new mac algorithms that change the packet format and compute the MAC over the encrypted message (including the packet size) instead of the plaintext data; these EtM modes are considered more secure and used by default. feedback and ok djm@
2012-10-05remove stray '+' from syncDarren Tucker
2012-10-05 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/04 13:21:50Darren Tucker
[myproposal.h ssh_config.5 umac.h sshd_config.5 ssh.1 sshd.8 mac.c] add umac128 variant; ok djm@ at n2k12 (note: further Makefile work is required)
2012-06-30 - (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Remove trailing backslash to fix compile errorDarren Tucker
2012-06-30 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/28 05:07:45Damien Miller
[mac.c myproposal.h ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5] Remove hmac-sha2-256-96 and hmac-sha2-512-96 MACs since they were removed from draft6 of the spec and will not be in the RFC when published. Patch from mdb at juniper net via bz#2023, ok markus.
2011-08-16 - (tim) [mac.c myproposal.h] Wrap SHA256 and SHA512 in ifdefs forTim Rice
OpenSSL 0.9.7. ok djm
2011-08-06 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2011/08/02 01:22:11Damien Miller
[mac.c myproposal.h ssh.1 ssh_config.5 sshd.8 sshd_config.5] Add new SHA256 and SHA512 based HMAC modes from http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-dbider-sha2-mac-for-ssh-02.txt Patch from mdb AT juniper.net; feedback and ok markus@
2011-01-13 - (djm) [myproposal.h] Fix reversed OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER test and badDamien Miller
#define that was causing diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 to be incorrectly disabled
2010-09-10 - (djm) [authfd.c authfile.c bufec.c buffer.h configure.ac kex.h kexecdh.c]Damien Miller
[kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c key.c key.h myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c] [ssh-agent.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] Disable ECDH and ECDSA on platforms that don't have the requisite OpenSSL support. ok dtucker@
2010-09-10 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/09/01 22:42:13Damien Miller
[myproposal.h] prefer ECDH in a 256 bit curve field; prompted by naddy@
2010-08-31 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/08/31 11:54:45Damien Miller
[PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys auth2-jpake.c authfd.c] [authfile.c buffer.h dns.c kex.c kex.h key.c key.h monitor.c] [monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c packet.h pathnames.h readconf.c] [ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1 ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c] [ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.8 ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h] [ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5] [uuencode.c uuencode.h bufec.c kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c ssh-ecdsa.c] Implement Elliptic Curve Cryptography modes for key exchange (ECDH) and host/user keys (ECDSA) as specified by RFC5656. ECDH and ECDSA offer better performance than plain DH and DSA at the same equivalent symmetric key length, as well as much shorter keys. Only the mandatory sections of RFC5656 are implemented, specifically the three REQUIRED curves nistp256, nistp384 and nistp521 and only ECDH and ECDSA. Point compression (optional in RFC5656 is NOT implemented). Certificate host and user keys using the new ECDSA key types are supported. Note that this code has not been tested for interoperability and may be subject to change. feedback and ok markus@
2010-04-16 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/04/16 01:47:26Damien Miller
[PROTOCOL.certkeys auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rsa.c] [auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c key.c key.h myproposal.h ssh-add.c] [ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c] [sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] revised certificate format ssh-{dss,rsa}-cert-v01@openssh.com with the following changes: move the nonce field to the beginning of the certificate where it can better protect against chosen-prefix attacks on the signature hash Rename "constraints" field to "critical options" Add a new non-critical "extensions" field Add a serial number The older format is still support for authentication and cert generation (use "ssh-keygen -t v00 -s ca_key ..." to generate a v00 certificate) ok markus@
2010-02-27 - OpenBSD CVS SyncDamien Miller
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/02/26 20:29:54 [PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys addrmatch.c auth-options.c] [auth-options.h auth.h auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c dns.c dns.h hostfile.c] [hostfile.h kex.h kexdhs.c kexgexs.c key.c key.h match.h monitor.c] [myproposal.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c] [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h sshconnect.c] [sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5] Add support for certificate key types for users and hosts. OpenSSH certificate key types are not X.509 certificates, but a much simpler format that encodes a public key, identity information and some validity constraints and signs it with a CA key. CA keys are regular SSH keys. This certificate style avoids the attack surface of X.509 certificates and is very easy to deploy. Certified host keys allow automatic acceptance of new host keys when a CA certificate is marked as sh/known_hosts. see VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1) for details. Certified user keys allow authentication of users when the signing CA key is marked as trusted in authorized_keys. See "AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT" in sshd(8) for details. Certificates are minted using ssh-keygen(1), documentation is in the "CERTIFICATES" section of that manpage. Documentation on the format of certificates is in the file PROTOCOL.certkeys feedback and ok markus@
2009-01-28 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/01/23 07:58:11Damien Miller
[myproposal.h] prefer CTR modes and revised arcfour (i.e w/ discard) modes to CBC modes; ok markus@
2007-06-11 - pvalchev@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/06/07 19:37:34Damien Miller
[kex.h mac.c mac.h monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c ssh.1] [ssh_config.5 sshd.8 sshd_config.5] Add a new MAC algorithm for data integrity, UMAC-64 (not default yet, must specify umac-64@openssh.com). Provides about 20% end-to-end speedup compared to hmac-md5. Represents a different approach to message authentication to that of HMAC that may be beneficial if HMAC based on one of its underlying hash algorithms is found to be vulnerable to a new attack. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4418.txt in conjunction with and OK djm@
2006-03-26 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/25 22:22:43Damien Miller
[atomicio.h auth-options.h auth.h auth2-gss.c authfd.h authfile.h] [bufaux.h buffer.h canohost.h channels.h cipher.h clientloop.h] [compat.h compress.h crc32.c crc32.h deattack.h dh.h dispatch.h] [dns.c dns.h getput.h groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c] [gss-serv.c hostfile.h includes.h kex.h key.h log.h mac.h match.h] [misc.h monitor.h monitor_fdpass.h monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.h msg.h] [myproposal.h packet.h pathnames.h progressmeter.h readconf.h rsa.h] [scard.h servconf.h serverloop.h session.h sftp-common.h sftp.h] [ssh-gss.h ssh.h ssh1.h ssh2.h sshconnect.h sshlogin.h sshpty.h] [ttymodes.h uidswap.h uuencode.h xmalloc.h] standardise spacing in $OpenBSD$ tags; requested by deraadt@
2006-03-26 - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/19 18:53:12Damien Miller
[kex.h myproposal.h] spacing
2006-03-15 - (tim) [kex.c myproposal.h md-sha256.c openbsd-compat/sha2.c,h] DisableTim Rice
sha256 when openssl < 0.9.7. Patch from djm@. Corrections/testing by me.