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ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9d34cf2f59aca5422021ae2857190578187dc2b4
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add RCSIDs to these; they make syncing portable a bit
easier
Upstream-ID: 56cb7021faea599736dd7e7f09c2e714425b1e68
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clear session keys from memory; ok djm@
Upstream-ID: ecd178819868975affd5fd6637458b7c712b6a0f
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remove miscellaneous SSH1 leftovers; ok markus@
Upstream-ID: af23696022ae4d45a1abc2fb8b490d8d9dd63b7c
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ssh proxy mux mode (-O proxy; idea from Simon Tatham): - mux
client speaks the ssh-packet protocol directly over unix-domain socket. - mux
server acts as a proxy, translates channel IDs and relays to the server. - no
filedescriptor passing necessary. - combined with unix-domain forwarding it's
even possible to run mux client and server on different machines. feedback
& ok djm@
Upstream-ID: 666a2fb79f58e5c50e246265fb2b9251e505c25b
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Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing
compression early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s,
but today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf. multiple
compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
Upstream-ID: 32af9771788d45a0779693b41d06ec199d849caf
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refactor canohost.c: move functions that cache results closer
to the places that use them (authn and session code). After this, no state is
cached in canohost.c
feedback and ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 5f2e4df88d4803fc8ec59ec53629105e23ce625e
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refactor activation of rekeying
This makes automatic rekeying internal to the packet code (previously
the server and client loops needed to assist). In doing to it makes
application of rekey limits more accurate by accounting for packets
about to be sent as well as packets queued during rekeying events
themselves.
Based on a patch from dtucker@ which was in turn based on a patch
Aleksander Adamowski in bz#2521; ok markus@
Upstream-ID: a441227fd64f9739850ca97b4cf794202860fcd8
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remove roaming support; ok djm@
Upstream-ID: 2cab8f4b197bc95776fb1c8dc2859dad0c64dc56
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Convert packet_send_debug and packet_disconnect from macros to
functions. Some older GCCs (2.7.x, 2.95.x) see to have problems with
variadic macros with only one argument so we convert these two into
functions. ok djm@
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make rekey_limit for sshd w/privsep work; ok djm@
dtucker@
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avoid more fatal/exit in the packet.c paths that
ssh-keyscan uses; feedback and "looks good" markus@
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avoid fatal() calls in packet code makes ssh-keyscan more
reliable against server failures ok dtucker@ markus@
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update packet.c & isolate, introduce struct ssh a) switch
packet.c to buffer api and isolate per-connection info into struct ssh b)
(de)serialization of the state is moved from monitor to packet.c c) the old
packet.c API is implemented in opacket.[ch] d) compress.c/h is removed and
integrated into packet.c with and ok djm@
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