Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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[authfile.c authfile.h cipher.c cipher.h key.c packet.c ssh-agent.c]
[ssh-keygen.c PROTOCOL.key] new private key format, bcrypt as KDF by
default; details in PROTOCOL.key; feedback and lots help from djm;
ok djm@
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[Makefile.in PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 authfile.c chacha.c]
[chacha.h cipher-chachapoly.c cipher-chachapoly.h cipher.c cipher.h]
[dh.c myproposal.h packet.c poly1305.c poly1305.h servconf.c ssh.1]
[ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5] Add a new protocol 2 transport
cipher "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" that combines Daniel
Bernstein's ChaCha20 stream cipher and Poly1305 MAC to build an
authenticated encryption mode.
Inspired by and similar to Adam Langley's proposal for TLS:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-03
but differs in layout used for the MAC calculation and the use of a
second ChaCha20 instance to separately encrypt packet lengths.
Details are in the PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 file.
Feedback markus@, naddy@; manpage bits Loganden Velvindron @ AfriNIC
ok markus@ naddy@
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[auth-options.c auth2-chall.c authfd.c channels.c cipher-3des1.c]
[clientloop.c gss-genr.c monitor_mm.c packet.c schnorr.c umac.c]
[sftp-client.c sftp-glob.c]
use calloc for all structure allocations; from markus@
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[auth-options.c auth-rsa.c bufaux.c buffer.h channels.c hostfile.c]
[hostfile.h mux.c packet.c packet.h roaming_common.c serverloop.c]
fix pointer-signedness warnings from clang/llvm-3.3; "seems nice" deraadt@
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[ssh-agent.c clientloop.c misc.h packet.c progressmeter.c misc.c
channels.c sandbox-systrace.c]
Use clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC ...) for ssh timers so that things like
keepalives and rekeying will work properly over clock steps. Suggested by
markus@, "looks good" djm@.
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[xmalloc.h cipher.c sftp-glob.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c sftp-common.c
ssh-ecdsa.c auth2-chall.c compat.c readconf.c kexgexs.c monitor.c
gss-genr.c cipher-3des1.c kex.c monitor_wrap.c ssh-pkcs11-client.c
auth-options.c rsa.c auth2-pubkey.c sftp.c hostfile.c auth2.c
servconf.c auth.c authfile.c xmalloc.c uuencode.c sftp-client.c
auth2-gss.c sftp-server.c bufaux.c mac.c session.c jpake.c kexgexc.c
sshconnect.c auth-chall.c auth2-passwd.c sshconnect1.c buffer.c
kexecdhs.c kexdhs.c ssh-rsa.c auth1.c ssh-pkcs11.c auth2-kbdint.c
kexdhc.c sshd.c umac.c ssh-dss.c auth2-jpake.c bufbn.c clientloop.c
monitor_mm.c scp.c roaming_client.c serverloop.c key.c auth-rsa.c
ssh-pkcs11-helper.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-keygen.c match.c channels.c
sshconnect2.c addrmatch.c mux.c canohost.c kexecdhc.c schnorr.c
ssh-add.c misc.c auth2-hostbased.c ssh-agent.c bufec.c groupaccess.c
dns.c packet.c readpass.c authfd.c moduli.c]
bye, bye xfree(); ok markus@
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[sshd_config.5 servconf.c servconf.h packet.c serverloop.c monitor.c sshd_config
sshd.c] Add RekeyLimit to sshd with the same syntax as the client allowing
rekeying based on traffic volume or time. ok djm@, help & ok jmc@ for the man
page.
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[ssh_config sshconnect2.c packet.c readconf.h readconf.c clientloop.c
ssh_config.5 packet.h]
Add an optional second argument to RekeyLimit in the client to allow
rekeying based on elapsed time in addition to amount of traffic.
with djm@ jmc@, ok djm
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[authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c]
[key.c key.h mac.c mac.h packet.c ssh.1 ssh.c]
add the ability to query supported ciphers, MACs, key type and KEX
algorithms to ssh. Includes some refactoring of KEX and key type handling
to be table-driven; ok markus@
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[packet.c]
quiet disconnect notifications on the server from error() back to logit()
if it is a normal client closure; bz#2057 ok+feedback dtucker@
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[packet.c]
record "Received disconnect" messages at ERROR rather than INFO priority,
since they are abnormal and result in a non-zero ssh exit status; patch
from Iain Morgan in bz#2057; ok dtucker@
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[PROTOCOL authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h monitor_wrap.c]
[myproposal.h packet.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5]
support AES-GCM as defined in RFC 5647 (but with simpler KEX handling)
ok and feedback djm@
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[packet.c]
reset incoming_packet buffer for each new packet in EtM-case, too;
this happens if packets are parsed only parially (e.g. ignore
messages sent when su/sudo turn off echo); noted by sthen/millert
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[PROTOCOL authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.h mac.c myproposal.h]
[packet.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5]
add encrypt-then-mac (EtM) modes to openssh by defining new mac algorithms
that change the packet format and compute the MAC over the encrypted
message (including the packet size) instead of the plaintext data;
these EtM modes are considered more secure and used by default.
feedback and ok djm@
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[packet.c]
clear old keys on rekeing; ok djm
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addressed connections. ok dtucker@
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[packet.c packet.h]
packet_read_poll() is not used anymore.
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[packet.c]
do not permit SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST/ACCEPT during rekeying;
ok dtucker@, djm@
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[auth2.c dh.c packet.c roaming.h roaming_client.c roaming_common.c]
fix some harmless and/or unreachable int overflows;
reported Xi Wang, ok markus@
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[packet.c packet.h]
set traffic class for IPv6 traffic as we do for IPv4 TOS;
patch from lionel AT mamane.lu via Colin Watson in bz#1855;
ok markus@
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[clientloop.c misc.c misc.h packet.c packet.h readconf.c readconf.h]
[servconf.c servconf.h session.c ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5]
allow ssh and sshd to set arbitrary TOS/DSCP/QoS values instead of
hardcoding lowdelay/throughput.
bz#1733 patch from philipp AT redfish-solutions.com; ok markus@ deraadt@
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[packet.c]
whitespace KNF
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[kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c key.c key.h myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c]
[ssh-agent.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] Disable ECDH and ECDSA on
platforms that don't have the requisite OpenSSL support. ok dtucker@
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[PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys auth2-jpake.c authfd.c]
[authfile.c buffer.h dns.c kex.c kex.h key.c key.h monitor.c]
[monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c packet.h pathnames.h readconf.c]
[ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1 ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
[ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.8 ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h]
[ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5]
[uuencode.c uuencode.h bufec.c kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c ssh-ecdsa.c]
Implement Elliptic Curve Cryptography modes for key exchange (ECDH) and
host/user keys (ECDSA) as specified by RFC5656. ECDH and ECDSA offer
better performance than plain DH and DSA at the same equivalent symmetric
key length, as well as much shorter keys.
Only the mandatory sections of RFC5656 are implemented, specifically the
three REQUIRED curves nistp256, nistp384 and nistp521 and only ECDH and
ECDSA. Point compression (optional in RFC5656 is NOT implemented).
Certificate host and user keys using the new ECDSA key types are supported.
Note that this code has not been tested for interoperability and may be
subject to change.
feedback and ok markus@
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[auth-options.c auth1.c auth2.c bufaux.c buffer.h kex.c key.c packet.c]
[packet.h ssh-dss.c ssh-rsa.c]
Add buffer_get_cstring() and related functions that verify that the
string extracted from the buffer contains no embedded \0 characters*
This prevents random (possibly malicious) crap from being appended to
strings where it would not be noticed if the string is used with
a string(3) function.
Use the new API in a few sensitive places.
* actually, we allow a single one at the end of the string for now because
we don't know how many deployed implementations get this wrong, but don't
count on this to remain indefinitely.
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[auth-rsa.c channels.c jpake.c key.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c packet.c]
[ssh-rsa.c]
s/timing_safe_cmp/timingsafe_bcmp/g
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[auth-rsa.c channels.c jpake.c key.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c]
[packet.c ssh-rsa.c]
implement a timing_safe_cmp() function to compare memory without leaking
timing information by short-circuiting like memcmp() and use it for
some of the more sensitive comparisons (though nothing high-value was
readily attackable anyway); "looks ok" markus@
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20090926
- (djm) [contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec]
[contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Update for release
- (djm) [README] update relnotes URL
- (djm) [packet.c] Restore EWOULDBLOCK handling that got lost somewhere
- (djm) Release 5.3p1
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[packet.h packet.c]
packet_bacup_state() and packet_restore_state() will be used to
temporarily save the current state ren resuming a suspended connection.
ok markus@
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[packet.c]
Move some more statics into session_state
ok markus@ djm@
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[monitor.c packet.c]
Fix warnings found by chl@ and djm@ and change roaming_atomicio's
return type to match atomicio's
Diff from djm@, ok markus@
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[sshd.c packet.c serverloop.c monitor_wrap.c clientloop.c sshconnect.c
monitor.c Added roaming.h roaming_common.c roaming_dummy.c]
Keep track of number of bytes read and written. Needed for upcoming
changes. Most code from Martin Forssen, maf at appgate dot com.
ok markus@
Also, applied appropriate changes to Makefile.in
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[sshconnect.h sshconnect.c]
Un-static ssh_exchange_identification(), part of a larger change from
Martin Forssen and needed for upcoming changes.
ok markus@
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[canohost.h canohost.c]
Add clear_cached_addr(), needed for upcoming changes allowing the peer
address to change.
ok markus@
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[packet.c]
check for enc !=NULL in packet_start_discard
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[cipher.c cipher.h packet.c]
Work around the CPNI-957037 Plaintext Recovery Attack by always
reading 256K of data on packet size or HMAC errors (in CBC mode only).
Help, feedback and ok djm@
Feedback from Martin Albrecht and Paterson Kenny
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[packet.c]
packet_disconnect() on padding error, too. should reduce the success
probability for the CPNI-957037 Plaintext Recovery Attack to 2^-18
ok djm@
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[clientloop.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c packet.c packet.h sshd.c]
sync v1 and v2 traffic accounting; add it to sshd, too;
ok djm@, dtucker@
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- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/04 23:08:25
[packet.c]
handle EINTR in packet_write_poll()l ok dtucker@
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[packet.c scp.c serverloop.c sftp-client.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keyscan.c]
[sshd.c] Explicitly handle EWOULDBLOCK wherever we handle EAGAIN, on
some platforms (HP nonstop) it is a distinct errno;
bz#1467 reported by sconeu AT yahoo.com; ok dtucker@
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[packet.c]
compile on older gcc; no decl after code
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[sshd.c sshconnect.c packet.h misc.c misc.h packet.c]
Make keepalive timeouts apply while waiting for a packet, particularly
during key renegotiation (bz #1363). With djm and Matt Day, ok djm@
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[packet.c] unbreak protocol keepalive timeouts bz#1465; ok dtucker@
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[bufaux.c buffer.h channels.c packet.c packet.h]
avoid extra malloc/copy/free when receiving data over the net;
~10% speedup for localhost-scp; ok djm@
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[clientloop.c packet.c packet.h serverloop.c]
Allow all SSH2 packet types, including UNIMPLEMENTED to reset the
keepalive timer (bz #1307). ok markus@
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[clientloop.c packet.c serverloop.c]
Revert the change for bz #1307 as it causes connection aborts if an IGNORE
packet arrives while we're waiting in packet_read_expect (and possibly
elsewhere).
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[clientloop.c serverloop.c packet.c]
Make SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED and SSH2_MSG_IGNORE messages reset the
ServerAlive and ClientAlive timers. Prevents dropping a connection
when these are enabled but the peer does not support our keepalives.
bz #1307, ok djm@.
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[kex.h mac.c mac.h monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c ssh.1]
[ssh_config.5 sshd.8 sshd_config.5]
Add a new MAC algorithm for data integrity, UMAC-64 (not default yet,
must specify umac-64@openssh.com). Provides about 20% end-to-end speedup
compared to hmac-md5. Represents a different approach to message
authentication to that of HMAC that may be beneficial if HMAC based on
one of its underlying hash algorithms is found to be vulnerable to a
new attack. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4418.txt
in conjunction with and OK djm@
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