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[moduli.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
Add optional checkpoints for moduli screening. feedback & ok deraadt
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ofsh-pkcs11.cpkcs_init and pkcs_terminate for building without dlopen support.
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[authfile.c authfile.h ssh-add.c]
allow "ssh-add - < key"; feedback and ok markus@
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[ssh-keygen.c]
fix -Wshadow
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[ssh-keygen.c]
use strcasecmp() for "clear" cert permission option also; ok djm
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[ssh-keygen.c]
remove -d, documentation removed >10 years ago; ok markus
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[ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
Add -A option. For each of the key types (rsa1, rsa, dsa and ecdsa)
for which host keys do not exist, generate the host keys with the
default key file path, an empty passphrase, default bits for the key
type, and default comment. This will be used by /etc/rc to generate
new host keys. Idea from deraadt.
ok deraadt
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[entropy.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c]
[ssh-keysign.c ssh-pkcs11-helper.c ssh-rand-helper.8 ssh-rand-helper.c]
[ssh.c ssh_prng_cmds.in sshd.c contrib/aix/buildbff.sh]
[regress/README.regress] Remove ssh-rand-helper and all its
tentacles. PRNGd seeding has been rolled into entropy.c directly.
Thanks to tim@ for testing on affected platforms.
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[clientloop.c ssh-keygen.c sshd.c]
some unsigned long long casts that make things a bit easier for
portable without resorting to dropping PRIu64 formats everywhere
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platforms that don't support ECC. Fixes some spurious warnings reported
by tim@
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[authfile.c key.c key.h ssh-keygen.c]
fix a possible NULL deref on loading a corrupt ECDH key
store ECDH group information in private keys files as "named groups"
rather than as a set of explicit group parameters (by setting
the OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE flag). This makes for shorter key files and
retrieves the group's OpenSSL NID that we need for various things.
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[kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c key.c key.h myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c]
[ssh-agent.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] Disable ECDH and ECDSA on
platforms that don't have the requisite OpenSSL support. ok dtucker@
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[ssh-keygen.c]
Switch ECDSA default key size to 256 bits, which according to RFC5656
should still be better than our current RSA-2048 default.
ok djm@, markus@
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[ssh-keygen.c]
permit -b 256, 384 or 521 as key size for ECDSA; ok djm@
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[ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keysign.c ssh.c sshd.c]
reintroduce commit from tedu@, which I pulled out for release
engineering:
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms is the name of the function we have a
man page for, so use that. ok djm
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[PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys auth2-jpake.c authfd.c]
[authfile.c buffer.h dns.c kex.c kex.h key.c key.h monitor.c]
[monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c packet.h pathnames.h readconf.c]
[ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1 ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
[ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.8 ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h]
[ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5]
[uuencode.c uuencode.h bufec.c kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c ssh-ecdsa.c]
Implement Elliptic Curve Cryptography modes for key exchange (ECDH) and
host/user keys (ECDSA) as specified by RFC5656. ECDH and ECDSA offer
better performance than plain DH and DSA at the same equivalent symmetric
key length, as well as much shorter keys.
Only the mandatory sections of RFC5656 are implemented, specifically the
three REQUIRED curves nistp256, nistp384 and nistp521 and only ECDH and
ECDSA. Point compression (optional in RFC5656 is NOT implemented).
Certificate host and user keys using the new ECDSA key types are supported.
Note that this code has not been tested for interoperability and may be
subject to change.
feedback and ok markus@
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[ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keysign.c ssh.c sshd.c]
backout previous temporarily; discussed with deraadt@
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[ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keysign.c ssh.c sshd.c]
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms is the name of the function we have a man page
for, so use that. ok djm
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[ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
Support CA keys in PKCS#11 tokens; feedback and ok markus@
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[PROTOCOL.certkeys ssh-keygen.c]
tighten the rules for certificate encoding by requiring that options
appear in lexical order and make our ssh-keygen comply. ok markus@
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- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/16 04:45:30
[ssh-keygen.c]
avoid bogus compiler warning
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[ssh-keygen.c]
sort usage();
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[ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
allow import (-i) and export (-e) of PEM and PKCS#8 encoded keys;
bz#1749; ok markus@
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[ssh-keygen.c]
fix printing of extensions in v01 certificates that I broke in r1.190
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[ssh-keygen.c]
standardise error messages when attempting to open private key
files to include "progname: filename: error reason"
bz#1783; ok dtucker@
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[PROTOCOL.certkeys auth-options.c ssh-keygen.c]
Move the permit-* options to the non-critical "extensions" field for v01
certificates. The logic is that if another implementation fails to
implement them then the connection just loses features rather than fails
outright.
ok markus@
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[ssh-keygen.c]
refuse to generate keys longer than OPENSSL_[RD]SA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS,
since we would refuse to use them anyway. bz#1516; ok dtucker@
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- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/04/23 01:47:41
[ssh-keygen.c]
bz#1740: display a more helpful error message when $HOME is
inaccessible while trying to create .ssh directory. Based on patch
from jchadima AT redhat.com; ok dtucker@
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[ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
tweak previous; ok djm
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[PROTOCOL.certkeys auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rsa.c]
[auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c key.c key.h myproposal.h ssh-add.c]
[ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c]
[sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
revised certificate format ssh-{dss,rsa}-cert-v01@openssh.com with the
following changes:
move the nonce field to the beginning of the certificate where it can
better protect against chosen-prefix attacks on the signature hash
Rename "constraints" field to "critical options"
Add a new non-critical "extensions" field
Add a serial number
The older format is still support for authentication and cert generation
(use "ssh-keygen -t v00 -s ca_key ..." to generate a v00 certificate)
ok markus@
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[key.c key.h ssh-keygen.c]
also print certificate type (user or host) for ssh-keygen -L
ok djm kettenis
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[ssh-keygen.c]
make internal strptime string match strftime format;
suggested by vinschen AT redhat.com and markus@
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[auth-options.c ssh-keygen.c]
"force-command" is not spelled "forced-command"; spotted by
imorgan AT nas.nasa.gov
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[ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
Add a -L flag to print the contents of a certificate; ok markus@
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[auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rsa.c auth.c auth.h auth2-hostbased.c auth2-pubkey.c]
[authfile.c authfile.h hostfile.c hostfile.h servconf.c servconf.h]
[ssh-keygen.c ssh.1 sshconnect.c sshd_config.5]
Add a TrustedUserCAKeys option to sshd_config to specify CA keys that
are trusted to authenticate users (in addition than doing it per-user
in authorized_keys).
Add a RevokedKeys option to sshd_config and a @revoked marker to
known_hosts to allow keys to me revoked and banned for user or host
authentication.
feedback and ok markus@
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maybe-undefined global "optarg"
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[ssh-keygen.c]
POSIX strptime is stricter than OpenBSD's so do a little dance to
appease it.
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- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/02/26 20:29:54
[PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys addrmatch.c auth-options.c]
[auth-options.h auth.h auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c dns.c dns.h hostfile.c]
[hostfile.h kex.h kexdhs.c kexgexs.c key.c key.h match.h monitor.c]
[myproposal.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c]
[ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h sshconnect.c]
[sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5]
Add support for certificate key types for users and hosts.
OpenSSH certificate key types are not X.509 certificates, but a much
simpler format that encodes a public key, identity information and
some validity constraints and signs it with a CA key. CA keys are
regular SSH keys. This certificate style avoids the attack surface
of X.509 certificates and is very easy to deploy.
Certified host keys allow automatic acceptance of new host keys
when a CA certificate is marked as sh/known_hosts.
see VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1) for details.
Certified user keys allow authentication of users when the signing
CA key is marked as trusted in authorized_keys. See "AUTHORIZED_KEYS
FILE FORMAT" in sshd(8) for details.
Certificates are minted using ssh-keygen(1), documentation is in
the "CERTIFICATES" section of that manpage.
Documentation on the format of certificates is in the file
PROTOCOL.certkeys
feedback and ok markus@
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[ssh-keygen.c]
fix -Wall
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[pathnames.h readconf.c readconf.h scp.1 sftp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c]
[ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh_config.5]
replace our obsolete smartcard code with PKCS#11.
ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-11/v2-20/pkcs-11v2-20.pdf
ssh(1) and ssh-keygen(1) use dlopen(3) directly to talk to a PKCS#11
provider (shared library) while ssh-agent(1) delegates PKCS#11 to
a forked a ssh-pkcs11-helper process.
PKCS#11 is currently a compile time option.
feedback and ok djm@; inspired by patches from Alon Bar-Lev
`
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[ssh-keygen.c]
when converting keys, truncate key comments at 72 chars as per RFC4716;
bz#1630 reported by tj AT castaglia.org; ok markus@
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[ssh-keygen.c]
force use of correct hash function for random-art signature display
as it was inheriting the wrong one when bubblebabble signatures were
activated; bz#1611 report and patch from fwojcik+openssh AT besh.com;
ok markus@
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[monitor_wrap.c monitor_mm.c ssh-keygen.c auth2.c gss-genr.c sftp-client.c]
alphabetize includes; reduces diff vs portable and style(9).
ok stevesk djm
(Id sync only; these were already in order in -portable)
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- tobias@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/02/21 19:32:04
[misc.c sftp-server-main.c ssh-keygen.c]
Added missing newlines in error messages.
ok dtucker
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[ssh-keygen.c]
spelling/typo in comment
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[ssh-keygen.c]
Change "ssh-keygen -F [host] -l" to not display random art unless
-v is also specified, making it consistent with the manual and other
uses of -l.
ok grunk@
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[ssh-keygen.c]
make ssh-keygen -lf show the key type just as ssh-add -l would do it
ok djm@ markus@
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[ssh-keygen.c ssh-keygen.1]
ssh-keygen would write fingerprints to STDOUT, and random art to STDERR,
that is not how it was envisioned.
Also correct manpage saying that -v is needed along with -l for it to work.
spotted by naddy@
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[ssh-keygen.c]
ssh-keygen -lv -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
would not display you the random art as intended, spotted by canacar@
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[ssh_config.5 key.h readconf.c readconf.h ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c key.c
sshconnect.c]
Introduce SSH Fingerprint ASCII Visualization, a technique inspired by the
graphical hash visualization schemes known as "random art", and by
Dan Kaminsky's musings on the subject during a BlackOp talk at the
23C3 in Berlin.
Scientific publication (original paper):
"Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security",
Perrig A. and Song D., 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic
Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99)
http://sparrow.ece.cmu.edu/~adrian/projects/validation/validation.pdf
The algorithm used here is a worm crawling over a discrete plane,
leaving a trace (augmenting the field) everywhere it goes.
Movement is taken from dgst_raw 2bit-wise. Bumping into walls
makes the respective movement vector be ignored for this turn,
thus switching to the other color of the chessboard.
Graphs are not unambiguous for now, because circles in graphs can be
walked in either direction.
discussions with several people,
help, corrections and ok markus@ djm@
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