Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 60cb0356114acc7625ab85105f6f6a7cd44a8d05
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It turns out we still support pre-auth compression on the client.
Therefore revert the previous two commits:
date: 2018/07/06 09:06:14; author: sf; commitid: yZVYKIRtUZWD9CmE;
Rename COMP_DELAYED to COMP_ZLIB
Only delayed compression is supported nowadays.
ok markus@
date: 2018/07/06 09:05:01; author: sf; commitid: rEGuT5UgI9f6kddP;
Remove leftovers from pre-authentication compression
Support for this has been removed in 2016.
COMP_DELAYED will be renamed in a later commit.
ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cdfef526357e4e1483c86cf599491b2dafb77772
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Support for this has been removed in 2016.
COMP_DELAYED will be renamed in a later commit.
ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6a99616c832627157113fcb0cf5a752daf2e6b58
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signature work - returns ability to add/remove/specify algorithms by
wildcard.
Algorithm lists are now fully expanded when the server/client configs
are finalised, so errors are reported early and the config dumps
(e.g. "ssh -G ...") now list the actual algorithms selected.
Clarify that, while wildcards are accepted in algorithm lists, they
aren't full pattern-lists that support negation.
(lots of) feedback, ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a8894c5c81f399a002f02ff4fe6b4fa46b1f3207
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for certs hosted in ssh-agent
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5fd5edd726137dda2d020e1cdebc464110a010f
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OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c36981fdf1f3ce04966d3310826a3e1e6233d93e
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In ssh, when an agent fails to return a RSA-SHA2 signature when
requested and falls back to RSA-SHA1 instead, retry the signature to
ensure that the public key algorithm sent in the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH
matches the one in the signature itself.
In sshd, strictly enforce that the public key algorithm sent in the
SSH_MSG_USERAUTH message matches what appears in the signature.
Make the sshd_config PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and
HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes options control accepted signature algorithms
(previously they selected supported key types). This allows these
options to ban RSA-SHA1 in favour of RSA-SHA2.
Add new signature algorithms "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com" and
"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com" to force use of RSA-SHA2 signatures
with certificate keys.
feedback and ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c6e9f6d45eed8962ad502d315d7eaef32c419dde
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OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9276951caf4daf555f6d262e95720e7f79244572
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from djm; ok deraadt dtucker
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 12e50836ba2040042383a8b71e12d7ea06e9633d
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different to what was requested. This might happen when an old/non-OpenSSH
agent is asked to make a rsa-sha2-256/512 signature but only supports
ssh-rsa. bz#2799 feedback and ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 760c0f9438c5c58abc16b5f98008ff2d95cb13ce
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ssh_free checks for and handles NULL args, remove NULL
checks from remaining callers. ok djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bb926825c53724c069df68a93a2597f9192f7e7b
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Drop compatibility hacks for some ancient SSH
implementations, including ssh.com <=2.* and OpenSSH <= 3.*.
These versions were all released in or before 2001 and predate the
final SSH RFCs. The hacks in question aren't necessary for RFC-
compliant SSH implementations.
ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4be81c67db57647f907f4e881fb9341448606138
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Increase the buffer sizes for user prompts to ensure that
they won't be truncated by snprintf. Based on patch from cjwatson at
debian.org via bz#2768, ok djm@
Upstream-ID: 6ffacf1abec8f40b469de5b94bfb29997d96af3e
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refuse to a private keys when its corresponding .pub key
does not match. bz#2737 ok dtucker@
Upstream-ID: 54ff5e2db00037f9db8d61690f26ef8f16e0d913
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Add user@host prefix to client's "Permisison denied"
messages, useful in particular when using "stacked" connections where it's
not clear which host is denying. bz#2720, ok djm@ markus@
Upstream-ID: de88e1e9dcb050c98e85377482d1287a9fe0d2be
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remove now obsolete ctx from ssh_dispatch_run; ok djm@
Upstream-ID: 9870aabf7f4d71660c31fda91b942b19a8e68d29
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another ctx => ssh conversion (in GSSAPI code)
Upstream-ID: 4d6574c3948075c60608d8e045af42fe5b5d8ae0
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protocol handlers all get struct ssh passed; ok djm@
Upstream-ID: 0ca9ea2a5d01a6d2ded94c5024456a930c5bfb5d
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ssh: pass struct ssh to auth functions, too; ok djm@
Upstream-ID: d13c509cc782f8f19728fbea47ac7cf36f6e85dd
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switch from Key typedef with struct sshkey; ok djm@
Upstream-ID: 3067d33e04efbe5131ce8f70668c47a58e5b7a1f
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more simplification and removal of SSHv1-related code;
ok djm@
Upstream-ID: d2f041aa0b79c0ebd98c68a01e5a0bfab2cf3b55
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remove KEY_RSA1
ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 7408517b077c892a86b581e19f82a163069bf133
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include key fingerprint in "Offering public key" debug
message
Upstream-ID: 964749f820c2ed4cf6a866268b1a05e907315c52
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allow ssh to use certificates accompanied by a private
key file but no corresponding plain *.pub public key. bz#2617 based on patch
from Adam Eijdenberg; ok dtucker@ markus@
Upstream-ID: 295668dca2c39505281577217583ddd2bd4b00b9
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Make ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits take u32 for the number of
seconds until rekeying (negative values are rejected at config parse time).
This allows the removal of some casts and a signed vs unsigned comparison
warning.
rekey_time is cast to int64 for the comparison which is a no-op
on OpenBSD, but should also do the right thing in -portable on
anything still using 32bit time_t (until the system time actually
wraps, anyway).
some early guidance deraadt@, ok djm@
Upstream-ID: c9f18613afb994a07e7622eb326f49de3d123b6c
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misplaced braces in test; from Karsten Weiss
Upstream-ID: f7b794074d3aae8e35b69a91d211c599c94afaae
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don't dereference authctxt before testing != NULL, it
causes compilers to make assumptions; from Karsten Weiss
Upstream-ID: 794243aad1e976ebc717885b7a97a25e00c031b2
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Fix public key authentication when multiple
authentication is in use. Instead of deleting and re-preparing the entire
keys list, just reset the 'used' flags; the keys list is already in a good
order (with already- tried keys at the back)
Analysis and patch from Vincent Brillault on bz#2642; ok dtucker@
Upstream-ID: 7123f12dc2f3bcaae715853035a97923d7300176
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restore pre-auth compression support in the client -- the
previous commit was intended to remove it from the server only.
remove a few server-side pre-auth compression bits that escaped
adjust wording of Compression directive in sshd_config(5)
pointed out by naddy@ ok markus@
Upstream-ID: d23696ed72a228dacd4839dd9f2dec424ba2016b
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Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing
compression early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s,
but today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf. multiple
compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
Upstream-ID: 32af9771788d45a0779693b41d06ec199d849caf
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If ssh receives a PACKET_DISCONNECT during userauth it
will cause ssh_dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, ...) to return without the
session being authenticated. Check for this and exit if necessary. ok djm@
Upstream-ID: b3afe126c0839d2eae6cddd41ff2ba317eda0903
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Lower loglevel for "Authenticated with partial success"
message similar to other similar level. bz#2599, patch from cgallek at
gmail.com, ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 3faab814e947dc7b2e292edede23e94c608cb4dd
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support UTF-8 characters in ssh(1) banners using
schwarze@'s safe fmprintf printer; bz#2058
feedback schwarze@ ok dtucker@
Upstream-ID: a72ce4e3644c957643c9524eea2959e41b91eea7
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KNF compression proposal and simplify the client side a
little. ok djm@
Upstream-ID: aa814b694efe9e5af8a26e4c80a05526ae6d6605
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prefer agent-hosted keys to keys from PKCS#11; ok markus
Upstream-ID: 7417f7653d58d6306d9f8c08d0263d050e2fd8f4
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add support for additional fixed DH groups from
draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-03
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 (2K group)
diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 (4K group)
diffie-hellman-group18-sha512 (8K group)
based on patch from Mark D. Baushke and Darren Tucker
ok markus@
Upstream-ID: ac00406ada4f0dfec41585ca0839f039545bc46f
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fix signed/unsigned errors reported by clang-3.7; add
sshbuf_dup_string() to replace a common idiom of strdup(sshbuf_ptr()) with
better safety checking; feedback and ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 71f926d9bb3f1efed51319a6daf37e93d57c8820
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fix comment
Upstream-ID: 313a385bd7b69a82f8e28ecbaf5789c774457b15
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unbreak authentication using lone certificate keys in
ssh-agent: when attempting pubkey auth with a certificate, if no separate
private key is found among the keys then try with the certificate key itself.
bz#2550 reported by Peter Moody
Upstream-ID: f939cd76d68e6a9a3d1711b5a943d6ed1e623966
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fix spurious error message when incorrect passphrase
entered for keys; reported by espie@ ok deraadt@
Upstream-ID: 58b2e46e63ed6912ed1ee780bd3bd8560f9a5899
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avoid an uninitialised value when NumberOfPasswordPrompts
is 0 ok markus@ djm@
Upstream-ID: 11b068d83c2865343aeb46acf1e9eec00f829b6b
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fd leaks; report Qualys Security Advisory team; ok
deraadt@
Upstream-ID: 4ec0f12b9d8fa202293c9effa115464185aa071d
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remove roaming support; ok djm@
Upstream-ID: 2cab8f4b197bc95776fb1c8dc2859dad0c64dc56
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Remove NULL-checks before sshkey_free().
ok djm@
Upstream-ID: 3e35afe8a25e021216696b5d6cde7f5d2e5e3f52
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correct error messages; from Tomas Kuthan bz#2507
Upstream-ID: 7454a0affeab772398052954c79300aa82077093
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Pass (char *)NULL rather than (char *)0 to execl and
execlp.
ok dtucker@
Upstream-ID: 56c955106cbddba86c3dd9bbf786ac0d1b361492
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Remove NULL-checks before free().
ok dtucker@
Upstream-ID: e3d3cb1ce900179906af36517b5eea0fb15e6ef8
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implement SHA2-{256,512} for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signatures
(user and host auth) based on draft-rsa-dsa-sha2-256-03.txt and
draft-ssh-ext-info-04.txt; with & ok djm@
Upstream-ID: cf82ce532b2733e5c4b34bb7b7c94835632db309
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clean up agent_fd handling; properly initialise it to -1
and make tests consistent
ok markus@
Upstream-ID: ac9554323d5065745caf17b5e37cb0f0d4825707
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Add an AddKeysToAgent client option which can be set to
'yes', 'no', 'ask', or 'confirm', and defaults to 'no'. When enabled, a
private key that is used during authentication will be added to ssh-agent if
it is running (with confirmation enabled if set to 'confirm').
Initial version from Joachim Schipper many years ago.
ok markus@
Upstream-ID: a680db2248e8064ec55f8be72d539458c987d5f4
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