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WITH_OPENSSL; ok djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 881f9a2c4e2239849cee8bbf4faec9bab128f55b
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noification prior to the SSH2 protocol banner according to RFC4253 section
4.2. ok djm@ deraadt@ markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5dabcb722d54dea18eafb336d50b733af4f9c63
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including the new U2F signatures.
Don't use sshsk_ecdsa_sign() directly, instead make it reachable via
sshkey_sign() like all other signature operations. This means that
we need to add a provider argument to sshkey_sign(), so most of this
change is mechanically adding that.
Suggested by / ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d5193a03fcfa895085d91b2b83d984a9fde76c8c
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unreliable signals and now-unneeded save and restore of errno. ok deraadt@
markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 01dd8a1ebdd991c8629ba1f5237283341a93cd88
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some arbitrary value < 0. errno is only updated in this case. Change all
(most?) callers of syscalls to follow this better, and let's see if this
strictness helps us in the future.
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 48081f00db7518e3b712a49dca06efc2a5428075
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speculation and memory sidechannel attacks like Spectre, Meltdown, Rowhammer
and Rambleed. This change encrypts private keys when they are not in use with
a symmetic key that is derived from a relatively large "prekey" consisting of
random data (currently 16KB).
Attackers must recover the entire prekey with high accuracy before
they can attempt to decrypt the shielded private key, but the current
generation of attacks have bit error rates that, when applied
cumulatively to the entire prekey, make this unlikely.
Implementation-wise, keys are encrypted "shielded" when loaded and then
automatically and transparently unshielded when used for signatures or
when being saved/serialised.
Hopefully we can remove this in a few years time when computer
architecture has become less unsafe.
been in snaps for a bit already; thanks deraadt@
ok dtucker@ deraadt@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 19767213c312e46f94b303a512ef8e9218a39bd4
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malloc_options. Prepares for changes in the way malloc is initialized. ok
guenther@ dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 154f4e3e174f614b09f792d4d06575e08de58a6b
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-C does not match, which allows it to work when sshd_config contains a Match
directive with or without -C. bz#2858, ok djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a701f0a33e3bc96753cfda2fe0b0378520b82eb
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1. Recently-forked child processes will briefly remain listening to
listen_socks. If the main server sshd process completes its restart
via execv() before these sockets are closed by the child processes
then it can fail to listen at the desired addresses/ports and/or
fail to restart.
2. When a SIGHUP is received, there may be forked child processes that
are awaiting their reexecution state. If the main server sshd
process restarts before passing this state, these child processes
will yield errors and use a fallback path of reading the current
sshd_config from the filesystem rather than use the one that sshd
was started with.
To fix both of these cases, we reuse the startup_pipes that are shared
between the main server sshd and forked children. Previously this was
used solely to implement tracking of pre-auth child processes for
MaxStartups, but this extends the messaging over these pipes to include
a child->parent message that the parent process is safe to restart. This
message is sent from the child after it has completed its preliminaries:
closing listen_socks and receiving its reexec state.
bz#2953, reported by Michal Koutný; ok markus@ dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7df09eacfa3ce13e9a7b1e9f17276ecc924d65ab
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KEM has been renamed to kexgen
from markus@ ok djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fac6da5dc63530ad0da537db022a9a4cfbe8bed8
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from markus@ ok djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6fbff96339a929835536b5730585d1d6057a352c
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from markus@ ok djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: af56466426b08a8be275412ae2743319e3d277c9
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OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38d937b85ff770886379dd66a8f32ab0c1c35c1f
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sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org using the Streamlined NTRU Prime
4591^761 implementation from SUPERCOP coupled with X25519 as a stop-loss. Not
enabled by default.
introduce KEM API; a simplified framework for DH-ish KEX methods.
from markus@ feedback & ok djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d687f76cffd3561dd73eb302d17a1c3bf321d1a7
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with & ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 78619a50ea7e4ca2f3b54d4658b3227277490ba2
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with & ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 61ecd154bd9804461a0cf5f495a29d919e0014d5
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with & ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea569d3eaf9b5cf1bad52779fbfa5fa0b28af891
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OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ed831bb95ad228c6791bc18b60ce7a2edef2c999
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with & ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 126553aecca302c9e02fd77e333b9cb217e623b4
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API, started almost exactly six years ago.
This change stops including the old packet_* API by default and makes
each file that requires the old API include it explicitly. We will
commit file-by-file refactoring to remove the old API in consistent
steps.
with & ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 93c98a6b38f6911fd1ae025a1ec57807fb4d4ef4
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patch from Markus Schmidt
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f3db619f67beb53257b21bac0e92b4fb7d5d5737
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ssh->kex and factor out the banner exchange. This eliminates some common code
from the client and server.
Also be more strict about handling \r characters - these should only
be accepted immediately before \n (pointed out by Jann Horn).
Inspired by a patch from Markus Schmidt.
(lots of) feedback and ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1cc7885487a6754f63641d7d3279b0941890275b
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Don't call OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() unless OpenSSL actually
supports it.
Move all libcrypto initialisation to a single function, and call that
from seed_rng() that is called early in each tool's main().
Prompted by patch from Rosen Penev
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loading the default hostkeys. Hostkeys explicitly specified in the
configuration or on the command-line are still reported as errors, and
failure to load at least one host key remains a fatal error.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Based on patch from Dag-Erling Smørgrav via
https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/103
ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ffc2e35a75d1008effaf05a5e27425041c27b684
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OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 482ce71a5ea5c5f3bc4d00fd719481a6a584d925
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we're old, but we don't have to act it
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9ca38d11f8ed19e61a55108d1e892d696cee08ec
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OIDs by calling ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids() regardless of whether
GSSAPI authentication is enabled in the main config.
This avoids sandbox violations for configurations that enable GSSAPI
auth later, e.g.
Match user djm
GSSAPIAuthentication yes
bz#2107; ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a5dd42d87c74e27cfb712b15b0f97ab20e0afd1d
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OpenSSH; feedback and ok tb@ jsing@ markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cacbcac87ce5da0d3ca7ef1b38a6f7fb349e4417
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causes double-free under some circumstances.
--
date: 2018/07/31 03:07:24; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +33 -18; commitid: f7g4UI8eeOXReTPh;
fix some memory leaks spotted by Coverity via Jakub Jelen in bz#2366
feedback and ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1e77547f60fdb5e2ffe23e2e4733c54d8d2d1137
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in bz#2366 feedback and ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8402bbae67d578bedbadb0ce68ff7c5a136ef563
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OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2b1f9619259e222bbd4fe9a8d3a0973eafb9dd8d
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OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 72b02017bac7feac48c9dceff8355056bea300bd
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OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f3cb4e54bff15c593602d95cc43e32ee1a4bac42
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In ssh, when an agent fails to return a RSA-SHA2 signature when
requested and falls back to RSA-SHA1 instead, retry the signature to
ensure that the public key algorithm sent in the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH
matches the one in the signature itself.
In sshd, strictly enforce that the public key algorithm sent in the
SSH_MSG_USERAUTH message matches what appears in the signature.
Make the sshd_config PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and
HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes options control accepted signature algorithms
(previously they selected supported key types). This allows these
options to ban RSA-SHA1 in favour of RSA-SHA2.
Add new signature algorithms "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com" and
"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com" to force use of RSA-SHA2 signatures
with certificate keys.
feedback and ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c6e9f6d45eed8962ad502d315d7eaef32c419dde
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establishes a minimum time for each failed authentication attempt (5ms) and
adds a per-user constant derived from a host secret (0-4ms). Based on work
by joona.kannisto at tut.fi, ok markus@ djm@.
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b7845b355bb7381703339c8fb0e57e81a20ae5ca
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after checking with codespell tool
(https://github.com/lucasdemarchi/codespell)
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 373222f12d7ab606598a2d36840c60be93568528
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remove the legacy one.
Includes a fairly big refactor of auth2-pubkey.c to retain less state
between key file lines.
feedback and ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dece6cae0f47751b9892080eb13d6625599573df
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Hash-Based Signatures) The code is not compiled in by default (see WITH_XMSS
in Makefile.inc) Joint work with stefan-lukas_gazdag at genua.eu See
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-xmss-hash-based-signatures-12 ok
djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef3eccb96762a5d6f135d7daeef608df7776a7ac
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The code required to support it is quite invasive to the mainline
code that is synced with upstream and is an ongoing maintenance burden.
Both the hardware and software are literal museum pieces these days and
we could not find anyone still running OpenSSH on one.
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The signal handlers from the original ssh1 code on which OpenSSH
is based assume unreliable signals and reinstall their handlers.
Since OpenBSD (and pretty much every current system) has reliable
signals this is not needed. In the unlikely even that -portable
is still being used on such systems we will deal with it in the
compat layer. ok deraadt@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f53a1015cb6908431b92116130d285d71589612c
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Fix a logic bug in sshd_exchange_identification which
prevented clients using major protocol version 2 from connecting to the
server. ok millert@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8668dec04586e27f1c0eb039ef1feb93d80a5ee9
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Drop compatibility hacks for some ancient SSH
implementations, including ssh.com <=2.* and OpenSSH <= 3.*.
These versions were all released in or before 2001 and predate the
final SSH RFCs. The hacks in question aren't necessary for RFC-
compliant SSH implementations.
ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4be81c67db57647f907f4e881fb9341448606138
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unbreak support for clients that advertise a protocol
version of "1.99" (indicating both v2 and v1 support). Busted by me during
SSHv1 purge in r1.358; bz2810, ok dtucker
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e8f9c2bee11afc16c872bb79d6abe9c555bd0e4b
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avoid modifying pw->pw_passwd; let endpwent() clean up
for us, but keep a scrubbed copy; bz2777, ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 715afc0f59c6b82c4929a73279199ed241ce0752
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fix problem in configuration parsing when in config dump mode
(sshd -T) without providing a full connection specification (sshd -T -C ...)
spotted by bluhm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7125faf5740eaa9d3a2f25400a0bc85e94e28b8f
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When doing a config test with sshd -T, only require the
attributes that are actually used in Match criteria rather than (an
incomplete list of) all criteria. ok djm@, man page help jmc@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b4e773c4212d3dea486d0259ae977551aab2c1fc
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improve printing of rdomain on accept() a little
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5da58db2243606899cedaa646c70201b2d12247a
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