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2010-03-31Drop most of our "LogLevel SILENT" (-qq) patch. This was originallyColin Watson
introduced to match the behaviour of non-free SSH, in which -q does not suppress fatal errors, but matching the behaviour of OpenSSH upstream is much more important nowadays. We no longer document that -q does not suppress fatal errors (closes: #280609). Migrate "LogLevel SILENT" to "LogLevel QUIET" in sshd_config on upgrade.
2010-03-31* New upstream release (LP: #535029).Colin Watson
- After a transition period of about 10 years, this release disables SSH protocol 1 by default. Clients and servers that need to use the legacy protocol must explicitly enable it in ssh_config / sshd_config or on the command-line. - Remove the libsectok/OpenSC-based smartcard code and add support for PKCS#11 tokens. This support is enabled by default in the Debian packaging, since it now doesn't involve additional library dependencies (closes: #231472, LP: #16918). - Add support for certificate authentication of users and hosts using a new, minimal OpenSSH certificate format (closes: #482806). - Added a 'netcat mode' to ssh(1): "ssh -W host:port ...". - Add the ability to revoke keys in sshd(8) and ssh(1). (For the Debian package, this overlaps with the key blacklisting facility added in openssh 1:4.7p1-9, but with different file formats and slightly different scopes; for the moment, I've roughly merged the two.) - Various multiplexing improvements, including support for requesting port-forwardings via the multiplex protocol (closes: #360151). - Allow setting an explicit umask on the sftp-server(8) commandline to override whatever default the user has (closes: #496843). - Many sftp client improvements, including tab-completion, more options, and recursive transfer support for get/put (LP: #33378). The old mget/mput commands never worked properly and have been removed (closes: #270399, #428082). - Do not prompt for a passphrase if we fail to open a keyfile, and log the reason why the open failed to debug (closes: #431538). - Prevent sftp from crashing when given a "-" without a command. Also, allow whitespace to follow a "-" (closes: #531561).
2010-03-31merge 5.4p1Colin Watson
2010-03-05 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/04 23:17:25Damien Miller
[sshd_config.5] missing word; spotted by jmc@
2010-03-05 - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/04 12:51:25Damien Miller
[ssh.1 sshd_config.5] tweak previous;
2010-03-04 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/04 10:36:03Damien Miller
[auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rsa.c auth.c auth.h auth2-hostbased.c auth2-pubkey.c] [authfile.c authfile.h hostfile.c hostfile.h servconf.c servconf.h] [ssh-keygen.c ssh.1 sshconnect.c sshd_config.5] Add a TrustedUserCAKeys option to sshd_config to specify CA keys that are trusted to authenticate users (in addition than doing it per-user in authorized_keys). Add a RevokedKeys option to sshd_config and a @revoked marker to known_hosts to allow keys to me revoked and banned for user or host authentication. feedback and ok markus@
2010-02-27 - OpenBSD CVS SyncDamien Miller
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/02/26 20:29:54 [PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys addrmatch.c auth-options.c] [auth-options.h auth.h auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c dns.c dns.h hostfile.c] [hostfile.h kex.h kexdhs.c kexgexs.c key.c key.h match.h monitor.c] [myproposal.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c] [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h sshconnect.c] [sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5] Add support for certificate key types for users and hosts. OpenSSH certificate key types are not X.509 certificates, but a much simpler format that encodes a public key, identity information and some validity constraints and signs it with a CA key. CA keys are regular SSH keys. This certificate style avoids the attack surface of X.509 certificates and is very easy to deploy. Certified host keys allow automatic acceptance of new host keys when a CA certificate is marked as sh/known_hosts. see VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1) for details. Certified user keys allow authentication of users when the signing CA key is marked as trusted in authorized_keys. See "AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT" in sshd(8) for details. Certificates are minted using ssh-keygen(1), documentation is in the "CERTIFICATES" section of that manpage. Documentation on the format of certificates is in the file PROTOCOL.certkeys feedback and ok markus@
2010-01-24* New upstream release.Colin Watson
* Update to GSSAPI patch from http://www.sxw.org.uk/computing/patches/openssh-5.3p1-gsskex-all-20100124.patch.
2010-01-24import openssh-5.3p1-gsskex-all-20100124.patchColin Watson
2010-01-16Implement DebianBanner server configuration flag that can be set to "no"Colin Watson
to allow sshd to run without the Debian-specific extra version in the initial protocol handshake (closes: #562048).
2010-01-10 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/01/09 23:04:13Darren Tucker
[channels.c ssh.1 servconf.c sshd_config.5 sshd.c channels.h servconf.h ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c readconf.c sshconnect.c misc.c ssh.c readconf.h scp.1 sftp.1 ssh_config.5 misc.h] Remove RoutingDomain from ssh since it's now not needed. It can be replaced with "route exec" or "nc -V" as a proxycommand. "route exec" also ensures that trafic such as DNS lookups stays withing the specified routingdomain. For example (from reyk): # route -T 2 exec /usr/sbin/sshd or inherited from the parent process $ route -T 2 exec sh $ ssh 10.1.2.3 ok deraadt@ markus@ stevesk@ reyk@
2010-01-08 - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/12/29 18:03:32Darren Tucker
[sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5] sort previous;
2010-01-08 - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/12/29 16:38:41Darren Tucker
[sshd_config.5 readconf.c ssh_config.5 scp.1 servconf.c sftp.1 ssh.1] Rename RDomain config option to RoutingDomain to be more clear and consistent with other options. NOTE: if you currently use RDomain in the ssh client or server config, or ssh/sshd -o, you must update to use RoutingDomain. ok markus@ djm@
2010-01-08 - guenther@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/12/20 07:28:36Darren Tucker
[ssh.c sftp.c scp.c] When passing user-controlled options with arguments to other programs, pass the option and option argument as separate argv entries and not smashed into one (e.g., as -l foo and not -lfoo). Also, always pass a "--" argument to stop option parsing, so that a positional argument that starts with a '-' isn't treated as an option. This fixes some error cases as well as the handling of hostnames and filenames that start with a '-'. Based on a diff by halex@ ok halex@ djm@ deraadt@
2010-01-08 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/11/10 02:58:56Darren Tucker
[sshd_config.5] clarify that StrictModes does not apply to ChrootDirectory. Permissions and ownership are always checked when chrooting. bz#1532
2010-01-08 - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/10/28 21:45:08Darren Tucker
[sshd_config.5 sftp.1] tweak previous;
2010-01-08 - reyk@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/10/28 16:38:18Darren Tucker
[ssh_config.5 sshd.c misc.h ssh-keyscan.1 readconf.h sshconnect.c channels.c channels.h servconf.h servconf.c ssh.1 ssh-keyscan.c scp.1 sftp.1 sshd_config.5 readconf.c ssh.c misc.c] Allow to set the rdomain in ssh/sftp/scp/sshd and ssh-keyscan. ok markus@
2010-01-04Remove manual page references to login.conf, which aren't applicable onColin Watson
non-BSD systems (closes: #154434).
2010-01-01* New upstream release (closes: #536182). Yes, I know 5.3p1 has been outColin Watson
for a while, but there's no GSSAPI patch available for it yet. - Change the default cipher order to prefer the AES CTR modes and the revised "arcfour256" mode to CBC mode ciphers that are susceptible to CPNI-957037 "Plaintext Recovery Attack Against SSH". - Add countermeasures to mitigate CPNI-957037-style attacks against the SSH protocol's use of CBC-mode ciphers. Upon detection of an invalid packet length or Message Authentication Code, ssh/sshd will continue reading up to the maximum supported packet length rather than immediately terminating the connection. This eliminates most of the known differences in behaviour that leaked information about the plaintext of injected data which formed the basis of this attack (closes: #506115, LP: #379329). - ForceCommand directive now accepts commandline arguments for the internal-sftp server (closes: #524423, LP: #362511). - Add AllowAgentForwarding to available Match keywords list (closes: #540623). - Make ssh(1) send the correct channel number for SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS and SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE messages to avoid triggering 'Non-public channel' error messages on sshd(8) in openssh-5.1. - Avoid printing 'Non-public channel' warnings in sshd(8), since the ssh(1) has sent incorrect channel numbers since ~2004 (this reverts a behaviour introduced in openssh-5.1; closes: #496017). * Update to GSSAPI patch from http://www.sxw.org.uk/computing/patches/openssh-5.2p1-gsskex-all-20090726.patch, including cascading credentials support (LP: #416958).
2010-01-01import openssh-5.2p1-gsskex-all-20090726.patchColin Watson
2009-12-29import openssh-5.1p1-gsskex-cjwatson-20080722.patchColin Watson
2009-12-29import openssh-4.7p1-gsskex-20070927.patchColin Watson
2009-12-29import openssh-4.6p1-gsskex-20070312.patchColin Watson
2009-12-29import openssh-4.3p2-gsskex-20060223.patchColin Watson
2009-12-29import openssh-4.2p1-gsskex-20050926-2.patchColin Watson
2009-10-11 - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/10/08 20:42:12Darren Tucker
[sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5 sshd.8 ssh.1] some tweaks now that protocol 1 is not offered by default; ok markus
2009-10-11 - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS SyncDarren Tucker
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/10/08 14:03:41 [sshd_config readconf.c ssh_config.5 servconf.c sshd_config.5] disable protocol 1 by default (after a transition period of about 10 years) ok deraadt
2009-10-07 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/08/16 23:29:26Darren Tucker
[sshd_config.5] Add PubkeyAuthentication to the list allowed in a Match block (bz #1577)
2009-08-28downgrade mention of login.conf to be an example and mention PAM asDamien Miller
another provider for ChallengeResponseAuthentication; bz#1408; ok dtucker@
2009-06-21 - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/04/21 15:13:17Darren Tucker
[sshd_config.5] clarify we cd to user's home after chroot; ok markus@ on earlier version; tweaks and ok jmc@
2009-06-21 - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/04/18 18:39:10Darren Tucker
[sshd_config.5] tweak previous; ok stevesk
2009-06-21 - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/04/17 19:40:17Darren Tucker
[sshd_config.5] clarify that even internal-sftp needs /dev/log for logging to work; ok markus@
2009-06-21 - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/04/13 19:07:44Darren Tucker
[sshd_config.5] fix possessive; ok djm@
2009-02-23 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/02/22 23:59:25Damien Miller
[sshd_config.5] missing period
2009-02-23 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/02/22 23:50:57Damien Miller
[ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5] don't advertise experimental options
2009-01-28 - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/01/24 17:10:22Damien Miller
[ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5] sync list of preferred ciphers; ok djm@
2009-01-28 - okan@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/12/30 00:46:56Damien Miller
[sshd_config.5] add AllowAgentForwarding to available Match keywords list ok djm
2008-11-05 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/11/04 08:22:13Damien Miller
[auth.h auth2.c monitor.c monitor.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h] [readconf.c readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh2.h ssh_config.5] [sshconnect2.c sshd_config.5 jpake.c jpake.h schnorr.c auth2-jpake.c] [Makefile.in] Add support for an experimental zero-knowledge password authentication method using the J-PAKE protocol described in F. Hao, P. Ryan, "Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling", 16th Workshop on Security Protocols, Cambridge, April 2008. This method allows password-based authentication without exposing the password to the server. Instead, the client and server exchange cryptographic proofs to demonstrate of knowledge of the password while revealing nothing useful to an attacker or compromised endpoint. This is experimental, work-in-progress code and is presently compiled-time disabled (turn on -DJPAKE in Makefile.inc). "just commit it. It isn't too intrusive." deraadt@
2008-11-03 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/10/09 03:50:54Damien Miller
[servconf.c sshd_config.5] support setting PermitEmptyPasswords in a Match block requested in PR3891; ok dtucker@
2008-07-22* New upstream release (closes: #474301). Important changes not previouslyColin Watson
backported to 4.7p1: - 4.9/4.9p1 (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-4.9): + Added chroot(2) support for sshd(8), controlled by a new option "ChrootDirectory" (closes: #139047, LP: #24777). + Linked sftp-server(8) into sshd(8). The internal sftp server is used when the command "internal-sftp" is specified in a Subsystem or ForceCommand declaration. When used with ChrootDirectory, the internal sftp server requires no special configuration of files inside the chroot environment. + Added a protocol extension method "posix-rename@openssh.com" for sftp-server(8) to perform POSIX atomic rename() operations; sftp(1) prefers this if available (closes: #308561). + Removed the fixed limit of 100 file handles in sftp-server(8). + ssh(8) will now skip generation of SSH protocol 1 ephemeral server keys when in inetd mode and protocol 2 connections are negotiated. This speeds up protocol 2 connections to inetd-mode servers that also allow Protocol 1. + Accept the PermitRootLogin directive in a sshd_config(5) Match block. Allows for, e.g. permitting root only from the local network. + Reworked sftp(1) argument splitting and escaping to be more internally consistent (i.e. between sftp commands) and more consistent with sh(1). Please note that this will change the interpretation of some quoted strings, especially those with embedded backslash escape sequences. + Support "Banner=none" in sshd_config(5) to disable sending of a pre-login banner (e.g. in a Match block). + ssh(1) ProxyCommands are now executed with $SHELL rather than /bin/sh. + ssh(1)'s ConnectTimeout option is now applied to both the TCP connection and the SSH banner exchange (previously it just covered the TCP connection). This allows callers of ssh(1) to better detect and deal with stuck servers that accept a TCP connection but don't progress the protocol, and also makes ConnectTimeout useful for connections via a ProxyCommand. + scp(1) incorrectly reported "stalled" on slow copies (closes: #140828). + scp(1) date underflow for timestamps before epoch. + ssh(1) used the obsolete SIG DNS RRtype for host keys in DNS, instead of the current standard RRSIG. + Correctly drain ACKs when a sftp(1) upload write fails midway, avoids a fatal() exit from what should be a recoverable condition. + Fixed ssh-keygen(1) selective host key hashing (i.e. "ssh-keygen -HF hostname") to not include any IP address in the data to be hashed. + Make ssh(1) skip listening on the IPv6 wildcard address when a binding address of 0.0.0.0 is used against an old SSH server that does not support the RFC4254 syntax for wildcard bind addresses. + Enable IPV6_V6ONLY socket option on sshd(8) listen socket, as is already done for X11/TCP forwarding sockets (closes: #439661). + Fix FD leak that could hang a ssh(1) connection multiplexing master. + Make ssh(1) -q option documentation consistent with reality. + Fixed sshd(8) PAM support not calling pam_session_close(), or failing to call it with root privileges (closes: #372680). + Fix activation of OpenSSL engine support when requested in configure (LP: #119295). - 5.1/5.1p1 (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-5.1): + Introduce experimental SSH Fingerprint ASCII Visualisation to ssh(1) and ssh-keygen(1). Visual fingerprint display is controlled by a new ssh_config(5) option "VisualHostKey". The intent is to render SSH host keys in a visual form that is amenable to easy recall and rejection of changed host keys. + sshd_config(5) now supports CIDR address/masklen matching in "Match address" blocks, with a fallback to classic wildcard matching. + sshd(8) now supports CIDR matching in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys from="..." restrictions, also with a fallback to classic wildcard matching. + Added an extended test mode (-T) to sshd(8) to request that it write its effective configuration to stdout and exit. Extended test mode also supports the specification of connection parameters (username, source address and hostname) to test the application of sshd_config(5) Match rules. + ssh(1) now prints the number of bytes transferred and the overall connection throughput for SSH protocol 2 sessions when in verbose mode (previously these statistics were displayed for protocol 1 connections only). + sftp-server(8) now supports extension methods statvfs@openssh.com and fstatvfs@openssh.com that implement statvfs(2)-like operations. + sftp(1) now has a "df" command to the sftp client that uses the statvfs@openssh.com to produce a df(1)-like display of filesystem space and inode utilisation (requires statvfs@openssh.com support on the server). + Added a MaxSessions option to sshd_config(5) to allow control of the number of multiplexed sessions supported over a single TCP connection. This allows increasing the number of allowed sessions above the previous default of 10, disabling connection multiplexing (MaxSessions=1) or disallowing login/shell/subsystem sessions entirely (MaxSessions=0). + Added a no-more-sessions@openssh.com global request extension that is sent from ssh(1) to sshd(8) when the client knows that it will never request another session (i.e. when session multiplexing is disabled). This allows a server to disallow further session requests and terminate the session in cases where the client has been hijacked. + ssh-keygen(1) now supports the use of the -l option in combination with -F to search for a host in ~/.ssh/known_hosts and display its fingerprint. + ssh-keyscan(1) now defaults to "rsa" (protocol 2) keys, instead of "rsa1". + Added an AllowAgentForwarding option to sshd_config(8) to control whether authentication agent forwarding is permitted. Note that this is a loose control, as a client may install their own unofficial forwarder. + ssh(1) and sshd(8): avoid unnecessary malloc/copy/free when receiving network data, resulting in a ~10% speedup. + ssh(1) and sshd(8) will now try additional addresses when connecting to a port forward destination whose DNS name resolves to more than one address. The previous behaviour was to try the only first address and give up if that failed. + ssh(1) and sshd(8) now support signalling that channels are half-closed for writing, through a channel protocol extension notification "eow@openssh.com". This allows propagation of closed file descriptors, so that commands such as "ssh -2 localhost od /bin/ls | true" do not send unnecessary data over the wire. + sshd(8): increased the default size of ssh protocol 1 ephemeral keys from 768 to 1024 bits. + When ssh(1) has been requested to fork after authentication ("ssh -f") with ExitOnForwardFailure enabled, delay the fork until after replies for any -R forwards have been seen. Allows for robust detection of -R forward failure when using -f. + "Match group" blocks in sshd_config(5) now support negation of groups. E.g. "Match group staff,!guests". + sftp(1) and sftp-server(8) now allow chmod-like operations to set set[ug]id/sticky bits. + The MaxAuthTries option is now permitted in sshd_config(5) match blocks. + Multiplexed ssh(1) sessions now support a subset of the ~ escapes that are available to a primary connection. + ssh(1) connection multiplexing will now fall back to creating a new connection in most error cases (closes: #352830). + Make ssh(1) deal more gracefully with channel requests that fail. Previously it would optimistically assume that requests would always succeed, which could cause hangs if they did not (e.g. when the server runs out of file descriptors). + ssh(1) now reports multiplexing errors via the multiplex slave's stderr where possible (subject to LogLevel in the mux master). + Prevent sshd(8) from erroneously applying public key restrictions leaned from ~/.ssh/authorized_keys to other authentication methods when public key authentication subsequently fails (LP: #161047). + Fixed an UMAC alignment problem that manifested on Itanium platforms.
2008-07-02 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/02 02:24:18Darren Tucker
[sshd_config sshd_config.5 sshd.8 servconf.c] increase default size of ssh protocol 1 ephemeral key from 768 to 1024 bits; prodded by & ok dtucker@ ok deraadt@
2008-06-16 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/15 16:58:40Damien Miller
[servconf.c sshd_config.5] Allow MaxAuthTries within a Match block. ok djm@
2008-06-16 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/15 16:55:38Damien Miller
[sshd_config.5] MaxSessions is allowed in a Match block too
2008-06-10 - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/10 07:12:00Darren Tucker
[sshd_config.5] tweak previous;
2008-06-10 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/10 04:17:46Darren Tucker
[sshd_config.5] better reference for pattern-list
2008-06-10 - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS SyncDarren Tucker
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/10 03:57:27 [servconf.c match.h sshd_config.5] support CIDR address matching in sshd_config "Match address" blocks, with full support for negation and fall-back to classic wildcard matching. For example: Match address 192.0.2.0/24,3ffe:ffff::/32,!10.* PasswordAuthentication yes addrmatch.c code mostly lifted from flowd's addr.c feedback and ok dtucker@
2008-05-19 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/05/08 12:21:16Damien Miller
[monitor.c monitor_wrap.c session.h servconf.c servconf.h session.c] [sshd_config sshd_config.5] Make the maximum number of sessions run-time controllable via a sshd_config MaxSessions knob. This is useful for disabling login/shell/subsystem access while leaving port-forwarding working (MaxSessions 0), disabling connection multiplexing (MaxSessions 1) or simply increasing the number of allows multiplexed sessions. Because some bozos are sure to configure MaxSessions in excess of the number of available file descriptors in sshd (which, at peak, might be as many as 9*MaxSessions), audit sshd to ensure that it doesn't leak fds on error paths, and make it fail gracefully on out-of-fd conditions - sending channel errors instead of than exiting with fatal(). bz#1090; MaxSessions config bits and manpage from junyer AT gmail.com ok markus@
2008-05-19 - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/05/07 08:00:14Damien Miller
[sshd_config.5] sort;
2008-05-19 - pyr@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/05/07 05:49:37Damien Miller
[servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd_config.5] Enable the AllowAgentForwarding option in sshd_config (global and match context), to specify if agents should be permitted on the server. As the man page states: ``Note that disabling Agent forwarding does not improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their own forwarders.'' ok djm@, ok and a mild frown markus@
2008-05-19 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/04/05 02:46:02Damien Miller
[sshd_config.5] HostbasedAuthentication is supported under Match too