Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|
This patch has been rejected upstream: "None of the OpenSSH developers are
in favour of adding this, and this situation has not changed for several
years. This is not a slight on Simon's patch, which is of fine quality, but
just that a) we don't trust GSSAPI implementations that much and b) we don't
like adding new KEX since they are pre-auth attack surface. This one is
particularly scary, since it requires hooks out to typically root-owned
system resources."
However, quite a lot of people rely on this in Debian, and it's better to
have it merged into the main openssh package rather than having separate
-krb5 packages (as we used to have). It seems to have a generally good
security history.
Origin: other, https://github.com/openssh-gsskex/openssh-gsskex/commits/debian/master
Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1242
Last-Updated: 2019-10-09
Patch-Name: gssapi.patch
|
|
markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 01f8cdbec63350490d2249f41112c5780d1cfbb8
|
|
private keys, enabled via "ssh-keygen -m PKCS8" on operations that save
private keys to disk.
The OpenSSH native key format remains the default, but PKCS8 is a
superior format to PEM if interoperability with non-OpenSSH software
is required, as it may use a less terrible KDF (IIRC PEM uses a single
round of MD5 as a KDF).
adapted from patch by Jakub Jelen via bz3013; ok markus
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 027824e3bc0b1c243dc5188504526d73a55accb1
|
|
speculation and memory sidechannel attacks like Spectre, Meltdown, Rowhammer
and Rambleed. This change encrypts private keys when they are not in use with
a symmetic key that is derived from a relatively large "prekey" consisting of
random data (currently 16KB).
Attackers must recover the entire prekey with high accuracy before
they can attempt to decrypt the shielded private key, but the current
generation of attacks have bit error rates that, when applied
cumulatively to the entire prekey, make this unlikely.
Implementation-wise, keys are encrypted "shielded" when loaded and then
automatically and transparently unshielded when used for signatures or
when being saved/serialised.
Hopefully we can remove this in a few years time when computer
architecture has become less unsafe.
been in snaps for a bit already; thanks deraadt@
ok dtucker@ deraadt@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 19767213c312e46f94b303a512ef8e9218a39bd4
|
|
Work by markus@ and Pedro Martelletto, feedback and ok me@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a37d651e221341376636056512bddfc16efb4424
|
|
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c05bf13b094093dfa01848a9306c82eb6e95f6c
|
|
OpenSSH; feedback and ok tb@ jsing@ markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cacbcac87ce5da0d3ca7ef1b38a6f7fb349e4417
|
|
cert->signature_type against a supplied whitelist; ok markus
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: caadb8073292ed7a9535e5adc067d11d356d9302
|
|
certificate signature wrt loading and certification operations; ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e8b8b9f76b66707a0cd926109c4383db8f664df3
|
|
for certs hosted in ssh-agent
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5fd5edd726137dda2d020e1cdebc464110a010f
|
|
In ssh, when an agent fails to return a RSA-SHA2 signature when
requested and falls back to RSA-SHA1 instead, retry the signature to
ensure that the public key algorithm sent in the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH
matches the one in the signature itself.
In sshd, strictly enforce that the public key algorithm sent in the
SSH_MSG_USERAUTH message matches what appears in the signature.
Make the sshd_config PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and
HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes options control accepted signature algorithms
(previously they selected supported key types). This allows these
options to ban RSA-SHA1 in favour of RSA-SHA2.
Add new signature algorithms "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com" and
"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com" to force use of RSA-SHA2 signatures
with certificate keys.
feedback and ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c6e9f6d45eed8962ad502d315d7eaef32c419dde
|
|
Some compilers (gcc 2.9.53, 3.0 and probably others, see gcc bug #3481)
do not accept __attribute__ on function pointer prototype args. Check for
this and hide them if they're not accepted.
|
|
Hash-Based Signatures) The code is not compiled in by default (see WITH_XMSS
in Makefile.inc) Joint work with stefan-lukas_gazdag at genua.eu See
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-xmss-hash-based-signatures-12 ok
djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef3eccb96762a5d6f135d7daeef608df7776a7ac
|
|
pass negotiated signing algorithm though to
sshkey_verify() and check that the negotiated algorithm matches the type in
the signature (only matters for RSA SHA1/SHA2 sigs). ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 735fb15bf4adc060d3bee9d047a4bcaaa81b1af9
|
|
sshkey_sigtype() function to return the type of a
signature; ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d3772b065ad6eed97285589bfb544befed9032e8
|
|
remove post-SSHv1 removal dead code from rsa.c and merge
the remaining bit that it still used into ssh-rsa.c; ok markus
Upstream-ID: ac8a048d24dcd89594b0052ea5e3404b473bfa2f
|
|
Allow ssh-keygen to use a key held in ssh-agent as a CA when
signing certificates. bz#2377 ok markus
Upstream-ID: fb42e920b592edcbb5b50465739a867c09329c8f
|
|
missing prototype.
Upstream-ID: f443d2be9910fd2165a0667956d03343c46f66c9
|
|
Refuse RSA keys <1024 bits in length. Improve reporting
for keys that do not meet this requirement. ok markus@
Upstream-ID: b385e2a7b13b1484792ee681daaf79e1e203df6c
|
|
remove miscellaneous SSH1 leftovers; ok markus@
Upstream-ID: af23696022ae4d45a1abc2fb8b490d8d9dd63b7c
|
|
remove KEY_RSA1
ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 7408517b077c892a86b581e19f82a163069bf133
|
|
fix regression in 7.4 server-sig-algs, where we were
accidentally excluding SHA2 RSA signature methods. bz#2680, patch from Nuno
Goncalves; ok dtucker@
Upstream-ID: 81ac8bfb30960447740b9b8f6a214dcf322f12e8
|
|
list all supported signature algorithms in the
server-sig-algs Reported by mb AT smartftp.com in bz#2547 and (independantly)
Ron Frederick; ok markus@
Upstream-ID: ddf702d721f54646b11ef2cee6d916666cb685cd
|
|
support SHA256 and SHA512 RSA signatures in certificates;
ok markus@
Upstream-ID: b45be2f2ce8cacd794dc5730edaabc90e5eb434a
|
|
implement SHA2-{256,512} for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signatures
(user and host auth) based on draft-rsa-dsa-sha2-256-03.txt and
draft-ssh-ext-info-04.txt; with & ok djm@
Upstream-ID: cf82ce532b2733e5c4b34bb7b7c94835632db309
|
|
move the certificate validity formatting code to
sshkey.[ch]
Upstream-ID: f05f7c78fab20d02ff1d5ceeda533ef52e8fe523
|
|
- Fix error message: passphrase needs to be at least 5
characters, not 4. - Remove unused function argument. - Remove two
unnecessary variables.
OK djm@
Upstream-ID: 13010c05bfa8b523da1c0dc19e81dd180662bc30
|
|
backout SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE increase for this
release; problems spotted by sthen@ ok deraadt@ markus@
Upstream-ID: d0bd60dde9e8c3cd7030007680371894c1499822
|
|
another SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE that needed
cranking
Upstream-ID: 9d8826cafe96aab4ae8e2f6fd22800874b7ffef1
|
|
delete support for legacy v00 certificates; "sure"
markus@ dtucker@
Upstream-ID: b5b9bb5f9202d09e88f912989d74928601b6636f
|
|
refactor: split base64 encoding of pubkey into its own
sshkey_to_base64() function and out of sshkey_write(); ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 54fc38f5832e9b91028900819bda46c3959a0c1a
|
|
small refactor and add some convenience functions; ok
markus
|
|
add sshd_config HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes and
PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes options to allow sshd to control what public key types
will be accepted. Currently defaults to all. Feedback & ok markus@
|
|
deprecate key_load_private_pem() and
sshkey_load_private_pem() interfaces. Refactor the generic key loading API to
not require pathnames to be specified (they weren't really used).
Fixes a few other things en passant:
Makes ed25519 keys work for hostbased authentication (ssh-keysign
previously used the PEM-only routines).
Fixes key comment regression bz#2306: key pathnames were being lost as
comment fields.
ok markus@
|
|
Add FingerprintHash option to control algorithm used for
key fingerprints. Default changes from MD5 to SHA256 and format from hex to
base64.
Feedback and ok naddy@ markus@
|
|
|
|
[Makefile.in auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-options.c auth-rsa.c
[auth2-none.c auth2-pubkey.c authfile.c authfile.h cipher-3des1.c
[cipher-chachapoly.c cipher-chachapoly.h cipher.c cipher.h
[digest-libc.c digest-openssl.c digest.h dns.c entropy.c hmac.h
[hostfile.c key.c key.h krl.c monitor.c packet.c rsa.c rsa.h
[ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c
[ssh-keygen.c ssh-pkcs11-client.c ssh-pkcs11-helper.c ssh-pkcs11.c
[ssh-rsa.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.h sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c
[sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshkey.c sshkey.h
[openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h]
New key API: refactor key-related functions to be more library-like,
existing API is offered as a set of wrappers.
with and ok markus@
Thanks also to Ben Hawkes, David Tomaschik, Ivan Fratric, Matthew
Dempsky and Ron Bowes for a detailed review a few months ago.
NB. This commit also removes portable OpenSSH support for OpenSSL
<0.9.8e.
|