summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/utf8.h
AgeCommit message (Collapse)Author
2020-05-01upstream: expose vasnmprintf(); ok (as part of other commit) markusdjm@openbsd.org
deraadt OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e80cea441c599631a870fd40307d2ade5a7f9b5
2020-04-03upstream: add allocating variant of the safe utf8 printer; okdjm@openbsd.org
dtucker as part of a larger diff OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 037e2965bd50eacc2ffb49889ecae41552744fa0
2016-12-12Force Turkish locales back to C/POSIX; bz#2643Damien Miller
Turkish locales are unique in their handling of the letters 'i' and 'I' (yes, they are different letters) and OpenSSH isn't remotely prepared to deal with that. For now, the best we can do is to force OpenSSH to use the C/POSIX locale and try to preserve the UTF-8 encoding if possible. ok dtucker@
2016-06-06upstream commitschwarze@openbsd.org
To prevent screwing up terminal settings when printing to the terminal, for ASCII and UTF-8, escape bytes not forming characters and bytes forming non-printable characters with vis(3) VIS_OCTAL. For other character sets, abort printing of the current string in these cases. In particular, * let scp(1) respect the local user's LC_CTYPE locale(1); * sanitize data received from the remote host; * sanitize filenames, usernames, and similar data even locally; * take character display widths into account for the progressmeter. This is believed to be sufficient to keep the local terminal safe on OpenBSD, but bad things can still happen on other systems with state-dependent locales because many places in the code print unencoded ASCII characters into the output stream. Using feedback from djm@ and martijn@, various aspects discussed with many others. deraadt@ says it should go in now, i probably already hesitated too long Upstream-ID: e66afbc94ee396ddcaffd433b9a3b80f387647e0