From 68580f4a03088e52e1d680389a35655c85613c7a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Scott Moser <smoser@ubuntu.com>
Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:03 +0000
Subject: Mention ssh-keygen in ssh fingerprint changed warning

Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1843
Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/686607
Last-Update: 2015-09-08

Patch-Name: mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch
---
 sshconnect.c | 8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
index 8adc94307..4aff104b8 100644
--- a/sshconnect.c
+++ b/sshconnect.c
@@ -1078,9 +1078,13 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
 			error("%s. This could either mean that", key_msg);
 			error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host");
 			error("and its host key have changed at the same time.");
-			if (ip_status != HOST_NEW)
+			if (ip_status != HOST_NEW) {
 				error("Offending key for IP in %s:%lu",
 				    ip_found->file, ip_found->line);
+				error("  remove with:");
+				error("  ssh-keygen -f \"%s\" -R %s",
+				    ip_found->file, ip);
+			}
 		}
 		/* The host key has changed. */
 		warn_changed_key(host_key);
@@ -1088,6 +1092,8 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
 		    user_hostfiles[0]);
 		error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu", key_type(host_found->key),
 		    host_found->file, host_found->line);
+		error("  remove with:");
+		error("  ssh-keygen -f \"%s\" -R %s", host_found->file, host);
 
 		/*
 		 * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From d0d72d370d0f02c220401029af04065c88055a4c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>
Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:05 +0000
Subject: Include the Debian version in our identification

This makes it easier to audit networks for versions patched against security
vulnerabilities.  It has little detrimental effect, as attackers will
generally just try attacks rather than bothering to scan for
vulnerable-looking version strings.  (However, see debian-banner.patch.)

Forwarded: not-needed
Last-Update: 2013-09-14

Patch-Name: package-versioning.patch
---
 sshconnect.c | 4 ++--
 sshd.c       | 2 +-
 version.h    | 7 ++++++-
 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
index 4aff104b8..2999061b3 100644
--- a/sshconnect.c
+++ b/sshconnect.c
@@ -524,10 +524,10 @@ send_client_banner(int connection_out, int minor1)
 	/* Send our own protocol version identification. */
 	if (compat20) {
 		xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\r\n",
-		    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION);
+		    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE);
 	} else {
 		xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n",
-		    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, minor1, SSH_VERSION);
+		    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, minor1, SSH_RELEASE);
 	}
 	if (roaming_atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, client_version_string,
 	    strlen(client_version_string)) != strlen(client_version_string))
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 9ff9e8ba6..96e75c6d7 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
 	}
 
 	xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s",
-	    major, minor, SSH_VERSION,
+	    major, minor, SSH_RELEASE,
 	    *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
 	    options.version_addendum, newline);
 
diff --git a/version.h b/version.h
index b58fbe1eb..bff2b3bbb 100644
--- a/version.h
+++ b/version.h
@@ -3,4 +3,9 @@
 #define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH_6.9"
 
 #define SSH_PORTABLE	"p1"
-#define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
+#define SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
+#ifdef SSH_EXTRAVERSION
+#define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM " " SSH_EXTRAVERSION
+#else
+#define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM
+#endif
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 781bef6cb1a423864072a07c08c9ae95c554b07a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kees Cook <kees@debian.org>
Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:06 +0000
Subject: Add DebianBanner server configuration option

Setting this to "no" causes sshd to omit the Debian revision from its
initial protocol handshake, for those scared by package-versioning.patch.

Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/562048
Forwarded: not-needed
Last-Update: 2015-08-19

Patch-Name: debian-banner.patch
---
 servconf.c    | 9 +++++++++
 servconf.h    | 2 ++
 sshd.c        | 3 ++-
 sshd_config.5 | 5 +++++
 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
index 8a5bd7b3e..fe3e31157 100644
--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 	options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
 	options->version_addendum = NULL;
 	options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
+	options->debian_banner = -1;
 }
 
 /* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */
@@ -347,6 +348,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 		options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0;
 	if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1)
 		options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
+	if (options->debian_banner == -1)
+		options->debian_banner = 1;
 	/* Turn privilege separation on by default */
 	if (use_privsep == -1)
 		use_privsep = PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX;
@@ -419,6 +422,7 @@ typedef enum {
 	sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC,
 	sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink,
 	sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash,
+	sDebianBanner,
 	sDeprecated, sUnsupported
 } ServerOpCodes;
 
@@ -565,6 +569,7 @@ static struct {
 	{ "streamlocalbindunlink", sStreamLocalBindUnlink, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "allowstreamlocalforwarding", sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "fingerprinthash", sFingerprintHash, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "debianbanner", sDebianBanner, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
 };
 
@@ -1850,6 +1855,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 			options->fingerprint_hash = value;
 		break;
 
+	case sDebianBanner:
+		intptr = &options->debian_banner;
+		goto parse_int;
+
 	case sDeprecated:
 		logit("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s",
 		    filename, linenum, arg);
diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
index b99b27067..ba7b73947 100644
--- a/servconf.h
+++ b/servconf.h
@@ -196,6 +196,8 @@ typedef struct {
 	char   *auth_methods[MAX_AUTH_METHODS];
 
 	int	fingerprint_hash;
+
+	int	debian_banner;
 }       ServerOptions;
 
 /* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 96e75c6d7..7886d0eac 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -442,7 +442,8 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
 	}
 
 	xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s",
-	    major, minor, SSH_RELEASE,
+	    major, minor,
+	    options.debian_banner ? SSH_RELEASE : SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM,
 	    *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
 	    options.version_addendum, newline);
 
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index 1269bbd40..a5afbc37e 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -528,6 +528,11 @@ or
 .Dq no .
 The default is
 .Dq delayed .
+.It Cm DebianBanner
+Specifies whether the distribution-specified extra version suffix is
+included during initial protocol handshake.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
 .It Cm DenyGroups
 This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated
 by spaces.
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 3b192a5f7a31dc247e546067fcca5fd3eb1d4b01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tomas Pospisek <tpo_deb@sourcepole.ch>
Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:07 +0000
Subject: Install authorized_keys(5) as a symlink to sshd(8)

Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1720
Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/441817
Last-Update: 2013-09-14

Patch-Name: authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
---
 Makefile.in | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
index c406aecef..37cb02332 100644
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -325,6 +325,7 @@ install-files:
 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5
 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/ssh_config.5
 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8
+	ln -s ../$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/authorized_keys.5
 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 5919db7dc21a34c31be70170728c2838ff59b740 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:08 +0000
Subject: Fix picky lintian errors about slogin symlinks

Apparently this breaks some SVR4 packaging systems, so upstream can't win
either way and opted to keep the status quo.  We need this patch anyway.

Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1728
Last-Update: 2013-09-14

Patch-Name: lintian-symlink-pickiness.patch
---
 Makefile.in | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
index 37cb02332..f52f90389 100644
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -331,9 +331,9 @@ install-files:
 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
-	ln -s ./ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
+	ln -s ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
-	ln -s ./ssh.1 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
+	ln -s ssh.1 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
 
 install-sysconf:
 	if [ ! -d $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir) ]; then \
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 5399167019a01a47c5208b0f8a6f0600b9af3bd5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:09 +0000
Subject: Adjust various OpenBSD-specific references in manual pages

No single bug reference for this patch, but history includes:
 http://bugs.debian.org/154434 (login.conf(5))
 http://bugs.debian.org/513417 (/etc/rc)
 http://bugs.debian.org/530692 (ssl(8))
 https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/456660 (ssl(8))

Forwarded: not-needed
Last-Update: 2014-10-07

Patch-Name: openbsd-docs.patch
---
 moduli.5      |  4 ++--
 ssh-keygen.1  | 12 ++++--------
 ssh.1         |  4 ++++
 sshd.8        |  5 ++---
 sshd_config.5 |  3 +--
 5 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/moduli.5 b/moduli.5
index ef0de0850..149846c8c 100644
--- a/moduli.5
+++ b/moduli.5
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
 .Nd Diffie-Hellman moduli
 .Sh DESCRIPTION
 The
-.Pa /etc/moduli
+.Pa /etc/ssh/moduli
 file contains prime numbers and generators for use by
 .Xr sshd 8
 in the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange key exchange method.
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ first estimates the size of the modulus required to produce enough
 Diffie-Hellman output to sufficiently key the selected symmetric cipher.
 .Xr sshd 8
 then randomly selects a modulus from
-.Fa /etc/moduli
+.Fa /etc/ssh/moduli
 that best meets the size requirement.
 .Sh SEE ALSO
 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
index 9b93666c9..19bed1e34 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.1
+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
@@ -174,9 +174,7 @@ key in
 .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
 or
 .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa .
-Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys,
-as seen in
-.Pa /etc/rc .
+Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys.
 .Pp
 Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which
 to store the private key.
@@ -223,9 +221,7 @@ For each of the key types (rsa1, rsa, dsa, ecdsa and ed25519)
 for which host keys
 do not exist, generate the host keys with the default key file path,
 an empty passphrase, default bits for the key type, and default comment.
-This is used by
-.Pa /etc/rc
-to generate new host keys.
+This is used by system administration scripts to generate new host keys.
 .It Fl a Ar rounds
 When saving a new-format private key (i.e. an ed25519 key or any SSH protocol
 2 key when the
@@ -638,7 +634,7 @@ option.
 Valid generator values are 2, 3, and 5.
 .Pp
 Screened DH groups may be installed in
-.Pa /etc/moduli .
+.Pa /etc/ssh/moduli .
 It is important that this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths and
 that both ends of a connection share common moduli.
 .Sh CERTIFICATES
@@ -837,7 +833,7 @@ on all machines
 where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication.
 There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret.
 .Pp
-.It Pa /etc/moduli
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/moduli
 Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX.
 The file format is described in
 .Xr moduli 5 .
diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
index c84196fd2..c3e12669b 100644
--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
@@ -766,6 +766,10 @@ Protocol 1 is restricted to using only RSA keys,
 but protocol 2 may use any.
 The HISTORY section of
 .Xr ssl 8
+(on non-OpenBSD systems, see
+.nh
+http://www.openbsd.org/cgi\-bin/man.cgi?query=ssl&sektion=8#HISTORY)
+.hy
 contains a brief discussion of the DSA and RSA algorithms.
 .Pp
 The file
diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
index 5afd10f27..2f4d4f3c4 100644
--- a/sshd.8
+++ b/sshd.8
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ over an insecure network.
 .Nm
 listens for connections from clients.
 It is normally started at boot from
-.Pa /etc/rc .
+.Pa /etc/init.d/ssh .
 It forks a new
 daemon for each incoming connection.
 The forked daemons handle
@@ -864,7 +864,7 @@ This file is for host-based authentication (see
 .Xr ssh 1 ) .
 It should only be writable by root.
 .Pp
-.It Pa /etc/moduli
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/moduli
 Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange".
 The file format is described in
 .Xr moduli 5 .
@@ -963,7 +963,6 @@ The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
 .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
 .Xr chroot 2 ,
 .Xr hosts_access 5 ,
-.Xr login.conf 5 ,
 .Xr moduli 5 ,
 .Xr sshd_config 5 ,
 .Xr inetd 8 ,
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index a5afbc37e..355b44544 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -374,8 +374,7 @@ This option is only available for protocol version 2.
 By default, no banner is displayed.
 .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
 Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
-PAM or through authentication styles supported in
-.Xr login.conf 5 )
+PAM).
 The default is
 .Dq yes .
 .It Cm ChrootDirectory
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From e3a11cda4f8bc5da2388c9446ed8bc1a18acd2e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:10 +0000
Subject: ssh(1): Refer to ssh-argv0(1)

Old versions of OpenSSH (up to 2.5 or thereabouts) allowed creating symlinks
to ssh with the name of the host you want to connect to.  Debian ships an
ssh-argv0 script restoring this feature; this patch refers to its manual
page from ssh(1).

Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/111341
Forwarded: not-needed
Last-Update: 2013-09-14

Patch-Name: ssh-argv0.patch
---
 ssh.1 | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
index c3e12669b..217886319 100644
--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
@@ -1487,6 +1487,7 @@ if an error occurred.
 .Xr sftp 1 ,
 .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
 .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-argv0 1 ,
 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
 .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
 .Xr tun 4 ,
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From d5510eadce4e2b22e9c341120e759c1f7da9175d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:11 +0000
Subject: Document that HashKnownHosts may break tab-completion

Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1727
Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/430154
Last-Update: 2013-09-14

Patch-Name: doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
---
 ssh_config.5 | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
index 1d0c52b0b..acd581bf5 100644
--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
@@ -802,6 +802,9 @@ Note that existing names and addresses in known hosts files
 will not be converted automatically,
 but may be manually hashed using
 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+Use of this option may break facilities such as tab-completion that rely
+on being able to read unhashed host names from
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts .
 .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
 Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key
 authentication.
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 99babbe6caea4ebf504fc3378012e0d6889a554e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@ubuntu.com>
Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:12 +0000
Subject: Refer to ssh's Upstart job as well as its init script

Forwarded: not-needed
Last-Update: 2013-09-14

Patch-Name: doc-upstart.patch
---
 sshd.8 | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
index 2f4d4f3c4..42f1520b4 100644
--- a/sshd.8
+++ b/sshd.8
@@ -67,7 +67,10 @@ over an insecure network.
 .Nm
 listens for connections from clients.
 It is normally started at boot from
-.Pa /etc/init.d/ssh .
+.Pa /etc/init.d/ssh
+(or
+.Pa /etc/init/ssh.conf
+on systems using the Upstart init daemon).
 It forks a new
 daemon for each incoming connection.
 The forked daemons handle
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 991a1f68f57fd602f65b4ac936daf2695be33b21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:13 +0000
Subject: Document consequences of ssh-agent being setgid in ssh-agent(1)

Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/711623
Forwarded: no
Last-Update: 2013-06-08

Patch-Name: ssh-agent-setgid.patch
---
 ssh-agent.1 | 15 +++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)

diff --git a/ssh-agent.1 b/ssh-agent.1
index d0aa712f1..2a940d9ff 100644
--- a/ssh-agent.1
+++ b/ssh-agent.1
@@ -186,6 +186,21 @@ environment variable holds the agent's process ID.
 .Pp
 The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command
 line terminates.
+.Pp
+In Debian,
+.Nm
+is installed with the set-group-id bit set, to prevent
+.Xr ptrace 2
+attacks retrieving private key material.
+This has the side-effect of causing the run-time linker to remove certain
+environment variables which might have security implications for set-id
+programs, including
+.Ev LD_PRELOAD ,
+.Ev LD_LIBRARY_PATH ,
+and
+.Ev TMPDIR .
+If you need to set any of these environment variables, you will need to do
+so in the program executed by ssh-agent.
 .Sh FILES
 .Bl -tag -width Ds
 .It Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 0ca693a1acb3b62c1f7d7c1e776d3c160d7c3e84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:14 +0000
Subject: Don't check the status field of the OpenSSL version

There is no reason to check the version of OpenSSL (in Debian).  If it's
not compatible the soname will change.  OpenSSH seems to want to do a
check for the soname based on the version number, but wants to keep the
status of the release the same.  Remove that check on the status since
it doesn't tell you anything about how compatible that version is.

Author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/93581
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/664383
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/732940
Forwarded: not-needed
Last-Update: 2014-10-07

Patch-Name: no-openssl-version-status.patch
---
 openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c         | 6 +++---
 openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c | 1 +
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
index 63a660c7a..3f62403ce 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
 /*
  * OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
  * We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0.
- * After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we
+ * After that, we accept compatible fix and status versions (so we
  * allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed
  * within a patch series.
  */
@@ -57,10 +57,10 @@ ssh_compatible_openssl(long headerver, long libver)
 	}
 	
 	/*
-	 * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor,status must match and library
+	 * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor must match and library
 	 * fix version must be equal to or newer than the header.
 	 */
-	mask = 0xfff0000fL; /* major,minor,status */
+	mask = 0xfff00000L; /* major,minor */
 	hfix = (headerver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
 	lfix = (libver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
 	if ( (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask) && lfix >= hfix)
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c b/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
index 5d019b598..58474873d 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ struct version_test {
 
 	/* built with 1.0.1b release headers */
 	{ 0x1000101fL, 0x1000101fL, 1},/* exact match */
+	{ 0x1000101fL, 0x10001010L, 1}, /* different status: ok */
 	{ 0x1000101fL, 0x1000102fL, 1},	/* newer library patch version: ok */
 	{ 0x1000101fL, 0x1000100fL, 1},	/* older library patch version: ok */
 	{ 0x1000101fL, 0x1000201fL, 1},	/* newer library fix version: ok */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 2ed0a5ba5af7955d4c5a0c6ff2cf9eabd8f3e3ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vincent Untz <vuntz@ubuntu.com>
Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:16 +0000
Subject: Give the ssh-askpass-gnome window a default icon

Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/27152
Last-Update: 2010-02-28

Patch-Name: gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
---
 contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
index 9d97c30c0..04b3a110e 100644
--- a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+++ b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
@@ -209,6 +209,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 
 	gtk_init(&argc, &argv);
 
+	gtk_window_set_default_icon_from_file ("/usr/share/pixmaps/ssh-askpass-gnome.png", NULL);
+
 	if (argc > 1) {
 		message = g_strjoinv(" ", argv + 1);
 	} else {
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From ef16932c23264c749f4b02af34dbd62a2075c04f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:17 +0000
Subject: Support synchronisation with service supervisor using SIGSTOP

Author: Robie Basak <robie.basak@ubuntu.com>
Forwarded: no
Last-Update: 2014-04-14

Patch-Name: sigstop.patch
---
 sshd.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 7886d0eac..cc8ecaff4 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -2038,6 +2038,16 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			}
 		}
 
+		if (getenv("SSH_SIGSTOP")) {
+			/* Tell service supervisor that we are ready. */
+			kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP);
+			/* The service supervisor only ever expects a single
+			 * STOP signal, so do not ever signal it again, even
+			 * in the case of a re-exec or future children.
+			 */
+			unsetenv("SSH_SIGSTOP");
+		}
+
 		/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
 		server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
 		    &newsock, config_s);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From c2ef7b500926be2f7d875d63ec72781b50d69294 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:18 +0000
Subject: Various Debian-specific configuration changes

ssh: Enable ForwardX11Trusted, returning to earlier semantics which cause
fewer problems with existing setups (http://bugs.debian.org/237021).

ssh: Set 'SendEnv LANG LC_*' by default (http://bugs.debian.org/264024).

ssh: Enable HashKnownHosts by default to try to limit the spread of ssh
worms.

ssh: Enable GSSAPIAuthentication and disable GSSAPIDelegateCredentials by
default.

sshd: Refer to /usr/share/doc/openssh-server/README.Debian.gz alongside
PermitRootLogin default.

Document all of this, along with several sshd defaults set in
debian/openssh-server.postinst.

Author: Russ Allbery <rra@debian.org>
Forwarded: not-needed
Last-Update: 2015-08-19

Patch-Name: debian-config.patch
---
 readconf.c    |  2 +-
 ssh.1         | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 ssh_config    |  7 ++++++-
 ssh_config.5  | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
 sshd_config   |  3 ++-
 sshd_config.5 | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
index 5f6c37fe4..f0769b574 100644
--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
@@ -1748,7 +1748,7 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
 	if (options->forward_x11 == -1)
 		options->forward_x11 = 0;
 	if (options->forward_x11_trusted == -1)
-		options->forward_x11_trusted = 0;
+		options->forward_x11_trusted = 1;
 	if (options->forward_x11_timeout == -1)
 		options->forward_x11_timeout = 1200;
 	if (options->exit_on_forward_failure == -1)
diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
index 217886319..e2cce49d3 100644
--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
@@ -670,12 +670,33 @@ option and the
 directive in
 .Xr ssh_config 5
 for more information.
+.Pp
+(Debian-specific: X11 forwarding is not subjected to X11 SECURITY extension
+restrictions by default, because too many programs currently crash in this
+mode.
+Set the
+.Cm ForwardX11Trusted
+option to
+.Dq no
+to restore the upstream behaviour.
+This may change in future depending on client-side improvements.)
 .It Fl x
 Disables X11 forwarding.
 .It Fl Y
 Enables trusted X11 forwarding.
 Trusted X11 forwardings are not subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension
 controls.
+.Pp
+(Debian-specific: This option does nothing in the default configuration: it
+is equivalent to
+.Dq Cm ForwardX11Trusted No yes ,
+which is the default as described above.
+Set the
+.Cm ForwardX11Trusted
+option to
+.Dq no
+to restore the upstream behaviour.
+This may change in future depending on client-side improvements.)
 .It Fl y
 Send log information using the
 .Xr syslog 3
diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
index 228e5abce..c9386aadd 100644
--- a/ssh_config
+++ b/ssh_config
@@ -17,9 +17,10 @@
 # list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the
 # ssh_config(5) man page.
 
-# Host *
+Host *
 #   ForwardAgent no
 #   ForwardX11 no
+#   ForwardX11Trusted yes
 #   RhostsRSAAuthentication no
 #   RSAAuthentication yes
 #   PasswordAuthentication yes
@@ -48,3 +49,7 @@
 #   VisualHostKey no
 #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
 #   RekeyLimit 1G 1h
+    SendEnv LANG LC_*
+    HashKnownHosts yes
+    GSSAPIAuthentication yes
+    GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
index acd581bf5..844d1a0f5 100644
--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
@@ -74,6 +74,22 @@ Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more
 host-specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the
 file, and general defaults at the end.
 .Pp
+Note that the Debian
+.Ic openssh-client
+package sets several options as standard in
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+which are not the default in
+.Xr ssh 1 :
+.Pp
+.Bl -bullet -offset indent -compact
+.It
+.Cm SendEnv No LANG LC_*
+.It
+.Cm HashKnownHosts No yes
+.It
+.Cm GSSAPIAuthentication No yes
+.El
+.Pp
 The configuration file has the following format:
 .Pp
 Empty lines and lines starting with
@@ -716,7 +732,8 @@ token used for the session will be set to expire after 20 minutes.
 Remote clients will be refused access after this time.
 .Pp
 The default is
-.Dq no .
+.Dq yes
+(Debian-specific).
 .Pp
 See the X11 SECURITY extension specification for full details on
 the restrictions imposed on untrusted clients.
diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
index 1dfd0f156..23a338fa3 100644
--- a/sshd_config
+++ b/sshd_config
@@ -41,7 +41,8 @@
 # Authentication:
 
 #LoginGraceTime 2m
-#PermitRootLogin no
+# See /usr/share/doc/openssh-server/README.Debian.gz.
+#PermitRootLogin without-password
 #StrictModes yes
 #MaxAuthTries 6
 #MaxSessions 10
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index 355b44544..eb6bff85f 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -57,6 +57,31 @@ Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes
 .Pq \&"
 in order to represent arguments containing spaces.
 .Pp
+Note that the Debian
+.Ic openssh-server
+package sets several options as standard in
+.Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+which are not the default in
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+The exact list depends on whether the package was installed fresh or
+upgraded from various possible previous versions, but includes at least the
+following:
+.Pp
+.Bl -bullet -offset indent -compact
+.It
+.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication No no
+.It
+.Cm X11Forwarding No yes
+.It
+.Cm PrintMotd No no
+.It
+.Cm AcceptEnv No LANG LC_*
+.It
+.Cm Subsystem No sftp /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server
+.It
+.Cm UsePAM No yes
+.El
+.Pp
 The possible
 keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
 keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 7c2583f26ff8eb848c53255a88574f923edaf94d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 23:09:15 +0000
Subject: Fix pty permissions

Origin: upstream, https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=6f941396b6835ad18018845f515b0c4fe20be21a
Forwarded: not-needed
Last-Update: 2015-08-19

Patch-Name: backport-fix-pty-permissions.patch
---
 sshpty.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/sshpty.c b/sshpty.c
index 0e32b392b..e89efb74a 100644
--- a/sshpty.c
+++ b/sshpty.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshpty.c,v 1.29 2014/09/03 18:55:07 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshpty.c,v 1.30 2015/07/30 23:09:15 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty, const char *role)
 	/* Determine the group to make the owner of the tty. */
 	grp = getgrnam("tty");
 	gid = (grp != NULL) ? grp->gr_gid : pw->pw_gid;
-	mode = (grp != NULL) ? 0622 : 0600;
+	mode = (grp != NULL) ? 0620 : 0600;
 
 	/*
 	 * Change owner and mode of the tty as required.
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 7de26a97986c8032bf1869347a2ceaee1d64f857 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2015 13:33:24 +1000
Subject: Don't resend username to PAM; it already has it.

Pointed out by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@

Origin: upstream, https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=d4697fe9a28dab7255c60433e4dd23cf7fce8a8b
Forwarded: not-needed
Last-Update: 2015-08-19

Patch-Name: backport-do-not-resend-username-to-pam.patch
---
 monitor.c      | 2 --
 monitor_wrap.c | 1 -
 2 files changed, 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index 12ed6fd00..870a6b9e1 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -1143,9 +1143,7 @@ extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device;
 int
 mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
 {
-
 	debug3("%s", __func__);
-	authctxt->user = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
 	sshpam_ctxt = (sshpam_device.init_ctx)(authctxt);
 	sshpam_authok = NULL;
 	buffer_clear(m);
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
index 2a0fe9bf6..e2fcf75ff 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -632,7 +632,6 @@ mm_sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
 
 	debug3("%s", __func__);
 	buffer_init(&m);
-	buffer_put_cstring(&m, authctxt->user);
 	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, &m);
 	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX", __func__);
 	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, &m);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 5811884269955979919121440a57a7475a4f9eac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2015 13:34:12 +1000
Subject: set sshpam_ctxt to NULL after free

Avoids use-after-free in monitor when privsep child is compromised.
Reported by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@

Origin: upstream, https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=5e75f5198769056089fb06c4d738ab0e5abc66f7
Forwarded: not-needed
Last-Update: 2015-08-19

Patch-Name: backport-pam-use-after-free.patch
---
 monitor.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index 870a6b9e1..e8541b4fa 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -1225,14 +1225,16 @@ mm_answer_pam_respond(int sock, Buffer *m)
 int
 mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
 {
+	int r = sshpam_authok != NULL && sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt;
 
 	debug3("%s", __func__);
 	(sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt);
+	sshpam_ctxt = sshpam_authok = NULL;
 	buffer_clear(m);
 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
 	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
 	auth_submethod = "pam";
-	return (sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt);
+	return r;
 }
 #endif
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From e1c118c1cd5b0c691e6d080c87c440c262fc6b12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2015 07:57:14 +0000
Subject: only query each keyboard-interactive device once per authentication
 request regardless of how many times it is listed

ok markus@

Origin: upstream, https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=5b64f85bb811246c59ebab70aed331f26ba37b18
Forwarded: not-needed
Last-Update: 2015-08-19

Patch-Name: backport-kbdint-duplicates.patch
---
 auth2-chall.c | 11 ++++++++---
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/auth2-chall.c b/auth2-chall.c
index ddabe1a90..4aff09d80 100644
--- a/auth2-chall.c
+++ b/auth2-chall.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.42 2015/01/19 20:07:45 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.43 2015/07/18 07:57:14 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Per Allansson.  All rights reserved.
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ struct KbdintAuthctxt
 	void *ctxt;
 	KbdintDevice *device;
 	u_int nreq;
+	u_int devices_done;
 };
 
 #ifdef USE_PAM
@@ -169,11 +170,15 @@ kbdint_next_device(Authctxt *authctxt, KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt)
 		if (len == 0)
 			break;
 		for (i = 0; devices[i]; i++) {
-			if (!auth2_method_allowed(authctxt,
+			if ((kbdintctxt->devices_done & (1 << i)) != 0 ||
+			    !auth2_method_allowed(authctxt,
 			    "keyboard-interactive", devices[i]->name))
 				continue;
-			if (strncmp(kbdintctxt->devices, devices[i]->name, len) == 0)
+			if (strncmp(kbdintctxt->devices, devices[i]->name,
+			    len) == 0) {
 				kbdintctxt->device = devices[i];
+				kbdintctxt->devices_done |= 1 << i;
+			}
 		}
 		t = kbdintctxt->devices;
 		kbdintctxt->devices = t[len] ? xstrdup(t+len+1) : NULL;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From fb43a1fa9d049900efd76861b9496a9585ba4759 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2015 11:13:44 +1000
Subject: let principals-command.sh work for noexec /var/run

Origin: upstream, https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=55b263fb7cfeacb81aaf1c2036e0394c881637da
Forwarded: not-needed
Last-Update: 2015-08-20

Patch-Name: backport-regress-principals-command-noexec.patch
---
 regress/principals-command.sh | 222 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 113 insertions(+), 109 deletions(-)

diff --git a/regress/principals-command.sh b/regress/principals-command.sh
index 90064373d..b90a8cf2c 100644
--- a/regress/principals-command.sh
+++ b/regress/principals-command.sh
@@ -14,15 +14,15 @@ fi
 
 # Establish a AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand in /var/run where it will have
 # acceptable directory permissions.
-PRINCIPALS_COMMAND="/var/run/principals_command_${LOGNAME}"
-cat << _EOF | $SUDO sh -c "cat > '$PRINCIPALS_COMMAND'"
+PRINCIPALS_CMD="/var/run/principals_command_${LOGNAME}"
+cat << _EOF | $SUDO sh -c "cat > '$PRINCIPALS_CMD'"
 #!/bin/sh
 test "x\$1" != "x${LOGNAME}" && exit 1
 test -f "$OBJ/authorized_principals_${LOGNAME}" &&
 	exec cat "$OBJ/authorized_principals_${LOGNAME}"
 _EOF
 test $? -eq 0 || fatal "couldn't prepare principals command"
-$SUDO chmod 0755 "$PRINCIPALS_COMMAND"
+$SUDO chmod 0755 "$PRINCIPALS_CMD"
 
 # Create a CA key and a user certificate.
 ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519  -f $OBJ/user_ca_key || \
@@ -33,109 +33,113 @@ ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "regress user key for $USER" \
     -z $$ -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/cert_user_key || \
 	fatal "couldn't sign cert_user_key"
 
-# Test explicitly-specified principals
-for privsep in yes no ; do
-	_prefix="privsep $privsep"
-
-	# Setup for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
-	rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
-	(
-		cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
-		echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
-		echo "AuthorizedKeysFile none"
-		echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND %u"
-		echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser ${LOGNAME}"
-		echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
-	) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-
-	# XXX test missing command
-	# XXX test failing command
-
-	# Empty authorized_principals
-	verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} empty authorized_principals"
-	echo > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
-	${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
-	    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
-	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
-		fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
-	fi
-
-	# Wrong authorized_principals
-	verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong authorized_principals"
-	echo gregorsamsa > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
-	${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
-	    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
-	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
-		fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
-	fi
-
-	# Correct authorized_principals
-	verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct authorized_principals"
-	echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
-	${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
-	    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
-	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
-		fail "ssh cert connect failed"
-	fi
-
-	# authorized_principals with bad key option
-	verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals bad key opt"
-	echo 'blah mekmitasdigoat' > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
-	${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
-	    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
-	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
-		fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
-	fi
-
-	# authorized_principals with command=false
-	verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=false"
-	echo 'command="false" mekmitasdigoat' > \
-	    $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
-	${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
-	    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
-	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
-		fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
-	fi
-
-
-	# authorized_principals with command=true
-	verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=true"
-	echo 'command="true" mekmitasdigoat' > \
-	    $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
-	${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
-	    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false >/dev/null 2>&1
-	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
-		fail "ssh cert connect failed"
-	fi
-
-	# Setup for principals= key option
-	rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
-	(
-		cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
-		echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
-	) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-
-	# Wrong principals list
-	verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong principals key option"
-	(
-		printf 'cert-authority,principals="gregorsamsa" '
-		cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
-	) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
-	${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
-	    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
-	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
-		fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
-	fi
-
-	# Correct principals list
-	verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct principals key option"
-	(
-		printf 'cert-authority,principals="mekmitasdigoat" '
-		cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
-	) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
-	${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
-	    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
-	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
-		fail "ssh cert connect failed"
-	fi
-done
+if [ -x $PRINCIPALS_CMD ]; then
+	# Test explicitly-specified principals
+	for privsep in yes no ; do
+		_prefix="privsep $privsep"
+
+		# Setup for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
+		rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+		(
+			cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+			echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
+			echo "AuthorizedKeysFile none"
+			echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand $PRINCIPALS_CMD %u"
+			echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser ${LOGNAME}"
+			echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
+		) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+		# XXX test missing command
+		# XXX test failing command
+
+		# Empty authorized_principals
+		verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} empty authorized_principals"
+		echo > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+		${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+		    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+		fi
+
+		# Wrong authorized_principals
+		verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong authorized_principals"
+		echo gregorsamsa > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+		${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+		    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+		fi
+
+		# Correct authorized_principals
+		verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct authorized_principals"
+		echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+		${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+		    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+		fi
+
+		# authorized_principals with bad key option
+		verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals bad key opt"
+		echo 'blah mekmitasdigoat' > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+		${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+		    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+		fi
+
+		# authorized_principals with command=false
+		verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=false"
+		echo 'command="false" mekmitasdigoat' > \
+		    $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+		${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+		    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+		fi
+
+		# authorized_principals with command=true
+		verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=true"
+		echo 'command="true" mekmitasdigoat' > \
+		    $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+		${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+		    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false >/dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+		fi
+
+		# Setup for principals= key option
+		rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+		(
+			cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+			echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
+		) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+		# Wrong principals list
+		verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong principals key option"
+		(
+			printf 'cert-authority,principals="gregorsamsa" '
+			cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
+		) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+		${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+		    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+		fi
+
+		# Correct principals list
+		verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct principals key option"
+		(
+			printf 'cert-authority,principals="mekmitasdigoat" '
+			cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
+		) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+		${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+		    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+		fi
+	done
+else
+	echo "SKIPPED: $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND not executable " \
+	    "(/var/run mounted noexec?)"
+fi
-- 
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