From 23e4b80a6085bddea80e2e64b4df99dd4931b1ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Thu, 30 Aug 2012 10:42:47 +1000
Subject:  - (dtucker) [moduli] Import new moduli file.

---
 ChangeLog | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index f8e600847..048cefa57 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
+20120830
+ - (dtucker) [moduli] Import new moduli file.
+
 20120828
  - (djm) Release openssh-6.1
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 3ee50c5d9f95cd40df403cf1a91fdaffefa21cc5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Thu, 6 Sep 2012 21:18:11 +1000
Subject:    - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/08/15 18:25:50      [ssh-keygen.1]     
 a little more info on certificate validity;      requested by Ross L
 Richardson, and provided by djm

---
 ChangeLog    | 7 +++++++
 ssh-keygen.1 | 8 +++++---
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 048cefa57..3b6803b6a 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
+20120906
+ - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/08/15 18:25:50
+     [ssh-keygen.1]
+     a little more info on certificate validity;
+     requested by Ross L Richardson, and provided by djm
+
 20120830
  - (dtucker) [moduli] Import new moduli file.
 
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
index 03f927edf..1d5564640 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.1
+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.109 2012/07/06 00:41:59 dtucker Exp $
+.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.110 2012/08/15 18:25:50 jmc Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: July 6 2012 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: August 15 2012 $
 .Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -628,7 +628,9 @@ The
 option allows specification of certificate start and end times.
 A certificate that is presented at a time outside this range will not be
 considered valid.
-By default, certificates have a maximum validity interval.
+By default, certificates are valid from
+.Ux
+Epoch to the distant future.
 .Pp
 For certificates to be used for user or host authentication, the CA
 public key must be trusted by
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 66cb0e0733782c2f6773abd9fd1d87f5efef6c27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Thu, 6 Sep 2012 21:19:05 +1000
Subject:    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/08/17 00:45:45      [clientloop.c
 clientloop.h mux.c]      Force a clean shutdown of ControlMaster client
 sessions when the ~. escape      sequence is used.  This means that ~. should
 now work in mux clients even      if the server is no longer responding. 
 Found by tedu, ok djm.

---
 ChangeLog    | 5 +++++
 clientloop.c | 4 +++-
 clientloop.h | 3 ++-
 mux.c        | 4 ++--
 4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 3b6803b6a..bdaaa0ae3 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -4,6 +4,11 @@
      [ssh-keygen.1]
      a little more info on certificate validity;
      requested by Ross L Richardson, and provided by djm
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/08/17 00:45:45
+     [clientloop.c clientloop.h mux.c]
+     Force a clean shutdown of ControlMaster client sessions when the ~. escape
+     sequence is used.  This means that ~. should now work in mux clients even
+     if the server is no longer responding.  Found by tedu, ok djm.
 
 20120830
  - (dtucker) [moduli] Import new moduli file.
diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
index 1c1a77088..65664cbcd 100644
--- a/clientloop.c
+++ b/clientloop.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.240 2012/06/20 04:42:58 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.241 2012/08/17 00:45:45 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -1046,6 +1046,8 @@ process_escapes(Channel *c, Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr,
 				if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) {
 					chan_read_failed(c);
 					chan_write_failed(c);
+					mux_master_session_cleanup_cb(c->self,
+					    NULL);
 					return 0;
 				} else
 					quit_pending = 1;
diff --git a/clientloop.h b/clientloop.h
index 3bb794879..d2baa0324 100644
--- a/clientloop.h
+++ b/clientloop.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.29 2011/09/09 22:46:44 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.30 2012/08/17 00:45:45 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -76,4 +76,5 @@ void	muxserver_listen(void);
 void	muxclient(const char *);
 void	mux_exit_message(Channel *, int);
 void	mux_tty_alloc_failed(Channel *);
+void	mux_master_session_cleanup_cb(int, void *);
 
diff --git a/mux.c b/mux.c
index 5e0e65ff3..0f1532bb5 100644
--- a/mux.c
+++ b/mux.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.36 2012/07/06 01:37:21 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.37 2012/08/17 00:45:45 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2002-2008 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
  *
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ static const struct {
 
 /* Cleanup callback fired on closure of mux slave _session_ channel */
 /* ARGSUSED */
-static void
+void
 mux_master_session_cleanup_cb(int cid, void *unused)
 {
 	Channel *cc, *c = channel_by_id(cid);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From ae608bdd83c8bc37ef701aba9603a4f69d473b2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Thu, 6 Sep 2012 21:19:51 +1000
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/08/17 01:22:56      [kex.c]      add
 some comments about better handling first-KEX-follows notifications      from
 the server. Nothing uses these right now. No binary change

---
 ChangeLog |  4 ++++
 kex.c     | 16 +++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index bdaaa0ae3..dd2877436 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@
      Force a clean shutdown of ControlMaster client sessions when the ~. escape
      sequence is used.  This means that ~. should now work in mux clients even
      if the server is no longer responding.  Found by tedu, ok djm.
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/08/17 01:22:56
+     [kex.c]
+     add some comments about better handling first-KEX-follows notifications
+     from the server. Nothing uses these right now. No binary change
 
 20120830
  - (dtucker) [moduli] Import new moduli file.
diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
index c65e28f94..f77b3c925 100644
--- a/kex.c
+++ b/kex.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.86 2010/09/22 05:01:29 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.87 2012/08/17 01:22:56 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -242,8 +242,18 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		packet_get_char();
 	for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
 		xfree(packet_get_string(NULL));
-	(void) packet_get_char();
-	(void) packet_get_int();
+	/*
+	 * XXX RFC4253 sec 7: "each side MAY guess" - currently no supported
+	 * KEX method has the server move first, but a server might be using
+	 * a custom method or one that we otherwise don't support. We should
+	 * be prepared to remember first_kex_follows here so we can eat a
+	 * packet later.
+	 * XXX2 - RFC4253 is kind of ambiguous on what first_kex_follows means
+	 * for cases where the server *doesn't* go first. I guess we should
+	 * ignore it when it is set for these cases, which is what we do now.
+	 */
+	(void) packet_get_char();	/* first_kex_follows */
+	(void) packet_get_int();	/* reserved */
 	packet_check_eom();
 
 	kex_kexinit_finish(kex);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From f09a8a6c6d8c06b9b855cf902e2a7129932a25e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Thu, 6 Sep 2012 21:20:39 +1000
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/08/17 01:25:58      [ssh-keygen.c]     
 print details of which host lines were deleted when using      "ssh-keygen -R
 host"; ok markus@

---
 ChangeLog    |  4 ++++
 ssh-keygen.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index dd2877436..bbc4435df 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -13,6 +13,10 @@
      [kex.c]
      add some comments about better handling first-KEX-follows notifications
      from the server. Nothing uses these right now. No binary change
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/08/17 01:25:58
+     [ssh-keygen.c]
+     print details of which host lines were deleted when using
+     "ssh-keygen -R host"; ok markus@
 
 20120830
  - (dtucker) [moduli] Import new moduli file.
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
index a223ddc81..5060276d7 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.216 2012/07/06 06:38:03 jmc Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.217 2012/08/17 01:25:58 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -1088,8 +1088,14 @@ do_known_hosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *name)
 					    ca ? " (CA key)" : "");
 					printhost(out, cp, pub, ca, 0);
 				}
-				if (delete_host && !c && !ca)
-					printhost(out, cp, pub, ca, 0);
+				if (delete_host) {
+					if (!c && !ca)
+						printhost(out, cp, pub, ca, 0);
+					else
+						printf("# Host %s found: "
+						    "line %d type %s\n", name,
+						    num, key_type(pub));
+				}
 			} else if (hash_hosts)
 				printhost(out, cp, pub, ca, 0);
 		} else {
@@ -1104,8 +1110,14 @@ do_known_hosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *name)
 					printhost(out, name, pub,
 					    ca, hash_hosts && !ca);
 				}
-				if (delete_host && !c && !ca)
-					printhost(out, cp, pub, ca, 0);
+				if (delete_host) {
+					if (!c && !ca)
+						printhost(out, cp, pub, ca, 0);
+					else
+						printf("# Host %s found: "
+						    "line %d type %s\n", name,
+						    num, key_type(pub));
+				}
 			} else if (hash_hosts) {
 				for (cp2 = strsep(&cp, ",");
 				    cp2 != NULL && *cp2 != '\0';
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 00c1518a4d0e610e319433fa588cc1fbdfbff0b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Thu, 6 Sep 2012 21:21:56 +1000
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/08/17 01:30:00      [compat.c
 sshconnect.c]      Send client banner immediately, rather than waiting for
 the server to      move first for SSH protocol 2 connections (the default).
 Patch based on      one in bz#1999 by tls AT panix.com, feedback dtucker@ ok
 markus@

---
 ChangeLog    |  5 +++++
 compat.c     |  4 +++-
 sshconnect.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 3 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index bbc4435df..178d05006 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -17,6 +17,11 @@
      [ssh-keygen.c]
      print details of which host lines were deleted when using
      "ssh-keygen -R host"; ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/08/17 01:30:00
+     [compat.c sshconnect.c]
+     Send client banner immediately, rather than waiting for the server to
+     move first for SSH protocol 2 connections (the default). Patch based on
+     one in bz#1999 by tls AT panix.com, feedback dtucker@ ok markus@
 
 20120830
  - (dtucker) [moduli] Import new moduli file.
diff --git a/compat.c b/compat.c
index 0dc089fd6..f680f4fe3 100644
--- a/compat.c
+++ b/compat.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.79 2011/09/23 07:45:05 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.80 2012/08/17 01:30:00 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ int datafellows = 0;
 void
 enable_compat20(void)
 {
+	if (compat20)
+		return;
 	debug("Enabling compatibility mode for protocol 2.0");
 	compat20 = 1;
 }
diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
index 0ee726637..3d44b2e46 100644
--- a/sshconnect.c
+++ b/sshconnect.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.234 2011/05/24 07:15:47 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.235 2012/08/17 01:30:00 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -429,6 +429,26 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static void
+send_client_banner(int connection_out, int minor1)
+{
+	char buf[256];
+
+	/* Send our own protocol version identification. */
+	if (compat20) {
+		xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\r\n",
+		    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION);
+	} else {
+		xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n",
+		    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, minor1, SSH_VERSION);
+	}
+	if (roaming_atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, client_version_string,
+	    strlen(client_version_string)) != strlen(client_version_string))
+		fatal("write: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+	chop(client_version_string);
+	debug("Local version string %.100s", client_version_string);
+}
+
 /*
  * Waits for the server identification string, and sends our own
  * identification string.
@@ -440,7 +460,7 @@ ssh_exchange_identification(int timeout_ms)
 	int remote_major, remote_minor, mismatch;
 	int connection_in = packet_get_connection_in();
 	int connection_out = packet_get_connection_out();
-	int minor1 = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1;
+	int minor1 = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1, client_banner_sent = 0;
 	u_int i, n;
 	size_t len;
 	int fdsetsz, remaining, rc;
@@ -450,6 +470,16 @@ ssh_exchange_identification(int timeout_ms)
 	fdsetsz = howmany(connection_in + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
 	fdset = xcalloc(1, fdsetsz);
 
+	/*
+	 * If we are SSH2-only then we can send the banner immediately and
+	 * save a round-trip.
+	 */
+	if (options.protocol == SSH_PROTO_2) {
+		enable_compat20();
+		send_client_banner(connection_out, 0);
+		client_banner_sent = 1;
+	}
+
 	/* Read other side's version identification. */
 	remaining = timeout_ms;
 	for (n = 0;;) {
@@ -552,18 +582,9 @@ ssh_exchange_identification(int timeout_ms)
 		fatal("Protocol major versions differ: %d vs. %d",
 		    (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) ? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1,
 		    remote_major);
-	/* Send our own protocol version identification. */
-	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s",
-	    compat20 ? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1,
-	    compat20 ? PROTOCOL_MINOR_2 : minor1,
-	    SSH_VERSION, compat20 ? "\r\n" : "\n");
-	if (roaming_atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, buf, strlen(buf))
-	    != strlen(buf))
-		fatal("write: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-	client_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
-	chop(client_version_string);
+	if (!client_banner_sent)
+		send_client_banner(connection_out, minor1);
 	chop(server_version_string);
-	debug("Local version string %.100s", client_version_string);
 }
 
 /* defaults to 'no' */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 50a48d025ffc961c3f5e48f521b406d7c49681bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Thu, 6 Sep 2012 21:25:37 +1000
Subject:    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/06 04:37:39      [clientloop.c
 log.c ssh.1 log.h]      Add ~v and ~V escape sequences to raise and lower the
 logging level      respectively. Man page help from jmc, ok deraadt jmc

---
 ChangeLog    |  4 ++++
 clientloop.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 log.c        | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
 log.h        |  4 +++-
 ssh.1        | 12 ++++++++++--
 5 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 178d05006..439893da6 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -22,6 +22,10 @@
      Send client banner immediately, rather than waiting for the server to
      move first for SSH protocol 2 connections (the default). Patch based on
      one in bz#1999 by tls AT panix.com, feedback dtucker@ ok markus@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/06 04:37:39
+     [clientloop.c log.c ssh.1 log.h]
+     Add ~v and ~V escape sequences to raise and lower the logging level
+     respectively. Man page help from jmc, ok deraadt jmc
 
 20120830
  - (dtucker) [moduli] Import new moduli file.
diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
index 65664cbcd..0e5c45a9d 100644
--- a/clientloop.c
+++ b/clientloop.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.241 2012/08/17 00:45:45 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.242 2012/09/06 04:37:38 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -1099,6 +1099,31 @@ process_escapes(Channel *c, Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr,
 				}
 				continue;
 
+			case 'V':
+				/* FALLTHROUGH */
+			case 'v':
+				if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1)
+					goto noescape;
+				if (!log_is_on_stderr()) {
+					snprintf(string, sizeof string,
+					    "%c%c [Logging to syslog]\r\n",
+					     escape_char, ch);
+					buffer_append(berr, string,
+					    strlen(string));
+					continue;
+				}
+				if (ch == 'V' && options.log_level >
+				    SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
+					log_change_level(--options.log_level);
+				if (ch == 'v' && options.log_level <
+				    SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
+					log_change_level(++options.log_level);
+				snprintf(string, sizeof string,
+				    "%c%c [LogLevel %s]\r\n", escape_char, ch,
+				    log_level_name(options.log_level));
+				buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string));
+				continue;
+
 			case '&':
 				if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1)
 					goto noescape;
@@ -1175,6 +1200,8 @@ Supported escape sequences:\r\n\
   %cB  - send a BREAK to the remote system\r\n\
   %cC  - open a command line\r\n\
   %cR  - Request rekey (SSH protocol 2 only)\r\n\
+  %cV  - Increase verbosity (LogLevel)\r\n\
+  %cv  - Decrease verbosity (LogLevel)\r\n\
   %c^Z - suspend ssh\r\n\
   %c#  - list forwarded connections\r\n\
   %c&  - background ssh (when waiting for connections to terminate)\r\n\
@@ -1186,6 +1213,7 @@ Supported escape sequences:\r\n\
 					    escape_char, escape_char,
 					    escape_char, escape_char,
 					    escape_char, escape_char,
+					    escape_char, escape_char,
 					    escape_char);
 				}
 				buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string));
diff --git a/log.c b/log.c
index ad5a10b47..7f4a1b9c6 100644
--- a/log.c
+++ b/log.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.42 2011/06/17 21:44:30 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.43 2012/09/06 04:37:39 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -329,6 +329,21 @@ log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr)
 #endif
 }
 
+void
+log_change_level(LogLevel new_log_level)
+{
+	/* no-op if log_init has not been called */
+	if (argv0 == NULL)
+		return;
+	log_init(argv0, new_log_level, log_facility, log_on_stderr);
+}
+
+int
+log_is_on_stderr(void)
+{
+	return log_on_stderr;
+}
+
 #define MSGBUFSIZ 1024
 
 void
diff --git a/log.h b/log.h
index 1b8d2142b..e3e328b06 100644
--- a/log.h
+++ b/log.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: log.h,v 1.18 2011/06/17 21:44:30 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: log.h,v 1.19 2012/09/06 04:37:39 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@ typedef enum {
 typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, const char *, void *);
 
 void     log_init(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
+void     log_change_level(LogLevel);
+int      log_is_on_stderr(void);
 
 SyslogFacility	log_facility_number(char *);
 const char * 	log_facility_name(SyslogFacility);
diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
index eaf5d83db..65342ff8f 100644
--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.326 2012/06/18 12:17:18 dtucker Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: June 18 2012 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.327 2012/09/06 04:37:39 dtucker Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: September 6 2012 $
 .Dt SSH 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -926,6 +926,14 @@ option.
 .It Cm ~R
 Request rekeying of the connection
 (only useful for SSH protocol version 2 and if the peer supports it).
+.It Cm ~V
+Decrease the verbosity
+.Pq Ic LogLevel
+when errors are being written to stderr.
+.It Cm ~v
+Increase the verbosit
+.Pq Ic LogLevel
+when errors are being written to stderr.
 .El
 .Sh TCP FORWARDING
 Forwarding of arbitrary TCP connections over the secure channel can
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 29bf4040b4aa98ce8b1be57a3107ddb1eaa085b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Thu, 6 Sep 2012 21:26:34 +1000
Subject:    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/06 09:50:13      [clientloop.c] 
     Make the escape command help (~?) context sensitive so that only commands
      that will work in the current session are shown.  ok markus@

---
 ChangeLog    | 4 ++++
 clientloop.c | 6 +++---
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 439893da6..03b16cc2b 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -26,6 +26,10 @@
      [clientloop.c log.c ssh.1 log.h]
      Add ~v and ~V escape sequences to raise and lower the logging level
      respectively. Man page help from jmc, ok deraadt jmc
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/06 09:50:13
+     [clientloop.c]
+     Make the escape command help (~?) context sensitive so that only commands
+     that will work in the current session are shown.  ok markus@
 
 20120830
  - (dtucker) [moduli] Import new moduli file.
diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
index 0e5c45a9d..72b1d40f0 100644
--- a/clientloop.c
+++ b/clientloop.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.242 2012/09/06 04:37:38 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.243 2012/09/06 06:25:41 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -1200,8 +1200,8 @@ Supported escape sequences:\r\n\
   %cB  - send a BREAK to the remote system\r\n\
   %cC  - open a command line\r\n\
   %cR  - Request rekey (SSH protocol 2 only)\r\n\
-  %cV  - Increase verbosity (LogLevel)\r\n\
-  %cv  - Decrease verbosity (LogLevel)\r\n\
+  %cV  - Decrease verbosity (LogLevel)\r\n\
+  %cv  - Increase verbosity (LogLevel)\r\n\
   %c^Z - suspend ssh\r\n\
   %c#  - list forwarded connections\r\n\
   %c&  - background ssh (when waiting for connections to terminate)\r\n\
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 241995382ee30b562a1f644ab9dd518bbbb8f902 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2012 10:44:34 +1000
Subject: bz#2039: add acknowledgement of the original authors of the ECDSA
 SSHFP DNS work.  From Ondřej Surý.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

---
 ChangeLog | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 03b16cc2b..242ef4043 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -208,6 +208,7 @@
      [dns.c dns.h key.c key.h ssh-keygen.c]
      add support for RFC6594 SSHFP DNS records for ECDSA key types.
      patch from bugzilla-m67 AT nulld.me in bz#1978; ok + tweak markus@
+     (Original authors OndÅ™ej SurÃ,  OndÅ™ej Caletka and Daniel Black)
    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/01 00:49:35
      [PROTOCOL.mux]
      correct types of port numbers (integers, not strings); bz#2004 from
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 92a39cfa09e38152be34437345577105c4110438 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2012 11:20:20 +1000
Subject:    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/06 09:50:13      [clientloop.c] 
     Make the escape command help (~?) context sensitive so that only commands
      that will work in the current session are shown.  ok markus@

(note: previous commit with this description was a mistake on my part while
pulling changes from OpenBSD)
---
 ChangeLog    |  11 ++++---
 clientloop.c | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
 2 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 242ef4043..dead49719 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
+20120907
+ - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/06 09:50:13
+     [clientloop.c]
+     Make the escape command help (~?) context sensitive so that only commands
+     that will work in the current session are shown.  ok markus@
+
 20120906
  - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
    - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/08/15 18:25:50
@@ -26,10 +33,6 @@
      [clientloop.c log.c ssh.1 log.h]
      Add ~v and ~V escape sequences to raise and lower the logging level
      respectively. Man page help from jmc, ok deraadt jmc
-   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/06 09:50:13
-     [clientloop.c]
-     Make the escape command help (~?) context sensitive so that only commands
-     that will work in the current session are shown.  ok markus@
 
 20120830
  - (dtucker) [moduli] Import new moduli file.
diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
index 72b1d40f0..07d2c8923 100644
--- a/clientloop.c
+++ b/clientloop.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.243 2012/09/06 06:25:41 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.244 2012/09/06 09:50:13 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -996,6 +996,64 @@ out:
 		xfree(fwd.connect_host);
 }
 
+/* reasons to suppress output of an escape command in help output */
+#define SUPPRESS_NEVER		0	/* never suppress, always show */
+#define SUPPRESS_PROTO1		1	/* don't show in protocol 1 sessions */
+#define SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT	2	/* don't show in mux client sessions */
+#define SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER	4	/* don't show in mux master sessions */
+#define SUPPRESS_SYSLOG		8	/* don't show when logging to syslog */
+struct escape_help_text {
+	const char *cmd;
+	const char *text;
+	unsigned int flags;
+};
+static struct escape_help_text esc_txt[] = {
+    {".",  "terminate session", SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER},
+    {".",  "terminate connection (and any multiplexed sessions)",
+	SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
+    {"B",  "send a BREAK to the remote system", SUPPRESS_PROTO1},
+    {"C",  "open a command line", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
+    {"R",  "request rekey", SUPPRESS_PROTO1},
+    {"V",  "decrease verbosity (LogLevel)", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
+    {"v",  "increase verbosity (LogLevel)", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
+    {"^Z", "suspend ssh", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
+    {"#",  "list forwarded connections", SUPPRESS_NEVER},
+    {"&",  "background ssh (when waiting for connections to terminate)",
+	SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
+    {"?", "this message", SUPPRESS_NEVER},
+};
+
+static void
+print_escape_help(Buffer *b, int escape_char, int protocol2, int mux_client,
+    int using_stderr)
+{
+	unsigned int i, suppress_flags;
+	char string[1024];
+
+	snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c?\r\n"
+	    "Supported escape sequences:\r\n", escape_char);
+	buffer_append(b, string, strlen(string));
+
+	suppress_flags = (protocol2 ? 0 : SUPPRESS_PROTO1) |
+	    (mux_client ? SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT : 0) |
+	    (mux_client ? 0 : SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER) |
+	    (using_stderr ? 0 : SUPPRESS_SYSLOG);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(esc_txt)/sizeof(esc_txt[0]); i++) {
+		if (esc_txt[i].flags & suppress_flags)
+			continue;
+		snprintf(string, sizeof string, " %c%-2s - %s\r\n",
+		    escape_char, esc_txt[i].cmd, esc_txt[i].text);
+		buffer_append(b, string, strlen(string));
+	}
+
+	snprintf(string, sizeof string,
+	    " %c%c  - send the escape character by typing it twice\r\n"
+	    "(Note that escapes are only recognized immediately after "
+	    "newline.)\r\n", escape_char, escape_char);
+	buffer_append(b, string, strlen(string));
+}
+
 /* 
  * Process the characters one by one, call with c==NULL for proto1 case.
  */
@@ -1177,46 +1235,9 @@ process_escapes(Channel *c, Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr,
 				continue;
 
 			case '?':
-				if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) {
-					snprintf(string, sizeof string,
-"%c?\r\n\
-Supported escape sequences:\r\n\
-  %c.  - terminate session\r\n\
-  %cB  - send a BREAK to the remote system\r\n\
-  %cR  - Request rekey (SSH protocol 2 only)\r\n\
-  %c#  - list forwarded connections\r\n\
-  %c?  - this message\r\n\
-  %c%c  - send the escape character by typing it twice\r\n\
-(Note that escapes are only recognized immediately after newline.)\r\n",
-					    escape_char, escape_char,
-					    escape_char, escape_char,
-					    escape_char, escape_char,
-					    escape_char, escape_char);
-				} else {
-					snprintf(string, sizeof string,
-"%c?\r\n\
-Supported escape sequences:\r\n\
-  %c.  - terminate connection (and any multiplexed sessions)\r\n\
-  %cB  - send a BREAK to the remote system\r\n\
-  %cC  - open a command line\r\n\
-  %cR  - Request rekey (SSH protocol 2 only)\r\n\
-  %cV  - Decrease verbosity (LogLevel)\r\n\
-  %cv  - Increase verbosity (LogLevel)\r\n\
-  %c^Z - suspend ssh\r\n\
-  %c#  - list forwarded connections\r\n\
-  %c&  - background ssh (when waiting for connections to terminate)\r\n\
-  %c?  - this message\r\n\
-  %c%c  - send the escape character by typing it twice\r\n\
-(Note that escapes are only recognized immediately after newline.)\r\n",
-					    escape_char, escape_char,
-					    escape_char, escape_char,
-					    escape_char, escape_char,
-					    escape_char, escape_char,
-					    escape_char, escape_char,
-					    escape_char, escape_char,
-					    escape_char);
-				}
-				buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string));
+				print_escape_help(berr, escape_char, compat20,
+				    (c && c->ctl_chan != -1),
+				    log_is_on_stderr());
 				continue;
 
 			case '#':
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 83d0af69075269769715b00c21d0debe15986bf2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2012 11:21:03 +1000
Subject:    - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/06 13:57:42      [ssh.1]     
 missing letter in previous;

---
 ChangeLog | 3 +++
 ssh.1     | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index dead49719..9fb565c6e 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@
      [clientloop.c]
      Make the escape command help (~?) context sensitive so that only commands
      that will work in the current session are shown.  ok markus@
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/06 13:57:42
+     [ssh.1]
+     missing letter in previous;
 
 20120906
  - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
index 65342ff8f..b218e11d9 100644
--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.327 2012/09/06 04:37:39 dtucker Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.328 2012/09/06 13:57:42 jmc Exp $
 .Dd $Mdocdate: September 6 2012 $
 .Dt SSH 1
 .Os
@@ -931,7 +931,7 @@ Decrease the verbosity
 .Pq Ic LogLevel
 when errors are being written to stderr.
 .It Cm ~v
-Increase the verbosit
+Increase the verbosity
 .Pq Ic LogLevel
 when errors are being written to stderr.
 .El
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From f111d40604846da18b190155b85fa72d58647802 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2012 11:21:42 +1000
Subject:    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/07 00:30:19      [clientloop.c] 
     Print '^Z' instead of a raw ^Z when the sequence is not supported.  ok
 djm@

---
 ChangeLog    |  3 +++
 clientloop.c | 11 ++++++++---
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 9fb565c6e..b3ec3e2a0 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@
    - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/06 13:57:42
      [ssh.1]
      missing letter in previous;
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/07 00:30:19
+     [clientloop.c]
+     Print '^Z' instead of a raw ^Z when the sequence is not supported.  ok djm@
 
 20120906
  - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
index 07d2c8923..20fa4b9f4 100644
--- a/clientloop.c
+++ b/clientloop.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.244 2012/09/06 09:50:13 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.245 2012/09/07 00:30:19 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -1114,11 +1114,16 @@ process_escapes(Channel *c, Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr,
 			case 'Z' - 64:
 				/* XXX support this for mux clients */
 				if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) {
+					char b[16];
  noescape:
+					if (ch == 'Z' - 64)
+						snprintf(b, sizeof b, "^Z");
+					else
+						snprintf(b, sizeof b, "%c", ch);
 					snprintf(string, sizeof string,
-					    "%c%c escape not available to "
+					    "%c%s escape not available to "
 					    "multiplexed sessions\r\n",
-					    escape_char, ch);
+					    escape_char, b);
 					buffer_append(berr, string,
 					    strlen(string));
 					continue;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From ca0d0fd806ebce746ac0bee52995fc32b1116656 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2012 11:22:24 +1000
Subject:    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/07 01:10:21      [clientloop.c] 
     Merge escape help text for ~v and ~V; ok djm@

---
 ChangeLog    | 3 +++
 clientloop.c | 9 ++++-----
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index b3ec3e2a0..289dc0011 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@
    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/07 00:30:19
      [clientloop.c]
      Print '^Z' instead of a raw ^Z when the sequence is not supported.  ok djm@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/07 01:10:21
+     [clientloop.c]
+     Merge escape help text for ~v and ~V; ok djm@
 
 20120906
  - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
index 20fa4b9f4..3de542814 100644
--- a/clientloop.c
+++ b/clientloop.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.245 2012/09/07 00:30:19 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.246 2012/09/07 01:10:21 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -1014,8 +1014,7 @@ static struct escape_help_text esc_txt[] = {
     {"B",  "send a BREAK to the remote system", SUPPRESS_PROTO1},
     {"C",  "open a command line", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
     {"R",  "request rekey", SUPPRESS_PROTO1},
-    {"V",  "decrease verbosity (LogLevel)", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
-    {"v",  "increase verbosity (LogLevel)", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
+    {"V/v",  "decrease/increase verbosity (LogLevel)", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
     {"^Z", "suspend ssh", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
     {"#",  "list forwarded connections", SUPPRESS_NEVER},
     {"&",  "background ssh (when waiting for connections to terminate)",
@@ -1042,13 +1041,13 @@ print_escape_help(Buffer *b, int escape_char, int protocol2, int mux_client,
 	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(esc_txt)/sizeof(esc_txt[0]); i++) {
 		if (esc_txt[i].flags & suppress_flags)
 			continue;
-		snprintf(string, sizeof string, " %c%-2s - %s\r\n",
+		snprintf(string, sizeof string, " %c%-3s - %s\r\n",
 		    escape_char, esc_txt[i].cmd, esc_txt[i].text);
 		buffer_append(b, string, strlen(string));
 	}
 
 	snprintf(string, sizeof string,
-	    " %c%c  - send the escape character by typing it twice\r\n"
+	    " %c%c   - send the escape character by typing it twice\r\n"
 	    "(Note that escapes are only recognized immediately after "
 	    "newline.)\r\n", escape_char, escape_char);
 	buffer_append(b, string, strlen(string));
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 48bf4b0ca366d68ef9c5ce95cb0c49fb3e149a40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2012 16:38:53 +1000
Subject:    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/07 06:34:21      [clientloop.c] 
     when muxmaster is run with -N, make it shut down gracefully when a client
      sends it "-O stop" rather than hanging around (bz#1985).  ok djm@

---
 ChangeLog    | 4 ++++
 clientloop.c | 8 ++++----
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 289dc0011..1655f764c 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -13,6 +13,10 @@
    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/07 01:10:21
      [clientloop.c]
      Merge escape help text for ~v and ~V; ok djm@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/07 06:34:21
+     [clientloop.c]
+     when muxmaster is run with -N, make it shut down gracefully when a client
+     sends it "-O stop" rather than hanging around (bz#1985).  ok djm@
 
 20120906
  - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
index 3de542814..564508146 100644
--- a/clientloop.c
+++ b/clientloop.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.246 2012/09/07 01:10:21 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.247 2012/09/07 06:34:21 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -2244,10 +2244,10 @@ client_stop_mux(void)
 	if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1)
 		unlink(options.control_path);
 	/*
-	 * If we are in persist mode, signal that we should close when all
-	 * active channels are closed.
+	 * If we are in persist mode, or don't have a shell, signal that we
+	 * should close when all active channels are closed.
 	 */
-	if (options.control_persist) {
+	if (options.control_persist || no_shell_flag) {
 		session_closed = 1;
 		setproctitle("[stopped mux]");
 	}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 86dc9b41107df8d4bb697f7d02b552d98c16a776 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2012 18:08:23 +1000
Subject: Fix author's name for RFC6594 SSHFP change

---
 ChangeLog | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 1655f764c..ab48e38f4 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@
      [dns.c dns.h key.c key.h ssh-keygen.c]
      add support for RFC6594 SSHFP DNS records for ECDSA key types.
      patch from bugzilla-m67 AT nulld.me in bz#1978; ok + tweak markus@
-     (Original authors OndÅ™ej SurÃ,  OndÅ™ej Caletka and Daniel Black)
+     (Original authors Ondřej Surý,  Ondřej Caletka and Daniel Black)
    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/01 00:49:35
      [PROTOCOL.mux]
      correct types of port numbers (integers, not strings); bz#2004 from
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From bb6cc07cf4e98d86b38a2011203c6bb724465135 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Mon, 17 Sep 2012 13:25:06 +1000
Subject:    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/13 23:37:36      [servconf.c]   
   Fix comment line length

---
 ChangeLog  | 6 ++++++
 servconf.c | 7 ++++---
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index ab48e38f4..83ec4298d 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
+20120917
+ - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/13 23:37:36
+     [servconf.c]
+     Fix comment line length
+
 20120907
  - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/06 09:50:13
diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
index ee2e531a0..f4b7dd58b 100644
--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.229 2012/07/13 01:35:21 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.230 2012/09/13 23:37:36 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
  *                    All rights reserved
@@ -618,8 +618,9 @@ out:
 }
 
 /*
- * All of the attributes on a single Match line are ANDed together, so we need to check every
- * attribute and set the result to zero if any attribute does not match.
+ * All of the attributes on a single Match line are ANDed together, so we need
+ * to check every * attribute and set the result to zero if any attribute does
+ * not match.
  */
 static int
 match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 26b9e3b0c5b2d303991fad61e453cc4f244054cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Mon, 17 Sep 2012 13:25:44 +1000
Subject:    - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/14 16:51:34      [sshconnect.c]  
    remove unused variable

---
 ChangeLog    | 3 +++
 sshconnect.c | 4 +---
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 83ec4298d..cd9edf8c2 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@
    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/13 23:37:36
      [servconf.c]
      Fix comment line length
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/14 16:51:34
+     [sshconnect.c]
+     remove unused variable
 
 20120907
  - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
index 3d44b2e46..07800a65f 100644
--- a/sshconnect.c
+++ b/sshconnect.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.235 2012/08/17 01:30:00 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.236 2012/09/14 16:51:34 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -432,8 +432,6 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr,
 static void
 send_client_banner(int connection_out, int minor1)
 {
-	char buf[256];
-
 	/* Send our own protocol version identification. */
 	if (compat20) {
 		xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\r\n",
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 0af2405ebf4d4c3b420740f0fb5b81aca7039bdc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2012 10:41:25 +1000
Subject:  - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/17
 09:54:44      [sftp.c]      an XXX for later

---
 ChangeLog | 6 ++++++
 sftp.c    | 3 ++-
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index cd9edf8c2..31aec8979 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
+20121005
+ - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/17 09:54:44
+     [sftp.c]
+     an XXX for later
+
 20120917
  - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/13 23:37:36
diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
index 235c6ad04..217b63a2d 100644
--- a/sftp.c
+++ b/sftp.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.136 2012/06/22 14:36:33 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.137 2012/09/17 09:54:44 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
  *
@@ -1917,6 +1917,7 @@ interactive_loop(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *file1, char *file2)
 				return (-1);
 			}
 		} else {
+			/* XXX this is wrong wrt quoting */
 			if (file2 == NULL)
 				snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "get %s", dir);
 			else
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 302889a1b0db42d8065fa882ae8e06ca2ff75477 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2012 10:42:53 +1000
Subject:    - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/17 13:04:11      [packet.c]     
 clear old keys on rekeing; ok djm

---
 ChangeLog | 3 +++
 packet.c  | 5 ++++-
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 31aec8979..11e7a92bd 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@
    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/17 09:54:44
      [sftp.c]
      an XXX for later
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/17 13:04:11
+     [packet.c]
+     clear old keys on rekeing; ok djm
 
 20120917
  - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
index d0c66fe57..b75c081f0 100644
--- a/packet.c
+++ b/packet.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.176 2012/01/25 19:40:09 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.177 2012/09/17 13:04:11 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -757,6 +757,9 @@ set_newkeys(int mode)
 		mac  = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
 		comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
 		mac_clear(mac);
+		memset(enc->iv,  0, enc->block_size);
+		memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len);
+		memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len);
 		xfree(enc->name);
 		xfree(enc->iv);
 		xfree(enc->key);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 063018d9f6f7beb1408213fc27c720534e7c987e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2012 10:43:58 +1000
Subject:    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/18 10:36:12      [sftp.c]     
 Add bounds check on sftp tab-completion.  Part of a patch from from     
 Jean-Marc Robert via tech@, ok djm

---
 ChangeLog | 4 ++++
 sftp.c    | 6 +++++-
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 11e7a92bd..6341bd564 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@
    - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/17 13:04:11
      [packet.c]
      clear old keys on rekeing; ok djm
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/18 10:36:12
+     [sftp.c]
+     Add bounds check on sftp tab-completion.  Part of a patch from from
+     Jean-Marc Robert via tech@, ok djm
 
 20120917
  - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
index 217b63a2d..3c7bc64e1 100644
--- a/sftp.c
+++ b/sftp.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.137 2012/09/17 09:54:44 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.138 2012/09/18 10:36:12 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
  *
@@ -991,6 +991,10 @@ makeargv(const char *arg, int *argcp, int sloppy, char *lastquote,
 	state = MA_START;
 	i = j = 0;
 	for (;;) {
+		if (argc >= sizeof(argv) / sizeof(*argv)){
+			error("Too many arguments.");
+			return NULL;
+		}
 		if (isspace(arg[i])) {
 			if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) {
 				/* Terminate current argument */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 191fcc6e4e6173a59720da043bc85618a4107fcf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2012 10:45:01 +1000
Subject:    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/21 10:53:07      [sftp.c]     
 Fix improper handling of absolute paths when PWD is part of the completed    
  path.  Patch from Jean-Marc Robert via tech@, ok djm.

---
 ChangeLog | 4 ++++
 sftp.c    | 9 ++++++---
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 6341bd564..9d3a7f581 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@
      [sftp.c]
      Add bounds check on sftp tab-completion.  Part of a patch from from
      Jean-Marc Robert via tech@, ok djm
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/21 10:53:07
+     [sftp.c]
+     Fix improper handling of absolute paths when PWD is part of the completed
+     path.  Patch from Jean-Marc Robert via tech@, ok djm.
 
 20120917
  - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
index 3c7bc64e1..9ab4e9f16 100644
--- a/sftp.c
+++ b/sftp.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.138 2012/09/18 10:36:12 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.139 2012/09/21 10:53:07 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
  *
@@ -1699,7 +1699,7 @@ complete_match(EditLine *el, struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path,
 {
 	glob_t g;
 	char *tmp, *tmp2, ins[3];
-	u_int i, hadglob, pwdlen, len, tmplen, filelen;
+	u_int i, hadglob, pwdlen, len, tmplen, filelen, isabs;
 	const LineInfo *lf;
 	
 	/* Glob from "file" location */
@@ -1708,6 +1708,9 @@ complete_match(EditLine *el, struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path,
 	else
 		xasprintf(&tmp, "%s*", file);
 
+	/* Check if the path is absolute. */
+	isabs = tmp[0] == '/';
+
 	memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
 	if (remote != LOCAL) {
 		tmp = make_absolute(tmp, remote_path);
@@ -1742,7 +1745,7 @@ complete_match(EditLine *el, struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path,
 		goto out;
 
 	tmp2 = complete_ambiguous(file, g.gl_pathv, g.gl_matchc);
-	tmp = path_strip(tmp2, remote_path);
+	tmp = path_strip(tmp2, isabs ? NULL : remote_path);
 	xfree(tmp2);
 
 	if (tmp == NULL)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 17146d369cd5f2c0088e4e299974ea3f87f37d4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2012 10:46:16 +1000
Subject:   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/21 10:55:04      [sftp.c]     
 Fix handling of filenames containing escaped globbing characters and     
 escape "#" and "*".  Patch from Jean-Marc Robert via tech@, ok djm.

---
 ChangeLog |  4 ++++
 sftp.c    | 20 ++++++++++++++++----
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 9d3a7f581..6f5072f15 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -14,6 +14,10 @@
      [sftp.c]
      Fix improper handling of absolute paths when PWD is part of the completed
      path.  Patch from Jean-Marc Robert via tech@, ok djm.
+  - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/21 10:55:04
+     [sftp.c]
+     Fix handling of filenames containing escaped globbing characters and
+     escape "#" and "*".  Patch from Jean-Marc Robert via tech@, ok djm.
 
 20120917
  - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
index 9ab4e9f16..7b91e0013 100644
--- a/sftp.c
+++ b/sftp.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.139 2012/09/21 10:53:07 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.140 2012/09/21 10:55:04 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
  *
@@ -1699,7 +1699,7 @@ complete_match(EditLine *el, struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path,
 {
 	glob_t g;
 	char *tmp, *tmp2, ins[3];
-	u_int i, hadglob, pwdlen, len, tmplen, filelen, isabs;
+	u_int i, hadglob, pwdlen, len, tmplen, filelen, cesc, isesc, isabs;
 	const LineInfo *lf;
 	
 	/* Glob from "file" location */
@@ -1754,8 +1754,18 @@ complete_match(EditLine *el, struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path,
 	tmplen = strlen(tmp);
 	filelen = strlen(file);
 
-	if (tmplen > filelen)  {
-		tmp2 = tmp + filelen;
+	/* Count the number of escaped characters in the input string. */
+	cesc = isesc = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < filelen; i++) {
+		if (!isesc && file[i] == '\\' && i + 1 < filelen){
+			isesc = 1;
+			cesc++;
+		} else
+			isesc = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (tmplen > (filelen - cesc)) {
+		tmp2 = tmp + filelen - cesc;
 		len = strlen(tmp2); 
 		/* quote argument on way out */
 		for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
@@ -1769,6 +1779,8 @@ complete_match(EditLine *el, struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path,
 			case '\t':
 			case '[':
 			case ' ':
+			case '#':
+			case '*':
 				if (quote == '\0' || tmp2[i] == quote) {
 					if (el_insertstr(el, ins) == -1)
 						fatal("el_insertstr "
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 628a3fdce25afcff19aaa981040198ccfa49e109 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2012 10:50:15 +1000
Subject:    - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/26 16:12:13      [ssh.1]      last
 stage of rfc changes, using consistent Rs/Re blocks, and moving the     
 references into a STANDARDS section;

---
 ChangeLog |   4 +++
 ssh.1     | 101 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 2 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 6f5072f15..c22e569c6 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -18,6 +18,10 @@
      [sftp.c]
      Fix handling of filenames containing escaped globbing characters and
      escape "#" and "*".  Patch from Jean-Marc Robert via tech@, ok djm.
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/26 16:12:13
+     [ssh.1]
+     last stage of rfc changes, using consistent Rs/Re blocks, and moving the
+     references into a STANDARDS section;
 
 20120917
  - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
index b218e11d9..e9bf3eaca 100644
--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.328 2012/09/06 13:57:42 jmc Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: September 6 2012 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.329 2012/09/26 16:12:13 jmc Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: September 26 2012 $
 .Dt SSH 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -1434,77 +1434,118 @@ if an error occurred.
 .Xr ssh_config 5 ,
 .Xr ssh-keysign 8 ,
 .Xr sshd 8
+.Sh STANDARDS
 .Rs
+.%A S. Lehtinen
+.%A C. Lonvick
+.%D January 2006
 .%R RFC 4250
-.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Assigned Numbers"
-.%D 2006
+.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Assigned Numbers
 .Re
+.Pp
 .Rs
+.%A T. Ylonen
+.%A C. Lonvick
+.%D January 2006
 .%R RFC 4251
-.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture"
-.%D 2006
+.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture
 .Re
+.Pp
 .Rs
+.%A T. Ylonen
+.%A C. Lonvick
+.%D January 2006
 .%R RFC 4252
-.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol"
-.%D 2006
+.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol
 .Re
+.Pp
 .Rs
+.%A T. Ylonen
+.%A C. Lonvick
+.%D January 2006
 .%R RFC 4253
-.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol"
-.%D 2006
+.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol
 .Re
+.Pp
 .Rs
+.%A T. Ylonen
+.%A C. Lonvick
+.%D January 2006
 .%R RFC 4254
-.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol"
-.%D 2006
+.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol
 .Re
+.Pp
 .Rs
+.%A J. Schlyter
+.%A W. Griffin
+.%D January 2006
 .%R RFC 4255
-.%T "Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints"
-.%D 2006
+.%T Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints
 .Re
+.Pp
 .Rs
+.%A F. Cusack
+.%A M. Forssen
+.%D January 2006
 .%R RFC 4256
-.%T "Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the Secure Shell Protocol (SSH)"
-.%D 2006
+.%T Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the Secure Shell Protocol (SSH)
 .Re
+.Pp
 .Rs
+.%A J. Galbraith
+.%A P. Remaker
+.%D January 2006
 .%R RFC 4335
-.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Session Channel Break Extension"
-.%D 2006
+.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Session Channel Break Extension
 .Re
+.Pp
 .Rs
+.%A M. Bellare
+.%A T. Kohno
+.%A C. Namprempre
+.%D January 2006
 .%R RFC 4344
-.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption Modes"
-.%D 2006
+.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption Modes
 .Re
+.Pp
 .Rs
+.%A B. Harris
+.%D January 2006
 .%R RFC 4345
-.%T "Improved Arcfour Modes for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol"
-.%D 2006
+.%T Improved Arcfour Modes for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol
 .Re
+.Pp
 .Rs
+.%A M. Friedl
+.%A N. Provos
+.%A W. Simpson
+.%D March 2006
 .%R RFC 4419
-.%T "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol"
-.%D 2006
+.%T Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol
 .Re
+.Pp
 .Rs
+.%A J. Galbraith
+.%A R. Thayer
+.%D November 2006
 .%R RFC 4716
-.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format"
-.%D 2006
+.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format
 .Re
+.Pp
 .Rs
+.%A D. Stebila
+.%A J. Green
+.%D December 2009
 .%R RFC 5656
-.%T "Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer"
-.%D 2009
+.%T Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer
 .Re
+.Pp
 .Rs
-.%T "Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security"
 .%A A. Perrig
 .%A D. Song
 .%D 1999
-.%O "International Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99)"
+.%O International Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99)
+.%T Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security
 .Re
 .Sh AUTHORS
 OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 3a7c04105a545188b84bd3b4db682d8d64a7ea8f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2012 10:51:59 +1000
Subject:    - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/01 13:59:51      [monitor_wrap.c] 
     pasto; ok djm@

---
 ChangeLog      | 3 +++
 monitor_wrap.c | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index c22e569c6..544f8d2bf 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@
      [ssh.1]
      last stage of rfc changes, using consistent Rs/Re blocks, and moving the
      references into a STANDARDS section;
+   - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/01 13:59:51
+     [monitor_wrap.c]
+     pasto; ok djm@
 
 20120917
  - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
index 1f60658e9..c22d0a2a6 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.73 2011/06/17 21:44:31 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.74 2012/10/01 13:59:51 naddy Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -621,7 +621,7 @@ mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor)
 		ivlen = packet_get_keyiv_len(MODE_OUT);
 		packet_get_keyiv(MODE_OUT, iv, ivlen);
 		buffer_put_string(&m, iv, ivlen);
-		ivlen = packet_get_keyiv_len(MODE_OUT);
+		ivlen = packet_get_keyiv_len(MODE_IN);
 		packet_get_keyiv(MODE_IN, iv, ivlen);
 		buffer_put_string(&m, iv, ivlen);
 		goto skip;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 0dc283b13acdd4926dec1289b94badc3bbc7f321 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2012 10:52:51 +1000
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/02 07:07:45      [ssh-keygen.c]     
 fix -z option, broken in revision 1.215

---
 ChangeLog    | 3 +++
 ssh-keygen.c | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 544f8d2bf..e4899f36e 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -25,6 +25,9 @@
    - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/01 13:59:51
      [monitor_wrap.c]
      pasto; ok djm@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/02 07:07:45
+     [ssh-keygen.c]
+     fix -z option, broken in revision 1.215
 
 20120917
  - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
index 5060276d7..11d1dd02b 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.217 2012/08/17 01:25:58 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.218 2012/10/02 07:07:45 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -1975,7 +1975,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 	}
 
 	while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "AegiqpclBHLhvxXyF:b:f:t:D:I:J:j:K:P:"
-	    "m:N:n:O:C:r:g:R:T:G:M:S:s:a:V:W:z")) != -1) {
+	    "m:N:n:O:C:r:g:R:T:G:M:S:s:a:V:W:z:")) != -1) {
 		switch (opt) {
 		case 'A':
 			gen_all_hostkeys = 1;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 427e409e99d465118fbc2f7c1ca2c5d44365f5a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2012 11:02:39 +1000
Subject:    - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/04 13:21:50      [myproposal.h
 ssh_config.5 umac.h sshd_config.5 ssh.1 sshd.8 mac.c]      add umac128
 variant; ok djm@ at n2k12      (note: further Makefile work is required)

---
 ChangeLog     |  3 +++
 mac.c         | 15 ++++++++++++++-
 myproposal.h  |  3 ++-
 ssh.1         |  6 +++---
 ssh_config.5  |  6 +++---
 sshd.8        |  6 +++---
 sshd_config.5 |  6 +++---
 umac.h        |  8 +++++++-
 8 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index e4899f36e..cb28e777d 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@
    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/02 07:07:45
      [ssh-keygen.c]
      fix -z option, broken in revision 1.215
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/04 13:21:50
+     [myproposal.h ssh_config.5 umac.h sshd_config.5 ssh.1 sshd.8 mac.c]
+     add umac128 variant; ok djm@ at n2k12
 
 20120917
  - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/mac.c b/mac.c
index 9b450e4e2..47db127f5 100644
--- a/mac.c
+++ b/mac.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.18 2012/06/28 05:07:45 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.19 2012/10/04 13:21:50 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
 
 #define SSH_EVP		1	/* OpenSSL EVP-based MAC */
 #define SSH_UMAC	2	/* UMAC (not integrated with OpenSSL) */
+#define SSH_UMAC128	3
 
 struct {
 	char		*name;
@@ -68,6 +69,7 @@ struct {
 	{ "hmac-ripemd160",		SSH_EVP, EVP_ripemd160, 0, -1, -1 },
 	{ "hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com",	SSH_EVP, EVP_ripemd160, 0, -1, -1 },
 	{ "umac-64@openssh.com",	SSH_UMAC, NULL, 0, 128, 64 },
+	{ "umac-128@openssh.com",	SSH_UMAC128, NULL, 0, 128, 128 },
 	{ NULL,				0, NULL, 0, -1, -1 }
 };
 
@@ -122,6 +124,9 @@ mac_init(Mac *mac)
 	case SSH_UMAC:
 		mac->umac_ctx = umac_new(mac->key);
 		return 0;
+	case SSH_UMAC128:
+		mac->umac_ctx = umac128_new(mac->key);
+		return 0;
 	default:
 		return -1;
 	}
@@ -151,6 +156,11 @@ mac_compute(Mac *mac, u_int32_t seqno, u_char *data, int datalen)
 		umac_update(mac->umac_ctx, data, datalen);
 		umac_final(mac->umac_ctx, m, nonce);
 		break;
+	case SSH_UMAC128:
+		put_u64(nonce, seqno);
+		umac128_update(mac->umac_ctx, data, datalen);
+		umac128_final(mac->umac_ctx, m, nonce);
+		break;
 	default:
 		fatal("mac_compute: unknown MAC type");
 	}
@@ -163,6 +173,9 @@ mac_clear(Mac *mac)
 	if (mac->type == SSH_UMAC) {
 		if (mac->umac_ctx != NULL)
 			umac_delete(mac->umac_ctx);
+	} else if (mac->type == SSH_UMAC128) {
+		if (mac->umac_ctx != NULL)
+			umac128_delete(mac->umac_ctx);
 	} else if (mac->evp_md != NULL)
 		HMAC_cleanup(&mac->evp_ctx);
 	mac->evp_md = NULL;
diff --git a/myproposal.h b/myproposal.h
index b9b819c0a..996c40765 100644
--- a/myproposal.h
+++ b/myproposal.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.29 2012/06/28 05:07:45 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.30 2012/10/04 13:21:50 markus Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@
 	"hmac-md5," \
 	"hmac-sha1," \
 	"umac-64@openssh.com," \
++	"umac-128@openssh.com," \
 	SHA2_HMAC_MODES \
 	"hmac-ripemd160," \
 	"hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com," \
diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
index e9bf3eaca..a5576edb6 100644
--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.329 2012/09/26 16:12:13 jmc Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: September 26 2012 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.330 2012/10/04 13:21:50 markus Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: October 4 2012 $
 .Dt SSH 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -674,7 +674,7 @@ it provides additional mechanisms for confidentiality
 (the traffic is encrypted using AES, 3DES, Blowfish, CAST128, or Arcfour)
 and integrity (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1,
 hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512,
-umac-64, hmac-ripemd160).
+umac-64, umac-128, hmac-ripemd160).
 Protocol 1 lacks a strong mechanism for ensuring the
 integrity of the connection.
 .Pp
diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
index 36b1af195..d3e801df0 100644
--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.157 2012/06/29 13:57:25 naddy Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: June 29 2012 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.158 2012/10/04 13:21:50 markus Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: October 4 2012 $
 .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -792,7 +792,7 @@ for data integrity protection.
 Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
 The default is:
 .Bd -literal -offset indent
-hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com,
+hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
 hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-ripemd160,
 hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96
 .Ed
diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
index a1a74d86a..132397839 100644
--- a/sshd.8
+++ b/sshd.8
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.266 2012/06/18 12:07:07 dtucker Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: June 18 2012 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.267 2012/10/04 13:21:50 markus Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: October 4 2012 $
 .Dt SSHD 8
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ The client selects the encryption algorithm
 to use from those offered by the server.
 Additionally, session integrity is provided
 through a cryptographic message authentication code
-(hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, umac-64, hmac-ripemd160,
+(hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, umac-64, umac-128, hmac-ripemd160,
 hmac-sha2-256 or hmac-sha2-512).
 .Pp
 Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog.
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index 314ecfb0e..987558ae8 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.144 2012/06/29 13:57:25 naddy Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: June 29 2012 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.145 2012/10/04 13:21:50 markus Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: October 4 2012 $
 .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -656,7 +656,7 @@ for data integrity protection.
 Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
 The default is:
 .Bd -literal -offset indent
-hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com,
+hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
 hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-ripemd160,
 hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96
 .Ed
diff --git a/umac.h b/umac.h
index 055c705f8..6795112a3 100644
--- a/umac.h
+++ b/umac.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: umac.h,v 1.1 2007/06/07 19:37:34 pvalchev Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: umac.h,v 1.2 2012/10/04 13:21:50 markus Exp $ */
 /* -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  * 
  * umac.h -- C Implementation UMAC Message Authentication
@@ -116,6 +116,12 @@ int uhash(uhash_ctx_t ctx,
 
 #endif
 
+/* matching umac-128 API, we reuse umac_ctx, since it's opaque */
+struct umac_ctx *umac128_new(u_char key[]);
+int umac128_update(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char *input, long len);
+int umac128_final(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char tag[], u_char nonce[8]);
+int umac128_delete(struct umac_ctx *ctx);
+
 #ifdef __cplusplus
     }
 #endif
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 992faad1f1f71114f66ea67485606b083f7d722a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2012 11:38:24 +1000
Subject:  - [Makefile umac.c] Add special-case target to build umac128.o.

---
 ChangeLog   |  1 +
 Makefile.in | 13 ++++++++++---
 umac.c      |  2 ++
 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index cb28e777d..ef85bec3d 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
    - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/04 13:21:50
      [myproposal.h ssh_config.5 umac.h sshd_config.5 ssh.1 sshd.8 mac.c]
      add umac128 variant; ok djm@ at n2k12
+ - [Makefile umac.c] Add special-case target to build umac128.o.
 
 20120917
  - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
index 566f58fe6..a0dc5dcf7 100644
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.326 2012/04/04 01:27:57 djm Exp $
+# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.327 2012/10/05 01:38:25 dtucker Exp $
 
 # uncomment if you run a non bourne compatable shell. Ie. csh
 #SHELL = @SH@
@@ -70,8 +70,8 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=acss.o authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
 	atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
 	monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
 	kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \
-	msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o jpake.o \
-	schnorr.o ssh-pkcs11.o
+	msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
+	jpake.o schnorr.o ssh-pkcs11.o
 
 SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
 	sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \
@@ -195,6 +195,13 @@ $(CONFIGFILES): $(CONFIGFILES_IN)
 moduli:
 	echo
 
+# special case target for umac128
+umac128.o:	umac.c
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o umac128.o -c $< \
+	    -DUMAC_OUTPUT_LEN=16 -Dumac_new=umac128_new \
+	    -Dumac_update=umac128_update -Dumac_final=umac128_final \
+	    -Dumac_delete=umac128_delete
+
 clean:	regressclean
 	rm -f *.o *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log
 	rm -f *.out core survey
diff --git a/umac.c b/umac.c
index e78d2cc5f..e373de5be 100644
--- a/umac.c
+++ b/umac.c
@@ -52,7 +52,9 @@
 /* --- User Switches ---------------------------------------------------- */
 /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
 
+#ifndef UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN
 #define UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN     8  /* Alowable: 4, 8, 12, 16                  */
+#endif
 /* #define FORCE_C_ONLY        1  ANSI C and 64-bit integers req'd        */
 /* #define AES_IMPLEMENTAION   1  1 = OpenSSL, 2 = Barreto, 3 = Gladman   */
 /* #define SSE2                0  Is SSE2 is available?                   */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 189e5bad5c556e320506436a5df19cde28e1f2d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2012 11:41:52 +1000
Subject:   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/06 04:11:07     
 [regress/try-ciphers.sh]      Restore missing space.  (Id sync only).

---
 ChangeLog              | 3 +++
 regress/try-ciphers.sh | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index ef85bec3d..44c736521 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@
    - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/04 13:21:50
      [myproposal.h ssh_config.5 umac.h sshd_config.5 ssh.1 sshd.8 mac.c]
      add umac128 variant; ok djm@ at n2k12
+  - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/06 04:11:07
+     [regress/try-ciphers.sh]
+     Restore missing space.  (Id sync only).
  - [Makefile umac.c] Add special-case target to build umac128.o.
 
 20120917
diff --git a/regress/try-ciphers.sh b/regress/try-ciphers.sh
index 925863504..0887979d8 100644
--- a/regress/try-ciphers.sh
+++ b/regress/try-ciphers.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: try-ciphers.sh,v 1.13 2012/06/28 05:07:45 dtucker Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: try-ciphers.sh,v 1.14 2012/09/06 04:11:07 dtucker Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="try ciphers"
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 6fc5aa8b2e76790b136adfb68f98fe3fb7230a25 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2012 11:43:57 +1000
Subject:    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/09 11:51:25      [multiplex.sh] 
     Add test for ssh -Ostop

---
 ChangeLog            |  3 +++
 regress/multiplex.sh | 14 ++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 44c736521..5d3f058ff 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@
   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/06 04:11:07
      [regress/try-ciphers.sh]
      Restore missing space.  (Id sync only).
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/09 11:51:25
+     [regress/multiplex.sh]
+     Add test for ssh -Ostop
  - [Makefile umac.c] Add special-case target to build umac128.o.
 
 20120917
diff --git a/regress/multiplex.sh b/regress/multiplex.sh
index 93e15088f..d8c751073 100644
--- a/regress/multiplex.sh
+++ b/regress/multiplex.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: multiplex.sh,v 1.13 2012/06/01 00:47:36 djm Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: multiplex.sh,v 1.14 2012/09/09 11:51:25 dtucker Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 CTL=/tmp/openssh.regress.ctl-sock.$$
@@ -87,4 +87,14 @@ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oexit otherhost || fail "send exit command fa
 # Wait for master to exit
 sleep 2
 
-kill -0 $MASTER_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail "exit command failed" 
+kill -0 $MASTER_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail "exit command failed"
+
+# Restart master and test -O stop command with master using -N
+trace "start master, fork to background"
+${SSH} -Nn2 -MS$CTL -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST" somehost &
+MASTER_PID=$!
+sleep 5 # Wait for master to start and authenticate
+trace "test stop command"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ostop otherhost || fail "send stop command failed"
+sleep 2 # Wait for master to exit
+ps -p $MASTER_PID >/dev/null && fail "stop command failed"
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 9b2c0360cf7de7b460f1740b4eb247c27da4630f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2012 11:45:39 +1000
Subject:    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/10 00:49:21     
 [regress/multiplex.sh]      Log -O cmd output to the log file and make
 logging consistent with the      other tests.  Test clean shutdown of an
 existing channel when testing      "stop".

---
 ChangeLog            |  5 +++++
 regress/multiplex.sh | 23 +++++++++++++++--------
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 5d3f058ff..1c4dba6dc 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -37,6 +37,11 @@
    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/09 11:51:25
      [regress/multiplex.sh]
      Add test for ssh -Ostop
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/10 00:49:21
+     [regress/multiplex.sh]
+     Log -O cmd output to the log file and make logging consistent with the
+     other tests.  Test clean shutdown of an existing channel when testing
+     "stop".
  - [Makefile umac.c] Add special-case target to build umac128.o.
 
 20120917
diff --git a/regress/multiplex.sh b/regress/multiplex.sh
index d8c751073..9169656dd 100644
--- a/regress/multiplex.sh
+++ b/regress/multiplex.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: multiplex.sh,v 1.14 2012/09/09 11:51:25 dtucker Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: multiplex.sh,v 1.15 2012/09/10 00:49:21 dtucker Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 CTL=/tmp/openssh.regress.ctl-sock.$$
@@ -78,11 +78,13 @@ for s in 0 1 4 5 44; do
 	fi
 done
 
-trace "test check command"
-${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocheck otherhost || fail "check command failed" 
+verbose "test $tid: cmd check"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocheck otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1 \
+    || fail "check command failed" 
 
-trace "test exit command"
-${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oexit otherhost || fail "send exit command failed" 
+verbose "test $tid: cmd exit"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oexit otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1 \
+    || fail "send exit command failed" 
 
 # Wait for master to exit
 sleep 2
@@ -94,7 +96,12 @@ trace "start master, fork to background"
 ${SSH} -Nn2 -MS$CTL -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST" somehost &
 MASTER_PID=$!
 sleep 5 # Wait for master to start and authenticate
-trace "test stop command"
-${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ostop otherhost || fail "send stop command failed"
-sleep 2 # Wait for master to exit
+verbose "test $tid: cmd stop"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost "sleep 10; exit 0" &
+SLEEP_PID=$!
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ostop otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1 \
+    || fail "send stop command failed"
+sleep 12 # Wait for master to exit
+wait $SLEEP_PID
+[ $! != 0 ] || fail "stop with concurrent command"
 ps -p $MASTER_PID >/dev/null && fail "stop command failed"
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From ee4ad778d778c8a19c763738a0851afb9c6ccf16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2012 12:04:10 +1000
Subject:    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/10 01:51:19     
 [regress/multiplex.sh]      use -Ocheck and waiting for completions by PID to
 make multiplexing test      less racy and (hopefully) more reliable on slow
 hardware.

---
 ChangeLog            |  4 ++++
 regress/multiplex.sh | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 1c4dba6dc..3ed3a2839 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -42,6 +42,10 @@
      Log -O cmd output to the log file and make logging consistent with the
      other tests.  Test clean shutdown of an existing channel when testing
      "stop".
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/10 01:51:19
+     [regress/multiplex.sh]
+     use -Ocheck and waiting for completions by PID to make multiplexing test
+     less racy and (hopefully) more reliable on slow hardware.
  - [Makefile umac.c] Add special-case target to build umac128.o.
 
 20120917
diff --git a/regress/multiplex.sh b/regress/multiplex.sh
index 9169656dd..f93ac9a41 100644
--- a/regress/multiplex.sh
+++ b/regress/multiplex.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: multiplex.sh,v 1.15 2012/09/10 00:49:21 dtucker Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: multiplex.sh,v 1.16 2012/09/10 01:51:19 dtucker Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 CTL=/tmp/openssh.regress.ctl-sock.$$
@@ -13,14 +13,22 @@ fi
 DATA=/bin/ls${EXEEXT}
 COPY=$OBJ/ls.copy
 
+wait_for_mux_master_ready()
+{
+	for i in 1 2 3 4 5; do
+		${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocheck otherhost \
+		    >/dev/null 2>&1 && return 0
+		sleep $i
+	done
+	fatal "mux master never becomes ready"
+}
+
 start_sshd
 
 trace "start master, fork to background"
 ${SSH} -Nn2 -MS$CTL -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST" somehost &
 MASTER_PID=$!
-
-# Wait for master to start and authenticate
-sleep 5
+wait_for_mux_master_ready
 
 verbose "test $tid: envpass"
 trace "env passing over multiplexed connection"
@@ -87,21 +95,26 @@ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oexit otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1 \
     || fail "send exit command failed" 
 
 # Wait for master to exit
-sleep 2
-
-kill -0 $MASTER_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail "exit command failed"
+wait $MASTER_PID
+kill -0 $MASTER_PID >/dev/null && fail "exit command failed"
 
 # Restart master and test -O stop command with master using -N
-trace "start master, fork to background"
+verbose "test $tid: cmd stop"
+trace "restart master, fork to background"
 ${SSH} -Nn2 -MS$CTL -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST" somehost &
 MASTER_PID=$!
-sleep 5 # Wait for master to start and authenticate
-verbose "test $tid: cmd stop"
-${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost "sleep 10; exit 0" &
+wait_for_mux_master_ready
+
+# start a long-running command then immediately request a stop
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost "sleep 10; exit 0" \
+     >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1 &
 SLEEP_PID=$!
 ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ostop otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1 \
     || fail "send stop command failed"
-sleep 12 # Wait for master to exit
+
+# wait until both long-running command and master have exited.
 wait $SLEEP_PID
-[ $! != 0 ] || fail "stop with concurrent command"
-ps -p $MASTER_PID >/dev/null && fail "stop command failed"
+[ $! != 0 ] || fail "waiting for concurrent command"
+wait $MASTER_PID
+[ $! != 0 ] || fail "waiting for master stop"
+kill -0 $MASTER_PID >/dev/null && fail "stop command failed"
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 50ce447ef9224030c2a770c318d747f7b08d966c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2012 12:11:33 +1000
Subject:  - [umac.c] Enforce allowed umac output sizes.  From djm@.

---
 ChangeLog | 1 +
 umac.c    | 6 ++++++
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 3ed3a2839..eda55cf57 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
      use -Ocheck and waiting for completions by PID to make multiplexing test
      less racy and (hopefully) more reliable on slow hardware.
  - [Makefile umac.c] Add special-case target to build umac128.o.
+ - [umac.c] Enforce allowed umac output sizes.  From djm@.
 
 20120917
  - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/umac.c b/umac.c
index e373de5be..0567c37f9 100644
--- a/umac.c
+++ b/umac.c
@@ -55,6 +55,12 @@
 #ifndef UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN
 #define UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN     8  /* Alowable: 4, 8, 12, 16                  */
 #endif
+
+#if UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 4 && UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 8 && \
+    UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 12 && UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 16
+# error UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN must be defined to 4, 8, 12 or 16
+#endif
+
 /* #define FORCE_C_ONLY        1  ANSI C and 64-bit integers req'd        */
 /* #define AES_IMPLEMENTAION   1  1 = OpenSSL, 2 = Barreto, 3 = Gladman   */
 /* #define SSE2                0  Is SSE2 is available?                   */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From cc8e9ffdd18e1ff2b14cc49cc983648f62c9d79a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2012 15:41:06 +1000
Subject:  - [Makefile.in] "Using $< in a non-suffix rule context is a GNUmake
 idiom"

---
 ChangeLog   | 1 +
 Makefile.in | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index eda55cf57..796656601 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
      less racy and (hopefully) more reliable on slow hardware.
  - [Makefile umac.c] Add special-case target to build umac128.o.
  - [umac.c] Enforce allowed umac output sizes.  From djm@.
+ - [Makefile.in] "Using $< in a non-suffix rule context is a GNUmake idiom".
 
 20120917
  - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
index a0dc5dcf7..e4f9ee194 100644
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.327 2012/10/05 01:38:25 dtucker Exp $
+# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.328 2012/10/05 05:41:07 dtucker Exp $
 
 # uncomment if you run a non bourne compatable shell. Ie. csh
 #SHELL = @SH@
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ moduli:
 
 # special case target for umac128
 umac128.o:	umac.c
-	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o umac128.o -c $< \
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o umac128.o -c $(srcdir)/umac.c \
 	    -DUMAC_OUTPUT_LEN=16 -Dumac_new=umac128_new \
 	    -Dumac_update=umac128_update -Dumac_final=umac128_final \
 	    -Dumac_delete=umac128_delete
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From c0e5cbe2226f602715e27e80d68b2c416589cb76 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2012 21:38:58 -0700
Subject:  - (tim) [buildpkg.sh.in] Double up on some backslashes so they end
 up in    the generated file as intended.

---
 ChangeLog      |  4 ++++
 buildpkg.sh.in | 20 ++++++++++----------
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 796656601..5df4094c1 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+20121019
+ - (tim) [buildpkg.sh.in] Double up on some backslashes so they end up in
+   the generated file as intended.
+
 20121005
  - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/17 09:54:44
diff --git a/buildpkg.sh.in b/buildpkg.sh.in
index 4de9d42e4..4b842b3f7 100644
--- a/buildpkg.sh.in
+++ b/buildpkg.sh.in
@@ -337,17 +337,17 @@ then
 else
 	if [ "\${USE_SYM_LINKS}" = yes ]
 	then
-		[ "$RCS_D" = yes ]  &&  \
+		[ "$RCS_D" = yes ]  &&  \\
 	installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rcS.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=../init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} s
 		installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc0.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=../init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} s
-		[ "$RC1_D" = no ]  ||  \
+		[ "$RC1_D" = no ]  ||  \\
 		installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc1.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=../init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} s
 		installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc2.d/${SYSVINITSTART}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=../init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} s
 	else
-		[ "$RCS_D" = yes ]  &&  \
+		[ "$RCS_D" = yes ]  &&  \\
 	installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rcS.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} l
 		installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc0.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} l
-		[ "$RC1_D" = no ]  ||  \
+		[ "$RC1_D" = no ]  ||  \\
 		installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc1.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} l
 		installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc2.d/${SYSVINITSTART}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} l
 	fi
@@ -538,10 +538,10 @@ then
 PRE_INS_STOP=no
 POST_INS_START=no
 # determine if should restart the daemon
-if [ -s ${piddir}/sshd.pid  ] && \
+if [ -s ${piddir}/sshd.pid  ] && \\
     /usr/bin/svcs -H $OPENSSH_FMRI 2>&1 | egrep "^online" > /dev/null 2>&1
 then
-	ans=\`ckyorn -d n \
+	ans=\`ckyorn -d n \\
 -p "Should the running sshd daemon be restarted? ${DEF_MSG}"\` || exit \$?
 	case \$ans in
 		[y,Y]*)	PRE_INS_STOP=yes
@@ -552,7 +552,7 @@ then
 else
 
 # determine if we should start sshd
-	ans=\`ckyorn -d n \
+	ans=\`ckyorn -d n \\
 -p "Start the sshd daemon after installing this package? ${DEF_MSG}"\` || exit \$?
 	case \$ans in
 		[y,Y]*)	POST_INS_START=yes ;;
@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ USE_SYM_LINKS=no
 PRE_INS_STOP=no
 POST_INS_START=no
 # Use symbolic links?
-ans=\`ckyorn -d n \
+ans=\`ckyorn -d n \\
 -p "Do you want symbolic links for the start/stop scripts? ${DEF_MSG}"\` || exit \$?
 case \$ans in
 	[y,Y]*)	USE_SYM_LINKS=yes ;;
@@ -582,7 +582,7 @@ esac
 # determine if should restart the daemon
 if [ -s ${piddir}/sshd.pid  -a  -f ${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} ]
 then
-	ans=\`ckyorn -d n \
+	ans=\`ckyorn -d n \\
 -p "Should the running sshd daemon be restarted? ${DEF_MSG}"\` || exit \$?
 	case \$ans in
 		[y,Y]*)	PRE_INS_STOP=yes
@@ -593,7 +593,7 @@ then
 else
 
 # determine if we should start sshd
-	ans=\`ckyorn -d n \
+	ans=\`ckyorn -d n \\
 -p "Start the sshd daemon after installing this package? ${DEF_MSG}"\` || exit \$?
 	case \$ans in
 		[y,Y]*)	POST_INS_START=yes ;;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 07daed505f1cd6a0beff4d060b588debcc1ca8c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2012 08:57:55 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync    - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/05
 12:34:39      [sftp.c]      fix signed vs unsigned warning; feedback & ok:
 djm@

---
 ChangeLog | 6 ++++++
 sftp.c    | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 5df4094c1..3cd16e480 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
+20121030
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/05 12:34:39
+     [sftp.c]
+     fix signed vs unsigned warning; feedback & ok: djm@
+
 20121019
  - (tim) [buildpkg.sh.in] Double up on some backslashes so they end up in
    the generated file as intended.
diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
index 7b91e0013..6516d1f1c 100644
--- a/sftp.c
+++ b/sftp.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.140 2012/09/21 10:55:04 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.141 2012/10/05 12:34:39 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
  *
@@ -991,7 +991,7 @@ makeargv(const char *arg, int *argcp, int sloppy, char *lastquote,
 	state = MA_START;
 	i = j = 0;
 	for (;;) {
-		if (argc >= sizeof(argv) / sizeof(*argv)){
+		if ((size_t)argc >= sizeof(argv) / sizeof(*argv)){
 			error("Too many arguments.");
 			return NULL;
 		}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 09d3e1251250dcf45e5434cd474430e4ec5e8639 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2012 08:58:58 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/30 21:29:55      [auth-rsa.c auth.c
 auth.h auth2-pubkey.c servconf.c servconf.h]      [sshd.c sshd_config
 sshd_config.5]      new sshd_config option AuthorizedKeysCommand to support
 fetching      authorized_keys from a command in addition to (or instead of)
 from      the filesystem. The command is run as the target server user unless
      another specified via a new AuthorizedKeysCommandUser option.

     patch originally by jchadima AT redhat.com, reworked by me; feedback
     and ok markus@
---
 ChangeLog      |  10 +++
 auth-rsa.c     |   4 +-
 auth.c         |  53 ++++++++++-----
 auth.h         |   6 +-
 auth2-pubkey.c | 206 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 servconf.c     |  30 ++++++++-
 servconf.h     |   4 +-
 sshd.c         |  11 ++-
 sshd_config    |   5 +-
 sshd_config.5  |  22 +++++-
 10 files changed, 308 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 3cd16e480..27ec898b8 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -3,6 +3,16 @@
    - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/05 12:34:39
      [sftp.c]
      fix signed vs unsigned warning; feedback & ok: djm@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/30 21:29:55
+     [auth-rsa.c auth.c auth.h auth2-pubkey.c servconf.c servconf.h]
+     [sshd.c sshd_config sshd_config.5]
+     new sshd_config option AuthorizedKeysCommand to support fetching
+     authorized_keys from a command in addition to (or instead of) from
+     the filesystem. The command is run as the target server user unless
+     another specified via a new AuthorizedKeysCommandUser option.
+     
+     patch originally by jchadima AT redhat.com, reworked by me; feedback
+     and ok markus@
 
 20121019
  - (tim) [buildpkg.sh.in] Double up on some backslashes so they end up in
diff --git a/auth-rsa.c b/auth-rsa.c
index 4ab46cd51..2c8a7cb35 100644
--- a/auth-rsa.c
+++ b/auth-rsa.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.80 2011/05/23 03:30:07 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.81 2012/10/30 21:29:54 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -276,6 +276,8 @@ auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
 	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
 
 	for (i = 0; !allowed && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) {
+		if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0)
+			continue;
 		file = expand_authorized_keys(
 		    options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw);
 		allowed = rsa_key_allowed_in_file(pw, file, client_n, rkey);
diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index a8cffd5c1..b5e1eefa0 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.96 2012/05/13 01:42:32 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.97 2012/10/30 21:29:54 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -409,41 +409,42 @@ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
 	return host_status;
 }
 
-
 /*
- * Check a given file for security. This is defined as all components
+ * Check a given path for security. This is defined as all components
  * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of
  * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
  *
  * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
  *
- * Takes an open file descriptor, the file name, a uid and and
+ * Takes an the file name, its stat information (preferably from fstat() to
+ * avoid races), the uid of the expected owner, their home directory and an
  * error buffer plus max size as arguments.
  *
  * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
  */
-static int
-secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
-    char *err, size_t errlen)
+int
+auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
+    uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen)
 {
-	uid_t uid = pw->pw_uid;
 	char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN];
 	char *cp;
 	int comparehome = 0;
 	struct stat st;
 
-	if (realpath(file, buf) == NULL) {
-		snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", file,
+	if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
+		snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
 		    strerror(errno));
 		return -1;
 	}
-	if (realpath(pw->pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
+	if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
 		comparehome = 1;
 
-	/* check the open file to avoid races */
-	if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0 ||
-	    (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
-	    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
+	if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) {
+		snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if ((stp->st_uid != 0 && stp->st_uid != uid) ||
+	    (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) {
 		snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
 		    buf);
 		return -1;
@@ -479,6 +480,28 @@ secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Version of secure_path() that accepts an open file descriptor to
+ * avoid races.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
+ */
+static int
+secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
+    char *err, size_t errlen)
+{
+	char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+	struct stat st;
+
+	/* check the open file to avoid races */
+	if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0) {
+		snprintf(err, errlen, "cannot stat file %s: %s",
+		    buf, strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	return auth_secure_path(file, &st, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_uid, err, errlen);
+}
+
 static FILE *
 auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes,
     int log_missing, char *file_type)
diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
index 0d786c4d5..063404167 100644
--- a/auth.h
+++ b/auth.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.69 2011/05/23 03:30:07 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.70 2012/10/30 21:29:54 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -120,6 +120,10 @@ int	 auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
 int	 hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, char *, Key *);
 int	 user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *);
 
+struct stat;
+int	 auth_secure_path(const char *, struct stat *, const char *, uid_t,
+    char *, size_t);
+
 #ifdef KRB5
 int	auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client, krb5_data *);
 int	auth_krb5_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *tgt);
diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
index 5bccb5d76..ec8f75d57 100644
--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.30 2011/09/25 05:44:47 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.31 2012/10/30 21:29:54 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -27,9 +27,13 @@
 
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
 
+#include <errno.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
+#include <paths.h>
 #include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <string.h>
@@ -240,7 +244,7 @@ match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct KeyCert *cert)
 			if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) == 0) {
 				debug3("matched principal \"%.100s\" "
 				    "from file \"%s\" on line %lu",
-			    	    cert->principals[i], file, linenum);
+				    cert->principals[i], file, linenum);
 				if (auth_parse_options(pw, line_opts,
 				    file, linenum) != 1)
 					continue;
@@ -253,31 +257,22 @@ match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct KeyCert *cert)
 	fclose(f);
 	restore_uid();
 	return 0;
-}	
+}
 
-/* return 1 if user allows given key */
+/*
+ * Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file,
+ * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
+ */
 static int
-user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
+check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
 {
 	char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
 	const char *reason;
 	int found_key = 0;
-	FILE *f;
 	u_long linenum = 0;
 	Key *found;
 	char *fp;
 
-	/* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
-	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-
-	debug("trying public key file %s", file);
-	f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes);
-
-	if (!f) {
-		restore_uid();
-		return 0;
-	}
-
 	found_key = 0;
 	found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type);
 
@@ -370,8 +365,6 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
 			break;
 		}
 	}
-	restore_uid();
-	fclose(f);
 	key_free(found);
 	if (!found_key)
 		debug2("key not found");
@@ -433,7 +426,172 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-/* check whether given key is in .ssh/authorized_keys* */
+/*
+ * Checks whether key is allowed in file.
+ * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
+{
+	FILE *f;
+	int found_key = 0;
+
+	/* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
+	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+	debug("trying public key file %s", file);
+	if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) != NULL) {
+		found_key = check_authkeys_file(f, file, key, pw);
+		fclose(f);
+	}
+
+	restore_uid();
+	return found_key;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks whether key is allowed in output of command.
+ * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
+{
+	FILE *f;
+	int ok, found_key = 0;
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	struct stat st;
+	int status, devnull, p[2], i;
+	pid_t pid;
+	char errmsg[512];
+
+	if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL ||
+	    options.authorized_keys_command[0] != '/')
+		return 0;
+
+	/* If no user specified to run commands the default to target user */
+	if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL)
+		pw = user_pw;
+	else {
+		pw = getpwnam(options.authorized_keys_command_user);
+		if (pw == NULL) {
+			error("AuthorizedKeyCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
+			    options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+	if (stat(options.authorized_keys_command, &st) < 0) {
+		error("Could not stat AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\": %s",
+		    options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (auth_secure_path(options.authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0,
+	    errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
+		error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (pipe(p) != 0) {
+		error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	debug3("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\"",
+	    options.authorized_keys_command, pw->pw_name);
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
+	 * run cleanup_exit() code.
+	 */
+	restore_uid();
+
+	switch ((pid = fork())) {
+	case -1: /* error */
+		error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		close(p[0]);
+		close(p[1]);
+		return 0;
+	case 0: /* child */
+		for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
+			signal(i, SIG_DFL);
+
+		/* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
+		if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
+			error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
+			    strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+		if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
+			error("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
+			    strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+
+		close(p[0]);
+		if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+			error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
+			    strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+		if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
+		    dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1 ||
+		    dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
+			error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+		closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+
+		execl(options.authorized_keys_command,
+		    options.authorized_keys_command, pw->pw_name, NULL);
+
+		error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
+		    options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
+		_exit(127);
+	default: /* parent */
+		break;
+	}
+
+	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+	close(p[1]);
+	if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		close(p[0]);
+		/* Don't leave zombie child */
+		kill(pid, SIGTERM);
+		while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
+			;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	ok = check_authkeys_file(f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, pw);
+	fclose(f);
+
+	while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
+		if (errno != EINTR) {
+			error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
+		error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
+		    options.authorized_keys_command, WTERMSIG(status));
+		goto out;
+	} else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
+		error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
+		    options.authorized_keys_command, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	found_key = ok;
+ out:
+	restore_uid();
+	return found_key;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user.
+ */
 int
 user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
 {
@@ -449,9 +607,17 @@ user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
 	if (success)
 		return success;
 
+	success = user_key_command_allowed2(pw, key);
+	if (success > 0)
+		return success;
+
 	for (i = 0; !success && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) {
+
+		if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0)
+			continue;
 		file = expand_authorized_keys(
 		    options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw);
+
 		success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file);
 		xfree(file);
 	}
diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
index f4b7dd58b..8e69ea5ce 100644
--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.230 2012/09/13 23:37:36 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.231 2012/10/30 21:29:54 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
  *                    All rights reserved
@@ -135,6 +135,8 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 	options->num_permitted_opens = -1;
 	options->adm_forced_command = NULL;
 	options->chroot_directory = NULL;
+	options->authorized_keys_command = NULL;
+	options->authorized_keys_command_user = NULL;
 	options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = -1;
 	options->revoked_keys_file = NULL;
 	options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL;
@@ -329,6 +331,7 @@ typedef enum {
 	sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, sHostCertificate,
 	sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
 	sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
+	sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser,
 	sDeprecated, sUnsupported
 } ServerOpCodes;
 
@@ -453,6 +456,8 @@ static struct {
 	{ "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
 };
@@ -1498,6 +1503,25 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 		}
 		return 0;
 
+	case sAuthorizedKeysCommand:
+		len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
+		if (*activep && options->authorized_keys_command == NULL) {
+			if (cp[len] != '/' && strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") != 0)
+				fatal("%.200s line %d: AuthorizedKeysCommand "
+				    "must be an absolute path",
+				    filename, linenum);
+			options->authorized_keys_command = xstrdup(cp + len);
+		}
+		return 0;
+
+	case sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser:
+		charptr = &options->authorized_keys_command_user;
+
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
+			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+		break;
+
 	case sDeprecated:
 		logit("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s",
 		    filename, linenum, arg);
@@ -1648,6 +1672,8 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
 	M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only);
 	M_CP_INTOPT(kbd_interactive_authentication);
 	M_CP_INTOPT(zero_knowledge_password_authentication);
+	M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command);
+	M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command_user);
 	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_root_login);
 	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_empty_passwd);
 
@@ -1908,6 +1934,8 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
 	dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
 	    o->authorized_principals_file);
 	dump_cfg_string(sVersionAddendum, o->version_addendum);
+	dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommand, o->authorized_keys_command);
+	dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, o->authorized_keys_command_user);
 
 	/* string arguments requiring a lookup */
 	dump_cfg_string(sLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level));
diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
index 096d596d7..0064c9bc5 100644
--- a/servconf.h
+++ b/servconf.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.103 2012/07/10 02:19:15 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.104 2012/10/30 21:29:55 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -166,6 +166,8 @@ typedef struct {
 	char   *revoked_keys_file;
 	char   *trusted_user_ca_keys;
 	char   *authorized_principals_file;
+	char   *authorized_keys_command;
+	char   *authorized_keys_command_user;
 
 	char   *version_addendum;	/* Appended to SSH banner */
 }       ServerOptions;
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 9aff5e8af..eff0290b0 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.393 2012/07/10 02:19:15 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.394 2012/10/30 21:29:55 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -359,6 +359,15 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
 	if (use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 0)
 		kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGALRM);
 
+	/*
+	 * Try to kill any processes that we have spawned, E.g. authorized
+	 * keys command helpers.
+	 */
+	if (getpgid(0) == getpid()) {
+		signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN);
+		killpg(0, SIGTERM);
+	}
+
 	/* Log error and exit. */
 	sigdie("Timeout before authentication for %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
 }
diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
index 9424ee2c6..3d35bef02 100644
--- a/sshd_config
+++ b/sshd_config
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.87 2012/07/10 02:19:15 djm Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.88 2012/10/30 21:29:55 djm Exp $
 
 # This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file.  See
 # sshd_config(5) for more information.
@@ -51,6 +51,9 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
 
 #AuthorizedPrincipalsFile none
 
+#AuthorizedKeysCommand none
+#AuthorizedKeysCommandUser nobody
+
 # For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
 #RhostsRSAAuthentication no
 # similar for protocol version 2
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index 987558ae8..de8f0f825 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.145 2012/10/04 13:21:50 markus Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: October 4 2012 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.146 2012/10/30 21:29:55 djm Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: October 30 2012 $
 .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -151,6 +151,22 @@ See
 in
 .Xr ssh_config 5
 for more information on patterns.
+.It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
+Specifies a program to be used for lookup of the user's public keys.
+The program will be invoked with a single argument of the username
+being authenticated, and should produce on standard output zero or
+more lines of authorized_keys output (see AUTHORIZED_KEYS in
+.Xr sshd 8 )
+If a key supplied by AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully authenticate
+and authorize the user then public key authentication continues using the usual
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
+files.
+By default, no AuthorizedKeysCommand is run.
+.It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser
+Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedKeysCommand is run.
+The default is the user being authenticated.
+It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no other role on the host
+than running authorized keys commands.
 .It Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
 Specifies the file that contains the public keys that can be used
 for user authentication.
@@ -712,6 +728,8 @@ Available keywords are
 .Cm AllowTcpForwarding ,
 .Cm AllowUsers ,
 .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile ,
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand ,
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ,
 .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile ,
 .Cm Banner ,
 .Cm ChrootDirectory ,
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From f33580eed055472b9e5ca05f4826b05e9eacc651 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Sun, 4 Nov 2012 22:22:52 +1100
Subject:  - OpenBSD CVS Sync    - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/31 08:04:50     
 [sshd_config.5]      tweak previous;

---
 ChangeLog     |  6 ++++++
 sshd_config.5 | 14 ++++++++------
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 27ec898b8..f1d0580fc 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
+20121104
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/31 08:04:50
+     [sshd_config.5]
+     tweak previous;
+
 20121030
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
    - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/05 12:34:39
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index de8f0f825..3cc901a82 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.146 2012/10/30 21:29:55 djm Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: October 30 2012 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.147 2012/10/31 08:04:50 jmc Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: October 31 2012 $
 .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -152,11 +152,13 @@ in
 .Xr ssh_config 5
 for more information on patterns.
 .It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
-Specifies a program to be used for lookup of the user's public keys.
+Specifies a program to be used to look up the user's public keys.
 The program will be invoked with a single argument of the username
 being authenticated, and should produce on standard output zero or
-more lines of authorized_keys output (see AUTHORIZED_KEYS in
-.Xr sshd 8 )
+more lines of authorized_keys output (see
+.Sx AUTHORIZED_KEYS
+in
+.Xr sshd 8 ) .
 If a key supplied by AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully authenticate
 and authorize the user then public key authentication continues using the usual
 .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
@@ -727,9 +729,9 @@ Available keywords are
 .Cm AllowGroups ,
 .Cm AllowTcpForwarding ,
 .Cm AllowUsers ,
-.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile ,
 .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand ,
 .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ,
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile ,
 .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile ,
 .Cm Banner ,
 .Cm ChrootDirectory ,
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From d0d1099b3b8a766480ce6df215631bf0af6e6bcd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Sun, 4 Nov 2012 22:23:14 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/11/04 10:38:43      [auth2-pubkey.c
 sshd.c sshd_config.5]      Remove default of AuthorizedCommandUser.
 Administrators are now expected      to explicitly specify a user. feedback
 and ok markus@

---
 ChangeLog      |  4 ++++
 auth2-pubkey.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++-------------
 sshd.c         |  9 ++++++++-
 sshd_config.5  |  5 ++---
 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index f1d0580fc..120c132af 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -3,6 +3,10 @@
    - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/31 08:04:50
      [sshd_config.5]
      tweak previous;
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/11/04 10:38:43
+     [auth2-pubkey.c sshd.c sshd_config.5]
+     Remove default of AuthorizedCommandUser. Administrators are now expected
+     to explicitly specify a user. feedback and ok markus@
 
 20121030
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
index ec8f75d57..6a6217017 100644
--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.31 2012/10/30 21:29:54 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.32 2012/11/04 10:38:43 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -462,23 +462,27 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
 	struct stat st;
 	int status, devnull, p[2], i;
 	pid_t pid;
-	char errmsg[512];
+	char *username, errmsg[512];
 
 	if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL ||
 	    options.authorized_keys_command[0] != '/')
 		return 0;
 
-	/* If no user specified to run commands the default to target user */
-	if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL)
-		pw = user_pw;
-	else {
-		pw = getpwnam(options.authorized_keys_command_user);
-		if (pw == NULL) {
-			error("AuthorizedKeyCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
-			    options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
-			return 0;
-		}
+	if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) {
+		error("No user for AuthorizedKeysCommand specified, skipping");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	username = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command_user,
+	    "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
+	pw = getpwnam(username);
+	if (pw == NULL) {
+		error("AuthorizedKeyCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
+		    options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
+		free(username);
+		return 0;
 	}
+	free(username);
 
 	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
 
@@ -517,6 +521,7 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
 		for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
 			signal(i, SIG_DFL);
 
+		closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
 		/* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
 		if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
 			error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
@@ -541,7 +546,6 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
 			error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
 			_exit(1);
 		}
-		closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
 
 		execl(options.authorized_keys_command,
 		    options.authorized_keys_command, pw->pw_name, NULL);
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index eff0290b0..4ad1a4bd1 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.394 2012/10/30 21:29:55 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.395 2012/11/04 10:38:43 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -1559,6 +1559,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
 		options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
 
+	/* Check that options are sensible */
+	if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL &&
+	    (options.authorized_keys_command != NULL &&
+	    strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_command, "none") != 0))
+		fatal("AuthorizedKeysCommand set without "
+		    "AuthorizedKeysCommandUser");
+
 	/* set default channel AF */
 	channel_set_af(options.address_family);
 
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index 3cc901a82..0fb0b837d 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.147 2012/10/31 08:04:50 jmc Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: October 31 2012 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.148 2012/11/04 10:38:43 djm Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: November 4 2012 $
 .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -166,7 +166,6 @@ files.
 By default, no AuthorizedKeysCommand is run.
 .It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser
 Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedKeysCommand is run.
-The default is the user being authenticated.
 It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no other role on the host
 than running authorized keys commands.
 .It Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From a6e3f01d1e230b8acfdd6b4cf3096459d2a325e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Sun, 4 Nov 2012 23:21:40 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/11/04 11:09:15      [auth.h auth1.c
 auth2.c monitor.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd.c]      [sshd_config.5]     
 Support multiple required authentication via an AuthenticationMethods     
 option. This option lists one or more comma-separated lists of     
 authentication method names. Successful completion of all the methods in     
 any list is required for authentication to complete;      feedback and ok
 markus@

---
 ChangeLog     |   8 +++
 auth.h        |   7 +-
 auth1.c       |   7 +-
 auth2.c       | 218 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 monitor.c     |  35 ++++++++--
 servconf.c    |  26 ++++++-
 servconf.h    |   7 +-
 sshd.c        |  23 ++++++-
 sshd_config.5 |  25 ++++++-
 9 files changed, 328 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 120c132af..85c92eb7f 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -7,6 +7,14 @@
      [auth2-pubkey.c sshd.c sshd_config.5]
      Remove default of AuthorizedCommandUser. Administrators are now expected
      to explicitly specify a user. feedback and ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/11/04 11:09:15
+     [auth.h auth1.c auth2.c monitor.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd.c]
+     [sshd_config.5]
+     Support multiple required authentication via an AuthenticationMethods
+     option. This option lists one or more comma-separated lists of
+     authentication method names. Successful completion of all the methods in
+     any list is required for authentication to complete;
+     feedback and ok markus@
 
 20121030
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
index 063404167..8920c7dae 100644
--- a/auth.h
+++ b/auth.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.70 2012/10/30 21:29:54 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.71 2012/11/04 11:09:15 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ struct Authctxt {
 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
 	auth_session_t	*as;
 #endif
+	char		**auth_methods;	/* modified from server config */
+	u_int		 num_auth_methods;
 #ifdef KRB5
 	krb5_context	 krb5_ctx;
 	krb5_ccache	 krb5_fwd_ccache;
@@ -152,6 +154,9 @@ void	userauth_send_banner(const char *);
 int	auth_root_allowed(char *);
 
 char	*auth2_read_banner(void);
+int	 auth2_methods_valid(const char *, int);
+int	 auth2_update_methods_lists(Authctxt *, const char *);
+int	 auth2_setup_methods_lists(Authctxt *);
 
 void	privsep_challenge_enable(void);
 
diff --git a/auth1.c b/auth1.c
index cc85aec74..fb37fadfe 100644
--- a/auth1.c
+++ b/auth1.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.75 2010/08/31 09:58:37 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.76 2012/11/04 11:09:15 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
  *                    All rights reserved
@@ -406,6 +406,11 @@ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		authctxt->pw = fakepw();
 	}
 
+	/* Configuration may have changed as a result of Match */
+	if (options.num_auth_methods != 0)
+		fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported with SSH "
+		    "protocol 1");
+
 	setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
 	    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
 
diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
index b66bef64c..8114ec863 100644
--- a/auth2.c
+++ b/auth2.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.124 2011/12/07 05:44:38 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.125 2012/11/04 11:09:15 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -96,8 +96,10 @@ static void input_service_request(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 static void input_userauth_request(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 
 /* helper */
-static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(const char *);
-static char *authmethods_get(void);
+static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(Authctxt *, const char *);
+static char *authmethods_get(Authctxt *authctxt);
+static int method_allowed(Authctxt *, const char *);
+static int list_starts_with(const char *, const char *);
 
 char *
 auth2_read_banner(void)
@@ -255,6 +257,8 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		if (use_privsep)
 			mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
 		userauth_banner();
+		if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
+			packet_disconnect("no authentication methods enabled");
 	} else if (strcmp(user, authctxt->user) != 0 ||
 	    strcmp(service, authctxt->service) != 0) {
 		packet_disconnect("Change of username or service not allowed: "
@@ -277,7 +281,7 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	authctxt->server_caused_failure = 0;
 
 	/* try to authenticate user */
-	m = authmethod_lookup(method);
+	m = authmethod_lookup(authctxt, method);
 	if (m != NULL && authctxt->failures < options.max_authtries) {
 		debug2("input_userauth_request: try method %s", method);
 		authenticated =	m->userauth(authctxt);
@@ -293,6 +297,7 @@ void
 userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
 {
 	char *methods;
+	int partial = 0;
 
 	if (!authctxt->valid && authenticated)
 		fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated invalid user %s",
@@ -335,7 +340,13 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
 	if (authctxt->postponed)
 		return;
 
-	/* XXX todo: check if multiple auth methods are needed */
+	if (authenticated && options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
+		if (!auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt, method)) {
+			authenticated = 0;
+			partial = 1;
+		}
+	}
+
 	if (authenticated == 1) {
 		/* turn off userauth */
 		dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, &dispatch_protocol_ignore);
@@ -356,34 +367,61 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
 #endif
 			packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user);
 		}
-		methods = authmethods_get();
+		methods = authmethods_get(authctxt);
+		debug3("%s: failure partial=%d next methods=\"%s\"", __func__,
+		    partial, methods);
 		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE);
 		packet_put_cstring(methods);
-		packet_put_char(0);	/* XXX partial success, unused */
+		packet_put_char(partial);
 		packet_send();
 		packet_write_wait();
 		xfree(methods);
 	}
 }
 
+/*
+ * Checks whether method is allowed by at least one AuthenticationMethods
+ * methods list. Returns 1 if allowed, or no methods lists configured.
+ * 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+method_allowed(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	/*
+	 * NB. authctxt->num_auth_methods might be zero as a result of
+	 * auth2_setup_methods_lists(), so check the configuration.
+	 */
+	if (options.num_auth_methods == 0)
+		return 1;
+	for (i = 0; i < authctxt->num_auth_methods; i++) {
+		if (list_starts_with(authctxt->auth_methods[i], method))
+			return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static char *
-authmethods_get(void)
+authmethods_get(Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
 	Buffer b;
 	char *list;
-	int i;
+	u_int i;
 
 	buffer_init(&b);
 	for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) {
 		if (strcmp(authmethods[i]->name, "none") == 0)
 			continue;
-		if (authmethods[i]->enabled != NULL &&
-		    *(authmethods[i]->enabled) != 0) {
-			if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
-				buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
-			buffer_append(&b, authmethods[i]->name,
-			    strlen(authmethods[i]->name));
-		}
+		if (authmethods[i]->enabled == NULL ||
+		    *(authmethods[i]->enabled) == 0)
+			continue;
+		if (!method_allowed(authctxt, authmethods[i]->name))
+			continue;
+		if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
+			buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
+		buffer_append(&b, authmethods[i]->name,
+		    strlen(authmethods[i]->name));
 	}
 	buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1);
 	list = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b));
@@ -392,7 +430,7 @@ authmethods_get(void)
 }
 
 static Authmethod *
-authmethod_lookup(const char *name)
+authmethod_lookup(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *name)
 {
 	int i;
 
@@ -400,10 +438,154 @@ authmethod_lookup(const char *name)
 		for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++)
 			if (authmethods[i]->enabled != NULL &&
 			    *(authmethods[i]->enabled) != 0 &&
-			    strcmp(name, authmethods[i]->name) == 0)
+			    strcmp(name, authmethods[i]->name) == 0 &&
+			    method_allowed(authctxt, authmethods[i]->name))
 				return authmethods[i];
 	debug2("Unrecognized authentication method name: %s",
 	    name ? name : "NULL");
 	return NULL;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Check a comma-separated list of methods for validity. Is need_enable is
+ * non-zero, then also require that the methods are enabled.
+ * Returns 0 on success or -1 if the methods list is invalid.
+ */
+int
+auth2_methods_valid(const char *_methods, int need_enable)
+{
+	char *methods, *omethods, *method;
+	u_int i, found;
+	int ret = -1;
+
+	if (*_methods == '\0') {
+		error("empty authentication method list");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	omethods = methods = xstrdup(_methods);
+	while ((method = strsep(&methods, ",")) != NULL) {
+		for (found = i = 0; !found && authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) {
+			if (strcmp(method, authmethods[i]->name) != 0)
+				continue;
+			if (need_enable) {
+				if (authmethods[i]->enabled == NULL ||
+				    *(authmethods[i]->enabled) == 0) {
+					error("Disabled method \"%s\" in "
+					    "AuthenticationMethods list \"%s\"",
+					    method, _methods);
+					goto out;
+				}
+			}
+			found = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (!found) {
+			error("Unknown authentication method \"%s\" in list",
+			    method);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	free(omethods);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Prune the AuthenticationMethods supplied in the configuration, removing
+ * any methods lists that include disabled methods. Note that this might
+ * leave authctxt->num_auth_methods == 0, even when multiple required auth
+ * has been requested. For this reason, all tests for whether multiple is
+ * enabled should consult options.num_auth_methods directly.
+ */
+int
+auth2_setup_methods_lists(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	if (options.num_auth_methods == 0)
+		return 0;
+	debug3("%s: checking methods", __func__);
+	authctxt->auth_methods = xcalloc(options.num_auth_methods,
+	    sizeof(*authctxt->auth_methods));
+	authctxt->num_auth_methods = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_auth_methods; i++) {
+		if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[i], 1) != 0) {
+			logit("Authentication methods list \"%s\" contains "
+			    "disabled method, skipping",
+			    options.auth_methods[i]);
+			continue;
+		}
+		debug("authentication methods list %d: %s",
+		    authctxt->num_auth_methods, options.auth_methods[i]);
+		authctxt->auth_methods[authctxt->num_auth_methods++] =
+		    xstrdup(options.auth_methods[i]);
+	}
+	if (authctxt->num_auth_methods == 0) {
+		error("No AuthenticationMethods left after eliminating "
+		    "disabled methods");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+list_starts_with(const char *methods, const char *method)
+{
+	size_t l = strlen(method);
+
+	if (strncmp(methods, method, l) != 0)
+		return 0;
+	if (methods[l] != ',' && methods[l] != '\0')
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Remove method from the start of a comma-separated list of methods.
+ * Returns 0 if the list of methods did not start with that method or 1
+ * if it did.
+ */
+static int
+remove_method(char **methods, const char *method)
+{
+	char *omethods = *methods;
+	size_t l = strlen(method);
+
+	if (!list_starts_with(omethods, method))
+		return 0;
+	*methods = xstrdup(omethods + l + (omethods[l] == ',' ? 1 : 0));
+	free(omethods);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called after successful authentication. Will remove the successful method
+ * from the start of each list in which it occurs. If it was the last method
+ * in any list, then authentication is deemed successful.
+ * Returns 1 if the method completed any authentication list or 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int
+auth2_update_methods_lists(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method)
+{
+	u_int i, found = 0;
+
+	debug3("%s: updating methods list after \"%s\"", __func__, method);
+	for (i = 0; i < authctxt->num_auth_methods; i++) {
+		if (!remove_method(&(authctxt->auth_methods[i]), method))
+			continue;
+		found = 1;
+		if (*authctxt->auth_methods[i] == '\0') {
+			debug2("authentication methods list %d complete", i);
+			return 1;
+		}
+		debug3("authentication methods list %d remaining: \"%s\"",
+		    i, authctxt->auth_methods[i]);
+	}
+	/* This should not happen, but would be bad if it did */
+	if (!found)
+		fatal("%s: method not in AuthenticationMethods", __func__);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index e9802a3fd..0adbf3a65 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.117 2012/06/22 12:30:26 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.118 2012/11/04 11:09:15 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -381,6 +381,21 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
 	while (!authenticated) {
 		auth_method = "unknown";
 		authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
+
+		/* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
+		if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
+			if (!compat20)
+				fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported"
+				    "with SSH protocol 1");
+			if (authenticated &&
+			    !auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
+			    auth_method)) {
+				debug3("%s: method %s: partial", __func__,
+				    auth_method);
+				authenticated = 0;
+			}
+		}
+
 		if (authenticated) {
 			if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
 				fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
@@ -401,7 +416,6 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
 			}
 #endif
 		}
-
 		if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
 			auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, auth_method,
 			    compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
@@ -781,7 +795,17 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
 	COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
 #undef M_CP_STROPT
 #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
-	
+
+	/* Create valid auth method lists */
+	if (compat20 && auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
+		/*
+		 * The monitor will continue long enough to let the child
+		 * run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
+		 * authentication to succeed.
+		 */
+		debug("%s: no valid authentication method lists", __func__);
+	}
+
 	debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
 
@@ -918,7 +942,10 @@ mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
 	debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
 
-	auth_method = "bsdauth";
+	if (compat20)
+		auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
+	else
+		auth_method = "bsdauth";
 
 	return (authok != 0);
 }
diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
index 8e69ea5ce..b90dba63b 100644
--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.231 2012/10/30 21:29:54 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.232 2012/11/04 11:09:15 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
  *                    All rights reserved
@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@
 #include "groupaccess.h"
 #include "canohost.h"
 #include "packet.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
 
 static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int);
 static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int);
@@ -332,6 +334,7 @@ typedef enum {
 	sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
 	sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
 	sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser,
+	sAuthenticationMethods,
 	sDeprecated, sUnsupported
 } ServerOpCodes;
 
@@ -459,6 +462,7 @@ static struct {
 	{ "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
 };
 
@@ -1522,6 +1526,24 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
 		break;
 
+	case sAuthenticationMethods:
+		if (*activep && options->num_auth_methods == 0) {
+			while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
+				if (options->num_auth_methods >=
+				    MAX_AUTH_METHODS)
+					fatal("%s line %d: "
+					    "too many authentication methods.",
+					    filename, linenum);
+				if (auth2_methods_valid(arg, 0) != 0)
+					fatal("%s line %d: invalid "
+					    "authentication method list.",
+					    filename, linenum);
+				options->auth_methods[
+				    options->num_auth_methods++] = xstrdup(arg);
+			}
+		}
+		return 0;
+
 	case sDeprecated:
 		logit("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s",
 		    filename, linenum, arg);
@@ -1953,6 +1975,8 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
 	dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowGroups, o->num_allow_groups, o->allow_groups);
 	dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyGroups, o->num_deny_groups, o->deny_groups);
 	dump_cfg_strarray(sAcceptEnv, o->num_accept_env, o->accept_env);
+	dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sAuthenticationMethods,
+	    o->num_auth_methods, o->auth_methods);
 
 	/* other arguments */
 	for (i = 0; i < o->num_subsystems; i++)
diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
index 0064c9bc5..68fcdb764 100644
--- a/servconf.h
+++ b/servconf.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.104 2012/10/30 21:29:55 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.105 2012/11/04 11:09:15 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #define MAX_ACCEPT_ENV		256	/* Max # of env vars. */
 #define MAX_MATCH_GROUPS	256	/* Max # of groups for Match. */
 #define MAX_AUTHKEYS_FILES	256	/* Max # of authorized_keys files. */
+#define MAX_AUTH_METHODS	256	/* Max # of AuthenticationMethods. */
 
 /* permit_root_login */
 #define	PERMIT_NOT_SET		-1
@@ -170,6 +171,9 @@ typedef struct {
 	char   *authorized_keys_command_user;
 
 	char   *version_addendum;	/* Appended to SSH banner */
+
+	u_int	num_auth_methods;
+	char   *auth_methods[MAX_AUTH_METHODS];
 }       ServerOptions;
 
 /* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
@@ -199,6 +203,7 @@ struct connection_info {
 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_groups, num_allow_groups); \
 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_groups, num_deny_groups); \
 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(accept_env, num_accept_env); \
+		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(auth_methods, num_auth_methods); \
 	} while (0)
 
 struct connection_info *get_connection_info(int, int);
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 4ad1a4bd1..af7ff91ba 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.395 2012/11/04 10:38:43 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.396 2012/11/04 11:09:15 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -1337,6 +1337,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	int remote_port;
 	char *line;
 	int config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 };
+	u_int n;
 	u_int64_t ibytes, obytes;
 	mode_t new_umask;
 	Key *key;
@@ -1566,6 +1567,26 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		fatal("AuthorizedKeysCommand set without "
 		    "AuthorizedKeysCommandUser");
 
+	/*
+	 * Check whether there is any path through configured auth methods.
+	 * Unfortunately it is not possible to verify this generally before
+	 * daemonisation in the presence of Match block, but this catches
+	 * and warns for trivial misconfigurations that could break login.
+	 */
+	if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
+		if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1))
+			fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported with "
+			    "SSH protocol 1");
+		for (n = 0; n < options.num_auth_methods; n++) {
+			if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[n],
+			    1) == 0)
+				break;
+		}
+		if (n >= options.num_auth_methods)
+			fatal("AuthenticationMethods cannot be satisfied by "
+			    "enabled authentication methods");
+	}
+
 	/* set default channel AF */
 	channel_set_af(options.address_family);
 
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index 0fb0b837d..05f3374fb 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.148 2012/11/04 10:38:43 djm Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.149 2012/11/04 11:09:15 djm Exp $
 .Dd $Mdocdate: November 4 2012 $
 .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
 .Os
@@ -151,6 +151,28 @@ See
 in
 .Xr ssh_config 5
 for more information on patterns.
+.It Cm AuthenticationMethods
+Specifies the authentication methods that must be successfully completed
+for a user to be granted access.
+This option must be followed by one or more comma-separated lists of
+authentication method names.
+Successful authentication requires completion of every method in at least
+one of these lists.
+.Pp
+For example, an argument of
+.Dq publickey,password publickey,keyboard-interactive
+would require the user to complete public key authentication, followed by
+either password or keyboard interactive authentication.
+Only methods that are next in one or more lists are offered at each stage,
+so for this example, it would not be possible to attempt password or
+keyboard-interactive authentication before public key.
+.Pp
+This option is only available for SSH protocol 2 and will yield a fatal
+error if enabled if protocol 1 is also enabled.
+Note that each authentication method listed should also be explicitly enabled
+in the configuration.
+The default is not to require multiple authentication; successful completion
+of a single authentication method is sufficient.
 .It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
 Specifies a program to be used to look up the user's public keys.
 The program will be invoked with a single argument of the username
@@ -728,6 +750,7 @@ Available keywords are
 .Cm AllowGroups ,
 .Cm AllowTcpForwarding ,
 .Cm AllowUsers ,
+.Cm AuthenticationMethods ,
 .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand ,
 .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ,
 .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile ,
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From f96ff18a9240e38e5d3c671f5f8f341099874aaf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2012 17:04:37 +1100
Subject:  - (dtucker) [uidswap.c openbsd-compat/Makefile.in   
 openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.c openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h   
 openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h]  Move the fallback code for setting uids   
 and gids from uidswap.c to the compat library, which allows it to work with  
  the new setresuid calls in auth2-pubkey.  with tim@, ok djm@

---
 ChangeLog                       |  7 +++
 openbsd-compat/Makefile.in      |  4 +-
 openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.c  | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h  | 24 ++++++++++
 openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h |  3 +-
 uidswap.c                       | 34 --------------
 6 files changed, 134 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.c
 create mode 100644 openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 85c92eb7f..8cc7c8e7b 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
+20121105
+ - (dtucker) [uidswap.c openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+   openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.c openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h
+   openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h]  Move the fallback code for setting uids
+   and gids from uidswap.c to the compat library, which allows it to work with
+   the new setresuid calls in auth2-pubkey.  with tim@, ok djm@
+
 20121104
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
    - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/31 08:04:50
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
index 196a81d13..992b9743b 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+++ b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.48 2011/11/04 00:25:25 dtucker Exp $
+# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.49 2012/11/05 06:04:37 dtucker Exp $
 
 sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@
 piddir=@piddir@
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ LDFLAGS=-L. @LDFLAGS@
 
 OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bindresvport.o daemon.o dirname.o fmt_scaled.o getcwd.o getgrouplist.o getopt.o getrrsetbyname.o glob.o inet_aton.o inet_ntoa.o inet_ntop.o mktemp.o pwcache.o readpassphrase.o realpath.o rresvport.o setenv.o setproctitle.o sha2.o sigact.o strlcat.o strlcpy.o strmode.o strnlen.o strptime.o strsep.o strtonum.o strtoll.o strtoul.o timingsafe_bcmp.o vis.o
 
-COMPAT=bsd-arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o
+COMPAT=bsd-arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o
 
 PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
 
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..020b214b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.c
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+/* $Id: bsd-setres_id.c,v 1.1 2012/11/05 06:04:37 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip com au).
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) || defined(BROKEN_SETRESGID)
+int
+setresgid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid)
+{
+	int ret = 0, saved_errno;
+
+	if (rgid != sgid) {
+		errno = ENOSYS;
+		return -1;
+	}
+#if defined(HAVE_SETREGID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETREGID)
+	if (setregid(rgid, egid) < 0) {
+		saved_errno = errno;
+		error("setregid %u: %.100s", rgid, strerror(errno));
+		errno = saved_errno;
+		ret = -1;
+	}
+#else
+	if (setegid(egid) < 0) {
+		saved_errno = errno;
+		error("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int)egid, strerror(errno));
+		errno = saved_errno;
+		ret = -1;
+	}
+	if (setgid(rgid) < 0) {
+		saved_errno = errno;
+		error("setgid %u: %.100s", rgid, strerror(errno));
+		errno = saved_errno;
+		ret = -1;
+	}
+#endif
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETRESUID) || defined(BROKEN_SETRESUID)
+int
+setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid)
+{
+	int ret = 0, saved_errno;
+
+	if (ruid != suid) {
+		errno = ENOSYS;
+		return -1;
+	}
+#if defined(HAVE_SETREUID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETREUID)
+	if (setreuid(ruid, euid) < 0) {
+		saved_errno = errno;
+		error("setreuid %u: %.100s", ruid, strerror(errno));
+		errno = saved_errno;
+		ret = -1;
+	}
+#else
+
+# ifndef SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID
+	if (seteuid(euid) < 0) {
+		saved_errno = errno;
+		error("seteuid %u: %.100s", euid, strerror(errno));
+		errno = saved_errno;
+		ret = -1;
+	}
+# endif
+	if (setuid(ruid) < 0) {
+		saved_errno = errno;
+		error("setuid %u: %.100s", ruid, strerror(errno));
+		errno = saved_errno;
+		ret = -1;
+	}
+#endif
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h b/openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6c269e0b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/* $Id: bsd-setres_id.h,v 1.1 2012/11/05 06:04:37 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip com au).
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETRESGID
+int	setresgid(gid_t, gid_t, gid_t);
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_SETRESUID
+int	setresuid(uid_t, uid_t, uid_t);
+#endif
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h b/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
index 807acf626..664cb0445 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: openbsd-compat.h,v 1.52 2011/09/23 01:16:11 djm Exp $ */
+/* $Id: openbsd-compat.h,v 1.53 2012/11/05 06:04:38 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ int writev(int, struct iovec *, int);
 
 /* Home grown routines */
 #include "bsd-misc.h"
+#include "bsd-setres_id.h"
 #include "bsd-statvfs.h"
 #include "bsd-waitpid.h"
 #include "bsd-poll.h"
diff --git a/uidswap.c b/uidswap.c
index 837648396..cdd7309e3 100644
--- a/uidswap.c
+++ b/uidswap.c
@@ -138,20 +138,8 @@ permanently_drop_suid(uid_t uid)
 	uid_t old_uid = getuid();
 
 	debug("permanently_drop_suid: %u", (u_int)uid);
-#if defined(HAVE_SETRESUID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETRESUID)
 	if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0)
 		fatal("setresuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)uid, strerror(errno));
-#elif defined(HAVE_SETREUID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETREUID)
-	if (setreuid(uid, uid) < 0)
-		fatal("setreuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)uid, strerror(errno));
-#else
-# ifndef SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID
-	if (seteuid(uid) < 0)
-		fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)uid, strerror(errno));
-# endif
-	if (setuid(uid) < 0)
-		fatal("setuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)uid, strerror(errno));
-#endif
 
 #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
 	/* Try restoration of UID if changed (test clearing of saved uid) */
@@ -220,18 +208,8 @@ permanently_set_uid(struct passwd *pw)
 	debug("permanently_set_uid: %u/%u", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
 	    (u_int)pw->pw_gid);
 
-#if defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETRESGID)
 	if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) < 0)
 		fatal("setresgid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
-#elif defined(HAVE_SETREGID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETREGID)
-	if (setregid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) < 0)
-		fatal("setregid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
-#else
-	if (setegid(pw->pw_gid) < 0)
-		fatal("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
-	if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0)
-		fatal("setgid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
-#endif
 
 #ifdef __APPLE__
 	/*
@@ -243,20 +221,8 @@ permanently_set_uid(struct passwd *pw)
 		    pw->pw_name, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
 #endif
 
-#if defined(HAVE_SETRESUID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETRESUID)
 	if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) < 0)
 		fatal("setresuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno));
-#elif defined(HAVE_SETREUID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETREUID)
-	if (setreuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) < 0)
-		fatal("setreuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno));
-#else
-# ifndef SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID
-	if (seteuid(pw->pw_uid) < 0)
-		fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno));
-# endif
-	if (setuid(pw->pw_uid) < 0)
-		fatal("setuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno));
-#endif
 
 #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
 	/* Try restoration of GID if changed (test clearing of saved gid) */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 737f7aff365a47039fb48dcc06367e59863a4cee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2012 17:07:43 +1100
Subject:  - (dtucker) [auth2-pubkey.c] wrap paths.h in an ifdef for platforms
 that    don't have it.  Spotted by tim@.

---
 ChangeLog      | 2 ++
 auth2-pubkey.c | 4 +++-
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 8cc7c8e7b..ae5557001 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
    openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h]  Move the fallback code for setting uids
    and gids from uidswap.c to the compat library, which allows it to work with
    the new setresuid calls in auth2-pubkey.  with tim@, ok djm@
+ - (dtucker) [auth2-pubkey.c] wrap paths.h in an ifdef for platforms that
+   don't have it.  Spotted by tim@.
 
 20121104
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
index 6a6217017..f9cc6c2c6 100644
--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
@@ -31,7 +31,9 @@
 
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
-#include <paths.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
 #include <pwd.h>
 #include <signal.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From d5c3d4c0ca0312ea96de9eca38b055a98335b550 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Wed, 7 Nov 2012 08:35:38 +1100
Subject:    - eric@cvs.openbsd.org 2011/11/28 08:46:27      [moduli.5]     
 fix formula      ok djm@

---
 ChangeLog | 7 +++++++
 moduli.5  | 6 +++---
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index ae5557001..c754470fb 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
+20121107
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - eric@cvs.openbsd.org 2011/11/28 08:46:27
+     [moduli.5]
+     fix formula
+     ok djm@
+
 20121105
  - (dtucker) [uidswap.c openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
    openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.c openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h
diff --git a/moduli.5 b/moduli.5
index 0e01b9414..aa7e06291 100644
--- a/moduli.5
+++ b/moduli.5
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$OpenBSD: moduli.5,v 1.15 2010/10/14 20:41:28 jmc Exp $
+.\"	$OpenBSD: moduli.5,v 1.16 2011/11/28 08:46:27 eric Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
 .\"
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 .\" WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
 .\" ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
 .\" OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
-.Dd $Mdocdate: October 14 2010 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: November 28 2011 $
 .Dt MODULI 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ Unknown, not tested.
 .It 2
 "Safe" prime; (p-1)/2 is also prime.
 .It 4
-Sophie Germain; (p+1)*2 is also prime.
+Sophie Germain; 2p+1 is also prime.
 .El
 .Pp
 Moduli candidates initially produced by
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 0120c41d6b927beb89499b49eb66512225d30f7f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Wed, 7 Nov 2012 08:36:00 +1100
Subject:    - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/26 17:34:38      [moduli.5]     
 last stage of rfc changes, using consistent Rs/Re blocks, and moving the     
 references into a STANDARDS section;

---
 ChangeLog |  4 ++++
 moduli.5  | 11 ++++++++---
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index c754470fb..24193233e 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@
      [moduli.5]
      fix formula
      ok djm@
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/26 17:34:38
+     [moduli.5]
+     last stage of rfc changes, using consistent Rs/Re blocks, and moving the
+     references into a STANDARDS section;
 
 20121105
  - (dtucker) [uidswap.c openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
diff --git a/moduli.5 b/moduli.5
index aa7e06291..ef0de0850 100644
--- a/moduli.5
+++ b/moduli.5
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$OpenBSD: moduli.5,v 1.16 2011/11/28 08:46:27 eric Exp $
+.\"	$OpenBSD: moduli.5,v 1.17 2012/09/26 17:34:38 jmc Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
 .\"
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 .\" WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
 .\" ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
 .\" OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
-.Dd $Mdocdate: November 28 2011 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: September 26 2012 $
 .Dt MODULI 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -115,8 +115,13 @@ that best meets the size requirement.
 .Sh SEE ALSO
 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
 .Xr sshd 8
+.Sh STANDARDS
 .Rs
+.%A M. Friedl
+.%A N. Provos
+.%A W. Simpson
+.%D March 2006
 .%R RFC 4419
-.%T "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol"
+.%T Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol
 .%D 2006
 .Re
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 1e85469fcb1e81e7f8f643eafd42eb6c123a8c13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2012 19:04:02 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/11/14 02:24:27      [auth2-pubkey.c]   
   fix username passed to helper program      prepare stdio fds before
 closefrom()

     spotted by landry@
---
 ChangeLog      |  9 +++++++++
 auth2-pubkey.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++--------------
 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 24193233e..0c018c29e 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,12 @@
+20121114
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/11/14 02:24:27
+     [auth2-pubkey.c]
+     fix username passed to helper program
+     prepare stdio fds before closefrom()
+     spotted by landry@
+
+
 20121107
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
    - eric@cvs.openbsd.org 2011/11/28 08:46:27
diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
index f9cc6c2c6..70d8996ea 100644
--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.32 2012/11/04 10:38:43 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.33 2012/11/14 02:24:27 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -504,8 +504,8 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	debug3("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\"",
-	    options.authorized_keys_command, pw->pw_name);
+	debug3("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s %s\" as \"%s\"",
+	    options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, pw->pw_name);
 
 	/*
 	 * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
@@ -523,7 +523,19 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
 		for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
 			signal(i, SIG_DFL);
 
+		if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+			error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
+			    strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+		/* Keep stderr around a while longer to catch errors */
+		if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
+		    dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
+			error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
 		closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+
 		/* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
 		if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
 			error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
@@ -535,22 +547,14 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
 			    strerror(errno));
 			_exit(1);
 		}
-
-		close(p[0]);
-		if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
-			error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
-			    strerror(errno));
-			_exit(1);
-		}
-		if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
-		    dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1 ||
-		    dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
+		/* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */
+		if (dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
 			error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
 			_exit(1);
 		}
 
 		execl(options.authorized_keys_command,
-		    options.authorized_keys_command, pw->pw_name, NULL);
+		    options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, NULL);
 
 		error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
 		    options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 6f3b362fa85e99905c86b768c80c66756116416c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2012 19:04:33 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/11/14 02:32:15      [ssh-keygen.c]     
 allow the full range of unsigned serial numbers; 'fine' deraadt@

---
 ChangeLog    |  4 +++-
 ssh-keygen.c | 12 +++++++-----
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 0c018c29e..870f0cc8b 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -5,7 +5,9 @@
      fix username passed to helper program
      prepare stdio fds before closefrom()
      spotted by landry@
-
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/11/14 02:32:15
+     [ssh-keygen.c]
+     allow the full range of unsigned serial numbers; 'fine' deraadt@
 
 20121107
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
index 11d1dd02b..2d8af679c 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.218 2012/10/02 07:07:45 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.219 2012/11/14 02:32:15 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -1937,7 +1937,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 {
 	char dotsshdir[MAXPATHLEN], comment[1024], *passphrase1, *passphrase2;
 	char *checkpoint = NULL;
-	char out_file[MAXPATHLEN], *rr_hostname = NULL;
+	char out_file[MAXPATHLEN], *rr_hostname = NULL, *ep;
 	Key *private, *public;
 	struct passwd *pw;
 	struct stat st;
@@ -2145,9 +2145,11 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 			parse_cert_times(optarg);
 			break;
 		case 'z':
-			cert_serial = strtonum(optarg, 0, LLONG_MAX, &errstr);
-			if (errstr)
-				fatal("Invalid serial number: %s", errstr);
+			errno = 0;
+			cert_serial = strtoull(optarg, &ep, 10);
+			if (*optarg < '0' || *optarg > '9' || *ep != '\0' ||
+			    (errno == ERANGE && cert_serial == ULLONG_MAX))
+				fatal("Invalid serial number \"%s\"", optarg);
 			break;
 		case '?':
 		default:
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From cf6ef137b516a9f739b6e899ec5ef7306835530b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Mon, 3 Dec 2012 09:37:56 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) [openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h] Sync with OpenBSD to get   
 TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE needed for upcoming changes.

---
 ChangeLog                  |  4 ++++
 openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 870f0cc8b..09a095f1a 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+20121203
+ - (djm) [openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h] Sync with OpenBSD to get
+   TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE needed for upcoming changes.
+
 20121114
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/11/14 02:24:27
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h b/openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h
index 5cf0587bd..28aaaa37a 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: queue.h,v 1.32 2007/04/30 18:42:34 pedro Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: queue.h,v 1.36 2012/04/11 13:29:14 naddy Exp $	*/
 /*	$NetBSD: queue.h,v 1.11 1996/05/16 05:17:14 mycroft Exp $	*/
 
 /*
@@ -202,10 +202,10 @@ struct {								\
 	    (var) != SLIST_END(head);					\
 	    (var) = SLIST_NEXT(var, field))
 
-#define	SLIST_FOREACH_PREVPTR(var, varp, head, field)			\
-	for ((varp) = &SLIST_FIRST((head));				\
-	    ((var) = *(varp)) != SLIST_END(head);			\
-	    (varp) = &SLIST_NEXT((var), field))
+#define	SLIST_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar)			\
+	for ((var) = SLIST_FIRST(head);				\
+	    (var) && ((tvar) = SLIST_NEXT(var, field), 1);		\
+	    (var) = (tvar))
 
 /*
  * Singly-linked List functions.
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ struct {								\
 	(head)->slh_first = (elm);					\
 } while (0)
 
-#define	SLIST_REMOVE_NEXT(head, elm, field) do {			\
+#define	SLIST_REMOVE_AFTER(elm, field) do {				\
 	(elm)->field.sle_next = (elm)->field.sle_next->field.sle_next;	\
 } while (0)
 
@@ -276,6 +276,11 @@ struct {								\
 	    (var)!= LIST_END(head);					\
 	    (var) = LIST_NEXT(var, field))
 
+#define	LIST_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar)			\
+	for ((var) = LIST_FIRST(head);				\
+	    (var) && ((tvar) = LIST_NEXT(var, field), 1);		\
+	    (var) = (tvar))
+
 /*
  * List functions.
  */
@@ -354,6 +359,11 @@ struct {								\
 	    (var) != SIMPLEQ_END(head);					\
 	    (var) = SIMPLEQ_NEXT(var, field))
 
+#define	SIMPLEQ_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar)			\
+	for ((var) = SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head);				\
+	    (var) && ((tvar) = SIMPLEQ_NEXT(var, field), 1);		\
+	    (var) = (tvar))
+
 /*
  * Simple queue functions.
  */
@@ -385,6 +395,12 @@ struct {								\
 		(head)->sqh_last = &(head)->sqh_first;			\
 } while (0)
 
+#define SIMPLEQ_REMOVE_AFTER(head, elm, field) do {			\
+	if (((elm)->field.sqe_next = (elm)->field.sqe_next->field.sqe_next) \
+	    == NULL)							\
+		(head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next;		\
+} while (0)
+
 /*
  * Tail queue definitions.
  */
@@ -422,11 +438,24 @@ struct {								\
 	    (var) != TAILQ_END(head);					\
 	    (var) = TAILQ_NEXT(var, field))
 
+#define	TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar)			\
+	for ((var) = TAILQ_FIRST(head);					\
+	    (var) != TAILQ_END(head) &&					\
+	    ((tvar) = TAILQ_NEXT(var, field), 1);			\
+	    (var) = (tvar))
+
+
 #define TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(var, head, headname, field)		\
 	for((var) = TAILQ_LAST(head, headname);				\
 	    (var) != TAILQ_END(head);					\
 	    (var) = TAILQ_PREV(var, headname, field))
 
+#define	TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE_SAFE(var, head, headname, field, tvar)	\
+	for ((var) = TAILQ_LAST(head, headname);			\
+	    (var) != TAILQ_END(head) &&					\
+	    ((tvar) = TAILQ_PREV(var, headname, field), 1);		\
+	    (var) = (tvar))
+
 /*
  * Tail queue functions.
  */
@@ -526,11 +555,23 @@ struct {								\
 	    (var) != CIRCLEQ_END(head);					\
 	    (var) = CIRCLEQ_NEXT(var, field))
 
+#define	CIRCLEQ_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar)			\
+	for ((var) = CIRCLEQ_FIRST(head);				\
+	    (var) != CIRCLEQ_END(head) &&				\
+	    ((tvar) = CIRCLEQ_NEXT(var, field), 1);			\
+	    (var) = (tvar))
+
 #define CIRCLEQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(var, head, field)			\
 	for((var) = CIRCLEQ_LAST(head);					\
 	    (var) != CIRCLEQ_END(head);					\
 	    (var) = CIRCLEQ_PREV(var, field))
 
+#define	CIRCLEQ_FOREACH_REVERSE_SAFE(var, head, headname, field, tvar)	\
+	for ((var) = CIRCLEQ_LAST(head, headname);			\
+	    (var) != CIRCLEQ_END(head) && 				\
+	    ((tvar) = CIRCLEQ_PREV(var, headname, field), 1);		\
+	    (var) = (tvar))
+
 /*
  * Circular queue functions.
  */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From cb6b68b209d8868a94a30b1a634beb1a65cb5265 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Mon, 3 Dec 2012 09:49:52 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/02 20:26:11      [ssh_config.5
 sshconnect2.c]      Make IdentitiesOnly apply to keys obtained from a
 PKCS11Provider.      This allows control of which keys are offered from
 tokens using      IdentityFile. ok markus@

---
 ChangeLog     |  6 ++++++
 ssh_config.5  |  6 ++++--
 sshconnect2.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 09a095f1a..199bca169 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,6 +1,12 @@
 20121203
  - (djm) [openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h] Sync with OpenBSD to get
    TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE needed for upcoming changes.
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/02 20:26:11
+     [ssh_config.5 sshconnect2.c]
+     Make IdentitiesOnly apply to keys obtained from a PKCS11Provider.
+     This allows control of which keys are offered from tokens using
+     IdentityFile. ok markus@
 
 20121114
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
index d3e801df0..09a3cf035 100644
--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.158 2012/10/04 13:21:50 markus Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: October 4 2012 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.159 2012/12/02 20:26:10 djm Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: December 2 2012 $
 .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -602,6 +602,8 @@ should only use the authentication identity files configured in the
 files,
 even if
 .Xr ssh-agent 1
+or a
+.Cm PKCS11Provider
 offers more identities.
 The argument to this keyword must be
 .Dq yes
diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
index 7c369d743..6791ea344 100644
--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.189 2012/06/22 12:30:26 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.190 2012/12/02 20:26:11 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -1359,7 +1359,7 @@ load_identity_file(char *filename)
 static void
 pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
-	Identity *id;
+	Identity *id, *id2, *tmp;
 	Idlist agent, files, *preferred;
 	Key *key;
 	AuthenticationConnection *ac;
@@ -1371,7 +1371,7 @@ pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	preferred = &authctxt->keys;
 	TAILQ_INIT(preferred);	/* preferred order of keys */
 
-	/* list of keys stored in the filesystem */
+	/* list of keys stored in the filesystem and PKCS#11 */
 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
 		key = options.identity_keys[i];
 		if (key && key->type == KEY_RSA1)
@@ -1384,6 +1384,29 @@ pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		id->filename = xstrdup(options.identity_files[i]);
 		TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&files, id, next);
 	}
+	/* Prefer PKCS11 keys that are explicitly listed */
+	TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, &files, next, tmp) {
+		if (id->key == NULL || (id->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0)
+			continue;
+		found = 0;
+		TAILQ_FOREACH(id2, &files, next) {
+			if (id2->key == NULL ||
+			    (id2->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0)
+				continue;
+			if (key_equal(id->key, id2->key)) {
+				TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
+				TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
+				found = 1;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		/* If IdentitiesOnly set and key not found then don't use it */
+		if (!found && options.identities_only) {
+			TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
+			bzero(id, sizeof(id));
+			free(id);
+		}
+	}
 	/* list of keys supported by the agent */
 	if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection())) {
 		for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 33a813613a9f48acba0e88f4c51a6a25259bbebc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Mon, 3 Dec 2012 09:50:24 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/02 20:42:15      [ssh-add.1
 ssh-add.c]      make deleting explicit keys "ssh-add -d" symmetric with
 adding keys -      try to delete the corresponding certificate too and
 respect the -k option      to allow deleting of the key only; feedback and ok
 markus@

---
 ChangeLog |  5 +++++
 ssh-add.1 | 14 +++++++-------
 ssh-add.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 199bca169..7cea00cb5 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -7,6 +7,11 @@
      Make IdentitiesOnly apply to keys obtained from a PKCS11Provider.
      This allows control of which keys are offered from tokens using
      IdentityFile. ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/02 20:42:15
+     [ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c]
+     make deleting explicit keys "ssh-add -d" symmetric with adding keys -
+     try to delete the corresponding certificate too and respect the -k option
+     to allow deleting of the key only; feedback and ok markus@
 
 20121114
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/ssh-add.1 b/ssh-add.1
index aec620dea..af93762ae 100644
--- a/ssh-add.1
+++ b/ssh-add.1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.56 2011/10/18 05:00:48 djm Exp $
+.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.57 2012/12/02 20:42:15 djm Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: October 18 2011 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: December 2 2012 $
 .Dt SSH-ADD 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -98,10 +98,10 @@ Deletes all identities from the agent.
 Instead of adding identities, removes identities from the agent.
 If
 .Nm
-has been run without arguments, the keys for the default identities will
-be removed.
+has been run without arguments, the keys for the default identities and
+their corresponding certificateswill be removed.
 Otherwise, the argument list will be interpreted as a list of paths to
-public key files and matching keys will be removed from the agent.
+public key files to specify keys and certificates to be removed from the agent.
 If no public key is found at a given path,
 .Nm
 will append
@@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ and retry.
 Remove keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library
 .Ar pkcs11 .
 .It Fl k
-When loading keys into the agent, load plain private keys only and skip
-certificates.
+When loading keys into or deleting keys from the agent, process plain private
+keys only and skip certificates.
 .It Fl L
 Lists public key parameters of all identities currently represented
 by the agent.
diff --git a/ssh-add.c b/ssh-add.c
index 738644d27..c8936e5ae 100644
--- a/ssh-add.c
+++ b/ssh-add.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.103 2011/10/18 23:37:42 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.104 2012/12/02 20:42:15 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -96,10 +96,10 @@ clear_pass(void)
 }
 
 static int
-delete_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename)
+delete_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename, int key_only)
 {
-	Key *public;
-	char *comment = NULL;
+	Key *public = NULL, *cert = NULL;
+	char *certpath = NULL, *comment = NULL;
 	int ret = -1;
 
 	public = key_load_public(filename, &comment);
@@ -113,8 +113,32 @@ delete_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename)
 	} else
 		fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity: %s\n", filename);
 
-	key_free(public);
-	xfree(comment);
+	if (key_only)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Now try to delete the corresponding certificate too */
+	free(comment);
+	xasprintf(&certpath, "%s-cert.pub", filename);
+	if ((cert = key_load_public(certpath, &comment)) == NULL)
+		goto out;
+	if (!key_equal_public(cert, public))
+		fatal("Certificate %s does not match private key %s",
+		    certpath, filename);
+
+	if (ssh_remove_identity(ac, cert)) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s (%s)\n", certpath,
+		    comment);
+		ret = 0;
+	} else
+		fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity: %s\n", certpath);
+
+ out:
+	if (cert != NULL)
+		key_free(cert);
+	if (public != NULL)
+		key_free(public);
+	free(certpath);
+	free(comment);
 
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -354,7 +378,7 @@ static int
 do_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int deleting, int key_only, char *file)
 {
 	if (deleting) {
-		if (delete_file(ac, file) == -1)
+		if (delete_file(ac, file, key_only) == -1)
 			return -1;
 	} else {
 		if (add_file(ac, file, key_only) == -1)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From aa5b3f831417bac9538d2b6f21d55fef278e8926 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Mon, 3 Dec 2012 09:50:54 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/02 20:46:11      [auth-options.c
 channels.c servconf.c servconf.h serverloop.c session.c]      [sshd_config.5]
      make AllowTcpForwarding accept "local" and "remote" in addition to its  
    current "yes"/"no" to allow the server to specify whether just local or   
   remote TCP forwarding is enabled. ok markus@

---
 ChangeLog      |  6 ++++++
 auth-options.c |  4 ++--
 channels.c     | 12 +++++-------
 servconf.c     | 18 ++++++++++++++----
 servconf.h     | 10 ++++++++--
 serverloop.c   | 19 +++++++++++++------
 session.c      |  9 ++++++---
 sshd_config.5  | 16 ++++++++++++++--
 8 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 7cea00cb5..cee038727 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -12,6 +12,12 @@
      make deleting explicit keys "ssh-add -d" symmetric with adding keys -
      try to delete the corresponding certificate too and respect the -k option
      to allow deleting of the key only; feedback and ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/02 20:46:11
+     [auth-options.c channels.c servconf.c servconf.h serverloop.c session.c]
+     [sshd_config.5]
+     make AllowTcpForwarding accept "local" and "remote" in addition to its
+     current "yes"/"no" to allow the server to specify whether just local or
+     remote TCP forwarding is enabled. ok markus@
 
 20121114
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/auth-options.c b/auth-options.c
index 0e67bd8c0..23d0423e1 100644
--- a/auth-options.c
+++ b/auth-options.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.56 2011/10/18 04:58:26 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.57 2012/12/02 20:46:11 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum)
 				xfree(patterns);
 				goto bad_option;
 			}
-			if (options.allow_tcp_forwarding)
+			if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0)
 				channel_add_permitted_opens(host, port);
 			xfree(patterns);
 			goto next_option;
diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
index 7791febd7..9cf85a38d 100644
--- a/channels.c
+++ b/channels.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.318 2012/04/23 08:18:17 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.319 2012/12/02 20:46:11 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -3165,12 +3165,10 @@ channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(char *host, int port)
 void
 channel_disable_adm_local_opens(void)
 {
-	if (num_adm_permitted_opens == 0) {
-		permitted_adm_opens = xmalloc(sizeof(*permitted_adm_opens));
-		permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].host_to_connect
-		   = NULL;
-		num_adm_permitted_opens = 1;
-	}
+	channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens();
+	permitted_adm_opens = xmalloc(sizeof(*permitted_adm_opens));
+	permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].host_to_connect = NULL;
+	num_adm_permitted_opens = 1;
 }
 
 void
diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
index b90dba63b..21b371c84 100644
--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.232 2012/11/04 11:09:15 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.233 2012/12/02 20:46:11 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
  *                    All rights reserved
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 	if (options->compression == -1)
 		options->compression = COMP_DELAYED;
 	if (options->allow_tcp_forwarding == -1)
-		options->allow_tcp_forwarding = 1;
+		options->allow_tcp_forwarding = FORWARD_ALLOW;
 	if (options->allow_agent_forwarding == -1)
 		options->allow_agent_forwarding = 1;
 	if (options->gateway_ports == -1)
@@ -786,6 +786,14 @@ static const struct multistate multistate_privsep[] = {
 	{ "no",				PRIVSEP_OFF },
 	{ NULL, -1 }
 };
+static const struct multistate multistate_tcpfwd[] = {
+	{ "yes",			FORWARD_ALLOW },
+	{ "all",			FORWARD_ALLOW },
+	{ "no",				FORWARD_DENY },
+	{ "remote",			FORWARD_REMOTE },
+	{ "local",			FORWARD_LOCAL },
+	{ NULL, -1 }
+};
 
 int
 process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
@@ -1143,7 +1151,8 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 
 	case sAllowTcpForwarding:
 		intptr = &options->allow_tcp_forwarding;
-		goto parse_flag;
+		multistate_ptr = multistate_tcpfwd;
+		goto parse_multistate;
 
 	case sAllowAgentForwarding:
 		intptr = &options->allow_agent_forwarding;
@@ -1423,7 +1432,6 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 		}
 		if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) {
 			if (*activep && n == -1) {
-				channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens();
 				options->num_permitted_opens = 1;
 				channel_disable_adm_local_opens();
 			}
@@ -1780,6 +1788,8 @@ fmt_intarg(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
 		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_compression);
 	case sUsePrivilegeSeparation:
 		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_privsep);
+	case sAllowTcpForwarding:
+		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tcpfwd);
 	case sProtocol:
 		switch (val) {
 		case SSH_PROTO_1:
diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
index 68fcdb764..a23ef7f3a 100644
--- a/servconf.h
+++ b/servconf.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.105 2012/11/04 11:09:15 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.106 2012/12/02 20:46:11 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -42,6 +42,12 @@
 #define PRIVSEP_ON		1
 #define PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX	2
 
+/* AllowTCPForwarding */
+#define FORWARD_DENY		0
+#define FORWARD_REMOTE		(1)
+#define FORWARD_LOCAL		(1<<1)
+#define FORWARD_ALLOW		(FORWARD_REMOTE|FORWARD_LOCAL)
+
 #define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX	6	/* Default for MaxAuthTries */
 #define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX	10	/* Default for MaxSessions */
 
@@ -116,7 +122,7 @@ typedef struct {
 	int     permit_user_env;	/* If true, read ~/.ssh/environment */
 	int     use_login;	/* If true, login(1) is used */
 	int     compression;	/* If true, compression is allowed */
-	int	allow_tcp_forwarding;
+	int	allow_tcp_forwarding; /* One of FORWARD_* */
 	int	allow_agent_forwarding;
 	u_int num_allow_users;
 	char   *allow_users[MAX_ALLOW_USERS];
diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
index 741c5befb..14e60c6dc 100644
--- a/serverloop.c
+++ b/serverloop.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.162 2012/06/20 04:42:58 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.163 2012/12/02 20:46:11 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -950,7 +950,7 @@ server_input_window_size(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 static Channel *
 server_request_direct_tcpip(void)
 {
-	Channel *c;
+	Channel *c = NULL;
 	char *target, *originator;
 	u_short target_port, originator_port;
 
@@ -963,9 +963,16 @@ server_request_direct_tcpip(void)
 	debug("server_request_direct_tcpip: originator %s port %d, target %s "
 	    "port %d", originator, originator_port, target, target_port);
 
-	/* XXX check permission */
-	c = channel_connect_to(target, target_port,
-	    "direct-tcpip", "direct-tcpip");
+	/* XXX fine grained permissions */
+	if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 &&
+	    !no_port_forwarding_flag) {
+		c = channel_connect_to(target, target_port,
+		    "direct-tcpip", "direct-tcpip");
+	} else {
+		logit("refused local port forward: "
+		    "originator %s port %d, target %s port %d",
+		    originator, originator_port, target, target_port);
+	}
 
 	xfree(originator);
 	xfree(target);
@@ -1126,7 +1133,7 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		    listen_address, listen_port);
 
 		/* check permissions */
-		if (!options.allow_tcp_forwarding ||
+		if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0 ||
 		    no_port_forwarding_flag ||
 		    (!want_reply && listen_port == 0)
 #ifndef NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT
diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
index 65bf28776..643e7fc59 100644
--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.260 2012/03/15 03:10:27 guenther Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.261 2012/12/02 20:46:11 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
  *                    All rights reserved
@@ -273,7 +273,10 @@ do_authenticated(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	setproctitle("%s", authctxt->pw->pw_name);
 
 	/* setup the channel layer */
-	if (!no_port_forwarding_flag && options.allow_tcp_forwarding)
+	if (no_port_forwarding_flag ||
+	    (options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) == 0)
+		channel_disable_adm_local_opens();
+	else
 		channel_permit_all_opens();
 
 	auth_debug_send();
@@ -383,7 +386,7 @@ do_authenticated1(Authctxt *authctxt)
 				debug("Port forwarding not permitted for this authentication.");
 				break;
 			}
-			if (!options.allow_tcp_forwarding) {
+			if (!(options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE)) {
 				debug("Port forwarding not permitted.");
 				break;
 			}
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index 05f3374fb..d2c4db55b 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.149 2012/11/04 11:09:15 djm Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: November 4 2012 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.150 2012/12/02 20:46:11 djm Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: December 2 2012 $
 .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -124,6 +124,18 @@ in
 for more information on patterns.
 .It Cm AllowTcpForwarding
 Specifies whether TCP forwarding is permitted.
+The available options are
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq all
+to allow TCP forwarding,
+.Dq no
+to prevent all TCP forwarding,
+.Dq local
+to allow local (from the perspective of
+.Xr ssh 1 ) forwarding only or
+.Dq remote
+to allow remote forwarding only.
 The default is
 .Dq yes .
 Note that disabling TCP forwarding does not improve security unless
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 15b05cfa17592da7470d7bd4b2de063188697471 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Mon, 3 Dec 2012 09:53:20 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/02 20:34:10      [auth.c auth.h
 auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c auth2-jpake.c auth2.c]      [monitor.c
 monitor.h]      Fixes logging of partial authentication when privsep is
 enabled      Previously, we recorded "Failed xxx" since we reset
 authenticated before      calling auth_log() in auth2.c. This adds an explcit
 "Partial" state.

     Add a "submethod" to auth_log() to report which submethod is used
     for keyboard-interactive.

     Fix multiple authentication when one of the methods is
     keyboard-interactive.

     ok markus@
---
 ChangeLog     | 14 +++++++++++
 auth.c        | 12 ++++++---
 auth.h        | 10 +++++---
 auth1.c       |  8 +++---
 auth2-chall.c | 12 ++++-----
 auth2-gss.c   |  8 +++---
 auth2-jpake.c |  4 +--
 auth2.c       | 37 ++++++++++++++-------------
 monitor.c     | 25 +++++++++++++------
 monitor.h     | 80 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------
 10 files changed, 123 insertions(+), 87 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index cee038727..9ed715925 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -29,6 +29,20 @@
    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/11/14 02:32:15
      [ssh-keygen.c]
      allow the full range of unsigned serial numbers; 'fine' deraadt@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/02 20:34:10
+     [auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c auth2-jpake.c auth2.c]
+     [monitor.c monitor.h]
+     Fixes logging of partial authentication when privsep is enabled
+     Previously, we recorded "Failed xxx" since we reset authenticated before
+     calling auth_log() in auth2.c. This adds an explcit "Partial" state.
+     
+     Add a "submethod" to auth_log() to report which submethod is used
+     for keyboard-interactive.
+     
+     Fix multiple authentication when one of the methods is
+     keyboard-interactive.
+     
+     ok markus@
 
 20121107
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index b5e1eefa0..7bc6f4021 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.97 2012/10/30 21:29:54 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.98 2012/12/02 20:34:09 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -251,7 +251,8 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
 }
 
 void
-auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
+auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial,
+    const char *method, const char *submethod, const char *info)
 {
 	void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
 	char *authmsg;
@@ -268,12 +269,15 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
 
 	if (authctxt->postponed)
 		authmsg = "Postponed";
+	else if (partial)
+		authmsg = "Partial";
 	else
 		authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
 
-	authlog("%s %s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s",
+	authlog("%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s",
 	    authmsg,
 	    method,
+	    submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod,
 	    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
 	    authctxt->user,
 	    get_remote_ipaddr(),
@@ -303,7 +307,7 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
  * Check whether root logins are disallowed.
  */
 int
-auth_root_allowed(char *method)
+auth_root_allowed(const char *method)
 {
 	switch (options.permit_root_login) {
 	case PERMIT_YES:
diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
index 8920c7dae..c6fe84722 100644
--- a/auth.h
+++ b/auth.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.71 2012/11/04 11:09:15 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.72 2012/12/02 20:34:09 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -148,10 +148,12 @@ void disable_forwarding(void);
 void	do_authentication(Authctxt *);
 void	do_authentication2(Authctxt *);
 
-void	auth_log(Authctxt *, int, char *, char *);
-void	userauth_finish(Authctxt *, int, char *);
+void	auth_log(Authctxt *, int, int, const char *, const char *,
+    const char *);
+void	userauth_finish(Authctxt *, int, const char *, const char *);
+int	auth_root_allowed(const char *);
+
 void	userauth_send_banner(const char *);
-int	auth_root_allowed(char *);
 
 char	*auth2_read_banner(void);
 int	 auth2_methods_valid(const char *, int);
diff --git a/auth1.c b/auth1.c
index fb37fadfe..6eea8d81e 100644
--- a/auth1.c
+++ b/auth1.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.76 2012/11/04 11:09:15 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.77 2012/12/02 20:34:09 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
  *                    All rights reserved
@@ -253,7 +253,8 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		if (options.use_pam && (PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())))
 #endif
 		{
-			auth_log(authctxt, 1, "without authentication", "");
+			auth_log(authctxt, 1, 0, "without authentication",
+			    NULL, "");
 			return;
 		}
 	}
@@ -352,7 +353,8 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 
  skip:
 		/* Log before sending the reply */
-		auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, get_authname(type), info);
+		auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, 0, get_authname(type),
+		    NULL, info);
 
 		if (client_user != NULL) {
 			xfree(client_user);
diff --git a/auth2-chall.c b/auth2-chall.c
index e6dbffe22..8fdb33498 100644
--- a/auth2-chall.c
+++ b/auth2-chall.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.34 2008/12/09 04:32:22 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.35 2012/12/02 20:34:09 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Per Allansson.  All rights reserved.
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
 	int authenticated = 0, res;
 	u_int i, nresp;
-	char **response = NULL, *method;
+	char *devicename = NULL, **response = NULL;
 
 	if (authctxt == NULL)
 		fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no authctxt");
@@ -329,9 +329,7 @@ input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		/* Failure! */
 		break;
 	}
-
-	xasprintf(&method, "keyboard-interactive/%s", kbdintctxt->device->name);
-
+	devicename = kbdintctxt->device->name;
 	if (!authctxt->postponed) {
 		if (authenticated) {
 			auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt);
@@ -341,8 +339,8 @@ input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 			auth2_challenge_start(authctxt);
 		}
 	}
-	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method);
-	xfree(method);
+	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "keyboard-interactive",
+	    devicename);
 }
 
 void
diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
index 0d59b2177..93d576bfb 100644
--- a/auth2-gss.c
+++ b/auth2-gss.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.17 2011/03/10 02:52:57 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.18 2012/12/02 20:34:09 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
 		}
 		authctxt->postponed = 0;
 		dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
-		userauth_finish(authctxt, 0, "gssapi-with-mic");
+		userauth_finish(authctxt, 0, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
 	} else {
 		if (send_tok.length != 0) {
 			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN);
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL);
 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
-	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic");
+	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
 }
 
 static void
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL);
 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
-	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic");
+	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
 }
 
 Authmethod method_gssapi = {
diff --git a/auth2-jpake.c b/auth2-jpake.c
index a460e8216..ed0eba47b 100644
--- a/auth2-jpake.c
+++ b/auth2-jpake.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-jpake.c,v 1.4 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-jpake.c,v 1.5 2012/12/02 20:34:09 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ input_userauth_jpake_client_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
 	jpake_free(authctxt->jpake_ctx);
 	authctxt->jpake_ctx = NULL;
-	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method_jpake.name);
+	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method_jpake.name, NULL);
 }
 
 #endif /* JPAKE */
diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
index 8114ec863..e367a1045 100644
--- a/auth2.c
+++ b/auth2.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.125 2012/11/04 11:09:15 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.126 2012/12/02 20:34:09 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		debug2("input_userauth_request: try method %s", method);
 		authenticated =	m->userauth(authctxt);
 	}
-	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method);
+	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method, NULL);
 
 	xfree(service);
 	xfree(user);
@@ -294,7 +294,8 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 }
 
 void
-userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
+userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, const char *method,
+    const char *submethod)
 {
 	char *methods;
 	int partial = 0;
@@ -302,6 +303,8 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
 	if (!authctxt->valid && authenticated)
 		fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated invalid user %s",
 		    authctxt->user);
+	if (authenticated && authctxt->postponed)
+		fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated and postponed");
 
 	/* Special handling for root */
 	if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
@@ -312,6 +315,19 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
 #endif
 	}
 
+	if (authenticated && options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
+		if (!auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt, method)) {
+			authenticated = 0;
+			partial = 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Log before sending the reply */
+	auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial, method, submethod, " ssh2");
+
+	if (authctxt->postponed)
+		return;
+
 #ifdef USE_PAM
 	if (options.use_pam && authenticated) {
 		if (!PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())) {
@@ -330,23 +346,10 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
 #ifdef _UNICOS
 	if (authenticated && cray_access_denied(authctxt->user)) {
 		authenticated = 0;
-		fatal("Access denied for user %s.",authctxt->user);
+		fatal("Access denied for user %s.", authctxt->user);
 	}
 #endif /* _UNICOS */
 
-	/* Log before sending the reply */
-	auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, method, " ssh2");
-
-	if (authctxt->postponed)
-		return;
-
-	if (authenticated && options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
-		if (!auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt, method)) {
-			authenticated = 0;
-			partial = 1;
-		}
-	}
-
 	if (authenticated == 1) {
 		/* turn off userauth */
 		dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, &dispatch_protocol_ignore);
diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index 0adbf3a65..1cfc48757 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.118 2012/11/04 11:09:15 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.119 2012/12/02 20:34:10 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
 static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
 static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
 static char *auth_method = "unknown";
+static char *auth_submethod = NULL;
 static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
 static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
 static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
@@ -352,7 +353,7 @@ void
 monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
 {
 	struct mon_table *ent;
-	int authenticated = 0;
+	int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
 
 	debug3("preauth child monitor started");
 
@@ -379,7 +380,9 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
 
 	/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
 	while (!authenticated) {
+		partial = 0;
 		auth_method = "unknown";
+		auth_submethod = NULL;
 		authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
 
 		/* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
@@ -393,6 +396,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
 				debug3("%s: method %s: partial", __func__,
 				    auth_method);
 				authenticated = 0;
+				partial = 1;
 			}
 		}
 
@@ -417,7 +421,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
 #endif
 		}
 		if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
-			auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, auth_method,
+			auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial,
+			    auth_method, auth_submethod,
 			    compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
 			if (!authenticated)
 				authctxt->failures++;
@@ -943,7 +948,7 @@ mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
 
 	if (compat20)
-		auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
+		auth_method = "keyboard-interactive"; /* XXX auth_submethod */
 	else
 		auth_method = "bsdauth";
 
@@ -1084,7 +1089,8 @@ mm_answer_pam_query(int sock, Buffer *m)
 		xfree(prompts);
 	if (echo_on != NULL)
 		xfree(echo_on);
-	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive/pam";
+	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
+	auth_submethod = "pam";
 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m);
 	return (0);
 }
@@ -1113,7 +1119,8 @@ mm_answer_pam_respond(int sock, Buffer *m)
 	buffer_clear(m);
 	buffer_put_int(m, ret);
 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, m);
-	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive/pam";
+	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
+	auth_submethod = "pam";
 	if (ret == 0)
 		sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
 	return (0);
@@ -1127,7 +1134,8 @@ mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
 	(sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt);
 	buffer_clear(m);
 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
-	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive/pam";
+	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
+	auth_submethod = "pam";
 	return (sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt);
 }
 #endif
@@ -1201,7 +1209,8 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
 		hostbased_chost = chost;
 	} else {
 		/* Log failed attempt */
-		auth_log(authctxt, 0, auth_method, compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
+		auth_log(authctxt, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL,
+		    compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
 		xfree(blob);
 		xfree(cuser);
 		xfree(chost);
diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
index 5e7d552fb..2caa46933 100644
--- a/monitor.h
+++ b/monitor.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.h,v 1.16 2011/06/17 21:44:31 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.h,v 1.17 2012/12/02 20:34:10 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
@@ -28,44 +28,48 @@
 #ifndef _MONITOR_H_
 #define _MONITOR_H_
 
+/* Please keep *_REQ_* values on even numbers and *_ANS_* on odd numbers */
 enum monitor_reqtype {
-	MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI,
-	MONITOR_REQ_FREE, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV,
-	MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN,
-	MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM,
-	MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER,
-	MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD,
-	MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY,
-	MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND,
-	MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY,
-	MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND,
-	MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED,
-	MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY,
-	MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT,
-	MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MONITOR_ANS_PTY,
-	MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP,
-	MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY,
-	MONITOR_REQ_SESSID,
-	MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED,
-	MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE,
-	MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE,
-	MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP,
-	MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP,
-	MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK,
-	MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC,
-	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START,
-	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT,
-	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX,
-	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY,
-	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND,
-	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX,
-	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND,
-	MONITOR_REQ_TERM,
-	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1,
-	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA,
-	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP2,
-	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM,
-	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM,
+	MONITOR_REQ_MODULI = 0, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI = 1,
+	MONITOR_REQ_FREE = 2,
+	MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV = 4,
+	MONITOR_REQ_SIGN = 6, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN = 7,
+	MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM = 8, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM = 9,
+	MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER = 10, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER = 11,
+	MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD = 12, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD = 13,
+	MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY = 14, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY = 15,
+	MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND = 16, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND = 17,
+	MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY = 18, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY = 19,
+	MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND = 20, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND = 21,
+	MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED = 22, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED = 23,
+	MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY = 24, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY = 25,
+	MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT = 26,
+	MONITOR_REQ_PTY = 28, MONITOR_ANS_PTY = 29,
+	MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP = 30,
+	MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY = 32, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY = 33,
+	MONITOR_REQ_SESSID = 34,
+	MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED = 36, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED = 37,
+	MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE = 38, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE = 39,
+	MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE = 40, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE = 41,
+	MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP = 42, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP = 43,
+	MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP = 44, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP = 45,
+	MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK = 46, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK = 47,
+	MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC = 48, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC = 49,
+	MONITOR_REQ_TERM = 50,
+	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1 = 52, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1 = 53,
+	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA = 54, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA = 55,
+	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2 = 56, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP2 = 57,
+	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM = 58, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM = 59,
+	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM = 60, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM = 61,
+
+	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
+	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
+	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
+	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107,
+	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109,
+	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
+	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
+
 };
 
 struct mm_master;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From d27a026ab7599a95d96436274c3033c2157cdd85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Mon, 3 Dec 2012 10:06:37 +1100
Subject:    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/05 02:05:30     
 [regress/multiplex.sh]      Use 'kill -0' to test for the presence of a pid
 since it's more portable

---
 ChangeLog            | 3 +++
 regress/multiplex.sh | 6 +++---
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 9ed715925..51cba6eed 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@
      keyboard-interactive.
      
      ok markus@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/05 02:05:30
+     [regress/multiplex.sh]
+     Use 'kill -0' to test for the presence of a pid since it's more portable
 
 20121107
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/regress/multiplex.sh b/regress/multiplex.sh
index f93ac9a41..1e6cc7606 100644
--- a/regress/multiplex.sh
+++ b/regress/multiplex.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: multiplex.sh,v 1.16 2012/09/10 01:51:19 dtucker Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: multiplex.sh,v 1.17 2012/10/05 02:05:30 dtucker Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 CTL=/tmp/openssh.regress.ctl-sock.$$
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oexit otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1 \
 
 # Wait for master to exit
 wait $MASTER_PID
-kill -0 $MASTER_PID >/dev/null && fail "exit command failed"
+kill -0 $MASTER_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail "exit command failed"
 
 # Restart master and test -O stop command with master using -N
 verbose "test $tid: cmd stop"
@@ -117,4 +117,4 @@ wait $SLEEP_PID
 [ $! != 0 ] || fail "waiting for concurrent command"
 wait $MASTER_PID
 [ $! != 0 ] || fail "waiting for master stop"
-kill -0 $MASTER_PID >/dev/null && fail "stop command failed"
+kill -0 $MASTER_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail "stop command failed"
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From fa51d8b6b2151c47c08ee54a0ece8173a4c465c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Mon, 3 Dec 2012 10:08:25 +1100
Subject:    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/05 02:20:48     
 [regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/try-ciphers.sh]      Add
 umac-128@openssh.com to the list of MACs to be tested

---
 ChangeLog               | 3 +++
 regress/cipher-speed.sh | 5 +++--
 regress/try-ciphers.sh  | 5 +++--
 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 51cba6eed..517e9c470 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -18,6 +18,9 @@
      make AllowTcpForwarding accept "local" and "remote" in addition to its
      current "yes"/"no" to allow the server to specify whether just local or
      remote TCP forwarding is enabled. ok markus@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/05 02:20:48
+     [regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/try-ciphers.sh]
+     Add umac-128@openssh.com to the list of MACs to be tested
 
 20121114
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/regress/cipher-speed.sh b/regress/cipher-speed.sh
index 5800f4b09..4f26f7e96 100644
--- a/regress/cipher-speed.sh
+++ b/regress/cipher-speed.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: cipher-speed.sh,v 1.5 2012/06/28 05:07:45 dtucker Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: cipher-speed.sh,v 1.6 2012/10/05 02:20:48 dtucker Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="cipher speed"
@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@ ciphers="aes128-cbc 3des-cbc blowfish-cbc cast128-cbc
 	arcfour128 arcfour256 arcfour 
 	aes192-cbc aes256-cbc rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se
 	aes128-ctr aes192-ctr aes256-ctr"
-macs="hmac-sha1 hmac-md5 umac-64@openssh.com hmac-sha1-96 hmac-md5-96"
+macs="hmac-sha1 hmac-md5 umac-64@openssh.com umac-128@openssh.com
+	hmac-sha1-96 hmac-md5-96"
 config_defined HAVE_EVP_SHA256 &&
     macs="$macs hmac-sha2-256 hmac-sha2-512"
 
diff --git a/regress/try-ciphers.sh b/regress/try-ciphers.sh
index 0887979d8..cf6014297 100644
--- a/regress/try-ciphers.sh
+++ b/regress/try-ciphers.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: try-ciphers.sh,v 1.14 2012/09/06 04:11:07 dtucker Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: try-ciphers.sh,v 1.15 2012/10/05 02:20:48 dtucker Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="try ciphers"
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ ciphers="aes128-cbc 3des-cbc blowfish-cbc cast128-cbc
 	arcfour128 arcfour256 arcfour 
 	aes192-cbc aes256-cbc rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se
 	aes128-ctr aes192-ctr aes256-ctr"
-macs="hmac-sha1 hmac-md5 umac-64@openssh.com hmac-sha1-96 hmac-md5-96"
+macs="hmac-sha1 hmac-md5 umac-64@openssh.com umac-128@openssh.com
+	hmac-sha1-96 hmac-md5-96"
 config_defined HAVE_EVP_SHA256 &&
     macs="$macs hmac-sha2-256 hmac-sha2-512"
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 6618e92509bc0362352de1386ee0d70e785a9bb5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Mon, 3 Dec 2012 10:09:04 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/19 05:10:42     
 [regress/cert-userkey.sh]      include a serial number when generating certs

---
 ChangeLog               | 3 +++
 regress/cert-userkey.sh | 7 +++----
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 517e9c470..ed4a60c7f 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@
    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/05 02:20:48
      [regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/try-ciphers.sh]
      Add umac-128@openssh.com to the list of MACs to be tested
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/19 05:10:42
+     [regress/cert-userkey.sh]
+     include a serial number when generating certs
 
 20121114
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/regress/cert-userkey.sh b/regress/cert-userkey.sh
index 6700db274..aa85cd6cb 100644
--- a/regress/cert-userkey.sh
+++ b/regress/cert-userkey.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: cert-userkey.sh,v 1.8 2011/05/17 07:13:31 djm Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: cert-userkey.sh,v 1.9 2012/10/19 05:10:42 djm Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="certified user keys"
@@ -22,9 +22,8 @@ for ktype in rsa dsa $ecdsa ; do
 	${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${ktype} \
 	    -f $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} || \
 		fail "ssh-keygen of cert_user_key_${ktype} failed"
-	${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I \
-	    "regress user key for $USER" \
-	    -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} ||
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "regress user key for $USER" \
+	    -z $$ -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} ||
 		fail "couldn't sign cert_user_key_${ktype}"
 	# v00 ecdsa certs do not exist
 	test "${ktype}" = "ecdsa" && continue
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 771c43cee6343f757884030ff92f1156b2ef399f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Mon, 3 Dec 2012 10:12:13 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/11/22 22:49:30      [regress/Makefile
 regress/keys-command.sh]      regress for AuthorizedKeysCommand; hints from
 markus@

---
 ChangeLog               |  3 +++
 regress/Makefile        |  5 +++--
 regress/keys-command.sh | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 regress/keys-command.sh

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index ed4a60c7f..873d81d59 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@
    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/19 05:10:42
      [regress/cert-userkey.sh]
      include a serial number when generating certs
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/11/22 22:49:30
+     [regress/Makefile regress/keys-command.sh]
+     regress for AuthorizedKeysCommand; hints from markus@
 
 20121114
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/regress/Makefile b/regress/Makefile
index f114c27e9..dcc80b734 100644
--- a/regress/Makefile
+++ b/regress/Makefile
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.58 2011/01/06 22:46:21 djm Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.59 2012/11/22 22:49:30 djm Exp $
 
 REGRESS_TARGETS=	t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t-exec
 tests:		$(REGRESS_TARGETS)
@@ -57,7 +57,8 @@ LTESTS= 	connect \
 		kextype \
 		cert-hostkey \
 		cert-userkey \
-		host-expand
+		host-expand \
+		keys-command
 
 INTEROP_TESTS=	putty-transfer putty-ciphers putty-kex conch-ciphers
 #INTEROP_TESTS+=ssh-com ssh-com-client ssh-com-keygen ssh-com-sftp
diff --git a/regress/keys-command.sh b/regress/keys-command.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..09f4db4b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/keys-command.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: keys-command.sh,v 1.1 2012/11/22 22:49:30 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="authorized keys from command"
+
+if test -z "$SUDO" ; then
+	echo "skipped (SUDO not set)"
+	echo "need SUDO to create file in /var/run, test won't work without"
+	exit 0
+fi
+
+# Establish a AuthorizedKeysCommand in /var/run where it will have
+# acceptable directory permissions.
+KEY_COMMAND="/var/run/keycommand_${LOGNAME}"
+cat << _EOF | $SUDO sh -c "cat > '$KEY_COMMAND'"
+#!/bin/sh
+test "x\$1" -ne "x${LOGNAME}" && exit 1
+exec cat "$OBJ/authorized_keys_${LOGNAME}"
+_EOF
+$SUDO chmod 0755 "$KEY_COMMAND"
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak
+(
+	grep -vi AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak
+	echo AuthorizedKeysFile none
+	echo AuthorizedKeysCommand $KEY_COMMAND
+	echo AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ${LOGNAME}
+) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "connect failed"
+fi
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 999bd2d259c1dacb53a2d8be31d4c1861b58cdb3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Mon, 3 Dec 2012 10:13:39 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/02 20:47:48      [Makefile
 regress/forward-control.sh]      regress for AllowTcpForwarding local/remote;
 ok markus@

---
 ChangeLog                  |   3 +
 regress/Makefile           |   9 ++-
 regress/forward-control.sh | 168 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 177 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 regress/forward-control.sh

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 873d81d59..2e9c4e279 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@
    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/11/22 22:49:30
      [regress/Makefile regress/keys-command.sh]
      regress for AuthorizedKeysCommand; hints from markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/02 20:47:48
+     [Makefile regress/forward-control.sh]
+     regress for AllowTcpForwarding local/remote; ok markus@
 
 20121114
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/regress/Makefile b/regress/Makefile
index dcc80b734..c628fb5ff 100644
--- a/regress/Makefile
+++ b/regress/Makefile
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.59 2012/11/22 22:49:30 djm Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.60 2012/12/02 20:47:48 djm Exp $
 
 REGRESS_TARGETS=	t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t-exec
 tests:		$(REGRESS_TARGETS)
@@ -58,7 +58,8 @@ LTESTS= 	connect \
 		cert-hostkey \
 		cert-userkey \
 		host-expand \
-		keys-command
+		keys-command \
+		forward-control
 
 INTEROP_TESTS=	putty-transfer putty-ciphers putty-kex conch-ciphers
 #INTEROP_TESTS+=ssh-com ssh-com-client ssh-com-keygen ssh-com-sftp
@@ -78,7 +79,9 @@ CLEANFILES=	t2.out t3.out t6.out1 t6.out2 t7.out t7.out.pub copy.1 copy.2 \
 		known_hosts-cert host_ca_key* cert_host_key* \
 		putty.rsa2 sshd_proxy_orig ssh_proxy_bak \
 		key.rsa-* key.dsa-* key.ecdsa-* \
-		authorized_principals_${USER} expect actual
+		authorized_principals_${USER} expect actual ready \
+		sshd_proxy.* authorized_keys_${USER}.*
+
 
 # Enable all malloc(3) randomisations and checks
 TEST_ENV=      "MALLOC_OPTIONS=AFGJPRX"
diff --git a/regress/forward-control.sh b/regress/forward-control.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9d000bc76
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/forward-control.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: forward-control.sh,v 1.1 2012/12/02 20:47:48 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="sshd control of local and remote forwarding"
+
+LFWD_PORT=3320
+RFWD_PORT=3321
+CTL=$OBJ/ctl-sock
+READY=$OBJ/ready
+
+wait_for_file_to_appear() {
+	_path=$1
+	_n=0
+	while test ! -e $_path ; do
+		test $_n -eq 1 && trace "waiting for $_path to appear"
+		_n=`expr $_n + 1`
+		test $_n -ge 5 && return 1
+		sleep 1
+	done
+	return 0
+}
+
+wait_for_process_to_exit() {
+	_pid=$1
+	_n=0
+	while kill -0 $_pid 2>/dev/null ; do
+		test $_n -eq 1 && trace "waiting for $_pid to exit"
+		_n=`expr $_n + 1`
+		test $_n -ge 5 && return 1
+		sleep 1
+	done
+	return 0
+}
+
+# usage: check_lfwd protocol Y|N message
+check_lfwd() {
+	_proto=$1
+	_expected=$2
+	_message=$3
+	rm -f $READY
+	${SSH} -oProtocol=$_proto -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \
+	    -L$LFWD_PORT:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+	    -o ExitOnForwardFailure=yes \
+	    -n host "sleep 60 & echo \$! > $READY ; wait " \
+	    >/dev/null 2>&1 &
+	_sshpid=$!
+	wait_for_file_to_appear $READY || \
+		fatal "check_lfwd ssh fail: $_message"
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p $LFWD_PORT \
+	    -oConnectionAttempts=4 host true >/dev/null 2>&1
+	_result=$?
+	kill $_sshpid `cat $READY` 2>/dev/null
+	wait_for_process_to_exit $_sshpid
+	if test "x$_expected" = "xY" -a $_result -ne 0 ; then
+		fail "check_lfwd failed (expecting success): $_message"
+	elif test "x$_expected" = "xN" -a $_result -eq 0 ; then
+		fail "check_lfwd succeeded (expecting failure): $_message"
+	elif test "x$_expected" != "xY" -a "x$_expected" != "xN" ; then
+		fatal "check_lfwd invalid argument \"$_expected\""
+	else
+		verbose "check_lfwd done (expecting $_expected): $_message"
+	fi
+}
+
+# usage: check_rfwd protocol Y|N message
+check_rfwd() {
+	_proto=$1
+	_expected=$2
+	_message=$3
+	rm -f $READY
+	${SSH} -oProtocol=$_proto -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \
+	    -R$RFWD_PORT:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+	    -o ExitOnForwardFailure=yes \
+	    -n host "sleep 60 & echo \$! > $READY ; wait " \
+	    >/dev/null 2>&1 &
+	_sshpid=$!
+	wait_for_file_to_appear $READY
+	_result=$?
+	if test $_result -eq 0 ; then
+		${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p $RFWD_PORT \
+		    -oConnectionAttempts=4 host true >/dev/null 2>&1
+		_result=$?
+		kill $_sshpid `cat $READY` 2>/dev/null
+		wait_for_process_to_exit $_sshpid
+	fi
+	if test "x$_expected" = "xY" -a $_result -ne 0 ; then
+		fail "check_rfwd failed (expecting success): $_message"
+	elif test "x$_expected" = "xN" -a $_result -eq 0 ; then
+		fail "check_rfwd succeeded (expecting failure): $_message"
+	elif test "x$_expected" != "xY" -a "x$_expected" != "xN" ; then
+		fatal "check_rfwd invalid argument \"$_expected\""
+	else
+		verbose "check_rfwd done (expecting $_expected): $_message"
+	fi
+}
+
+start_sshd
+cp ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak
+cp ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak
+
+# Sanity check: ensure the default config allows forwarding
+for p in 1 2 ; do
+	check_lfwd $p Y "proto $p, default configuration"
+	check_rfwd $p Y "proto $p, default configuration"
+done
+
+# Usage: all_tests yes|local|remote|no Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N
+all_tests() {
+	_tcpfwd=$1
+	_plain_lfwd=$2
+	_plain_rfwd=$3
+	_nopermit_lfwd=$4
+	_nopermit_rfwd=$5
+	_permit_lfwd=$6
+	_permit_rfwd=$7
+	_badfwd=127.0.0.1:22
+	_goodfwd=127.0.0.1:${PORT}
+	for _proto in 1 2 ; do
+		cp ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \
+		    ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}
+		_prefix="proto $_proto, AllowTcpForwarding=$_tcpfwd"
+		# No PermitOpen
+		( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
+		  echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \
+		    > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
+		check_lfwd $_proto $_plain_lfwd "$_prefix"
+		check_rfwd $_proto $_plain_rfwd "$_prefix"
+		# PermitOpen via sshd_config that doesn't match
+		( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
+		  echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ;
+		  echo "PermitOpen $_badfwd" ) \
+		    > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
+		check_lfwd $_proto $_nopermit_lfwd "$_prefix, !PermitOpen"
+		check_rfwd $_proto $_nopermit_rfwd "$_prefix, !PermitOpen"
+		# PermitOpen via sshd_config that does match
+		( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
+		  echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ;
+		  echo "PermitOpen $_badfwd $_goodfwd" ) \
+		    > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
+		# NB. permitopen via authorized_keys should have same
+		# success/fail as via sshd_config
+		# permitopen via authorized_keys that doesn't match
+		sed "s/^/permitopen=\"$_badfwd\" /" \
+		    < ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \
+		    > ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} || fatal "sed 1 fail"
+		( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
+		  echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \
+		    > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
+		check_lfwd $_proto $_nopermit_lfwd "$_prefix, !permitopen"
+		check_rfwd $_proto $_nopermit_rfwd "$_prefix, !permitopen"
+		# permitopen via authorized_keys that does match
+		sed "s/^/permitopen=\"$_badfwd\",permitopen=\"$_goodfwd\" /" \
+		    < ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \
+		    > ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} || fatal "sed 2 fail"
+		( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
+		  echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \
+		    > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
+		check_lfwd $_proto $_permit_lfwd "$_prefix, permitopen"
+		check_rfwd $_proto $_permit_rfwd "$_prefix, permitopen"
+	done
+}
+
+#                      no-permitopen mismatch-permitopen match-permitopen
+#   AllowTcpForwarding  local remote        local remote     local remote
+all_tests          yes      Y      Y            N      Y         Y      Y
+all_tests        local      Y      N            N      N         Y      N
+all_tests       remote      N      Y            N      Y         N      Y
+all_tests           no      N      N            N      N         N      N
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 55aca027ed24f8fdce43bd451ce96b89f979606c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Mon, 3 Dec 2012 11:25:30 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/03 00:14:06      [auth2-chall.c
 ssh-keygen.c]      Fix compilation with -Wall -Werror (trivial type fixes)

---
 ChangeLog     | 3 +++
 auth2-chall.c | 5 +++--
 ssh-keygen.c  | 4 ++--
 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 2e9c4e279..83b13d7d7 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@
    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/02 20:47:48
      [Makefile regress/forward-control.sh]
      regress for AllowTcpForwarding local/remote; ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/03 00:14:06
+     [auth2-chall.c ssh-keygen.c]
+     Fix compilation with -Wall -Werror (trivial type fixes)
 
 20121114
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/auth2-chall.c b/auth2-chall.c
index 8fdb33498..6505d4009 100644
--- a/auth2-chall.c
+++ b/auth2-chall.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.35 2012/12/02 20:34:09 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.36 2012/12/03 00:14:06 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Per Allansson.  All rights reserved.
@@ -283,7 +283,8 @@ input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
 	int authenticated = 0, res;
 	u_int i, nresp;
-	char *devicename = NULL, **response = NULL;
+	const char *devicename = NULL;
+	char **response = NULL;
 
 	if (authctxt == NULL)
 		fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no authctxt");
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
index 2d8af679c..1bbe0b0a8 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.219 2012/11/14 02:32:15 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.220 2012/12/03 00:14:06 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ char *identity_comment = NULL;
 char *ca_key_path = NULL;
 
 /* Certificate serial number */
-long long cert_serial = 0;
+unsigned long long cert_serial = 0;
 
 /* Key type when certifying */
 u_int cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 03af12e9305900611bec6b5f4b106891f025c8a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Mon, 3 Dec 2012 11:55:53 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) [configure.ac] Turn on -g for gcc compilers. Helps
 pre-installation    debugging. ok dtucker@

---
 ChangeLog    | 2 ++
 configure.ac | 5 +++--
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 83b13d7d7..bc3302a60 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/03 00:14:06
      [auth2-chall.c ssh-keygen.c]
      Fix compilation with -Wall -Werror (trivial type fixes)
+ - (djm) [configure.ac] Turn on -g for gcc compilers. Helps pre-installation
+   debugging. ok dtucker@
 
 20121114
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index a704fc7ff..0fa9ba827 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.496 2012/07/06 01:49:29 djm Exp $
+# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.497 2012/12/03 00:55:54 djm Exp $
 #
 # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
 #
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 
 AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org])
-AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.496 $)
+AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.497 $)
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
 AC_LANG([C])
 
@@ -155,6 +155,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([stackprotect],
 
 
 if test "$GCC" = "yes" || test "$GCC" = "egcs"; then
+	OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-g])
 	OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wall])
 	OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wpointer-arith])
 	OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wuninitialized])
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 8b48982a569596f40f9ad16baac9c8c42c8a96aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Mon, 3 Dec 2012 12:35:55 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) [configure.ac] Revert previous. configure.ac already does
 this    for us.

---
 ChangeLog    | 2 ++
 configure.ac | 5 ++---
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index bc3302a60..36ad90498 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@
      Fix compilation with -Wall -Werror (trivial type fixes)
  - (djm) [configure.ac] Turn on -g for gcc compilers. Helps pre-installation
    debugging. ok dtucker@
+ - (djm) [configure.ac] Revert previous. configure.ac already does this
+   for us.
 
 20121114
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 0fa9ba827..8b32e40c9 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.497 2012/12/03 00:55:54 djm Exp $
+# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.498 2012/12/03 01:35:55 djm Exp $
 #
 # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
 #
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 
 AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org])
-AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.497 $)
+AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.498 $)
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
 AC_LANG([C])
 
@@ -155,7 +155,6 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([stackprotect],
 
 
 if test "$GCC" = "yes" || test "$GCC" = "egcs"; then
-	OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-g])
 	OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wall])
 	OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wpointer-arith])
 	OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wuninitialized])
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 96ce9a1e45a2f2a1b8be7b97fde07e629dd9fa05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2012 07:50:03 -0800
Subject: 20121205  - (tim) [defines.h] Some platforms are missing ULLONG_MAX.
 Feedback djm@.

---
 ChangeLog | 3 +++
 defines.h | 6 +++++-
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 36ad90498..b572f6006 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
+20121205
+ - (tim) [defines.h] Some platforms are missing ULLONG_MAX. Feedback djm@.
+
 20121203
  - (djm) [openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h] Sync with OpenBSD to get
    TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE needed for upcoming changes.
diff --git a/defines.h b/defines.h
index 53f83a142..54de062d3 100644
--- a/defines.h
+++ b/defines.h
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
 #ifndef _DEFINES_H
 #define _DEFINES_H
 
-/* $Id: defines.h,v 1.169 2012/02/15 04:13:06 tim Exp $ */
+/* $Id: defines.h,v 1.170 2012/12/04 15:50:04 tim Exp $ */
 
 
 /* Constants */
@@ -283,6 +283,10 @@ typedef unsigned char u_char;
 # define HAVE_U_CHAR
 #endif /* HAVE_U_CHAR */
 
+#ifndef ULLONG_MAX
+# define ULLONG_MAX ((unsigned long long)-1)
+#endif
+
 #ifndef SIZE_T_MAX
 #define SIZE_T_MAX ULONG_MAX
 #endif /* SIZE_T_MAX */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 3dfb877046b40638ac7c88de9bb07091eb463205 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 7 Dec 2012 13:03:10 +1100
Subject:    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/06 06:06:54     
 [regress/keys-command.sh]      Fix some problems with the keys-command test: 
      - use string comparison rather than numeric comparison       - check for
 existing KEY_COMMAND file and don't clobber if it exists       - clean up
 KEY_COMMAND file if we do create it.       - check that KEY_COMMAND is
 executable (which it won't be if eg /var/run         is mounted noexec).     
 ok djm.

---
 ChangeLog               | 12 ++++++++++++
 regress/keys-command.sh | 16 +++++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index b572f6006..be3118146 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,15 @@
+20121207
+ - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/06 06:06:54
+     [regress/keys-command.sh]
+     Fix some problems with the keys-command test:
+      - use string comparison rather than numeric comparison
+      - check for existing KEY_COMMAND file and don't clobber if it exists
+      - clean up KEY_COMMAND file if we do create it.
+      - check that KEY_COMMAND is executable (which it won't be if eg /var/run
+        is mounted noexec).
+     ok djm.
+
 20121205
  - (tim) [defines.h] Some platforms are missing ULLONG_MAX. Feedback djm@.
 
diff --git a/regress/keys-command.sh b/regress/keys-command.sh
index 09f4db4b7..b595a434f 100644
--- a/regress/keys-command.sh
+++ b/regress/keys-command.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: keys-command.sh,v 1.1 2012/11/22 22:49:30 djm Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: keys-command.sh,v 1.2 2012/12/06 06:06:54 dtucker Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="authorized keys from command"
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ fi
 KEY_COMMAND="/var/run/keycommand_${LOGNAME}"
 cat << _EOF | $SUDO sh -c "cat > '$KEY_COMMAND'"
 #!/bin/sh
-test "x\$1" -ne "x${LOGNAME}" && exit 1
+test "x\$1" != "x${LOGNAME}" && exit 1
 exec cat "$OBJ/authorized_keys_${LOGNAME}"
 _EOF
 $SUDO chmod 0755 "$KEY_COMMAND"
@@ -27,7 +27,13 @@ cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak
 	echo AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ${LOGNAME}
 ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
 
-${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
-if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
-	fail "connect failed"
+if [ -x $KEY_COMMAND ]; then
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "connect failed"
+	fi
+else
+	echo "SKIPPED: $KEY_COMMAND not executable (/var/run mounted noexec?)"
 fi
+
+$SUDO rm -f $KEY_COMMAND
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From f9333d5246d979a448c5ff4d466de2fd2d286cfd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 7 Dec 2012 13:06:13 +1100
Subject:    - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/03 08:33:03      [ssh-add.1
 sshd_config.5]      tweak previous;

---
 ChangeLog     | 3 +++
 ssh-add.1     | 6 +++---
 sshd_config.5 | 7 ++++---
 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index be3118146..19dc33403 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@
       - check that KEY_COMMAND is executable (which it won't be if eg /var/run
         is mounted noexec).
      ok djm.
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/03 08:33:03
+     [ssh-add.1 sshd_config.5]
+     tweak previous;
 
 20121205
  - (tim) [defines.h] Some platforms are missing ULLONG_MAX. Feedback djm@.
diff --git a/ssh-add.1 b/ssh-add.1
index af93762ae..44846b67e 100644
--- a/ssh-add.1
+++ b/ssh-add.1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.57 2012/12/02 20:42:15 djm Exp $
+.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.58 2012/12/03 08:33:02 jmc Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: December 2 2012 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: December 3 2012 $
 .Dt SSH-ADD 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ Instead of adding identities, removes identities from the agent.
 If
 .Nm
 has been run without arguments, the keys for the default identities and
-their corresponding certificateswill be removed.
+their corresponding certificates will be removed.
 Otherwise, the argument list will be interpreted as a list of paths to
 public key files to specify keys and certificates to be removed from the agent.
 If no public key is found at a given path,
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index d2c4db55b..ad3692b38 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.150 2012/12/02 20:46:11 djm Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: December 2 2012 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.151 2012/12/03 08:33:03 jmc Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: December 3 2012 $
 .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -133,7 +133,8 @@ to allow TCP forwarding,
 to prevent all TCP forwarding,
 .Dq local
 to allow local (from the perspective of
-.Xr ssh 1 ) forwarding only or
+.Xr ssh 1 )
+forwarding only or
 .Dq remote
 to allow remote forwarding only.
 The default is
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 8a96522482acd40af2e8a08696780a54c00b4feb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 7 Dec 2012 13:07:02 +1100
Subject:    - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/05 15:42:52      [ssh-add.c]     
 prevent double-free of comment; ok djm@

---
 ChangeLog | 3 +++
 ssh-add.c | 3 ++-
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 19dc33403..7a3f272e1 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@
    - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/03 08:33:03
      [ssh-add.1 sshd_config.5]
      tweak previous;
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/05 15:42:52
+     [ssh-add.c]
+     prevent double-free of comment; ok djm@
 
 20121205
  - (tim) [defines.h] Some platforms are missing ULLONG_MAX. Feedback djm@.
diff --git a/ssh-add.c b/ssh-add.c
index c8936e5ae..008084704 100644
--- a/ssh-add.c
+++ b/ssh-add.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.104 2012/12/02 20:42:15 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.105 2012/12/05 15:42:52 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ delete_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename, int key_only)
 
 	/* Now try to delete the corresponding certificate too */
 	free(comment);
+	comment = NULL;
 	xasprintf(&certpath, "%s-cert.pub", filename);
 	if ((cert = key_load_public(certpath, &comment)) == NULL)
 		goto out;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 3e1027cd1fff4b3b6320f186ccc69efe06a50466 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 7 Dec 2012 13:07:46 +1100
Subject:    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/07 01:51:35      [serverloop.c] 
     Cast signal to int for logging.  A no-op on openbsd (they're always ints)
      but will prevent warnings in portable.  ok djm@

---
 ChangeLog    | 4 ++++
 serverloop.c | 6 +++---
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 7a3f272e1..85f251ce5 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -15,6 +15,10 @@
    - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/05 15:42:52
      [ssh-add.c]
      prevent double-free of comment; ok djm@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/07 01:51:35
+     [serverloop.c]
+     Cast signal to int for logging.  A no-op on openbsd (they're always ints)
+     but will prevent warnings in portable.  ok djm@
 
 20121205
  - (tim) [defines.h] Some platforms are missing ULLONG_MAX. Feedback djm@.
diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
index 14e60c6dc..e224bd08a 100644
--- a/serverloop.c
+++ b/serverloop.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.163 2012/12/02 20:46:11 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.164 2012/12/07 01:51:35 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -708,7 +708,7 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int fdout_arg, int fderr_arg)
 		    &nalloc, max_time_milliseconds);
 
 		if (received_sigterm) {
-			logit("Exiting on signal %d", received_sigterm);
+			logit("Exiting on signal %d", (int)received_sigterm);
 			/* Clean up sessions, utmp, etc. */
 			cleanup_exit(255);
 		}
@@ -858,7 +858,7 @@ server_loop2(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		    &nalloc, 0);
 
 		if (received_sigterm) {
-			logit("Exiting on signal %d", received_sigterm);
+			logit("Exiting on signal %d", (int)received_sigterm);
 			/* Clean up sessions, utmp, etc. */
 			cleanup_exit(255);
 		}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 6a1937eac5da5bdcf33aaa922ce5de0c764e37ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Wed, 12 Dec 2012 10:44:38 +1100
Subject:    - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/11 22:16:21      [monitor.c]     
 drain the log messages after receiving the keystate from the unpriv     
 child. otherwise it might block while sending. ok djm@

---
 ChangeLog |  7 +++++++
 monitor.c | 10 +++++-----
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 85f251ce5..b96329ef2 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
+20121212
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/11 22:16:21
+     [monitor.c]
+     drain the log messages after receiving the keystate from the unpriv
+     child. otherwise it might block while sending. ok djm@
+
 20121207
  - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/06 06:06:54
diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index 1cfc48757..8006b833c 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.119 2012/12/02 20:34:10 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.120 2012/12/11 22:16:21 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -438,10 +438,6 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
 #endif
 	}
 
-	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
-	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
-		;
-
 	if (!authctxt->valid)
 		fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
 	if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
@@ -452,6 +448,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
 
 	mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
 
+	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
+	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
+		;
+
 	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
 	close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
 	pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From af43a7ac2d77c57112b48f34c7a72be2adb761bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Wed, 12 Dec 2012 10:46:31 +1100
Subject:    - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/11 22:31:18      [PROTOCOL
 authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.h mac.c myproposal.h]      [packet.c
 ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5]      add encrypt-then-mac (EtM) modes to openssh
 by defining new mac algorithms      that change the packet format and compute
 the MAC over the encrypted      message (including the packet size) instead
 of the plaintext data;      these EtM modes are considered more secure and
 used by default.      feedback and ok djm@

---
 ChangeLog     |   8 +++++
 PROTOCOL      |  29 ++++++++++++++-
 authfile.c    |   6 ++--
 cipher.c      |  22 +++++++++---
 cipher.h      |   4 +--
 kex.h         |   3 +-
 mac.c         |  40 ++++++++++++++-------
 myproposal.h  |  11 +++++-
 packet.c      | 113 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 ssh_config.5  |  13 +++++--
 sshd_config.5 |  13 +++++--
 11 files changed, 196 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index b96329ef2..df6d03207 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -4,6 +4,14 @@
      [monitor.c]
      drain the log messages after receiving the keystate from the unpriv
      child. otherwise it might block while sending. ok djm@
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/11 22:31:18
+     [PROTOCOL authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.h mac.c myproposal.h]
+     [packet.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5]
+     add encrypt-then-mac (EtM) modes to openssh by defining new mac algorithms
+     that change the packet format and compute the MAC over the encrypted
+     message (including the packet size) instead of the plaintext data;
+     these EtM modes are considered more secure and used by default.
+     feedback and ok djm@
 
 20121207
  - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/PROTOCOL b/PROTOCOL
index c28196011..834716cc9 100644
--- a/PROTOCOL
+++ b/PROTOCOL
@@ -51,6 +51,33 @@ and ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 curves over GF(p) are supported. Elliptic
 curve points encoded using point compression are NOT accepted or
 generated.
 
+1.5 transport: Protocol 2 Encrypt-then-MAC MAC algorithms
+
+OpenSSH supports MAC algorithms, whose names contain "-etm", that
+perform the calculations in a different order to that defined in RFC
+4253. These variants use the so-called "encrypt then MAC" ordering,
+calculating the MAC over the packet ciphertext rather than the
+plaintext. This ordering closes a security flaw in the SSH transport
+protocol, where decryption of unauthenticated ciphertext provided a
+"decryption oracle" that could, in conjunction with cipher flaws, reveal
+session plaintext.
+
+Specifically, the "-etm" MAC algorithms modify the transport protocol
+to calculate the MAC over the packet ciphertext and to send the packet
+length unencrypted. This is necessary for the transport to obtain the
+length of the packet and location of the MAC tag so that it may be
+verified without decrypting unauthenticated data.
+
+As such, the MAC covers:
+
+      mac = MAC(key, sequence_number || encrypted_packet)
+
+where "encrypted_packet" contains:
+
+      byte      padding_length
+      byte[n1]  payload; n1 = packet_length - padding_length - 1
+      byte[n2]  random padding; n2 = padding_length
+
 2. Connection protocol changes
 
 2.1. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com"
@@ -291,4 +318,4 @@ link(oldpath, newpath) and will respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
 This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
 "1".
 
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.17 2010/12/04 00:18:01 djm Exp $
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.18 2012/12/11 22:31:18 markus Exp $
diff --git a/authfile.c b/authfile.c
index 7dd449690..d9ee4ca65 100644
--- a/authfile.c
+++ b/authfile.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.93 2012/01/25 19:36:31 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.94 2012/12/11 22:31:18 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ key_private_rsa1_to_blob(Key *key, Buffer *blob, const char *passphrase,
 	cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase,
 	    CIPHER_ENCRYPT);
 	cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, cp,
-	    buffer_ptr(&buffer), buffer_len(&buffer));
+	    buffer_ptr(&buffer), buffer_len(&buffer), 0);
 	cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext);
 	memset(&ciphercontext, 0, sizeof(ciphercontext));
 
@@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ key_parse_private_rsa1(Buffer *blob, const char *passphrase, char **commentp)
 	cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase,
 	    CIPHER_DECRYPT);
 	cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, cp,
-	    buffer_ptr(&copy), buffer_len(&copy));
+	    buffer_ptr(&copy), buffer_len(&copy), 0);
 	cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext);
 	memset(&ciphercontext, 0, sizeof(ciphercontext));
 	buffer_free(&copy);
diff --git a/cipher.c b/cipher.c
index bb5c0ac3a..2116b55b1 100644
--- a/cipher.c
+++ b/cipher.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.82 2009/01/26 09:58:15 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.83 2012/12/11 22:31:18 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -273,13 +273,25 @@ cipher_init(CipherContext *cc, Cipher *cipher,
 	}
 }
 
+/*
+ * cipher_crypt() operates as following:
+ * Copy 'aadlen' bytes (without en/decryption) from 'src' to 'dest'.
+ * Theses bytes are treated as additional authenticated data for
+ * authenticated encryption modes.
+ * En/Decrypt 'len' bytes at offset 'aadlen' from 'src' to 'dest'.
+ * Both 'aadlen' and 'authlen' can be set to 0.
+ */
 void
-cipher_crypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len)
+cipher_crypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src,
+    u_int len, u_int aadlen)
 {
+	if (aadlen)
+		memcpy(dest, src, aadlen);
 	if (len % cc->cipher->block_size)
-		fatal("cipher_encrypt: bad plaintext length %d", len);
-	if (EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, dest, (u_char *)src, len) == 0)
-		fatal("evp_crypt: EVP_Cipher failed");
+		fatal("%s: bad plaintext length %d", __func__, len);
+	if (EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, dest + aadlen, (u_char *)src + aadlen,
+	    len) < 0)
+		fatal("%s: EVP_Cipher failed", __func__);
 }
 
 void
diff --git a/cipher.h b/cipher.h
index 3dd2270bb..78972fea5 100644
--- a/cipher.h
+++ b/cipher.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: cipher.h,v 1.37 2009/01/26 09:58:15 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher.h,v 1.38 2012/12/11 22:31:18 markus Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ char	*cipher_name(int);
 int	 ciphers_valid(const char *);
 void	 cipher_init(CipherContext *, Cipher *, const u_char *, u_int,
     const u_char *, u_int, int);
-void	 cipher_crypt(CipherContext *, u_char *, const u_char *, u_int);
+void	 cipher_crypt(CipherContext *, u_char *, const u_char *, u_int, u_int);
 void	 cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *);
 void	 cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *, Cipher *, const char *, int);
 u_int	 cipher_blocksize(const Cipher *);
diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
index 7373d3c78..03b984cc8 100644
--- a/kex.h
+++ b/kex.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.52 2010/09/22 05:01:29 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.53 2012/12/11 22:31:18 markus Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ struct Mac {
 	u_char	*key;
 	u_int	key_len;
 	int	type;
+	int	etm;		/* Encrypt-then-MAC */
 	const EVP_MD	*evp_md;
 	HMAC_CTX	evp_ctx;
 	struct umac_ctx *umac_ctx;
diff --git a/mac.c b/mac.c
index 47db127f5..0ece2e55d 100644
--- a/mac.c
+++ b/mac.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.19 2012/10/04 13:21:50 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.20 2012/12/11 22:31:18 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -58,19 +58,34 @@ struct {
 	int		key_len;	/* just for UMAC */
 	int		len;		/* just for UMAC */
 } macs[] = {
-	{ "hmac-sha1",			SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 0, -1, -1 },
-	{ "hmac-sha1-96",		SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 96, -1, -1 },
+	/* Encrypt-and-MAC (encrypt-and-authenticate) variants */
+	{ "hmac-sha1",				SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+	{ "hmac-sha1-96",			SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 96, 0, 0, 0 },
 #ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
-	{ "hmac-sha2-256",		SSH_EVP, EVP_sha256, 0, -1, -1 },
-	{ "hmac-sha2-512",		SSH_EVP, EVP_sha512, 0, -1, -1 },
+	{ "hmac-sha2-256",			SSH_EVP, EVP_sha256, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+	{ "hmac-sha2-512",			SSH_EVP, EVP_sha512, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
 #endif
-	{ "hmac-md5",			SSH_EVP, EVP_md5, 0, -1, -1 },
-	{ "hmac-md5-96",		SSH_EVP, EVP_md5, 96, -1, -1 },
-	{ "hmac-ripemd160",		SSH_EVP, EVP_ripemd160, 0, -1, -1 },
-	{ "hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com",	SSH_EVP, EVP_ripemd160, 0, -1, -1 },
-	{ "umac-64@openssh.com",	SSH_UMAC, NULL, 0, 128, 64 },
-	{ "umac-128@openssh.com",	SSH_UMAC128, NULL, 0, 128, 128 },
-	{ NULL,				0, NULL, 0, -1, -1 }
+	{ "hmac-md5",				SSH_EVP, EVP_md5, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+	{ "hmac-md5-96",			SSH_EVP, EVP_md5, 96, 0, 0, 0 },
+	{ "hmac-ripemd160",			SSH_EVP, EVP_ripemd160, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+	{ "hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com",		SSH_EVP, EVP_ripemd160, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+	{ "umac-64@openssh.com",		SSH_UMAC, NULL, 0, 128, 64, 0 },
+	{ "umac-128@openssh.com",		SSH_UMAC128, NULL, 0, 128, 128, 0 },
+
+	/* Encrypt-then-MAC variants */
+	{ "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com",		SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
+	{ "hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com",	SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 96, 0, 0, 1 },
+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
+	{ "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com",	SSH_EVP, EVP_sha256, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
+	{ "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com",	SSH_EVP, EVP_sha512, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
+#endif
+	{ "hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com",		SSH_EVP, EVP_md5, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
+	{ "hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com",	SSH_EVP, EVP_md5, 96, 0, 0, 1 },
+	{ "hmac-ripemd160-tem@openssh.com",	SSH_EVP, EVP_ripemd160, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
+	{ "umac-64-etm@openssh.com",		SSH_UMAC, NULL, 0, 128, 64, 1 },
+	{ "umac-128-etm@openssh.com",		SSH_UMAC128, NULL, 0, 128, 128, 1 },
+
+	{ NULL,					0, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
 };
 
 static void
@@ -90,6 +105,7 @@ mac_setup_by_id(Mac *mac, int which)
 	}
 	if (macs[which].truncatebits != 0)
 		mac->mac_len = macs[which].truncatebits / 8;
+	mac->etm = macs[which].etm;
 }
 
 int
diff --git a/myproposal.h b/myproposal.h
index 5e2b99857..d98f4b051 100644
--- a/myproposal.h
+++ b/myproposal.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.30 2012/10/04 13:21:50 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.31 2012/12/11 22:31:18 markus Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -83,6 +83,15 @@
 # define SHA2_HMAC_MODES
 #endif
 #define	KEX_DEFAULT_MAC \
+	"hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com," \
+	"hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
+	"umac-64-etm@openssh.com," \
+	"umac-128-etm@openssh.com," \
+	"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
+	"hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com," \
+	"hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com," \
+	"hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com," \
+	"hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com," \
 	"hmac-md5," \
 	"hmac-sha1," \
 	"umac-64@openssh.com," \
diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
index b75c081f0..be8907854 100644
--- a/packet.c
+++ b/packet.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.177 2012/09/17 13:04:11 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.178 2012/12/11 22:31:18 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ packet_stop_discard(void)
 static void
 packet_start_discard(Enc *enc, Mac *mac, u_int packet_length, u_int discard)
 {
-	if (enc == NULL || !cipher_is_cbc(enc->cipher))
+	if (enc == NULL || !cipher_is_cbc(enc->cipher) || (mac && mac->etm))
 		packet_disconnect("Packet corrupt");
 	if (packet_length != PACKET_MAX_SIZE && mac && mac->enabled)
 		active_state->packet_discard_mac = mac;
@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ packet_send1(void)
 	    buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet));
 	cipher_crypt(&active_state->send_context, cp,
 	    buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet),
-	    buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet));
+	    buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet), 0);
 
 #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
 	fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: ");
@@ -845,9 +845,8 @@ static void
 packet_send2_wrapped(void)
 {
 	u_char type, *cp, *macbuf = NULL;
-	u_char padlen, pad;
-	u_int packet_length = 0;
-	u_int i, len;
+	u_char padlen, pad = 0;
+	u_int i, len, aadlen = 0;
 	u_int32_t rnd = 0;
 	Enc *enc   = NULL;
 	Mac *mac   = NULL;
@@ -860,6 +859,7 @@ packet_send2_wrapped(void)
 		comp = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->comp;
 	}
 	block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8;
+	aadlen = mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm ? 4 : 0;
 
 	cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
 	type = cp[5];
@@ -892,6 +892,7 @@ packet_send2_wrapped(void)
 	 * calc size of padding, alloc space, get random data,
 	 * minimum padding is 4 bytes
 	 */
+	len -= aadlen; /* packet length is not encrypted for EtM modes */
 	padlen = block_size - (len % block_size);
 	if (padlen < 4)
 		padlen += block_size;
@@ -919,29 +920,37 @@ packet_send2_wrapped(void)
 		/* clear padding */
 		memset(cp, 0, padlen);
 	}
-	/* packet_length includes payload, padding and padding length field */
-	packet_length = buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet) - 4;
+	/* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload + padding) */
+	len = buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
 	cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
-	put_u32(cp, packet_length);
+	/* packet_length includes payload, padding and padding length field */
+	put_u32(cp, len - 4);
 	cp[4] = padlen;
-	DBG(debug("send: len %d (includes padlen %d)", packet_length+4, padlen));
+	DBG(debug("send: len %d (includes padlen %d, aadlen %d)",
+	    len, padlen, aadlen));
 
 	/* compute MAC over seqnr and packet(length fields, payload, padding) */
-	if (mac && mac->enabled) {
+	if (mac && mac->enabled && !mac->etm) {
 		macbuf = mac_compute(mac, active_state->p_send.seqnr,
-		    buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet),
-		    buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet));
+		    buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet), len);
 		DBG(debug("done calc MAC out #%d", active_state->p_send.seqnr));
 	}
 	/* encrypt packet and append to output buffer. */
-	cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->output,
-	    buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet));
+	cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->output, len);
 	cipher_crypt(&active_state->send_context, cp,
 	    buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet),
-	    buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet));
+	    len - aadlen, aadlen);
 	/* append unencrypted MAC */
-	if (mac && mac->enabled)
+	if (mac && mac->enabled) {
+		if (mac->etm) {
+			/* EtM: compute mac over aadlen + cipher text */
+			macbuf = mac_compute(mac,
+			    active_state->p_send.seqnr, cp, len);
+			DBG(debug("done calc MAC(EtM) out #%d",
+			    active_state->p_send.seqnr));
+		}
 		buffer_append(&active_state->output, macbuf, mac->mac_len);
+	}
 #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
 	fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: ");
 	buffer_dump(&active_state->output);
@@ -952,8 +961,8 @@ packet_send2_wrapped(void)
 	if (++active_state->p_send.packets == 0)
 		if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
 			fatal("XXX too many packets with same key");
-	active_state->p_send.blocks += (packet_length + 4) / block_size;
-	active_state->p_send.bytes += packet_length + 4;
+	active_state->p_send.blocks += len / block_size;
+	active_state->p_send.bytes += len;
 	buffer_clear(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
 
 	if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
@@ -1190,7 +1199,7 @@ packet_read_poll1(void)
 	buffer_clear(&active_state->incoming_packet);
 	cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->incoming_packet, padded_len);
 	cipher_crypt(&active_state->receive_context, cp,
-	    buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), padded_len);
+	    buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), padded_len, 0);
 
 	buffer_consume(&active_state->input, padded_len);
 
@@ -1238,8 +1247,8 @@ static int
 packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 {
 	u_int padlen, need;
-	u_char *macbuf, *cp, type;
-	u_int maclen, block_size;
+	u_char *macbuf = NULL, *cp, type;
+	u_int maclen, aadlen = 0, block_size;
 	Enc *enc   = NULL;
 	Mac *mac   = NULL;
 	Comp *comp = NULL;
@@ -1254,8 +1263,22 @@ packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 	}
 	maclen = mac && mac->enabled ? mac->mac_len : 0;
 	block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8;
+	aadlen = mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm ? 4 : 0;
 
-	if (active_state->packlen == 0) {
+	if (aadlen && active_state->packlen == 0) {
+		if (buffer_len(&active_state->input) < 4)
+			return SSH_MSG_NONE;
+		cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->input);
+		active_state->packlen = get_u32(cp);
+		if (active_state->packlen < 1 + 4 ||
+		    active_state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) {
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+			buffer_dump(&active_state->input);
+#endif
+			logit("Bad packet length %u.", active_state->packlen);
+			packet_disconnect("Packet corrupt");
+		}
+	} else if (active_state->packlen == 0) {
 		/*
 		 * check if input size is less than the cipher block size,
 		 * decrypt first block and extract length of incoming packet
@@ -1266,7 +1289,7 @@ packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 		cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->incoming_packet,
 		    block_size);
 		cipher_crypt(&active_state->receive_context, cp,
-		    buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), block_size);
+		    buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), block_size, 0);
 		cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet);
 		active_state->packlen = get_u32(cp);
 		if (active_state->packlen < 1 + 4 ||
@@ -1279,13 +1302,21 @@ packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 			    PACKET_MAX_SIZE);
 			return SSH_MSG_NONE;
 		}
-		DBG(debug("input: packet len %u", active_state->packlen+4));
 		buffer_consume(&active_state->input, block_size);
 	}
-	/* we have a partial packet of block_size bytes */
-	need = 4 + active_state->packlen - block_size;
-	DBG(debug("partial packet %d, need %d, maclen %d", block_size,
-	    need, maclen));
+	DBG(debug("input: packet len %u", active_state->packlen+4));
+	if (aadlen) {
+		/* only the payload is encrypted */
+		need = active_state->packlen;
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * the payload size and the payload are encrypted, but we
+		 * have a partial packet of block_size bytes
+		 */
+		need = 4 + active_state->packlen - block_size;
+	}
+	DBG(debug("partial packet: block %d, need %d, maclen %d, aadlen %d",
+	    block_size, need, maclen, aadlen));
 	if (need % block_size != 0) {
 		logit("padding error: need %d block %d mod %d",
 		    need, block_size, need % block_size);
@@ -1295,26 +1326,34 @@ packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 	}
 	/*
 	 * check if the entire packet has been received and
-	 * decrypt into incoming_packet
+	 * decrypt into incoming_packet:
+	 * 'aadlen' bytes are unencrypted, but authenticated.
+	 * 'need' bytes are encrypted, followed by
+	 * 'maclen' bytes of message authentication code.
 	 */
-	if (buffer_len(&active_state->input) < need + maclen)
+	if (buffer_len(&active_state->input) < aadlen + need + maclen)
 		return SSH_MSG_NONE;
 #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
 	fprintf(stderr, "read_poll enc/full: ");
 	buffer_dump(&active_state->input);
 #endif
-	cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->incoming_packet, need);
+	/* EtM: compute mac over encrypted input */
+	if (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm)
+		macbuf = mac_compute(mac, active_state->p_read.seqnr,
+		    buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), aadlen + need);
+	cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->incoming_packet, aadlen + need);
 	cipher_crypt(&active_state->receive_context, cp,
-	    buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), need);
-	buffer_consume(&active_state->input, need);
+	    buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), need, aadlen);
+	buffer_consume(&active_state->input, aadlen + need);
 	/*
 	 * compute MAC over seqnr and packet,
 	 * increment sequence number for incoming packet
 	 */
 	if (mac && mac->enabled) {
-		macbuf = mac_compute(mac, active_state->p_read.seqnr,
-		    buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet),
-		    buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet));
+		if (!mac->etm)
+			macbuf = mac_compute(mac, active_state->p_read.seqnr,
+			    buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet),
+			    buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet));
 		if (timingsafe_bcmp(macbuf, buffer_ptr(&active_state->input),
 		    mac->mac_len) != 0) {
 			logit("Corrupted MAC on input.");
diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
index 09a3cf035..ee466d800 100644
--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.159 2012/12/02 20:26:10 djm Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: December 2 2012 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.160 2012/12/11 22:31:18 markus Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: December 11 2012 $
 .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -792,8 +792,17 @@ in order of preference.
 The MAC algorithm is used in protocol version 2
 for data integrity protection.
 Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+The algorithms that contain
+.Dq -etm
+calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac).
+These are considered safer and their use recommended.
 The default is:
 .Bd -literal -offset indent
+hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
+umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
+hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
+hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com,
+hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com,
 hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
 hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-ripemd160,
 hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index ad3692b38..0f4aa639d 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.151 2012/12/03 08:33:03 jmc Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: December 3 2012 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.152 2012/12/11 22:31:18 markus Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: December 11 2012 $
 .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -706,8 +706,17 @@ Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms.
 The MAC algorithm is used in protocol version 2
 for data integrity protection.
 Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+The algorithms that contain
+.Dq -etm
+calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac).
+These are considered safer and their use recommended.
 The default is:
 .Bd -literal -offset indent
+hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
+umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
+hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
+hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com,
+hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com,
 hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
 hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-ripemd160,
 hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 74f13bdf26fc9ef29b9789d7004817ab7e7a295a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Wed, 12 Dec 2012 10:46:53 +1100
Subject:    - sthen@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/11 22:51:45      [mac.c]      fix
 typo, s/tem/etm in hmac-ripemd160-tem. ok markus@

---
 ChangeLog | 3 +++
 mac.c     | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index df6d03207..425f7276b 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@
      message (including the packet size) instead of the plaintext data;
      these EtM modes are considered more secure and used by default.
      feedback and ok djm@
+   - sthen@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/11 22:51:45
+     [mac.c]
+     fix typo, s/tem/etm in hmac-ripemd160-tem. ok markus@
 
 20121207
  - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/mac.c b/mac.c
index 0ece2e55d..e55face40 100644
--- a/mac.c
+++ b/mac.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.20 2012/12/11 22:31:18 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.21 2012/12/11 22:51:45 sthen Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ struct {
 #endif
 	{ "hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com",		SSH_EVP, EVP_md5, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
 	{ "hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com",	SSH_EVP, EVP_md5, 96, 0, 0, 1 },
-	{ "hmac-ripemd160-tem@openssh.com",	SSH_EVP, EVP_ripemd160, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
+	{ "hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com",	SSH_EVP, EVP_ripemd160, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
 	{ "umac-64-etm@openssh.com",		SSH_UMAC, NULL, 0, 128, 64, 1 },
 	{ "umac-128-etm@openssh.com",		SSH_UMAC128, NULL, 0, 128, 128, 1 },
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 1a45b63d7b4fe34e18ab4cc669669003e6f8e403 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Wed, 12 Dec 2012 10:52:07 +1100
Subject:    - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/11 22:32:56     
 [regress/try-ciphers.sh]      add etm modes

---
 ChangeLog              |  3 +++
 regress/try-ciphers.sh | 10 +++++++---
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 425f7276b..49ee0eb00 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@
    - sthen@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/11 22:51:45
      [mac.c]
      fix typo, s/tem/etm in hmac-ripemd160-tem. ok markus@
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/11 22:32:56
+     [regress/try-ciphers.sh]
+     add etm modes
 
 20121207
  - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/regress/try-ciphers.sh b/regress/try-ciphers.sh
index cf6014297..46131f715 100644
--- a/regress/try-ciphers.sh
+++ b/regress/try-ciphers.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: try-ciphers.sh,v 1.15 2012/10/05 02:20:48 dtucker Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: try-ciphers.sh,v 1.16 2012/12/11 22:32:56 markus Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="try ciphers"
@@ -8,9 +8,13 @@ ciphers="aes128-cbc 3des-cbc blowfish-cbc cast128-cbc
 	aes192-cbc aes256-cbc rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se
 	aes128-ctr aes192-ctr aes256-ctr"
 macs="hmac-sha1 hmac-md5 umac-64@openssh.com umac-128@openssh.com
-	hmac-sha1-96 hmac-md5-96"
+	hmac-sha1-96 hmac-md5-96
+	hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com
+	umac-64-etm@openssh.com umac-128-etm@openssh.com
+	hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com"
 config_defined HAVE_EVP_SHA256 &&
-    macs="$macs hmac-sha2-256 hmac-sha2-512"
+    macs="$macs hmac-sha2-256 hmac-sha2-512
+	hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
 
 for c in $ciphers; do
 	for m in $macs; do
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 1fb593a3f198b75787c5c5974fe256122427d1d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Wed, 12 Dec 2012 10:54:37 +1100
Subject:    - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/11 22:42:11     
 [regress/Makefile regress/modpipe.c regress/integrity.sh]      test the
 integrity of the packets; with djm@

---
 ChangeLog            |   3 ++
 regress/Makefile     |   9 ++--
 regress/integrity.sh |  58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 regress/modpipe.c    | 124 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 191 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 regress/integrity.sh
 create mode 100755 regress/modpipe.c

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 49ee0eb00..2fe093dad 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -18,6 +18,9 @@
    - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/11 22:32:56
      [regress/try-ciphers.sh]
      add etm modes
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/11 22:42:11
+     [regress/Makefile regress/modpipe.c regress/integrity.sh]
+     test the integrity of the packets; with djm@
 
 20121207
  - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/regress/Makefile b/regress/Makefile
index c628fb5ff..2eb2e3181 100644
--- a/regress/Makefile
+++ b/regress/Makefile
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.60 2012/12/02 20:47:48 djm Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.61 2012/12/11 22:42:11 markus Exp $
 
 REGRESS_TARGETS=	t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t-exec
 tests:		$(REGRESS_TARGETS)
@@ -59,7 +59,8 @@ LTESTS= 	connect \
 		cert-userkey \
 		host-expand \
 		keys-command \
-		forward-control
+		forward-control \
+		integrity
 
 INTEROP_TESTS=	putty-transfer putty-ciphers putty-kex conch-ciphers
 #INTEROP_TESTS+=ssh-com ssh-com-client ssh-com-keygen ssh-com-sftp
@@ -142,7 +143,9 @@ t9: $(OBJ)/t9.out
 	test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \
 	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t9.out > /dev/null
 
-t-exec:	${LTESTS:=.sh}
+modpipe: modpipe.c
+
+t-exec:	modpipe ${LTESTS:=.sh}
 	@if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \
 	for TEST in ""$?; do \
 		echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \
diff --git a/regress/integrity.sh b/regress/integrity.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..23135685c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/integrity.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.1 2012/12/11 22:42:11 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="integrity"
+
+# start at byte 2300 (i.e. after kex) and corrupt at different offsets
+# XXX the test hangs if we modify the low bytes of the packet length
+# XXX and ssh tries to read...
+tries=10
+startoffset=2300
+macs="hmac-sha1 hmac-md5 umac-64@openssh.com umac-128@openssh.com
+	hmac-sha1-96 hmac-md5-96 hmac-sha2-256 hmac-sha2-512
+	hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com
+	umac-64-etm@openssh.com umac-128-etm@openssh.com
+	hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com
+	hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
+
+# sshd-command for proxy (see test-exec.sh)
+cmd="sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${SSHD} ${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy"
+
+for m in $macs; do
+	trace "test $tid: mac $m"
+	elen=0
+	epad=0
+	emac=0
+	ecnt=0
+	skip=0
+	for off in $(jot $tries $startoffset); do
+		if [ $((skip--)) -gt 0 ]; then
+			# avoid modifying the high bytes of the length
+			continue
+		fi
+		# modify output from sshd at offset $off
+		pxy="proxycommand=$cmd | $OBJ/modpipe -m xor:$off:1"
+		output=$(${SSH} -m $m -2F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o "$pxy" \
+		    999.999.999.999 true 2>&1)
+		if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh -m $m succeeds with bit-flip at $off"
+		fi
+		ecnt=$((ecnt+1))
+		output=$(echo $output | tr -s '\r\n' '.')
+		verbose "test $tid: $m @$off $output"
+		case "$output" in
+		Bad?packet*)	elen=$((elen+1)); skip=2;;
+		Corrupted?MAC*) emac=$((emac+1)); skip=0;;
+		padding*)	epad=$((epad+1)); skip=0;;
+		*)		fail "unexpected error mac $m at $off";;
+		esac
+	done
+	verbose "test $tid: $ecnt errors: mac $emac padding $epad length $elen"
+	if [ $emac -eq 0 ]; then
+		fail "$m: no mac errors"
+	fi
+	expect=$((ecnt-epad-elen))
+	if [ $emac -ne $expect ]; then
+		fail "$m: expected $expect mac errors, got $emac"
+	fi
+done
diff --git a/regress/modpipe.c b/regress/modpipe.c
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..439be4c9d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/modpipe.c
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* $Id: modpipe.c,v 1.1 2012/12/11 23:54:40 djm Exp $ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <err.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "Usage: modpipe [-m modspec ...] < in > out\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "modspec is one of:\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "    xor:offset:value       - XOR \"value\" at \"offset\"\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "    andor:offset:val1:val2 - AND \"val1\" then OR \"val2\" at \"offset\"\n");
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+#define MAX_MODIFICATIONS 256
+struct modification {
+	enum { MOD_XOR, MOD_AND_OR } what;
+	u_int64_t offset;
+	u_int8_t m1, m2;
+};
+
+static void
+parse_modification(const char *s, struct modification *m)
+{
+	char what[16+1];
+	int n;
+
+	bzero(m, sizeof(*m));
+	if ((n = sscanf(s, "%16[^:]%*[:]%lli%*[:]%hhi%*[:]%hhi",
+	    what, &m->offset, &m->m1, &m->m2)) < 3)
+		errx(1, "Invalid modification spec \"%s\"", s);
+	if (strcasecmp(what, "xor") == 0) {
+		m->what = MOD_XOR;
+		if (n > 3)
+			errx(1, "Invalid modification spec \"%s\"", s);
+	} else if (strcasecmp(what, "andor") == 0) {
+		m->what = MOD_AND_OR;
+		if (n != 4)
+			errx(1, "Invalid modification spec \"%s\"", s);
+	} else
+		errx(1, "Invalid modification type \"%s\"", what);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	int ch;
+	u_char buf[8192];
+	size_t total;
+	ssize_t r, s, o;
+	struct modification mods[MAX_MODIFICATIONS];
+	u_int i, num_mods = 0;
+
+	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "m:")) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		case 'm':
+			if (num_mods >= MAX_MODIFICATIONS)
+				errx(1, "Too many modifications");
+			parse_modification(optarg, &(mods[num_mods++]));
+			break;
+		default:
+			usage();
+			/* NOTREACHED */
+		}
+	}
+	for (total = 0;;) {
+		r = s = read(STDIN_FILENO, buf, sizeof(buf));
+		if (r == 0)
+			return 0;
+		if (r < 0) {
+			if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)
+				continue;
+			err(1, "read");
+		}
+		for (i = 0; i < num_mods; i++) {
+			if (mods[i].offset < total ||
+			    mods[i].offset >= total + s)
+				continue;
+			switch (mods[i].what) {
+			case MOD_XOR:
+				buf[mods[i].offset - total] ^= mods[i].m1;
+				break;
+			case MOD_AND_OR:
+				buf[mods[i].offset - total] &= mods[i].m1;
+				buf[mods[i].offset - total] |= mods[i].m2;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		for (o = 0; o < s; o += r) {
+			r = write(STDOUT_FILENO, buf, s - o);
+			if (r == 0)
+				return 0;
+			if (r < 0) {
+				if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)
+					continue;
+				err(1, "write");
+			}
+		}
+		total += s;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From ec7ce9ace470aad20aeea0769ddc998dea307830 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Wed, 12 Dec 2012 10:55:32 +1100
Subject:    - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/11 23:12:13      [try-ciphers.sh]
      add hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com

---
 ChangeLog              | 3 +++
 regress/try-ciphers.sh | 5 +++--
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 2fe093dad..05a3b078d 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@
    - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/11 22:42:11
      [regress/Makefile regress/modpipe.c regress/integrity.sh]
      test the integrity of the packets; with djm@
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/11 23:12:13
+     [try-ciphers.sh]
+     add hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com
 
 20121207
  - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/regress/try-ciphers.sh b/regress/try-ciphers.sh
index 46131f715..2b11b59ea 100644
--- a/regress/try-ciphers.sh
+++ b/regress/try-ciphers.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: try-ciphers.sh,v 1.16 2012/12/11 22:32:56 markus Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: try-ciphers.sh,v 1.17 2012/12/11 23:12:13 markus Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="try ciphers"
@@ -11,7 +11,8 @@ macs="hmac-sha1 hmac-md5 umac-64@openssh.com umac-128@openssh.com
 	hmac-sha1-96 hmac-md5-96
 	hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com
 	umac-64-etm@openssh.com umac-128-etm@openssh.com
-	hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com"
+	hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com
+	hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com"
 config_defined HAVE_EVP_SHA256 &&
     macs="$macs hmac-sha2-256 hmac-sha2-512
 	hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 37834afe7be91de1aff4bdffbef2c54797ec58d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Wed, 12 Dec 2012 11:00:37 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) [mac.c] fix merge botch

---
 ChangeLog | 1 +
 mac.c     | 1 +
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 05a3b078d..ed58d1ced 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
    - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/11 23:12:13
      [try-ciphers.sh]
      add hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com
+ - (djm) [mac.c] fix merge botch
 
 20121207
  - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/mac.c b/mac.c
index e55face40..3f2dc6f2a 100644
--- a/mac.c
+++ b/mac.c
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ struct {
 	int		truncatebits;	/* truncate digest if != 0 */
 	int		key_len;	/* just for UMAC */
 	int		len;		/* just for UMAC */
+	int		etm;		/* Encrypt-then-MAC */
 } macs[] = {
 	/* Encrypt-and-MAC (encrypt-and-authenticate) variants */
 	{ "hmac-sha1",				SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 37461d7391e0944d880757b9ac8c98d1feb15a40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Wed, 12 Dec 2012 12:37:32 +1100
Subject: - (djm) [regress/integrity.sh] Fix awk quoting, packet length skip

---
 ChangeLog            | 3 +++
 regress/integrity.sh | 6 +++---
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index ed58d1ced..9473d60ca 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -25,6 +25,9 @@
      [try-ciphers.sh]
      add hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com
  - (djm) [mac.c] fix merge botch
+ - (djm) [regress/Makefile regress/integrity.sh] Make the integrity.sh test
+   work on platforms without 'jot'
+ - (djm) [regress/integrity.sh] Fix awk quoting, packet length skip
 
 20121207
  - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/regress/integrity.sh b/regress/integrity.sh
index f6e5c1963..0185490c1 100644
--- a/regress/integrity.sh
+++ b/regress/integrity.sh
@@ -19,9 +19,9 @@ macs="hmac-sha1 hmac-md5 umac-64@openssh.com umac-128@openssh.com
 cmd="sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${SSHD} ${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy"
 
 jot() {
-	awk 'BEGIN { for (i = $2; i < $2 + $1; i++) { printf "%d\n", i } }'
+	awk "BEGIN { for (i = $2; i < $2 + $1; i++) { printf \"%d\n\", i } }"
 }
-set -x
+
 for m in $macs; do
 	trace "test $tid: mac $m"
 	elen=0
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ for m in $macs; do
 		output=$(echo $output | tr -s '\r\n' '.')
 		verbose "test $tid: $m @$off $output"
 		case "$output" in
-		Bad?packet*)	elen=$((elen+1)); skip=2;;
+		Bad?packet*)	elen=$((elen+1)); skip=3;;
 		Corrupted?MAC*) emac=$((emac+1)); skip=0;;
 		padding*)	epad=$((epad+1)); skip=0;;
 		*)		fail "unexpected error mac $m at $off";;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From faabeb6b36df2e1d17b5d23280812c68900d4e40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Wed, 12 Dec 2012 12:51:54 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) [regress/Makefile] fix t-exec rule

---
 ChangeLog        |  1 +
 regress/Makefile | 10 ++++++----
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 9473d60ca..93f2404f0 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
  - (djm) [regress/Makefile regress/integrity.sh] Make the integrity.sh test
    work on platforms without 'jot'
  - (djm) [regress/integrity.sh] Fix awk quoting, packet length skip
+ - (djm) [regress/Makefile] fix t-exec rule
 
 20121207
  - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/regress/Makefile b/regress/Makefile
index 636858662..af1fa31df 100644
--- a/regress/Makefile
+++ b/regress/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.61 2012/12/11 22:42:11 markus Exp $
 
 REGRESS_TARGETS=	t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t-exec
-tests:		$(REGRESS_TARGETS)
+tests:		prereq $(REGRESS_TARGETS)
 
 # Interop tests are not run by default
 interop interop-tests: t-exec-interop
@@ -143,15 +143,17 @@ t9: $(OBJ)/t9.out
 	test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \
 	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t9.out > /dev/null
 
-t-exec:	${LTESTS:=.sh} modpipe
+prereq: modpipe
+
+modpipe: modpipe.c
+
+t-exec:	${LTESTS:=.sh}
 	@if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \
 	for TEST in ""$?; do \
 		echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \
 		(env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} sh ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \
 	done
 
-modpipe: modpipe.c
-
 t-exec-interop:	${INTEROP_TESTS:=.sh}
 	@if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \
 	for TEST in ""$?; do \
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 8c05da3326fef892d993f0cd91808f2daf4d6a5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Thu, 13 Dec 2012 07:18:59 +1100
Subject:    - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/12 16:45:52      [packet.c]     
 reset incoming_packet buffer for each new packet in EtM-case, too;      this
 happens if packets are parsed only parially (e.g. ignore      messages sent
 when su/sudo turn off echo); noted by sthen/millert

---
 ChangeLog | 8 ++++++++
 packet.c  | 3 ++-
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 93f2404f0..f44c4f1ca 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,11 @@
+20121213
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/12 16:45:52
+     [packet.c]
+     reset incoming_packet buffer for each new packet in EtM-case, too;
+     this happens if packets are parsed only parially (e.g. ignore
+     messages sent when su/sudo turn off echo); noted by sthen/millert
+
 20121212
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
    - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/11 22:16:21
diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
index be8907854..fe379aa49 100644
--- a/packet.c
+++ b/packet.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.178 2012/12/11 22:31:18 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.179 2012/12/12 16:45:52 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -1278,6 +1278,7 @@ packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 			logit("Bad packet length %u.", active_state->packlen);
 			packet_disconnect("Packet corrupt");
 		}
+		buffer_clear(&active_state->incoming_packet);
 	} else if (active_state->packlen == 0) {
 		/*
 		 * check if input size is less than the cipher block size,
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 25a02b0c95e01bc331267a1db0f62d3cbd7a0897 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Thu, 13 Dec 2012 08:18:56 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) [configure.ac cipher-ctr.c] Adapt EVP AES CTR change to
 retain our    compat code for older OpenSSL

---
 ChangeLog    |  6 ++++++
 cipher-ctr.c |  3 +++
 cipher.c     | 22 +++++++++++++++-------
 configure.ac | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
 4 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index f44c4f1ca..2c6da413f 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -5,6 +5,12 @@
      reset incoming_packet buffer for each new packet in EtM-case, too;
      this happens if packets are parsed only parially (e.g. ignore
      messages sent when su/sudo turn off echo); noted by sthen/millert
+   - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/12 16:46:10
+     [cipher.c]
+     use OpenSSL's EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_ctr() API and remove our hand-rolled
+     counter mode code; ok djm@
+ - (djm) [configure.ac cipher-ctr.c] Adapt EVP AES CTR change to retain our
+   compat code for older OpenSSL
 
 20121212
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/cipher-ctr.c b/cipher-ctr.c
index 04975b4b6..f053abe2e 100644
--- a/cipher-ctr.c
+++ b/cipher-ctr.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
  */
 #include "includes.h"
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR
 #include <sys/types.h>
 
 #include <stdarg.h>
@@ -144,3 +145,5 @@ evp_aes_128_ctr(void)
 #endif
 	return (&aes_ctr);
 }
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR */
diff --git a/cipher.c b/cipher.c
index 2116b55b1..d15c226ae 100644
--- a/cipher.c
+++ b/cipher.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.83 2012/12/11 22:31:18 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.84 2012/12/12 16:46:10 naddy Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -54,8 +54,12 @@
 extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_bf(void);
 extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_3des(void);
 extern void ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int);
-extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_128_ctr(void);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR
+#define EVP_aes_128_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
+#define EVP_aes_192_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
+#define EVP_aes_256_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
 extern void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, u_int);
+#endif
 
 struct Cipher {
 	char	*name;
@@ -82,9 +86,9 @@ struct Cipher {
 	{ "aes256-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
 	{ "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se",
 				SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
-	{ "aes128-ctr",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, evp_aes_128_ctr },
-	{ "aes192-ctr",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, evp_aes_128_ctr },
-	{ "aes256-ctr",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, evp_aes_128_ctr },
+	{ "aes128-ctr",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_ctr },
+	{ "aes192-ctr",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, EVP_aes_192_ctr },
+	{ "aes256-ctr",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_ctr },
 #ifdef USE_CIPHER_ACSS
 	{ "acss@openssh.org",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 5, 0, 0, EVP_acss },
 #endif
@@ -363,10 +367,12 @@ cipher_get_keyiv(CipherContext *cc, u_char *iv, u_int len)
 			ssh_rijndael_iv(&cc->evp, 0, iv, len);
 		else
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR
 		if (c->evptype == evp_aes_128_ctr)
 			ssh_aes_ctr_iv(&cc->evp, 0, iv, len);
 		else
-			memcpy(iv, cc->evp.iv, len);
+#endif
+		memcpy(iv, cc->evp.iv, len);
 		break;
 	case SSH_CIPHER_3DES:
 		ssh1_3des_iv(&cc->evp, 0, iv, 24);
@@ -394,10 +400,12 @@ cipher_set_keyiv(CipherContext *cc, u_char *iv)
 			ssh_rijndael_iv(&cc->evp, 1, iv, evplen);
 		else
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR
 		if (c->evptype == evp_aes_128_ctr)
 			ssh_aes_ctr_iv(&cc->evp, 1, iv, evplen);
 		else
-			memcpy(cc->evp.iv, iv, evplen);
+#endif
+		memcpy(cc->evp.iv, iv, evplen);
 		break;
 	case SSH_CIPHER_3DES:
 		ssh1_3des_iv(&cc->evp, 1, iv, 24);
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 8b32e40c9..64c231b7e 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.498 2012/12/03 01:35:55 djm Exp $
+# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.499 2012/12/12 21:18:56 djm Exp $
 #
 # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
 #
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 
 AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org])
-AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.498 $)
+AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.499 $)
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
 AC_LANG([C])
 
@@ -2299,6 +2299,27 @@ AC_LINK_IFELSE(
 	]
 )
 
+# Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*ctr
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has AES CTR via EVP])
+AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+	[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+	]], [[
+	exit(EVP_aes_128_ctr() == NULL ||
+	    EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL ||
+	    EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL);
+	]])],
+	[
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+		AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR], [1],
+		    [libcrypto has EVP AES CTR])
+	],
+	[
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+	]
+)
+
 AC_MSG_CHECKING([if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int])
 AC_LINK_IFELSE(
 	[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 13cbff1e009c2a1f786e5d84bf78099c70949bf0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Thu, 13 Dec 2012 08:25:07 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) [cipher.c] Fix missing prototype for compat code

---
 ChangeLog | 1 +
 cipher.c  | 1 +
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 2c6da413f..16a6489e5 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
      counter mode code; ok djm@
  - (djm) [configure.ac cipher-ctr.c] Adapt EVP AES CTR change to retain our
    compat code for older OpenSSL
+ - (djm) [cipher.c] Fix missing prototype for compat code
 
 20121212
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/cipher.c b/cipher.c
index d15c226ae..aae69c347 100644
--- a/cipher.c
+++ b/cipher.c
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ extern void ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int);
 #define EVP_aes_128_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
 #define EVP_aes_192_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
 #define EVP_aes_256_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
+extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_128_ctr(void);
 extern void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, u_int);
 #endif
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 0fc77297e6825ae83618c5137e190aa9f9dac9da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Mon, 17 Dec 2012 15:59:42 +1100
Subject:  - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] Add some scaffolding so that the new
 regress    tests will work with VPATH directories.

---
 ChangeLog   | 4 ++++
 Makefile.in | 5 ++++-
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 16a6489e5..86f756423 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+20121217
+ - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] Add some scaffolding so that the new regress
+   tests will work with VPATH directories.
+
 20121213
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
    - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/12 16:45:52
diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
index e4f9ee194..8765b7efb 100644
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.328 2012/10/05 05:41:07 dtucker Exp $
+# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.329 2012/12/17 04:59:43 dtucker Exp $
 
 # uncomment if you run a non bourne compatable shell. Ie. csh
 #SHELL = @SH@
@@ -384,6 +384,9 @@ tests interop-tests:	$(TARGETS)
 	[ -d `pwd`/regress ]  ||  mkdir -p `pwd`/regress; \
 	[ -f `pwd`/regress/Makefile ]  || \
 	    ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile ; \
+	[ -f `pwd`/regress/modpipe.c ]  || \
+	    ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/modpipe.c `pwd`/regress/modpipe.c; \
+	(cd regress && make prereq); \
 	TEST_SHELL="@TEST_SHELL@"; \
 	TEST_SSH_SSH="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh"; \
 	TEST_SSH_SSHD="$${BUILDDIR}/sshd"; \
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 4e14a58f3f01842ba6a50f84d0ddaa12d6bed62b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Wed, 9 Jan 2013 15:54:48 +1100
Subject:    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/14 05:26:43      [auth.c]     
 use correct string in error message; from rustybsd at gmx.fr

---
 ChangeLog | 6 ++++++
 auth.c    | 5 ++---
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 86f756423..3a84d27ed 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
+20130109
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/14 05:26:43
+     [auth.c]
+     use correct string in error message; from rustybsd at gmx.fr
+
 20121217
  - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] Add some scaffolding so that the new regress
    tests will work with VPATH directories.
diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index 7bc6f4021..f5e2d3d2e 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.98 2012/12/02 20:34:09 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.99 2012/12/14 05:26:43 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -494,13 +494,12 @@ static int
 secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
     char *err, size_t errlen)
 {
-	char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
 	struct stat st;
 
 	/* check the open file to avoid races */
 	if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0) {
 		snprintf(err, errlen, "cannot stat file %s: %s",
-		    buf, strerror(errno));
+		    file, strerror(errno));
 		return -1;
 	}
 	return auth_secure_path(file, &st, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_uid, err, errlen);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 73298f420efd37659f462d3eb10d8a7f71022e1b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Wed, 9 Jan 2013 15:55:50 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/02 00:32:07      [clientloop.c
 mux.c]      channel_setup_local_fwd_listener() returns 0 on failure, not -ve 
     bz#2055 reported by mathieu.lacage AT gmail.com

---
 ChangeLog    | 4 ++++
 clientloop.c | 6 +++---
 mux.c        | 6 +++---
 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 3a84d27ed..3b15b99c8 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -3,6 +3,10 @@
    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/14 05:26:43
      [auth.c]
      use correct string in error message; from rustybsd at gmx.fr
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/02 00:32:07
+     [clientloop.c mux.c]
+     channel_setup_local_fwd_listener() returns 0 on failure, not -ve
+     bz#2055 reported by mathieu.lacage AT gmail.com
 
 20121217
  - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] Add some scaffolding so that the new regress
diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
index 564508146..c1d1d4472 100644
--- a/clientloop.c
+++ b/clientloop.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.247 2012/09/07 06:34:21 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.248 2013/01/02 00:32:07 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -968,9 +968,9 @@ process_cmdline(void)
 			goto out;
 		}
 		if (local || dynamic) {
-			if (channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(fwd.listen_host,
+			if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(fwd.listen_host,
 			    fwd.listen_port, fwd.connect_host,
-			    fwd.connect_port, options.gateway_ports) < 0) {
+			    fwd.connect_port, options.gateway_ports)) {
 				logit("Port forwarding failed.");
 				goto out;
 			}
diff --git a/mux.c b/mux.c
index 0f1532bb5..1b24660b2 100644
--- a/mux.c
+++ b/mux.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.37 2012/08/17 00:45:45 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.38 2013/01/02 00:32:07 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2002-2008 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
  *
@@ -738,9 +738,9 @@ process_mux_open_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
 	}
 
 	if (ftype == MUX_FWD_LOCAL || ftype == MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) {
-		if (channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(fwd.listen_host,
+		if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(fwd.listen_host,
 		    fwd.listen_port, fwd.connect_host, fwd.connect_port,
-		    options.gateway_ports) < 0) {
+		    options.gateway_ports)) {
  fail:
 			logit("slave-requested %s failed", fwd_desc);
 			buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 697485d50af953d36503c11d9e549dd0db8a3287 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Wed, 9 Jan 2013 15:56:13 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/02 00:33:49      [PROTOCOL.agent]   
   correct format description for SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED     
 bz#2051 from david AT lechnology.com

---
 ChangeLog      | 4 ++++
 PROTOCOL.agent | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 3b15b99c8..35a29d51a 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -7,6 +7,10 @@
      [clientloop.c mux.c]
      channel_setup_local_fwd_listener() returns 0 on failure, not -ve
      bz#2055 reported by mathieu.lacage AT gmail.com
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/02 00:33:49
+     [PROTOCOL.agent]
+     correct format description for SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED
+     bz#2051 from david AT lechnology.com
 
 20121217
  - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] Add some scaffolding so that the new regress
diff --git a/PROTOCOL.agent b/PROTOCOL.agent
index de94d037d..3fcaa14d4 100644
--- a/PROTOCOL.agent
+++ b/PROTOCOL.agent
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ fully specified using just rsa_q, rsa_p and rsa_e at the cost of extra
 computation.
 
 "key_constraints" may only be present if the request type is
-SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY.
+SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED.
 
 The agent will reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if the key has been
 successfully added or a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if an error occurred.
@@ -557,4 +557,4 @@ Locking and unlocking affects both protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys.
 	SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME			1
 	SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM			2
 
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.agent,v 1.6 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.agent,v 1.7 2013/01/02 00:33:49 djm Exp $
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 441384453c7400e8b122e7368c50ab713399fd80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Wed, 9 Jan 2013 15:56:45 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/03 05:49:36      [servconf.h]     
 add a couple of ServerOptions members that should be copied to the privsep   
   child (for consistency, in this case they happen only to be accessed in    
  the monitor); ok dtucker@

---
 ChangeLog  | 5 +++++
 servconf.h | 4 +++-
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 35a29d51a..66cc48ba2 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -11,6 +11,11 @@
      [PROTOCOL.agent]
      correct format description for SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED
      bz#2051 from david AT lechnology.com
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/03 05:49:36
+     [servconf.h]
+     add a couple of ServerOptions members that should be copied to the privsep
+     child (for consistency, in this case they happen only to be accessed in
+     the monitor); ok dtucker@
 
 20121217
  - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] Add some scaffolding so that the new regress
diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
index a23ef7f3a..870c70982 100644
--- a/servconf.h
+++ b/servconf.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.106 2012/12/02 20:46:11 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.107 2013/01/03 05:49:36 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -203,6 +203,8 @@ struct connection_info {
 		M_CP_STROPT(trusted_user_ca_keys); \
 		M_CP_STROPT(revoked_keys_file); \
 		M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_file); \
+		M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command); \
+		M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command_user); \
 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(authorized_keys_files, num_authkeys_files); \
 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_users, num_allow_users); \
 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_users, num_deny_users); \
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 3739c8f0413bc7a90a1fc3a6c723436bd285bf86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Wed, 9 Jan 2013 15:57:16 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/03 12:49:01      [PROTOCOL]      fix
 description of MAC calculation for EtM modes; ok markus@

---
 ChangeLog | 3 +++
 PROTOCOL  | 7 ++++---
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 66cc48ba2..67d4884d6 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@
      add a couple of ServerOptions members that should be copied to the privsep
      child (for consistency, in this case they happen only to be accessed in
      the monitor); ok dtucker@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/03 12:49:01
+     [PROTOCOL]
+     fix description of MAC calculation for EtM modes; ok markus@
 
 20121217
  - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] Add some scaffolding so that the new regress
diff --git a/PROTOCOL b/PROTOCOL
index 834716cc9..eb5d0889c 100644
--- a/PROTOCOL
+++ b/PROTOCOL
@@ -70,9 +70,10 @@ verified without decrypting unauthenticated data.
 
 As such, the MAC covers:
 
-      mac = MAC(key, sequence_number || encrypted_packet)
+      mac = MAC(key, sequence_number || packet_length || encrypted_packet)
 
-where "encrypted_packet" contains:
+where "packet_length" is encoded as a uint32 and "encrypted_packet"
+contains:
 
       byte      padding_length
       byte[n1]  payload; n1 = packet_length - padding_length - 1
@@ -318,4 +319,4 @@ link(oldpath, newpath) and will respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
 This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
 "1".
 
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.18 2012/12/11 22:31:18 markus Exp $
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.19 2013/01/03 12:49:01 djm Exp $
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 502ab0eff1bba68a1d0492a9d9da3616b0301724 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Wed, 9 Jan 2013 15:57:36 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/03 12:54:49      [sftp-server.8
 sftp-server.c]      allow specification of an alternate start directory for
 sftp-server(8)      "I like this" markus@

---
 ChangeLog     |  4 ++++
 sftp-server.8 | 16 ++++++++++++++--
 sftp-server.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++-----
 3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 67d4884d6..ab80dca45 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -19,6 +19,10 @@
    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/03 12:49:01
      [PROTOCOL]
      fix description of MAC calculation for EtM modes; ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/03 12:54:49
+     [sftp-server.8 sftp-server.c]
+     allow specification of an alternate start directory for sftp-server(8)
+     "I like this" markus@
 
 20121217
  - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] Add some scaffolding so that the new regress
diff --git a/sftp-server.8 b/sftp-server.8
index bb19c15e1..4d15f1249 100644
--- a/sftp-server.8
+++ b/sftp-server.8
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: sftp-server.8,v 1.19 2010/01/09 03:36:00 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sftp-server.8,v 1.20 2013/01/03 12:54:49 djm Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
 .\"
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: January 9 2010 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: January 3 2013 $
 .Dt SFTP-SERVER 8
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 .Sh SYNOPSIS
 .Nm sftp-server
 .Op Fl ehR
+.Op Fl d Ar start_directory
 .Op Fl f Ar log_facility
 .Op Fl l Ar log_level
 .Op Fl u Ar umask
@@ -56,6 +57,17 @@ for more information.
 .Pp
 Valid options are:
 .Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl d
+specifies an alternate starting directory for users.
+The pathname may contain the following tokens that are expanded at runtime:
+%% is replaced by a literal '%',
+%h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated,
+and %u is replaced by the username of that user.
+The default is to use the user's home directory.
+This option is useful in conjunction with the
+.Xr sshd_config 5
+.Cm ChrootDirectory
+option.
 .It Fl e
 Causes
 .Nm
diff --git a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
index 9d01c7d79..c8858147a 100644
--- a/sftp-server.c
+++ b/sftp-server.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.94 2011/06/17 21:46:16 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.95 2013/01/03 12:54:49 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000-2004 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -1402,7 +1402,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
 	int in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
 	ssize_t len, olen, set_size;
 	SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
-	char *cp, buf[4*4096];
+	char *cp, *homedir = NULL, buf[4*4096];
 	long mask;
 
 	extern char *optarg;
@@ -1411,7 +1411,9 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
 	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
 
-	while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv, "f:l:u:cehR")) != -1) {
+	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
+
+	while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv, "d:f:l:u:cehR")) != -1) {
 		switch (ch) {
 		case 'R':
 			readonly = 1;
@@ -1436,6 +1438,12 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
 			if (log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET)
 				error("Invalid log facility \"%s\"", optarg);
 			break;
+		case 'd':
+			cp = tilde_expand_filename(optarg, user_pw->pw_uid);
+			homedir = percent_expand(cp, "d", user_pw->pw_dir,
+			    "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
+			free(cp);
+			break;
 		case 'u':
 			errno = 0;
 			mask = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8);
@@ -1463,8 +1471,6 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
 	} else
 		client_addr = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
 
-	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
-
 	logit("session opened for local user %s from [%s]",
 	    pw->pw_name, client_addr);
 
@@ -1489,6 +1495,13 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
 	rset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(set_size);
 	wset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(set_size);
 
+	if (homedir != NULL) {
+		if (chdir(homedir) != 0) {
+			error("chdir to \"%s\" failed: %s", homedir,
+			    strerror(errno));
+		}
+	}
+
 	for (;;) {
 		memset(rset, 0, set_size);
 		memset(wset, 0, set_size);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From ec77c954c8c7b7cebab0e263b1a43bf6b789ecfb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Wed, 9 Jan 2013 15:58:00 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/03 23:22:58      [ssh-keygen.c]     
 allow fingerprinting of keys hosted in PKCS#11 tokens: ssh-keygen -lD ...    
  ok markus@

---
 ChangeLog    |  4 ++++
 ssh-keygen.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++------
 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index ab80dca45..297c08bdd 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@
      [sftp-server.8 sftp-server.c]
      allow specification of an alternate start directory for sftp-server(8)
      "I like this" markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/03 23:22:58
+     [ssh-keygen.c]
+     allow fingerprinting of keys hosted in PKCS#11 tokens: ssh-keygen -lD ...
+     ok markus@
 
 20121217
  - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] Add some scaffolding so that the new regress
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
index 1bbe0b0a8..106f1536d 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.220 2012/12/03 00:14:06 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.221 2013/01/03 23:22:58 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -723,15 +723,30 @@ do_download(struct passwd *pw)
 #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
 	Key **keys = NULL;
 	int i, nkeys;
+	enum fp_rep rep;
+	enum fp_type fptype;
+	char *fp, *ra;
 
 	pkcs11_init(0);
 	nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, NULL, &keys);
 	if (nkeys <= 0)
 		fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11");
 	for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
-		key_write(keys[i], stdout);
+		if (print_fingerprint) {
+			fp = key_fingerprint(keys[i], fptype, rep);
+			ra = key_fingerprint(keys[i], SSH_FP_MD5,
+			    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+			printf("%u %s %s (PKCS11 key)\n", key_size(keys[i]),
+			    fp, key_type(keys[i]));
+			if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
+				printf("%s\n", ra);
+			xfree(ra);
+			xfree(fp);
+		} else {
+			key_write(keys[i], stdout);
+			fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+		}
 		key_free(keys[i]);
-		fprintf(stdout, "\n");
 	}
 	xfree(keys);
 	pkcs11_terminate();
@@ -2177,7 +2192,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 		usage();
 	}
 	if (print_fingerprint && (delete_host || hash_hosts)) {
-		printf("Cannot use -l with -D or -R.\n");
+		printf("Cannot use -l with -H or -R.\n");
 		usage();
 	}
 	if (ca_key_path != NULL) {
@@ -2189,6 +2204,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 		do_show_cert(pw);
 	if (delete_host || hash_hosts || find_host)
 		do_known_hosts(pw, rr_hostname);
+	if (pkcs11provider != NULL)
+		do_download(pw);
 	if (print_fingerprint || print_bubblebabble)
 		do_fingerprint(pw);
 	if (change_passphrase)
@@ -2226,8 +2243,6 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 			exit(0);
 		}
 	}
-	if (pkcs11provider != NULL)
-		do_download(pw);
 
 	if (do_gen_candidates) {
 		FILE *out = fopen(out_file, "w");
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From aa7ad3039c671c157bb99217d60674dad8154a22 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Wed, 9 Jan 2013 15:58:21 +1100
Subject:    - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/04 19:26:38      [sftp-server.8
 sftp-server.c]      sftp-server.8: add argument name to -d     
 sftp-server.c: add -d to usage()      ok djm

---
 ChangeLog     | 5 +++++
 sftp-server.8 | 6 +++---
 sftp-server.c | 5 +++--
 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 297c08bdd..0f62953c7 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -27,6 +27,11 @@
      [ssh-keygen.c]
      allow fingerprinting of keys hosted in PKCS#11 tokens: ssh-keygen -lD ...
      ok markus@
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/04 19:26:38
+     [sftp-server.8 sftp-server.c]
+     sftp-server.8: add argument name to -d
+     sftp-server.c: add -d to usage()
+     ok djm
 
 20121217
  - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] Add some scaffolding so that the new regress
diff --git a/sftp-server.8 b/sftp-server.8
index 4d15f1249..2fd3df20c 100644
--- a/sftp-server.8
+++ b/sftp-server.8
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: sftp-server.8,v 1.20 2013/01/03 12:54:49 djm Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sftp-server.8,v 1.21 2013/01/04 19:26:38 jmc Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
 .\"
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: January 3 2013 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: January 4 2013 $
 .Dt SFTP-SERVER 8
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ for more information.
 .Pp
 Valid options are:
 .Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Fl d
+.It Fl d Ar start_directory
 specifies an alternate starting directory for users.
 The pathname may contain the following tokens that are expanded at runtime:
 %% is replaced by a literal '%',
diff --git a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
index c8858147a..cce074a56 100644
--- a/sftp-server.c
+++ b/sftp-server.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.95 2013/01/03 12:54:49 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.96 2013/01/04 19:26:38 jmc Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000-2004 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -1390,7 +1390,8 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
 	extern char *__progname;
 
 	fprintf(stderr,
-	    "usage: %s [-ehR] [-f log_facility] [-l log_level] [-u umask]\n",
+	    "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] "
+	    "[-l log_level]\n\t[-u umask]\n",
 	    __progname);
 	exit(1);
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 1d75abfe23cadf8cdba0bd2cfd54f3bc1ca80dc5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Wed, 9 Jan 2013 16:12:19 +1100
Subject:    - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/08 18:49:04      [PROTOCOL
 authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h monitor_wrap.c]      [myproposal.h
 packet.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5]      support AES-GCM as defined in RFC
 5647 (but with simpler KEX handling)      ok and feedback djm@

---
 ChangeLog      |   5 +++
 PROTOCOL       |  14 +++++++-
 authfile.c     |   6 ++--
 cipher.c       | 105 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 cipher.h       |   8 +++--
 kex.c          |  16 ++++++---
 kex.h          |   3 +-
 monitor_wrap.c |  39 ++++++++++-----------
 myproposal.h   |   3 +-
 packet.c       |  45 ++++++++++++++-----------
 ssh_config.5   |   7 ++--
 sshd_config.5  |   7 ++--
 12 files changed, 179 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 0f62953c7..b5812cc7d 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -32,6 +32,11 @@
      sftp-server.8: add argument name to -d
      sftp-server.c: add -d to usage()
      ok djm
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/08 18:49:04
+     [PROTOCOL authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h monitor_wrap.c]
+     [myproposal.h packet.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5]
+     support AES-GCM as defined in RFC 5647 (but with simpler KEX handling)
+     ok and feedback djm@
 
 20121217
  - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] Add some scaffolding so that the new regress
diff --git a/PROTOCOL b/PROTOCOL
index eb5d0889c..48b3a4400 100644
--- a/PROTOCOL
+++ b/PROTOCOL
@@ -79,6 +79,18 @@ contains:
       byte[n1]  payload; n1 = packet_length - padding_length - 1
       byte[n2]  random padding; n2 = padding_length
 
+1.6 transport: AES-GCM
+
+OpenSSH supports the AES-GCM algorithm as specified in RFC 5647.
+Because of problems with the specification of the key exchange
+the behaviour of OpenSSH differs from the RFC as follows:
+
+AES-GCM is only negotiated as the cipher algorithms
+"aes128-gcm@openssh.com" or "aes256-gcm@openssh.com" and never as
+an MAC algorithm. Additionally, if AES-GCM is selected as the cipher
+the exchanged MAC algorithms are ignored and there doesn't have to be
+a matching MAC.
+
 2. Connection protocol changes
 
 2.1. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com"
@@ -319,4 +331,4 @@ link(oldpath, newpath) and will respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
 This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
 "1".
 
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.19 2013/01/03 12:49:01 djm Exp $
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.20 2013/01/08 18:49:04 markus Exp $
diff --git a/authfile.c b/authfile.c
index d9ee4ca65..3544d170b 100644
--- a/authfile.c
+++ b/authfile.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.94 2012/12/11 22:31:18 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.95 2013/01/08 18:49:04 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ key_private_rsa1_to_blob(Key *key, Buffer *blob, const char *passphrase,
 	cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase,
 	    CIPHER_ENCRYPT);
 	cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, cp,
-	    buffer_ptr(&buffer), buffer_len(&buffer), 0);
+	    buffer_ptr(&buffer), buffer_len(&buffer), 0, 0);
 	cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext);
 	memset(&ciphercontext, 0, sizeof(ciphercontext));
 
@@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ key_parse_private_rsa1(Buffer *blob, const char *passphrase, char **commentp)
 	cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase,
 	    CIPHER_DECRYPT);
 	cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, cp,
-	    buffer_ptr(&copy), buffer_len(&copy), 0);
+	    buffer_ptr(&copy), buffer_len(&copy), 0, 0);
 	cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext);
 	memset(&ciphercontext, 0, sizeof(ciphercontext));
 	buffer_free(&copy);
diff --git a/cipher.c b/cipher.c
index aae69c347..cad8a2f36 100644
--- a/cipher.c
+++ b/cipher.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.84 2012/12/12 16:46:10 naddy Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.85 2013/01/08 18:49:04 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -71,29 +71,38 @@ struct Cipher {
 	u_int	cbc_mode;
 	const EVP_CIPHER	*(*evptype)(void);
 } ciphers[] = {
-	{ "none",		SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null },
-	{ "des",		SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, 1, EVP_des_cbc },
-	{ "3des",		SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_3des },
-	{ "blowfish",		SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH, 8, 32, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_bf },
-
-	{ "3des-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, 1, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
-	{ "blowfish-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 1, EVP_bf_cbc },
-	{ "cast128-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 1, EVP_cast5_cbc },
-	{ "arcfour",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 0, EVP_rc4 },
-	{ "arcfour128",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 1536, 0, EVP_rc4 },
-	{ "arcfour256",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 32, 1536, 0, EVP_rc4 },
-	{ "aes128-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 1, EVP_aes_128_cbc },
-	{ "aes192-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 1, EVP_aes_192_cbc },
-	{ "aes256-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
+	{ NULL,			SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
+
+	{ "none",	SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null },
+	{ "des",	SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_cbc },
+	{ "3des",	SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_3des },
+	{ "blowfish",	SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH, 8, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_bf },
+
+	{ "3des-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
+	{ "blowfish-cbc",
+			SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_bf_cbc },
+	{ "cast128-cbc",
+			SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_cast5_cbc },
+	{ "arcfour",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_rc4 },
+	{ "arcfour128",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 0, 1536, 0, EVP_rc4 },
+	{ "arcfour256",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 32, 0, 0, 1536, 0, EVP_rc4 },
+	{ "aes128-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_128_cbc },
+	{ "aes192-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_192_cbc },
+	{ "aes256-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
 	{ "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se",
-				SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
-	{ "aes128-ctr",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_ctr },
-	{ "aes192-ctr",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, EVP_aes_192_ctr },
-	{ "aes256-ctr",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_ctr },
+			SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
+	{ "aes128-ctr",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_ctr },
+	{ "aes192-ctr",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_192_ctr },
+	{ "aes256-ctr",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_ctr },
+	{ "aes128-gcm@openssh.com",
+			SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_gcm },
+	{ "aes256-gcm@openssh.com",
+			SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_gcm },
 #ifdef USE_CIPHER_ACSS
-	{ "acss@openssh.org",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 5, 0, 0, EVP_acss },
+	{ "acss@openssh.org",
+			SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_acss },
 #endif
-	{ NULL,			SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
+	{ NULL,		SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
 };
 
 /*--*/
@@ -110,6 +119,18 @@ cipher_keylen(const Cipher *c)
 	return (c->key_len);
 }
 
+u_int
+cipher_authlen(const Cipher *c)
+{
+	return (c->auth_len);
+}
+
+u_int
+cipher_ivlen(const Cipher *c)
+{
+	return (c->iv_len ? c->iv_len : c->block_size);
+}
+
 u_int
 cipher_get_number(const Cipher *c)
 {
@@ -229,11 +250,12 @@ cipher_init(CipherContext *cc, Cipher *cipher,
 			keylen = 8;
 	}
 	cc->plaintext = (cipher->number == SSH_CIPHER_NONE);
+	cc->encrypt = do_encrypt;
 
 	if (keylen < cipher->key_len)
 		fatal("cipher_init: key length %d is insufficient for %s.",
 		    keylen, cipher->name);
-	if (iv != NULL && ivlen < cipher->block_size)
+	if (iv != NULL && ivlen < cipher_ivlen(cipher))
 		fatal("cipher_init: iv length %d is insufficient for %s.",
 		    ivlen, cipher->name);
 	cc->cipher = cipher;
@@ -254,6 +276,11 @@ cipher_init(CipherContext *cc, Cipher *cipher,
 	    (do_encrypt == CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) == 0)
 		fatal("cipher_init: EVP_CipherInit failed for %s",
 		    cipher->name);
+	if (cipher_authlen(cipher) &&
+	    !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED,
+	    -1, (u_char *)iv))
+		fatal("cipher_init: EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED failed for %s",
+		    cipher->name);
 	klen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(&cc->evp);
 	if (klen > 0 && keylen != (u_int)klen) {
 		debug2("cipher_init: set keylen (%d -> %d)", klen, keylen);
@@ -284,19 +311,49 @@ cipher_init(CipherContext *cc, Cipher *cipher,
  * Theses bytes are treated as additional authenticated data for
  * authenticated encryption modes.
  * En/Decrypt 'len' bytes at offset 'aadlen' from 'src' to 'dest'.
+ * Use 'authlen' bytes at offset 'len'+'aadlen' as the authentication tag.
+ * This tag is written on encryption and verified on decryption.
  * Both 'aadlen' and 'authlen' can be set to 0.
  */
 void
 cipher_crypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src,
-    u_int len, u_int aadlen)
+    u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen)
 {
-	if (aadlen)
+	if (authlen) {
+		u_char lastiv[1];
+
+		if (authlen != cipher_authlen(cc->cipher))
+			fatal("%s: authlen mismatch %d", __func__, authlen);
+		/* increment IV */
+		if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN,
+		    1, lastiv))
+			fatal("%s: EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN", __func__);
+		/* set tag on decyption */
+		if (!cc->encrypt &&
+		    !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG,
+		    authlen, (u_char *)src + aadlen + len))
+			fatal("%s: EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG", __func__);
+	}
+	if (aadlen) {
+		if (authlen &&
+		    EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, NULL, (u_char *)src, aadlen) < 0)
+			fatal("%s: EVP_Cipher(aad) failed", __func__);
 		memcpy(dest, src, aadlen);
+	}
 	if (len % cc->cipher->block_size)
 		fatal("%s: bad plaintext length %d", __func__, len);
 	if (EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, dest + aadlen, (u_char *)src + aadlen,
 	    len) < 0)
 		fatal("%s: EVP_Cipher failed", __func__);
+	if (authlen) {
+		/* compute tag (on encrypt) or verify tag (on decrypt) */
+		if (EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, NULL, NULL, 0) < 0)
+			fatal("%s: EVP_Cipher(finish) failed", __func__);
+		if (cc->encrypt &&
+		    !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG,
+		    authlen, dest + aadlen + len))
+			fatal("%s: EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG", __func__);
+	}
 }
 
 void
diff --git a/cipher.h b/cipher.h
index 78972fea5..8cb57c3e5 100644
--- a/cipher.h
+++ b/cipher.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: cipher.h,v 1.38 2012/12/11 22:31:18 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher.h,v 1.39 2013/01/08 18:49:04 markus Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ typedef struct CipherContext CipherContext;
 struct Cipher;
 struct CipherContext {
 	int	plaintext;
+	int	encrypt;
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX evp;
 	Cipher *cipher;
 };
@@ -76,11 +77,14 @@ char	*cipher_name(int);
 int	 ciphers_valid(const char *);
 void	 cipher_init(CipherContext *, Cipher *, const u_char *, u_int,
     const u_char *, u_int, int);
-void	 cipher_crypt(CipherContext *, u_char *, const u_char *, u_int, u_int);
+void	 cipher_crypt(CipherContext *, u_char *, const u_char *,
+    u_int, u_int, u_int);
 void	 cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *);
 void	 cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *, Cipher *, const char *, int);
 u_int	 cipher_blocksize(const Cipher *);
 u_int	 cipher_keylen(const Cipher *);
+u_int	 cipher_authlen(const Cipher *);
+u_int	 cipher_ivlen(const Cipher *);
 u_int	 cipher_is_cbc(const Cipher *);
 
 u_int	 cipher_get_number(const Cipher *);
diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
index f77b3c925..57a79dd9e 100644
--- a/kex.c
+++ b/kex.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.87 2012/08/17 01:22:56 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.88 2013/01/08 18:49:04 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -304,6 +304,7 @@ choose_enc(Enc *enc, char *client, char *server)
 	enc->name = name;
 	enc->enabled = 0;
 	enc->iv = NULL;
+	enc->iv_len = cipher_ivlen(enc->cipher);
 	enc->key = NULL;
 	enc->key_len = cipher_keylen(enc->cipher);
 	enc->block_size = cipher_blocksize(enc->cipher);
@@ -415,7 +416,7 @@ kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex)
 	char **my, **peer;
 	char **cprop, **sprop;
 	int nenc, nmac, ncomp;
-	u_int mode, ctos, need;
+	u_int mode, ctos, need, authlen;
 	int first_kex_follows, type;
 
 	my   = kex_buf2prop(&kex->my, NULL);
@@ -448,13 +449,16 @@ kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex)
 		nenc  = ctos ? PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS  : PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC;
 		nmac  = ctos ? PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS  : PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC;
 		ncomp = ctos ? PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC;
-		choose_enc (&newkeys->enc,  cprop[nenc],  sprop[nenc]);
-		choose_mac (&newkeys->mac,  cprop[nmac],  sprop[nmac]);
+		choose_enc(&newkeys->enc, cprop[nenc], sprop[nenc]);
+		/* ignore mac for authenticated encryption */
+		authlen = cipher_authlen(newkeys->enc.cipher);
+		if (authlen == 0)
+			choose_mac(&newkeys->mac, cprop[nmac], sprop[nmac]);
 		choose_comp(&newkeys->comp, cprop[ncomp], sprop[ncomp]);
 		debug("kex: %s %s %s %s",
 		    ctos ? "client->server" : "server->client",
 		    newkeys->enc.name,
-		    newkeys->mac.name,
+		    authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "<implicit>",
 		    newkeys->comp.name);
 	}
 	choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
@@ -467,6 +471,8 @@ kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex)
 			need = newkeys->enc.key_len;
 		if (need < newkeys->enc.block_size)
 			need = newkeys->enc.block_size;
+		if (need < newkeys->enc.iv_len)
+			need = newkeys->enc.iv_len;
 		if (need < newkeys->mac.key_len)
 			need = newkeys->mac.key_len;
 	}
diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
index 03b984cc8..46731fa45 100644
--- a/kex.h
+++ b/kex.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.53 2012/12/11 22:31:18 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.54 2013/01/08 18:49:04 markus Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ struct Enc {
 	Cipher	*cipher;
 	int	enabled;
 	u_int	key_len;
+	u_int	iv_len;
 	u_int	block_size;
 	u_char	*key;
 	u_char	*iv;
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
index c22d0a2a6..ea654a73f 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.74 2012/10/01 13:59:51 naddy Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.75 2013/01/08 18:49:04 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -491,25 +491,24 @@ mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *blob, int blen)
 	enc->enabled = buffer_get_int(&b);
 	enc->block_size = buffer_get_int(&b);
 	enc->key = buffer_get_string(&b, &enc->key_len);
-	enc->iv = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
-	if (len != enc->block_size)
-		fatal("%s: bad ivlen: expected %u != %u", __func__,
-		    enc->block_size, len);
+	enc->iv = buffer_get_string(&b, &enc->iv_len);
 
 	if (enc->name == NULL || cipher_by_name(enc->name) != enc->cipher)
 		fatal("%s: bad cipher name %s or pointer %p", __func__,
 		    enc->name, enc->cipher);
 
 	/* Mac structure */
-	mac->name = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
-	if (mac->name == NULL || mac_setup(mac, mac->name) == -1)
-		fatal("%s: can not setup mac %s", __func__, mac->name);
-	mac->enabled = buffer_get_int(&b);
-	mac->key = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
-	if (len > mac->key_len)
-		fatal("%s: bad mac key length: %u > %d", __func__, len,
-		    mac->key_len);
-	mac->key_len = len;
+	if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) {
+		mac->name = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+		if (mac->name == NULL || mac_setup(mac, mac->name) == -1)
+			fatal("%s: can not setup mac %s", __func__, mac->name);
+		mac->enabled = buffer_get_int(&b);
+		mac->key = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
+		if (len > mac->key_len)
+			fatal("%s: bad mac key length: %u > %d", __func__, len,
+			    mac->key_len);
+		mac->key_len = len;
+	}
 
 	/* Comp structure */
 	comp->type = buffer_get_int(&b);
@@ -551,13 +550,15 @@ mm_newkeys_to_blob(int mode, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp)
 	buffer_put_int(&b, enc->enabled);
 	buffer_put_int(&b, enc->block_size);
 	buffer_put_string(&b, enc->key, enc->key_len);
-	packet_get_keyiv(mode, enc->iv, enc->block_size);
-	buffer_put_string(&b, enc->iv, enc->block_size);
+	packet_get_keyiv(mode, enc->iv, enc->iv_len);
+	buffer_put_string(&b, enc->iv, enc->iv_len);
 
 	/* Mac structure */
-	buffer_put_cstring(&b, mac->name);
-	buffer_put_int(&b, mac->enabled);
-	buffer_put_string(&b, mac->key, mac->key_len);
+	if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) {
+		buffer_put_cstring(&b, mac->name);
+		buffer_put_int(&b, mac->enabled);
+		buffer_put_string(&b, mac->key, mac->key_len);
+	}
 
 	/* Comp structure */
 	buffer_put_int(&b, comp->type);
diff --git a/myproposal.h b/myproposal.h
index d98f4b051..99d093461 100644
--- a/myproposal.h
+++ b/myproposal.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.31 2012/12/11 22:31:18 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.32 2013/01/08 18:49:04 markus Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@
 #define	KEX_DEFAULT_ENCRYPT \
 	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
 	"arcfour256,arcfour128," \
+	"aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com," \
 	"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc," \
 	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,arcfour,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se"
 #ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
index fe379aa49..ae7b04cd8 100644
--- a/packet.c
+++ b/packet.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.179 2012/12/12 16:45:52 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.180 2013/01/08 18:49:04 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ packet_send1(void)
 	    buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet));
 	cipher_crypt(&active_state->send_context, cp,
 	    buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet),
-	    buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet), 0);
+	    buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet), 0, 0);
 
 #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
 	fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: ");
@@ -757,7 +757,7 @@ set_newkeys(int mode)
 		mac  = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
 		comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
 		mac_clear(mac);
-		memset(enc->iv,  0, enc->block_size);
+		memset(enc->iv,  0, enc->iv_len);
 		memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len);
 		memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len);
 		xfree(enc->name);
@@ -774,11 +774,11 @@ set_newkeys(int mode)
 	enc  = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->enc;
 	mac  = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
 	comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
-	if (mac_init(mac) == 0)
+	if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0 && mac_init(mac) == 0)
 		mac->enabled = 1;
 	DBG(debug("cipher_init_context: %d", mode));
 	cipher_init(cc, enc->cipher, enc->key, enc->key_len,
-	    enc->iv, enc->block_size, crypt_type);
+	    enc->iv, enc->iv_len, crypt_type);
 	/* Deleting the keys does not gain extra security */
 	/* memset(enc->iv,  0, enc->block_size);
 	   memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len);
@@ -846,7 +846,7 @@ packet_send2_wrapped(void)
 {
 	u_char type, *cp, *macbuf = NULL;
 	u_char padlen, pad = 0;
-	u_int i, len, aadlen = 0;
+	u_int i, len, authlen = 0, aadlen = 0;
 	u_int32_t rnd = 0;
 	Enc *enc   = NULL;
 	Mac *mac   = NULL;
@@ -857,9 +857,12 @@ packet_send2_wrapped(void)
 		enc  = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc;
 		mac  = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->mac;
 		comp = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->comp;
+		/* disable mac for authenticated encryption */
+		if ((authlen = cipher_authlen(enc->cipher)) != 0)
+			mac = NULL;
 	}
 	block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8;
-	aadlen = mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm ? 4 : 0;
+	aadlen = (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) || authlen ? 4 : 0;
 
 	cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
 	type = cp[5];
@@ -936,10 +939,10 @@ packet_send2_wrapped(void)
 		DBG(debug("done calc MAC out #%d", active_state->p_send.seqnr));
 	}
 	/* encrypt packet and append to output buffer. */
-	cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->output, len);
+	cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->output, len + authlen);
 	cipher_crypt(&active_state->send_context, cp,
 	    buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet),
-	    len - aadlen, aadlen);
+	    len - aadlen, aadlen, authlen);
 	/* append unencrypted MAC */
 	if (mac && mac->enabled) {
 		if (mac->etm) {
@@ -1199,7 +1202,7 @@ packet_read_poll1(void)
 	buffer_clear(&active_state->incoming_packet);
 	cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->incoming_packet, padded_len);
 	cipher_crypt(&active_state->receive_context, cp,
-	    buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), padded_len, 0);
+	    buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), padded_len, 0, 0);
 
 	buffer_consume(&active_state->input, padded_len);
 
@@ -1248,7 +1251,7 @@ packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 {
 	u_int padlen, need;
 	u_char *macbuf = NULL, *cp, type;
-	u_int maclen, aadlen = 0, block_size;
+	u_int maclen, authlen = 0, aadlen = 0, block_size;
 	Enc *enc   = NULL;
 	Mac *mac   = NULL;
 	Comp *comp = NULL;
@@ -1260,10 +1263,13 @@ packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 		enc  = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->enc;
 		mac  = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->mac;
 		comp = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->comp;
+		/* disable mac for authenticated encryption */
+		if ((authlen = cipher_authlen(enc->cipher)) != 0)
+			mac = NULL;
 	}
 	maclen = mac && mac->enabled ? mac->mac_len : 0;
 	block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8;
-	aadlen = mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm ? 4 : 0;
+	aadlen = (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) || authlen ? 4 : 0;
 
 	if (aadlen && active_state->packlen == 0) {
 		if (buffer_len(&active_state->input) < 4)
@@ -1290,7 +1296,7 @@ packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 		cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->incoming_packet,
 		    block_size);
 		cipher_crypt(&active_state->receive_context, cp,
-		    buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), block_size, 0);
+		    buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), block_size, 0, 0);
 		cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet);
 		active_state->packlen = get_u32(cp);
 		if (active_state->packlen < 1 + 4 ||
@@ -1316,8 +1322,8 @@ packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 		 */
 		need = 4 + active_state->packlen - block_size;
 	}
-	DBG(debug("partial packet: block %d, need %d, maclen %d, aadlen %d",
-	    block_size, need, maclen, aadlen));
+	DBG(debug("partial packet: block %d, need %d, maclen %d, authlen %d,"
+	    " aadlen %d", block_size, need, maclen, authlen, aadlen));
 	if (need % block_size != 0) {
 		logit("padding error: need %d block %d mod %d",
 		    need, block_size, need % block_size);
@@ -1329,10 +1335,11 @@ packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 	 * check if the entire packet has been received and
 	 * decrypt into incoming_packet:
 	 * 'aadlen' bytes are unencrypted, but authenticated.
-	 * 'need' bytes are encrypted, followed by
+	 * 'need' bytes are encrypted, followed by either
+	 * 'authlen' bytes of authentication tag or
 	 * 'maclen' bytes of message authentication code.
 	 */
-	if (buffer_len(&active_state->input) < aadlen + need + maclen)
+	if (buffer_len(&active_state->input) < aadlen + need + authlen + maclen)
 		return SSH_MSG_NONE;
 #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
 	fprintf(stderr, "read_poll enc/full: ");
@@ -1344,8 +1351,8 @@ packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 		    buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), aadlen + need);
 	cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->incoming_packet, aadlen + need);
 	cipher_crypt(&active_state->receive_context, cp,
-	    buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), need, aadlen);
-	buffer_consume(&active_state->input, aadlen + need);
+	    buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), need, aadlen, authlen);
+	buffer_consume(&active_state->input, aadlen + need + authlen);
 	/*
 	 * compute MAC over seqnr and packet,
 	 * increment sequence number for incoming packet
diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
index ee466d800..269529c00 100644
--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.160 2012/12/11 22:31:18 markus Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: December 11 2012 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.161 2013/01/08 18:49:04 markus Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: January 8 2013 $
 .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -204,6 +204,8 @@ The supported ciphers are
 .Dq aes128-ctr ,
 .Dq aes192-ctr ,
 .Dq aes256-ctr ,
+.Dq aes128-gcm@openssh.com ,
+.Dq aes256-gcm@openssh.com ,
 .Dq arcfour128 ,
 .Dq arcfour256 ,
 .Dq arcfour ,
@@ -213,6 +215,7 @@ and
 The default is:
 .Bd -literal -offset 3n
 aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,arcfour256,arcfour128,
+aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,
 aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,aes192-cbc,
 aes256-cbc,arcfour
 .Ed
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index 0f4aa639d..e7bb0b55f 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.152 2012/12/11 22:31:18 markus Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: December 11 2012 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.153 2013/01/08 18:49:04 markus Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: January 8 2013 $
 .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -336,6 +336,8 @@ The supported ciphers are
 .Dq aes128-ctr ,
 .Dq aes192-ctr ,
 .Dq aes256-ctr ,
+.Dq aes128-gcm@openssh.com ,
+.Dq aes256-gcm@openssh.com ,
 .Dq arcfour128 ,
 .Dq arcfour256 ,
 .Dq arcfour ,
@@ -345,6 +347,7 @@ and
 The default is:
 .Bd -literal -offset 3n
 aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,arcfour256,arcfour128,
+aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,
 aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,aes192-cbc,
 aes256-cbc,arcfour
 .Ed
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From d522c68872689e2e80d9667da1c9a18d04b001cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Wed, 9 Jan 2013 16:42:47 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) [cipher.c configure.ac openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h]   
 Fix merge botch, automatically detect AES-GCM in OpenSSL, move a little   
 cipher compat code to openssl-compat.h

---
 ChangeLog                       |  3 +++
 cipher.c                        | 21 ++++-----------------
 configure.ac                    | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
 openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 4 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index b5812cc7d..868158cfc 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@
      [myproposal.h packet.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5]
      support AES-GCM as defined in RFC 5647 (but with simpler KEX handling)
      ok and feedback djm@
+ - (djm) [cipher.c configure.ac openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h]
+   Fix merge botch, automatically detect AES-GCM in OpenSSL, move a little
+   cipher compat code to openssl-compat.h
 
 20121217
  - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] Add some scaffolding so that the new regress
diff --git a/cipher.c b/cipher.c
index cad8a2f36..e137f359b 100644
--- a/cipher.c
+++ b/cipher.c
@@ -54,25 +54,18 @@
 extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_bf(void);
 extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_3des(void);
 extern void ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR
-#define EVP_aes_128_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
-#define EVP_aes_192_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
-#define EVP_aes_256_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
-extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_128_ctr(void);
-extern void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, u_int);
-#endif
 
 struct Cipher {
 	char	*name;
 	int	number;		/* for ssh1 only */
 	u_int	block_size;
 	u_int	key_len;
+	u_int	iv_len;		/* defaults to block_size */
+	u_int	auth_len;
 	u_int	discard_len;
 	u_int	cbc_mode;
 	const EVP_CIPHER	*(*evptype)(void);
 } ciphers[] = {
-	{ NULL,			SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
-
 	{ "none",	SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null },
 	{ "des",	SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_cbc },
 	{ "3des",	SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_3des },
@@ -94,10 +87,12 @@ struct Cipher {
 	{ "aes128-ctr",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_ctr },
 	{ "aes192-ctr",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_192_ctr },
 	{ "aes256-ctr",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_ctr },
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM
 	{ "aes128-gcm@openssh.com",
 			SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_gcm },
 	{ "aes256-gcm@openssh.com",
 			SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_gcm },
+#endif
 #ifdef USE_CIPHER_ACSS
 	{ "acss@openssh.org",
 			SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_acss },
@@ -473,14 +468,6 @@ cipher_set_keyiv(CipherContext *cc, u_char *iv)
 	}
 }
 
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
-#define EVP_X_STATE(evp)	&(evp).c
-#define EVP_X_STATE_LEN(evp)	sizeof((evp).c)
-#else
-#define EVP_X_STATE(evp)	(evp).cipher_data
-#define EVP_X_STATE_LEN(evp)	(evp).cipher->ctx_size
-#endif
-
 int
 cipher_get_keycontext(const CipherContext *cc, u_char *dat)
 {
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 64c231b7e..36761233c 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.499 2012/12/12 21:18:56 djm Exp $
+# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.500 2013/01/09 05:42:47 djm Exp $
 #
 # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
 #
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 
 AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org])
-AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.499 $)
+AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.500 $)
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
 AC_LANG([C])
 
@@ -2320,6 +2320,26 @@ AC_LINK_IFELSE(
 	]
 )
 
+# Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*gcm
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has AES GCM via EVP])
+AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+	[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+	]], [[
+	exit(EVP_aes_128_gcm() == NULL ||
+	    EVP_aes_256_gcm() == NULL);
+	]])],
+	[
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+		AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM], [1],
+		    [libcrypto has EVP AES GCM])
+	],
+	[
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+	]
+)
+
 AC_MSG_CHECKING([if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int])
 AC_LINK_IFELSE(
 	[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
index a151eff38..28da3be2d 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: openssl-compat.h,v 1.20 2012/01/17 03:03:39 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: openssl-compat.h,v 1.21 2013/01/09 05:42:49 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
@@ -63,6 +63,30 @@ extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_rijndael(void);
 extern void ssh_rijndael_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, u_int);
 #endif
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR
+#define EVP_aes_128_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
+#define EVP_aes_192_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
+#define EVP_aes_256_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
+extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_128_ctr(void);
+extern void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, u_int);
+#endif
+
+/* Avoid some #ifdef. Code that uses these is unreachable without GCM */
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM) && !defined(EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED)
+# define EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED -1
+# define EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN -1
+# define EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG -1
+# define EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG -1
+#endif
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
+#define EVP_X_STATE(evp)	&(evp).c
+#define EVP_X_STATE_LEN(evp)	sizeof((evp).c)
+#else
+#define EVP_X_STATE(evp)	(evp).cipher_data
+#define EVP_X_STATE_LEN(evp)	(evp).cipher->ctx_size
+#endif
+
 #if !defined(EVP_CTRL_SET_ACSS_MODE)
 # if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
 #  define USE_CIPHER_ACSS 1
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 1422c0887c8e92f7159f6f6ddd4974aab177c6de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Wed, 9 Jan 2013 16:44:54 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/09 05:40:17      [ssh-keygen.c]     
 correctly initialise fingerprint type for fingerprinting PKCS#11 keys

---
 ChangeLog    | 3 +++
 ssh-keygen.c | 5 ++++-
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 868158cfc..37f114b5b 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@
      [myproposal.h packet.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5]
      support AES-GCM as defined in RFC 5647 (but with simpler KEX handling)
      ok and feedback djm@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/09 05:40:17
+     [ssh-keygen.c]
+     correctly initialise fingerprint type for fingerprinting PKCS#11 keys
  - (djm) [cipher.c configure.ac openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h]
    Fix merge botch, automatically detect AES-GCM in OpenSSL, move a little
    cipher compat code to openssl-compat.h
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
index 106f1536d..a19a2b085 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.221 2013/01/03 23:22:58 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.222 2013/01/09 05:40:17 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -727,6 +727,9 @@ do_download(struct passwd *pw)
 	enum fp_type fptype;
 	char *fp, *ra;
 
+	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
+	rep =    print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
+
 	pkcs11_init(0);
 	nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, NULL, &keys);
 	if (nkeys <= 0)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From c20eb8b8eac8b6cb1f86199e16dc7d13902a760b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Sat, 12 Jan 2013 22:41:26 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/12 11:22:04      [cipher.c]     
 improve error message for integrity failure in AES-GCM modes; ok markus@

---
 ChangeLog |  6 ++++++
 cipher.c  | 10 +++++++---
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 37f114b5b..3be438c75 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
+20130112
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/12 11:22:04
+     [cipher.c]
+     improve error message for integrity failure in AES-GCM modes; ok markus@
+
 20130109
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/14 05:26:43
diff --git a/cipher.c b/cipher.c
index e137f359b..2d307e160 100644
--- a/cipher.c
+++ b/cipher.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.85 2013/01/08 18:49:04 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.86 2013/01/12 11:22:04 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -342,8 +342,12 @@ cipher_crypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src,
 		fatal("%s: EVP_Cipher failed", __func__);
 	if (authlen) {
 		/* compute tag (on encrypt) or verify tag (on decrypt) */
-		if (EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, NULL, NULL, 0) < 0)
-			fatal("%s: EVP_Cipher(finish) failed", __func__);
+		if (EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, NULL, NULL, 0) < 0) {
+			if (cc->encrypt)
+				fatal("%s: EVP_Cipher(final) failed", __func__);
+			else
+				fatal("Decryption integrity check failed");
+		}
 		if (cc->encrypt &&
 		    !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG,
 		    authlen, dest + aadlen + len))
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 846dc7f21c0dd52bc8cc8f433d464a6561066d00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Sat, 12 Jan 2013 22:46:26 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/12 11:23:53     
 [regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/integrity.sh regress/try-ciphers.sh]     
 test AES-GCM modes; feedback markus@

---
 ChangeLog               |  3 +++
 regress/cipher-speed.sh | 11 +++++++++--
 regress/integrity.sh    | 14 +++++++++++---
 regress/try-ciphers.sh  | 11 +++++++++--
 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 3be438c75..dd847610f 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@
    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/12 11:22:04
      [cipher.c]
      improve error message for integrity failure in AES-GCM modes; ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/12 11:23:53
+     [regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/integrity.sh regress/try-ciphers.sh]
+     test AES-GCM modes; feedback markus@
 
 20130109
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/regress/cipher-speed.sh b/regress/cipher-speed.sh
index 4f26f7e96..ed7c6f320 100644
--- a/regress/cipher-speed.sh
+++ b/regress/cipher-speed.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: cipher-speed.sh,v 1.6 2012/10/05 02:20:48 dtucker Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: cipher-speed.sh,v 1.7 2013/01/12 11:23:53 djm Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="cipher speed"
@@ -16,12 +16,14 @@ ciphers="aes128-cbc 3des-cbc blowfish-cbc cast128-cbc
 	arcfour128 arcfour256 arcfour 
 	aes192-cbc aes256-cbc rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se
 	aes128-ctr aes192-ctr aes256-ctr"
+config_defined OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM &&
+	ciphers="$ciphers aes128-gcm@openssh.com aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
 macs="hmac-sha1 hmac-md5 umac-64@openssh.com umac-128@openssh.com
 	hmac-sha1-96 hmac-md5-96"
 config_defined HAVE_EVP_SHA256 &&
     macs="$macs hmac-sha2-256 hmac-sha2-512"
 
-for c in $ciphers; do for m in $macs; do
+for c in $ciphers; do n=0; for m in $macs; do
 	trace "proto 2 cipher $c mac $m"
 	for x in $tries; do
 		echon "$c/$m:\t"
@@ -34,6 +36,11 @@ for c in $ciphers; do for m in $macs; do
 			fail "ssh -2 failed with mac $m cipher $c"
 		fi
 	done
+	# No point trying all MACs for GCM since they are ignored.
+	case $c in
+	aes*-gcm@openssh.com)	test $n -gt 0 && break;;
+	esac
+	n=$(($n + 1))
 done; done
 
 ciphers="3des blowfish"
diff --git a/regress/integrity.sh b/regress/integrity.sh
index 0185490c1..608cde0fe 100644
--- a/regress/integrity.sh
+++ b/regress/integrity.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.1 2012/12/11 22:42:11 markus Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.2 2013/01/12 11:23:53 djm Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="integrity"
@@ -14,6 +14,10 @@ macs="hmac-sha1 hmac-md5 umac-64@openssh.com umac-128@openssh.com
 	umac-64-etm@openssh.com umac-128-etm@openssh.com
 	hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com
 	hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
+# The following are not MACs, but ciphers with integrated integrity. They are
+# handled specially below.
+config_defined OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM &&
+	macs="$macs aes128-gcm@openssh.com aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
 
 # sshd-command for proxy (see test-exec.sh)
 cmd="sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${SSHD} ${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy"
@@ -37,7 +41,11 @@ for m in $macs; do
 		fi
 		# modify output from sshd at offset $off
 		pxy="proxycommand=$cmd | $OBJ/modpipe -m xor:$off:1"
-		output=$(${SSH} -m $m -2F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o "$pxy" \
+		case $m in
+			aes*gcm*)	macopt="-c $m";;
+			*)		macopt="-m $m";;
+		esac
+		output=$(${SSH} $macopt -2F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o "$pxy" \
 		    999.999.999.999 true 2>&1)
 		if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
 			fail "ssh -m $m succeeds with bit-flip at $off"
@@ -47,7 +55,7 @@ for m in $macs; do
 		verbose "test $tid: $m @$off $output"
 		case "$output" in
 		Bad?packet*)	elen=$((elen+1)); skip=3;;
-		Corrupted?MAC*) emac=$((emac+1)); skip=0;;
+		Corrupted?MAC* | Decryption?integrity?check?failed*)
 		padding*)	epad=$((epad+1)); skip=0;;
 		*)		fail "unexpected error mac $m at $off";;
 		esac
diff --git a/regress/try-ciphers.sh b/regress/try-ciphers.sh
index 2b11b59ea..ca2851713 100644
--- a/regress/try-ciphers.sh
+++ b/regress/try-ciphers.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: try-ciphers.sh,v 1.17 2012/12/11 23:12:13 markus Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: try-ciphers.sh,v 1.18 2013/01/12 11:23:53 djm Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="try ciphers"
@@ -6,7 +6,8 @@ tid="try ciphers"
 ciphers="aes128-cbc 3des-cbc blowfish-cbc cast128-cbc 
 	arcfour128 arcfour256 arcfour 
 	aes192-cbc aes256-cbc rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se
-	aes128-ctr aes192-ctr aes256-ctr"
+	aes128-ctr aes192-ctr aes256-ctr
+	aes128-gcm@openssh.com aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
 macs="hmac-sha1 hmac-md5 umac-64@openssh.com umac-128@openssh.com
 	hmac-sha1-96 hmac-md5-96
 	hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com
@@ -18,6 +19,7 @@ config_defined HAVE_EVP_SHA256 &&
 	hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
 
 for c in $ciphers; do
+	n=0
 	for m in $macs; do
 		trace "proto 2 cipher $c mac $m"
 		verbose "test $tid: proto 2 cipher $c mac $m"
@@ -25,6 +27,11 @@ for c in $ciphers; do
 		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
 			fail "ssh -2 failed with mac $m cipher $c"
 		fi
+		# No point trying all MACs for GCM since they are ignored.
+		case $c in
+		aes*-gcm@openssh.com)	test $n -gt 0 && break;;
+		esac
+		n=$(($n + 1))
 	done
 done
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From efa1c950921659a0f10b9adf30625fba21b3815c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Sat, 12 Jan 2013 23:10:47 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) [regress/integrity.sh] repair botched merge

---
 ChangeLog            | 1 +
 regress/integrity.sh | 1 +
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index dd847610f..92830553e 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/12 11:23:53
      [regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/integrity.sh regress/try-ciphers.sh]
      test AES-GCM modes; feedback markus@
+ - (djm) [regress/integrity.sh] repair botched merge
 
 20130109
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/regress/integrity.sh b/regress/integrity.sh
index 608cde0fe..2b4bfeacc 100644
--- a/regress/integrity.sh
+++ b/regress/integrity.sh
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ for m in $macs; do
 		case "$output" in
 		Bad?packet*)	elen=$((elen+1)); skip=3;;
 		Corrupted?MAC* | Decryption?integrity?check?failed*)
+				emac=$((emac+1)); skip=0;;
 		padding*)	epad=$((epad+1)); skip=0;;
 		*)		fail "unexpected error mac $m at $off";;
 		esac
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From b26699bbadaffa1b1de2f6b0e175b77aba337de5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Thu, 17 Jan 2013 14:31:57 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) [regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/integrity.sh
 regress/try-ciphers.sh]    check for GCM support before testing GCM ciphers.

---
 ChangeLog               | 4 ++++
 regress/cipher-speed.sh | 4 ++--
 regress/integrity.sh    | 2 +-
 regress/try-ciphers.sh  | 5 +++--
 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 92830553e..686fe8966 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+20130117
+ - (djm) [regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/integrity.sh regress/try-ciphers.sh]
+   check for GCM support before testing GCM ciphers.
+
 20130112
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/12 11:22:04
diff --git a/regress/cipher-speed.sh b/regress/cipher-speed.sh
index ed7c6f320..114191b89 100644
--- a/regress/cipher-speed.sh
+++ b/regress/cipher-speed.sh
@@ -16,11 +16,11 @@ ciphers="aes128-cbc 3des-cbc blowfish-cbc cast128-cbc
 	arcfour128 arcfour256 arcfour 
 	aes192-cbc aes256-cbc rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se
 	aes128-ctr aes192-ctr aes256-ctr"
-config_defined OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM &&
+config_defined OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM && \
 	ciphers="$ciphers aes128-gcm@openssh.com aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
 macs="hmac-sha1 hmac-md5 umac-64@openssh.com umac-128@openssh.com
 	hmac-sha1-96 hmac-md5-96"
-config_defined HAVE_EVP_SHA256 &&
+config_defined HAVE_EVP_SHA256 && \
     macs="$macs hmac-sha2-256 hmac-sha2-512"
 
 for c in $ciphers; do n=0; for m in $macs; do
diff --git a/regress/integrity.sh b/regress/integrity.sh
index 2b4bfeacc..91168fd2e 100644
--- a/regress/integrity.sh
+++ b/regress/integrity.sh
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ macs="hmac-sha1 hmac-md5 umac-64@openssh.com umac-128@openssh.com
 	hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
 # The following are not MACs, but ciphers with integrated integrity. They are
 # handled specially below.
-config_defined OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM &&
+config_defined OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM && \
 	macs="$macs aes128-gcm@openssh.com aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
 
 # sshd-command for proxy (see test-exec.sh)
diff --git a/regress/try-ciphers.sh b/regress/try-ciphers.sh
index ca2851713..ef91085c5 100644
--- a/regress/try-ciphers.sh
+++ b/regress/try-ciphers.sh
@@ -6,8 +6,9 @@ tid="try ciphers"
 ciphers="aes128-cbc 3des-cbc blowfish-cbc cast128-cbc 
 	arcfour128 arcfour256 arcfour 
 	aes192-cbc aes256-cbc rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se
-	aes128-ctr aes192-ctr aes256-ctr
-	aes128-gcm@openssh.com aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
+	aes128-ctr aes192-ctr aes256-ctr"
+config_defined OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM && \
+	ciphers="$ciphers aes128-gcm@openssh.com aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
 macs="hmac-sha1 hmac-md5 umac-64@openssh.com umac-128@openssh.com
 	hmac-sha1-96 hmac-md5-96
 	hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From f3747bf4014a450c9aaf1d88b010f6e579d10072 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2013 11:44:04 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/17 23:00:01      [auth.c key.c key.h
 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c sshd_config.5]      [krl.c krl.h PROTOCOL.krl]     
 add support for Key Revocation Lists (KRLs). These are a compact way to     
 represent lists of revoked keys and certificates, taking as little as      a
 single bit of incremental cost to revoke a certificate by serial number.     
 KRLs are loaded via the existing RevokedKeys sshd_config option.     
 feedback and ok markus@

---
 ChangeLog     |   11 +
 Makefile.in   |    4 +-
 PROTOCOL.krl  |  164 ++++++++
 auth.c        |   15 +-
 key.c         |   40 +-
 key.h         |    6 +-
 krl.c         | 1227 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 krl.h         |   63 +++
 ssh-keygen.1  |  118 +++++-
 ssh-keygen.c  |  257 +++++++++++-
 sshd_config.5 |   13 +-
 11 files changed, 1884 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 PROTOCOL.krl
 create mode 100644 krl.c
 create mode 100644 krl.h

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 686fe8966..65403d6e7 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,14 @@
+20130118
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/17 23:00:01
+     [auth.c key.c key.h ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c sshd_config.5]
+     [krl.c krl.h PROTOCOL.krl]
+     add support for Key Revocation Lists (KRLs). These are a compact way to
+     represent lists of revoked keys and certificates, taking as little as
+     a single bit of incremental cost to revoke a certificate by serial number.
+     KRLs are loaded via the existing RevokedKeys sshd_config option.
+     feedback and ok markus@
+
 20130117
  - (djm) [regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/integrity.sh regress/try-ciphers.sh]
    check for GCM support before testing GCM ciphers.
diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
index 8765b7efb..74eeab574 100644
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.329 2012/12/17 04:59:43 dtucker Exp $
+# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.330 2013/01/18 00:44:04 djm Exp $
 
 # uncomment if you run a non bourne compatable shell. Ie. csh
 #SHELL = @SH@
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=acss.o authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
 	monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
 	kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \
 	msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
-	jpake.o schnorr.o ssh-pkcs11.o
+	jpake.o schnorr.o ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o
 
 SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
 	sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \
diff --git a/PROTOCOL.krl b/PROTOCOL.krl
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e8caa4527
--- /dev/null
+++ b/PROTOCOL.krl
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+This describes the key/certificate revocation list format for OpenSSH.
+
+1. Overall format
+
+The KRL consists of a header and zero or more sections. The header is:
+
+#define KRL_MAGIC		0x5353484b524c0a00ULL  /* "SSHKRL\n\0" */
+#define KRL_FORMAT_VERSION	1
+
+	uint64	KRL_MAGIC
+	uint32	KRL_FORMAT_VERSION
+	uint64	krl_version
+	uint64	generated_date
+	uint64	flags
+	string	reserved
+	string	comment
+
+Where "krl_version" is a version number that increases each time the KRL
+is modified, "generated_date" is the time in seconds since 1970-01-01
+00:00:00 UTC that the KRL was generated, "comment" is an optional comment
+and "reserved" an extension field whose contents are currently ignored.
+No "flags" are currently defined.
+
+Following the header are zero or more sections, each consisting of:
+
+	byte	section_type
+	string	section_data
+
+Where "section_type" indicates the type of the "section_data". An exception
+to this is the KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE section, that has a slightly different
+format (see below).
+
+The available section types are:
+
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES		1
+#define KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY		2
+#define KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1		3
+#define KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE			4
+
+3. Certificate serial section
+
+These sections use type KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES to revoke certificates by
+serial number or key ID. The consist of the CA key that issued the
+certificates to be revoked and a reserved field whose contents is currently
+ignored.
+
+	string ca_key
+	string reserved
+
+Followed by one or more sections:
+
+	byte	cert_section_type
+	string	cert_section_data
+
+The certificate section types are:
+
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST	0x20
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE	0x21
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP	0x22
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID		0x23
+
+2.1 Certificate serial list section
+
+This section is identified as KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST. It revokes
+certificates by listing their serial numbers. The cert_section_data in this
+case contains:
+
+	uint64	revoked_cert_serial
+	uint64	...
+
+This section may appear multiple times.
+
+2.2. Certificate serial range section
+
+These sections use type KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE and hold
+a range of serial numbers of certificates:
+
+	uint64	serial_min
+	uint64	serial_max
+
+All certificates in the range serial_min <= serial <= serial_max are
+revoked.
+
+This section may appear multiple times.
+
+2.3. Certificate serial bitmap section
+
+Bitmap sections use type KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP and revoke keys
+by listing their serial number in a bitmap.
+
+	uint64	serial_offset
+	mpint	revoked_keys_bitmap
+
+A bit set at index N in the bitmap corresponds to revocation of a keys with
+serial number (serial_offset + N).
+
+This section may appear multiple times.
+
+2.4. Revoked key ID sections
+
+KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID sections revoke particular certificate "key
+ID" strings. This may be useful in revoking all certificates
+associated with a particular identity, e.g. a host or a user.
+
+	string	key_id[0]
+	...
+
+This section must contain at least one "key_id". This section may appear
+multiple times.
+
+3. Explicit key sections
+
+These sections, identified as KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY, revoke keys
+(not certificates). They are less space efficient than serial numbers,
+but are able to revoke plain keys.
+
+	string	public_key_blob[0]
+	....
+
+This section must contain at least one "public_key_blob". The blob
+must be a raw key (i.e. not a certificate).
+
+This section may appear multiple times.
+
+4. SHA1 fingerprint sections
+
+These sections, identified as KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1, revoke
+plain keys (i.e. not certificates) by listing their SHA1 hashes:
+
+	string	public_key_hash[0]
+	....
+
+This section must contain at least one "public_key_hash". The hash blob
+is obtained by taking the SHA1 hash of the public key blob. Hashes in
+this section must appear in numeric order, treating each hash as a big-
+endian integer.
+
+This section may appear multiple times.
+
+5. KRL signature sections
+
+The KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE section serves a different purpose to the
+preceeding ones: to provide cryptographic authentication of a KRL that
+is retrieved over a channel that does not provide integrity protection.
+Its format is slightly different to the previously-described sections:
+in order to simplify the signature generation, it includes as a "body"
+two string components instead of one.
+
+	byte	KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE
+	string	signature_key
+	string	signature
+
+The signature is calculated over the entire KRL from the KRL_MAGIC
+to this subsection's "signature_key", including both and using the
+signature generation rules appropriate for the type of "signature_key".
+
+This section must appear last in the KRL. If multiple signature sections
+appear, they must appear consecutively at the end of the KRL file.
+
+Implementations that retrieve KRLs over untrusted channels must verify
+signatures. Signature sections are optional for KRLs distributed by
+trusted means.
+
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.krl,v 1.2 2013/01/18 00:24:58 djm Exp $
diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index f5e2d3d2e..d978f0271 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.99 2012/12/14 05:26:43 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.100 2013/01/17 23:00:01 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
 #endif
 #include "authfile.h"
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "krl.h"
 
 /* import */
 extern ServerOptions options;
@@ -640,7 +641,16 @@ auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key)
 
 	if (options.revoked_keys_file == NULL)
 		return 0;
-
+	switch (ssh_krl_file_contains_key(options.revoked_keys_file, key)) {
+	case 0:
+		return 0;	/* Not revoked */
+	case -2:
+		break;		/* Not a KRL */
+	default:
+		goto revoked;
+	}
+	debug3("%s: treating %s as a key list", __func__,
+	    options.revoked_keys_file);
 	switch (key_in_file(key, options.revoked_keys_file, 0)) {
 	case 0:
 		/* key not revoked */
@@ -651,6 +661,7 @@ auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key)
 		    "authentication");
 		return 1;
 	case 1:
+ revoked:
 		/* Key revoked */
 		key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
 		error("WARNING: authentication attempt with a revoked "
diff --git a/key.c b/key.c
index 7e9099703..4cc5c5d35 100644
--- a/key.c
+++ b/key.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.99 2012/05/23 03:28:28 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.100 2013/01/17 23:00:01 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * read_bignum():
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -55,6 +55,8 @@
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
 
+static int to_blob(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *, int);
+
 static struct KeyCert *
 cert_new(void)
 {
@@ -324,14 +326,15 @@ key_equal(const Key *a, const Key *b)
 }
 
 u_char*
-key_fingerprint_raw(Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type, u_int *dgst_raw_length)
+key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type,
+    u_int *dgst_raw_length)
 {
 	const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
 	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
 	u_char *blob = NULL;
 	u_char *retval = NULL;
 	u_int len = 0;
-	int nlen, elen, otype;
+	int nlen, elen;
 
 	*dgst_raw_length = 0;
 
@@ -371,10 +374,7 @@ key_fingerprint_raw(Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type, u_int *dgst_raw_length)
 	case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
 	case KEY_RSA_CERT:
 		/* We want a fingerprint of the _key_ not of the cert */
-		otype = k->type;
-		k->type = key_type_plain(k->type);
-		key_to_blob(k, &blob, &len);
-		k->type = otype;
+		to_blob(k, &blob, &len, 1);
 		break;
 	case KEY_UNSPEC:
 		return retval;
@@ -1587,18 +1587,19 @@ key_from_blob(const u_char *blob, u_int blen)
 	return key;
 }
 
-int
-key_to_blob(const Key *key, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp)
+static int
+to_blob(const Key *key, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp, int force_plain)
 {
 	Buffer b;
-	int len;
+	int len, type;
 
 	if (key == NULL) {
 		error("key_to_blob: key == NULL");
 		return 0;
 	}
 	buffer_init(&b);
-	switch (key->type) {
+	type = force_plain ? key_type_plain(key->type) : key->type;
+	switch (type) {
 	case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
 	case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
 	case KEY_DSA_CERT:
@@ -1609,7 +1610,8 @@ key_to_blob(const Key *key, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp)
 		    buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob));
 		break;
 	case KEY_DSA:
-		buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(key));
+		buffer_put_cstring(&b,
+		    key_ssh_name_from_type_nid(type, key->ecdsa_nid));
 		buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->p);
 		buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->q);
 		buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->g);
@@ -1617,14 +1619,16 @@ key_to_blob(const Key *key, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp)
 		break;
 #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
 	case KEY_ECDSA:
-		buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(key));
+		buffer_put_cstring(&b,
+		    key_ssh_name_from_type_nid(type, key->ecdsa_nid));
 		buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_curve_nid_to_name(key->ecdsa_nid));
 		buffer_put_ecpoint(&b, EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa),
 		    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key->ecdsa));
 		break;
 #endif
 	case KEY_RSA:
-		buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(key));
+		buffer_put_cstring(&b,
+		    key_ssh_name_from_type_nid(type, key->ecdsa_nid));
 		buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->rsa->e);
 		buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->rsa->n);
 		break;
@@ -1645,6 +1649,12 @@ key_to_blob(const Key *key, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp)
 	return len;
 }
 
+int
+key_to_blob(const Key *key, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp)
+{
+	return to_blob(key, blobp, lenp, 0);
+}
+
 int
 key_sign(
     const Key *key,
@@ -2024,7 +2034,7 @@ key_cert_check_authority(const Key *k, int want_host, int require_principal,
 }
 
 int
-key_cert_is_legacy(Key *k)
+key_cert_is_legacy(const Key *k)
 {
 	switch (k->type) {
 	case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
diff --git a/key.h b/key.h
index 39e5577f6..ebdf45677 100644
--- a/key.h
+++ b/key.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.34 2012/05/23 03:28:28 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.35 2013/01/17 23:00:01 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ Key		*key_demote(const Key *);
 int		 key_equal_public(const Key *, const Key *);
 int		 key_equal(const Key *, const Key *);
 char		*key_fingerprint(Key *, enum fp_type, enum fp_rep);
-u_char		*key_fingerprint_raw(Key *, enum fp_type, u_int *);
+u_char		*key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *, enum fp_type, u_int *);
 const char	*key_type(const Key *);
 const char	*key_cert_type(const Key *);
 int		 key_write(const Key *, FILE *);
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ int	 key_certify(Key *, Key *);
 void	 key_cert_copy(const Key *, struct Key *);
 int	 key_cert_check_authority(const Key *, int, int, const char *,
 	    const char **);
-int	 key_cert_is_legacy(Key *);
+int	 key_cert_is_legacy(const Key *);
 
 int		 key_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *);
 int		 key_curve_name_to_nid(const char *);
diff --git a/krl.c b/krl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..485057029
--- /dev/null
+++ b/krl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1227 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.2 2013/01/18 00:24:58 djm Exp $ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/tree.h>
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "err.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+#include "krl.h"
+
+/* #define DEBUG_KRL */
+#ifdef DEBUG_KRL
+# define KRL_DBG(x) debug3 x
+#else
+# define KRL_DBG(x)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Trees of revoked serial numbers, key IDs and keys. This allows
+ * quick searching, querying and producing lists in canonical order.
+ */
+
+/* Tree of serial numbers. XXX make smarter: really need a real sparse bitmap */
+struct revoked_serial {
+	u_int64_t lo, hi;
+	RB_ENTRY(revoked_serial) tree_entry;
+};
+static int serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b);
+RB_HEAD(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial);
+RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial, tree_entry, serial_cmp);
+
+/* Tree of key IDs */
+struct revoked_key_id {
+	char *key_id;
+	RB_ENTRY(revoked_key_id) tree_entry;
+};
+static int key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b);
+RB_HEAD(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id);
+RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id, tree_entry, key_id_cmp);
+
+/* Tree of blobs (used for keys and fingerprints) */
+struct revoked_blob {
+	u_char *blob;
+	u_int len;
+	RB_ENTRY(revoked_blob) tree_entry;
+};
+static int blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b);
+RB_HEAD(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob);
+RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob, tree_entry, blob_cmp);
+
+/* Tracks revoked certs for a single CA */
+struct revoked_certs {
+	Key *ca_key;
+	struct revoked_serial_tree revoked_serials;
+	struct revoked_key_id_tree revoked_key_ids;
+	TAILQ_ENTRY(revoked_certs) entry;
+};
+TAILQ_HEAD(revoked_certs_list, revoked_certs);
+
+struct ssh_krl {
+	u_int64_t krl_version;
+	u_int64_t generated_date;
+	u_int64_t flags;
+	char *comment;
+	struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_keys;
+	struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_sha1s;
+	struct revoked_certs_list revoked_certs;
+};
+
+/* Return equal if a and b overlap */
+static int
+serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b)
+{
+	if (a->hi >= b->lo && a->lo <= b->hi)
+		return 0;
+	return a->lo < b->lo ? -1 : 1;
+}
+
+static int
+key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b)
+{
+	return strcmp(a->key_id, b->key_id);
+}
+
+static int
+blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (a->len != b->len) {
+		if ((r = memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, MIN(a->len, b->len))) != 0)
+			return r;
+		return a->len > b->len ? 1 : -1;
+	} else
+		return memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, a->len);
+}
+
+struct ssh_krl *
+ssh_krl_init(void)
+{
+	struct ssh_krl *krl;
+
+	if ((krl = calloc(1, sizeof(*krl))) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_keys);
+	RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_sha1s);
+	TAILQ_INIT(&krl->revoked_certs);
+	return krl;
+}
+
+static void
+revoked_certs_free(struct revoked_certs *rc)
+{
+	struct revoked_serial *rs, *trs;
+	struct revoked_key_id *rki, *trki;
+
+	RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rs, revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, trs) {
+		RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs);
+		free(rs);
+	}
+	RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, trki) {
+		RB_REMOVE(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki);
+		free(rki->key_id);
+		free(rki);
+	}
+	if (rc->ca_key != NULL)
+		key_free(rc->ca_key);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_krl_free(struct ssh_krl *krl)
+{
+	struct revoked_blob *rb, *trb;
+	struct revoked_certs *rc, *trc;
+
+	if (krl == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	free(krl->comment);
+	RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, trb) {
+		RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, rb);
+		free(rb->blob);
+		free(rb);
+	}
+	RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, trb) {
+		RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, rb);
+		free(rb->blob);
+		free(rb);
+	}
+	TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry, trc) {
+		TAILQ_REMOVE(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry);
+		revoked_certs_free(rc);
+	}
+}
+
+void
+ssh_krl_set_version(struct ssh_krl *krl, u_int64_t version)
+{
+	krl->krl_version = version;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_krl_set_comment(struct ssh_krl *krl, const char *comment)
+{
+	free(krl->comment);
+	if ((krl->comment = strdup(comment)) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: strdup", __func__);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find the revoked_certs struct for a CA key. If allow_create is set then
+ * create a new one in the tree if one did not exist already.
+ */
+static int
+revoked_certs_for_ca_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *ca_key,
+    struct revoked_certs **rcp, int allow_create)
+{
+	struct revoked_certs *rc;
+
+	*rcp = NULL;
+	TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) {
+		if (key_equal(rc->ca_key, ca_key)) {
+			*rcp = rc;
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+	if (!allow_create)
+		return 0;
+	/* If this CA doesn't exist in the list then add it now */
+	if ((rc = calloc(1, sizeof(*rc))) == NULL)
+		return -1;
+	if ((rc->ca_key = key_from_private(ca_key)) == NULL) {
+		free(rc);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_serials);
+	RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_key_ids);
+	TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry);
+	debug3("%s: new CA %s", __func__, key_type(ca_key));
+	*rcp = rc;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+insert_serial_range(struct revoked_serial_tree *rt, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi)
+{
+	struct revoked_serial rs, *ers, *crs, *irs;
+
+	KRL_DBG(("%s: insert %llu:%llu", __func__, lo, hi));
+	bzero(&rs, sizeof(rs));
+	rs.lo = lo;
+	rs.hi = hi;
+	ers = RB_NFIND(revoked_serial_tree, rt, &rs);
+	if (ers == NULL || serial_cmp(ers, &rs) != 0) {
+		/* No entry matches. Just insert */
+		if ((irs = malloc(sizeof(rs))) == NULL)
+			return -1;
+		memcpy(irs, &rs, sizeof(*irs));
+		ers = RB_INSERT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, irs);
+		if (ers != NULL) {
+			KRL_DBG(("%s: bad: ers != NULL", __func__));
+			/* Shouldn't happen */
+			free(ers);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		ers = irs;
+	} else {
+		KRL_DBG(("%s: overlap found %llu:%llu", __func__,
+		    ers->lo, ers->hi));
+		/*
+		 * The inserted entry overlaps an existing one. Grow the
+		 * existing entry.
+		 */
+		if (ers->lo > lo)
+			ers->lo = lo;
+		if (ers->hi < hi)
+			ers->hi = hi;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * The inserted or revised range might overlap or abut adjacent ones;
+	 * coalesce as necessary.
+	 */
+
+	/* Check predecessors */
+	while ((crs = RB_PREV(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) {
+		KRL_DBG(("%s: pred %llu:%llu", __func__, crs->lo, crs->hi));
+		if (ers->lo != 0 && crs->hi < ers->lo - 1)
+			break;
+		/* This entry overlaps. */
+		if (crs->lo < ers->lo) {
+			ers->lo = crs->lo;
+			KRL_DBG(("%s: pred extend %llu:%llu", __func__,
+			    ers->lo, ers->hi));
+		}
+		RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs);
+		free(crs);
+	}
+	/* Check successors */
+	while ((crs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) {
+		KRL_DBG(("%s: succ %llu:%llu", __func__, crs->lo, crs->hi));
+		if (ers->hi != (u_int64_t)-1 && crs->lo > ers->hi + 1)
+			break;
+		/* This entry overlaps. */
+		if (crs->hi > ers->hi) {
+			ers->hi = crs->hi;
+			KRL_DBG(("%s: succ extend %llu:%llu", __func__,
+			    ers->lo, ers->hi));
+		}
+		RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs);
+		free(crs);
+	}
+	KRL_DBG(("%s: done, final %llu:%llu", __func__, ers->lo, ers->hi));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *ca_key,
+    u_int64_t serial)
+{
+	return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, ca_key, serial, serial);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *ca_key,
+    u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi)
+{
+	struct revoked_certs *rc;
+
+	if (lo > hi || lo == 0)
+		return -1;
+	if (revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1) != 0)
+		return -1;
+	return insert_serial_range(&rc->revoked_serials, lo, hi);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *ca_key,
+    const char *key_id)
+{
+	struct revoked_key_id *rki, *erki;
+	struct revoked_certs *rc;
+
+	if (revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1) != 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	debug3("%s: revoke %s", __func__, key_id);
+	if ((rki = calloc(1, sizeof(*rki))) == NULL ||
+	    (rki->key_id = strdup(key_id)) == NULL) {
+		free(rki);
+		fatal("%s: strdup", __func__);
+	}
+	erki = RB_INSERT(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki);
+	if (erki != NULL) {
+		free(rki->key_id);
+		free(rki);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Convert "key" to a public key blob without any certificate information */
+static int
+plain_key_blob(const Key *key, u_char **blob, u_int *blen)
+{
+	Key *kcopy;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((kcopy = key_from_private(key)) == NULL)
+		return -1;
+	if (key_is_cert(kcopy)) {
+		if (key_drop_cert(kcopy) != 0) {
+			error("%s: key_drop_cert", __func__);
+			key_free(kcopy);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+	r = key_to_blob(kcopy, blob, blen);
+	free(kcopy);
+	return r == 0 ? -1 : 0;
+}
+
+/* Revoke a key blob. Ownership of blob is transferred to the tree */
+static int
+revoke_blob(struct revoked_blob_tree *rbt, u_char *blob, u_int len)
+{
+	struct revoked_blob *rb, *erb;
+
+	if ((rb = calloc(1, sizeof(*rb))) == NULL)
+		return -1;
+	rb->blob = blob;
+	rb->len = len;
+	erb = RB_INSERT(revoked_blob_tree, rbt, rb);
+	if (erb != NULL) {
+		free(rb->blob);
+		free(rb);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key)
+{
+	u_char *blob;
+	u_int len;
+
+	debug3("%s: revoke type %s", __func__, key_type(key));
+	if (plain_key_blob(key, &blob, &len) != 0)
+		return -1;
+	return revoke_blob(&krl->revoked_keys, blob, len);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key)
+{
+	u_char *blob;
+	u_int len;
+
+	debug3("%s: revoke type %s by sha1", __func__, key_type(key));
+	if ((blob = key_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_FP_SHA1, &len)) == NULL)
+		return -1;
+	return revoke_blob(&krl->revoked_sha1s, blob, len);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_krl_revoke_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key)
+{
+	if (!key_is_cert(key))
+		return ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(krl, key);
+
+	if (key_cert_is_legacy(key) || key->cert->serial == 0) {
+		return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl,
+		    key->cert->signature_key,
+		    key->cert->key_id);
+	} else {
+		return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl,
+		    key->cert->signature_key,
+		    key->cert->serial);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Select a copact next section type to emit in a KRL based on the
+ * current section type, the run length of contiguous revoked serial
+ * numbers and the gaps from the last and to the next revoked serial.
+ * Applies a mostly-accurate bit cost model to select the section type
+ * that will minimise the size of the resultant KRL.
+ */
+static int
+choose_next_state(int current_state, u_int64_t contig, int final,
+    u_int64_t last_gap, u_int64_t next_gap, int *force_new_section)
+{
+	int new_state;
+	u_int64_t cost, cost_list, cost_range, cost_bitmap, cost_bitmap_restart;
+
+	/*
+	 * Avoid unsigned overflows.
+	 * The limits are high enough to avoid confusing the calculations.
+	 */
+	contig = MIN(contig, 1ULL<<31);
+	last_gap = MIN(last_gap, 1ULL<<31);
+	next_gap = MIN(next_gap, 1ULL<<31);
+
+	/*
+	 * Calculate the cost to switch from the current state to candidates.
+	 * NB. range sections only ever contain a single range, so their
+	 * switching cost is independent of the current_state.
+	 */
+	cost_list = cost_bitmap = cost_bitmap_restart = 0;
+	cost_range = 8;
+	switch (current_state) {
+	case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
+		cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64;
+		break;
+	case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
+		cost_list = 8;
+		cost_bitmap_restart = 8 + 64;
+		break;
+	case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
+	case 0:
+		cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64;
+		cost_list = 8;
+	}
+
+	/* Estimate base cost in bits of each section type */
+	cost_list += 64 * contig + (final ? 0 : 8+64);
+	cost_range += (2 * 64) + (final ? 0 : 8+64);
+	cost_bitmap += last_gap + contig + (final ? 0 : MIN(next_gap, 8+64));
+	cost_bitmap_restart += contig + (final ? 0 : MIN(next_gap, 8+64));
+
+	/* Convert to byte costs for actual comparison */
+	cost_list = (cost_list + 7) / 8;
+	cost_bitmap = (cost_bitmap + 7) / 8;
+	cost_bitmap_restart = (cost_bitmap_restart + 7) / 8;
+	cost_range = (cost_range + 7) / 8;
+
+	/* Now pick the best choice */
+	*force_new_section = 0;
+	new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP;
+	cost = cost_bitmap;
+	if (cost_range < cost) {
+		new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE;
+		cost = cost_range;
+	}
+	if (cost_list < cost) {
+		new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST;
+		cost = cost_list;
+	}
+	if (cost_bitmap_restart < cost) {
+		new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP;
+		*force_new_section = 1;
+		cost = cost_bitmap_restart;
+	}
+	debug3("%s: contig %llu last_gap %llu next_gap %llu final %d, costs:"
+	    "list %llu range %llu bitmap %llu new bitmap %llu, "
+	    "selected 0x%02x%s", __func__, contig, last_gap, next_gap, final,
+	    cost_list, cost_range, cost_bitmap, cost_bitmap_restart, new_state,
+	    *force_new_section ? " restart" : "");
+	return new_state;
+}
+
+/* Generate a KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES KRL section */
+static int
+revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, Buffer *buf)
+{
+	int final, force_new_sect, r = -1;
+	u_int64_t i, contig, gap, last = 0, bitmap_start = 0;
+	struct revoked_serial *rs, *nrs;
+	struct revoked_key_id *rki;
+	int next_state, state = 0;
+	Buffer sect;
+	u_char *kblob = NULL;
+	u_int klen;
+	BIGNUM *bitmap = NULL;
+
+	/* Prepare CA scope key blob if we have one supplied */
+	if (key_to_blob(rc->ca_key, &kblob, &klen) == 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	buffer_init(&sect);
+
+	/* Store the header */
+	buffer_put_string(buf, kblob, klen);
+	buffer_put_string(buf, NULL, 0); /* Reserved */
+
+	free(kblob);
+
+	/* Store the revoked serials.  */
+	for (rs = RB_MIN(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials);
+	     rs != NULL;
+	     rs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs)) {
+		debug3("%s: serial %llu:%llu state 0x%02x", __func__,
+		    rs->lo, rs->hi, state);
+
+		/* Check contiguous length and gap to next section (if any) */
+		nrs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs);
+		final = nrs == NULL;
+		gap = nrs == NULL ? 0 : nrs->lo - rs->hi;
+		contig = 1 + (rs->hi - rs->lo);
+
+		/* Choose next state based on these */
+		next_state = choose_next_state(state, contig, final,
+		    state == 0 ? 0 : rs->lo - last, gap, &force_new_sect);
+
+		/*
+		 * If the current section is a range section or has a different
+		 * type to the next section, then finish it off now.
+		 */
+		if (state != 0 && (force_new_sect || next_state != state ||
+		    state == KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE)) {
+			debug3("%s: finish state 0x%02x", __func__, state);
+			switch (state) {
+			case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
+			case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
+				break;
+			case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
+				buffer_put_bignum2(&sect, bitmap);
+				BN_free(bitmap);
+				bitmap = NULL;
+				break;
+			}
+			buffer_put_char(buf, state);
+			buffer_put_string(buf,
+			    buffer_ptr(&sect), buffer_len(&sect));
+		}
+
+		/* If we are starting a new section then prepare it now */
+		if (next_state != state || force_new_sect) {
+			debug3("%s: start state 0x%02x", __func__, next_state);
+			state = next_state;
+			buffer_clear(&sect);
+			switch (state) {
+			case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
+			case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
+				break;
+			case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
+				if ((bitmap = BN_new()) == NULL)
+					goto out;
+				bitmap_start = rs->lo;
+				buffer_put_int64(&sect, bitmap_start);
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/* Perform section-specific processing */
+		switch (state) {
+		case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
+			for (i = rs->lo; i < contig; i++)
+				buffer_put_int64(&sect, rs->lo + i);
+			break;
+		case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
+			buffer_put_int64(&sect, rs->lo);
+			buffer_put_int64(&sect, rs->hi);
+			break;
+		case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
+			if (rs->lo - bitmap_start > INT_MAX) {
+				error("%s: insane bitmap gap", __func__);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) {
+				if (BN_set_bit(bitmap,
+				    rs->lo + i - bitmap_start) != 1)
+					goto out;
+			}
+			break;
+		}
+		last = rs->hi;
+	}
+	/* Flush the remaining section, if any */
+	if (state != 0) {
+		debug3("%s: serial final flush for state 0x%02x",
+		    __func__, state);
+		switch (state) {
+		case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
+		case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
+			break;
+		case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
+			buffer_put_bignum2(&sect, bitmap);
+			BN_free(bitmap);
+			bitmap = NULL;
+			break;
+		}
+		buffer_put_char(buf, state);
+		buffer_put_string(buf,
+		    buffer_ptr(&sect), buffer_len(&sect));
+	}
+	debug3("%s: serial done ", __func__);
+
+	/* Now output a section for any revocations by key ID */
+	buffer_clear(&sect);
+	RB_FOREACH(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids) {
+		debug3("%s: key ID %s", __func__, rki->key_id);
+		buffer_put_cstring(&sect, rki->key_id);
+	}
+	if (buffer_len(&sect) != 0) {
+		buffer_put_char(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID);
+		buffer_put_string(buf, buffer_ptr(&sect),
+		    buffer_len(&sect));
+	}
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	if (bitmap != NULL)
+		BN_free(bitmap);
+	buffer_free(&sect);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_krl_to_blob(struct ssh_krl *krl, Buffer *buf, const Key **sign_keys,
+    u_int nsign_keys)
+{
+	int r = -1;
+	struct revoked_certs *rc;
+	struct revoked_blob *rb;
+	Buffer sect;
+	u_char *kblob = NULL, *sblob = NULL;
+	u_int klen, slen, i;
+
+	if (krl->generated_date == 0)
+		krl->generated_date = time(NULL);
+
+	buffer_init(&sect);
+
+	/* Store the header */
+	buffer_append(buf, KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1);
+	buffer_put_int(buf, KRL_FORMAT_VERSION);
+	buffer_put_int64(buf, krl->krl_version);
+	buffer_put_int64(buf, krl->generated_date);
+	buffer_put_int64(buf, krl->flags);
+	buffer_put_string(buf, NULL, 0);
+	buffer_put_cstring(buf, krl->comment ? krl->comment : "");
+
+	/* Store sections for revoked certificates */
+	TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) {
+		if (revoked_certs_generate(rc, &sect) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		buffer_put_char(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES);
+		buffer_put_string(buf, buffer_ptr(&sect),
+		    buffer_len(&sect));
+	}
+
+	/* Finally, output sections for revocations by public key/hash */
+	buffer_clear(&sect);
+	RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys) {
+		debug3("%s: key len %u ", __func__, rb->len);
+		buffer_put_string(&sect, rb->blob, rb->len);
+	}
+	if (buffer_len(&sect) != 0) {
+		buffer_put_char(buf, KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY);
+		buffer_put_string(buf, buffer_ptr(&sect),
+		    buffer_len(&sect));
+	}
+	buffer_clear(&sect);
+	RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s) {
+		debug3("%s: hash len %u ", __func__, rb->len);
+		buffer_put_string(&sect, rb->blob, rb->len);
+	}
+	if (buffer_len(&sect) != 0) {
+		buffer_put_char(buf, KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1);
+		buffer_put_string(buf, buffer_ptr(&sect),
+		    buffer_len(&sect));
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nsign_keys; i++) {
+		if (key_to_blob(sign_keys[i], &kblob, &klen) == 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		debug3("%s: signature key len %u", __func__, klen);
+		buffer_put_char(buf, KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE);
+		buffer_put_string(buf, kblob, klen);
+
+		if (key_sign(sign_keys[i], &sblob, &slen,
+		    buffer_ptr(buf), buffer_len(buf)) == -1)
+			goto out;
+		debug3("%s: signature sig len %u", __func__, slen);
+		buffer_put_string(buf, sblob, slen);
+	}
+
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	free(kblob);
+	free(sblob);
+	buffer_free(&sect);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void
+format_timestamp(u_int64_t timestamp, char *ts, size_t nts)
+{
+	time_t t;
+	struct tm *tm;
+
+	t = timestamp;
+	tm = localtime(&t);
+	*ts = '\0';
+	strftime(ts, nts, "%Y%m%dT%H%M%S", tm);
+}
+
+static int
+parse_revoked_certs(Buffer *buf, struct ssh_krl *krl)
+{
+	int ret = -1, nbits;
+	u_char type, *blob;
+	u_int blen;
+	Buffer subsect;
+	u_int64_t serial, serial_lo, serial_hi;
+	BIGNUM *bitmap = NULL;
+	char *key_id = NULL;
+	Key *ca_key = NULL;
+
+	buffer_init(&subsect);
+
+	if ((blob = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(buf, &blen)) == NULL ||
+	    buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(buf, NULL) == NULL) { /* reserved */
+		error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((ca_key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
+		goto out;
+
+	while (buffer_len(buf) > 0) {
+		if (buffer_get_char_ret(&type, buf) != 0 ||
+		    (blob = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(buf, &blen)) == NULL) {
+			error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		buffer_clear(&subsect);
+		buffer_append(&subsect, blob, blen);
+		debug3("%s: subsection type 0x%02x", __func__, type);
+		/* buffer_dump(&subsect); */
+
+		switch (type) {
+		case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
+			while (buffer_len(&subsect) > 0) {
+				if (buffer_get_int64_ret(&serial,
+				    &subsect) != 0) {
+					error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+					goto out;
+				}
+				if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl, ca_key,
+				    serial) != 0) {
+					error("%s: update failed", __func__);
+					goto out;
+				}
+			}
+			break;
+		case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
+			if (buffer_get_int64_ret(&serial_lo, &subsect) != 0 ||
+			    buffer_get_int64_ret(&serial_hi, &subsect) != 0) {
+				error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, ca_key,
+			    serial_lo, serial_hi) != 0) {
+				error("%s: update failed", __func__);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			break;
+		case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
+			if ((bitmap = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+				error("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			if (buffer_get_int64_ret(&serial_lo, &subsect) != 0 ||
+			    buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&subsect, bitmap) != 0) {
+				error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			if ((nbits = BN_num_bits(bitmap)) < 0) {
+				error("%s: bitmap bits < 0", __func__);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			for (serial = 0; serial < (u_int)nbits; serial++) {
+				if (serial > 0 && serial_lo + serial == 0) {
+					error("%s: bitmap wraps u64", __func__);
+					goto out;
+				}
+				if (!BN_is_bit_set(bitmap, serial))
+					continue;
+				if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl, ca_key,
+				    serial_lo + serial) != 0) {
+					error("%s: update failed", __func__);
+					goto out;
+				}
+			}
+			BN_free(bitmap);
+			bitmap = NULL;
+			break;
+		case KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID:
+			while (buffer_len(&subsect) > 0) {
+				if ((key_id = buffer_get_cstring_ret(&subsect,
+				    NULL)) == NULL) {
+					error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+					goto out;
+				}
+				if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, ca_key,
+				    key_id) != 0) {
+					error("%s: update failed", __func__);
+					goto out;
+				}
+				free(key_id);
+				key_id = NULL;
+			}
+			break;
+		default:
+			error("Unsupported KRL certificate section %u", type);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (buffer_len(&subsect) > 0) {
+			error("KRL certificate section contains unparsed data");
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	if (ca_key != NULL)
+		key_free(ca_key);
+	if (bitmap != NULL)
+		BN_free(bitmap);
+	free(key_id);
+	buffer_free(&subsect);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+
+/* Attempt to parse a KRL, checking its signature (if any) with sign_ca_keys. */
+int
+ssh_krl_from_blob(Buffer *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp,
+    const Key **sign_ca_keys, u_int nsign_ca_keys)
+{
+	Buffer copy, sect;
+	struct ssh_krl *krl;
+	char timestamp[64];
+	int ret = -1, r, sig_seen;
+	Key *key = NULL, **ca_used = NULL;
+	u_char type, *blob;
+	u_int i, j, sig_off, sects_off, blen, format_version, nca_used = 0;
+
+	*krlp = NULL;
+	if (buffer_len(buf) < sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1 ||
+	    memcmp(buffer_ptr(buf), KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1) != 0) {
+		debug3("%s: not a KRL", __func__);
+		/*
+		 * Return success but a NULL *krlp here to signal that the
+		 * file might be a simple list of keys.
+		 */
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Take a copy of the KRL buffer so we can verify its signature later */
+	buffer_init(&copy);
+	buffer_append(&copy, buffer_ptr(buf), buffer_len(buf));
+
+	buffer_init(&sect);
+	buffer_consume(&copy, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1);
+
+	if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: alloc failed", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (buffer_get_int_ret(&format_version, &copy) != 0) {
+		error("%s: KRL truncated", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (format_version != KRL_FORMAT_VERSION) {
+		error("%s: KRL unsupported format version %u",
+		    __func__, format_version);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (buffer_get_int64_ret(&krl->krl_version, &copy) != 0 ||
+	    buffer_get_int64_ret(&krl->generated_date, &copy) != 0 ||
+	    buffer_get_int64_ret(&krl->flags, &copy) != 0 ||
+	    buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&copy, NULL) == NULL || /* reserved */
+	    (krl->comment = buffer_get_cstring_ret(&copy, NULL)) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	format_timestamp(krl->generated_date, timestamp, sizeof(timestamp));
+	debug("KRL version %llu generated at %s%s%s", krl->krl_version,
+	    timestamp, *krl->comment ? ": " : "", krl->comment);
+
+	/*
+	 * 1st pass: verify signatures, if any. This is done to avoid
+	 * detailed parsing of data whose provenance is unverified.
+	 */
+	sig_seen = 0;
+	sects_off = buffer_len(buf) - buffer_len(&copy);
+	while (buffer_len(&copy) > 0) {
+		if (buffer_get_char_ret(&type, &copy) != 0 ||
+		    (blob = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&copy, &blen)) == NULL) {
+			error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		debug3("%s: first pass, section 0x%02x", __func__, type);
+		if (type != KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE) {
+			if (sig_seen) {
+				error("KRL contains non-signature section "
+				    "after signature");
+				goto out;
+			}
+			/* Not interested for now. */
+			continue;
+		}
+		sig_seen = 1;
+		/* First string component is the signing key */
+		if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL) {
+			error("%s: invalid signature key", __func__);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		sig_off = buffer_len(buf) - buffer_len(&copy);
+		/* Second string component is the signature itself */
+		if ((blob = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&copy, &blen)) == NULL) {
+			error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		/* Check signature over entire KRL up to this point */
+		if (key_verify(key, blob, blen,
+		    buffer_ptr(buf), buffer_len(buf) - sig_off) == -1) {
+			error("bad signaure on KRL");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		/* Check if this key has already signed this KRL */
+		for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) {
+			if (key_equal(ca_used[i], key)) {
+				error("KRL signed more than once with "
+				    "the same key");
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+		/* Record keys used to sign the KRL */
+		xrealloc(ca_used, nca_used + 1, sizeof(*ca_used));
+		ca_used[nca_used++] = key;
+		key = NULL;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * 2nd pass: parse and load the KRL, skipping the header to the point
+	 * where the section start.
+	 */
+	buffer_append(&copy, (u_char*)buffer_ptr(buf) + sects_off,
+	    buffer_len(buf) - sects_off);
+	while (buffer_len(&copy) > 0) {
+		if (buffer_get_char_ret(&type, &copy) != 0 ||
+		    (blob = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&copy, &blen)) == NULL) {
+			error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		debug3("%s: second pass, section 0x%02x", __func__, type);
+		buffer_clear(&sect);
+		buffer_append(&sect, blob, blen);
+
+		switch (type) {
+		case KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES:
+			if ((r = parse_revoked_certs(&sect, krl)) != 0)
+				goto out;
+			break;
+		case KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY:
+		case KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1:
+			while (buffer_len(&sect) > 0) {
+				if ((blob = buffer_get_string_ret(&sect,
+				    &blen)) == NULL) {
+					error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+					goto out;
+				}
+				if (type == KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1 &&
+				    blen != 20) {
+					error("%s: bad SHA1 length", __func__);
+					goto out;
+				}
+				if (revoke_blob(
+				    type == KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY ?
+				    &krl->revoked_keys : &krl->revoked_sha1s,
+				    blob, blen) != 0)
+					goto out; /* revoke_blob frees blob */
+			}
+			break;
+		case KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE:
+			/* Handled above, but still need to stay in synch */
+			buffer_clear(&sect);
+			if ((blob = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&sect,
+			    &blen)) == NULL) {
+				error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			break;
+		default:
+			error("Unsupported KRL section %u", type);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (buffer_len(&sect) > 0) {
+			error("KRL section contains unparsed data");
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Check that the key(s) used to sign the KRL weren't revoked */
+	sig_seen = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) {
+		if (ssh_krl_check_key(krl, ca_used[i]) == 0)
+			sig_seen = 1;
+		else {
+			key_free(ca_used[i]);
+			ca_used[i] = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+	if (nca_used && !sig_seen) {
+		error("All keys used to sign KRL were revoked");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* If we have CA keys, then verify that one was used to sign the KRL */
+	if (sig_seen && nsign_ca_keys != 0) {
+		sig_seen = 0;
+		for (i = 0; !sig_seen && i < nsign_ca_keys; i++) {
+			for (j = 0; j < nca_used; j++) {
+				if (ca_used[j] == NULL)
+					continue;
+				if (key_equal(ca_used[j], sign_ca_keys[i])) {
+					sig_seen = 1;
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		if (!sig_seen) {
+			error("KRL not signed with any trusted key");
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	*krlp = krl;
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	if (ret != 0)
+		ssh_krl_free(krl);
+	for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) {
+		if (ca_used[i] != NULL)
+			key_free(ca_used[i]);
+	}
+	free(ca_used);
+	if (key != NULL)
+		key_free(key);
+	buffer_free(&copy);
+	buffer_free(&sect);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* Checks whether a given key/cert is revoked. Does not check its CA */
+static int
+is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key)
+{
+	struct revoked_blob rb, *erb;
+	struct revoked_serial rs, *ers;
+	struct revoked_key_id rki, *erki;
+	struct revoked_certs *rc;
+
+	/* Check explicitly revoked hashes first */
+	bzero(&rb, sizeof(rb));
+	if ((rb.blob = key_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_FP_SHA1, &rb.len)) == NULL)
+		return -1;
+	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb);
+	free(rb.blob);
+	if (erb != NULL) {
+		debug("%s: revoked by key SHA1", __func__);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Next, explicit keys */
+	bzero(&rb, sizeof(rb));
+	if (plain_key_blob(key, &rb.blob, &rb.len) != 0)
+		return -1;
+	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb);
+	free(rb.blob);
+	if (erb != NULL) {
+		debug("%s: revoked by explicit key", __func__);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (!key_is_cert(key))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Check cert revocation */
+	if (revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, key->cert->signature_key,
+	    &rc, 0) != 0)
+		return -1;
+	if (rc == NULL)
+		return 0; /* No entry for this CA */
+
+	/* Check revocation by cert key ID */
+	bzero(&rki, sizeof(rki));
+	rki.key_id = key->cert->key_id;
+	erki = RB_FIND(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, &rki);
+	if (erki != NULL) {
+		debug("%s: revoked by key ID", __func__);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Legacy cert formats lack serial numbers */
+	if (key_cert_is_legacy(key))
+		return 0;
+
+	bzero(&rs, sizeof(rs));
+	rs.lo = rs.hi = key->cert->serial;
+	ers = RB_FIND(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, &rs);
+	if (ers != NULL) {
+		KRL_DBG(("%s: %llu matched %llu:%llu", __func__,
+		    key->cert->serial, ers->lo, ers->hi));
+		debug("%s: revoked by serial", __func__);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	KRL_DBG(("%s: %llu no match", __func__, key->cert->serial));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_krl_check_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	debug2("%s: checking key", __func__);
+	if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if (key_is_cert(key)) {
+		debug2("%s: checking CA key", __func__);
+		if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key->cert->signature_key)) != 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+	debug3("%s: key okay", __func__);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error or key revoked, -2 if path is not a KRL */
+int
+ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const Key *key)
+{
+	Buffer krlbuf;
+	struct ssh_krl *krl;
+	int revoked, fd;
+
+	if (path == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
+		error("open %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
+		error("Revoked keys file not accessible - refusing public key "
+		    "authentication");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	buffer_init(&krlbuf);
+	if (!key_load_file(fd, path, &krlbuf)) {
+		close(fd);
+		buffer_free(&krlbuf);
+		error("Revoked keys file not readable - refusing public key "
+		    "authentication");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	close(fd);
+	if (ssh_krl_from_blob(&krlbuf, &krl, NULL, 0) != 0) {
+		buffer_free(&krlbuf);
+		error("Invalid KRL, refusing public key "
+		    "authentication");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	buffer_free(&krlbuf);
+	if (krl == NULL) {
+		debug3("%s: %s is not a KRL file", __func__, path);
+		return -2;
+	}
+	debug2("%s: checking KRL %s", __func__, path);
+	revoked = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, key) != 0;
+	ssh_krl_free(krl);
+	return revoked ? -1 : 0;
+}
diff --git a/krl.h b/krl.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2c43f5bb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/krl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* $OpenBSD: krl.h,v 1.2 2013/01/18 00:24:58 djm Exp $ */
+
+#ifndef _KRL_H
+#define _KRL_H
+
+/* Functions to manage key revocation lists */
+
+#define KRL_MAGIC		"SSHKRL\n\0"
+#define KRL_FORMAT_VERSION	1
+
+/* KRL section types */
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES	1
+#define KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY	2
+#define KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1	3
+#define KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE		4
+
+/* KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES subsection types */
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST	0x20
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE	0x21
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP	0x22
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID		0x23
+
+struct ssh_krl;
+
+struct ssh_krl *ssh_krl_init(void);
+void ssh_krl_free(struct ssh_krl *krl);
+void ssh_krl_set_version(struct ssh_krl *krl, u_int64_t version);
+void ssh_krl_set_sign_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *sign_key);
+void ssh_krl_set_comment(struct ssh_krl *krl, const char *comment);
+int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *ca_key,
+    u_int64_t serial);
+int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *ca_key,
+    u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi);
+int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *ca_key,
+    const char *key_id);
+int ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key);
+int ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key);
+int ssh_krl_revoke_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key);
+int ssh_krl_to_blob(struct ssh_krl *krl, Buffer *buf, const Key **sign_keys,
+    u_int nsign_keys);
+int ssh_krl_from_blob(Buffer *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp,
+    const Key **sign_ca_keys, u_int nsign_ca_keys);
+int ssh_krl_check_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key);
+int ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const Key *key);
+
+#endif /* _KRL_H */
+
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
index 1d5564640..52f4b6ea6 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.1
+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.110 2012/08/15 18:25:50 jmc Exp $
+.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.111 2013/01/17 23:00:01 djm Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: August 15 2012 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: January 17 2013 $
 .Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -122,6 +122,17 @@
 .Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
 .Nm ssh-keygen
 .Fl A
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl k
+.Fl f Ar krl_file
+.Op Fl u
+.Op Fl s ca_public
+.Op Fl z version_number
+.Ar
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl Q
+.Fl f Ar krl_file
+.Ar
 .Ek
 .Sh DESCRIPTION
 .Nm
@@ -144,6 +155,13 @@ See the
 .Sx MODULI GENERATION
 section for details.
 .Pp
+Finally,
+.Nm
+can be used to generate and update Key Revocation Lists, and to test whether
+given keys have been revoked by one. See the
+.Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS
+section for details.
+.Pp
 Normally each user wishing to use SSH
 with public key authentication runs this once to create the authentication
 key in
@@ -321,6 +339,17 @@ This option allows importing keys from other software, including several
 commercial SSH implementations.
 The default import format is
 .Dq RFC4716 .
+.It Fl k
+Generate a KRL file.
+In this mode,
+.Nm
+will generate a KRL file at the location specified via the
+.Fl f
+flag that revokes every key or certificate presented on the command-line.
+Keys/certificates to be revoked may be specified by public key file or
+using the format described in the
+.Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS
+section.
 .It Fl L
 Prints the contents of a certificate.
 .It Fl l
@@ -448,6 +477,14 @@ Certify (sign) a public key using the specified CA key.
 Please see the
 .Sx CERTIFICATES
 section for details.
+.Pp
+When generating a KRL,
+.Fl s
+specifies a path to a CA public key file used to revoke certificated directly
+by key ID or serial number.
+See the
+.Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS
+section for details.
 .It Fl T Ar output_file
 Test DH group exchange candidate primes (generated using the
 .Fl G
@@ -485,6 +522,12 @@ For example:
 (valid from 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2010 to 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2011),
 .Dq -1d:20110101
 (valid from yesterday to midnight, January 1st, 2011).
+.It Fl u
+Update a KRL.
+When specified with
+.Fl k ,
+keys listed via the command-line are added to the existing KRL rather than
+a new KRL being created.
 .It Fl v
 Verbose mode.
 Causes
@@ -504,6 +547,10 @@ OpenSSH format file and print an OpenSSH public key to stdout.
 Specifies a serial number to be embedded in the certificate to distinguish
 this certificate from others from the same CA.
 The default serial number is zero.
+.Pp
+When generating a KRL, the
+.Fl z
+flag is used to specify a KRL version number.
 .El
 .Sh MODULI GENERATION
 .Nm
@@ -638,6 +685,73 @@ public key must be trusted by
 or
 .Xr ssh 1 .
 Please refer to those manual pages for details.
+.Sh KEY REVOCATION LISTS
+.Nm
+is able to manage OpenSSH format Key Revocation Lists (KRLs).
+These binary files specify keys or certificates to be revoked using a
+compact format; taking as little a one bit per certificate if they are being
+revoked by serial number.
+.Pp
+KRLs may be generated using the
+.Fl k
+flag.
+This option reads one or more files from the command-line and generates a new
+KRL.
+The files may either contain a KRL specification (see below) or public keys,
+listed one per line.
+Plain public keys are revoked by listing their hash or contents in the KRL and
+certificates revoked by serial number or key ID (if the serial is zero or
+not available).
+.Pp
+Revoking keys using a KRL specification offers explicit control over the
+types of record used to revoke keys and may be used to directly revoke
+certificates by serial number or key ID without having the complete original
+certificate on hand.
+A KRL specification consists of lines containing one of the following directives
+followed by a colon and some directive-specific information.
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Cm serial : Ar serial_number Op -serial_number
+Revokes a certificate with the specified serial number.
+Serial numbers are 64 bit values, not including zero and may be expressed
+in decimal, hex or octal.
+If two serial numbers are specified separated by a hyphen, then the range
+of serial numbers including and between each is revoked.
+The CA key must have been specified on the
+.Nm
+command-line using the
+.Fl s
+option.
+.It Cm id : Ar key_id
+Revokes a certificate with the specified key ID string.
+The CA key must have been specified on the
+.Nm
+command-line using the
+.Fl s
+option.
+.It Cm key : Ar public_key
+Revokes the specified key.
+In a certificate is listed, then it is revoked as a plain public key.
+.It Cm sha1 : Ar public_key
+Revokes the specified key by its SHA1 hash.
+.El
+.Pp
+KRLs may be updated using the
+.Fl u
+flag in addition to
+.Fl k .
+When this option is specified, keys listed via the command-line are merged into
+the KRL, adding to those already there.
+.Pp
+It is also possible, given a KRL, to test whether it revokes a particular key
+(or keys).
+The
+.Fl Q
+flag will query an existing KRL, testing each key specified on the commandline.
+If any key listed on the command-line has been revoked (or an error encountered)
+then
+.Nm
+will exit with a non-zero exit status.
+A zero exit status will only be returned if no key was revoked.
 .Sh FILES
 .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
 .It Pa ~/.ssh/identity
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
index a19a2b085..861b04e2d 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.222 2013/01/09 05:40:17 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.223 2013/01/17 23:00:01 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -48,8 +48,11 @@
 #include "match.h"
 #include "hostfile.h"
 #include "dns.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
 #include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "krl.h"
 
 /* Number of bits in the RSA/DSA key.  This value can be set on the command line. */
 #define DEFAULT_BITS		2048
@@ -1896,6 +1899,226 @@ do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw)
 	exit(0);
 }
 
+static void
+load_krl(const char *path, struct ssh_krl **krlp)
+{
+	Buffer krlbuf;
+	int fd;
+
+	buffer_init(&krlbuf);
+	if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
+		fatal("open %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
+	if (!key_load_file(fd, path, &krlbuf))
+		fatal("Unable to load KRL");
+	close(fd);
+	/* XXX check sigs */
+	if (ssh_krl_from_blob(&krlbuf, krlp, NULL, 0) != 0 ||
+	    *krlp == NULL)
+		fatal("Invalid KRL file");
+	buffer_free(&krlbuf);
+}
+
+static void
+update_krl_from_file(struct passwd *pw, const char *file, const Key *ca,
+    struct ssh_krl *krl)
+{
+	Key *key = NULL;
+	u_long lnum = 0;
+	char *path, *cp, *ep, line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
+	unsigned long long serial, serial2;
+	int i, was_explicit_key, was_sha1, r;
+	FILE *krl_spec;
+
+	path = tilde_expand_filename(file, pw->pw_uid);
+	if (strcmp(path, "-") == 0) {
+		krl_spec = stdin;
+		free(path);
+		path = xstrdup("(standard input)");
+	} else if ((krl_spec = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL)
+		fatal("fopen %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
+
+	if (!quiet)
+		printf("Revoking from %s\n", path);
+	while (read_keyfile_line(krl_spec, path, line, sizeof(line),
+	    &lnum) == 0) {
+		was_explicit_key = was_sha1 = 0;
+		cp = line + strspn(line, " \t");
+		/* Trim trailing space, comments and strip \n */
+		for (i = 0, r = -1; cp[i] != '\0'; i++) {
+			if (cp[i] == '#' || cp[i] == '\n') {
+				cp[i] = '\0';
+				break;
+			}
+			if (cp[i] == ' ' || cp[i] == '\t') {
+				/* Remember the start of a span of whitespace */
+				if (r == -1)
+					r = i;
+			} else
+				r = -1;
+		}
+		if (r != -1)
+			cp[r] = '\0';
+		if (*cp == '\0')
+			continue;
+		if (strncasecmp(cp, "serial:", 7) == 0) {
+			if (ca == NULL) {
+				fatal("revoking certificated by serial number "
+				    "requires specification of a CA key");
+			}
+			cp += 7;
+			cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
+			errno = 0;
+			serial = strtoull(cp, &ep, 0);
+			if (*cp == '\0' || (*ep != '\0' && *ep != '-'))
+				fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial \"%s\"",
+				    path, lnum, cp);
+			if (errno == ERANGE && serial == ULLONG_MAX)
+				fatal("%s:%lu: serial out of range",
+				    path, lnum);
+			serial2 = serial;
+			if (*ep == '-') {
+				cp = ep + 1;
+				errno = 0;
+				serial2 = strtoull(cp, &ep, 0);
+				if (*cp == '\0' || *ep != '\0')
+					fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial \"%s\"",
+					    path, lnum, cp);
+				if (errno == ERANGE && serial2 == ULLONG_MAX)
+					fatal("%s:%lu: serial out of range",
+					    path, lnum);
+				if (serial2 <= serial)
+					fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial range "
+					    "%llu:%llu", path, lnum,
+					    (unsigned long long)serial,
+					    (unsigned long long)serial2);
+			}
+			if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl,
+			    ca, serial, serial2) != 0) {
+				fatal("%s: revoke serial failed",
+				    __func__);
+			}
+		} else if (strncasecmp(cp, "id:", 3) == 0) {
+			if (ca == NULL) {
+				fatal("revoking certificated by key ID "
+				    "requires specification of a CA key");
+			}
+			cp += 3;
+			cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
+			if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, ca, cp) != 0)
+				fatal("%s: revoke key ID failed", __func__);
+		} else {
+			if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) {
+				cp += 4;
+				cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
+				was_explicit_key = 1;
+			} else if (strncasecmp(cp, "sha1:", 5) == 0) {
+				cp += 5;
+				cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
+				was_sha1 = 1;
+			} else {
+				/*
+				 * Just try to process the line as a key.
+				 * Parsing will fail if it isn't.
+				 */
+			}
+			if ((key = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+				fatal("key_new");
+			if (key_read(key, &cp) != 1)
+				fatal("%s:%lu: invalid key", path, lnum);
+			if (was_explicit_key)
+				r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(krl, key);
+			else if (was_sha1)
+				r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(krl, key);
+			else
+				r = ssh_krl_revoke_key(krl, key);
+			if (r != 0)
+				fatal("%s: revoke key failed", __func__);
+			key_free(key);
+		}
+	}
+	if (strcmp(path, "-") != 0)
+		fclose(krl_spec);
+}
+
+static void
+do_gen_krl(struct passwd *pw, int updating, int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	struct ssh_krl *krl;
+	struct stat sb;
+	Key *ca = NULL;
+	int fd, i;
+	char *tmp;
+	Buffer kbuf;
+
+	if (*identity_file == '\0')
+		fatal("KRL generation requires an output file");
+	if (stat(identity_file, &sb) == -1) {
+		if (errno != ENOENT)
+			fatal("Cannot access KRL \"%s\": %s",
+			    identity_file, strerror(errno));
+		if (updating)
+			fatal("KRL \"%s\" does not exist", identity_file);
+	}
+	if (ca_key_path != NULL) {
+		tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid);
+		if ((ca = key_load_public(tmp, NULL)) == NULL)
+			fatal("Cannot load CA public key %s", tmp);
+		xfree(tmp);
+	}
+
+	if (updating)
+		load_krl(identity_file, &krl);
+	else if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL)
+		fatal("couldn't create KRL");
+
+	if (cert_serial != 0)
+		ssh_krl_set_version(krl, cert_serial);
+	if (identity_comment != NULL)
+		ssh_krl_set_comment(krl, identity_comment);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < argc; i++)
+		update_krl_from_file(pw, argv[i], ca, krl);
+
+	buffer_init(&kbuf);
+	if (ssh_krl_to_blob(krl, &kbuf, NULL, 0) != 0)
+		fatal("Couldn't generate KRL");
+	if ((fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1)
+		fatal("open %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buffer_ptr(&kbuf), buffer_len(&kbuf)) !=
+	    buffer_len(&kbuf))
+		fatal("write %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
+	close(fd);
+	buffer_free(&kbuf);
+	ssh_krl_free(krl);
+}
+
+static void
+do_check_krl(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	int i, r, ret = 0;
+	char *comment;
+	struct ssh_krl *krl;
+	Key *k;
+
+	if (*identity_file == '\0')
+		fatal("KRL checking requires an input file");
+	load_krl(identity_file, &krl);
+	for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+		if ((k = key_load_public(argv[i], &comment)) == NULL)
+			fatal("Cannot load public key %s", argv[i]);
+		r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, k);
+		printf("%s%s%s%s: %s\n", argv[i],
+		    *comment ? " (" : "", comment, *comment ? ")" : "",
+		    r == 0 ? "ok" : "REVOKED");
+		if (r != 0)
+			ret = 1;
+		key_free(k);
+		free(comment);
+	}
+	ssh_krl_free(krl);
+	exit(ret);
+}
+
 static void
 usage(void)
 {
@@ -1922,6 +2145,7 @@ usage(void)
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -J number   Screen this number of moduli lines.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -j number   Start screening moduli at specified line.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -K checkpt  Write checkpoints to this file.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -k          Generate a KRL file.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -L          Print the contents of a certificate.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -l          Show fingerprint of key file.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -M memory   Amount of memory (MB) to use for generating DH-GEX moduli.\n");
@@ -1931,6 +2155,7 @@ usage(void)
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -O option   Specify a certificate option.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -P phrase   Provide old passphrase.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -p          Change passphrase of private key file.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -Q          Test whether key(s) are revoked in KRL.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -q          Quiet.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -R hostname Remove host from known_hosts file.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -r hostname Print DNS resource record.\n");
@@ -1939,6 +2164,7 @@ usage(void)
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -T file     Screen candidates for DH-GEX moduli.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -t type     Specify type of key to create.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -V from:to  Specify certificate validity interval.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -u          Update KRL rather than creating a new one.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -v          Verbose.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -W gen      Generator to use for generating DH-GEX moduli.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -y          Read private key file and print public key.\n");
@@ -1955,14 +2181,14 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 {
 	char dotsshdir[MAXPATHLEN], comment[1024], *passphrase1, *passphrase2;
 	char *checkpoint = NULL;
-	char out_file[MAXPATHLEN], *rr_hostname = NULL, *ep;
+	char out_file[MAXPATHLEN], *ep, *rr_hostname = NULL;
 	Key *private, *public;
 	struct passwd *pw;
 	struct stat st;
 	int opt, type, fd;
 	u_int32_t memory = 0, generator_wanted = 0, trials = 100;
 	int do_gen_candidates = 0, do_screen_candidates = 0;
-	int gen_all_hostkeys = 0;
+	int gen_all_hostkeys = 0, gen_krl = 0, update_krl = 0, check_krl = 0;
 	unsigned long start_lineno = 0, lines_to_process = 0;
 	BIGNUM *start = NULL;
 	FILE *f;
@@ -1992,8 +2218,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 		exit(1);
 	}
 
-	while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "AegiqpclBHLhvxXyF:b:f:t:D:I:J:j:K:P:"
-	    "m:N:n:O:C:r:g:R:T:G:M:S:s:a:V:W:z:")) != -1) {
+	while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "ABHLQXceghiklpquvxy"
+	    "C:D:F:G:I:J:K:M:N:O:P:R:S:T:V:W:a:b:f:g:j:m:n:r:s:t:z:")) != -1) {
 		switch (opt) {
 		case 'A':
 			gen_all_hostkeys = 1;
@@ -2072,6 +2298,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 		case 'N':
 			identity_new_passphrase = optarg;
 			break;
+		case 'Q':
+			check_krl = 1;
+			break;
 		case 'O':
 			add_cert_option(optarg);
 			break;
@@ -2090,6 +2319,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 			cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST;
 			certflags_flags = 0;
 			break;
+		case 'k':
+			gen_krl = 1;
+			break;
 		case 'i':
 		case 'X':
 			/* import key */
@@ -2107,6 +2339,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 		case 'D':
 			pkcs11provider = optarg;
 			break;
+		case 'u':
+			update_krl = 1;
+			break;
 		case 'v':
 			if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO)
 				log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
@@ -2182,11 +2417,11 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 	argc -= optind;
 
 	if (ca_key_path != NULL) {
-		if (argc < 1) {
+		if (argc < 1 && !gen_krl) {
 			printf("Too few arguments.\n");
 			usage();
 		}
-	} else if (argc > 0) {
+	} else if (argc > 0 && !gen_krl && !check_krl) {
 		printf("Too many arguments.\n");
 		usage();
 	}
@@ -2198,6 +2433,14 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 		printf("Cannot use -l with -H or -R.\n");
 		usage();
 	}
+	if (gen_krl) {
+		do_gen_krl(pw, update_krl, argc, argv);
+		return (0);
+	}
+	if (check_krl) {
+		do_check_krl(pw, argc, argv);
+		return (0);
+	}
 	if (ca_key_path != NULL) {
 		if (cert_key_id == NULL)
 			fatal("Must specify key id (-I) when certifying");
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index e7bb0b55f..c8b814da6 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.153 2013/01/08 18:49:04 markus Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: January 8 2013 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.154 2013/01/17 23:00:01 djm Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: January 17 2013 $
 .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -994,10 +994,17 @@ The default is
 .Dq yes .
 Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
 .It Cm RevokedKeys
-Specifies a list of revoked public keys.
+Specifies revoked public keys.
 Keys listed in this file will be refused for public key authentication.
 Note that if this file is not readable, then public key authentication will
 be refused for all users.
+Keys may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line, or as
+an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1
+For more information on KRLs, see the
+.Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS
+section in
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
 .It Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
 Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
 with successful RSA host authentication is allowed.
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From ebafebda8570b2b013327cdc6627f9c5fb9733c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2013 11:51:56 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 00:45:29      [regress/Makefile
 regress/cert-userkey.sh regress/krl.sh]      Tests for Key Revocation Lists
 (KRLs)

---
 ChangeLog               |   4 ++
 regress/Makefile        |   9 +--
 regress/cert-userkey.sh |  22 ++++++-
 regress/krl.sh          | 151 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 180 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 regress/krl.sh

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 65403d6e7..a45d24b29 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -8,6 +8,10 @@
      a single bit of incremental cost to revoke a certificate by serial number.
      KRLs are loaded via the existing RevokedKeys sshd_config option.
      feedback and ok markus@
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 00:45:29
+     [regress/Makefile regress/cert-userkey.sh regress/krl.sh]
+     Tests for Key Revocation Lists (KRLs)
 
 20130117
  - (djm) [regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/integrity.sh regress/try-ciphers.sh]
diff --git a/regress/Makefile b/regress/Makefile
index af1fa31df..18f9f124c 100644
--- a/regress/Makefile
+++ b/regress/Makefile
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.61 2012/12/11 22:42:11 markus Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.62 2013/01/18 00:45:29 djm Exp $
 
 REGRESS_TARGETS=	t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t-exec
 tests:		prereq $(REGRESS_TARGETS)
@@ -60,7 +60,8 @@ LTESTS= 	connect \
 		host-expand \
 		keys-command \
 		forward-control \
-		integrity
+		integrity \
+		krl
 
 INTEROP_TESTS=	putty-transfer putty-ciphers putty-kex conch-ciphers
 #INTEROP_TESTS+=ssh-com ssh-com-client ssh-com-keygen ssh-com-sftp
@@ -77,11 +78,11 @@ CLEANFILES=	t2.out t3.out t6.out1 t6.out2 t7.out t7.out.pub copy.1 copy.2 \
 		ls.copy banner.in banner.out empty.in \
 		scp-ssh-wrapper.scp ssh_proxy_envpass remote_pid \
 		sshd_proxy_bak rsa_ssh2_cr.prv rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv \
-		known_hosts-cert host_ca_key* cert_host_key* \
+		known_hosts-cert host_ca_key* cert_host_key* cert_user_key* \
 		putty.rsa2 sshd_proxy_orig ssh_proxy_bak \
 		key.rsa-* key.dsa-* key.ecdsa-* \
 		authorized_principals_${USER} expect actual ready \
-		sshd_proxy.* authorized_keys_${USER}.* modpipe
+		sshd_proxy.* authorized_keys_${USER}.* modpipe revoked-* krl-*
 
 
 # Enable all malloc(3) randomisations and checks
diff --git a/regress/cert-userkey.sh b/regress/cert-userkey.sh
index aa85cd6cb..3bba9f8f2 100644
--- a/regress/cert-userkey.sh
+++ b/regress/cert-userkey.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: cert-userkey.sh,v 1.9 2012/10/19 05:10:42 djm Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: cert-userkey.sh,v 1.10 2013/01/18 00:45:29 djm Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="certified user keys"
@@ -184,14 +184,32 @@ basic_tests() {
 			(
 				cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
 				echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
-				echo "RevokedKeys $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype}.pub"
+				echo "RevokedKeys $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked"
 				echo "$extra_sshd"
 			) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+			cp $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype}.pub \
+			    $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked
 			${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
 			    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
 			if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
 				fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpecedly"
 			fi
+			verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} revoked via KRL"
+			rm $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked
+			${SSHKEYGEN} -kqf $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked \
+			    $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype}.pub
+			${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+			    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+			if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+				fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpecedly"
+			fi
+			verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} empty KRL"
+			${SSHKEYGEN} -kqf $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked
+			${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+			    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+			if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+				fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+			fi
 		done
 	
 		# Revoked CA
diff --git a/regress/krl.sh b/regress/krl.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3ee5a9060
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/krl.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: krl.sh,v 1.1 2013/01/18 00:45:29 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="key revocation lists"
+
+# Do most testing with ssh-keygen; it uses the same verification code as sshd.
+
+# Old keys will interfere with ssh-keygen.
+rm -f $OBJ/revoked-* $OBJ/krl-*
+
+# Generate a CA key
+$SSHKEYGEN -t ecdsa -f $OBJ/revoked-ca  -C "" -N "" > /dev/null ||
+	fatal "$SSHKEYGEN CA failed"
+
+# A specification that revokes some certificates by serial numbers
+# The serial pattern is chosen to ensure the KRL includes list, range and
+# bitmap sections.
+cat << EOF >> $OBJ/revoked-serials
+serial: 1-4
+serial: 10
+serial: 15
+serial: 30
+serial: 50
+serial: 999
+# The following sum to 500-799
+serial: 500
+serial: 501
+serial: 502
+serial: 503-600
+serial: 700-797
+serial: 798
+serial: 799
+serial: 599-701
+EOF
+
+# A specification that revokes some certificated by key ID.
+touch $OBJ/revoked-keyid
+for n in 1 2 3 4 10 15 30 50 `jot 500 300` 999 1000 1001 1002; do
+	# Fill in by-ID revocation spec.
+	echo "id: revoked $n" >> $OBJ/revoked-keyid
+done
+
+keygen() {
+	N=$1
+	f=$OBJ/revoked-`printf "%04d" $N`
+	# Vary the keytype. We use mostly ECDSA since this is fastest by far.
+	keytype=ecdsa
+	case $N in
+	2 | 10 | 510 | 1001)	keytype=rsa;;
+	4 | 30 | 520 | 1002)	keytype=dsa;;
+	esac
+	$SSHKEYGEN -t $keytype -f $f -C "" -N "" > /dev/null \
+		|| fatal "$SSHKEYGEN failed"
+	# Sign cert
+	$SSHKEYGEN -s $OBJ/revoked-ca -z $n -I "revoked $N" $f >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+		|| fatal "$SSHKEYGEN sign failed"
+	echo $f
+}
+
+# Generate some keys.
+verbose "$tid: generating test keys"
+REVOKED_SERIALS="1 4 10 50 500 510 520 799 999"
+for n in $REVOKED_SERIALS ; do
+	f=`keygen $n`
+	REVOKED_KEYS="$REVOKED_KEYS ${f}.pub"
+	REVOKED_CERTS="$REVOKED_CERTS ${f}-cert.pub"
+done
+NOTREVOKED_SERIALS="5 9 14 16 29 30 49 51 499 800 1000 1001"
+NOTREVOKED=""
+for n in $NOTREVOKED_SERIALS ; do
+	NOTREVOKED_KEYS="$NOTREVOKED_KEYS ${f}.pub"
+	NOTREVOKED_CERTS="$NOTREVOKED_CERTS ${f}-cert.pub"
+done
+
+genkrls() {
+	OPTS=$1
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-empty - </dev/null \
+	>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keys $REVOKED_KEYS \
+	>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-cert $REVOKED_CERTS \
+	>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-all $REVOKED_KEYS $REVOKED_CERTS \
+	>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-ca $OBJ/revoked-ca.pub \
+	>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+# KRLs from serial/key-id spec need the CA specified.
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial $OBJ/revoked-serials \
+	>/dev/null 2>&1 && fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL succeeded unexpectedly"
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keyid $OBJ/revoked-keyid \
+	>/dev/null 2>&1 && fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL succeeded unexpectedly"
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial -s $OBJ/revoked-ca $OBJ/revoked-serials \
+	>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keyid -s $OBJ/revoked-ca.pub $OBJ/revoked-keyid \
+	>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+}
+
+verbose "$tid: generating KRLs"
+genkrls
+
+check_krl() {
+	KEY=$1
+	KRL=$2
+	EXPECT_REVOKED=$3
+	TAG=$4
+	$SSHKEYGEN -Qf $KRL $KEY >/dev/null
+	result=$?
+	if test "x$EXPECT_REVOKED" = "xyes" -a $result -eq 0 ; then
+		fatal "key $KEY not revoked by KRL $KRL: $TAG"
+	elif test "x$EXPECT_REVOKED" = "xno" -a $result -ne 0 ; then
+		fatal "key $KEY unexpectedly revoked by KRL $KRL: $TAG"
+	fi
+}
+test_all() {
+	FILES=$1
+	TAG=$2
+	KEYS_RESULT=$3
+	ALL_RESULT=$4
+	SERIAL_RESULT=$5
+	KEYID_RESULT=$6
+	CERTS_RESULT=$7
+	CA_RESULT=$8
+	verbose "$tid: checking revocations for $TAG"
+	for f in $FILES ; do
+		check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-empty  no             "$TAG"
+		check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-keys   $KEYS_RESULT   "$TAG"
+		check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-all    $ALL_RESULT    "$TAG"
+		check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-serial $SERIAL_RESULT "$TAG"
+		check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-keyid  $KEYID_RESULT  "$TAG"
+		check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-cert  $CERTS_RESULT   "$TAG"
+		check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-ca     $CA_RESULT     "$TAG"
+	done
+}
+#                                            keys  all serial  keyid  certs   CA
+test_all    "$REVOKED_KEYS"    "revoked keys" yes  yes     no     no     no   no
+test_all  "$UNREVOKED_KEYS"  "unrevoked keys"  no   no     no     no     no   no
+test_all   "$REVOKED_CERTS"   "revoked certs" yes  yes    yes    yes    yes  yes
+test_all "$UNREVOKED_CERTS" "unrevoked certs"  no   no     no     no     no  yes
+
+# Check update. Results should be identical.
+verbose "$tid: testing KRL update"
+for f in $OBJ/krl-keys $OBJ/krl-cert $OBJ/krl-all \
+    $OBJ/krl-ca $OBJ/krl-serial $OBJ/krl-keyid ; do
+	cp -f $OBJ/krl-empty $f
+	genkrls -u
+done
+#                                            keys  all serial  keyid  certs   CA
+test_all    "$REVOKED_KEYS"    "revoked keys" yes  yes     no     no     no   no
+test_all  "$UNREVOKED_KEYS"  "unrevoked keys"  no   no     no     no     no   no
+test_all   "$REVOKED_CERTS"   "revoked certs" yes  yes    yes    yes    yes  yes
+test_all "$UNREVOKED_CERTS" "unrevoked certs"  no   no     no     no     no  yes
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 13f5f768bc4861bff58074717fc19764ee347ac9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2013 15:32:03 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 03:00:32      [krl.c]      fix
 KRL generation bug for list sections

---
 ChangeLog | 4 +++-
 krl.c     | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index a45d24b29..6be8cd468 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -8,10 +8,12 @@
      a single bit of incremental cost to revoke a certificate by serial number.
      KRLs are loaded via the existing RevokedKeys sshd_config option.
      feedback and ok markus@
- - OpenBSD CVS Sync
    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 00:45:29
      [regress/Makefile regress/cert-userkey.sh regress/krl.sh]
      Tests for Key Revocation Lists (KRLs)
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 03:00:32
+     [krl.c]
+     fix KRL generation bug for list sections
 
 20130117
  - (djm) [regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/integrity.sh regress/try-ciphers.sh]
diff --git a/krl.c b/krl.c
index 485057029..ca2010a77 100644
--- a/krl.c
+++ b/krl.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  */
 
-/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.2 2013/01/18 00:24:58 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.3 2013/01/18 03:00:32 djm Exp $ */
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
@@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, Buffer *buf)
 		/* Perform section-specific processing */
 		switch (state) {
 		case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
-			for (i = rs->lo; i < contig; i++)
+			for (i = 0; i < contig; i++)
 				buffer_put_int64(&sect, rs->lo + i);
 			break;
 		case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From da5cc5d09a193f29d1a1e1c5a96e06980d240816 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Sun, 20 Jan 2013 22:31:29 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) [cipher-aes.c cipher-ctr.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] 
   Move prototypes for replacement ciphers to openssl-compat.h; fix EVP   
 prototypes for openssl-1.0.0-fips.

---
 ChangeLog                       |  5 +++++
 cipher-aes.c                    |  3 ---
 cipher-ctr.c                    |  3 ---
 openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h | 12 ++++++------
 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 6be8cd468..9132fb7c5 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
+20130120
+ - (djm) [cipher-aes.c cipher-ctr.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h]
+   Move prototypes for replacement ciphers to openssl-compat.h; fix EVP
+   prototypes for openssl-1.0.0-fips.
+
 20130118
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/17 23:00:01
diff --git a/cipher-aes.c b/cipher-aes.c
index bfda6d2f2..07ec7aa5d 100644
--- a/cipher-aes.c
+++ b/cipher-aes.c
@@ -46,9 +46,6 @@ struct ssh_rijndael_ctx
 	u_char		r_iv[RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE];
 };
 
-const EVP_CIPHER * evp_rijndael(void);
-void ssh_rijndael_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, u_int);
-
 static int
 ssh_rijndael_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv,
     int enc)
diff --git a/cipher-ctr.c b/cipher-ctr.c
index f053abe2e..d1fe69f57 100644
--- a/cipher-ctr.c
+++ b/cipher-ctr.c
@@ -34,9 +34,6 @@
 #include <openssl/aes.h>
 #endif
 
-const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_128_ctr(void);
-void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, size_t);
-
 struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx
 {
 	AES_KEY		aes_ctx;
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
index 28da3be2d..eca62769e 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: openssl-compat.h,v 1.21 2013/01/09 05:42:49 djm Exp $ */
+/* $Id: openssl-compat.h,v 1.22 2013/01/20 11:31:37 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
 # define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(e)		((e)->app_data)
 #endif
 
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1000000fL
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000001L
 # define LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE unsigned int
 #else
 # define LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE size_t
@@ -59,16 +59,16 @@
 # define EVP_aes_128_cbc evp_rijndael
 # define EVP_aes_192_cbc evp_rijndael
 # define EVP_aes_256_cbc evp_rijndael
-extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_rijndael(void);
-extern void ssh_rijndael_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, u_int);
+const EVP_CIPHER *evp_rijndael(void);
+void ssh_rijndael_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, u_int);
 #endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR
 #define EVP_aes_128_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
 #define EVP_aes_192_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
 #define EVP_aes_256_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
-extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_128_ctr(void);
-extern void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, u_int);
+const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_128_ctr(void);
+void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, size_t);
 #endif
 
 /* Avoid some #ifdef. Code that uses these is unreachable without GCM */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From ac5542b6b879636144cef61ea318ecf177518b50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Sun, 20 Jan 2013 22:33:02 +1100
Subject:    - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 07:57:47      [ssh-keygen.1]     
 tweak previous;

---
 ChangeLog    |  4 ++++
 ssh-keygen.1 | 31 ++++++++++++++++---------------
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 9132fb7c5..e3a333d27 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -2,6 +2,10 @@
  - (djm) [cipher-aes.c cipher-ctr.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h]
    Move prototypes for replacement ciphers to openssl-compat.h; fix EVP
    prototypes for openssl-1.0.0-fips.
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 07:57:47
+     [ssh-keygen.1]
+     tweak previous;
 
 20130118
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
index 52f4b6ea6..ac97678d3 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.1
+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.111 2013/01/17 23:00:01 djm Exp $
+.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.112 2013/01/18 07:57:47 jmc Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: January 17 2013 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: January 18 2013 $
 .Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -126,8 +126,8 @@
 .Fl k
 .Fl f Ar krl_file
 .Op Fl u
-.Op Fl s ca_public
-.Op Fl z version_number
+.Op Fl s Ar ca_public
+.Op Fl z Ar version_number
 .Ar
 .Nm ssh-keygen
 .Fl Q
@@ -158,7 +158,8 @@ section for details.
 Finally,
 .Nm
 can be used to generate and update Key Revocation Lists, and to test whether
-given keys have been revoked by one. See the
+given keys have been revoked by one.
+See the
 .Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS
 section for details.
 .Pp
@@ -480,7 +481,7 @@ section for details.
 .Pp
 When generating a KRL,
 .Fl s
-specifies a path to a CA public key file used to revoke certificated directly
+specifies a path to a CA public key file used to revoke certificates directly
 by key ID or serial number.
 See the
 .Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS
@@ -499,6 +500,12 @@ for protocol version 1 and
 or
 .Dq rsa
 for protocol version 2.
+.It Fl u
+Update a KRL.
+When specified with
+.Fl k ,
+keys listed via the command-line are added to the existing KRL rather than
+a new KRL being created.
 .It Fl V Ar validity_interval
 Specify a validity interval when signing a certificate.
 A validity interval may consist of a single time, indicating that the
@@ -522,12 +529,6 @@ For example:
 (valid from 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2010 to 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2011),
 .Dq -1d:20110101
 (valid from yesterday to midnight, January 1st, 2011).
-.It Fl u
-Update a KRL.
-When specified with
-.Fl k ,
-keys listed via the command-line are added to the existing KRL rather than
-a new KRL being created.
 .It Fl v
 Verbose mode.
 Causes
@@ -689,7 +690,7 @@ Please refer to those manual pages for details.
 .Nm
 is able to manage OpenSSH format Key Revocation Lists (KRLs).
 These binary files specify keys or certificates to be revoked using a
-compact format; taking as little a one bit per certificate if they are being
+compact format, taking as little a one bit per certificate if they are being
 revoked by serial number.
 .Pp
 KRLs may be generated using the
@@ -712,7 +713,7 @@ followed by a colon and some directive-specific information.
 .Bl -tag -width Ds
 .It Cm serial : Ar serial_number Op -serial_number
 Revokes a certificate with the specified serial number.
-Serial numbers are 64 bit values, not including zero and may be expressed
+Serial numbers are 64-bit values, not including zero and may be expressed
 in decimal, hex or octal.
 If two serial numbers are specified separated by a hyphen, then the range
 of serial numbers including and between each is revoked.
@@ -730,7 +731,7 @@ command-line using the
 option.
 .It Cm key : Ar public_key
 Revokes the specified key.
-In a certificate is listed, then it is revoked as a plain public key.
+If a certificate is listed, then it is revoked as a plain public key.
 .It Cm sha1 : Ar public_key
 Revokes the specified key by its SHA1 hash.
 .El
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 3d6d68b1e14e78bd0e50e896c99e6a72e1ef7e89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Sun, 20 Jan 2013 22:33:23 +1100
Subject:    - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 07:59:46      [ssh-keygen.c]     
 -u before -V in usage();

---
 ChangeLog    | 3 +++
 ssh-keygen.c | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index e3a333d27..be9d50060 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -6,6 +6,9 @@
    - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 07:57:47
      [ssh-keygen.1]
      tweak previous;
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 07:59:46
+     [ssh-keygen.c]
+     -u before -V in usage();
 
 20130118
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
index 861b04e2d..21c7f25ea 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.223 2013/01/17 23:00:01 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.224 2013/01/18 07:59:46 jmc Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -2163,8 +2163,8 @@ usage(void)
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -s ca_key   Certify keys with CA key.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -T file     Screen candidates for DH-GEX moduli.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -t type     Specify type of key to create.\n");
-	fprintf(stderr, "  -V from:to  Specify certificate validity interval.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -u          Update KRL rather than creating a new one.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -V from:to  Specify certificate validity interval.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -v          Verbose.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -W gen      Generator to use for generating DH-GEX moduli.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -y          Read private key file and print public key.\n");
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 72abeb709ee835088d9151629de8d29a9f2529c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Sun, 20 Jan 2013 22:33:44 +1100
Subject:    - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 08:00:49      [sshd_config.5]    
  tweak previous;

---
 ChangeLog     | 3 +++
 sshd_config.5 | 6 +++---
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index be9d50060..cc5c7f010 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@
    - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 07:59:46
      [ssh-keygen.c]
      -u before -V in usage();
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 08:00:49
+     [sshd_config.5]
+     tweak previous;
 
 20130118
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index c8b814da6..d2913c33f 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.154 2013/01/17 23:00:01 djm Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: January 17 2013 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.155 2013/01/18 08:00:49 jmc Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: January 18 2013 $
 .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -1000,7 +1000,7 @@ Note that if this file is not readable, then public key authentication will
 be refused for all users.
 Keys may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line, or as
 an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by
-.Xr ssh-keygen 1
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
 For more information on KRLs, see the
 .Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS
 section in
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 072fdcd19821bbd36ee175475286fad17eaaa367 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Sun, 20 Jan 2013 22:34:04 +1100
Subject:    - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 08:39:04      [ssh-keygen.1]     
 add -Q to the options list; ok djm

---
 ChangeLog    | 3 +++
 ssh-keygen.1 | 4 +++-
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index cc5c7f010..f9bdf2ab9 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@
    - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 08:00:49
      [sshd_config.5]
      tweak previous;
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 08:39:04
+     [ssh-keygen.1]
+     add -Q to the options list; ok djm
 
 20130118
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
index ac97678d3..ca0ab3537 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.1
+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.112 2013/01/18 07:57:47 jmc Exp $
+.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.113 2013/01/18 08:39:04 jmc Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -455,6 +455,8 @@ creating a new private key.
 The program will prompt for the file
 containing the private key, for the old passphrase, and twice for the
 new passphrase.
+.It Fl Q
+Test whether keys have been revoked in a KRL.
 .It Fl q
 Silence
 .Nm ssh-keygen .
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 881a7a2c5dc1d39b7e5f50e0d6c52d61b85491c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Sun, 20 Jan 2013 22:34:46 +1100
Subject:    - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 21:48:43      [ssh-keygen.1]     
 command-line (adj.) -> command line (n.);

---
 ChangeLog    |  3 +++
 ssh-keygen.1 | 16 ++++++++--------
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index f9bdf2ab9..1b05af704 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@
    - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 08:39:04
      [ssh-keygen.1]
      add -Q to the options list; ok djm
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 21:48:43
+     [ssh-keygen.1]
+     command-line (adj.) -> command line (n.);
 
 20130118
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
index ca0ab3537..9d7a25cf4 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.1
+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.113 2013/01/18 08:39:04 jmc Exp $
+.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.114 2013/01/18 21:48:43 jmc Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ In this mode,
 .Nm
 will generate a KRL file at the location specified via the
 .Fl f
-flag that revokes every key or certificate presented on the command-line.
+flag that revokes every key or certificate presented on the command line.
 Keys/certificates to be revoked may be specified by public key file or
 using the format described in the
 .Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS
@@ -506,7 +506,7 @@ for protocol version 2.
 Update a KRL.
 When specified with
 .Fl k ,
-keys listed via the command-line are added to the existing KRL rather than
+keys listed via the command line are added to the existing KRL rather than
 a new KRL being created.
 .It Fl V Ar validity_interval
 Specify a validity interval when signing a certificate.
@@ -698,7 +698,7 @@ revoked by serial number.
 KRLs may be generated using the
 .Fl k
 flag.
-This option reads one or more files from the command-line and generates a new
+This option reads one or more files from the command line and generates a new
 KRL.
 The files may either contain a KRL specification (see below) or public keys,
 listed one per line.
@@ -721,14 +721,14 @@ If two serial numbers are specified separated by a hyphen, then the range
 of serial numbers including and between each is revoked.
 The CA key must have been specified on the
 .Nm
-command-line using the
+command line using the
 .Fl s
 option.
 .It Cm id : Ar key_id
 Revokes a certificate with the specified key ID string.
 The CA key must have been specified on the
 .Nm
-command-line using the
+command line using the
 .Fl s
 option.
 .It Cm key : Ar public_key
@@ -742,7 +742,7 @@ KRLs may be updated using the
 .Fl u
 flag in addition to
 .Fl k .
-When this option is specified, keys listed via the command-line are merged into
+When this option is specified, keys listed via the command line are merged into
 the KRL, adding to those already there.
 .Pp
 It is also possible, given a KRL, to test whether it revokes a particular key
@@ -750,7 +750,7 @@ It is also possible, given a KRL, to test whether it revokes a particular key
 The
 .Fl Q
 flag will query an existing KRL, testing each key specified on the commandline.
-If any key listed on the command-line has been revoked (or an error encountered)
+If any key listed on the command line has been revoked (or an error encountered)
 then
 .Nm
 will exit with a non-zero exit status.
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From a0a7ee8bf417c651f4f5bb8a8a8fb877c13011cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Sun, 20 Jan 2013 22:35:06 +1100
Subject:    - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/19 07:13:25      [ssh-keygen.1]     
 fix some formatting; ok djm

---
 ChangeLog    | 3 +++
 ssh-keygen.1 | 6 +++---
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 1b05af704..518f441d6 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -18,6 +18,9 @@
    - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 21:48:43
      [ssh-keygen.1]
      command-line (adj.) -> command line (n.);
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/19 07:13:25
+     [ssh-keygen.1]
+     fix some formatting; ok djm
 
 20130118
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
index 9d7a25cf4..7da73e07c 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.1
+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.114 2013/01/18 21:48:43 jmc Exp $
+.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.115 2013/01/19 07:13:25 jmc Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: January 18 2013 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: January 19 2013 $
 .Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -713,7 +713,7 @@ certificate on hand.
 A KRL specification consists of lines containing one of the following directives
 followed by a colon and some directive-specific information.
 .Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Cm serial : Ar serial_number Op -serial_number
+.It Cm serial : Ar serial_number Ns Op - Ns Ar serial_number
 Revokes a certificate with the specified serial number.
 Serial numbers are 64-bit values, not including zero and may be expressed
 in decimal, hex or octal.
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From a7522d9fc07ab06680853104d52dbbf90146b458 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Sun, 20 Jan 2013 22:35:31 +1100
Subject:    - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/19 12:34:55      [krl.c]     
 RB_INSERT does not remove existing elments; ok djm@

---
 ChangeLog | 3 +++
 krl.c     | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 518f441d6..43cedb63e 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@
    - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/19 07:13:25
      [ssh-keygen.1]
      fix some formatting; ok djm
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/19 12:34:55
+     [krl.c]
+     RB_INSERT does not remove existing elments; ok djm@
 
 20130118
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/krl.c b/krl.c
index ca2010a77..b09f2dc11 100644
--- a/krl.c
+++ b/krl.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  */
 
-/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.3 2013/01/18 03:00:32 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.4 2013/01/19 12:34:55 markus Exp $ */
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ insert_serial_range(struct revoked_serial_tree *rt, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi)
 		if (ers != NULL) {
 			KRL_DBG(("%s: bad: ers != NULL", __func__));
 			/* Shouldn't happen */
-			free(ers);
+			free(irs);
 			return -1;
 		}
 		ers = irs;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From d60b2108307dccdc596d1bf3195f6882067e2b2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Sun, 20 Jan 2013 22:49:58 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) [openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h] Sync with OpenBSD. krl.c needs
 newer     version.

---
 ChangeLog                 |   2 +
 krl.c                     |   4 +-
 openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h | 109 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 3 files changed, 94 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 43cedb63e..7bc6b451c 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
    - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/19 12:34:55
      [krl.c]
      RB_INSERT does not remove existing elments; ok djm@
+ - (djm) [openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h] Sync with OpenBSD. krl.c needs newer
+   version.
 
 20130118
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/krl.c b/krl.c
index b09f2dc11..fe22bde25 100644
--- a/krl.c
+++ b/krl.c
@@ -20,8 +20,8 @@
 
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/tree.h>
-#include <sys/queue.h>
+#include <openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h>
+#include <openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h>
 
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h b/openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h
index d4949b5e7..058fa3b23 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: tree.h,v 1.10 2007/10/29 23:49:41 djm Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: tree.h,v 1.13 2011/07/09 00:19:45 pirofti Exp $	*/
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * All rights reserved.
@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ struct {								\
 } while (0)
 
 #ifndef RB_AUGMENT
-#define RB_AUGMENT(x)
+#define RB_AUGMENT(x)	do {} while (0)
 #endif
 
 #define RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, elm, tmp, field) do {			\
@@ -375,21 +375,31 @@ struct {								\
 } while (0)
 
 /* Generates prototypes and inline functions */
-#define RB_PROTOTYPE(name, type, field, cmp)				\
-void name##_RB_INSERT_COLOR(struct name *, struct type *);	\
-void name##_RB_REMOVE_COLOR(struct name *, struct type *, struct type *);\
-struct type *name##_RB_REMOVE(struct name *, struct type *);		\
-struct type *name##_RB_INSERT(struct name *, struct type *);		\
-struct type *name##_RB_FIND(struct name *, struct type *);		\
-struct type *name##_RB_NEXT(struct type *);				\
-struct type *name##_RB_MINMAX(struct name *, int);			
-
+#define	RB_PROTOTYPE(name, type, field, cmp)				\
+	RB_PROTOTYPE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp,)
+#define	RB_PROTOTYPE_STATIC(name, type, field, cmp)			\
+	RB_PROTOTYPE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp, __attribute__((__unused__)) static)
+#define RB_PROTOTYPE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp, attr)		\
+attr void name##_RB_INSERT_COLOR(struct name *, struct type *);		\
+attr void name##_RB_REMOVE_COLOR(struct name *, struct type *, struct type *);\
+attr struct type *name##_RB_REMOVE(struct name *, struct type *);	\
+attr struct type *name##_RB_INSERT(struct name *, struct type *);	\
+attr struct type *name##_RB_FIND(struct name *, struct type *);		\
+attr struct type *name##_RB_NFIND(struct name *, struct type *);	\
+attr struct type *name##_RB_NEXT(struct type *);			\
+attr struct type *name##_RB_PREV(struct type *);			\
+attr struct type *name##_RB_MINMAX(struct name *, int);			\
+									\
 
 /* Main rb operation.
  * Moves node close to the key of elm to top
  */
-#define RB_GENERATE(name, type, field, cmp)				\
-void									\
+#define	RB_GENERATE(name, type, field, cmp)				\
+	RB_GENERATE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp,)
+#define	RB_GENERATE_STATIC(name, type, field, cmp)			\
+	RB_GENERATE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp, __attribute__((__unused__)) static)
+#define RB_GENERATE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp, attr)		\
+attr void								\
 name##_RB_INSERT_COLOR(struct name *head, struct type *elm)		\
 {									\
 	struct type *parent, *gparent, *tmp;				\
@@ -433,7 +443,7 @@ name##_RB_INSERT_COLOR(struct name *head, struct type *elm)		\
 	RB_COLOR(head->rbh_root, field) = RB_BLACK;			\
 }									\
 									\
-void									\
+attr void								\
 name##_RB_REMOVE_COLOR(struct name *head, struct type *parent, struct type *elm) \
 {									\
 	struct type *tmp;						\
@@ -509,7 +519,7 @@ name##_RB_REMOVE_COLOR(struct name *head, struct type *parent, struct type *elm)
 		RB_COLOR(elm, field) = RB_BLACK;			\
 }									\
 									\
-struct type *								\
+attr struct type *							\
 name##_RB_REMOVE(struct name *head, struct type *elm)			\
 {									\
 	struct type *child, *parent, *old = elm;			\
@@ -577,7 +587,7 @@ color:									\
 }									\
 									\
 /* Inserts a node into the RB tree */					\
-struct type *								\
+attr struct type *							\
 name##_RB_INSERT(struct name *head, struct type *elm)			\
 {									\
 	struct type *tmp;						\
@@ -608,7 +618,7 @@ name##_RB_INSERT(struct name *head, struct type *elm)			\
 }									\
 									\
 /* Finds the node with the same key as elm */				\
-struct type *								\
+attr struct type *							\
 name##_RB_FIND(struct name *head, struct type *elm)			\
 {									\
 	struct type *tmp = RB_ROOT(head);				\
@@ -625,7 +635,29 @@ name##_RB_FIND(struct name *head, struct type *elm)			\
 	return (NULL);							\
 }									\
 									\
-struct type *								\
+/* Finds the first node greater than or equal to the search key */	\
+attr struct type *							\
+name##_RB_NFIND(struct name *head, struct type *elm)			\
+{									\
+	struct type *tmp = RB_ROOT(head);				\
+	struct type *res = NULL;					\
+	int comp;							\
+	while (tmp) {							\
+		comp = cmp(elm, tmp);					\
+		if (comp < 0) {						\
+			res = tmp;					\
+			tmp = RB_LEFT(tmp, field);			\
+		}							\
+		else if (comp > 0)					\
+			tmp = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field);			\
+		else							\
+			return (tmp);					\
+	}								\
+	return (res);							\
+}									\
+									\
+/* ARGSUSED */								\
+attr struct type *							\
 name##_RB_NEXT(struct type *elm)					\
 {									\
 	if (RB_RIGHT(elm, field)) {					\
@@ -646,7 +678,29 @@ name##_RB_NEXT(struct type *elm)					\
 	return (elm);							\
 }									\
 									\
-struct type *								\
+/* ARGSUSED */								\
+attr struct type *							\
+name##_RB_PREV(struct type *elm)					\
+{									\
+	if (RB_LEFT(elm, field)) {					\
+		elm = RB_LEFT(elm, field);				\
+		while (RB_RIGHT(elm, field))				\
+			elm = RB_RIGHT(elm, field);			\
+	} else {							\
+		if (RB_PARENT(elm, field) &&				\
+		    (elm == RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field)))	\
+			elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field);			\
+		else {							\
+			while (RB_PARENT(elm, field) &&			\
+			    (elm == RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field)))\
+				elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field);		\
+			elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field);			\
+		}							\
+	}								\
+	return (elm);							\
+}									\
+									\
+attr struct type *							\
 name##_RB_MINMAX(struct name *head, int val)				\
 {									\
 	struct type *tmp = RB_ROOT(head);				\
@@ -667,7 +721,9 @@ name##_RB_MINMAX(struct name *head, int val)				\
 #define RB_INSERT(name, x, y)	name##_RB_INSERT(x, y)
 #define RB_REMOVE(name, x, y)	name##_RB_REMOVE(x, y)
 #define RB_FIND(name, x, y)	name##_RB_FIND(x, y)
+#define RB_NFIND(name, x, y)	name##_RB_NFIND(x, y)
 #define RB_NEXT(name, x, y)	name##_RB_NEXT(y)
+#define RB_PREV(name, x, y)	name##_RB_PREV(y)
 #define RB_MIN(name, x)		name##_RB_MINMAX(x, RB_NEGINF)
 #define RB_MAX(name, x)		name##_RB_MINMAX(x, RB_INF)
 
@@ -676,4 +732,19 @@ name##_RB_MINMAX(struct name *head, int val)				\
 	     (x) != NULL;						\
 	     (x) = name##_RB_NEXT(x))
 
+#define RB_FOREACH_SAFE(x, name, head, y)				\
+	for ((x) = RB_MIN(name, head);					\
+	    ((x) != NULL) && ((y) = name##_RB_NEXT(x), 1);		\
+	     (x) = (y))
+
+#define RB_FOREACH_REVERSE(x, name, head)				\
+	for ((x) = RB_MAX(name, head);					\
+	     (x) != NULL;						\
+	     (x) = name##_RB_PREV(x))
+
+#define RB_FOREACH_REVERSE_SAFE(x, name, head, y)			\
+	for ((x) = RB_MAX(name, head);					\
+	    ((x) != NULL) && ((y) = name##_RB_PREV(x), 1);		\
+	     (x) = (y))
+
 #endif	/* _SYS_TREE_H_ */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From dc75d1fc0488a6637779470200f2b4dca2ed6248 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Sun, 20 Jan 2013 22:58:51 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) [regress/krl.sh] replacement for jot; most platforms lack it

---
 ChangeLog      | 1 +
 regress/krl.sh | 4 ++++
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 7bc6b451c..0e55ed4c3 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
      RB_INSERT does not remove existing elments; ok djm@
  - (djm) [openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h] Sync with OpenBSD. krl.c needs newer
    version.
+ - (djm) [regress/krl.sh] replacement for jot; most platforms lack it
 
 20130118
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/regress/krl.sh b/regress/krl.sh
index 3ee5a9060..46a2ad3f9 100644
--- a/regress/krl.sh
+++ b/regress/krl.sh
@@ -33,6 +33,10 @@ serial: 799
 serial: 599-701
 EOF
 
+jot() {
+	awk "BEGIN { for (i = $2; i < $2 + $1; i++) { printf \"%d\n\", i } }"
+}
+
 # A specification that revokes some certificated by key ID.
 touch $OBJ/revoked-keyid
 for n in 1 2 3 4 10 15 30 50 `jot 500 300` 999 1000 1001 1002; do
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 5c3bbd76aa5c6f050e7b4606ea55efce3d46e054 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2013 10:11:05 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) [configure.ac] Don't probe seccomp capability of running
 kernel     at configure time; the seccomp sandbox will fall back to rlimit at
        runtime anyway. Patch from plautrba AT redhat.com in bz#2011

---
 ChangeLog    | 5 +++++
 configure.ac | 9 ++++-----
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 0e55ed4c3..53785de6a 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
+20100207
+ - (djm) [configure.ac] Don't probe seccomp capability of running kernel
+   at configure time; the seccomp sandbox will fall back to rlimit at
+   runtime anyway. Patch from plautrba AT redhat.com in bz#2011
+
 20130120
  - (djm) [cipher-aes.c cipher-ctr.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h]
    Move prototypes for replacement ciphers to openssl-compat.h; fix EVP
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 36761233c..f61106441 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.500 2013/01/09 05:42:47 djm Exp $
+# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.501 2013/02/06 23:11:05 djm Exp $
 #
 # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
 #
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 
 AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org])
-AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.500 $)
+AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.501 $)
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
 AC_LANG([C])
 
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ AC_CHECK_DECL([SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER], [have_seccomp_filter=1], , [
 fi
 if test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" ; then
 AC_MSG_CHECKING([kernel for seccomp_filter support])
-AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
 		#include <errno.h>
 		#include <linux/seccomp.h>
 		#include <stdlib.h>
@@ -141,8 +141,7 @@ AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
 		AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
 		# Disable seccomp filter as a target
 		have_seccomp_filter=0
-	],
-	[ AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming yes]) ]
+	]
 )
 fi
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From e7f50e1c181bad14787a4b995875ed63b79adf5d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 10:49:37 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) [contrib/redhat/sshd.init] treat RETVAL as an integer;   
 patch from Iain Morgan in bz#2059

---
 ChangeLog                | 6 +++++-
 contrib/redhat/sshd.init | 8 ++++----
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 53785de6a..6c569b81d 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@
-20100207
+20130208
+ - (djm) [contrib/redhat/sshd.init] treat RETVAL as an integer;
+   patch from Iain Morgan in bz#2059
+
+20130207
  - (djm) [configure.ac] Don't probe seccomp capability of running kernel
    at configure time; the seccomp sandbox will fall back to rlimit at
    runtime anyway. Patch from plautrba AT redhat.com in bz#2011
diff --git a/contrib/redhat/sshd.init b/contrib/redhat/sshd.init
index e9a751796..40c8dfd9f 100755
--- a/contrib/redhat/sshd.init
+++ b/contrib/redhat/sshd.init
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ do_restart_sanity_check()
 {
 	$SSHD -t
 	RETVAL=$?
-	if [ ! "$RETVAL" = 0 ]; then
+	if [ $RETVAL -ne 0 ]; then
 		failure $"Configuration file or keys are invalid"
 		echo
 	fi
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ start()
 	echo -n $"Starting $prog:"
 	$SSHD $OPTIONS && success || failure
 	RETVAL=$?
-	[ "$RETVAL" = 0 ] && touch /var/lock/subsys/sshd
+	[ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && touch /var/lock/subsys/sshd
 	echo
 }
 
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ stop()
 	echo -n $"Stopping $prog:"
 	killproc $SSHD -TERM
 	RETVAL=$?
-	[ "$RETVAL" = 0 ] && rm -f /var/lock/subsys/sshd
+	[ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && rm -f /var/lock/subsys/sshd
 	echo
 }
 
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ case "$1" in
 	condrestart)
 		if [ -f /var/lock/subsys/sshd ] ; then
 			do_restart_sanity_check
-			if [ "$RETVAL" = 0 ] ; then
+			if [ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] ; then
 				stop
 				# avoid race
 				sleep 3
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 951b53b1bede98fdcfeeac8c5c00dbf3948d9b75 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 11:50:09 +1100
Subject:  - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h] Test if
 compiler allows    __attribute__ on return values and work around if
 necessary.  ok djm@

---
 ChangeLog                 |  2 ++
 configure.ac              | 16 ++++++++++++++--
 openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h |  5 +++++
 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 6c569b81d..5e832e7d5 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 20130208
  - (djm) [contrib/redhat/sshd.init] treat RETVAL as an integer;
    patch from Iain Morgan in bz#2059
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h] Test if compiler allows
+   __attribute__ on return values and work around if necessary.  ok djm@
 
 20130207
  - (djm) [configure.ac] Don't probe seccomp capability of running kernel
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index f61106441..6df09e210 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.501 2013/02/06 23:11:05 djm Exp $
+# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.502 2013/02/08 00:50:09 dtucker Exp $
 #
 # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
 #
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 
 AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org])
-AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.501 $)
+AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.502 $)
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
 AC_LANG([C])
 
@@ -238,6 +238,18 @@ if test "$GCC" = "yes" || test "$GCC" = "egcs"; then
 	fi
 fi
 
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler allows __attribute__ on return types])
+AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
+    [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdlib.h>
+__attribute__((__unused__)) static void foo(void){return;}]],
+    [[ exit(0); ]])],
+    [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
+    [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+      AC_DEFINE(NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE, 1,
+	 [compiler does not accept __attribute__ on return types]) ]
+)
+
 if test "x$no_attrib_nonnull" != "x1" ; then
 	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__], [1], [Have attribute nonnull])
 fi
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h b/openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h
index 058fa3b23..7f7546ecd 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h
@@ -26,6 +26,11 @@
 
 /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: sys/sys/tree.h */
 
+#include "config.h"
+#ifdef NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE
+# define __attribute__(x)
+#endif
+
 #ifndef	_SYS_TREE_H_
 #define	_SYS_TREE_H_
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From b6f73b3af6fa14df1306d763dd7ec38f68de6f79 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2013 10:39:12 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Repair build
 on old    libcrypto that lacks EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl

---
 ChangeLog                       |  4 ++++
 configure.ac                    | 15 ++++++++++++---
 openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h | 11 ++++++++++-
 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 5e832e7d5..798f5452e 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+20130211
+ - (djm) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Repair build on old
+   libcrypto that lacks EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl
+
 20130208
  - (djm) [contrib/redhat/sshd.init] treat RETVAL as an integer;
    patch from Iain Morgan in bz#2059
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 6df09e210..e96e81e64 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.502 2013/02/08 00:50:09 dtucker Exp $
+# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.503 2013/02/10 23:39:13 djm Exp $
 #
 # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
 #
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 
 AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org])
-AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.502 $)
+AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.503 $)
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
 AC_LANG([C])
 
@@ -2339,7 +2339,12 @@ AC_LINK_IFELSE(
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 	]], [[
 	exit(EVP_aes_128_gcm() == NULL ||
-	    EVP_aes_256_gcm() == NULL);
+	    EVP_aes_256_gcm() == NULL ||
+	    EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED == 0 ||
+	    EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN == 0 ||
+	    EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG == 0 ||
+	    EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG == 0 ||
+	    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(NULL, 0, 0, NULL) == 0);
 	]])],
 	[
 		AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
@@ -2351,6 +2356,10 @@ AC_LINK_IFELSE(
 	]
 )
 
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl], [crypto],
+	[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL], [1],
+	    [Define if libcrypto has EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl])])
+
 AC_MSG_CHECKING([if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int])
 AC_LINK_IFELSE(
 	[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
index eca62769e..6c4d68def 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: openssl-compat.h,v 1.22 2013/01/20 11:31:37 djm Exp $ */
+/* $Id: openssl-compat.h,v 1.23 2013/02/10 23:39:15 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
@@ -79,6 +79,15 @@ void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, size_t);
 # define EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG -1
 #endif
 
+/* Replace missing EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl() with something that returns failure */
+#ifndef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM
+#  error AES-GCM enabled without EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl /* shouldn't happen */
+# else
+# define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(a,b,c,d) (0)
+# endif
+#endif
+
 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
 #define EVP_X_STATE(evp)	&(evp).c
 #define EVP_X_STATE_LEN(evp)	sizeof((evp).c)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From ea078462ea9b6efec982dce999ffa47ca1055077 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2013 10:54:37 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/24
 21:45:37      [krl.c]      fix handling of (unused) KRL signatures; skip
 string in correct buffer

---
 ChangeLog | 6 ++++++
 krl.c     | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 798f5452e..d663448ea 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
+20130212
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/24 21:45:37
+     [krl.c]
+     fix handling of (unused) KRL signatures; skip string in correct buffer
+
 20130211
  - (djm) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Repair build on old
    libcrypto that lacks EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl
diff --git a/krl.c b/krl.c
index fe22bde25..8e53f46dc 100644
--- a/krl.c
+++ b/krl.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  */
 
-/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.4 2013/01/19 12:34:55 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.5 2013/01/24 21:45:37 djm Exp $ */
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
@@ -1031,7 +1031,7 @@ ssh_krl_from_blob(Buffer *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp,
 		case KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE:
 			/* Handled above, but still need to stay in synch */
 			buffer_clear(&sect);
-			if ((blob = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&sect,
+			if ((blob = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&copy,
 			    &blen)) == NULL) {
 				error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
 				goto out;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 6045f5d5748582dff473934d760cf0e7e892da8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2013 10:54:54 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/24 22:08:56      [krl.c]      skip
 serial lookup when cert's serial number is zero

---
 ChangeLog | 3 +++
 krl.c     | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index d663448ea..87fe12d71 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@
    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/24 21:45:37
      [krl.c]
      fix handling of (unused) KRL signatures; skip string in correct buffer
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/24 22:08:56
+     [krl.c]
+     skip serial lookup when cert's serial number is zero
 
 20130211
  - (djm) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Repair build on old
diff --git a/krl.c b/krl.c
index 8e53f46dc..916852675 100644
--- a/krl.c
+++ b/krl.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  */
 
-/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.5 2013/01/24 21:45:37 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.6 2013/01/24 22:08:56 djm Exp $ */
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
@@ -1149,7 +1149,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key)
 	}
 
 	/* Legacy cert formats lack serial numbers */
-	if (key_cert_is_legacy(key))
+	if (key_cert_is_legacy(key) || key->cert->serial == buf0)
 		return 0;
 
 	bzero(&rs, sizeof(rs));
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 377d9a44f9c79c4fde96e973392175d5b22eed80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2013 10:55:16 +1100
Subject:    - krw@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/25 05:00:27      [krl.c]      Revert
 last. Breaks due to likely typo. Let djm@ fix later.      ok djm@ via dlg@

---
 ChangeLog | 4 ++++
 krl.c     | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 87fe12d71..4f8fe9713 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@
    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/24 22:08:56
      [krl.c]
      skip serial lookup when cert's serial number is zero
+   - krw@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/25 05:00:27
+     [krl.c]
+     Revert last. Breaks due to likely typo. Let djm@ fix later.
+     ok djm@ via dlg@
 
 20130211
  - (djm) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Repair build on old
diff --git a/krl.c b/krl.c
index 916852675..6d86c2097 100644
--- a/krl.c
+++ b/krl.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  */
 
-/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.6 2013/01/24 22:08:56 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.7 2013/01/25 05:00:27 krw Exp $ */
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
@@ -1149,7 +1149,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key)
 	}
 
 	/* Legacy cert formats lack serial numbers */
-	if (key_cert_is_legacy(key) || key->cert->serial == buf0)
+	if (key_cert_is_legacy(key))
 		return 0;
 
 	bzero(&rs, sizeof(rs));
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 60565bcb5c26f38b9f1c0261c0608751979571d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2013 10:56:42 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/25 10:22:19      [krl.c]      redo
 last commit without the vi-vomit that snuck in:      skip serial lookup when
 cert's serial number is zero      (now with 100% better comment)

---
 ChangeLog | 5 +++++
 krl.c     | 9 ++++++---
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 4f8fe9713..428a93ddb 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -10,6 +10,11 @@
      [krl.c]
      Revert last. Breaks due to likely typo. Let djm@ fix later.
      ok djm@ via dlg@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/25 10:22:19
+     [krl.c]
+     redo last commit without the vi-vomit that snuck in:
+     skip serial lookup when cert's serial number is zero
+     (now with 100% better comment)
 
 20130211
  - (djm) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Repair build on old
diff --git a/krl.c b/krl.c
index 6d86c2097..e4e1788f4 100644
--- a/krl.c
+++ b/krl.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  */
 
-/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.7 2013/01/25 05:00:27 krw Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.8 2013/01/25 10:22:19 djm Exp $ */
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
@@ -1148,8 +1148,11 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key)
 		return -1;
 	}
 
-	/* Legacy cert formats lack serial numbers */
-	if (key_cert_is_legacy(key))
+	/*
+	 * Legacy cert formats lack serial numbers. Zero serials numbers
+	 * are ignored (it's the default when the CA doesn't specify one).
+	 */
+	if (key_cert_is_legacy(key) || key->cert->serial == 0)
 		return 0;
 
 	bzero(&rs, sizeof(rs));
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From f0a8ded824a0149940a8c95755da05a9ce5d7f35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2013 11:00:34 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/26 06:11:05      [Makefile.in acss.c
 acss.h cipher-acss.c cipher.c]      [openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h]     
 remove ACSS, now that it is gone from libcrypto too

---
 ChangeLog                       |   4 +
 Makefile.in                     |   6 +-
 acss.c                          | 267 ----------------------------------------
 acss.h                          |  47 -------
 cipher-acss.c                   |  86 -------------
 cipher.c                        |  10 +-
 openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h |  12 +-
 7 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 421 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 acss.c
 delete mode 100644 acss.h
 delete mode 100644 cipher-acss.c

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 428a93ddb..25fb4b680 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -15,6 +15,10 @@
      redo last commit without the vi-vomit that snuck in:
      skip serial lookup when cert's serial number is zero
      (now with 100% better comment)
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/26 06:11:05
+     [Makefile.in acss.c acss.h cipher-acss.c cipher.c]
+     [openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h]
+     remove ACSS, now that it is gone from libcrypto too
 
 20130211
  - (djm) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Repair build on old
diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
index 74eeab574..ec3e1f417 100644
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.330 2013/01/18 00:44:04 djm Exp $
+# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.331 2013/02/12 00:00:34 djm Exp $
 
 # uncomment if you run a non bourne compatable shell. Ie. csh
 #SHELL = @SH@
@@ -61,8 +61,8 @@ MANFMT=@MANFMT@
 
 TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT)
 
-LIBSSH_OBJS=acss.o authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
-	canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-acss.o cipher-aes.o \
+LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
+	canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o \
 	cipher-bf1.o cipher-ctr.o cipher-3des1.o cleanup.o \
 	compat.o compress.o crc32.o deattack.o fatal.o hostfile.o \
 	log.o match.o md-sha256.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o \
diff --git a/acss.c b/acss.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 86e2c01a8..000000000
--- a/acss.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,267 +0,0 @@
-/*	$Id: acss.c,v 1.4 2006/07/24 04:51:01 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2004 The OpenBSD project
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
-#if !defined(EVP_CTRL_SET_ACSS_MODE) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00906000L)
-
-#include "acss.h"
-
-/* decryption sbox */
-static unsigned char sboxdec[] = {
-	0x33, 0x73, 0x3b, 0x26, 0x63, 0x23, 0x6b, 0x76,
-	0x3e, 0x7e, 0x36, 0x2b, 0x6e, 0x2e, 0x66, 0x7b,
-	0xd3, 0x93, 0xdb, 0x06, 0x43, 0x03, 0x4b, 0x96,
-	0xde, 0x9e, 0xd6, 0x0b, 0x4e, 0x0e, 0x46, 0x9b,
-	0x57, 0x17, 0x5f, 0x82, 0xc7, 0x87, 0xcf, 0x12,
-	0x5a, 0x1a, 0x52, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x8a, 0xc2, 0x1f,
-	0xd9, 0x99, 0xd1, 0x00, 0x49, 0x09, 0x41, 0x90,
-	0xd8, 0x98, 0xd0, 0x01, 0x48, 0x08, 0x40, 0x91,
-	0x3d, 0x7d, 0x35, 0x24, 0x6d, 0x2d, 0x65, 0x74,
-	0x3c, 0x7c, 0x34, 0x25, 0x6c, 0x2c, 0x64, 0x75,
-	0xdd, 0x9d, 0xd5, 0x04, 0x4d, 0x0d, 0x45, 0x94,
-	0xdc, 0x9c, 0xd4, 0x05, 0x4c, 0x0c, 0x44, 0x95,
-	0x59, 0x19, 0x51, 0x80, 0xc9, 0x89, 0xc1, 0x10,
-	0x58, 0x18, 0x50, 0x81, 0xc8, 0x88, 0xc0, 0x11,
-	0xd7, 0x97, 0xdf, 0x02, 0x47, 0x07, 0x4f, 0x92,
-	0xda, 0x9a, 0xd2, 0x0f, 0x4a, 0x0a, 0x42, 0x9f,
-	0x53, 0x13, 0x5b, 0x86, 0xc3, 0x83, 0xcb, 0x16,
-	0x5e, 0x1e, 0x56, 0x8b, 0xce, 0x8e, 0xc6, 0x1b,
-	0xb3, 0xf3, 0xbb, 0xa6, 0xe3, 0xa3, 0xeb, 0xf6,
-	0xbe, 0xfe, 0xb6, 0xab, 0xee, 0xae, 0xe6, 0xfb,
-	0x37, 0x77, 0x3f, 0x22, 0x67, 0x27, 0x6f, 0x72,
-	0x3a, 0x7a, 0x32, 0x2f, 0x6a, 0x2a, 0x62, 0x7f,
-	0xb9, 0xf9, 0xb1, 0xa0, 0xe9, 0xa9, 0xe1, 0xf0,
-	0xb8, 0xf8, 0xb0, 0xa1, 0xe8, 0xa8, 0xe0, 0xf1,
-	0x5d, 0x1d, 0x55, 0x84, 0xcd, 0x8d, 0xc5, 0x14,
-	0x5c, 0x1c, 0x54, 0x85, 0xcc, 0x8c, 0xc4, 0x15,
-	0xbd, 0xfd, 0xb5, 0xa4, 0xed, 0xad, 0xe5, 0xf4,
-	0xbc, 0xfc, 0xb4, 0xa5, 0xec, 0xac, 0xe4, 0xf5,
-	0x39, 0x79, 0x31, 0x20, 0x69, 0x29, 0x61, 0x70,
-	0x38, 0x78, 0x30, 0x21, 0x68, 0x28, 0x60, 0x71,
-	0xb7, 0xf7, 0xbf, 0xa2, 0xe7, 0xa7, 0xef, 0xf2,
-	0xba, 0xfa, 0xb2, 0xaf, 0xea, 0xaa, 0xe2, 0xff
-};
-
-/* encryption sbox */
-static unsigned char sboxenc[] = {
-	0x33, 0x3b, 0x73, 0x15, 0x53, 0x5b, 0x13, 0x75,
-	0x3d, 0x35, 0x7d, 0x1b, 0x5d, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x7b,
-	0x67, 0x6f, 0x27, 0x81, 0xc7, 0xcf, 0x87, 0x21,
-	0x69, 0x61, 0x29, 0x8f, 0xc9, 0xc1, 0x89, 0x2f,
-	0xe3, 0xeb, 0xa3, 0x05, 0x43, 0x4b, 0x03, 0xa5,
-	0xed, 0xe5, 0xad, 0x0b, 0x4d, 0x45, 0x0d, 0xab,
-	0xea, 0xe2, 0xaa, 0x00, 0x4a, 0x42, 0x0a, 0xa0,
-	0xe8, 0xe0, 0xa8, 0x02, 0x48, 0x40, 0x08, 0xa2,
-	0x3e, 0x36, 0x7e, 0x14, 0x5e, 0x56, 0x1e, 0x74,
-	0x3c, 0x34, 0x7c, 0x16, 0x5c, 0x54, 0x1c, 0x76,
-	0x6a, 0x62, 0x2a, 0x80, 0xca, 0xc2, 0x8a, 0x20,
-	0x68, 0x60, 0x28, 0x82, 0xc8, 0xc0, 0x88, 0x22,
-	0xee, 0xe6, 0xae, 0x04, 0x4e, 0x46, 0x0e, 0xa4,
-	0xec, 0xe4, 0xac, 0x06, 0x4c, 0x44, 0x0c, 0xa6,
-	0xe7, 0xef, 0xa7, 0x01, 0x47, 0x4f, 0x07, 0xa1,
-	0xe9, 0xe1, 0xa9, 0x0f, 0x49, 0x41, 0x09, 0xaf,
-	0x63, 0x6b, 0x23, 0x85, 0xc3, 0xcb, 0x83, 0x25,
-	0x6d, 0x65, 0x2d, 0x8b, 0xcd, 0xc5, 0x8d, 0x2b,
-	0x37, 0x3f, 0x77, 0x11, 0x57, 0x5f, 0x17, 0x71,
-	0x39, 0x31, 0x79, 0x1f, 0x59, 0x51, 0x19, 0x7f,
-	0xb3, 0xbb, 0xf3, 0x95, 0xd3, 0xdb, 0x93, 0xf5,
-	0xbd, 0xb5, 0xfd, 0x9b, 0xdd, 0xd5, 0x9d, 0xfb,
-	0xba, 0xb2, 0xfa, 0x90, 0xda, 0xd2, 0x9a, 0xf0,
-	0xb8, 0xb0, 0xf8, 0x92, 0xd8, 0xd0, 0x98, 0xf2,
-	0x6e, 0x66, 0x2e, 0x84, 0xce, 0xc6, 0x8e, 0x24,
-	0x6c, 0x64, 0x2c, 0x86, 0xcc, 0xc4, 0x8c, 0x26,
-	0x3a, 0x32, 0x7a, 0x10, 0x5a, 0x52, 0x1a, 0x70,
-	0x38, 0x30, 0x78, 0x12, 0x58, 0x50, 0x18, 0x72,
-	0xbe, 0xb6, 0xfe, 0x94, 0xde, 0xd6, 0x9e, 0xf4,
-	0xbc, 0xb4, 0xfc, 0x96, 0xdc, 0xd4, 0x9c, 0xf6,
-	0xb7, 0xbf, 0xf7, 0x91, 0xd7, 0xdf, 0x97, 0xf1,
-	0xb9, 0xb1, 0xf9, 0x9f, 0xd9, 0xd1, 0x99, 0xff
-};
-
-static unsigned char reverse[] = {
-	0x00, 0x80, 0x40, 0xc0, 0x20, 0xa0, 0x60, 0xe0,
-	0x10, 0x90, 0x50, 0xd0, 0x30, 0xb0, 0x70, 0xf0,
-	0x08, 0x88, 0x48, 0xc8, 0x28, 0xa8, 0x68, 0xe8,
-	0x18, 0x98, 0x58, 0xd8, 0x38, 0xb8, 0x78, 0xf8,
-	0x04, 0x84, 0x44, 0xc4, 0x24, 0xa4, 0x64, 0xe4,
-	0x14, 0x94, 0x54, 0xd4, 0x34, 0xb4, 0x74, 0xf4,
-	0x0c, 0x8c, 0x4c, 0xcc, 0x2c, 0xac, 0x6c, 0xec,
-	0x1c, 0x9c, 0x5c, 0xdc, 0x3c, 0xbc, 0x7c, 0xfc,
-	0x02, 0x82, 0x42, 0xc2, 0x22, 0xa2, 0x62, 0xe2,
-	0x12, 0x92, 0x52, 0xd2, 0x32, 0xb2, 0x72, 0xf2,
-	0x0a, 0x8a, 0x4a, 0xca, 0x2a, 0xaa, 0x6a, 0xea,
-	0x1a, 0x9a, 0x5a, 0xda, 0x3a, 0xba, 0x7a, 0xfa,
-	0x06, 0x86, 0x46, 0xc6, 0x26, 0xa6, 0x66, 0xe6,
-	0x16, 0x96, 0x56, 0xd6, 0x36, 0xb6, 0x76, 0xf6,
-	0x0e, 0x8e, 0x4e, 0xce, 0x2e, 0xae, 0x6e, 0xee,
-	0x1e, 0x9e, 0x5e, 0xde, 0x3e, 0xbe, 0x7e, 0xfe,
-	0x01, 0x81, 0x41, 0xc1, 0x21, 0xa1, 0x61, 0xe1,
-	0x11, 0x91, 0x51, 0xd1, 0x31, 0xb1, 0x71, 0xf1,
-	0x09, 0x89, 0x49, 0xc9, 0x29, 0xa9, 0x69, 0xe9,
-	0x19, 0x99, 0x59, 0xd9, 0x39, 0xb9, 0x79, 0xf9,
-	0x05, 0x85, 0x45, 0xc5, 0x25, 0xa5, 0x65, 0xe5,
-	0x15, 0x95, 0x55, 0xd5, 0x35, 0xb5, 0x75, 0xf5,
-	0x0d, 0x8d, 0x4d, 0xcd, 0x2d, 0xad, 0x6d, 0xed,
-	0x1d, 0x9d, 0x5d, 0xdd, 0x3d, 0xbd, 0x7d, 0xfd,
-	0x03, 0x83, 0x43, 0xc3, 0x23, 0xa3, 0x63, 0xe3,
-	0x13, 0x93, 0x53, 0xd3, 0x33, 0xb3, 0x73, 0xf3,
-	0x0b, 0x8b, 0x4b, 0xcb, 0x2b, 0xab, 0x6b, 0xeb,
-	0x1b, 0x9b, 0x5b, 0xdb, 0x3b, 0xbb, 0x7b, 0xfb,
-	0x07, 0x87, 0x47, 0xc7, 0x27, 0xa7, 0x67, 0xe7,
-	0x17, 0x97, 0x57, 0xd7, 0x37, 0xb7, 0x77, 0xf7,
-	0x0f, 0x8f, 0x4f, 0xcf, 0x2f, 0xaf, 0x6f, 0xef,
-	0x1f, 0x9f, 0x5f, 0xdf, 0x3f, 0xbf, 0x7f, 0xff
-};
-
-/*
- * Two linear feedback shift registers are used:
- *
- * lfsr17:  polynomial of degree 17, primitive modulo 2 (listed in Schneier)
- *          x^15 + x + 1
- * lfsr25:  polynomial of degree 25, not know if primitive modulo 2
- *          x^13 + x^5 + x^4 + x^1 + 1
- *
- * Output bits are discarded, instead the feedback bits are added to produce
- * the cipher stream.  Depending on the mode, feedback bytes may be inverted
- * bit-wise before addition.
- *
- * The lfsrs are seeded with bytes from the raw key:
- *
- * lfsr17:  byte 0[0:7] at bit 9
- *          byte 1[0:7] at bit 0
- *
- * lfsr25:  byte 2[0:4] at bit 16
- *          byte 2[5:7] at bit 22
- *          byte 3[0:7] at bit 8
- *          byte 4[0:7] at bit 0
- *
- * To prevent 0 cycles, 1's are inject at bit 8 in lfrs17 and bit 21 in
- * lfsr25.
- *
- */
-
-int
-acss(ACSS_KEY *key, unsigned long len, const unsigned char *in,
-    unsigned char *out)
-{
-	unsigned long i;
-	unsigned long lfsr17tmp, lfsr25tmp, lfsrsumtmp;
-
-	lfsrsumtmp = lfsr17tmp = lfsr25tmp = 0;
-
-	/* keystream is sum of lfsrs */
-	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
-		lfsr17tmp = key->lfsr17 ^ (key->lfsr17 >> 14);
-		key->lfsr17 = (key->lfsr17 >> 8)
-			^ (lfsr17tmp << 9)
-			^ (lfsr17tmp << 12)
-			^ (lfsr17tmp << 15);
-		key->lfsr17 &= 0x1ffff;	/* 17 bit LFSR */
-
-		lfsr25tmp = key->lfsr25
-			^ (key->lfsr25 >> 3)
-			^ (key->lfsr25 >> 4)
-			^ (key->lfsr25 >> 12);
-		key->lfsr25 = (key->lfsr25 >> 8) ^ (lfsr25tmp << 17);
-		key->lfsr25 &= 0x1ffffff;	/* 25 bit LFSR */
-
-		lfsrsumtmp = key->lfsrsum;
-
-		/* addition */
-		switch (key->mode) {
-		case ACSS_AUTHENTICATE:
-		case ACSS_DATA:
-			key->lfsrsum = 0xff & ~(key->lfsr17 >> 9);
-			key->lfsrsum += key->lfsr25 >> 17;
-			break;
-		case ACSS_SESSIONKEY:
-			key->lfsrsum = key->lfsr17 >> 9;
-			key->lfsrsum += key->lfsr25 >> 17;
-			break;
-		case ACSS_TITLEKEY:
-			key->lfsrsum = key->lfsr17 >> 9;
-			key->lfsrsum += 0xff & ~(key->lfsr25 >> 17);
-			break;
-		default:
-			return 1;
-		}
-		key->lfsrsum += (lfsrsumtmp >> 8);
-
-		if (key->encrypt) {
-			out[i] = sboxenc[(in[i] ^ key->lfsrsum) & 0xff];
-		} else {
-			out[i] = (sboxdec[in[i]] ^ key->lfsrsum) & 0xff;
-		}
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void
-acss_seed(ACSS_KEY *key)
-{
-	int i;
-
-	/* if available, mangle with subkey */
-	if (key->subkey_avilable) {
-		for (i = 0; i < ACSS_KEYSIZE; i++)
-			key->seed[i] = reverse[key->data[i] ^ key->subkey[i]];
-	} else {
-		for (i = 0; i < ACSS_KEYSIZE; i++)
-			key->seed[i] = reverse[key->data[i]];
-	}
-
-	/* seed lfsrs */
-	key->lfsr17 = key->seed[1]
-		| (key->seed[0] << 9)
-		| (1 << 8);	/* inject 1 at bit 9 */
-	key->lfsr25 = key->seed[4]
-		| (key->seed[3] << 8)
-		| ((key->seed[2] & 0x1f) << 16)
-		| ((key->seed[2] & 0xe0) << 17)
-			| (1 << 21);	/* inject 1 at bit 22 */
-
-	key->lfsrsum = 0;
-}
-
-void
-acss_setkey(ACSS_KEY *key, const unsigned char *data, int enc, int mode)
-{
-	memcpy(key->data, data, sizeof(key->data));
-	memset(key->subkey, 0, sizeof(key->subkey));
-
-	if (enc != -1)
-		key->encrypt = enc;
-	key->mode = mode;
-	key->subkey_avilable = 0;
-
-	acss_seed(key);
-}
-
-void
-acss_setsubkey(ACSS_KEY *key, const unsigned char *subkey)
-{
-	memcpy(key->subkey, subkey, sizeof(key->subkey));
-	key->subkey_avilable = 1;
-	acss_seed(key);
-}
-#endif
diff --git a/acss.h b/acss.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 91b489542..000000000
--- a/acss.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-/*	$Id: acss.h,v 1.2 2004/02/06 04:22:43 dtucker Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2004 The OpenBSD project
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#ifndef _ACSS_H_
-#define _ACSS_H_
-
-/* 40bit key */
-#define ACSS_KEYSIZE		5
-
-/* modes of acss */
-#define ACSS_AUTHENTICATE	0
-#define ACSS_SESSIONKEY		1
-#define ACSS_TITLEKEY		2
-#define ACSS_DATA		3
-
-typedef struct acss_key_st {
-	unsigned int	lfsr17;		/* current state of lfsrs */
-	unsigned int	lfsr25;
-	unsigned int	lfsrsum;
-	unsigned char	seed[ACSS_KEYSIZE];
-	unsigned char	data[ACSS_KEYSIZE];
-	unsigned char	subkey[ACSS_KEYSIZE];
-	int		encrypt;	/* XXX make these bit flags? */
-	int		mode;
-	int		seeded;
-	int		subkey_avilable;
-} ACSS_KEY;
-
-void acss_setkey(ACSS_KEY *, const unsigned char *, int, int);
-void acss_setsubkey(ACSS_KEY *, const unsigned char *);
-int acss(ACSS_KEY *, unsigned long, const unsigned char *, unsigned char *);
-
-#endif /* ifndef _ACSS_H_ */
diff --git a/cipher-acss.c b/cipher-acss.c
deleted file mode 100644
index e755f92b9..000000000
--- a/cipher-acss.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2004 The OpenBSD project
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
-#include <string.h>
-
-#if !defined(EVP_CTRL_SET_ACSS_MODE) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
-
-#include "acss.h"
-#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-
-#define data(ctx) ((EVP_ACSS_KEY *)(ctx)->cipher_data)
-
-typedef struct {
-	ACSS_KEY ks;
-} EVP_ACSS_KEY;
-
-#define EVP_CTRL_SET_ACSS_MODE          0xff06
-#define EVP_CTRL_SET_ACSS_SUBKEY        0xff07
-
-static int
-acss_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
-    const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
-{
-	acss_setkey(&data(ctx)->ks,key,enc,ACSS_DATA);
-	return 1;
-}
-
-static int
-acss_ciph(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
-    LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE inl)
-{
-	acss(&data(ctx)->ks,inl,in,out);
-	return 1;
-}
-
-static int
-acss_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
-{
-	switch(type) {
-	case EVP_CTRL_SET_ACSS_MODE:
-		data(ctx)->ks.mode = arg;
-		return 1;
-	case EVP_CTRL_SET_ACSS_SUBKEY:
-		acss_setsubkey(&data(ctx)->ks,(unsigned char *)ptr);
-		return 1;
-	default:
-		return -1;
-	}
-}
-
-const EVP_CIPHER *
-evp_acss(void)
-{
-	static EVP_CIPHER acss_cipher;
-
-	memset(&acss_cipher, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
-
-	acss_cipher.nid = NID_undef;
-	acss_cipher.block_size = 1;
-	acss_cipher.key_len = 5;
-	acss_cipher.init = acss_init_key;
-	acss_cipher.do_cipher = acss_ciph;
-	acss_cipher.ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_ACSS_KEY);
-	acss_cipher.ctrl = acss_ctrl;
-
-	return (&acss_cipher);
-}
-#endif
-
diff --git a/cipher.c b/cipher.c
index 2d307e160..9ca1d0065 100644
--- a/cipher.c
+++ b/cipher.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.86 2013/01/12 11:22:04 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.87 2013/01/26 06:11:05 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -92,10 +92,6 @@ struct Cipher {
 			SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_gcm },
 	{ "aes256-gcm@openssh.com",
 			SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_gcm },
-#endif
-#ifdef USE_CIPHER_ACSS
-	{ "acss@openssh.org",
-			SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_acss },
 #endif
 	{ NULL,		SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
 };
@@ -478,7 +474,7 @@ cipher_get_keycontext(const CipherContext *cc, u_char *dat)
 	Cipher *c = cc->cipher;
 	int plen = 0;
 
-	if (c->evptype == EVP_rc4 || c->evptype == EVP_acss) {
+	if (c->evptype == EVP_rc4) {
 		plen = EVP_X_STATE_LEN(cc->evp);
 		if (dat == NULL)
 			return (plen);
@@ -493,7 +489,7 @@ cipher_set_keycontext(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dat)
 	Cipher *c = cc->cipher;
 	int plen;
 
-	if (c->evptype == EVP_rc4 || c->evptype == EVP_acss) {
+	if (c->evptype == EVP_rc4) {
 		plen = EVP_X_STATE_LEN(cc->evp);
 		memcpy(EVP_X_STATE(cc->evp), dat, plen);
 	}
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
index 6c4d68def..e7439b4e7 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: openssl-compat.h,v 1.23 2013/02/10 23:39:15 djm Exp $ */
+/* $Id: openssl-compat.h,v 1.24 2013/02/12 00:00:40 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
@@ -96,16 +96,6 @@ void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, size_t);
 #define EVP_X_STATE_LEN(evp)	(evp).cipher->ctx_size
 #endif
 
-#if !defined(EVP_CTRL_SET_ACSS_MODE)
-# if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
-#  define USE_CIPHER_ACSS 1
-extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_acss(void);
-#  define EVP_acss evp_acss
-# else
-#  define EVP_acss NULL
-# endif
-#endif
-
 /* OpenSSL 0.9.8e returns cipher key len not context key len */
 #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER == 0x0090805fL)
 # define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(c) ((c)->key_len)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 0cd2f8e5f8276e178d696f3495ca2a9a691dccf5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2013 11:01:39 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/27 10:06:12      [krl.c]     
 actually use the xrealloc() return value; spotted by xi.wang AT gmail.com

---
 ChangeLog | 3 +++
 krl.c     | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 25fb4b680..b028fef82 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@
      [Makefile.in acss.c acss.h cipher-acss.c cipher.c]
      [openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h]
      remove ACSS, now that it is gone from libcrypto too
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/27 10:06:12
+     [krl.c]
+     actually use the xrealloc() return value; spotted by xi.wang AT gmail.com
 
 20130211
  - (djm) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Repair build on old
diff --git a/krl.c b/krl.c
index e4e1788f4..5ed7bd7e5 100644
--- a/krl.c
+++ b/krl.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  */
 
-/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.8 2013/01/25 10:22:19 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.9 2013/01/27 10:06:12 djm Exp $ */
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
@@ -981,7 +981,7 @@ ssh_krl_from_blob(Buffer *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp,
 			}
 		}
 		/* Record keys used to sign the KRL */
-		xrealloc(ca_used, nca_used + 1, sizeof(*ca_used));
+		ca_used = xrealloc(ca_used, nca_used + 1, sizeof(*ca_used));
 		ca_used[nca_used++] = key;
 		key = NULL;
 		break;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 1f583df8c3a7a3731a18b17e14c9ec09f31905ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2013 11:02:08 +1100
Subject:    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/06 00:20:42      [servconf.c
 sshd_config sshd_config.5]      Change default of MaxStartups to 10:30:100 to
 start doing random early      drop at 10 connections up to 100 connections. 
 This will make it harder      to DoS as CPUs have come a long way since the
 original value was set      back in 2000.  Prompted by nion at debian org, ok
 markus@

---
 ChangeLog     | 6 ++++++
 servconf.c    | 8 ++++----
 sshd_config   | 4 ++--
 sshd_config.5 | 6 +++---
 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index b028fef82..2d5f1d96b 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -22,6 +22,12 @@
    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/27 10:06:12
      [krl.c]
      actually use the xrealloc() return value; spotted by xi.wang AT gmail.com
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/06 00:20:42
+     [servconf.c sshd_config sshd_config.5]
+     Change default of MaxStartups to 10:30:100 to start doing random early
+     drop at 10 connections up to 100 connections.  This will make it harder
+     to DoS as CPUs have come a long way since the original value was set
+     back in 2000.  Prompted by nion at debian org, ok markus@
 
 20130211
  - (djm) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Repair build on old
diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
index 21b371c84..b2a60fd6c 100644
--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.233 2012/12/02 20:46:11 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.234 2013/02/06 00:20:42 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
  *                    All rights reserved
@@ -256,11 +256,11 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 	if (options->gateway_ports == -1)
 		options->gateway_ports = 0;
 	if (options->max_startups == -1)
-		options->max_startups = 10;
+		options->max_startups = 100;
 	if (options->max_startups_rate == -1)
-		options->max_startups_rate = 100;		/* 100% */
+		options->max_startups_rate = 30;		/* 30% */
 	if (options->max_startups_begin == -1)
-		options->max_startups_begin = options->max_startups;
+		options->max_startups_begin = 10;
 	if (options->max_authtries == -1)
 		options->max_authtries = DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX;
 	if (options->max_sessions == -1)
diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
index 3d35bef02..9cd2fddce 100644
--- a/sshd_config
+++ b/sshd_config
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.88 2012/10/30 21:29:55 djm Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.89 2013/02/06 00:20:42 dtucker Exp $
 
 # This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file.  See
 # sshd_config(5) for more information.
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox		# Default for new installations.
 #ClientAliveCountMax 3
 #UseDNS yes
 #PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid
-#MaxStartups 10
+#MaxStartups 10:30:100
 #PermitTunnel no
 #ChrootDirectory none
 #VersionAddendum none
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index d2913c33f..cfa480697 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.155 2013/01/18 08:00:49 jmc Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: January 18 2013 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.156 2013/02/06 00:20:42 dtucker Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: February 6 2013 $
 .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -820,7 +820,7 @@ SSH daemon.
 Additional connections will be dropped until authentication succeeds or the
 .Cm LoginGraceTime
 expires for a connection.
-The default is 10.
+The default is 10:30:100.
 .Pp
 Alternatively, random early drop can be enabled by specifying
 the three colon separated values
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 18de9133c223cf820688659903de6d1ffc9873b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2013 11:02:27 +1100
Subject:    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/06 00:22:21      [auth.c]     
 Fix comment, from jfree.e1 at gmail

---
 ChangeLog | 3 +++
 auth.c    | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 2d5f1d96b..c1d428709 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@
      drop at 10 connections up to 100 connections.  This will make it harder
      to DoS as CPUs have come a long way since the original value was set
      back in 2000.  Prompted by nion at debian org, ok markus@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/06 00:22:21
+     [auth.c]
+     Fix comment, from jfree.e1 at gmail
 
 20130211
  - (djm) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Repair build on old
diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index d978f0271..054c7282f 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.100 2013/01/17 23:00:01 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.101 2013/02/06 00:22:21 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -421,7 +421,7 @@ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
  *
  * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
  *
- * Takes an the file name, its stat information (preferably from fstat() to
+ * Takes a file name, its stat information (preferably from fstat() to
  * avoid races), the uid of the expected owner, their home directory and an
  * error buffer plus max size as arguments.
  *
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From d6d9fa0281e4856c40d5f03ebe4a5cb6a98337e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2013 11:02:46 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/08 00:41:12      [sftp.c]      fix
 NULL deref when built without libedit and control characters      entered as
 command; debugging and patch from Iain Morgan an      Loganaden Velvindron in
 bz#1956

---
 ChangeLog | 5 +++++
 sftp.c    | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index c1d428709..4084052d4 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -31,6 +31,11 @@
    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/06 00:22:21
      [auth.c]
      Fix comment, from jfree.e1 at gmail
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/08 00:41:12
+     [sftp.c]
+     fix NULL deref when built without libedit and control characters
+     entered as command; debugging and patch from Iain Morgan an
+     Loganaden Velvindron in bz#1956
 
 20130211
  - (djm) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Repair build on old
diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
index 6516d1f1c..9a53b12b7 100644
--- a/sftp.c
+++ b/sftp.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.141 2012/10/05 12:34:39 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.142 2013/02/08 00:41:12 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
  *
@@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@ parse_args(const char **cpp, int *pflag, int *rflag, int *lflag, int *iflag,
 
 	/* Figure out which command we have */
 	for (i = 0; cmds[i].c != NULL; i++) {
-		if (strcasecmp(cmds[i].c, argv[0]) == 0)
+		if (argv[0] != NULL && strcasecmp(cmds[i].c, argv[0]) == 0)
 			break;
 	}
 	cmdnum = cmds[i].n;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From fd05154dc45f6079618c6b0ce92cd6e9b55fc87f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2013 11:03:10 +1100
Subject:    - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/10 21:19:34      [version.h]     
 openssh 6.2

---
 ChangeLog | 3 +++
 version.h | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 4084052d4..07384320a 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@
      fix NULL deref when built without libedit and control characters
      entered as command; debugging and patch from Iain Morgan an
      Loganaden Velvindron in bz#1956
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/10 21:19:34
+     [version.h]
+     openssh 6.2
 
 20130211
  - (djm) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Repair build on old
diff --git a/version.h b/version.h
index 76adaaff2..784f707a6 100644
--- a/version.h
+++ b/version.h
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.65 2012/07/22 18:19:21 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.66 2013/02/10 21:19:34 markus Exp $ */
 
-#define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH_6.1"
+#define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH_6.2"
 
 #define SSH_PORTABLE	"p1"
 #define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 78d22713c79da46b80eceec02411563be3c65e71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2013 11:03:36 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/10 23:32:10      [ssh-keygen.c]     
 append to moduli file when screening candidates rather than overwriting.     
 allows resumption of interrupted screen; patch from Christophe Garault     
 in bz#1957; ok dtucker@

---
 ChangeLog    | 5 +++++
 ssh-keygen.c | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 07384320a..1b803f7dc 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -39,6 +39,11 @@
    - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/10 21:19:34
      [version.h]
      openssh 6.2
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/10 23:32:10
+     [ssh-keygen.c]
+     append to moduli file when screening candidates rather than overwriting.
+     allows resumption of interrupted screen; patch from Christophe Garault
+     in bz#1957; ok dtucker@
 
 20130211
  - (djm) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Repair build on old
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
index 21c7f25ea..d1a205e18 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.224 2013/01/18 07:59:46 jmc Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.225 2013/02/10 23:32:10 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -2508,7 +2508,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 
 	if (do_screen_candidates) {
 		FILE *in;
-		FILE *out = fopen(out_file, "w");
+		FILE *out = fopen(out_file, "a");
 
 		if (have_identity && strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0) {
 			if ((in = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) {
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 894926ebd8cc3d6651ad1a3a1269a60ef127cd44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2013 11:03:58 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/10 23:35:24      [packet.c]     
 record "Received disconnect" messages at ERROR rather than INFO priority,    
  since they are abnormal and result in a non-zero ssh exit status; patch     
 from Iain Morgan in bz#2057; ok dtucker@

---
 ChangeLog | 5 +++++
 packet.c  | 6 +++---
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 1b803f7dc..6e1a85bcc 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -44,6 +44,11 @@
      append to moduli file when screening candidates rather than overwriting.
      allows resumption of interrupted screen; patch from Christophe Garault
      in bz#1957; ok dtucker@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/10 23:35:24
+     [packet.c]
+     record "Received disconnect" messages at ERROR rather than INFO priority,
+     since they are abnormal and result in a non-zero ssh exit status; patch
+     from Iain Morgan in bz#2057; ok dtucker@
 
 20130211
  - (djm) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Repair build on old
diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
index ae7b04cd8..9326ddea6 100644
--- a/packet.c
+++ b/packet.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.180 2013/01/08 18:49:04 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.181 2013/02/10 23:35:24 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -1460,7 +1460,7 @@ packet_read_poll_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 			case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT:
 				reason = packet_get_int();
 				msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
-				logit("Received disconnect from %s: %u: %.400s",
+				error("Received disconnect from %s: %u: %.400s",
 				    get_remote_ipaddr(), reason, msg);
 				xfree(msg);
 				cleanup_exit(255);
@@ -1485,7 +1485,7 @@ packet_read_poll_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 				break;
 			case SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT:
 				msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
-				logit("Received disconnect from %s: %.400s",
+				error("Received disconnect from %s: %.400s",
 				    get_remote_ipaddr(), msg);
 				cleanup_exit(255);
 				break;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 22e8a1e1695f1c8179cea61ac63b2fdd4b11f2d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2013 11:04:48 +1100
Subject:    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/11 21:21:58      [sshd.c]     
 Add openssl version to debug output similar to the client.  ok markus@

---
 ChangeLog | 3 +++
 sshd.c    | 5 +++--
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 6e1a85bcc..01ba1fe33 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@
      record "Received disconnect" messages at ERROR rather than INFO priority,
      since they are abnormal and result in a non-zero ssh exit status; patch
      from Iain Morgan in bz#2057; ok dtucker@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/11 21:21:58
+     [sshd.c]
+     Add openssl version to debug output similar to the client.  ok markus@
 
 20130211
  - (djm) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Repair build on old
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index af7ff91ba..3e9d17640 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.396 2012/11/04 11:09:15 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.397 2013/02/11 21:21:58 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -1596,7 +1596,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		exit(1);
 	}
 
-	debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_RELEASE);
+	debug("sshd version %s, %s", SSH_VERSION,
+	    SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
 
 	/* Store privilege separation user for later use if required. */
 	if ((privsep_pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL) {
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 58e2c5b3947122f82ecc0158180ba260e6e59166 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2013 11:16:57 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/11 23:58:51      [try-ciphers.sh]   
   remove acss here too

---
 ChangeLog              |  3 +++
 regress/try-ciphers.sh | 12 +-----------
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 01ba1fe33..e744747e3 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -52,6 +52,9 @@
    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/11 21:21:58
      [sshd.c]
      Add openssl version to debug output similar to the client.  ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/11 23:58:51
+     [regress/try-ciphers.sh]
+     remove acss here too
 
 20130211
  - (djm) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Repair build on old
diff --git a/regress/try-ciphers.sh b/regress/try-ciphers.sh
index ef91085c5..054a1f14e 100644
--- a/regress/try-ciphers.sh
+++ b/regress/try-ciphers.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: try-ciphers.sh,v 1.18 2013/01/12 11:23:53 djm Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: try-ciphers.sh,v 1.19 2013/02/11 23:58:51 djm Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="try ciphers"
@@ -51,15 +51,5 @@ then
 	:
 else
 
-echo "Ciphers acss@openssh.org" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-c=acss@openssh.org
-for m in $macs; do
-	trace "proto 2 $c mac $m"
-	verbose "test $tid: proto 2 cipher $c mac $m"
-	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -2 -m $m -c $c somehost true
-	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
-		fail "ssh -2 failed with mac $m cipher $c"
-	fi
-done
 
 fi
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 2f20de5e3f1c60eee3c9bda52289aff5c037dd08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2013 11:31:38 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) [regress/try-ciphers.sh] clean up CVS merge botch

---
 ChangeLog              | 1 +
 regress/try-ciphers.sh | 7 -------
 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index e744747e3..567bdf290 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/11 23:58:51
      [regress/try-ciphers.sh]
      remove acss here too
+ - (djm) [regress/try-ciphers.sh] clean up CVS merge botch
 
 20130211
  - (djm) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Repair build on old
diff --git a/regress/try-ciphers.sh b/regress/try-ciphers.sh
index 054a1f14e..87ec7497a 100644
--- a/regress/try-ciphers.sh
+++ b/regress/try-ciphers.sh
@@ -46,10 +46,3 @@ for c in $ciphers; do
 	fi
 done
 
-if ${SSH} -oCiphers=acss@openssh.org 2>&1 | grep "Bad SSH2 cipher" >/dev/null
-then
-	:
-else
-
-
-fi
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 2653f5c0a67c403ff14403b9aac94e6a53f6bbf9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2013 10:14:51 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) [regress/krl.sh] Don't use ecdsa keys in environment that
 lack ECC.

---
 ChangeLog      |  3 +++
 regress/krl.sh | 10 ++++++++--
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 567bdf290..f39894df5 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
+20130214
+ - (djm) [regress/krl.sh] Don't use ecdsa keys in environment that lack ECC.
+
 20130212
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/24 21:45:37
diff --git a/regress/krl.sh b/regress/krl.sh
index 46a2ad3f9..1e767f335 100644
--- a/regress/krl.sh
+++ b/regress/krl.sh
@@ -3,13 +3,19 @@
 
 tid="key revocation lists"
 
+# If we don't support ecdsa keys then this tell will be much slower.
+ECDSA=ecdsa
+if test "x$TEST_SSH_ECC" != "xyes"; then
+	$ECDSA=rsa
+fi
+
 # Do most testing with ssh-keygen; it uses the same verification code as sshd.
 
 # Old keys will interfere with ssh-keygen.
 rm -f $OBJ/revoked-* $OBJ/krl-*
 
 # Generate a CA key
-$SSHKEYGEN -t ecdsa -f $OBJ/revoked-ca  -C "" -N "" > /dev/null ||
+$SSHKEYGEN -t $ECDSA -f $OBJ/revoked-ca  -C "" -N "" > /dev/null ||
 	fatal "$SSHKEYGEN CA failed"
 
 # A specification that revokes some certificates by serial numbers
@@ -48,7 +54,7 @@ keygen() {
 	N=$1
 	f=$OBJ/revoked-`printf "%04d" $N`
 	# Vary the keytype. We use mostly ECDSA since this is fastest by far.
-	keytype=ecdsa
+	keytype=$ECDSA
 	case $N in
 	2 | 10 | 510 | 1001)	keytype=rsa;;
 	4 | 30 | 520 | 1002)	keytype=dsa;;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 6d77d6ea2b96c2e7df0ab036ab4116ac548deb1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2013 10:31:03 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) [regress/krl.sh] typo; found by Iain Morgan

---
 ChangeLog      | 1 +
 regress/krl.sh | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index f39894df5..b77f88b02 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 20130214
  - (djm) [regress/krl.sh] Don't use ecdsa keys in environment that lack ECC.
+ - (djm) [regress/krl.sh] typo; found by Iain Morgan
 
 20130212
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/regress/krl.sh b/regress/krl.sh
index 1e767f335..09d26ab5c 100644
--- a/regress/krl.sh
+++ b/regress/krl.sh
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ tid="key revocation lists"
 # If we don't support ecdsa keys then this tell will be much slower.
 ECDSA=ecdsa
 if test "x$TEST_SSH_ECC" != "xyes"; then
-	$ECDSA=rsa
+	ECDSA=rsa
 fi
 
 # Do most testing with ssh-keygen; it uses the same verification code as sshd.
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 57f92185288e0101fe9c3f3dfa29ea1619da8354 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2013 10:32:33 +1100
Subject: - (djm) [regress/integrity.sh] Start fuzzing from offset 2500
 (instead   of 2300) to avoid clobbering the end of (non-MAC'd) KEX. Verified
 by   Iain Morgan

---
 ChangeLog            | 3 +++
 regress/integrity.sh | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index b77f88b02..c6162496e 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
 20130214
  - (djm) [regress/krl.sh] Don't use ecdsa keys in environment that lack ECC.
  - (djm) [regress/krl.sh] typo; found by Iain Morgan
+ - (djm) [regress/integrity.sh] Start fuzzing from offset 2500 (instead
+   of 2300) to avoid clobbering the end of (non-MAC'd) KEX. Verified by
+   Iain Morgan
 
 20130212
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/regress/integrity.sh b/regress/integrity.sh
index 91168fd2e..bcace97e6 100644
--- a/regress/integrity.sh
+++ b/regress/integrity.sh
@@ -3,11 +3,11 @@
 
 tid="integrity"
 
-# start at byte 2300 (i.e. after kex) and corrupt at different offsets
+# start at byte 2500 (i.e. after kex) and corrupt at different offsets
 # XXX the test hangs if we modify the low bytes of the packet length
 # XXX and ssh tries to read...
 tries=10
-startoffset=2300
+startoffset=2500
 macs="hmac-sha1 hmac-md5 umac-64@openssh.com umac-128@openssh.com
 	hmac-sha1-96 hmac-md5-96 hmac-sha2-256 hmac-sha2-512
 	hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 91edc1ce2b4a7038432efbcbbfc0b1cb2fb85d0d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Fri, 15 Feb 2013 10:23:44 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) [contrib/suse/rc.sshd] Use SSHD_BIN consistently; bz#2056
 from    Iain Morgan

---
 ChangeLog            | 4 ++++
 contrib/suse/rc.sshd | 8 ++++----
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index c6162496e..997982e61 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+20130215
+ - (djm) [contrib/suse/rc.sshd] Use SSHD_BIN consistently; bz#2056 from
+   Iain Morgan
+
 20130214
  - (djm) [regress/krl.sh] Don't use ecdsa keys in environment that lack ECC.
  - (djm) [regress/krl.sh] typo; found by Iain Morgan
diff --git a/contrib/suse/rc.sshd b/contrib/suse/rc.sshd
index 4a3bc41db..28f28e41d 100644
--- a/contrib/suse/rc.sshd
+++ b/contrib/suse/rc.sshd
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ case "$1" in
 	## Start daemon with startproc(8). If this fails
 	## the echo return value is set appropriate.
 
-	startproc -f -p $SSHD_PIDFILE /usr/sbin/sshd $SSHD_OPTS -o "PidFile=$SSHD_PIDFILE" 
+	startproc -f -p $SSHD_PIDFILE $SSHD_BIN $SSHD_OPTS -o "PidFile=$SSHD_PIDFILE" 
 
 	# Remember status and be verbose
 	rc_status -v
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ case "$1" in
 	## Stop daemon with killproc(8) and if this fails
 	## set echo the echo return value.
 
-	killproc -p $SSHD_PIDFILE -TERM /usr/sbin/sshd
+	killproc -p $SSHD_PIDFILE -TERM $SSHD_BIN
 
 	# Remember status and be verbose
 	rc_status -v
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ case "$1" in
 
 	echo -n "Reload service sshd"
 
-	killproc -p $SSHD_PIDFILE -HUP /usr/sbin/sshd
+	killproc -p $SSHD_PIDFILE -HUP $SSHD_BIN
 
         rc_status -v
 
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ case "$1" in
         # 2 - service dead, but /var/lock/ lock file exists
         # 3 - service not running
 
-	checkproc -p $SSHD_PIDFILE /usr/sbin/sshd
+	checkproc -p $SSHD_PIDFILE $SSHD_BIN
 
 	rc_status -v
 	;;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 4018dc04daa613d0e20df10947b85f154dc5765d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Fri, 15 Feb 2013 10:28:55 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/14 21:35:59      [auth2-pubkey.c]   
   Correct error message that had a typo and was logging the wrong thing;     
 patch from Petr Lautrbach

---
 ChangeLog      | 5 +++++
 auth2-pubkey.c | 6 +++---
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 997982e61..2a2584661 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,6 +1,11 @@
 20130215
  - (djm) [contrib/suse/rc.sshd] Use SSHD_BIN consistently; bz#2056 from
    Iain Morgan
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/14 21:35:59
+     [auth2-pubkey.c]
+     Correct error message that had a typo and was logging the wrong thing;
+     patch from Petr Lautrbach
 
 20130214
  - (djm) [regress/krl.sh] Don't use ecdsa keys in environment that lack ECC.
diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
index 70d8996ea..3ff6faa8b 100644
--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.33 2012/11/14 02:24:27 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.34 2013/02/14 21:35:59 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -479,8 +479,8 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
 	    "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
 	pw = getpwnam(username);
 	if (pw == NULL) {
-		error("AuthorizedKeyCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
-		    options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
+		error("AuthorizedKeysCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
+		    username, strerror(errno));
 		free(username);
 		return 0;
 	}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 3c4a24c3e329ccca86629ed694b9756309b00113 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 15 Feb 2013 11:41:35 +1100
Subject:  - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
 openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h]    Use getpgrp() if we don't have getpgid() (old
 BSDs, maybe others).

---
 ChangeLog                 |  2 ++
 configure.ac              |  6 ++++--
 openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c | 13 +++++++++++++
 openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h |  6 +++++-
 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 2a2584661..b4abe75fc 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 20130215
  - (djm) [contrib/suse/rc.sshd] Use SSHD_BIN consistently; bz#2056 from
    Iain Morgan
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h]
+   Use getpgrp() if we don't have getpgid() (old BSDs, maybe others).
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/14 21:35:59
      [auth2-pubkey.c]
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index e96e81e64..def34fa0b 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.503 2013/02/10 23:39:13 djm Exp $
+# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.504 2013/02/15 00:41:35 dtucker Exp $
 #
 # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
 #
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 
 AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org])
-AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.503 $)
+AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.504 $)
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
 AC_LANG([C])
 
@@ -1550,6 +1550,8 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
 	getopt \
 	getpeereid \
 	getpeerucred \
+	getpgid \
+	getpgrp \
 	_getpty \
 	getrlimit \
 	getttyent \
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
index 3ef373f56..0cff2e423 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
@@ -247,3 +247,16 @@ int isblank(int c)
 	return (c == ' ' || c == '\t');
 }
 #endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETPGID
+pid_t
+getpgid(pid_t pid)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_GETPGRP
+	if (pid == 0)
+		return getpgrp();
+#endif
+	errno = ESRCH;
+	return -1;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h b/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h
index eac5217ca..de8367386 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: bsd-misc.h,v 1.21 2012/07/03 22:50:10 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: bsd-misc.h,v 1.22 2013/02/15 00:41:36 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
@@ -102,4 +102,8 @@ mysig_t mysignal(int sig, mysig_t act);
 int	isblank(int);
 #endif
 
+#ifndef HAVE_GETPGID
+pid_t getpgid(pid_t);
+#endif
+
 #endif /* _BSD_MISC_H */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 8e6fb780e54f484e3dca4f1bf0abcd9bf13f092f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 15 Feb 2013 12:13:01 +1100
Subject:  - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
 openbsd-compat/strtoull.c    openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Add strtoull to
 compat library for    platforms that don't have it.

---
 ChangeLog                       |   3 ++
 configure.ac                    |   5 +-
 openbsd-compat/Makefile.in      |   4 +-
 openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h |   6 ++-
 openbsd-compat/strtoull.c       | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 123 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 openbsd-compat/strtoull.c

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index b4abe75fc..0a5c5059d 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@
    Iain Morgan
  - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h]
    Use getpgrp() if we don't have getpgid() (old BSDs, maybe others).
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/Makefile.in openbsd-compat/strtoull.c
+   openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Add strtoull to compat library for
+   platforms that don't have it.
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/14 21:35:59
      [auth2-pubkey.c]
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index def34fa0b..d62323d97 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.504 2013/02/15 00:41:35 dtucker Exp $
+# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.505 2013/02/15 01:13:01 dtucker Exp $
 #
 # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
 #
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 
 AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org])
-AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.504 $)
+AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.505 $)
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
 AC_LANG([C])
 
@@ -1611,6 +1611,7 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
 	strtonum \
 	strtoll \
 	strtoul \
+	strtoull \
 	swap32 \
 	sysconf \
 	tcgetpgrp \
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
index 992b9743b..e1c3651e8 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+++ b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.49 2012/11/05 06:04:37 dtucker Exp $
+# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.50 2013/02/15 01:13:02 dtucker Exp $
 
 sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@
 piddir=@piddir@
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ RANLIB=@RANLIB@
 INSTALL=@INSTALL@
 LDFLAGS=-L. @LDFLAGS@
 
-OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bindresvport.o daemon.o dirname.o fmt_scaled.o getcwd.o getgrouplist.o getopt.o getrrsetbyname.o glob.o inet_aton.o inet_ntoa.o inet_ntop.o mktemp.o pwcache.o readpassphrase.o realpath.o rresvport.o setenv.o setproctitle.o sha2.o sigact.o strlcat.o strlcpy.o strmode.o strnlen.o strptime.o strsep.o strtonum.o strtoll.o strtoul.o timingsafe_bcmp.o vis.o
+OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bindresvport.o daemon.o dirname.o fmt_scaled.o getcwd.o getgrouplist.o getopt.o getrrsetbyname.o glob.o inet_aton.o inet_ntoa.o inet_ntop.o mktemp.o pwcache.o readpassphrase.o realpath.o rresvport.o setenv.o setproctitle.o sha2.o sigact.o strlcat.o strlcpy.o strmode.o strnlen.o strptime.o strsep.o strtonum.o strtoll.o strtoul.o strtoull.o timingsafe_bcmp.o vis.o
 
 COMPAT=bsd-arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o
 
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h b/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
index 664cb0445..99cebef71 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: openbsd-compat.h,v 1.53 2012/11/05 06:04:38 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: openbsd-compat.h,v 1.54 2013/02/15 01:13:02 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -218,6 +218,10 @@ char *group_from_gid(gid_t, int);
 int timingsafe_bcmp(const void *, const void *, size_t);
 #endif
 
+#ifndef HAVE_STRTOULL
+unsigned long long strtoull(const char *, char **, int);
+#endif
+
 void *xmmap(size_t size);
 char *xcrypt(const char *password, const char *salt);
 char *shadow_pw(struct passwd *pw);
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/strtoull.c b/openbsd-compat/strtoull.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f7c818c52
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/strtoull.c
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: strtoull.c,v 1.5 2005/08/08 08:05:37 espie Exp $ */
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1992 The Regents of the University of California.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/strtoull.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_STRTOULL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+/*
+ * Convert a string to an unsigned long long.
+ *
+ * Ignores `locale' stuff.  Assumes that the upper and lower case
+ * alphabets and digits are each contiguous.
+ */
+unsigned long long
+strtoull(const char *nptr, char **endptr, int base)
+{
+	const char *s;
+	unsigned long long acc, cutoff;
+	int c;
+	int neg, any, cutlim;
+
+	/*
+	 * See strtoq for comments as to the logic used.
+	 */
+	s = nptr;
+	do {
+		c = (unsigned char) *s++;
+	} while (isspace(c));
+	if (c == '-') {
+		neg = 1;
+		c = *s++;
+	} else { 
+		neg = 0;
+		if (c == '+')
+			c = *s++;
+	}
+	if ((base == 0 || base == 16) &&
+	    c == '0' && (*s == 'x' || *s == 'X')) {
+		c = s[1];
+		s += 2;
+		base = 16;
+	}
+	if (base == 0)
+		base = c == '0' ? 8 : 10;
+
+	cutoff = ULLONG_MAX / (unsigned long long)base;
+	cutlim = ULLONG_MAX % (unsigned long long)base;
+	for (acc = 0, any = 0;; c = (unsigned char) *s++) {
+		if (isdigit(c))
+			c -= '0';
+		else if (isalpha(c))
+			c -= isupper(c) ? 'A' - 10 : 'a' - 10;
+		else
+			break;
+		if (c >= base)
+			break;
+		if (any < 0)
+			continue;
+		if (acc > cutoff || (acc == cutoff && c > cutlim)) {
+			any = -1;
+			acc = ULLONG_MAX;
+			errno = ERANGE;
+		} else {
+			any = 1;
+			acc *= (unsigned long long)base;
+			acc += c;
+		}
+	}
+	if (neg && any > 0)
+		acc = -acc;
+	if (endptr != 0)
+		*endptr = (char *) (any ? s - 1 : nptr);
+	return (acc);
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRTOULL */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 5ceddc31cd654303086c81e0b17b73c4c6af5a5c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Fri, 15 Feb 2013 12:18:32 +1100
Subject:    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/15 00:21:01      [sshconnect2.c]
      Warn more loudly if an IdentityFile provided by the user cannot be read.
      bz #1981, ok djm@

---
 ChangeLog     |  4 ++++
 sshconnect2.c | 19 ++++++++++++-------
 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 0a5c5059d..8edb2d888 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@
      [auth2-pubkey.c]
      Correct error message that had a typo and was logging the wrong thing;
      patch from Petr Lautrbach
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/15 00:21:01
+     [sshconnect2.c]
+     Warn more loudly if an IdentityFile provided by the user cannot be read.
+     bz #1981, ok djm@
 
 20130214
  - (djm) [regress/krl.sh] Don't use ecdsa keys in environment that lack ECC.
diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
index 6791ea344..a306447b3 100644
--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.190 2012/12/02 20:26:11 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.191 2013/02/15 00:21:01 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ struct identity {
 	char	*filename;		/* comment for agent-only keys */
 	int	tried;
 	int	isprivate;		/* key points to the private key */
+	int	userprovided;
 };
 TAILQ_HEAD(idlist, identity);
 
@@ -312,7 +313,7 @@ void	userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
 static int sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *, Identity *);
 static void pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *);
 static void pubkey_cleanup(Authctxt *);
-static Key *load_identity_file(char *);
+static Key *load_identity_file(char *, int);
 
 static Authmethod *authmethod_get(char *authlist);
 static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(const char *name);
@@ -1186,7 +1187,7 @@ identity_sign(Identity *id, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
 	if (id->isprivate || (id->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT))
 		return (key_sign(id->key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen));
 	/* load the private key from the file */
-	if ((prv = load_identity_file(id->filename)) == NULL)
+	if ((prv = load_identity_file(id->filename, id->userprovided)) == NULL)
 		return (-1);
 	ret = key_sign(prv, sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
 	key_free(prv);
@@ -1311,7 +1312,7 @@ send_pubkey_test(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
 }
 
 static Key *
-load_identity_file(char *filename)
+load_identity_file(char *filename, int userprovided)
 {
 	Key *private;
 	char prompt[300], *passphrase;
@@ -1319,7 +1320,8 @@ load_identity_file(char *filename)
 	struct stat st;
 
 	if (stat(filename, &st) < 0) {
-		debug3("no such identity: %s", filename);
+		(userprovided ? logit : debug3)("no such identity: %s: %s",
+		    filename, strerror(errno));
 		return NULL;
 	}
 	private = key_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, filename, "", NULL, &perm_ok);
@@ -1382,6 +1384,7 @@ pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
 		id->key = key;
 		id->filename = xstrdup(options.identity_files[i]);
+		id->userprovided = 1;
 		TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&files, id, next);
 	}
 	/* Prefer PKCS11 keys that are explicitly listed */
@@ -1446,7 +1449,8 @@ pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
 	}
 	TAILQ_FOREACH(id, preferred, next) {
-		debug2("key: %s (%p)", id->filename, id->key);
+		debug2("key: %s (%p),%s", id->filename, id->key,
+		    id->userprovided ? " explicit" : "");
 	}
 }
 
@@ -1491,7 +1495,8 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
 			sent = send_pubkey_test(authctxt, id);
 		} else if (id->key == NULL) {
 			debug("Trying private key: %s", id->filename);
-			id->key = load_identity_file(id->filename);
+			id->key = load_identity_file(id->filename,
+			    id->userprovided);
 			if (id->key != NULL) {
 				id->isprivate = 1;
 				sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(authctxt, id);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From f32db83f41cc0c1355ae28fd9df464ea56562d2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 15 Feb 2013 12:20:41 +1100
Subject:  - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Add prototype for
 strtoul,    group strto* function prototypes together.

---
 ChangeLog                       |  2 ++
 openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h | 14 +++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 8edb2d888..88e4fe267 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
  - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/Makefile.in openbsd-compat/strtoull.c
    openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Add strtoull to compat library for
    platforms that don't have it.
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Add prototype for strtoul,
+   group strto* function prototypes together.
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/14 21:35:59
      [auth2-pubkey.c]
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h b/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
index 99cebef71..a8c579f49 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: openbsd-compat.h,v 1.54 2013/02/15 01:13:02 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: openbsd-compat.h,v 1.55 2013/02/15 01:20:42 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -190,6 +190,14 @@ int snprintf(char *, size_t, SNPRINTF_CONST char *, ...);
 long long strtoll(const char *, char **, int);
 #endif
 
+#ifndef HAVE_STRTOUL
+unsigned long strtoul(const char *, char **, int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRTOULL
+unsigned long long strtoull(const char *, char **, int);
+#endif
+
 #ifndef HAVE_STRTONUM
 long long strtonum(const char *, long long, long long, const char **);
 #endif
@@ -218,10 +226,6 @@ char *group_from_gid(gid_t, int);
 int timingsafe_bcmp(const void *, const void *, size_t);
 #endif
 
-#ifndef HAVE_STRTOULL
-unsigned long long strtoull(const char *, char **, int);
-#endif
-
 void *xmmap(size_t size);
 char *xcrypt(const char *password, const char *salt);
 char *shadow_pw(struct passwd *pw);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 2991d288db4355a54f0860be184c31343cb2c139 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 15 Feb 2013 14:55:38 +1100
Subject:  - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c] Handle the case where
 setpgrp() takes    an argument.  Pointed out by djm.

---
 ChangeLog                 | 2 ++
 openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c | 5 ++++-
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 88e4fe267..8dd37b2c0 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@
    platforms that don't have it.
  - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Add prototype for strtoul,
    group strto* function prototypes together.
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c] Handle the case where setpgrp() takes
+   an argument.  Pointed out by djm.
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/14 21:35:59
      [auth2-pubkey.c]
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
index ad524b8b7..8dc7d02d1 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
@@ -253,10 +253,13 @@ isblank(int c)
 pid_t
 getpgid(pid_t pid)
 {
-#ifdef HAVE_GETPGRP
+#if defined(HAVE_GETPGRP) && !defined(GETPGRP_VOID)
+	return getpgrp(pid);
+#elif defined(HAVE_GETPGRP)
 	if (pid == 0)
 		return getpgrp();
 #endif
+
 	errno = ESRCH;
 	return -1;
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 5d7b9565bc2cc2b0734a6e8b0b7ab781745d35f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Sat, 16 Feb 2013 17:32:31 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/16 06:08:45      [integrity.sh]     
 make sure the fuzz offset is actually past the end of KEX for all KEX     
 types. diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 requires an offset around     
 2700. Noticed via test failures in portable OpenSSH on platforms that     
 lack ECC and this the more byte-frugal ECDH KEX algorithms.

---
 ChangeLog            | 9 +++++++++
 regress/integrity.sh | 6 +++---
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 8dd37b2c0..406a609a6 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,12 @@
+20130216
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/16 06:08:45
+     [integrity.sh]
+     make sure the fuzz offset is actually past the end of KEX for all KEX
+     types. diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 requires an offset around
+     2700. Noticed via test failures in portable OpenSSH on platforms that
+     lack ECC and this the more byte-frugal ECDH KEX algorithms.
+
 20130215
  - (djm) [contrib/suse/rc.sshd] Use SSHD_BIN consistently; bz#2056 from
    Iain Morgan
diff --git a/regress/integrity.sh b/regress/integrity.sh
index bcace97e6..d779aa930 100644
--- a/regress/integrity.sh
+++ b/regress/integrity.sh
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.2 2013/01/12 11:23:53 djm Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.3 2013/02/16 06:08:45 djm Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="integrity"
 
-# start at byte 2500 (i.e. after kex) and corrupt at different offsets
+# start at byte 2800 (i.e. after kex) and corrupt at different offsets
 # XXX the test hangs if we modify the low bytes of the packet length
 # XXX and ssh tries to read...
 tries=10
-startoffset=2500
+startoffset=2800
 macs="hmac-sha1 hmac-md5 umac-64@openssh.com umac-128@openssh.com
 	hmac-sha1-96 hmac-md5-96 hmac-sha2-256 hmac-sha2-512
 	hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 33d52566bc8e36091b74fbd532df1bc4d2368576 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Mon, 18 Feb 2013 10:18:05 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/17 23:16:55      [integrity.sh]     
 make the ssh command generates some output to ensure that there are at     
 least offset+tries bytes in the stream.

---
 ChangeLog            | 7 +++++++
 regress/integrity.sh | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 406a609a6..6f3a224a0 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
+20130217
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/17 23:16:55
+     [integrity.sh]
+     make the ssh command generates some output to ensure that there are at
+     least offset+tries bytes in the stream.
+
 20130216
  - OpenBSD CVS Sync
    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/16 06:08:45
diff --git a/regress/integrity.sh b/regress/integrity.sh
index d779aa930..4d104c145 100644
--- a/regress/integrity.sh
+++ b/regress/integrity.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.3 2013/02/16 06:08:45 djm Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.4 2013/02/17 23:16:55 djm Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="integrity"
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ for m in $macs; do
 			*)		macopt="-m $m";;
 		esac
 		output=$(${SSH} $macopt -2F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o "$pxy" \
-		    999.999.999.999 true 2>&1)
+		    999.999.999.999 'printf "%2048s" " "' 2>&1)
 		if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
 			fail "ssh -m $m succeeds with bit-flip at $off"
 		fi
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 0dc3bc908e702cc2db460446f11628654c9c602e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2013 09:28:32 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/18 22:26:47      [integrity.sh]     
 crank the offset yet again; it was still fuzzing KEX one of Darren's     
 portable test hosts at 2800

---
 ChangeLog            | 7 +++++++
 regress/integrity.sh | 6 +++---
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 6f3a224a0..afde4d9b2 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
+20130219
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/18 22:26:47
+     [integrity.sh]
+     crank the offset yet again; it was still fuzzing KEX one of Darren's
+     portable test hosts at 2800
+
 20130217
  - OpenBSD CVS Sync
    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/17 23:16:55
diff --git a/regress/integrity.sh b/regress/integrity.sh
index 4d104c145..261e9f9a9 100644
--- a/regress/integrity.sh
+++ b/regress/integrity.sh
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.4 2013/02/17 23:16:55 djm Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.5 2013/02/18 22:26:47 djm Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="integrity"
 
-# start at byte 2800 (i.e. after kex) and corrupt at different offsets
+# start at byte 2900 (i.e. after kex) and corrupt at different offsets
 # XXX the test hangs if we modify the low bytes of the packet length
 # XXX and ssh tries to read...
 tries=10
-startoffset=2800
+startoffset=2900
 macs="hmac-sha1 hmac-md5 umac-64@openssh.com umac-128@openssh.com
 	hmac-sha1-96 hmac-md5-96 hmac-sha2-256 hmac-sha2-512
 	hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From b3764e12024e70296d35877a3da2c4d575dafdb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2013 13:15:01 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/19 02:14:09      [integrity.sh]     
 oops, forgot to increase the output of the ssh command to ensure that      we
 actually reach $offset

---
 ChangeLog            |  4 ++++
 regress/Makefile     |  2 ++
 regress/integrity.sh |  4 ++--
 regress/modpipe.c    | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index afde4d9b2..bac8998c0 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@
      [integrity.sh]
      crank the offset yet again; it was still fuzzing KEX one of Darren's
      portable test hosts at 2800
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/19 02:14:09
+     [integrity.sh]
+     oops, forgot to increase the output of the ssh command to ensure that
+     we actually reach $offset
 
 20130217
  - OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/regress/Makefile b/regress/Makefile
index 18f9f124c..c3aec43fc 100644
--- a/regress/Makefile
+++ b/regress/Makefile
@@ -90,6 +90,8 @@ TEST_ENV=      "MALLOC_OPTIONS=AFGJPRX"
 
 TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN?=ssh-keygen
 
+CPPFLAGS=-I..
+
 t1:
 	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv
 	tr '\n' '\r' <${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv > ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_cr.prv
diff --git a/regress/integrity.sh b/regress/integrity.sh
index 261e9f9a9..0a0146e05 100644
--- a/regress/integrity.sh
+++ b/regress/integrity.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.5 2013/02/18 22:26:47 djm Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.6 2013/02/19 02:14:09 djm Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="integrity"
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ for m in $macs; do
 			*)		macopt="-m $m";;
 		esac
 		output=$(${SSH} $macopt -2F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o "$pxy" \
-		    999.999.999.999 'printf "%2048s" " "' 2>&1)
+		    999.999.999.999 'printf "%4096s" " "' 2>&1)
 		if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
 			fail "ssh -m $m succeeds with bit-flip at $off"
 		fi
diff --git a/regress/modpipe.c b/regress/modpipe.c
index 439be4c9d..b05915b63 100755
--- a/regress/modpipe.c
+++ b/regress/modpipe.c
@@ -14,16 +14,44 @@
  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  */
 
-/* $Id: modpipe.c,v 1.1 2012/12/11 23:54:40 djm Exp $ */
+/* $Id: modpipe.c,v 1.2 2013/02/19 02:15:08 djm Exp $ */
 
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
-#include <err.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 
+static void err(int, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+static void errx(int, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+
+static void
+err(int r, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", strerror(errno));
+	vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args);
+	fputc('\n', stderr);
+	va_end(args);
+	exit(r);
+}
+
+static void
+errx(int r, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args);
+	fputc('\n', stderr);
+	va_end(args);
+	exit(r);
+}
+
 static void
 usage(void)
 {
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From dae85cc3ad02a068b58f42fddc2ccc4f3a9b8311 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2013 14:27:44 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) [regress/integrity.sh] Skip SHA2-based MACs on
 configurations that    lack support for SHA2.

---
 ChangeLog            | 2 ++
 regress/integrity.sh | 8 +++++---
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index bac8998c0..09d5c1304 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@
      [integrity.sh]
      oops, forgot to increase the output of the ssh command to ensure that
      we actually reach $offset
+ - (djm) [regress/integrity.sh] Skip SHA2-based MACs on configurations that
+   lack support for SHA2.
 
 20130217
  - OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/regress/integrity.sh b/regress/integrity.sh
index 0a0146e05..2a93372fc 100644
--- a/regress/integrity.sh
+++ b/regress/integrity.sh
@@ -9,11 +9,13 @@ tid="integrity"
 tries=10
 startoffset=2900
 macs="hmac-sha1 hmac-md5 umac-64@openssh.com umac-128@openssh.com
-	hmac-sha1-96 hmac-md5-96 hmac-sha2-256 hmac-sha2-512
+	hmac-sha1-96 hmac-md5-96 
 	hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com
 	umac-64-etm@openssh.com umac-128-etm@openssh.com
-	hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com
-	hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
+	hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com"
+config_defined HAVE_EVP_SHA256 &&
+	macs="$macs hmac-sha2-256 hmac-sha2-512
+		hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
 # The following are not MACs, but ciphers with integrated integrity. They are
 # handled specially below.
 config_defined OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM && \
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From c08b3ef6f435b64c3b7125f93e5b3e661e019f3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2013 11:53:29 -0800
Subject:  - (tim) [regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/try-ciphers.sh] shell
 portability fix.

---
 ChangeLog               | 3 +++
 regress/cipher-speed.sh | 2 +-
 regress/try-ciphers.sh  | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 09d5c1304..41d49f6b5 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
+20130220
+ - (tim) [regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/try-ciphers.sh] shell portability fix.
+
 20130219
  - OpenBSD CVS Sync
    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/18 22:26:47
diff --git a/regress/cipher-speed.sh b/regress/cipher-speed.sh
index 114191b89..21bf0f2e9 100644
--- a/regress/cipher-speed.sh
+++ b/regress/cipher-speed.sh
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ for c in $ciphers; do n=0; for m in $macs; do
 	case $c in
 	aes*-gcm@openssh.com)	test $n -gt 0 && break;;
 	esac
-	n=$(($n + 1))
+	n=`expr $n + 1`
 done; done
 
 ciphers="3des blowfish"
diff --git a/regress/try-ciphers.sh b/regress/try-ciphers.sh
index 87ec7497a..084a1457a 100644
--- a/regress/try-ciphers.sh
+++ b/regress/try-ciphers.sh
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ for c in $ciphers; do
 		case $c in
 		aes*-gcm@openssh.com)	test $n -gt 0 && break;;
 		esac
-		n=$(($n + 1))
+		n=`expr $n + 1`
 	done
 done
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From c31db8cd6e301c8d4024cb9250e3178d13d1be44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2013 19:01:51 -0800
Subject:  - (tim) [krl.c Makefile.in regress/Makefile regress/modpipe.c]
 remove unneeded    err.h include from krl.c. Additional portability fixes for
 modpipe. OK djm

---
 ChangeLog         |  4 ++++
 Makefile.in       | 12 +++++++-----
 krl.c             |  1 -
 regress/Makefile  |  6 +-----
 regress/modpipe.c |  3 ++-
 5 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 41d49f6b5..cf50b4688 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 20130220
  - (tim) [regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/try-ciphers.sh] shell portability fix.
+ - (tim) [krl.c Makefile.in regress/Makefile regress/modpipe.c] remove unneeded
+   err.h include from krl.c. Additional portability fixes for modpipe. OK djm
 
 20130219
  - OpenBSD CVS Sync
@@ -13,6 +15,8 @@
      we actually reach $offset
  - (djm) [regress/integrity.sh] Skip SHA2-based MACs on configurations that
    lack support for SHA2.
+ - (djm) [regress/modpipe.c] Add local err, and errx functions for platforms
+   that do not have them.
 
 20130217
  - OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
index ec3e1f417..44d594441 100644
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.331 2013/02/12 00:00:34 djm Exp $
+# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.332 2013/02/20 03:01:51 tim Exp $
 
 # uncomment if you run a non bourne compatable shell. Ie. csh
 #SHELL = @SH@
@@ -379,14 +379,16 @@ uninstall:
 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
 
-tests interop-tests:	$(TARGETS)
+regress/modpipe: $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c
+	[ -d `pwd`/regress ]  ||  mkdir -p `pwd`/regress; \
+	$(CC) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $? \
+	$(LDFLAGS) -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+tests interop-tests:	$(TARGETS) regress/modpipe
 	BUILDDIR=`pwd`; \
 	[ -d `pwd`/regress ]  ||  mkdir -p `pwd`/regress; \
 	[ -f `pwd`/regress/Makefile ]  || \
 	    ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile ; \
-	[ -f `pwd`/regress/modpipe.c ]  || \
-	    ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/modpipe.c `pwd`/regress/modpipe.c; \
-	(cd regress && make prereq); \
 	TEST_SHELL="@TEST_SHELL@"; \
 	TEST_SSH_SSH="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh"; \
 	TEST_SSH_SSHD="$${BUILDDIR}/sshd"; \
diff --git a/krl.c b/krl.c
index 5ed7bd7e5..5a6bd14aa 100644
--- a/krl.c
+++ b/krl.c
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@
 #include "buffer.h"
 #include "key.h"
 #include "authfile.h"
-#include "err.h"
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
diff --git a/regress/Makefile b/regress/Makefile
index c3aec43fc..779abf4fb 100644
--- a/regress/Makefile
+++ b/regress/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.62 2013/01/18 00:45:29 djm Exp $
 
 REGRESS_TARGETS=	t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t-exec
-tests:		prereq $(REGRESS_TARGETS)
+tests:		$(REGRESS_TARGETS)
 
 # Interop tests are not run by default
 interop interop-tests: t-exec-interop
@@ -146,10 +146,6 @@ t9: $(OBJ)/t9.out
 	test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \
 	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t9.out > /dev/null
 
-prereq: modpipe
-
-modpipe: modpipe.c
-
 t-exec:	${LTESTS:=.sh}
 	@if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \
 	for TEST in ""$?; do \
diff --git a/regress/modpipe.c b/regress/modpipe.c
index b05915b63..1d4229885 100755
--- a/regress/modpipe.c
+++ b/regress/modpipe.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  */
 
-/* $Id: modpipe.c,v 1.2 2013/02/19 02:15:08 djm Exp $ */
+/* $Id: modpipe.c,v 1.3 2013/02/20 03:01:52 tim Exp $ */
 
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <errno.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/getopt.c"
 
 static void err(int, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
 static void errx(int, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 283e575a7db49addd1cffe1a7cb6c5503a98e027 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2013 21:13:27 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/20 08:27:50     
 [regress/integrity.sh regress/modpipe.c]      Add an option to modpipe that
 warns if the modification offset it not      reached in it's stream and turn
 it on for t-integrity. This should catch      cases where the session is not
 fuzzed for being too short (cf. my last      "oops" commit)

---
 ChangeLog         |  7 +++++++
 regress/modpipe.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++-------
 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index cf50b4688..99946236e 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -2,6 +2,13 @@
  - (tim) [regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/try-ciphers.sh] shell portability fix.
  - (tim) [krl.c Makefile.in regress/Makefile regress/modpipe.c] remove unneeded
    err.h include from krl.c. Additional portability fixes for modpipe. OK djm
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/20 08:27:50
+     [regress/integrity.sh regress/modpipe.c]
+     Add an option to modpipe that warns if the modification offset it not
+     reached in it's stream and turn it on for t-integrity. This should catch
+     cases where the session is not fuzzed for being too short (cf. my last
+     "oops" commit)
 
 20130219
  - OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/regress/modpipe.c b/regress/modpipe.c
index 1d4229885..dca927603 100755
--- a/regress/modpipe.c
+++ b/regress/modpipe.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  */
 
-/* $Id: modpipe.c,v 1.3 2013/02/20 03:01:52 tim Exp $ */
+/* $Id: modpipe.c,v 1.4 2013/02/20 10:13:29 djm Exp $ */
 
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ errx(int r, const char *fmt, ...)
 static void
 usage(void)
 {
-	fprintf(stderr, "Usage: modpipe [-m modspec ...] < in > out\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "Usage: modpipe -w [-m modspec ...] < in > out\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "modspec is one of:\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "    xor:offset:value       - XOR \"value\" at \"offset\"\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "    andor:offset:val1:val2 - AND \"val1\" then OR \"val2\" at \"offset\"\n");
@@ -100,15 +100,18 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 	size_t total;
 	ssize_t r, s, o;
 	struct modification mods[MAX_MODIFICATIONS];
-	u_int i, num_mods = 0;
+	u_int i, wflag = 0, num_mods = 0;
 
-	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "m:")) != -1) {
+	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "wm:")) != -1) {
 		switch (ch) {
 		case 'm':
 			if (num_mods >= MAX_MODIFICATIONS)
 				errx(1, "Too many modifications");
 			parse_modification(optarg, &(mods[num_mods++]));
 			break;
+		case 'w':
+			wflag = 1;
+			break;
 		default:
 			usage();
 			/* NOTREACHED */
@@ -117,7 +120,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 	for (total = 0;;) {
 		r = s = read(STDIN_FILENO, buf, sizeof(buf));
 		if (r == 0)
-			return 0;
+			break;
 		if (r < 0) {
 			if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)
 				continue;
@@ -140,7 +143,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 		for (o = 0; o < s; o += r) {
 			r = write(STDOUT_FILENO, buf, s - o);
 			if (r == 0)
-				return 0;
+				break;
 			if (r < 0) {
 				if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)
 					continue;
@@ -149,5 +152,13 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 		}
 		total += s;
 	}
-	return 0;
+	/* Warn if modifications not reached in input stream */
+	r = 0;
+	for (i = 0; wflag && i < num_mods; i++) {
+		if (mods[i].offset < total)
+			continue;
+		r = 1;
+		fprintf(stderr, "modpipe: warning - mod %u not reached\n", i);
+	}
+	return r;
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 5acc6be9818e0cd0a6fd95f9d7b65de331ee46d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2013 21:16:07 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/20 08:29:27      [regress/modpipe.c]
      s/Id/OpenBSD/ in RCS tag

---
 ChangeLog         | 3 +++
 regress/modpipe.c | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 99946236e..b527ff057 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@
      reached in it's stream and turn it on for t-integrity. This should catch
      cases where the session is not fuzzed for being too short (cf. my last
      "oops" commit)
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/20 08:29:27
+     [regress/modpipe.c]
+     s/Id/OpenBSD/ in RCS tag
 
 20130219
  - OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/regress/modpipe.c b/regress/modpipe.c
index dca927603..1f17e41f8 100755
--- a/regress/modpipe.c
+++ b/regress/modpipe.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  */
 
-/* $Id: modpipe.c,v 1.4 2013/02/20 10:13:29 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: modpipe.c,v 1.4 2013/02/20 08:29:27 djm Exp $ */
 
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 0ec742369243cb4ffaaa0b2938cae9a96dfd27c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2013 21:37:55 -0800
Subject:  - (tim) [regress/forward-control.sh] shell portability fix.

---
 ChangeLog                  | 3 +++
 regress/forward-control.sh | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index b527ff057..a87e7fb5a 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
+20130221
+ - (tim) [regress/forward-control.sh] shell portability fix.
+
 20130220
  - (tim) [regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/try-ciphers.sh] shell portability fix.
  - (tim) [krl.c Makefile.in regress/Makefile regress/modpipe.c] remove unneeded
diff --git a/regress/forward-control.sh b/regress/forward-control.sh
index 9d000bc76..ac20bacc9 100644
--- a/regress/forward-control.sh
+++ b/regress/forward-control.sh
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ READY=$OBJ/ready
 wait_for_file_to_appear() {
 	_path=$1
 	_n=0
-	while test ! -e $_path ; do
+	while test ! -f $_path ; do
 		test $_n -eq 1 && trace "waiting for $_path to appear"
 		_n=`expr $_n + 1`
 		test $_n -ge 5 && return 1
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 964de184a8bbb85b1992176c28963f6115c780e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2013 10:39:59 +1100
Subject:  - (dtucker) [Makefile.in configure.ac] bz#2072: don't link krb5 libs
 to    ssh(1) since they're not needed.  Patch from Pierre Ossman.

---
 ChangeLog    |  4 ++++
 Makefile.in  |  8 +++++---
 configure.ac | 28 ++++++++++++++--------------
 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index a87e7fb5a..706ec6262 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+20120222
+ - (dtucker) [Makefile.in configure.ac] bz#2072: don't link krb5 libs to
+   ssh(1) since they're not needed.  Patch from Pierre Ossman.
+
 20130221
  - (tim) [regress/forward-control.sh] shell portability fix.
 
diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
index 44d594441..6067063a2 100644
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.332 2013/02/20 03:01:51 tim Exp $
+# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.333 2013/02/21 23:40:00 dtucker Exp $
 
 # uncomment if you run a non bourne compatable shell. Ie. csh
 #SHELL = @SH@
@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ LD=@LD@
 CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
 CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
 LIBS=@LIBS@
+K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
+GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
 SSHLIBS=@SSHLIBS@
 SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
 LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
@@ -139,10 +141,10 @@ libssh.a: $(LIBSSH_OBJS)
 	$(RANLIB) $@
 
 ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS)
-	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS)
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS)
 
 sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a	$(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS)
-	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS)
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS)
 
 scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o
 	$(LD) -o $@ scp.o progressmeter.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index d62323d97..088bcb652 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.505 2013/02/15 01:13:01 dtucker Exp $
+# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.506 2013/02/21 23:40:00 dtucker Exp $
 #
 # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
 #
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 
 AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org])
-AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.505 $)
+AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.506 $)
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
 AC_LANG([C])
 
@@ -3624,6 +3624,9 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
 			     [$KRB5ROOT/bin/krb5-config],
 			     [$KRB5ROOT/bin:$PATH])
 		if test -x $KRB5CONF ; then
+			K5CFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags`"
+			K5LIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs`"
+			CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $K5CFLAGS"
 
 			AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gssapi support])
 			if $KRB5CONF | grep gssapi >/dev/null ; then
@@ -3631,14 +3634,12 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
 				AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI], [1],
 					[Define this if you want GSSAPI
 					support in the version 2 protocol])
-				k5confopts=gssapi
+				GSSCFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags gssapi`"
+				GSSLIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs gssapi`"
+				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $GSSCFLAGS"
 			else
 				AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
-				k5confopts=""
 			fi
-			K5CFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags $k5confopts`"
-			K5LIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs $k5confopts`"
-			CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $K5CFLAGS"
 			AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether we are using Heimdal])
 			AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <krb5.h>
 				]], [[ char *tmp = heimdal_version; ]])],
@@ -3670,14 +3671,12 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
 
 			AC_CHECK_LIB([gssapi_krb5], [gss_init_sec_context],
 				[ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI])
-				  K5LIBS="-lgssapi_krb5 $K5LIBS" ],
+				  GSSLIBS="-lgssapi_krb5" ],
 				[ AC_CHECK_LIB([gssapi], [gss_init_sec_context],
 					[ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI])
-					  K5LIBS="-lgssapi $K5LIBS" ],
-					AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find any suitable gss-api library - build may fail]),
-					$K5LIBS)
-				],
-				$K5LIBS)
+					  GSSLIBS="-lgssapi" ],
+					AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find any suitable gss-api library - build may fail]))
+				])
 
 			AC_CHECK_HEADER([gssapi.h], ,
 				[ unset ac_cv_header_gssapi_h
@@ -3705,12 +3704,13 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
 		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_krb5.h gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h])
 		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_generic.h gssapi/gssapi_generic.h])
 
-		LIBS="$LIBS $K5LIBS"
 		AC_SEARCH_LIBS([k_hasafs], [kafs], [AC_DEFINE([USE_AFS], [1],
 			[Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support])])
 	fi
 	]
 )
+AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
+AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
 
 # Looking for programs, paths and files
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From a2b5a4c746871bd32a12a00548ccf1a9c3c21101 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2013 10:43:15 +1100
Subject:  - (dtucker) [configure.ac] bz#2073: look for Solaris'
 differently-named    libgss too.  Patch from Pierre Ossman, ok djm.

---
 ChangeLog    |  4 +++-
 configure.ac | 10 +++++++---
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 706ec6262..d67e550c2 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 20120222
  - (dtucker) [Makefile.in configure.ac] bz#2072: don't link krb5 libs to
-   ssh(1) since they're not needed.  Patch from Pierre Ossman.
+   ssh(1) since they're not needed.  Patch from Pierre Ossman, ok djm.
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] bz#2073: look for Solaris' differently-named
+   libgss too.  Patch from Pierre Ossman, ok djm.
 
 20130221
  - (tim) [regress/forward-control.sh] shell portability fix.
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 088bcb652..6c11f0b90 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.506 2013/02/21 23:40:00 dtucker Exp $
+# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.507 2013/02/21 23:43:16 dtucker Exp $
 #
 # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
 #
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 
 AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org])
-AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.506 $)
+AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.507 $)
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
 AC_LANG([C])
 
@@ -3675,7 +3675,11 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
 				[ AC_CHECK_LIB([gssapi], [gss_init_sec_context],
 					[ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI])
 					  GSSLIBS="-lgssapi" ],
-					AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find any suitable gss-api library - build may fail]))
+					[ AC_CHECK_LIB([gss], [gss_init_sec_context],
+						[ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI])
+						  GSSLIBS="-lgss" ],
+						AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find any suitable gss-api library - build may fail]))
+					])
 				])
 
 			AC_CHECK_HEADER([gssapi.h], ,
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 91f40d8592562b804813a320a4ac3871dbaaf433 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2013 11:37:00 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) [configure.ac sandbox-seccomp-filter.c] Support for Linux   
  seccomp-bpf sandbox on ARM. Patch from shawnlandden AT gmail.com;        ok
 dtucker

---
 ChangeLog                |  3 ++
 configure.ac             | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
 sandbox-seccomp-filter.c |  8 +++++
 3 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index d67e550c2..c8f85fd8b 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@
    ssh(1) since they're not needed.  Patch from Pierre Ossman, ok djm.
  - (dtucker) [configure.ac] bz#2073: look for Solaris' differently-named
    libgss too.  Patch from Pierre Ossman, ok djm.
+ - (djm) [configure.ac sandbox-seccomp-filter.c] Support for Linux
+   seccomp-bpf sandbox on ARM. Patch from shawnlandden AT gmail.com;
+   ok dtucker
 
 20130221
  - (tim) [regress/forward-control.sh] shell portability fix.
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 6c11f0b90..e526390f7 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.507 2013/02/21 23:43:16 dtucker Exp $
+# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.508 2013/02/22 00:37:00 djm Exp $
 #
 # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
 #
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 
 AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org])
-AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.507 $)
+AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.508 $)
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
 AC_LANG([C])
 
@@ -120,31 +120,6 @@ AC_CHECK_DECL([PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS], [have_linux_no_new_privs=1], , [
 	#include <sys/types.h>
 	#include <linux/prctl.h>
 ])
-if test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" ; then
-AC_CHECK_DECL([SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER], [have_seccomp_filter=1], , [
-	#include <sys/types.h>
-	#include <linux/seccomp.h>
-])
-fi
-if test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" ; then
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([kernel for seccomp_filter support])
-AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-		#include <errno.h>
-		#include <linux/seccomp.h>
-		#include <stdlib.h>
-		#include <sys/prctl.h>
-	]],
-	[[ errno = 0;
-	   prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, NULL, 0, 0);
-	   exit(errno == EFAULT ? 0 : 1); ]])],
-	[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [
-		AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
-		# Disable seccomp filter as a target
-		have_seccomp_filter=0
-	]
-)
-fi
-
 use_stack_protector=1
 AC_ARG_WITH([stackprotect],
     [  --without-stackprotect  Don't use compiler's stack protection], [
@@ -321,6 +296,7 @@ AC_CHECK_HEADERS([ \
 	crypto/sha2.h \
 	dirent.h \
 	endian.h \
+	elf.h \
 	features.h \
 	fcntl.h \
 	floatingpoint.h \
@@ -700,20 +676,26 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
 	AC_CHECK_HEADERS([linux/seccomp.h linux/filter.h linux/audit.h], [],
 	    [], [#include <linux/types.h>])
 	AC_CHECK_FUNCS([prctl])
-	have_seccomp_audit_arch=1
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([for seccomp architecture])
+	seccomp_audit_arch=
 	case "$host" in
 	x86_64-*)
-		AC_DEFINE([SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH], [AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64],
-		    [Specify the system call convention in use])
+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64
 		;;
 	i*86-*)
-		AC_DEFINE([SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH], [AUDIT_ARCH_I386],
-		    [Specify the system call convention in use])
-		;;
-	*)
-		have_seccomp_audit_arch=0
+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_I386
 		;;
+        arm*-*)
+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_ARM
+                ;;
 	esac
+	if test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" ; then
+		AC_MSG_RESULT(["$seccomp_audit_arch"])
+                AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH], [$seccomp_audit_arch],
+                    [Specify the system call convention in use])
+	else
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([architecture not supported])
+	fi
 	;;
 mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
 	AC_DEFINE([NEED_SETPGRP], [1], [Need setpgrp to acquire controlling tty])
@@ -2629,6 +2611,34 @@ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], ["$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER"],
 	[non-privileged user for privilege separation])
 AC_SUBST([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER])
 
+if test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" ; then
+AC_CHECK_DECL([SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER], [have_seccomp_filter=1], , [
+	#include <sys/types.h>
+	#include <linux/seccomp.h>
+])
+fi
+if test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" ; then
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([kernel for seccomp_filter support])
+AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+		#include <errno.h>
+		#include <elf.h>
+		#include <linux/audit.h>
+		#include <linux/seccomp.h>
+		#include <stdlib.h>
+		#include <sys/prctl.h>
+	]],
+	[[ int i = $seccomp_audit_arch;
+	   errno = 0;
+	   prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, NULL, 0, 0);
+	   exit(errno == EFAULT ? 0 : 1); ]])],
+	[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+		# Disable seccomp filter as a target
+		have_seccomp_filter=0
+	]
+)
+fi
+
 # Decide which sandbox style to use
 sandbox_arg=""
 AC_ARG_WITH([sandbox],
@@ -2716,11 +2726,13 @@ elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xdarwin" || \
 elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xseccomp_filter" || \
      ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \
        test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" && \
+       test "x$ac_cv_header_elf_h" = "xyes" && \
        test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_audit_h" = "xyes" && \
-       test "x$have_seccomp_audit_arch" = "x1" && \
+       test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_filter_h" = "xyes" && \
+       test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" && \
        test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" && \
        test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" = "xyes" ) ; then
-	test "x$have_seccomp_audit_arch" != "x1" && \
+	test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" = "x" && \
 		AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox not supported on $host])
 	test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" != "x1" && \
 		AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS])
diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
index ef2b13c4f..e12418399 100644
--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/filter.h>
 #include <linux/seccomp.h>
+#include <elf.h>
 
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
 
@@ -90,7 +91,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
 	SC_DENY(open, EACCES),
 	SC_ALLOW(getpid),
 	SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday),
+#ifdef __NR_time /* not defined on EABI ARM */
 	SC_ALLOW(time),
+#endif
 	SC_ALLOW(read),
 	SC_ALLOW(write),
 	SC_ALLOW(close),
@@ -102,7 +105,12 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
 	SC_ALLOW(select),
 #endif
 	SC_ALLOW(madvise),
+#ifdef __NR_mmap2 /* EABI ARM only has mmap2() */
+	SC_ALLOW(mmap2),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_mmap
 	SC_ALLOW(mmap),
+#endif
 	SC_ALLOW(munmap),
 	SC_ALLOW(exit_group),
 #ifdef __NR_rt_sigprocmask
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From b87f6b70f894952b74443c8ef1b86323e7c9f465 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Sat, 23 Feb 2013 09:12:23 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) [configure.ac includes.h loginrec.c mux.c sftp.c] Prefer   
 bsd/libutil.h to libutil.h to avoid deprecation warnings on Ubuntu.    ok tim

---
 ChangeLog    | 5 +++++
 configure.ac | 6 +++---
 includes.h   | 6 ++++--
 loginrec.c   | 4 ----
 mux.c        | 4 ----
 sftp.c       | 4 ----
 6 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index c8f85fd8b..4ec2282de 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
+20120223
+ - (djm) [configure.ac includes.h loginrec.c mux.c sftp.c] Prefer
+   bsd/libutil.h to libutil.h to avoid deprecation warnings on Ubuntu.
+   ok tim
+
 20120222
  - (dtucker) [Makefile.in configure.ac] bz#2072: don't link krb5 libs to
    ssh(1) since they're not needed.  Patch from Pierre Ossman, ok djm.
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index e526390f7..3ea3f8a35 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.508 2013/02/22 00:37:00 djm Exp $
+# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.509 2013/02/22 22:12:24 djm Exp $
 #
 # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
 #
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 
 AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org])
-AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.508 $)
+AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.509 $)
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
 AC_LANG([C])
 
@@ -1163,7 +1163,7 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([utimes],
 )
 
 dnl    Checks for libutil functions
-AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libutil.h])
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS([bsd/libutil.h libutil.h])
 AC_SEARCH_LIBS([fmt_scaled], [util bsd])
 AC_SEARCH_LIBS([login], [util bsd])
 AC_SEARCH_LIBS([logout], [util bsd])
diff --git a/includes.h b/includes.h
index b4c53d9b4..3e206c899 100644
--- a/includes.h
+++ b/includes.h
@@ -137,8 +137,10 @@
 # include <tmpdir.h>
 #endif
 
-#ifdef HAVE_LIBUTIL_H
-# include <libutil.h> /* Openpty on FreeBSD at least */
+#if defined(HAVE_BSD_LIBUTIL_H)
+# include <bsd/libutil.h>
+#elif defined(HAVE_LIBUTIL_H)
+# include <libutil.h>
 #endif
 
 #if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS)
diff --git a/loginrec.c b/loginrec.c
index 32941c985..f9662fa5c 100644
--- a/loginrec.c
+++ b/loginrec.c
@@ -180,10 +180,6 @@
 # include <util.h>
 #endif
 
-#ifdef HAVE_LIBUTIL_H
-# include <libutil.h>
-#endif
-
 /**
  ** prototypes for helper functions in this file
  **/
diff --git a/mux.c b/mux.c
index 1b24660b2..1ae0e0915 100644
--- a/mux.c
+++ b/mux.c
@@ -63,10 +63,6 @@
 # include <util.h>
 #endif
 
-#ifdef HAVE_LIBUTIL_H
-# include <libutil.h>
-#endif
-
 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "log.h"
diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
index 9a53b12b7..342ae7efc 100644
--- a/sftp.c
+++ b/sftp.c
@@ -54,10 +54,6 @@ typedef void EditLine;
 # include <util.h>
 #endif
 
-#ifdef HAVE_LIBUTIL_H
-# include <libutil.h>
-#endif
-
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From a423fefb89519814ab4a7a44001268648c58ff36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2013 10:32:27 +1100
Subject: welcome to 2013

---
 ChangeLog | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 4ec2282de..3d060e2cc 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-20120223
+20130223
  - (djm) [configure.ac includes.h loginrec.c mux.c sftp.c] Prefer
    bsd/libutil.h to libutil.h to avoid deprecation warnings on Ubuntu.
    ok tim
 
-20120222
+20130222
  - (dtucker) [Makefile.in configure.ac] bz#2072: don't link krb5 libs to
    ssh(1) since they're not needed.  Patch from Pierre Ossman, ok djm.
  - (dtucker) [configure.ac] bz#2073: look for Solaris' differently-named
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 03978c61f32935b31337844aa25d87dc0edd39d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2013 11:24:44 +1100
Subject:  - (dtucker) [configure.ac ssh-gss.h] bz#2073: additional #includes
 needed    to use Solaris native GSS libs.  Patch from Pierre Ossman.

---
 ChangeLog    |  4 ++++
 configure.ac | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
 ssh-gss.h    | 11 ++++++-----
 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 3d060e2cc..0d0340f8f 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+20130225
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac ssh-gss.h] bz#2073: additional #includes needed
+   to use Solaris native GSS libs.  Patch from Pierre Ossman.
+
 20130223
  - (djm) [configure.ac includes.h loginrec.c mux.c sftp.c] Prefer
    bsd/libutil.h to libutil.h to avoid deprecation warnings on Ubuntu.
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 3ea3f8a35..f2d671197 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.509 2013/02/22 22:12:24 djm Exp $
+# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.510 2013/02/25 00:24:44 dtucker Exp $
 #
 # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
 #
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 
 AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org])
-AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.509 $)
+AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.510 $)
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
 AC_LANG([C])
 
@@ -3722,6 +3722,20 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
 
 		AC_SEARCH_LIBS([k_hasafs], [kafs], [AC_DEFINE([USE_AFS], [1],
 			[Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support])])
+
+		AC_CHECK_DECLS([GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE], [], [], [[
+#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
+# include <gssapi.h>
+#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H)
+# include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
+# include <gssapi_generic.h>
+#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H)
+# include <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h>
+#endif
+		]])
 	fi
 	]
 )
diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
index c29a1b7e7..077e13ce4 100644
--- a/ssh-gss.h
+++ b/ssh-gss.h
@@ -42,12 +42,13 @@
 #   include <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h>
 #  endif
 
-/* MIT Kerberos doesn't seem to define GSS_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE */
+/* Old MIT Kerberos doesn't seem to define GSS_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE */
 
-#ifndef GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE
-#define GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE gss_nt_service_name
-#endif /* GSS_C_NT_... */
-#endif /* !HEIMDAL */
+#  if !HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE
+#   define GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE gss_nt_service_name
+#  endif /* !HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_... */
+
+# endif /* !HEIMDAL */
 #endif /* KRB5 */
 
 /* draft-ietf-secsh-gsskeyex-06 */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 1e657d592d1afa169ffb0a7a1a407b4fe5c97686 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2013 18:58:06 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/20 08:27:50      [integrity.sh]     
 Add an option to modpipe that warns if the modification offset it not     
 reached in it's stream and turn it on for t-integrity. This should catch     
 cases where the session is not fuzzed for being too short (cf. my last     
 "oops" commit)

---
 ChangeLog            | 9 +++++++++
 regress/integrity.sh | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 0d0340f8f..076aca702 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,12 @@
+20130226
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/20 08:27:50
+     [integrity.sh]
+     Add an option to modpipe that warns if the modification offset it not
+     reached in it's stream and turn it on for t-integrity. This should catch
+     cases where the session is not fuzzed for being too short (cf. my last
+     "oops" commit)
+
 20130225
  - (dtucker) [configure.ac ssh-gss.h] bz#2073: additional #includes needed
    to use Solaris native GSS libs.  Patch from Pierre Ossman.
diff --git a/regress/integrity.sh b/regress/integrity.sh
index 2a93372fc..a57ec87f9 100644
--- a/regress/integrity.sh
+++ b/regress/integrity.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.6 2013/02/19 02:14:09 djm Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.7 2013/02/20 08:27:50 djm Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="integrity"
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ for m in $macs; do
 			continue
 		fi
 		# modify output from sshd at offset $off
-		pxy="proxycommand=$cmd | $OBJ/modpipe -m xor:$off:1"
+		pxy="proxycommand=$cmd | $OBJ/modpipe -wm xor:$off:1"
 		case $m in
 			aes*gcm*)	macopt="-c $m";;
 			*)		macopt="-m $m";;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 6c21bb8c4ae2104f8fff44a9a966897353175b4d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2013 19:41:30 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) [regress/integrity.sh] Run sshd via $SUDO; fixes tinderbox
 breakage    for UsePAM=yes configuration

---
 ChangeLog            | 2 ++
 regress/integrity.sh | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 076aca702..f363ef2cf 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
      reached in it's stream and turn it on for t-integrity. This should catch
      cases where the session is not fuzzed for being too short (cf. my last
      "oops" commit)
+ - (djm) [regress/integrity.sh] Run sshd via $SUDO; fixes tinderbox breakage
+   for UsePAM=yes configuration
 
 20130225
  - (dtucker) [configure.ac ssh-gss.h] bz#2073: additional #includes needed
diff --git a/regress/integrity.sh b/regress/integrity.sh
index a57ec87f9..78fb53260 100644
--- a/regress/integrity.sh
+++ b/regress/integrity.sh
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ config_defined OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM && \
 	macs="$macs aes128-gcm@openssh.com aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
 
 # sshd-command for proxy (see test-exec.sh)
-cmd="sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${SSHD} ${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy"
+cmd="$SUDO sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${SSHD} ${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy"
 
 jot() {
 	awk "BEGIN { for (i = $2; i < $2 + $1; i++) { printf \"%d\n\", i } }"
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From c0cc7ce1669d15cd1302d2d2ef9a704b5e680aee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2013 10:48:18 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) [README contrib/caldera/openssh.spec
 contrib/redhat/openssh.spec]    [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Crank version
 numbers

---
 ChangeLog                    | 4 ++++
 README                       | 4 ++--
 contrib/caldera/openssh.spec | 4 ++--
 contrib/redhat/openssh.spec  | 2 +-
 contrib/suse/openssh.spec    | 2 +-
 5 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index f363ef2cf..4d125e3de 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+20130227
+ - (djm) [README contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec]
+   [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Crank version numbers
+
 20130226
  - OpenBSD CVS Sync
    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/20 08:27:50
diff --git a/README b/README
index 81cb922be..21dc6e1f7 100644
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-See http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.1 for the release notes.
+See http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.2 for the release notes.
 
 - A Japanese translation of this document and of the OpenSSH FAQ is
 - available at http://www.unixuser.org/~haruyama/security/openssh/index.html
@@ -62,4 +62,4 @@ References -
 [6] http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=style&sektion=9
 [7] http://www.openssh.com/faq.html
 
-$Id: README,v 1.81 2012/08/22 11:57:13 djm Exp $
+$Id: README,v 1.82 2013/02/26 23:48:19 djm Exp $
diff --git a/contrib/caldera/openssh.spec b/contrib/caldera/openssh.spec
index 9fd07953a..196bd7904 100644
--- a/contrib/caldera/openssh.spec
+++ b/contrib/caldera/openssh.spec
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 
 #old cvs stuff.  please update before use.  may be deprecated.
 %define use_stable	1
-%define version 	6.1p1
+%define version 	6.2p1
 %if %{use_stable}
   %define cvs		%{nil}
   %define release 	1
@@ -363,4 +363,4 @@ fi
 * Mon Jan 01 1998 ...
 Template Version: 1.31
 
-$Id: openssh.spec,v 1.78 2012/08/22 11:57:15 djm Exp $
+$Id: openssh.spec,v 1.79 2013/02/26 23:48:20 djm Exp $
diff --git a/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec b/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec
index f74ad4486..3898c6c99 100644
--- a/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec
+++ b/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-%define ver 6.1p1
+%define ver 6.2p1
 %define rel 1
 
 # OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID
diff --git a/contrib/suse/openssh.spec b/contrib/suse/openssh.spec
index 3b8abecc8..960feae07 100644
--- a/contrib/suse/openssh.spec
+++ b/contrib/suse/openssh.spec
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 
 Summary:	OpenSSH, a free Secure Shell (SSH) protocol implementation
 Name:		openssh
-Version:	6.1p1
+Version:	6.2p1
 URL:		http://www.openssh.com/
 Release:	1
 Source0:	openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From a514bc05b180c8fb3b11a387b20513743fb1837d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2013 19:35:26 -0800
Subject:  - (tim) [regress/forward-control.sh] use sh in case login shell is
 csh.

---
 ChangeLog                  | 1 +
 regress/forward-control.sh | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 4d125e3de..c58b09997 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 20130227
  - (djm) [README contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec]
    [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Crank version numbers
+ - (tim) [regress/forward-control.sh] use sh in case login shell is csh.
 
 20130226
  - OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/regress/forward-control.sh b/regress/forward-control.sh
index ac20bacc9..806874895 100644
--- a/regress/forward-control.sh
+++ b/regress/forward-control.sh
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ check_lfwd() {
 	${SSH} -oProtocol=$_proto -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \
 	    -L$LFWD_PORT:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
 	    -o ExitOnForwardFailure=yes \
-	    -n host "sleep 60 & echo \$! > $READY ; wait " \
+	    -n host exec sh -c \'"sleep 60 & echo \$! > $READY ; wait "\' \
 	    >/dev/null 2>&1 &
 	_sshpid=$!
 	wait_for_file_to_appear $READY || \
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ check_rfwd() {
 	${SSH} -oProtocol=$_proto -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \
 	    -R$RFWD_PORT:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
 	    -o ExitOnForwardFailure=yes \
-	    -n host "sleep 60 & echo \$! > $READY ; wait " \
+	    -n host exec sh -c \'"sleep 60 & echo \$! > $READY ; wait "\' \
 	    >/dev/null 2>&1 &
 	_sshpid=$!
 	wait_for_file_to_appear $READY
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From f9e2060ca9d350733ac82ed9858b010a2b1ba5c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2013 20:27:29 -0800
Subject:  - (tim) [regress/integrity.sh] shell portability fix.

---
 ChangeLog            |  1 +
 regress/integrity.sh | 20 ++++++++++----------
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index c58b09997..2adfc510f 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
  - (djm) [README contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec]
    [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Crank version numbers
  - (tim) [regress/forward-control.sh] use sh in case login shell is csh.
+ - (tim) [regress/integrity.sh] shell portability fix.
 
 20130226
  - OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/regress/integrity.sh b/regress/integrity.sh
index 78fb53260..8ed8d080e 100644
--- a/regress/integrity.sh
+++ b/regress/integrity.sh
@@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ for m in $macs; do
 	emac=0
 	ecnt=0
 	skip=0
-	for off in $(jot $tries $startoffset); do
-		skip=$((skip - 1))
+	for off in `jot $tries $startoffset`; do
+		skip=`expr $skip - 1`
 		if [ $skip -gt 0 ]; then
 			# avoid modifying the high bytes of the length
 			continue
@@ -47,19 +47,19 @@ for m in $macs; do
 			aes*gcm*)	macopt="-c $m";;
 			*)		macopt="-m $m";;
 		esac
-		output=$(${SSH} $macopt -2F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o "$pxy" \
-		    999.999.999.999 'printf "%4096s" " "' 2>&1)
+		output=`${SSH} $macopt -2F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o "$pxy" \
+		    999.999.999.999 'printf "%4096s" " "' 2>&1`
 		if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
 			fail "ssh -m $m succeeds with bit-flip at $off"
 		fi
-		ecnt=$((ecnt+1))
-		output=$(echo $output | tr -s '\r\n' '.')
+		ecnt=`expr $ecnt + 1`
+		output=`echo $output | tr -s '\r\n' '.'`
 		verbose "test $tid: $m @$off $output"
 		case "$output" in
-		Bad?packet*)	elen=$((elen+1)); skip=3;;
+		Bad?packet*)	elen=`expr $elen + 1`; skip=3;;
 		Corrupted?MAC* | Decryption?integrity?check?failed*)
-				emac=$((emac+1)); skip=0;;
-		padding*)	epad=$((epad+1)); skip=0;;
+				emac=`expr $emac + 1`; skip=0;;
+		padding*)	epad=`expr $epad + 1`; skip=0;;
 		*)		fail "unexpected error mac $m at $off";;
 		esac
 	done
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ for m in $macs; do
 	if [ $emac -eq 0 ]; then
 		fail "$m: no mac errors"
 	fi
-	expect=$((ecnt-epad-elen))
+	expect=`expr $ecnt - $epad - $elen`
 	if [ $emac -ne $expect ]; then
 		fail "$m: expected $expect mac errors, got $emac"
 	fi
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From ada7e17ae504b0bbbc04e380986f41ee8f67c437 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2013 21:49:09 -0800
Subject:  - (tim) [regress/integrity.sh] keep old solaris awk from hanging.

---
 ChangeLog            | 1 +
 regress/integrity.sh | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 2adfc510f..9c5b1e577 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
    [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Crank version numbers
  - (tim) [regress/forward-control.sh] use sh in case login shell is csh.
  - (tim) [regress/integrity.sh] shell portability fix.
+ - (tim) [regress/integrity.sh] keep old solaris awk from hanging.
 
 20130226
  - OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/regress/integrity.sh b/regress/integrity.sh
index 8ed8d080e..4d46926d5 100644
--- a/regress/integrity.sh
+++ b/regress/integrity.sh
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ config_defined OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM && \
 cmd="$SUDO sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${SSHD} ${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy"
 
 jot() {
-	awk "BEGIN { for (i = $2; i < $2 + $1; i++) { printf \"%d\n\", i } }"
+	awk "BEGIN { for (i = $2; i < $2 + $1; i++) { printf \"%d\n\", i } exit }"
 }
 
 for m in $macs; do
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 21f591b6d975301fd005b4c031dffa0efefded08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2013 22:48:31 -0800
Subject:  - (tim) [regress/krl.sh] keep old solaris awk from hanging.

---
 ChangeLog      | 1 +
 regress/krl.sh | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 9c5b1e577..2dcde27c1 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
  - (tim) [regress/forward-control.sh] use sh in case login shell is csh.
  - (tim) [regress/integrity.sh] shell portability fix.
  - (tim) [regress/integrity.sh] keep old solaris awk from hanging.
+ - (tim) [regress/krl.sh] keep old solaris awk from hanging.
 
 20130226
  - OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/regress/krl.sh b/regress/krl.sh
index 09d26ab5c..62a239c38 100644
--- a/regress/krl.sh
+++ b/regress/krl.sh
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ serial: 599-701
 EOF
 
 jot() {
-	awk "BEGIN { for (i = $2; i < $2 + $1; i++) { printf \"%d\n\", i } }"
+	awk "BEGIN { for (i = $2; i < $2 + $1; i++) { printf \"%d\n\", i } exit }"
 }
 
 # A specification that revokes some certificated by key ID.
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 43e5e60badb827104363169c333b0b7eadb0d09a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2013 09:49:00 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) [regress/modpipe.c] Compilation fix for AIX and parsing fix
 for    HP/UX. Spotted by Kevin Brott

---
 ChangeLog         |  4 ++++
 regress/modpipe.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 2dcde27c1..8190c663d 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+20130305
+ - (djm) [regress/modpipe.c] Compilation fix for AIX and parsing fix for
+   HP/UX. Spotted by Kevin Brott
+
 20130227
  - (djm) [README contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec]
    [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Crank version numbers
diff --git a/regress/modpipe.c b/regress/modpipe.c
index 1f17e41f8..9629aa80b 100755
--- a/regress/modpipe.c
+++ b/regress/modpipe.c
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
 
 /* $OpenBSD: modpipe.c,v 1.4 2013/02/20 08:29:27 djm Exp $ */
 
+#include "includes.h"
+
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -74,20 +76,29 @@ static void
 parse_modification(const char *s, struct modification *m)
 {
 	char what[16+1];
-	int n;
+	int n, m1, m2;
 
 	bzero(m, sizeof(*m));
-	if ((n = sscanf(s, "%16[^:]%*[:]%lli%*[:]%hhi%*[:]%hhi",
-	    what, &m->offset, &m->m1, &m->m2)) < 3)
+	if ((n = sscanf(s, "%16[^:]%*[:]%lli%*[:]%i%*[:]%i",
+	    what, &m->offset, &m1, &m2)) < 3)
 		errx(1, "Invalid modification spec \"%s\"", s);
 	if (strcasecmp(what, "xor") == 0) {
-		m->what = MOD_XOR;
 		if (n > 3)
 			errx(1, "Invalid modification spec \"%s\"", s);
+		if (m1 < 0 || m1 > 0xff)
+			errx(1, "Invalid XOR modification value");
+		m->what = MOD_XOR;
+		m->m1 = m1;
 	} else if (strcasecmp(what, "andor") == 0) {
-		m->what = MOD_AND_OR;
 		if (n != 4)
 			errx(1, "Invalid modification spec \"%s\"", s);
+		if (m1 < 0 || m1 > 0xff)
+			errx(1, "Invalid AND modification value");
+		if (m2 < 0 || m2 > 0xff)
+			errx(1, "Invalid OR modification value");
+		m->what = MOD_AND_OR;
+		m->m1 = m1;
+		m->m2 = m2;
 	} else
 		errx(1, "Invalid modification type \"%s\"", what);
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 5f0e54c8924e7f2391342cfd8198bd92e28d726f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2013 19:57:39 +1100
Subject:  - (dtucker) [configure.ac] use "=" for shell test and not "==". 
 Spotted by    Kevin Brott.

---
 ChangeLog    | 2 ++
 configure.ac | 6 +++---
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 8190c663d..15f20c8bb 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 20130305
  - (djm) [regress/modpipe.c] Compilation fix for AIX and parsing fix for
    HP/UX. Spotted by Kevin Brott
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] use "=" for shell test and not "==".  Spotted by
+   Kevin Brott.
 
 20130227
  - (djm) [README contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec]
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index f2d671197..bd8b21d61 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.510 2013/02/25 00:24:44 dtucker Exp $
+# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.511 2013/03/05 08:57:39 dtucker Exp $
 #
 # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
 #
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 
 AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org])
-AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.510 $)
+AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.511 $)
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
 AC_LANG([C])
 
@@ -2744,7 +2744,7 @@ elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xseccomp_filter" || \
 	AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER], [1], [Sandbox using seccomp filter])
 elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xrlimit" || \
      ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" = "xyes" && \
-       test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" == "xyes" ) ; then
+       test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" = "xyes" ) ; then
 	test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" != "xyes" && \
 		AC_MSG_ERROR([rlimit sandbox requires setrlimit function])
 	test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" != "xyes" && \
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From fef9f7c3d104dd2ecc9af93450c57abd66384737 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2013 20:02:24 +1100
Subject: add Amit.

---
 ChangeLog | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 15f20c8bb..31e45f761 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
  - (djm) [regress/modpipe.c] Compilation fix for AIX and parsing fix for
    HP/UX. Spotted by Kevin Brott
  - (dtucker) [configure.ac] use "=" for shell test and not "==".  Spotted by
-   Kevin Brott.
+   Amit Kulkarni and Kevin Brott.
 
 20130227
  - (djm) [README contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec]
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 29c7151d2055ce8469e07e6ac40b1c5b18bfeff0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2013 21:50:09 +1100
Subject:  - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] Remove trailing "\" on PATHS, which caused
 obscure    build breakage on (at least) HP-UX 11.11.  Found by Amit Kulkarni
 and Kevin    Brott.

---
 ChangeLog   | 3 +++
 Makefile.in | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 31e45f761..f3340b6e5 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@
    HP/UX. Spotted by Kevin Brott
  - (dtucker) [configure.ac] use "=" for shell test and not "==".  Spotted by
    Amit Kulkarni and Kevin Brott.
+ - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] Remove trailing "\" on PATHS, which caused obscure
+   build breakage on (at least) HP-UX 11.11.  Found by Amit Kulkarni and Kevin
+   Brott.
 
 20130227
  - (djm) [README contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec]
diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
index 6067063a2..45509658f 100644
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.333 2013/02/21 23:40:00 dtucker Exp $
+# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.334 2013/03/05 10:50:09 dtucker Exp $
 
 # uncomment if you run a non bourne compatable shell. Ie. csh
 #SHELL = @SH@
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ PATHS= -DSSHDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \
 	-D_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN=\"$(SSH_KEYSIGN)\" \
 	-D_PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=\"$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)\" \
 	-D_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR=\"$(piddir)\" \
-	-D_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR=\"$(PRIVSEP_PATH)\" \
+	-D_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR=\"$(PRIVSEP_PATH)\"
 
 CC=@CC@
 LD=@LD@
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From ff8bda8f05e85b1196ec3a135d9970c475bcdcdb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2013 14:23:58 -0800
Subject:  - (tim) [Makefile.in] Add missing $(EXEEXT). Found by Roumen Petrov.

---
 ChangeLog   | 1 +
 Makefile.in | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index f3340b6e5..36a52deb8 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
  - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] Remove trailing "\" on PATHS, which caused obscure
    build breakage on (at least) HP-UX 11.11.  Found by Amit Kulkarni and Kevin
    Brott.
+ - (tim) [Makefile.in] Add missing $(EXEEXT). Found by Roumen Petrov.
 
 20130227
  - (djm) [README contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec]
diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
index 45509658f..38ffbdc3b 100644
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.334 2013/03/05 10:50:09 dtucker Exp $
+# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.335 2013/03/05 22:23:59 tim Exp $
 
 # uncomment if you run a non bourne compatable shell. Ie. csh
 #SHELL = @SH@
@@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ uninstall:
 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
 
-regress/modpipe: $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c
+regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c
 	[ -d `pwd`/regress ]  ||  mkdir -p `pwd`/regress; \
 	$(CC) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $? \
 	$(LDFLAGS) -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 834a0d6d541faf7d8e8aa8116eaf594746239275 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2013 14:06:48 +1100
Subject:  - (dtucker) [regress/forward-control.sh] Wait longer for the
 forwarding   connection to start so that the test works on slower machines.

---
 ChangeLog                  | 4 ++++
 regress/forward-control.sh | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 36a52deb8..e3d524348 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+20130306
+ - (dtucker) [regress/forward-control.sh] Wait longer for the forwarding
+  connection to start so that the test works on slower machines.
+
 20130305
  - (djm) [regress/modpipe.c] Compilation fix for AIX and parsing fix for
    HP/UX. Spotted by Kevin Brott
diff --git a/regress/forward-control.sh b/regress/forward-control.sh
index 806874895..80ddb4167 100644
--- a/regress/forward-control.sh
+++ b/regress/forward-control.sh
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ wait_for_file_to_appear() {
 	while test ! -f $_path ; do
 		test $_n -eq 1 && trace "waiting for $_path to appear"
 		_n=`expr $_n + 1`
-		test $_n -ge 5 && return 1
+		test $_n -ge 20 && return 1
 		sleep 1
 	done
 	return 0
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ wait_for_process_to_exit() {
 	while kill -0 $_pid 2>/dev/null ; do
 		test $_n -eq 1 && trace "waiting for $_pid to exit"
 		_n=`expr $_n + 1`
-		test $_n -ge 5 && return 1
+		test $_n -ge 20 && return 1
 		sleep 1
 	done
 	return 0
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From ff008ded7f9641c03fcbe44aedb51040e04c93e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2013 17:48:48 +1100
Subject:  - (dtucker) [configure.ac] test that we can set number of file
 descriptors    to zero with setrlimit before enabling the rlimit sandbox. 
 This affects    (at least) HPUX 11.11.

---
 ChangeLog    |  3 +++
 configure.ac | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index e3d524348..c4042efd2 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
 20130306
  - (dtucker) [regress/forward-control.sh] Wait longer for the forwarding
   connection to start so that the test works on slower machines.
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] test that we can set number of file descriptors
+   to zero with setrlimit before enabling the rlimit sandbox.  This affects
+   (at least) HPUX 11.11.
 
 20130305
  - (djm) [regress/modpipe.c] Compilation fix for AIX and parsing fix for
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index bd8b21d61..ccf3373bd 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.511 2013/03/05 08:57:39 dtucker Exp $
+# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.512 2013/03/06 06:48:48 dtucker Exp $
 #
 # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
 #
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 
 AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org])
-AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.511 $)
+AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.512 $)
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
 AC_LANG([C])
 
@@ -2690,6 +2690,32 @@ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
 	[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])]
 )
 
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,{0,0}) works])
+AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+	[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+	]],[[
+	struct rlimit rl_zero;
+	int fd, r;
+	fd_set fds;
+
+	rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
+	r = setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero);
+	exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0);
+	]])],
+	[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+	 rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes],
+	[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+	 rlimit_nofile_zero_works=no],
+	[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])]
+)
+
 AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works])
 AC_RUN_IFELSE(
 	[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
@@ -2744,7 +2770,8 @@ elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xseccomp_filter" || \
 	AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER], [1], [Sandbox using seccomp filter])
 elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xrlimit" || \
      ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" = "xyes" && \
-       test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" = "xyes" ) ; then
+       test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" = "xyes" && \
+       test "x$rlimit_nofile_zero_works" = "xyes" ) ; then
 	test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" != "xyes" && \
 		AC_MSG_ERROR([rlimit sandbox requires setrlimit function])
 	test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" != "xyes" && \
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From b3cd5037425c6541722745bef69ee52133d3491b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2013 12:33:35 +1100
Subject:  - (dtucker) [INSTALL] Bump documented autoconf version to what we're
    currently using.

---
 ChangeLog | 4 ++++
 INSTALL   | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index c4042efd2..0d922d5a7 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+20130307
+ - (dtucker) [INSTALL] Bump documented autoconf version to what we're
+   currently using.
+
 20130306
  - (dtucker) [regress/forward-control.sh] Wait longer for the forwarding
   connection to start so that the test works on slower machines.
diff --git a/INSTALL b/INSTALL
index 7c6046932..576723048 100644
--- a/INSTALL
+++ b/INSTALL
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ http://nlnetlabs.nl/projects/ldns/
 Autoconf:
 
 If you modify configure.ac or configure doesn't exist (eg if you checked
-the code out of CVS yourself) then you will need autoconf-2.61 to rebuild
+the code out of CVS yourself) then you will need autoconf-2.68 to rebuild
 the automatically generated files by running "autoreconf".  Earlier
 versions may also work but this is not guaranteed.
 
@@ -266,4 +266,4 @@ Please refer to the "reporting bugs" section of the webpage at
 http://www.openssh.com/
 
 
-$Id: INSTALL,v 1.87 2011/11/04 00:25:25 dtucker Exp $
+$Id: INSTALL,v 1.88 2013/03/07 01:33:35 dtucker Exp $
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 9243ef086fa1afa804c7870fd1be7b466934c048 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2013 20:06:13 +1100
Subject:  - (dtucker) [defines.h] Remove SIZEOF_CHAR bits since the test for
 it is    was removed in configure.ac rev 1.481 as it was redundant.

---
 ChangeLog | 2 ++
 defines.h | 6 +-----
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 0d922d5a7..a3b27329f 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 20130307
  - (dtucker) [INSTALL] Bump documented autoconf version to what we're
    currently using.
+ - (dtucker) [defines.h] Remove SIZEOF_CHAR bits since the test for it is
+   was removed in configure.ac rev 1.481 as it was redundant.
 
 20130306
  - (dtucker) [regress/forward-control.sh] Wait longer for the forwarding
diff --git a/defines.h b/defines.h
index 54de062d3..64515c2ff 100644
--- a/defines.h
+++ b/defines.h
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
 #ifndef _DEFINES_H
 #define _DEFINES_H
 
-/* $Id: defines.h,v 1.170 2012/12/04 15:50:04 tim Exp $ */
+/* $Id: defines.h,v 1.171 2013/03/07 09:06:13 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 
 /* Constants */
@@ -227,11 +227,7 @@ typedef uint16_t u_int16_t;
 typedef uint32_t u_int32_t;
 # define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1
 # else
-#  if (SIZEOF_CHAR == 1)
 typedef unsigned char u_int8_t;
-#  else
-#   error "8 bit int type not found."
-#  endif
 #  if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 2)
 typedef unsigned short int u_int16_t;
 #  else
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 4d1a0fe02916450242a0546fb68aa8261494254d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2013 20:14:34 +1100
Subject: remove extra word

---
 ChangeLog | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index a3b27329f..7f21ea921 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 20130307
  - (dtucker) [INSTALL] Bump documented autoconf version to what we're
    currently using.
- - (dtucker) [defines.h] Remove SIZEOF_CHAR bits since the test for it is
+ - (dtucker) [defines.h] Remove SIZEOF_CHAR bits since the test for it
    was removed in configure.ac rev 1.481 as it was redundant.
 
 20130306
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 2b6ea47106537cff31c863d05062ac97efe3f132 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2013 07:37:13 -0800
Subject:  - (tim) [Makefile.in] Add another missing $(EXEEXT) I should have
 seen 3 days    ago.

---
 ChangeLog   | 2 ++
 Makefile.in | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 7f21ea921..728de6ad0 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@
    currently using.
  - (dtucker) [defines.h] Remove SIZEOF_CHAR bits since the test for it
    was removed in configure.ac rev 1.481 as it was redundant.
+ - (tim) [Makefile.in] Add another missing $(EXEEXT) I should have seen 3 days
+   ago.
 
 20130306
  - (dtucker) [regress/forward-control.sh] Wait longer for the forwarding
diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
index 38ffbdc3b..d327787b0 100644
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.335 2013/03/05 22:23:59 tim Exp $
+# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.336 2013/03/07 15:37:13 tim Exp $
 
 # uncomment if you run a non bourne compatable shell. Ie. csh
 #SHELL = @SH@
@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c
 	$(CC) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $? \
 	$(LDFLAGS) -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
 
-tests interop-tests:	$(TARGETS) regress/modpipe
+tests interop-tests:	$(TARGETS) regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT)
 	BUILDDIR=`pwd`; \
 	[ -d `pwd`/regress ]  ||  mkdir -p `pwd`/regress; \
 	[ -f `pwd`/regress/Makefile ]  || \
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From e4f43478228256ddbbce3b7f0c312ff5c707b667 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Mar 2013 12:14:22 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) [configure.ac] Add a timeout to the select/rlimit test to
 give it a     chance to complete on broken systems; ok dtucker@

---
 ChangeLog    | 2 ++
 configure.ac | 9 ++++++---
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 728de6ad0..3b5b5482f 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@
    was removed in configure.ac rev 1.481 as it was redundant.
  - (tim) [Makefile.in] Add another missing $(EXEEXT) I should have seen 3 days
    ago.
+ - (djm) [configure.ac] Add a timeout to the select/rlimit test to give it a
+   chance to complete on broken systems; ok dtucker@
 
 20130306
  - (dtucker) [regress/forward-control.sh] Wait longer for the forwarding
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index ccf3373bd..6005d7c2f 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.512 2013/03/06 06:48:48 dtucker Exp $
+# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.513 2013/03/08 01:14:23 djm Exp $
 #
 # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
 #
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 
 AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org])
-AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.512 $)
+AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.513 $)
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
 AC_LANG([C])
 
@@ -2673,6 +2673,7 @@ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
 	struct rlimit rl_zero;
 	int fd, r;
 	fd_set fds;
+	struct timeval tv;
 
 	fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY);
 	FD_ZERO(&fds);
@@ -2680,7 +2681,9 @@ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
 	rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
 	setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero);
 	setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero);
-	r = select(fd+1, &fds, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+	tv.tv_sec = 1;
+	tv.tv_usec = 0;
+	r = select(fd+1, &fds, NULL, NULL, &tv);
 	exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0);
 	]])],
 	[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From fe10a28e088751ec3a6ac96e73be21bae8b86d70 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2013 11:19:40 +1100
Subject:  - (dtucker) [regress/Makefile regress/cipher-speed.sh
 regress/test-exec.sh]    Improve portability of cipher-speed test, based
 mostly on a patch from    Iain Morgan.

---
 ChangeLog               | 5 +++++
 regress/Makefile        | 2 +-
 regress/cipher-speed.sh | 9 ++++-----
 regress/test-exec.sh    | 4 ++++
 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 3b5b5482f..859c01ad9 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
+20120312
+ - (dtucker) [regress/Makefile regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/test-exec.sh]
+   Improve portability of cipher-speed test, based mostly on a patch from
+   Iain Morgan.
+
 20130307
  - (dtucker) [INSTALL] Bump documented autoconf version to what we're
    currently using.
diff --git a/regress/Makefile b/regress/Makefile
index 779abf4fb..6ef5d9cce 100644
--- a/regress/Makefile
+++ b/regress/Makefile
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ INTEROP_TESTS=	putty-transfer putty-ciphers putty-kex conch-ciphers
 USER!=		id -un
 CLEANFILES=	t2.out t3.out t6.out1 t6.out2 t7.out t7.out.pub copy.1 copy.2 \
 		t8.out t8.out.pub t9.out t9.out.pub \
-		authorized_keys_${USER} known_hosts pidfile \
+		authorized_keys_${USER} known_hosts pidfile testdata \
 		ssh_config sshd_config.orig ssh_proxy sshd_config sshd_proxy \
 		rsa.pub rsa rsa1.pub rsa1 host.rsa host.rsa1 \
 		rsa-agent rsa-agent.pub rsa1-agent rsa1-agent.pub \
diff --git a/regress/cipher-speed.sh b/regress/cipher-speed.sh
index 21bf0f2e9..65e5f35ec 100644
--- a/regress/cipher-speed.sh
+++ b/regress/cipher-speed.sh
@@ -5,12 +5,11 @@ tid="cipher speed"
 
 getbytes ()
 {
-	sed -n '/transferred/s/.*secs (\(.* bytes.sec\).*/\1/p'
+	sed -n -e '/transferred/s/.*secs (\(.* bytes.sec\).*/\1/p' \
+	    -e '/copied/s/.*s, \(.* MB.s\).*/\1/p'
 }
 
 tries="1 2"
-DATA=/bin/ls
-DATA=/bsd
 
 ciphers="aes128-cbc 3des-cbc blowfish-cbc cast128-cbc 
 	arcfour128 arcfour256 arcfour 
@@ -26,7 +25,7 @@ config_defined HAVE_EVP_SHA256 && \
 for c in $ciphers; do n=0; for m in $macs; do
 	trace "proto 2 cipher $c mac $m"
 	for x in $tries; do
-		echon "$c/$m:\t"
+		printf "%-60s" "$c/$m:"
 		( ${SSH} -o 'compression no' \
 			-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -2 -m $m -c $c somehost \
 			exec sh -c \'"dd of=/dev/null obs=32k"\' \
@@ -47,7 +46,7 @@ ciphers="3des blowfish"
 for c in $ciphers; do
 	trace "proto 1 cipher $c"
 	for x in $tries; do
-		echon "$c:\t"
+		printf "%-60s" "$c:"
 		( ${SSH} -o 'compression no' \
 			-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -1 -c $c somehost \
 			exec sh -c \'"dd of=/dev/null obs=32k"\' \
diff --git a/regress/test-exec.sh b/regress/test-exec.sh
index bdc2c1a49..aa4e6e5c0 100644
--- a/regress/test-exec.sh
+++ b/regress/test-exec.sh
@@ -140,6 +140,10 @@ if [ "x$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then
 	TEST_SSH_LOGFILE=/dev/null
 fi
 
+# Some data for test copies
+DATA=$OBJ/testdata
+cat $SSHD${EXEEXT} $SSHD${EXEEXT} $SSHD${EXEEXT} $SSHD${EXEEXT} >$DATA
+
 # these should be used in tests
 export SSH SSHD SSHAGENT SSHADD SSHKEYGEN SSHKEYSCAN SFTP SFTPSERVER SCP
 #echo $SSH $SSHD $SSHAGENT $SSHADD $SSHKEYGEN $SSHKEYSCAN $SFTP $SFTPSERVER $SCP
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From aa97d13fa22d410ad155d23b230fd3cce989ce25 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2013 11:31:05 +1100
Subject:  - (dtucker) [auth.c configure.ac platform.c platform.h] Accept uid 2
 ("bin")    in addition to root as an owner of system directories on AIX and
 HP-UX.    ok djm@

---
 ChangeLog    |  3 +++
 auth.c       |  4 ++--
 configure.ac |  6 ++++--
 platform.c   | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
 platform.h   |  5 ++---
 5 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 859c01ad9..730cdd92c 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
  - (dtucker) [regress/Makefile regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/test-exec.sh]
    Improve portability of cipher-speed test, based mostly on a patch from
    Iain Morgan.
+ - (dtucker) [auth.c configure.ac platform.c platform.h] Accept uid 2 ("bin")
+   in addition to root as an owner of system directories on AIX and HP-UX.
+   ok djm@
 
 20130307
  - (dtucker) [INSTALL] Bump documented autoconf version to what we're
diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index 054c7282f..6128fa460 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
 		snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf);
 		return -1;
 	}
-	if ((stp->st_uid != 0 && stp->st_uid != uid) ||
+	if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) ||
 	    (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) {
 		snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
 		    buf);
@@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
 		strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
 
 		if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
-		    (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
+		    (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) ||
 		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
 			snprintf(err, errlen,
 			    "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 6005d7c2f..a49de84e1 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.513 2013/03/08 01:14:23 djm Exp $
+# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.514 2013/03/12 00:31:05 dtucker Exp $
 #
 # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
 #
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 
 AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org])
-AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.513 $)
+AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.514 $)
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
 AC_LANG([C])
 
@@ -480,6 +480,7 @@ case "$host" in
 	AC_DEFINE([SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID], [1],
 	    [AIX 5.2 and 5.3 (and presumably newer) require this])
 	AC_DEFINE([PTY_ZEROREAD], [1], [read(1) can return 0 for a non-closed fd])
+	AC_DEFINE([PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID], 2, [System dirs owned by bin (uid 2)])
 	;;
 *-*-cygwin*)
 	check_for_libcrypt_later=1
@@ -565,6 +566,7 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
 	AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*"],
 		[String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account])
 	AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_PSTAT])
+	AC_DEFINE([PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID], 2, [System dirs owned by bin (uid 2)])
 	maildir="/var/mail"
 	LIBS="$LIBS -lsec"
 	AC_CHECK_LIB([xnet], [t_error], ,
diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
index a455472b3..3262b2478 100644
--- a/platform.c
+++ b/platform.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: platform.c,v 1.18 2011/01/11 06:02:25 djm Exp $ */
+/* $Id: platform.c,v 1.19 2013/03/12 00:31:05 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
@@ -194,3 +194,19 @@ platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *pw_name)
 	return NULL;
 #endif
 }
+
+/*
+ * return 1 if the specified uid is a uid that may own a system directory
+ * otherwise 0.
+ */
+int
+platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t uid)
+{
+	if (uid == 0)
+		return 1;
+#ifdef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID
+	if (uid == PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID)
+		return 1;
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/platform.h b/platform.h
index 944d2c340..19f6bfdd3 100644
--- a/platform.h
+++ b/platform.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: platform.h,v 1.7 2010/11/05 03:47:01 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: platform.h,v 1.8 2013/03/12 00:31:05 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
@@ -29,5 +29,4 @@ void platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
 void platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *);
 char *platform_get_krb5_client(const char *);
 char *platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *);
-
-
+int platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From a2438bbd28eb35a8968d193ac89b30a90e96f719 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2013 10:23:07 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) [configure.ac] Disable utmp, wtmp and/or lastlog if the
 platform     is unable to successfully compile them. Based on patch from des
 AT     des.no

---
 ChangeLog    |  5 +++++
 configure.ac | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 730cdd92c..635c4cd0c 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
+20120316
+ - (djm) [configure.ac] Disable utmp, wtmp and/or lastlog if the platform
+   is unable to successfully compile them. Based on patch from des AT
+   des.no
+
 20120312
  - (dtucker) [regress/Makefile regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/test-exec.sh]
    Improve portability of cipher-speed test, based mostly on a patch from
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index a49de84e1..bf161b257 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.514 2013/03/12 00:31:05 dtucker Exp $
+# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.515 2013/03/14 23:23:07 djm Exp $
 #
 # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
 #
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 
 AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org])
-AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.514 $)
+AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.515 $)
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
 AC_LANG([C])
 
@@ -4439,7 +4439,6 @@ if test -n "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
 		[Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmp file])
 fi
 
-
 dnl wtmpx detection
 AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines WTMPX_FILE])
 AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
@@ -4471,6 +4470,41 @@ if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then
 	AC_MSG_WARN([Please check and edit blibpath in LDFLAGS in Makefile])
 fi
 
+AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct lastlog.ll_line], [], [
+	AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG])
+	], [
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H
+#include <utmp.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
+#include <utmpx.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
+#include <lastlog.h>
+#endif
+	])
+
+AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct utmp.ut_line], [], [
+	AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP])
+	AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP])
+	], [
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H
+#include <utmp.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
+#include <utmpx.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
+#include <lastlog.h>
+#endif
+	])
+
 dnl Adding -Werror to CFLAGS early prevents configure tests from running.
 dnl Add now.
 CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $werror_flags"
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From f4db77d7668104c1237636781cfbd59ef30f79b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2013 10:34:25 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
 openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h]    Add a usleep replacement for platforms that
 lack it; ok dtucker

---
 ChangeLog                 |  2 ++
 configure.ac              |  5 +++--
 openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c | 11 +++++++++++
 openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h |  6 +++++-
 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 635c4cd0c..9f6fc7058 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
  - (djm) [configure.ac] Disable utmp, wtmp and/or lastlog if the platform
    is unable to successfully compile them. Based on patch from des AT
    des.no
+ - (djm) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h]
+   Add a usleep replacement for platforms that lack it; ok dtucker
 
 20120312
  - (dtucker) [regress/Makefile regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/test-exec.sh]
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index bf161b257..907192d60 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.515 2013/03/14 23:23:07 djm Exp $
+# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.516 2013/03/14 23:34:25 djm Exp $
 #
 # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
 #
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 
 AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org])
-AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.515 $)
+AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.516 $)
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
 AC_LANG([C])
 
@@ -1604,6 +1604,7 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
 	unsetenv \
 	updwtmpx \
 	user_from_uid \
+	usleep \
 	vasprintf \
 	vhangup \
 	vsnprintf \
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
index 8dc7d02d1..d75854e83 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
@@ -165,6 +165,17 @@ int nanosleep(const struct timespec *req, struct timespec *rem)
 }
 #endif
 
+#if !defined(HAVE_USLEEP)
+int usleep(unsigned int useconds)
+{
+	struct timespec ts;
+
+	ts.tv_sec = useconds / 1000000;
+	ts.tv_nsec = (useconds % 1000000) * 1000;
+	return nanosleep(&ts, NULL);
+}
+#endif
+
 #ifndef HAVE_TCGETPGRP
 pid_t
 tcgetpgrp(int fd)
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h b/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h
index de8367386..430066376 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: bsd-misc.h,v 1.22 2013/02/15 00:41:36 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: bsd-misc.h,v 1.23 2013/03/14 23:34:27 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
@@ -80,6 +80,10 @@ struct timespec {
 int nanosleep(const struct timespec *, struct timespec *);
 #endif
 
+#ifndef HAVE_USLEEP
+int usleep(unsigned int useconds);
+#endif
+
 #ifndef HAVE_TCGETPGRP
 pid_t tcgetpgrp(int);
 #endif
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 585284019020eccaf0ce744df198bd56b6aa109f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2013 11:22:37 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) [session.c] FreeBSD needs setusercontext(...,
 LOGIN_SETUMASK) to    occur after UID switch; patch from John Marshall via
 des AT des.no;    ok dtucker@

---
 ChangeLog | 3 +++
 session.c | 5 +++++
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 9f6fc7058..f9f2166b1 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@
    des.no
  - (djm) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h]
    Add a usleep replacement for platforms that lack it; ok dtucker
+ - (djm) [session.c] FreeBSD needs setusercontext(..., LOGIN_SETUMASK) to
+   occur after UID switch; patch from John Marshall via des AT des.no;
+   ok dtucker@
 
 20120312
  - (dtucker) [regress/Makefile regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/test-exec.sh]
diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
index 643e7fc59..19eaa20c3 100644
--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
@@ -1520,6 +1520,11 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
 			perror("unable to set user context (setuser)");
 			exit(1);
 		}
+		/* 
+		 * FreeBSD's setusercontext() will not apply the user's
+		 * own umask setting unless running with the user's UID.
+		 */
+		(void) setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETUMASK);
 #else
 		/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
 		permanently_set_uid(pw);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From aa86c3970f24fc22185a9561ae84eeae0c6d15cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2013 20:55:46 -0700
Subject:  - (tim) [configure.ac] OpenServer 5 wants lastlog even though it has
 none    of the bits the configure test looks for.

---
 ChangeLog    | 4 ++++
 configure.ac | 7 +++++--
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index f9f2166b1..502d85c3b 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+20120317
+ - (tim) [configure.ac] OpenServer 5 wants lastlog even though it has none
+   of the bits the configure test looks for.
+
 20120316
  - (djm) [configure.ac] Disable utmp, wtmp and/or lastlog if the platform
    is unable to successfully compile them. Based on patch from des AT
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 907192d60..5d835c93d 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.516 2013/03/14 23:34:25 djm Exp $
+# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.517 2013/03/17 03:55:47 tim Exp $
 #
 # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
 #
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 
 AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org])
-AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.516 $)
+AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.517 $)
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
 AC_LANG([C])
 
@@ -897,6 +897,7 @@ mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
 	AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getluid setluid])
 	MANTYPE=man
 	TEST_SHELL=ksh
+	SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE=yes
 	;;
 *-*-unicosmk*)
 	AC_DEFINE([NO_SSH_LASTLOG], [1],
@@ -4472,7 +4473,9 @@ if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then
 fi
 
 AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct lastlog.ll_line], [], [
+    if test x$SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE != "xyes" ; then
 	AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG])
+    fi
 	], [
 #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
 #include <sys/types.h>
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 63b4bcd04e1c57b77eabb4e4d359508a4b2af685 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2013 12:55:14 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) [configure.ac log.c scp.c sshconnect2.c
 openbsd-compat/vis.c]    [openbsd-compat/vis.h] FreeBSD's strnvis isn't
 compatible with OpenBSD's    so mark it as broken. Patch from des AT des.no

---
 ChangeLog            | 5 +++++
 configure.ac         | 5 +++--
 log.c                | 2 +-
 openbsd-compat/vis.c | 2 +-
 openbsd-compat/vis.h | 4 ++--
 scp.c                | 2 +-
 sshconnect2.c        | 2 +-
 7 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 502d85c3b..80429f849 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
+20120318
+ - (djm) [configure.ac log.c scp.c sshconnect2.c openbsd-compat/vis.c]
+   [openbsd-compat/vis.h] FreeBSD's strnvis isn't compatible with OpenBSD's
+   so mark it as broken. Patch from des AT des.no
+
 20120317
  - (tim) [configure.ac] OpenServer 5 wants lastlog even though it has none
    of the bits the configure test looks for.
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 5d835c93d..88dd29e9d 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.517 2013/03/17 03:55:47 tim Exp $
+# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.518 2013/03/20 01:55:15 djm Exp $
 #
 # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
 #
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 
 AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org])
-AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.517 $)
+AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.518 $)
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
 AC_LANG([C])
 
@@ -721,6 +721,7 @@ mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
 	AC_CHECK_HEADER([net/if_tap.h], ,
 	    AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_NO_L2], [1], [No layer 2 tunnel support]))
 	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GLOB], [1], [FreeBSD glob does not do what we need])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNVIS], [1], [FreeBSD strnvis does not do what we need])
 	;;
 *-*-bsdi*)
 	AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
diff --git a/log.c b/log.c
index 7f4a1b9c6..d69154a67 100644
--- a/log.c
+++ b/log.c
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
 #include <syslog.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <errno.h>
-#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H)
+#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
 # include <vis.h>
 #endif
 
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/vis.c b/openbsd-compat/vis.c
index 3a087b341..f6f5665c1 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/vis.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/vis.c
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
 /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/vis.c */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-#if !defined(HAVE_STRNVIS)
+#if !defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) || defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
 
 #include <ctype.h>
 #include <string.h>
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/vis.h b/openbsd-compat/vis.h
index 3898a9e70..d1286c99d 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/vis.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/vis.h
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
 /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/vis.h */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-#if !defined(HAVE_STRNVIS)
+#if !defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) || defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
 
 #ifndef _VIS_H_
 #define	_VIS_H_
@@ -92,4 +92,4 @@ ssize_t strnunvis(char *, const char *, size_t)
 
 #endif /* !_VIS_H_ */
 
-#endif /* !HAVE_STRNVIS */
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRNVIS || BROKEN_STRNVIS */
diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
index 08587b5f2..645d7403b 100644
--- a/scp.c
+++ b/scp.c
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <time.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
-#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H)
+#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
 #include <vis.h>
 #endif
 
diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
index a306447b3..d6af0b940 100644
--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
-#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H)
+#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
 #include <vis.h>
 #endif
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 83efe7c86168cc07b8e6cc6df6b54f7ace3b64a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2013 10:17:36 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) [contrib/ssh-copy-id contrib/ssh-copy-id.1] Updated to Phil 
    Hands' greatly revised version.

---
 ChangeLog             |   4 +
 contrib/ssh-copy-id   | 309 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 | 251 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 3 files changed, 459 insertions(+), 105 deletions(-)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 80429f849..d69fd350c 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+20120322
+ - (djm) [contrib/ssh-copy-id contrib/ssh-copy-id.1] Updated to Phil
+   Hands' greatly revised version.
+
 20120318
  - (djm) [configure.ac log.c scp.c sshconnect2.c openbsd-compat/vis.c]
    [openbsd-compat/vis.h] FreeBSD's strnvis isn't compatible with OpenBSD's
diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
index 9451aceec..af18a1929 100644
--- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
+++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
@@ -1,54 +1,293 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 
-# Shell script to install your public key on a remote machine
-# Takes the remote machine name as an argument.
-# Obviously, the remote machine must accept password authentication,
-# or one of the other keys in your ssh-agent, for this to work.
-
-ID_FILE="${HOME}/.ssh/id_rsa.pub"
-
-if [ "-i" = "$1" ]; then
-  shift
-  # check if we have 2 parameters left, if so the first is the new ID file
-  if [ -n "$2" ]; then
-    if expr "$1" : ".*\.pub" > /dev/null ; then
-      ID_FILE="$1"
-    else
-      ID_FILE="$1.pub"
-    fi
-    shift         # and this should leave $1 as the target name
+# Copyright (c) 1999-2013 Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>
+#               2013 Martin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com>
+#               2010 Adeodato =?iso-8859-1?Q?Sim=F3?= <asp16@alu.ua.es>
+#               2010 Eric Moret <eric.moret@gmail.com>
+#               2009 Xr <xr@i-jeuxvideo.com>
+#               2007 Justin Pryzby <justinpryzby@users.sourceforge.net>
+#               2004 Reini Urban <rurban@x-ray.at>
+#               2003 Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+# All rights reserved.
+#
+# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+# modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+# are met:
+# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+#    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+#    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+#    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+#
+# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+# IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+# OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+# IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+# INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+# NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+# DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+# THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+# (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+# THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+
+# Shell script to install your public key(s) on a remote machine
+# See the ssh-copy-id(1) man page for details
+
+# check that we have something mildly sane as our shell, or try to find something better
+if false ^ printf "%s: WARNING: ancient shell, hunting for a more modern one... " "$0"
+then
+  SANE_SH=${SANE_SH:-/usr/bin/ksh}
+  if printf 'true ^ false\n' | "$SANE_SH"
+  then
+    printf "'%s' seems viable.\n" "$SANE_SH"
+    exec "$SANE_SH" "$0" "$@"
+  else
+    cat <<-EOF
+	oh dear.
+
+	  If you have a more recent shell available, that supports \$(...) etc.
+	  please try setting the environment variable SANE_SH to the path of that
+	  shell, and then retry running this script. If that works, please report
+	  a bug describing your setup, and the shell you used to make it work.
+
+	EOF
+    printf "%s: ERROR: Less dimwitted shell required.\n" "$0"
+    exit 1
   fi
-else
-  if [ x$SSH_AUTH_SOCK != x ] && ssh-add -L >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-    GET_ID="$GET_ID ssh-add -L"
+fi
+
+DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE=$(ls -t ${HOME}/.ssh/id*.pub 2>/dev/null | grep -v -- '-cert.pub$' | head -n 1)
+
+usage () {
+  printf 'Usage: %s [-h|-?|-n] [-i [identity_file]] [-p port] [[-o <ssh -o options>] ...] [user@]hostname\n' "$0" >&2
+  exit 1
+}
+
+# escape any single quotes in an argument
+quote() {
+  printf "%s\n" "$1" | sed -e "s/'/'\\\\''/g"
+}
+
+use_id_file() {
+  local L_ID_FILE="$1"
+
+  if expr "$L_ID_FILE" : ".*\.pub$" >/dev/null ; then
+    PUB_ID_FILE="$L_ID_FILE"
+  else
+    PUB_ID_FILE="$L_ID_FILE.pub"
   fi
+
+  PRIV_ID_FILE=$(dirname "$PUB_ID_FILE")/$(basename "$PUB_ID_FILE" .pub)
+
+  # check that the files are readable
+  for f in $PUB_ID_FILE $PRIV_ID_FILE ; do
+    ErrMSG=$( { : < $f ; } 2>&1 ) || {
+      printf "\n%s: ERROR: failed to open ID file '%s': %s\n\n" "$0" "$f" "$(printf "%s\n" "$ErrMSG" | sed -e 's/.*: *//')"
+      exit 1
+    }
+  done
+  GET_ID="cat \"$PUB_ID_FILE\""
+}
+
+if [ -n "$SSH_AUTH_SOCK" ] && ssh-add -L >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+  GET_ID="ssh-add -L"
 fi
 
-if [ -z "`eval $GET_ID`" ] && [ -r "${ID_FILE}" ] ; then
-  GET_ID="cat \"${ID_FILE}\""
+while test "$#" -gt 0
+do
+  [ "${SEEN_OPT_I}" ] && expr "$1" : "[-]i" >/dev/null && {
+        printf "\n%s: ERROR: -i option must not be specified more than once\n\n" "$0"
+        usage
+  }
+
+  OPT= OPTARG=
+  # implement something like getopt to avoid Solaris pain
+  case "$1" in
+    -i?*|-o?*|-p?*)
+      OPT="$(printf -- "$1"|cut -c1-2)"
+      OPTARG="$(printf -- "$1"|cut -c3-)"
+      shift
+      ;;
+    -o|-p)
+      OPT="$1"
+      OPTARG="$2"
+      shift 2
+      ;;
+    -i)
+      OPT="$1"
+      test "$#" -le 2 || expr "$2" : "[-]" >/dev/null || {
+        OPTARG="$2"
+        shift
+      }
+      shift
+      ;;
+    -n|-h|-\?)
+      OPT="$1"
+      OPTARG=
+      shift
+      ;;
+    --)
+      shift
+      while test "$#" -gt 0
+      do
+        SAVEARGS="${SAVEARGS:+$SAVEARGS }'$(quote "$1")'"
+        shift
+      done
+      break
+      ;;
+    -*)
+      printf "\n%s: ERROR: invalid option (%s)\n\n" "$0" "$1"
+      usage
+      ;;
+    *)
+      SAVEARGS="${SAVEARGS:+$SAVEARGS }'$(quote "$1")'"
+      shift
+      continue
+      ;;
+  esac
+
+  case "$OPT" in
+    -i)
+      SEEN_OPT_I="yes"
+      use_id_file "${OPTARG:-$DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE}"
+      ;;
+    -o|-p)
+      SSH_OPTS="${SSH_OPTS:+$SSH_OPTS }$OPT '$(quote "$OPTARG")'"
+      ;;
+    -n)
+      DRY_RUN=1
+      ;;
+    -h|-\?)
+      usage
+      ;;
+  esac
+done 
+
+eval set -- "$SAVEARGS"
+
+if [ $# != 1 ] ; then
+  printf '%s: ERROR: Too many arguments.  Expecting a target hostname, got: %s\n\n' "$0" "$SAVEARGS" >&2
+  usage
 fi
 
-if [ -z "`eval $GET_ID`" ]; then
-  echo "$0: ERROR: No identities found" >&2
-  exit 1
+# drop trailing colon
+USER_HOST=$(printf "%s\n" "$1" | sed 's/:$//')
+# tack the hostname onto SSH_OPTS
+SSH_OPTS="${SSH_OPTS:+$SSH_OPTS }'$(quote "$USER_HOST")'"
+# and populate "$@" for later use (only way to get proper quoting of options)
+eval set -- "$SSH_OPTS"
+
+if [ -z "$(eval $GET_ID)" ] && [ -r "${PUB_ID_FILE:=$DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE}" ] ; then
+  use_id_file "$PUB_ID_FILE"
 fi
 
-if [ "$#" -lt 1 ] || [ "$1" = "-h" ] || [ "$1" = "--help" ]; then
-  echo "Usage: $0 [-i [identity_file]] [user@]machine" >&2
+if [ -z "$(eval $GET_ID)" ] ; then
+  printf '%s: ERROR: No identities found\n' "$0" >&2
   exit 1
 fi
 
-# strip any trailing colon
-host=`echo $1 | sed 's/:$//'`
+# populate_new_ids() uses several global variables ($USER_HOST, $SSH_OPTS ...)
+# and has the side effect of setting $NEW_IDS
+populate_new_ids() {
+  local L_SUCCESS="$1"
 
-{ eval "$GET_ID" ; } | ssh $host "umask 077; test -d ~/.ssh || mkdir ~/.ssh ; cat >> ~/.ssh/authorized_keys" || exit 1
+  # repopulate "$@" inside this function 
+  eval set -- "$SSH_OPTS"
 
-cat <<EOF
-Now try logging into the machine, with "ssh '$host'", and check in:
+  umask 0177
+  local L_TMP_ID_FILE=$(mktemp ~/.ssh/ssh-copy-id_id.XXXXXXXXXX)
+  trap "rm -f $L_TMP_ID_FILE*" EXIT TERM INT QUIT
+  printf '%s: INFO: attempting to log in with the new key(s), to filter out any that are already installed\n' "$0" >&2
+  NEW_IDS=$(
+    eval $GET_ID | {
+      while read ID ; do
+        printf '%s\n' "$ID" > $L_TMP_ID_FILE
 
-  ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+        # the next line assumes $PRIV_ID_FILE only set if using a single id file - this
+        # assumption will break if we implement the possibility of multiple -i options.
+        # The point being that if file based, ssh needs the private key, which it cannot
+        # find if only given the contents of the .pub file in an unrelated tmpfile
+        ssh -i "${PRIV_ID_FILE:-$L_TMP_ID_FILE}" \
+            -o PreferredAuthentications=publickey \
+            -o IdentitiesOnly=yes "$@" exit 2>$L_TMP_ID_FILE.stderr </dev/null
+        if [ "$?" = "$L_SUCCESS" ] ; then
+          : > $L_TMP_ID_FILE
+        else
+          grep 'Permission denied' $L_TMP_ID_FILE.stderr >/dev/null || {
+            sed -e 's/^/ERROR: /' <$L_TMP_ID_FILE.stderr >$L_TMP_ID_FILE
+            cat >/dev/null #consume the other keys, causing loop to end
+          }
+        fi
+
+        cat $L_TMP_ID_FILE
+      done
+    }
+  )
+  rm -f $L_TMP_ID_FILE* && trap - EXIT TERM INT QUIT
+
+  if expr "$NEW_IDS" : "^ERROR: " >/dev/null ; then
+    printf '\n%s: %s\n\n' "$0" "$NEW_IDS" >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+  if [ -z "$NEW_IDS" ] ; then
+    printf '\n%s: WARNING: All keys were skipped because they already exist on the remote system.\n\n' "$0" >&2
+    exit 0
+  fi
+  printf '%s: INFO: %d key(s) remain to be installed -- if you are prompted now it is to install the new keys\n' "$0" "$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l)" >&2
+}
 
-to make sure we haven't added extra keys that you weren't expecting.
+REMOTE_VERSION=$(ssh -v -o PreferredAuthentications=',' "$@" 2>&1 |
+                 sed -ne 's/.*remote software version //p')
 
-EOF
+case "$REMOTE_VERSION" in
+  NetScreen*)
+    populate_new_ids 1
+    for KEY in $(printf "%s" "$NEW_IDS" | cut -d' ' -f2) ; do
+      KEY_NO=$(($KEY_NO + 1))
+      printf "%s\n" "$KEY" | grep ssh-dss >/dev/null || {
+         printf '%s: WARNING: Non-dsa key (#%d) skipped (NetScreen only supports DSA keys)\n' "$0" "$KEY_NO" >&2
+         continue
+      }
+      [ "$DRY_RUN" ] || printf 'set ssh pka-dsa key %s\nsave\nexit\n' "$KEY" | ssh -T "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1
+      if [ $? = 255 ] ; then
+        printf '%s: ERROR: installation of key #%d failed (please report a bug describing what caused this, so that we can make this message useful)\n' "$0" "$KEY_NO" >&2
+      else
+        ADDED=$(($ADDED + 1))
+      fi
+    done
+    if [ -z "$ADDED" ] ; then
+      exit 1
+    fi
+    ;;
+  *)
+    # Assuming that the remote host treats ~/.ssh/authorized_keys as one might expect
+    populate_new_ids 0
+    [ "$DRY_RUN" ] || printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | ssh "$@" "
+		umask 077 ;
+		mkdir -p .ssh && cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys || exit 1 ;
+		if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then restorecon -F .ssh .ssh/authorized_keys ; fi" \
+      || exit 1
+    ADDED=$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l)
+    ;;
+esac
+
+if [ "$DRY_RUN" ] ; then
+  cat <<-EOF
+	=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
+	Would have added the following key(s):
+
+	$NEW_IDS
+	=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
+	EOF
+else
+  cat <<-EOF
+
+	Number of key(s) added: $ADDED
+
+	Now try logging into the machine, with:   "ssh $SSH_OPTS"
+	and check to make sure that only the key(s) you wanted were added.
+
+	EOF
+fi
 
+# =-=-=-=
diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 b/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1
index cb15ab24d..67a59e492 100644
--- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1
+++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1
@@ -1,75 +1,186 @@
 .ig \"  -*- nroff -*-
-Copyright (c) 1999 Philip Hands Computing <http://www.hands.com/>
+Copyright (c) 1999-2013 hands.com Ltd. <http://hands.com/>
 
-Permission is granted to make and distribute verbatim copies of
-this manual provided the copyright notice and this permission notice
-are preserved on all copies.
+Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+are met:
+1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+   documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 
-Permission is granted to copy and distribute modified versions of this
-manual under the conditions for verbatim copying, provided that the
-entire resulting derived work is distributed under the terms of a
-permission notice identical to this one.
-
-Permission is granted to copy and distribute translations of this
-manual into another language, under the above conditions for modified
-versions, except that this permission notice may be included in
-translations approved by the Free Software Foundation instead of in
-the original English.
+THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 ..
-.TH SSH-COPY-ID 1 "14 November 1999" "OpenSSH"
-.SH NAME
-ssh-copy-id \- install your public key in a remote machine's authorized_keys
-.SH SYNOPSIS
-.B ssh-copy-id [-i [identity_file]]
-.I "[user@]machine"
+.Dd $Mdocdate: June 17 2010 $
+.Dt SSH-COPY-ID 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh-copy-id
+.Nd use locally available keys to authorise logins on a remote machine
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm
+.Op Fl n
+.Op Fl i Op Ar identity_file
+.Op Fl p Ar port
+.Op Fl o Ar ssh_option
+.Op Ar user Ns @ Ns
+.Ar hostname
+.Nm
+.Fl h | Fl ?
 .br
-.SH DESCRIPTION
-.BR ssh-copy-id
-is a script that uses ssh to log into a remote machine and
-append the indicated identity file to that machine's
-.B ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
-file.
-.PP
-If the
-.B -i
-option is given then the identity file (defaults to
-.BR ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub )
-is used, regardless of whether there are any keys in your
-.BR ssh-agent .
-Otherwise, if this:
-.PP
-.B "      ssh-add -L"
-.PP
-provides any output, it uses that in preference to the identity file.
-.PP
-If the
-.B -i
-option is used, or the
-.B ssh-add
-produced no output, then it uses the contents of the identity
-file.  Once it has one or more fingerprints (by whatever means) it
-uses ssh to append them to
-.B ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
-on the remote machine (creating the file, and directory, if necessary.)
-
-.SH NOTES
-This program does not modify the permissions of any
-pre-existing files or directories. Therefore, if the remote
-.B sshd
-has
-.B StrictModes
-set in its
-configuration, then the user's home,
-.B ~/.ssh
-folder, and
-.B ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
-file may need to have group writability disabled manually, e.g. via
-
-.B "      chmod go-w ~ ~/.ssh ~/.ssh/authorized_keys"
-
-on the remote machine.
-
-.SH "SEE ALSO"
-.BR ssh (1),
-.BR ssh-agent (1),
-.BR sshd (8)
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+is a script that uses
+.Xr ssh 1
+to log into a remote machine (presumably using a login password,
+so password authentication should be enabled, unless you've done some
+clever use of multiple identities).  It assembles a list of one or more
+fingerprints (as described below) and tries to log in with each key, to
+see if any of them are already installed (of course, if you are not using
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+this may result in you being repeatedly prompted for pass-phrases).
+It then assembles a list of those that failed to log in, and using ssh,
+enables logins with those keys on the remote server.  By default it adds
+the keys by appending them to the remote user's
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+(creating the file, and directory, if necessary).  It is also capable
+of detecting if the remote system is a NetScreen, and using its
+.Ql set ssh pka-dsa key ...
+command instead.
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl i Ar identity_file
+Use only the key(s) contained in
+.Ar identity_file
+(rather than looking for identities via
+.Xr ssh-add 1
+or in the
+.Ic default_ID_file ) .
+If the filename does not end in
+.Pa .pub
+this is added.  If the filename is omitted, the 
+.Ic default_ID_file
+is used.
+.Pp
+Note that this can be used to ensure that the keys copied have the
+comment one prefers and/or extra options applied, by ensuring that the
+key file has these set as preferred before the copy is attempted.
+.It Fl n
+do a dry-run.  Instead of installing keys on the remote system simply
+prints the key(s) that would have been installed.
+.It Fl h , Fl ?
+Print Usage summary
+.It Fl p Ar port , Fl o Ar ssh_option
+These two options are simply passed through untouched, along with their
+argument, to allow one to set the port or other
+.Xr ssh 1
+options, respectively.
+.Pp
+Rather than specifying these as command line options, it is often better to use (per-host) settings in
+.Xr ssh 1 Ns 's
+configuration file:
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+.El
+.Pp
+Default behaviour without
+.Fl i ,
+is to check if
+.Ql ssh-add -L
+provides any output, and if so those keys are used.  Note that this results in
+the comment on the key being the filename that was given to
+.Xr ssh-add 1
+when the key was loaded into your
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+rather than the comment contained in that file, which is a bit of a shame.
+Otherwise, if
+.Xr ssh-add 1
+provides no keys contents of the 
+.Ic default_ID_file
+will be used.
+.Pp
+The
+.Ic default_ID_file
+is the most recent file that matches:
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id*.pub ,
+(excluding those that match
+.Pa ~/.ssh/*-cert.pub )
+so if you create a key that is not the one you want
+.Nm
+to use, just use
+.Xr touch 1
+on your preferred key's 
+.Pa .pub
+file to reinstate it as the most recent.
+.Pp
+.Sh EXAMPLES
+If you have already installed keys from one system on a lot of remote
+hosts, and you then create a new key, on a new client machine, say,
+it can be difficult to keep track of which systems on which you've
+installed the new key.  One way of dealing with this is to load both
+the new key and old key(s) into your
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
+Load the new key first, without the
+.Fl c
+option, then load one or more old keys into the agent, possibly by
+ssh-ing to the client machine that has that old key, using the
+.Fl A
+option to allow agent forwarding:
+.Pp
+.D1 user@newclient$ ssh-add
+.D1 user@newclient$ ssh -A old.client
+.D1 user@oldl$ ssh-add -c
+.D1 No   ... prompt for pass-phrase ...
+.D1 user@old$ logoff
+.D1 user@newclient$ ssh someserver
+.Pp
+now, if the new key is installed on the server, you'll be allowed in
+unprompted, whereas if you only have the old key(s) enabled, you'll be
+asked for confirmation, which is your cue to log back out and run
+.Pp
+.D1 user@newclient$ ssh-copy-id -i someserver
+.Pp
+The reason you might want to specify the -i option in this case is to
+ensure that the comment on the installed key is the one from the
+.Pa .pub
+file, rather than just the filename that was loaded into you agent.
+It also ensures that only the id you intended is installed, rather than
+all the keys that you have in your
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
+Of course, you can specify another id, or use the contents of the
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+as you prefer.
+.Pp
+Having mentioned
+.Xr ssh-add 1 Ns 's
+.Fl c
+option, you might consider using this whenever using agent forwarding
+to avoid your key being hijacked, but it is much better to instead use
+.Xr ssh 1 Ns 's
+.Ar ProxyCommand
+and 
+.Fl W
+option,
+to bounce through remote servers while always doing direct end-to-end
+authentication. This way the middle hop(s) don't get access to your
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
+A web search for
+.Ql ssh proxycommand nc
+should prove enlightening (N.B. the modern approach is to use the
+.Fl W
+option, rather than
+.Xr nc 1 ) .
+.Sh "SEE ALSO"
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From eed8dc261018aea4d6b8606ca3addc9f8cf9ed1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2013 10:25:22 +1100
Subject:  - (djm) Release 6.2p1

---
 ChangeLog | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

(limited to 'ChangeLog')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index d69fd350c..dbd8b0aa9 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 20120322
  - (djm) [contrib/ssh-copy-id contrib/ssh-copy-id.1] Updated to Phil
    Hands' greatly revised version.
+ - (djm) Release 6.2p1
 
 20120318
  - (djm) [configure.ac log.c scp.c sshconnect2.c openbsd-compat/vis.c]
-- 
cgit v1.2.3