From 094cd0ba02a3a29f170227dc0219e08c006c9b86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2005 21:56:48 +1100
Subject:    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2005/01/22 08:17:59      [auth.c]     
 Log source of connections denied by AllowUsers, DenyUsers, AllowGroups and   
   DenyGroups.  bz #909, ok djm@

---
 auth.c | 25 ++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

(limited to 'auth.c')

diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index 0956b0b19..4698e3990 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.56 2004/07/28 09:40:29 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.57 2005/01/22 08:17:59 dtucker Exp $");
 
 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
 #include <login.h>
@@ -153,8 +153,9 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
 		for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
 			if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
 			    options.deny_users[i])) {
-				logit("User %.100s not allowed because listed in DenyUsers",
-				    pw->pw_name);
+				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
+				    "because listed in DenyUsers",
+				    pw->pw_name, hostname);
 				return 0;
 			}
 	}
@@ -166,16 +167,16 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
 				break;
 		/* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
 		if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
-			logit("User %.100s not allowed because not listed in AllowUsers",
-			    pw->pw_name);
+			logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
+			    "not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname);
 			return 0;
 		}
 	}
 	if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
 		/* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
 		if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
-			logit("User %.100s not allowed because not in any group",
-			    pw->pw_name);
+			logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
+			    "not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname);
 			return 0;
 		}
 
@@ -184,8 +185,9 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
 			if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
 			    options.num_deny_groups)) {
 				ga_free();
-				logit("User %.100s not allowed because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
-				    pw->pw_name);
+				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
+				    "because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
+				    pw->pw_name, hostname);
 				return 0;
 			}
 		/*
@@ -196,8 +198,9 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
 			if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
 			    options.num_allow_groups)) {
 				ga_free();
-				logit("User %.100s not allowed because none of user's groups are listed in AllowGroups",
-				    pw->pw_name);
+				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
+				    "because none of user's groups are listed "
+				    "in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname);
 				return 0;
 			}
 		ga_free();
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 42d9dc75ed2eefa6eeffc892f02eb164c1860603 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2005 17:10:11 +1100
Subject:  - (dtucker) [auth.c loginrec.h
 openbsd-compat/{bsd-cray,port-aix}.{c,h}]    Make record_failed_login() call
 provide hostname rather than having the    implementations having to do
 lookups themselves.  Only affects AIX and    UNICOS (the latter only uses the
 "user" parameter anyway).  ok djm@

---
 ChangeLog                 | 6 +++++-
 auth.c                    | 7 +++++--
 loginrec.h                | 4 +++-
 openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c | 4 ++--
 openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.h | 6 +++---
 openbsd-compat/port-aix.c | 7 +------
 openbsd-compat/port-aix.h | 3 +--
 7 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

(limited to 'auth.c')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index eb897ec41..82758ca10 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
 20050202
  - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/realpath.c] Sync up with realpath
    rev 1.11 from OpenBSD and make it use fchdir if available.  ok djm@
+ - (dtucker) [auth.c loginrec.h openbsd-compat/{bsd-cray,port-aix}.{c,h}]
+   Make record_failed_login() call provide hostname rather than having the
+   implementations having to do lookups themselves.  Only affects AIX and
+   UNICOS (the latter only uses the "user" parameter anyway).  ok djm@
 
 20050201
  - (dtucker) [log.c] Bug #973: force log_init() to open syslog, since on some
@@ -2055,4 +2059,4 @@
    - (djm) Trim deprecated options from INSTALL. Mention UsePAM
    - (djm) Fix quote handling in sftp; Patch from admorten AT umich.edu
 
-$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3629 2005/02/01 23:43:59 dtucker Exp $
+$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3630 2005/02/02 06:10:11 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index 4698e3990..dfc1be374 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.57 2005/01/22 08:17:59 dtucker Exp $");
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "bufaux.h"
 #include "packet.h"
+#include "loginrec.h"
 
 /* import */
 extern ServerOptions options;
@@ -244,7 +245,8 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
 
 #ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
 	if (authenticated == 0 && strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
-		record_failed_login(authctxt->user, "ssh");
+		record_failed_login(authctxt->user,
+		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
 #endif
 }
 
@@ -468,7 +470,8 @@ getpwnamallow(const char *user)
 		logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s",
 		    user, get_remote_ipaddr());
 #ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
-		record_failed_login(user, "ssh");
+		record_failed_login(user,
+		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
 #endif
 		return (NULL);
 	}
diff --git a/loginrec.h b/loginrec.h
index 6b7233256..d1a12a853 100644
--- a/loginrec.h
+++ b/loginrec.h
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
 #include <netinet/in.h>
 #include <sys/socket.h>
 
-/* RCSID("$Id: loginrec.h,v 1.8 2005/01/20 11:07:30 dtucker Exp $"); */
+/* RCSID("$Id: loginrec.h,v 1.9 2005/02/02 06:10:11 dtucker Exp $"); */
 
 /**
  ** you should use the login_* calls to work around platform dependencies
@@ -132,4 +132,6 @@ char *line_fullname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize);
 char *line_stripname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize);
 char *line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize);
 
+void record_failed_login(const char *, const char *, const char *);
+
 #endif /* _HAVE_LOGINREC_H_ */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c
index f630366be..d1f1c059c 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /* 
- * $Id: bsd-cray.c,v 1.13 2004/01/30 03:34:22 dtucker Exp $
+ * $Id: bsd-cray.c,v 1.14 2005/02/02 06:10:11 dtucker Exp $
  *
  * bsd-cray.c
  *
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ cray_access_denied(char *username)
  * record_failed_login: generic "login failed" interface function
  */
 void
-record_failed_login(const char *user, const char *ttyname)
+record_failed_login(const char *user, const char *hostname, const char *ttyname)
 {
 	cray_login_failure((char *)user, IA_UDBERR);
 }
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.h b/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.h
index de6ba1a8d..774eceb5a 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: bsd-cray.h,v 1.11 2004/01/30 03:34:22 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: bsd-cray.h,v 1.12 2005/02/02 06:10:11 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2002, Cray Inc.  (Wendy Palm <wendyp@cray.com>)
@@ -42,10 +42,10 @@ void cray_init_job(struct passwd *);
 void cray_job_termination_handler(int);
 void cray_login_failure(char *, int );
 int cray_access_denied(char *);
-#define CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN 1
-void record_failed_login(const char *, const char *);
 extern char cray_tmpdir[];
 
+#define CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN 1
+
 #ifndef IA_SSHD
 # define IA_SSHD IA_LOGIN
 #endif
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c b/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c
index e7eb179ec..79d180211 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c
@@ -28,8 +28,6 @@
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "log.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
 
@@ -38,7 +36,6 @@
 #include <uinfo.h>
 #include "port-aix.h"
 
-extern ServerOptions options;
 extern Buffer loginmsg;
 
 # ifdef HAVE_SETAUTHDB
@@ -280,10 +277,8 @@ sys_auth_record_login(const char *user, const char *host, const char *ttynm)
  * record_failed_login: generic "login failed" interface function
  */
 void
-record_failed_login(const char *user, const char *ttyname)
+record_failed_login(const char *user, const char *hostname, const char *ttyname)
 {
-	char *hostname = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
-
 	if (geteuid() != 0)
 		return;
 
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h b/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h
index 29e9751ce..751139004 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: port-aix.h,v 1.21 2004/08/14 14:09:12 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: port-aix.h,v 1.22 2005/02/02 06:10:11 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  *
@@ -68,7 +68,6 @@ int sys_auth_allowed_user(struct passwd *);
 # define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_RECORD_LOGIN 1
 int sys_auth_record_login(const char *, const char *, const char *);
 # define CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN 1
-void record_failed_login(const char *, const char *);
 #endif
 
 void aix_setauthdb(const char *);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 2fba993080eba14e339d6a6666ee79580ee20f97 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2005 23:30:24 +1100
Subject:  - (dtucker) [auth.c canohost.c canohost.h configure.ac defines.h
 loginrec.c]    Bug #974: Teach sshd to write failed login records to btmp for
 failed auth    attempts (currently only for password, kbdint and C/R, only on
 Linux and    HP-UX), based on code from login.c from util-linux. With
 ashok_kovai at    hotmail.com, ok djm@

---
 ChangeLog    |   7 +++-
 auth.c       |   5 ++-
 canohost.c   |   3 +-
 canohost.h   |   2 ++
 configure.ac |   5 ++-
 defines.h    |  11 ++++++-
 loginrec.c   | 104 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 7 files changed, 130 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

(limited to 'auth.c')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index d9670f361..07ae663d7 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -9,6 +9,11 @@
    the process.  Since we also unset KRB5CCNAME at startup, if it's set after
    authentication it must have been set by the platform's native auth system.
    This was already done for AIX; this enables it for the general case.
+ - (dtucker) [auth.c canohost.c canohost.h configure.ac defines.h loginrec.c]
+   Bug #974: Teach sshd to write failed login records to btmp for failed auth
+   attempts (currently only for password, kbdint and C/R, only on Linux and
+   HP-UX), based on code from login.c from util-linux. With ashok_kovai at
+   hotmail.com, ok djm@
 
 20050201
  - (dtucker) [log.c] Bug #973: force log_init() to open syslog, since on some
@@ -2063,4 +2068,4 @@
    - (djm) Trim deprecated options from INSTALL. Mention UsePAM
    - (djm) Fix quote handling in sftp; Patch from admorten AT umich.edu
 
-$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3631 2005/02/02 07:30:33 dtucker Exp $
+$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3632 2005/02/02 12:30:24 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index dfc1be374..b6c00c12b 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -244,7 +244,10 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
 	    info);
 
 #ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
-	if (authenticated == 0 && strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
+	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed &&
+	    (strcmp(method, "password") == 0 ||
+	    strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0) ||
+	    strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0)
 		record_failed_login(authctxt->user,
 		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
 #endif
diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c
index 8ad684d6c..e5a6b6be3 100644
--- a/canohost.c
+++ b/canohost.c
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.41 2004/07/21 11:51:29 djm Exp $");
 #include "canohost.h"
 
 static void check_ip_options(int, char *);
-static void ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *, socklen_t *);
 
 /*
  * Return the canonical name of the host at the other end of the socket. The
@@ -166,7 +165,7 @@ check_ip_options(int sock, char *ipaddr)
 #endif /* IP_OPTIONS */
 }
 
-static void
+void
 ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *addr, socklen_t *len)
 {
 	struct sockaddr_in6 *a6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr;
diff --git a/canohost.h b/canohost.h
index 4347b488a..df1f125e5 100644
--- a/canohost.h
+++ b/canohost.h
@@ -23,3 +23,5 @@ char		*get_local_name(int);
 
 int		 get_remote_port(void);
 int		 get_local_port(void);
+
+void		 ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *, socklen_t *);
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 94d6b1e78..86b26daf9 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.236 2005/02/01 23:44:00 dtucker Exp $
+# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.237 2005/02/02 12:30:25 dtucker Exp $
 #
 # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
 #
@@ -219,6 +219,7 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
 	AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_UTMP)
 	AC_DEFINE(LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING, "*")
 	AC_DEFINE(SPT_TYPE,SPT_PSTAT)
+	AC_DEFINE(USE_BTMP, 1, [Use btmp to log bad logins])
 	check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo=1
 	check_for_conflicting_getspnam=1
 	LIBS="$LIBS -lsec"
@@ -256,6 +257,8 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
 	AC_DEFINE(LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX, "!")
 	AC_DEFINE(SPT_TYPE,SPT_REUSEARGV)
 	AC_DEFINE(LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO, EPERM)
+	AC_DEFINE(_PATH_BTMP, "/var/log/btmp", [log for bad login attempts])
+	AC_DEFINE(USE_BTMP, 1, [Use btmp to log bad logins])
 	inet6_default_4in6=yes
 	case `uname -r` in
 	1.*|2.0.*)
diff --git a/defines.h b/defines.h
index 8c1d9c409..4d59408ad 100644
--- a/defines.h
+++ b/defines.h
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
 #ifndef _DEFINES_H
 #define _DEFINES_H
 
-/* $Id: defines.h,v 1.117 2004/06/22 03:27:16 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: defines.h,v 1.118 2005/02/02 12:30:25 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 
 /* Constants */
@@ -644,6 +644,15 @@ struct winsize {
 # define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1
 #endif
 
+/* HP-UX 11.11 */
+#ifdef BTMP_FILE
+# define _PATH_BTMP BTMP_FILE
+#endif
+
+#if defined(USE_BTMP) && defined(_PATH_BTMP)
+# define CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
+#endif
+
 /** end of login recorder definitions */
 
 #endif /* _DEFINES_H */
diff --git a/loginrec.c b/loginrec.c
index 25aa29f2f..e77318ba3 100644
--- a/loginrec.c
+++ b/loginrec.c
@@ -25,6 +25,27 @@
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 
+/*
+ * The btmp logging code is derived from login.c from util-linux and is under
+ * the the following license:
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1980, 1987, 1988 The Regents of the University of California.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms are permitted
+ * provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
+ * duplicated in all such forms and that any documentation,
+ * advertising materials, and other materials related to such
+ * distribution and use acknowledge that the software was developed
+ * by the University of California, Berkeley.  The name of the
+ * University may not be used to endorse or promote products derived
+ * from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+ */
+
+
 /**
  ** loginrec.c:  platform-independent login recording and lastlog retrieval
  **/
@@ -131,6 +152,8 @@
 #include "loginrec.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "atomicio.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
 
 #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
 # include <util.h>
@@ -140,7 +163,7 @@
 # include <libutil.h>
 #endif
 
-RCSID("$Id: loginrec.c,v 1.62 2004/09/12 05:26:01 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$Id: loginrec.c,v 1.63 2005/02/02 12:30:25 dtucker Exp $");
 
 /**
  ** prototypes for helper functions in this file
@@ -1563,3 +1586,82 @@ lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
 	return (0);
 }
 #endif /* USE_LASTLOG */
+
+#ifdef USE_BTMP
+  /*
+   * Logs failed login attempts in _PATH_BTMP if that exists.
+   * The most common login failure is to give password instead of username.
+   * So the _PATH_BTMP file checked for the correct permission, so that
+   * only root can read it.
+   */
+
+void
+record_failed_login(const char *username, const char *hostname,
+    const char *ttyn)
+{
+	int fd;
+	struct utmp ut;
+	struct sockaddr_storage from;
+	size_t fromlen = sizeof(from);
+	struct sockaddr_in *a4;
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *a6;
+	time_t t;
+	struct stat fst;
+
+	if (geteuid() != 0)
+		return;
+	if ((fd = open(_PATH_BTMP, O_WRONLY | O_APPEND)) < 0) {
+		debug("Unable to open the btmp file %s: %s", _PATH_BTMP,
+		    strerror(errno));
+		return;
+	}
+	if (fstat(fd, &fst) < 0) {
+		logit("%s: fstat of %s failed: %s", __func__, _PATH_BTMP,
+		    strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if((fst.st_mode & (S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO)) || (fst.st_uid != 0)){
+		logit("Excess permission or bad ownership on file %s",
+		    _PATH_BTMP);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(ut));
+	/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
+	strncpy(ut.ut_user, username, sizeof(ut.ut_user));
+	strlcpy(ut.ut_line, "ssh:notty", sizeof(ut.ut_line));
+
+	time(&t);
+	ut.ut_time = t;     /* ut_time is not always a time_t */
+	ut.ut_type = LOGIN_PROCESS;
+	ut.ut_pid = getpid();
+
+	/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
+	strncpy(ut.ut_host, hostname, sizeof(ut.ut_host));
+
+	if (packet_connection_is_on_socket() &&
+	    getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
+	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == 0) {
+		ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
+		if (from.ss_family == AF_INET) {
+			a4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&from;
+			memcpy(&ut.ut_addr, &(a4->sin_addr),
+			    MIN_SIZEOF(ut.ut_addr, a4->sin_addr));
+		}
+#ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
+		if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) {
+			a6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&from;
+			memcpy(&ut.ut_addr_v6, &(a6->sin6_addr),
+			    MIN_SIZEOF(ut.ut_addr_v6, a6->sin6_addr));
+		}
+#endif
+	}
+
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, &ut, sizeof(ut)) != sizeof(ut))
+		error("Failed to write to %s: %s", _PATH_BTMP,
+		    strerror(errno));
+
+out:
+	close(fd);
+}
+#endif	/* USE_BTMP */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 269a1ea1c80a855d1eb74fccba6dd5c75947c5d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2005 00:20:53 +1100
Subject:  - (dtucker) [Makefile.in auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2.c loginrec.c
 monitor.c    monitor.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h session.c sshd.c] Bug
 #125:    (first stage) Add audit instrumentation to sshd, currently disabled
 by    default.  with suggestions from and djm@

---
 ChangeLog      |  6 +++++-
 Makefile.in    |  4 ++--
 auth.c         | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 auth.h         |  1 +
 auth1.c        | 12 +++++++++--
 auth2.c        | 15 ++++++++++++--
 loginrec.c     |  9 +++++++-
 monitor.c      | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 monitor.h      |  1 +
 monitor_wrap.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 monitor_wrap.h |  6 ++++++
 session.c      | 16 +++++++++++++++
 sshd.c         | 12 +++++++++++
 13 files changed, 211 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

(limited to 'auth.c')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 07ae663d7..e2dc30e5a 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -14,6 +14,10 @@
    attempts (currently only for password, kbdint and C/R, only on Linux and
    HP-UX), based on code from login.c from util-linux. With ashok_kovai at
    hotmail.com, ok djm@
+ - (dtucker) [Makefile.in auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2.c loginrec.c monitor.c
+   monitor.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h session.c sshd.c] Bug #125:
+   (first stage) Add audit instrumentation to sshd, currently disabled by
+   default.  with suggestions from and djm@
 
 20050201
  - (dtucker) [log.c] Bug #973: force log_init() to open syslog, since on some
@@ -2068,4 +2072,4 @@
    - (djm) Trim deprecated options from INSTALL. Mention UsePAM
    - (djm) Fix quote handling in sftp; Patch from admorten AT umich.edu
 
-$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3632 2005/02/02 12:30:24 dtucker Exp $
+$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3633 2005/02/02 13:20:53 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
index 8a1c9f7c0..c6cfef11a 100644
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.267 2005/01/18 01:05:18 dtucker Exp $
+# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.268 2005/02/02 13:20:53 dtucker Exp $
 
 # uncomment if you run a non bourne compatable shell. Ie. csh
 #SHELL = @SH@
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \
 	monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o \
 	auth-krb5.o \
 	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
-	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o
+	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o audit.o
 
 MANPAGES	= scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-rand-helper.8.out ssh-keysign.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out
 MANPAGES_IN	= scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-rand-helper.8 ssh-keysign.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5
diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index b6c00c12b..bbf3a54a4 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.57 2005/01/22 08:17:59 dtucker Exp $");
 #include "bufaux.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "loginrec.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
 
 /* import */
 extern ServerOptions options;
@@ -251,6 +252,44 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
 		record_failed_login(authctxt->user,
 		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
 #endif
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed) {
+		ssh_audit_event_t event;
+
+		debug3("audit failed auth attempt, method %s euid %d",
+		    method, (int)geteuid());
+		/*
+		 * Because the auth loop is used in both monitor and slave,
+		 * we must be careful to send each event only once and with
+		 * enough privs to write the event.
+		 */
+		event = audit_classify_auth(method);
+		switch(event) {
+		case AUTH_FAIL_NONE:
+		case AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
+		case AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
+			if (geteuid() == 0)
+				audit_event(event);
+			break;
+		case AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
+		case AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
+		case AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
+			/*
+			 * This is required to handle the case where privsep
+			 * is enabled but it's root logging in, since
+			 * use_privsep won't be cleared until after a
+			 * successful login.
+			 */
+			if (geteuid() == 0)
+				audit_event(event);
+			else
+				PRIVSEP(audit_event(event));
+			break;
+		default:
+			error("unknown authentication audit event %d", event);
+		}
+	}
+#endif
 }
 
 /*
@@ -476,6 +515,9 @@ getpwnamallow(const char *user)
 		record_failed_login(user,
 		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
 #endif
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+		audit_event(INVALID_USER);
+#endif /* AUDIT_EVENTS */
 		return (NULL);
 	}
 	if (!allowed_user(pw))
diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
index 6c0089dc7..8d1f93403 100644
--- a/auth.h
+++ b/auth.h
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ int auth_shadow_pwexpired(Authctxt *);
 #endif
 
 #include "auth-pam.h"
+#include "audit.h"
 void remove_kbdint_device(const char *);
 
 void disable_forwarding(void);
diff --git a/auth1.c b/auth1.c
index 2a9d18b9a..aeb5d8cb9 100644
--- a/auth1.c
+++ b/auth1.c
@@ -247,8 +247,12 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 #else
 		/* Special handling for root */
 		if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
-		    !auth_root_allowed(get_authname(type)))
+		    !auth_root_allowed(get_authname(type))) {
 			authenticated = 0;
+# ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+			PRIVSEP(audit_event(LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED));
+# endif
+		}
 #endif
 
 #ifdef USE_PAM
@@ -283,8 +287,12 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		if (authenticated)
 			return;
 
-		if (authctxt->failures++ > options.max_authtries)
+		if (authctxt->failures++ > options.max_authtries) {
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+			PRIVSEP(audit_event(LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
+#endif
 			packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user);
+		}
 
 		packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
 		packet_send();
diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
index 60e261f7f..2727e0ff5 100644
--- a/auth2.c
+++ b/auth2.c
@@ -166,6 +166,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 #ifdef USE_PAM
 			if (options.use_pam)
 				PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt));
+#endif
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+			PRIVSEP(audit_event(INVALID_USER));
 #endif
 		}
 		setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
@@ -214,8 +217,12 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
 
 	/* Special handling for root */
 	if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
-	    !auth_root_allowed(method))
+	    !auth_root_allowed(method)) {
 		authenticated = 0;
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+		PRIVSEP(audit_event(LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED));
+#endif
+	}
 
 #ifdef USE_PAM
 	if (options.use_pam && authenticated) {
@@ -255,8 +262,12 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
 		/* now we can break out */
 		authctxt->success = 1;
 	} else {
-		if (authctxt->failures++ > options.max_authtries)
+		if (authctxt->failures++ > options.max_authtries) {
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+			PRIVSEP(audit_event(LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
+#endif
 			packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user);
+		}
 		methods = authmethods_get();
 		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE);
 		packet_put_cstring(methods);
diff --git a/loginrec.c b/loginrec.c
index e77318ba3..0fa9bdea7 100644
--- a/loginrec.c
+++ b/loginrec.c
@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@
 #include "atomicio.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "canohost.h"
+#include "auth.h"
 
 #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
 # include <util.h>
@@ -163,7 +164,7 @@
 # include <libutil.h>
 #endif
 
-RCSID("$Id: loginrec.c,v 1.63 2005/02/02 12:30:25 dtucker Exp $");
+RCSID("$Id: loginrec.c,v 1.64 2005/02/02 13:20:53 dtucker Exp $");
 
 /**
  ** prototypes for helper functions in this file
@@ -442,6 +443,12 @@ login_write(struct logininfo *li)
 	if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN && 
 	   !sys_auth_record_login(li->username,li->hostname,li->line))
 		logit("Writing login record failed for %s", li->username);
+#endif
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+	if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN)
+		audit_session_open(li->line);
+	else if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT)
+		audit_session_close(li->line);
 #endif
 	return (0);
 }
diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index 00d4a785f..ce7784aa1 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -143,6 +143,11 @@ int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
 #endif
 
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
+#endif
+
 static Authctxt *authctxt;
 static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL;	/* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
 
@@ -186,6 +191,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
 #endif
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, 0, mm_answer_audit_event},
+#endif
 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH,mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
@@ -211,6 +219,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
     {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
     {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
+#endif
     {0, 0, NULL}
 };
 
@@ -238,6 +250,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
+#endif
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, 0, mm_answer_audit_event},
 #endif
     {0, 0, NULL}
 };
@@ -246,6 +261,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
     {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
     {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
+#endif
     {0, 0, NULL}
 };
 
@@ -609,6 +628,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
 	if (options.use_pam)
 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1);
 #endif
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, 1);
+#endif
 
 	return (0);
 }
@@ -1491,6 +1513,49 @@ mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
 	exit(res);
 }
 
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+/* Report that an audit event occurred */
+int
+mm_answer_audit_event(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+	ssh_audit_event_t event;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	event = buffer_get_int(m);
+	buffer_free(m);
+	switch(event) {
+	case AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
+	case AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
+	case AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
+	case LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
+	case LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
+	case CONNECTION_CLOSE:
+		audit_event(event);
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal("Audit event type %d not permitted", event);
+	}
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+	u_int len;
+	char *cmd;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+	cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+	/* sanity check command, if so how? */
+	audit_run_command(cmd);
+	xfree(cmd);
+	buffer_free(m);
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif /* AUDIT_EVENTS */
+
 void
 monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
 {
diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
index 621a4ad18..13ce3e1ca 100644
--- a/monitor.h
+++ b/monitor.h
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY,
 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND,
 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX,
+	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND,
 	MONITOR_REQ_TERM
 };
 
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
index 23857639b..983b24072 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -1103,6 +1103,36 @@ mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *p, u_char response[16])
 	return (success);
 }
 
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+void
+mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_int(&m, event);
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, &m);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+void
+mm_audit_run_command(const char *command)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+
+	debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, command);
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+}
+#endif /* AUDIT_EVENTS */
+
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 OM_uint32
 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID goid)
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
index e5cf5718c..7ed241aa8 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
@@ -74,6 +74,12 @@ int mm_sshpam_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
 void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
 #endif
 
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+#include "audit.h"
+void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
+void mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
+#endif
+
 struct Session;
 void mm_terminate(void);
 int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, int);
diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
index 4d7ac9de7..b645144c5 100644
--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
@@ -665,6 +665,18 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
 		debug("Forced command '%.900s'", command);
 	}
 
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+	if (command != NULL)
+		PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
+	else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
+		char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell;
+
+		if (shell[0] == '\0')	/* empty shell means /bin/sh */
+			shell =_PATH_BSHELL;
+		PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell));
+	}
+#endif
+
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 	if (options.gss_authentication) {
 		temporarily_use_uid(s->pw);
@@ -2321,6 +2333,10 @@ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	}
 #endif
 
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+	PRIVSEP(audit_event(CONNECTION_CLOSE));
+#endif
+
 	/* remove agent socket */
 	auth_sock_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw);
 
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 23d6962c0..e61870ea5 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1628,6 +1628,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	remote_port = get_remote_port();
 	remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
 
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+	audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
+#endif
 #ifdef LIBWRAP
 	/* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */
 	if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
@@ -1697,6 +1700,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	}
 
  authenticated:
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+	audit_event(AUTH_SUCCESS);
+#endif
+
 	/*
 	 * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare
 	 * file descriptor passing.
@@ -2010,5 +2017,10 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
 {
 	if (the_authctxt)
 		do_cleanup(the_authctxt);
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+	/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
+	if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
+		audit_event(CONNECTION_ABANDON);
+#endif
 	_exit(i);
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 40d9a63788e66d3d330fbf76fbdfd9cc437cb334 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2005 15:19:44 +1100
Subject:  - (dtucker) [auth.c] Fix parens in audit log check.

---
 ChangeLog | 3 ++-
 auth.c    | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'auth.c')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index c8f65b46b..9c36570c6 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 20050204
  - (dtucker) [monitor.c] Permit INVALID_USER audit events from slave too.
+ - (dtucker) [auth.c] Fix parens in audit log check.
 
 20050202
  - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/realpath.c] Sync up with realpath
@@ -2075,4 +2076,4 @@
    - (djm) Trim deprecated options from INSTALL. Mention UsePAM
    - (djm) Fix quote handling in sftp; Patch from admorten AT umich.edu
 
-$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3635 2005/02/04 04:05:08 dtucker Exp $
+$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3636 2005/02/04 04:19:44 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index bbf3a54a4..4b62ad8f7 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -247,8 +247,8 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
 #ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
 	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed &&
 	    (strcmp(method, "password") == 0 ||
-	    strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0) ||
-	    strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0)
+	    strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0))
 		record_failed_login(authctxt->user,
 		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
 #endif
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 2e0cf0dca20e56eb5d95a80ba0004769c5bc4ba7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2005 21:52:47 +1100
Subject:  - (dtucker) [audit.c audit.h auth.c auth1.c auth2.c loginrec.c
 monitor.c    monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h session.c sshd.c]: Prepend all of
 the audit    defines and enums with SSH_ to prevent namespace collisions on
 some    platforms (eg AIX).

---
 ChangeLog      |  6 +++++-
 audit.c        | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------
 audit.h        | 30 +++++++++++++++---------------
 auth.c         | 20 ++++++++++----------
 auth1.c        |  8 ++++----
 auth2.c        | 12 ++++++------
 loginrec.c     |  4 ++--
 monitor.c      | 30 +++++++++++++++---------------
 monitor_wrap.c |  4 ++--
 monitor_wrap.h |  2 +-
 session.c      |  6 +++---
 sshd.c         | 10 +++++-----
 12 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 92 deletions(-)

(limited to 'auth.c')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 89424da03..60e5374ee 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -3,6 +3,10 @@
    regress tests so newer versions of GNU head(1) behave themselves.  Patch
    by djm, so ok me.
  - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/port-aix.c] Silence compiler warnings.
+ - (dtucker) [audit.c audit.h auth.c auth1.c auth2.c loginrec.c monitor.c
+   monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h session.c sshd.c]: Prepend all of the audit
+   defines and enums with SSH_ to prevent namespace collisions on some
+   platforms (eg AIX).
 
 20050204
  - (dtucker) [monitor.c] Permit INVALID_USER audit events from slave too.
@@ -2082,4 +2086,4 @@
    - (djm) Trim deprecated options from INSTALL. Mention UsePAM
    - (djm) Fix quote handling in sftp; Patch from admorten AT umich.edu
 
-$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3638 2005/02/08 10:06:55 dtucker Exp $
+$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3639 2005/02/08 10:52:47 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/audit.c b/audit.c
index 13852a05e..18fc41047 100644
--- a/audit.c
+++ b/audit.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: audit.c,v 1.1 2005/02/02 13:37:14 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: audit.c,v 1.2 2005/02/08 10:52:48 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 
 #include "audit.h"
 #include "log.h"
@@ -44,22 +44,22 @@ ssh_audit_event_t
 audit_classify_auth(const char *method)
 {
 	if (strcmp(method, "none") == 0)
-		return AUTH_FAIL_NONE;
+		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE;
 	else if (strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
-		return AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD;
+		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD;
 	else if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
 	    strcmp(method, "rsa") == 0)
-		return AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY;
+		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY;
 	else if (strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 ||
 	    strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0)
-		return AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT;
+		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT;
 	else if (strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
 	    strcmp(method, "rhosts-rsa") == 0)
-		return AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED;
+		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED;
 	else if (strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0)
-		return AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI;
+		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI;
 	else
-		return AUDIT_UNKNOWN;
+		return SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN;
 }
 
 /* helper to return supplied username */
@@ -84,32 +84,32 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)
 		ssh_audit_event_t event;
 		const char *name;
 	} event_lookup[] = {
-		{LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES,	"LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES"},
-		{LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED,	"LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED"},
-		{AUTH_SUCCESS,		"AUTH_SUCCESS"},
-		{AUTH_FAIL_NONE,	"AUTH_FAIL_NONE"},
-		{AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD,	"AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD"},
-		{AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT,	"AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT"},
-		{AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY,	"AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY"},
-		{AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED,	"AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED"},
-		{AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI,	"AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI"},
-		{INVALID_USER,		"INVALID_USER"},
-		{NOLOGIN,		"NOLOGIN"},
-		{CONNECTION_CLOSE,	"CONNECTION_CLOSE"},
-		{CONNECTION_ABANDON,	"CONNECTION_ABANDON"},
-		{AUDIT_UNKNOWN,		"AUDIT_UNKNOWN"}
+		{SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES,	"LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES"},
+		{SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED,		"LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS,		"AUTH_SUCCESS"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE,		"AUTH_FAIL_NONE"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD,		"AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT,		"AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY,		"AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED,	"AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI,		"AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI"},
+		{SSH_INVALID_USER,		"INVALID_USER"},
+		{SSH_NOLOGIN,			"NOLOGIN"},
+		{SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE,		"CONNECTION_CLOSE"},
+		{SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON,	"CONNECTION_ABANDON"},
+		{SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN,		"AUDIT_UNKNOWN"}
 	};
 
-	for (i = 0; event_lookup[i].event != AUDIT_UNKNOWN; i++)
+	for (i = 0; event_lookup[i].event != SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN; i++)
 		if (event_lookup[i].event == ev)
 			break;
 	return(event_lookup[i].name);
 }
 
-# ifndef CUSTOM_AUDIT_EVENTS
+# ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 /*
  * Null implementations of audit functions.
- * These get used if AUDIT_EVENTS is defined but no audit module is enabled.
+ * These get used if SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS is defined but no audit module is enabled.
  */
 
 /*
@@ -177,5 +177,5 @@ audit_run_command(const char *command)
 	debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
 	    audit_username(), command);
 }
-# endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-#endif /* AUDIT_EVENTS */
+# endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff --git a/audit.h b/audit.h
index 2c1437391..78e58966f 100644
--- a/audit.h
+++ b/audit.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: audit.h,v 1.1 2005/02/02 13:37:14 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: audit.h,v 1.2 2005/02/08 10:52:48 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
@@ -29,20 +29,20 @@
 #ifndef _SSH_AUDIT_H
 # define _SSH_AUDIT_H
 enum ssh_audit_event_type {
-	LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES,
-	LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED,
-	AUTH_SUCCESS,
-	AUTH_FAIL_NONE,
-	AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD,
-	AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT,	/* keyboard-interactive or challenge-response */
-	AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY,	/* ssh2 pubkey or ssh1 rsa */
-	AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED,	/* ssh2 hostbased or ssh1 rhostsrsa */
-	AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI,
-	INVALID_USER,
-	NOLOGIN,		/* denied by /etc/nologin, not implemented */
-	CONNECTION_CLOSE,	/* closed after attempting auth or session */
-	CONNECTION_ABANDON,	/* closed without completing auth */
-	AUDIT_UNKNOWN
+	SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES,
+	SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED,
+	SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS,
+	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE,
+	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD,
+	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT,	/* keyboard-interactive or challenge-response */
+	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY,	/* ssh2 pubkey or ssh1 rsa */
+	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED,	/* ssh2 hostbased or ssh1 rhostsrsa */
+	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI,
+	SSH_INVALID_USER,
+	SSH_NOLOGIN,		/* denied by /etc/nologin, not implemented */
+	SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE,	/* closed after attempting auth or session */
+	SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON,	/* closed without completing auth */
+	SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN
 };
 typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t;
 
diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index 4b62ad8f7..e6dcab209 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
 		record_failed_login(authctxt->user,
 		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
 #endif
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed) {
 		ssh_audit_event_t event;
 
@@ -265,15 +265,15 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
 		 */
 		event = audit_classify_auth(method);
 		switch(event) {
-		case AUTH_FAIL_NONE:
-		case AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
-		case AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
+		case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE:
+		case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
+		case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
 			if (geteuid() == 0)
 				audit_event(event);
 			break;
-		case AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
-		case AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
-		case AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
+		case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
+		case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
+		case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
 			/*
 			 * This is required to handle the case where privsep
 			 * is enabled but it's root logging in, since
@@ -515,9 +515,9 @@ getpwnamallow(const char *user)
 		record_failed_login(user,
 		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
 #endif
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
-		audit_event(INVALID_USER);
-#endif /* AUDIT_EVENTS */
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+		audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER);
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
 		return (NULL);
 	}
 	if (!allowed_user(pw))
diff --git a/auth1.c b/auth1.c
index aeb5d8cb9..d08928455 100644
--- a/auth1.c
+++ b/auth1.c
@@ -249,8 +249,8 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
 		    !auth_root_allowed(get_authname(type))) {
 			authenticated = 0;
-# ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
-			PRIVSEP(audit_event(LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED));
+# ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+			PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED));
 # endif
 		}
 #endif
@@ -288,8 +288,8 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 			return;
 
 		if (authctxt->failures++ > options.max_authtries) {
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
-			PRIVSEP(audit_event(LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+			PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
 #endif
 			packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user);
 		}
diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
index 2727e0ff5..2265d311e 100644
--- a/auth2.c
+++ b/auth2.c
@@ -167,8 +167,8 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 			if (options.use_pam)
 				PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt));
 #endif
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
-			PRIVSEP(audit_event(INVALID_USER));
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+			PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER));
 #endif
 		}
 		setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
@@ -219,8 +219,8 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
 	if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
 	    !auth_root_allowed(method)) {
 		authenticated = 0;
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
-		PRIVSEP(audit_event(LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED));
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+		PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED));
 #endif
 	}
 
@@ -263,8 +263,8 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
 		authctxt->success = 1;
 	} else {
 		if (authctxt->failures++ > options.max_authtries) {
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
-			PRIVSEP(audit_event(LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+			PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
 #endif
 			packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user);
 		}
diff --git a/loginrec.c b/loginrec.c
index 0fa9bdea7..c033582ad 100644
--- a/loginrec.c
+++ b/loginrec.c
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@
 # include <libutil.h>
 #endif
 
-RCSID("$Id: loginrec.c,v 1.64 2005/02/02 13:20:53 dtucker Exp $");
+RCSID("$Id: loginrec.c,v 1.65 2005/02/08 10:52:48 dtucker Exp $");
 
 /**
  ** prototypes for helper functions in this file
@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ login_write(struct logininfo *li)
 	   !sys_auth_record_login(li->username,li->hostname,li->line))
 		logit("Writing login record failed for %s", li->username);
 #endif
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 	if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN)
 		audit_session_open(li->line);
 	else if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT)
diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index 04534d759..d6df656b0 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
 #endif
 
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
 #endif
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
 #endif
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, 0, mm_answer_audit_event},
 #endif
 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
     {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
     {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
 #endif
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
 #endif
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, 0, mm_answer_audit_event},
 #endif
     {0, 0, NULL}
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
     {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
     {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
 #endif
@@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
 	if (options.use_pam)
 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1);
 #endif
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, 1);
 #endif
 
@@ -1513,7 +1513,7 @@ mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
 	exit(res);
 }
 
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 /* Report that an audit event occurred */
 int
 mm_answer_audit_event(int socket, Buffer *m)
@@ -1525,13 +1525,13 @@ mm_answer_audit_event(int socket, Buffer *m)
 	event = buffer_get_int(m);
 	buffer_free(m);
 	switch(event) {
-	case AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
-	case AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
-	case AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
-	case LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
-	case LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
-	case CONNECTION_CLOSE:
-	case INVALID_USER:
+	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
+	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
+	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
+	case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
+	case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
+	case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
+	case SSH_INVALID_USER:
 		audit_event(event);
 		break;
 	default:
@@ -1555,7 +1555,7 @@ mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buffer *m)
 	buffer_free(m);
 	return (0);
 }
-#endif /* AUDIT_EVENTS */
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
 
 void
 monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
index 983b24072..e1b6512b4 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -1103,7 +1103,7 @@ mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *p, u_char response[16])
 	return (success);
 }
 
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 void
 mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
 {
@@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ mm_audit_run_command(const char *command)
 	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m);
 	buffer_free(&m);
 }
-#endif /* AUDIT_EVENTS */
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
 
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 OM_uint32
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
index 7ed241aa8..310b42513 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ int mm_sshpam_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
 void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
 #endif
 
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 #include "audit.h"
 void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
 void mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
index b645144c5..a50bfcff7 100644
--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
@@ -665,7 +665,7 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
 		debug("Forced command '%.900s'", command);
 	}
 
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 	if (command != NULL)
 		PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
 	else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
@@ -2333,8 +2333,8 @@ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	}
 #endif
 
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
-	PRIVSEP(audit_event(CONNECTION_CLOSE));
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+	PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE));
 #endif
 
 	/* remove agent socket */
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index e61870ea5..6b379521b 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1628,7 +1628,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	remote_port = get_remote_port();
 	remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
 
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 	audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
 #endif
 #ifdef LIBWRAP
@@ -1700,8 +1700,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	}
 
  authenticated:
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
-	audit_event(AUTH_SUCCESS);
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+	audit_event(SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS);
 #endif
 
 	/*
@@ -2017,10 +2017,10 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
 {
 	if (the_authctxt)
 		do_cleanup(the_authctxt);
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 	/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
 	if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
-		audit_event(CONNECTION_ABANDON);
+		audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
 #endif
 	_exit(i);
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 691d5235ca9485877e8345269b1be4b2cf1be322 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2005 21:45:57 +1100
Subject:  - (dtucker) [README.platform auth.c configure.ac loginrec.c   
 openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-aix.h] Bug #835: enable IPv6   
 on AIX where possible (see README.platform for details) and work around    a
 misfeature of AIX's getnameinfo.  ok djm@

---
 ChangeLog                 |  6 ++++-
 README.platform           | 11 ++++++++-
 auth.c                    |  2 +-
 configure.ac              | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 loginrec.c                |  6 +++--
 openbsd-compat/port-aix.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 openbsd-compat/port-aix.h | 22 ++++++++++++++---
 7 files changed, 136 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

(limited to 'auth.c')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index a55a3b3d7..9b0b3e2af 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
 20050215
  - (dtucker) [config.sh.in] Collect oslevel -r too.
+ - (dtucker) [README.platform auth.c configure.ac loginrec.c
+   openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-aix.h] Bug #835: enable IPv6
+   on AIX where possible (see README.platform for details) and work around
+   a misfeature of AIX's getnameinfo.  ok djm@
 
 20050211
  - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Tidy up configure --help output.
@@ -2126,4 +2130,4 @@
    - (djm) Trim deprecated options from INSTALL. Mention UsePAM
    - (djm) Fix quote handling in sftp; Patch from admorten AT umich.edu
 
-$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3651 2005/02/15 10:26:32 dtucker Exp $
+$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3652 2005/02/15 10:45:57 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/README.platform b/README.platform
index 880b83c63..136304a8e 100644
--- a/README.platform
+++ b/README.platform
@@ -13,6 +13,15 @@ Accounts in this state must have their passwords reset manually by the
 administrator.  As a precaution, it is recommended that the administrative
 passwords be reset before upgrading from OpenSSH <3.8.
 
+As of OpenSSH 4.0, configure will attempt to detect if your version
+and maintenance level of AIX has a working getaddrinfo, and will use it
+if found.  This will enable IPv6 support.  If for some reason configure
+gets it wrong, or if you want to build binaries to work on earlier MLs
+than the build host then you can add "-DBROKEN_GETADDRINFO" to CFLAGS
+to force the previous IPv4-only behaviour.
+
+IPv6 known to work: 5.2ML2 5.2ML5
+IPv6 known broken: 4.3.3ML11 5.1ML4
 
 Cygwin
 ------
@@ -27,4 +36,4 @@ Currently, sshd does not support BSM auditting.  This can show up as errors
 when editting cron entries via crontab.  See.
 http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=125
 
-$Id: README.platform,v 1.2 2004/04/23 08:57:13 dtucker Exp $
+$Id: README.platform,v 1.3 2005/02/15 10:45:57 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index e6dcab209..256807683 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
 	}
 
 #ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER
-	if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw))
+	if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw, &loginmsg))
 		return 0;
 #endif
 
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 2df8a5e87..b27f0cf70 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.241 2005/02/11 05:11:49 dtucker Exp $
+# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.242 2005/02/15 10:45:57 dtucker Exp $
 #
 # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
 #
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ case "$host" in
 		[#include <usersec.h>]
 	)
 	AC_CHECK_FUNCS(setauthdb)
-	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO)
+	check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo=1
 	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_REALPATH)
 	AC_DEFINE(SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID)
 	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SETREUID)
@@ -1146,6 +1146,64 @@ main(void)
 	)
 fi
 
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" -a "x$check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING(if getaddrinfo seems to work)
+	AC_TRY_RUN(
+		[
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#define TEST_PORT "2222"
+
+int
+main(void)
+{
+	int err, sock;
+	struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints;
+	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL;
+
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
+
+	err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai);
+	if (err != 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err));
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+		if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
+			continue;
+
+		err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop,
+		    sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
+		    NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV);
+
+		if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET && err != 0) {
+			perror("getnameinfo");
+			exit(2);
+		}
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
+		],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+			AC_DEFINE(AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK, [],
+[Define if you have a getaddrinfo that fails for the all-zeros IPv6 address])
+		],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+			AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO)
+		]
+	)
+fi
+
 if test "x$check_for_conflicting_getspnam" = "x1"; then
 	AC_MSG_CHECKING(for conflicting getspnam in shadow.h)
 	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
diff --git a/loginrec.c b/loginrec.c
index c033582ad..8f5061cdc 100644
--- a/loginrec.c
+++ b/loginrec.c
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@
 # include <libutil.h>
 #endif
 
-RCSID("$Id: loginrec.c,v 1.65 2005/02/08 10:52:48 dtucker Exp $");
+RCSID("$Id: loginrec.c,v 1.66 2005/02/15 10:45:57 dtucker Exp $");
 
 /**
  ** prototypes for helper functions in this file
@@ -192,6 +192,8 @@ int lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li);
 int wtmp_get_entry(struct logininfo *li);
 int wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li);
 
+extern Buffer loginmsg;
+
 /* pick the shortest string */
 #define MIN_SIZEOF(s1,s2) (sizeof(s1) < sizeof(s2) ? sizeof(s1) : sizeof(s2))
 
@@ -441,7 +443,7 @@ login_write(struct logininfo *li)
 #endif
 #ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_RECORD_LOGIN
 	if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN && 
-	   !sys_auth_record_login(li->username,li->hostname,li->line))
+	   !sys_auth_record_login(li->username,li->hostname,li->line, &loginmsg))
 		logit("Writing login record failed for %s", li->username);
 #endif
 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c b/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c
index b16988543..8ab862f98 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c
@@ -34,14 +34,13 @@
 #ifdef _AIX
 
 #include <uinfo.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
 #include "port-aix.h"
 
 /* These should be in the system headers but are not. */
 int usrinfo(int, char *, int);
 int setauthdb(const char *, char *);
 
-extern Buffer loginmsg;
-
 # ifdef HAVE_SETAUTHDB
 static char old_registry[REGISTRY_SIZE] = "";
 # endif
@@ -156,7 +155,7 @@ aix_valid_authentications(const char *user)
  * returns 0.
  */
 int
-sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *ctxt, const char *password)
+sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *ctxt, const char *password, Buffer *loginmsg)
 {
 	char *authmsg = NULL, *msg, *name = ctxt->pw->pw_name;
 	int authsuccess = 0, expired, reenter, result;
@@ -186,7 +185,7 @@ sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *ctxt, const char *password)
 		 */
 		expired = passwdexpired(name, &msg);
 		if (msg && *msg) {
-			buffer_append(&loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg));
+			buffer_append(loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg));
 			aix_remove_embedded_newlines(msg);
 		}
 		debug3("AIX/passwdexpired returned %d msg %.100s", expired, msg);
@@ -219,7 +218,7 @@ sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *ctxt, const char *password)
  * Returns 1 if login is allowed, 0 if not allowed.
  */
 int
-sys_auth_allowed_user(struct passwd *pw)
+sys_auth_allowed_user(struct passwd *pw, Buffer *loginmsg)
 {
 	char *msg = NULL;
 	int result, permitted = 0;
@@ -246,7 +245,7 @@ sys_auth_allowed_user(struct passwd *pw)
 	if (result == -1 && errno == EPERM && stat(_PATH_NOLOGIN, &st) == 0)
 		permitted = 1;
 	else if (msg != NULL)
-		buffer_append(&loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg));
+		buffer_append(loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg));
 	if (msg == NULL)
 		msg = xstrdup("(none)");
 	aix_remove_embedded_newlines(msg);
@@ -259,7 +258,8 @@ sys_auth_allowed_user(struct passwd *pw)
 }
 
 int
-sys_auth_record_login(const char *user, const char *host, const char *ttynm)
+sys_auth_record_login(const char *user, const char *host, const char *ttynm,
+    Buffer *loginmsg)
 {
 	char *msg;
 	int success = 0;
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ sys_auth_record_login(const char *user, const char *host, const char *ttynm)
 		success = 1;
 		if (msg != NULL) {
 			debug("AIX/loginsuccess: msg %s", msg);
-			buffer_append(&loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg));
+			buffer_append(loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg));
 			xfree(msg);
 		}
 	}
@@ -349,4 +349,33 @@ aix_restoreauthdb(void)
 
 # endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
 
+# if defined(AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK) && !defined(BROKEN_ADDRINFO)
+# undef getnameinfo
+/*
+ * For some reason, AIX's getnameinfo will refuse to resolve the all-zeros
+ * IPv6 address into its textual representation ("::"), so we wrap it
+ * with a function that will.
+ */
+int
+sshaix_getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *sa, size_t salen, char *host,
+    size_t hostlen, char *serv, size_t servlen, int flags)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6;
+	u_int32_t *a6;
+
+	if (flags & (NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) &&
+	    sa->sa_family == AF_INET6) {
+		sa6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa;
+		a6 = sa6->sin6_addr.u6_addr.u6_addr32;
+
+		if (a6[0] == 0 && a6[1] == 0 && a6[2] == 0 && a6[3] == 0) {
+			strlcpy(host, "::", hostlen);
+			snprintf(serv, servlen, "%d", sa6->sin6_port);
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+	return getnameinfo(sa, salen, host, hostlen, serv, servlen, flags);
+}
+# endif /* AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK */
+
 #endif /* _AIX */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h b/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h
index 751139004..cc7c43cda 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: port-aix.h,v 1.22 2005/02/02 06:10:11 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: port-aix.h,v 1.23 2005/02/15 10:45:58 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  *
@@ -27,6 +27,10 @@
 
 #ifdef _AIX
 
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H
+# include <sys/socket.h>
+#endif
+
 #ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
 # include <login.h>
 # include <userpw.h>
@@ -36,6 +40,8 @@
 # include <usersec.h>
 #endif
 
+#include "buffer.h"
+
 /* Some versions define r_type in the above headers, which causes a conflict */
 #ifdef r_type
 # undef r_type
@@ -64,13 +70,23 @@ void aix_usrinfo(struct passwd *);
 #ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
 # define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1
 # define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER 1
-int sys_auth_allowed_user(struct passwd *);
+int sys_auth_allowed_user(struct passwd *, Buffer *);
 # define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_RECORD_LOGIN 1
-int sys_auth_record_login(const char *, const char *, const char *);
+int sys_auth_record_login(const char *, const char *, const char *, Buffer *);
 # define CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN 1
 #endif
 
 void aix_setauthdb(const char *);
 void aix_restoreauthdb(void);
 void aix_remove_embedded_newlines(char *);
+
+#if defined(AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK) && !defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO)
+# ifdef getnameinfo
+#  undef getnameinfo
+# endif
+int sshaix_getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *, size_t, char *, size_t,
+    char *, size_t, int);
+# define getnameinfo(a,b,c,d,e,f,g) (sshaix_getnameinfo(a,b,c,d,e,f,g))
+#endif
+
 #endif /* _AIX */
-- 
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