From 0082fba4efdd492f765ed4c53f0d0fbd3bdbdf7f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "djm@openbsd.org" Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2016 16:33:06 +0000 Subject: upstream commit Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf. multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface. Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the required attack surface considerably larger. Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security check in the shared memory manager found by Stack (http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@ NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd for >10 years. Upstream-ID: 32af9771788d45a0779693b41d06ec199d849caf --- opacket.h | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'opacket.h') diff --git a/opacket.h b/opacket.h index 16322ec6f..d2a63a355 100644 --- a/opacket.h +++ b/opacket.h @@ -133,9 +133,6 @@ void packet_disconnect(const char *, ...) ssh_packet_get_input(active_state) #define packet_get_output() \ ssh_packet_get_output(active_state) -#define packet_set_compress_hooks(ctx, allocfunc, freefunc) \ - ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(active_state, ctx, \ - allocfunc, freefunc); #define packet_check_eom() \ ssh_packet_check_eom(active_state) #define set_newkeys(mode) \ -- cgit v1.2.3