From 73ddb25bae4c33a0db361ac13f2e3a60d7c6c4a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "dtucker@openbsd.org" Date: Fri, 27 Jul 2018 05:13:02 +0000 Subject: upstream: Remove uid checks from low port binds. Now that ssh cannot be setuid and sshd always has privsep on, we can remove the uid checks for low port binds and just let the system do the check. We leave a sanity check for the !privsep case so long as the code is stil there. with & ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9535cfdbd1cd54486fdbedfaee44ce4367ec7ca0 --- readconf.c | 5 +---- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'readconf.c') diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c index ce832526a..d9b6e4cf9 100644 --- a/readconf.c +++ b/readconf.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.294 2018/07/19 10:28:47 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.295 2018/07/27 05:13:02 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -323,9 +323,6 @@ add_local_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd) extern uid_t original_real_uid; int i; - if (!bind_permitted(newfwd->listen_port, original_real_uid) && - newfwd->listen_path == NULL) - fatal("Privileged ports can only be forwarded by root."); /* Don't add duplicates */ for (i = 0; i < options->num_local_forwards; i++) { if (forward_equals(newfwd, options->local_forwards + i)) -- cgit v1.2.3