From 9bcd25b78b8764ab27cd807f267ff5d82720a0cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Darren Tucker Date: Wed, 7 Oct 2009 08:45:48 +1100 Subject: - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/08/27 17:33:49 [ssh-keygen.c] force use of correct hash function for random-art signature display as it was inheriting the wrong one when bubblebabble signatures were activated; bz#1611 report and patch from fwojcik+openssh AT besh.com; ok markus@ --- ssh-keygen.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'ssh-keygen.c') diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c index da5db9845..4f90ac5c1 100644 --- a/ssh-keygen.c +++ b/ssh-keygen.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.174 2009/06/22 05:39:28 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.175 2009/08/27 17:33:49 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) public = key_load_public(identity_file, &comment); if (public != NULL) { fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep); - ra = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); + ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, comment, key_type(public)); if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) @@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) } comment = *cp ? cp : comment; fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep); - ra = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); + ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, comment ? comment : "no comment", key_type(public)); if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) @@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ print_host(FILE *f, const char *name, Key *public, int hash) fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5; rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX; fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep); - ra = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); + ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, name, key_type(public)); if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) -- cgit v1.2.3 From d04758dc4c001104933ce3e2088ac46d461ec1f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Darren Tucker Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2010 19:41:57 +1100 Subject: - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/01/11 10:51:07 [ssh-keygen.c] when converting keys, truncate key comments at 72 chars as per RFC4716; bz#1630 reported by tj AT castaglia.org; ok markus@ --- ChangeLog | 4 ++++ ssh-keygen.c | 12 ++++++++---- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'ssh-keygen.c') diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index 74936fa8b..a9ae9ea3e 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -11,6 +11,10 @@ Do not prompt for a passphrase if we fail to open a keyfile, and log the reason the open failed to debug. bz #1693, found by tj AT castaglia org, ok djm@ + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/01/11 10:51:07 + [ssh-keygen.c] + when converting keys, truncate key comments at 72 chars as per RFC4716; + bz#1630 reported by tj AT castaglia.org; ok markus@ 20100110 - (dtucker) [configure.ac misc.c readconf.c servconf.c ssh-keyscan.c] diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c index 4f90ac5c1..7f5185f8e 100644 --- a/ssh-keygen.c +++ b/ssh-keygen.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.175 2009/08/27 17:33:49 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.176 2010/01/11 10:51:07 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ do_convert_to_ssh2(struct passwd *pw) Key *k; u_int len; u_char *blob; + char comment[61]; struct stat st; if (!have_identity) @@ -203,11 +204,14 @@ do_convert_to_ssh2(struct passwd *pw) fprintf(stderr, "key_to_blob failed\n"); exit(1); } - fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN); - fprintf(stdout, - "Comment: \"%u-bit %s, converted from OpenSSH by %s@%s\"\n", + /* Comment + surrounds must fit into 72 chars (RFC 4716 sec 3.3) */ + snprintf(comment, sizeof(comment), + "%u-bit %s, converted by %s@%s from OpenSSH", key_size(k), key_type(k), pw->pw_name, hostname); + + fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN); + fprintf(stdout, "Comment: \"%s\"\n", comment); dump_base64(stdout, blob, len); fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END); key_free(k); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7ea845e48df6d34a333ebbe79380cba0938d02a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Damien Miller Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 09:21:02 +1100 Subject: - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/02/08 10:50:20 [pathnames.h readconf.c readconf.h scp.1 sftp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c] [ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh_config.5] replace our obsolete smartcard code with PKCS#11. ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-11/v2-20/pkcs-11v2-20.pdf ssh(1) and ssh-keygen(1) use dlopen(3) directly to talk to a PKCS#11 provider (shared library) while ssh-agent(1) delegates PKCS#11 to a forked a ssh-pkcs11-helper process. PKCS#11 is currently a compile time option. feedback and ok djm@; inspired by patches from Alon Bar-Lev ` --- ChangeLog | 10 + Makefile.in | 20 +- configure.ac | 8 +- pathnames.h | 7 +- readconf.c | 16 +- readconf.h | 4 +- scp.1 | 6 +- sftp.1 | 6 +- ssh-add.1 | 16 +- ssh-add.c | 20 +- ssh-agent.c | 101 +++++----- ssh-keygen.1 | 14 +- ssh-keygen.c | 84 +++----- ssh-pkcs11-client.c | 229 ++++++++++++++++++++++ ssh-pkcs11-helper.c | 349 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ ssh-pkcs11.c | 544 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ ssh-pkcs11.h | 19 ++ ssh.1 | 14 +- ssh.c | 29 +-- ssh_config.5 | 18 +- 20 files changed, 1326 insertions(+), 188 deletions(-) create mode 100644 ssh-pkcs11-client.c create mode 100644 ssh-pkcs11-helper.c create mode 100644 ssh-pkcs11.c create mode 100644 ssh-pkcs11.h (limited to 'ssh-keygen.c') diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index 2c815a3ab..776116171 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -5,6 +5,16 @@ make buffer_get_string_ret() really non-fatal in all cases (it was using buffer_get_int(), which could fatal() on buffer empty); ok markus dtucker + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/02/08 10:50:20 + [pathnames.h readconf.c readconf.h scp.1 sftp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c] + [ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh_config.5] + replace our obsolete smartcard code with PKCS#11. + ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-11/v2-20/pkcs-11v2-20.pdf + ssh(1) and ssh-keygen(1) use dlopen(3) directly to talk to a PKCS#11 + provider (shared library) while ssh-agent(1) delegates PKCS#11 to + a forked a ssh-pkcs11-helper process. + PKCS#11 is currently a compile time option. + feedback and ok djm@; inspired by patches from Alon Bar-Lev 20100210 - (djm) add -lselinux to LIBS before calling AC_CHECK_FUNCS for diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in index d7f338c0f..0c45bfca6 100644 --- a/Makefile.in +++ b/Makefile.in @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.303 2010/01/08 08:27:57 dtucker Exp $ +# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.304 2010/02/11 22:21:02 djm Exp $ # uncomment if you run a non bourne compatable shell. Ie. csh #SHELL = @SH@ @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign +SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper RAND_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-rand-helper PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@ @@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ PATHS= -DSSHDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \ -D_PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT=\"$(ASKPASS_PROGRAM)\" \ -D_PATH_SFTP_SERVER=\"$(SFTP_SERVER)\" \ -D_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN=\"$(SSH_KEYSIGN)\" \ + -D_PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=\"$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)\" \ -D_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR=\"$(piddir)\" \ -D_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR=\"$(PRIVSEP_PATH)\" \ -DSSH_RAND_HELPER=\"$(RAND_HELPER)\" @@ -60,7 +62,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@ INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS=@INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS@ INSTALL_SSH_RAND_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_RAND_HELPER@ -TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) ssh-rand-helper${EXEEXT} sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) +TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) ssh-rand-helper${EXEEXT} sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) LIBSSH_OBJS=acss.o authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \ canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-acss.o cipher-aes.o \ @@ -71,7 +73,8 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=acss.o authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \ atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \ monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o kexdh.o \ kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o scard.o msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o \ - entropy.o scard-opensc.o gss-genr.o umac.o jpake.o schnorr.o + entropy.o scard-opensc.o gss-genr.o umac.o jpake.o schnorr.o \ + ssh-pkcs11.o SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \ sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \ @@ -147,8 +150,8 @@ scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-add.o $(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-agent.o - $(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) +ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o + $(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) @@ -156,6 +159,9 @@ ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keysign.o roaming_dummy.o readconf.o $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) +ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o + $(LD) -o $@ ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) @@ -265,6 +271,7 @@ install-files: scard-install $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-rand-helper $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-rand-helper ; \ fi $(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER) $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 @@ -368,6 +375,7 @@ uninstall: -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT) -rm -r $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT) + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(RAND_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1 @@ -393,6 +401,7 @@ tests interop-tests: $(TARGETS) TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-agent"; \ TEST_SSH_SSHADD="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-add"; \ TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-keygen"; \ + TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-pkcs11-helper"; \ TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-keyscan"; \ TEST_SSH_SFTP="$${BUILDDIR}/sftp"; \ TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER="$${BUILDDIR}/sftp-server"; \ @@ -413,6 +422,7 @@ tests interop-tests: $(TARGETS) TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT="$${TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT}" \ TEST_SSH_SSHADD="$${TEST_SSH_SSHADD}" \ TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN="$${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN}" \ + TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER="$${TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER}" \ TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN="$${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN}" \ TEST_SSH_SFTP="$${TEST_SSH_SFTP}" \ TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER="$${TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER}" \ diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac index 5fc1d4a46..717d315fd 100644 --- a/configure.ac +++ b/configure.ac @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.440 2010/02/09 23:19:29 djm Exp $ +# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.441 2010/02/11 22:21:02 djm Exp $ # # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller # @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. AC_INIT(OpenSSH, Portable, openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org) -AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.440 $) +AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.441 $) AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c]) AC_CONFIG_HEADER(config.h) @@ -4197,6 +4197,10 @@ else AC_SUBST(TEST_SSH_IPV6, yes) fi +if test "x$enable_pkcs11" != "xno" ; then + AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_PKCS11], [], [Enable for PKCS#11 support]) +fi + AC_EXEEXT AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile buildpkg.sh opensshd.init openssh.xml \ openbsd-compat/Makefile openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile \ diff --git a/pathnames.h b/pathnames.h index 80c5d9cbb..32b9e065b 100644 --- a/pathnames.h +++ b/pathnames.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: pathnames.h,v 1.17 2008/12/29 02:23:26 stevesk Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: pathnames.h,v 1.18 2010/02/08 10:50:20 markus Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen @@ -125,6 +125,11 @@ #define _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN "/usr/libexec/ssh-keysign" #endif +/* Location of ssh-keysign for hostbased authentication */ +#ifndef _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER +#define _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER "/usr/libexec/ssh-pkcs11-helper" +#endif + /* xauth for X11 forwarding */ #ifndef _PATH_XAUTH #define _PATH_XAUTH "/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth" diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c index d424c1697..8bdc8caf1 100644 --- a/readconf.c +++ b/readconf.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.182 2010/01/09 23:04:13 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.183 2010/02/08 10:50:20 markus Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ typedef enum { oGlobalKnownHostsFile2, oUserKnownHostsFile2, oPubkeyAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveDevices, oHostKeyAlias, oDynamicForward, oPreferredAuthentications, oHostbasedAuthentication, - oHostKeyAlgorithms, oBindAddress, oSmartcardDevice, + oHostKeyAlgorithms, oBindAddress, oPKCS11Provider, oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout, oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, @@ -205,10 +205,12 @@ static struct { { "preferredauthentications", oPreferredAuthentications }, { "hostkeyalgorithms", oHostKeyAlgorithms }, { "bindaddress", oBindAddress }, -#ifdef SMARTCARD - { "smartcarddevice", oSmartcardDevice }, +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + { "smartcarddevice", oPKCS11Provider }, + { "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider }, #else { "smartcarddevice", oUnsupported }, + { "pkcs11provider", oUnsupported }, #endif { "clearallforwardings", oClearAllForwardings }, { "enablesshkeysign", oEnableSSHKeysign }, @@ -609,8 +611,8 @@ parse_string: charptr = &options->bind_address; goto parse_string; - case oSmartcardDevice: - charptr = &options->smartcard_device; + case oPKCS11Provider: + charptr = &options->pkcs11_provider; goto parse_string; case oProxyCommand: @@ -1051,7 +1053,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options) options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET; options->preferred_authentications = NULL; options->bind_address = NULL; - options->smartcard_device = NULL; + options->pkcs11_provider = NULL; options->enable_ssh_keysign = - 1; options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = - 1; options->identities_only = - 1; diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h index f7c0b9c6d..4264751c5 100644 --- a/readconf.h +++ b/readconf.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.81 2010/01/09 23:04:13 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.82 2010/02/08 10:50:20 markus Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ typedef struct { char *user_hostfile2; char *preferred_authentications; char *bind_address; /* local socket address for connection to sshd */ - char *smartcard_device; /* Smartcard reader device */ + char *pkcs11_provider; /* PKCS#11 provider */ int verify_host_key_dns; /* Verify host key using DNS */ int num_identity_files; /* Number of files for RSA/DSA identities. */ diff --git a/scp.1 b/scp.1 index 74ee5db13..bc5e259f5 100644 --- a/scp.1 +++ b/scp.1 @@ -9,9 +9,9 @@ .\" .\" Created: Sun May 7 00:14:37 1995 ylo .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.49 2010/01/09 23:04:13 dtucker Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.50 2010/02/08 10:50:20 markus Exp $ .\" -.Dd $Mdocdate: January 9 2010 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: February 8 2010 $ .Dt SCP 1 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see .It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost .It NumberOfPasswordPrompts .It PasswordAuthentication +.It PKCS11Provider .It Port .It PreferredAuthentications .It Protocol @@ -164,7 +165,6 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see .It SendEnv .It ServerAliveInterval .It ServerAliveCountMax -.It SmartcardDevice .It StrictHostKeyChecking .It TCPKeepAlive .It UsePrivilegedPort diff --git a/sftp.1 b/sftp.1 index 175dc6520..777b02a58 100644 --- a/sftp.1 +++ b/sftp.1 @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -.\" $OpenBSD: sftp.1,v 1.82 2010/01/13 12:48:34 jmc Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: sftp.1,v 1.83 2010/02/08 10:50:20 markus Exp $ .\" .\" Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. .\" @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.Dd $Mdocdate: January 13 2010 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: February 8 2010 $ .Dt SFTP 1 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -202,6 +202,7 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see .It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost .It NumberOfPasswordPrompts .It PasswordAuthentication +.It PKCS11Provider .It Port .It PreferredAuthentications .It Protocol @@ -213,7 +214,6 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see .It SendEnv .It ServerAliveInterval .It ServerAliveCountMax -.It SmartcardDevice .It StrictHostKeyChecking .It TCPKeepAlive .It UsePrivilegedPort diff --git a/ssh-add.1 b/ssh-add.1 index ee9a00ff0..a5dc3311a 100644 --- a/ssh-add.1 +++ b/ssh-add.1 @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.48 2009/10/22 15:02:12 sobrado Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.49 2010/02/08 10:50:20 markus Exp $ .\" .\" -*- nroff -*- .\" @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.Dd $Mdocdate: October 22 2009 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: February 8 2010 $ .Dt SSH-ADD 1 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -101,17 +101,17 @@ If no public key is found at a given path, will append .Pa .pub and retry. -.It Fl e Ar reader -Remove key in smartcard -.Ar reader . +.It Fl e Ar pkcs11 +Remove key provided by +.Ar pkcs11 . .It Fl L Lists public key parameters of all identities currently represented by the agent. .It Fl l Lists fingerprints of all identities currently represented by the agent. -.It Fl s Ar reader -Add key in smartcard -.Ar reader . +.It Fl s Ar pkcs11 +Add key provider by +.Ar pkcs11 . .It Fl t Ar life Set a maximum lifetime when adding identities to an agent. The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format diff --git a/ssh-add.c b/ssh-add.c index 084478d78..90e5be20b 100644 --- a/ssh-add.c +++ b/ssh-add.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.91 2009/08/27 17:44:52 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.92 2010/02/08 10:50:20 markus Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ update_card(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int add, const char *id) char *pin; int ret = -1; - pin = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase for smartcard: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); + pin = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase for PKCS#11: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); if (pin == NULL) return -1; @@ -317,10 +317,8 @@ usage(void) fprintf(stderr, " -X Unlock agent.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -t life Set lifetime (in seconds) when adding identities.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -c Require confirmation to sign using identities\n"); -#ifdef SMARTCARD - fprintf(stderr, " -s reader Add key in smartcard reader.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -e reader Remove key in smartcard reader.\n"); -#endif + fprintf(stderr, " -s pkcs11 Add keys from PKCS#11 provider.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -e pkcs11 Remove keys provided by PKCS#11 provider.\n"); } int @@ -329,7 +327,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) extern char *optarg; extern int optind; AuthenticationConnection *ac = NULL; - char *sc_reader_id = NULL; + char *pkcs11provider = NULL; int i, ch, deleting = 0, ret = 0; /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ @@ -371,11 +369,11 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) ret = 1; goto done; case 's': - sc_reader_id = optarg; + pkcs11provider = optarg; break; case 'e': deleting = 1; - sc_reader_id = optarg; + pkcs11provider = optarg; break; case 't': if ((lifetime = convtime(optarg)) == -1) { @@ -392,8 +390,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) } argc -= optind; argv += optind; - if (sc_reader_id != NULL) { - if (update_card(ac, !deleting, sc_reader_id) == -1) + if (pkcs11provider != NULL) { + if (update_card(ac, !deleting, pkcs11provider) == -1) ret = 1; goto done; } diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c index df3a87d9a..f745c2513 100644 --- a/ssh-agent.c +++ b/ssh-agent.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.162 2009/09/01 14:43:17 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.163 2010/02/08 10:50:20 markus Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -76,8 +76,8 @@ #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" -#ifdef SMARTCARD -#include "scard.h" +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 +#include "ssh-pkcs11.h" #endif #if defined(HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H) @@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ typedef struct identity { TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next; Key *key; char *comment; + char *provider; u_int death; u_int confirm; } Identity; @@ -171,6 +172,7 @@ static void free_identity(Identity *id) { key_free(id->key); + xfree(id->provider); xfree(id->comment); xfree(id); } @@ -549,7 +551,7 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version) if (lifetime && !death) death = time(NULL) + lifetime; if ((id = lookup_identity(k, version)) == NULL) { - id = xmalloc(sizeof(Identity)); + id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity)); id->key = k; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next); /* Increment the number of identities. */ @@ -609,17 +611,17 @@ no_identities(SocketEntry *e, u_int type) buffer_free(&msg); } -#ifdef SMARTCARD +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 static void process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) { - char *sc_reader_id = NULL, *pin; - int i, type, version, success = 0, death = 0, confirm = 0; - Key **keys, *k; + char *provider = NULL, *pin; + int i, type, version, count = 0, success = 0, death = 0, confirm = 0; + Key **keys = NULL, *k; Identity *id; Idtab *tab; - sc_reader_id = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL); + provider = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL); pin = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL); while (buffer_len(&e->request)) { @@ -633,30 +635,22 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) default: error("process_add_smartcard_key: " "Unknown constraint type %d", type); - xfree(sc_reader_id); - xfree(pin); goto send; } } if (lifetime && !death) death = time(NULL) + lifetime; - keys = sc_get_keys(sc_reader_id, pin); - xfree(sc_reader_id); - xfree(pin); - - if (keys == NULL || keys[0] == NULL) { - error("sc_get_keys failed"); - goto send; - } - for (i = 0; keys[i] != NULL; i++) { + count = pkcs11_add_provider(provider, pin, &keys); + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { k = keys[i]; version = k->type == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2; tab = idtab_lookup(version); if (lookup_identity(k, version) == NULL) { - id = xmalloc(sizeof(Identity)); + id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity)); id->key = k; - id->comment = sc_get_key_label(k); + id->provider = xstrdup(provider); + id->comment = xstrdup(provider); /* XXX */ id->death = death; id->confirm = confirm; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next); @@ -667,8 +661,13 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) } keys[i] = NULL; } - xfree(keys); send: + if (pin) + xfree(pin); + if (provider) + xfree(provider); + if (keys) + xfree(keys); buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1); buffer_put_char(&e->output, success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); @@ -677,42 +676,37 @@ send: static void process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) { - char *sc_reader_id = NULL, *pin; - int i, version, success = 0; - Key **keys, *k = NULL; - Identity *id; + char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL; + int version, success = 0; + Identity *id, *nxt; Idtab *tab; - sc_reader_id = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL); + provider = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL); pin = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL); - keys = sc_get_keys(sc_reader_id, pin); - xfree(sc_reader_id); xfree(pin); - if (keys == NULL || keys[0] == NULL) { - error("sc_get_keys failed"); - goto send; - } - for (i = 0; keys[i] != NULL; i++) { - k = keys[i]; - version = k->type == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2; - if ((id = lookup_identity(k, version)) != NULL) { - tab = idtab_lookup(version); - TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next); - tab->nentries--; - free_identity(id); - success = 1; + for (version = 1; version < 3; version++) { + tab = idtab_lookup(version); + for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist); id; id = nxt) { + nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next); + if (!strcmp(provider, id->provider)) { + TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next); + free_identity(id); + tab->nentries--; + } } - key_free(k); - keys[i] = NULL; } - xfree(keys); -send: + if (pkcs11_del_provider(provider) == 0) + success = 1; + else + error("process_remove_smartcard_key:" + " pkcs11_del_provider failed"); + xfree(provider); buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1); buffer_put_char(&e->output, success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); } -#endif /* SMARTCARD */ +#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ /* dispatch incoming messages */ @@ -797,7 +791,7 @@ process_message(SocketEntry *e) case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES: process_remove_all_identities(e, 2); break; -#ifdef SMARTCARD +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY: case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED: process_add_smartcard_key(e); @@ -805,7 +799,7 @@ process_message(SocketEntry *e) case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY: process_remove_smartcard_key(e); break; -#endif /* SMARTCARD */ +#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ default: /* Unknown message. Respond with failure. */ error("Unknown message %d", type); @@ -1009,6 +1003,9 @@ static void cleanup_handler(int sig) { cleanup_socket(); +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + pkcs11_terminate(); +#endif _exit(2); } @@ -1255,6 +1252,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) #endif skip: + +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + pkcs11_init(0); +#endif new_socket(AUTH_SOCKET, sock); if (ac > 0) parent_alive_interval = 10; diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1 index 9e59c16f7..7dc76976a 100644 --- a/ssh-keygen.1 +++ b/ssh-keygen.1 @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.80 2009/10/24 00:48:34 dtucker Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.81 2010/02/08 10:50:20 markus Exp $ .\" .\" -*- nroff -*- .\" @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.Dd $Mdocdate: October 24 2009 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: February 8 2010 $ .Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -201,9 +201,10 @@ Requests changing the comment in the private and public key files. This operation is only supported for RSA1 keys. The program will prompt for the file containing the private keys, for the passphrase if the key has one, and for the new comment. -.It Fl D Ar reader -Download the RSA public key stored in the smartcard in -.Ar reader . +.It Fl D Ar pkcs11 +Download the RSA public keys stored in the +.Ar pkcs11 +provider. .It Fl e This option will read a private or public OpenSSH key file and print the key in @@ -313,9 +314,6 @@ for protocol version 1 and or .Dq dsa for protocol version 2. -.It Fl U Ar reader -Upload an existing RSA private key into the smartcard in -.Ar reader . .It Fl v Verbose mode. Causes diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c index 7f5185f8e..005f9c7ab 100644 --- a/ssh-keygen.c +++ b/ssh-keygen.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.176 2010/01/11 10:51:07 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.177 2010/02/08 10:50:20 markus Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ #include "hostfile.h" #include "dns.h" -#ifdef SMARTCARD -#include "scard.h" +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 +#include "ssh-pkcs11.h" #endif /* Number of bits in the RSA/DSA key. This value can be set on the command line. */ @@ -459,51 +459,29 @@ do_print_public(struct passwd *pw) exit(0); } -#ifdef SMARTCARD static void -do_upload(struct passwd *pw, const char *sc_reader_id) -{ - Key *prv = NULL; - struct stat st; - int ret; - - if (!have_identity) - ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); - if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) { - perror(identity_file); - exit(1); - } - prv = load_identity(identity_file); - if (prv == NULL) { - error("load failed"); - exit(1); - } - ret = sc_put_key(prv, sc_reader_id); - key_free(prv); - if (ret < 0) - exit(1); - logit("loading key done"); - exit(0); -} - -static void -do_download(struct passwd *pw, const char *sc_reader_id) +do_download(struct passwd *pw, const char *pkcs11provider) { +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 Key **keys = NULL; - int i; + int i, nkeys; - keys = sc_get_keys(sc_reader_id, NULL); - if (keys == NULL) - fatal("cannot read public key from smartcard"); - for (i = 0; keys[i]; i++) { + pkcs11_init(0); + nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, NULL, &keys); + if (nkeys <= 0) + fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11"); + for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { key_write(keys[i], stdout); key_free(keys[i]); fprintf(stdout, "\n"); } xfree(keys); + pkcs11_terminate(); exit(0); +#else + fatal("no pkcs11 support"); +#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ } -#endif /* SMARTCARD */ static void do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) @@ -1044,9 +1022,9 @@ usage(void) fprintf(stderr, " -b bits Number of bits in the key to create.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -C comment Provide new comment.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -c Change comment in private and public key files.\n"); -#ifdef SMARTCARD - fprintf(stderr, " -D reader Download public key from smartcard.\n"); -#endif /* SMARTCARD */ +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + fprintf(stderr, " -D pkcs11 Download public key from pkcs11 token.\n"); +#endif fprintf(stderr, " -e Convert OpenSSH to RFC 4716 key file.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -F hostname Find hostname in known hosts file.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -f filename Filename of the key file.\n"); @@ -1065,9 +1043,6 @@ usage(void) fprintf(stderr, " -S start Start point (hex) for generating DH-GEX moduli.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -T file Screen candidates for DH-GEX moduli.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -t type Specify type of key to create.\n"); -#ifdef SMARTCARD - fprintf(stderr, " -U reader Upload private key to smartcard.\n"); -#endif /* SMARTCARD */ fprintf(stderr, " -v Verbose.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -W gen Generator to use for generating DH-GEX moduli.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -y Read private key file and print public key.\n"); @@ -1082,12 +1057,12 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) { char dotsshdir[MAXPATHLEN], comment[1024], *passphrase1, *passphrase2; - char out_file[MAXPATHLEN], *reader_id = NULL; + char out_file[MAXPATHLEN], *pkcs11provider = NULL; char *rr_hostname = NULL; Key *private, *public; struct passwd *pw; struct stat st; - int opt, type, fd, download = 0; + int opt, type, fd; u_int32_t memory = 0, generator_wanted = 0, trials = 100; int do_gen_candidates = 0, do_screen_candidates = 0; BIGNUM *start = NULL; @@ -1120,7 +1095,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) } while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, - "degiqpclBHvxXyF:b:f:t:U:D:P:N:C:r:g:R:T:G:M:S:a:W:")) != -1) { + "degiqpclBHvxXyF:b:f:t:D:P:N:C:r:g:R:T:G:M:S:a:W:")) != -1) { switch (opt) { case 'b': bits = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 768, 32768, &errstr); @@ -1192,10 +1167,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) key_type_name = optarg; break; case 'D': - download = 1; - /*FALLTHROUGH*/ - case 'U': - reader_id = optarg; + pkcs11provider = optarg; break; case 'v': if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) @@ -1303,16 +1275,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) exit(0); } } - if (reader_id != NULL) { -#ifdef SMARTCARD - if (download) - do_download(pw, reader_id); - else - do_upload(pw, reader_id); -#else /* SMARTCARD */ - fatal("no support for smartcards."); -#endif /* SMARTCARD */ - } + if (pkcs11provider != NULL) + do_download(pw, pkcs11provider); if (do_gen_candidates) { FILE *out = fopen(out_file, "w"); diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-client.c b/ssh-pkcs11-client.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6ffdd9364 --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh-pkcs11-client.c @@ -0,0 +1,229 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "authfd.h" +#include "atomicio.h" +#include "ssh-pkcs11.h" + +/* borrows code from sftp-server and ssh-agent */ + +int fd = -1; +pid_t pid = -1; + +static void +send_msg(Buffer *m) +{ + u_char buf[4]; + int mlen = buffer_len(m); + + put_u32(buf, mlen); + if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, 4) != 4 || + atomicio(vwrite, fd, buffer_ptr(m), + buffer_len(m)) != buffer_len(m)) + error("write to helper failed"); + buffer_consume(m, mlen); +} + +static int +recv_msg(Buffer *m) +{ + u_int l, len; + u_char buf[1024]; + + if ((len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, 4)) != 4) { + error("read from helper failed: %u", len); + return (0); /* XXX */ + } + len = get_u32(buf); + if (len > 256 * 1024) + fatal("response too long: %u", len); + /* read len bytes into m */ + buffer_clear(m); + while (len > 0) { + l = len; + if (l > sizeof(buf)) + l = sizeof(buf); + if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, l) != l) { + error("response from helper failed."); + return (0); /* XXX */ + } + buffer_append(m, buf, l); + len -= l; + } + return (buffer_get_char(m)); +} + +int +pkcs11_init(int interactive) +{ + return (0); +} + +void +pkcs11_terminate(void) +{ + close(fd); +} + +static int +pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, + int padding) +{ + Key key; + u_char *blob, *signature = NULL; + u_int blen, slen = 0; + int ret = -1; + Buffer msg; + + if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) + return (-1); + key.type = KEY_RSA; + key.rsa = rsa; + if (key_to_blob(&key, &blob, &blen) == 0) + return -1; + buffer_init(&msg); + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST); + buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen); + buffer_put_string(&msg, from, flen); + buffer_put_int(&msg, 0); + xfree(blob); + send_msg(&msg); + + if (recv_msg(&msg) == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) { + signature = buffer_get_string(&msg, &slen); + if (slen <= (u_int)RSA_size(rsa)) { + memcpy(to, signature, slen); + ret = slen; + } + xfree(signature); + } + return (ret); +} + +/* redirect the private key encrypt operation to the ssh-pkcs11-helper */ +static int +wrap_key(RSA *rsa) +{ + static RSA_METHOD helper_rsa; + + memcpy(&helper_rsa, RSA_get_default_method(), sizeof(helper_rsa)); + helper_rsa.name = "ssh-pkcs11-helper"; + helper_rsa.rsa_priv_enc = pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt; + RSA_set_method(rsa, &helper_rsa); + return (0); +} + +static int +pkcs11_start_helper(void) +{ + int pair[2]; + + if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1) { + error("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno)); + return (-1); + } + if ((pid = fork()) == -1) { + error("fork: %s", strerror(errno)); + return (-1); + } else if (pid == 0) { + if ((dup2(pair[1], STDIN_FILENO) == -1) || + (dup2(pair[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)) { + fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } + close(pair[0]); + close(pair[1]); + execlp(_PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER, _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER, + (char *) 0); + fprintf(stderr, "exec: %s: %s\n", _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER, + strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } + close(pair[1]); + fd = pair[0]; + return (0); +} + +int +pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pin, Key ***keysp) +{ + Key *k; + int i, nkeys; + u_char *blob; + u_int blen; + Buffer msg; + + if (fd < 0 && pkcs11_start_helper() < 0) + return (-1); + + buffer_init(&msg); + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY); + buffer_put_cstring(&msg, name); + buffer_put_cstring(&msg, pin); + send_msg(&msg); + buffer_clear(&msg); + + if (recv_msg(&msg) == SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) { + nkeys = buffer_get_int(&msg); + *keysp = xcalloc(nkeys, sizeof(Key *)); + for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { + blob = buffer_get_string(&msg, &blen); + xfree(buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL)); + k = key_from_blob(blob, blen); + wrap_key(k->rsa); + (*keysp)[i] = k; + xfree(blob); + } + } else { + nkeys = -1; + } + buffer_free(&msg); + return (nkeys); +} + +int +pkcs11_del_provider(char *name) +{ + int ret = -1; + Buffer msg; + + buffer_init(&msg); + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY); + buffer_put_cstring(&msg, name); + buffer_put_cstring(&msg, ""); + send_msg(&msg); + buffer_clear(&msg); + + if (recv_msg(&msg) == SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS) + ret = 0; + buffer_free(&msg); + return (ret); +} diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c b/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f9962709b --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c @@ -0,0 +1,349 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "authfd.h" +#include "ssh-pkcs11.h" + +/* borrows code from sftp-server and ssh-agent */ + +struct pkcs11_keyinfo { + Key *key; + char *providername; + TAILQ_ENTRY(pkcs11_keyinfo) next; +}; + +TAILQ_HEAD(, pkcs11_keyinfo) pkcs11_keylist; + +#define MAX_MSG_LENGTH 10240 /*XXX*/ + +/* helper */ +#define get_int() buffer_get_int(&iqueue); +#define get_string(lenp) buffer_get_string(&iqueue, lenp); + +/* input and output queue */ +Buffer iqueue; +Buffer oqueue; + +static void +add_key(Key *k, char *name) +{ + struct pkcs11_keyinfo *ki; + + ki = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ki)); + ki->providername = xstrdup(name); + ki->key = k; + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_keylist, ki, next); +} + +static void +del_keys_by_name(char *name) +{ + struct pkcs11_keyinfo *ki, *nxt; + + for (ki = TAILQ_FIRST(&pkcs11_keylist); ki; ki = nxt) { + nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(ki, next); + if (!strcmp(ki->providername, name)) { + TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_keylist, ki, next); + xfree(ki->providername); + key_free(ki->key); + free(ki); + } + } +} + +/* lookup matching 'private' key */ +static Key * +lookup_key(Key *k) +{ + struct pkcs11_keyinfo *ki; + + TAILQ_FOREACH(ki, &pkcs11_keylist, next) { + debug("check %p %s", ki, ki->providername); + if (key_equal(k, ki->key)) + return (ki->key); + } + return (NULL); +} + +static void +send_msg(Buffer *m) +{ + int mlen = buffer_len(m); + + buffer_put_int(&oqueue, mlen); + buffer_append(&oqueue, buffer_ptr(m), mlen); + buffer_consume(m, mlen); +} + +static void +process_add(void) +{ + char *name, *pin; + Key **keys; + int i, nkeys; + u_char *blob; + u_int blen; + Buffer msg; + + buffer_init(&msg); + name = get_string(NULL); + pin = get_string(NULL); + if ((nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(name, pin, &keys)) > 0) { + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER); + buffer_put_int(&msg, nkeys); + for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { + key_to_blob(keys[i], &blob, &blen); + buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen); + buffer_put_cstring(&msg, name); + xfree(blob); + add_key(keys[i], name); + } + xfree(keys); + } else { + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); + } + xfree(pin); + xfree(name); + send_msg(&msg); + buffer_free(&msg); +} + +static void +process_del(void) +{ + char *name, *pin; + Buffer msg; + + buffer_init(&msg); + name = get_string(NULL); + pin = get_string(NULL); + del_keys_by_name(name); + if (pkcs11_del_provider(name) == 0) + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS); + else + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); + xfree(pin); + xfree(name); + send_msg(&msg); + buffer_free(&msg); +} + +static void +process_sign(void) +{ + u_char *blob, *data, *signature = NULL; + u_int blen, dlen, slen = 0; + int ok = -1, flags, ret; + Key *key, *found; + Buffer msg; + + blob = get_string(&blen); + data = get_string(&dlen); + flags = get_int(); /* XXX ignore */ + + if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) != NULL) { + if ((found = lookup_key(key)) != NULL) { + slen = RSA_size(key->rsa); + signature = xmalloc(slen); + if ((ret = RSA_private_encrypt(dlen, data, signature, + found->rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) != -1) { + slen = ret; + ok = 0; + } + } + key_free(key); + } + buffer_init(&msg); + if (ok == 0) { + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE); + buffer_put_string(&msg, signature, slen); + } else { + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); + } + xfree(data); + xfree(blob); + if (signature != NULL) + xfree(signature); + send_msg(&msg); + buffer_free(&msg); +} + +static void +process(void) +{ + u_int msg_len; + u_int buf_len; + u_int consumed; + u_int type; + u_char *cp; + + buf_len = buffer_len(&iqueue); + if (buf_len < 5) + return; /* Incomplete message. */ + cp = buffer_ptr(&iqueue); + msg_len = get_u32(cp); + if (msg_len > MAX_MSG_LENGTH) { + error("bad message len %d", msg_len); + cleanup_exit(11); + } + if (buf_len < msg_len + 4) + return; + buffer_consume(&iqueue, 4); + buf_len -= 4; + type = buffer_get_char(&iqueue); + switch (type) { + case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY: + debug("process_add"); + process_add(); + break; + case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY: + debug("process_del"); + process_del(); + break; + case SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST: + debug("process_sign"); + process_sign(); + break; + default: + error("Unknown message %d", type); + break; + } + /* discard the remaining bytes from the current packet */ + if (buf_len < buffer_len(&iqueue)) { + error("iqueue grew unexpectedly"); + cleanup_exit(255); + } + consumed = buf_len - buffer_len(&iqueue); + if (msg_len < consumed) { + error("msg_len %d < consumed %d", msg_len, consumed); + cleanup_exit(255); + } + if (msg_len > consumed) + buffer_consume(&iqueue, msg_len - consumed); +} + +void +cleanup_exit(int i) +{ + /* XXX */ + _exit(i); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + fd_set *rset, *wset; + int in, out, max, log_stderr = 0; + ssize_t len, olen, set_size; + SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH; + LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR; + char buf[4*4096]; + + TAILQ_INIT(&pkcs11_keylist); + pkcs11_init(0); + + extern char *optarg; + extern char *__progname; + + log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr); + + in = STDIN_FILENO; + out = STDOUT_FILENO; + + max = 0; + if (in > max) + max = in; + if (out > max) + max = out; + + buffer_init(&iqueue); + buffer_init(&oqueue); + + set_size = howmany(max + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask); + rset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(set_size); + wset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(set_size); + + for (;;) { + memset(rset, 0, set_size); + memset(wset, 0, set_size); + + /* + * Ensure that we can read a full buffer and handle + * the worst-case length packet it can generate, + * otherwise apply backpressure by stopping reads. + */ + if (buffer_check_alloc(&iqueue, sizeof(buf)) && + buffer_check_alloc(&oqueue, MAX_MSG_LENGTH)) + FD_SET(in, rset); + + olen = buffer_len(&oqueue); + if (olen > 0) + FD_SET(out, wset); + + if (select(max+1, rset, wset, NULL, NULL) < 0) { + if (errno == EINTR) + continue; + error("select: %s", strerror(errno)); + cleanup_exit(2); + } + + /* copy stdin to iqueue */ + if (FD_ISSET(in, rset)) { + len = read(in, buf, sizeof buf); + if (len == 0) { + debug("read eof"); + cleanup_exit(0); + } else if (len < 0) { + error("read: %s", strerror(errno)); + cleanup_exit(1); + } else { + buffer_append(&iqueue, buf, len); + } + } + /* send oqueue to stdout */ + if (FD_ISSET(out, wset)) { + len = write(out, buffer_ptr(&oqueue), olen); + if (len < 0) { + error("write: %s", strerror(errno)); + cleanup_exit(1); + } else { + buffer_consume(&oqueue, len); + } + } + + /* + * Process requests from client if we can fit the results + * into the output buffer, otherwise stop processing input + * and let the output queue drain. + */ + if (buffer_check_alloc(&oqueue, MAX_MSG_LENGTH)) + process(); + } +} diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.c b/ssh-pkcs11.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f82454329 --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh-pkcs11.c @@ -0,0 +1,544 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +#define CRYPTOKI_COMPAT +#include "pkcs11.h" + +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "ssh-pkcs11.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" + +struct pkcs11_slotinfo { + CK_TOKEN_INFO token; + CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; + int logged_in; +}; + +struct pkcs11_provider { + char *name; + void *handle; + CK_FUNCTION_LIST *function_list; + CK_INFO info; + CK_ULONG nslots; + CK_SLOT_ID *slotlist; + struct pkcs11_slotinfo *slotinfo; + int valid; + int refcount; + TAILQ_ENTRY(pkcs11_provider) next; +}; + +TAILQ_HEAD(, pkcs11_provider) pkcs11_providers; + +struct pkcs11_key { + struct pkcs11_provider *provider; + CK_ULONG slotidx; + int (*orig_finish)(RSA *rsa); + RSA_METHOD rsa_method; + char *keyid; + int keyid_len; +}; + +int pkcs11_interactive = 0; + +int +pkcs11_init(int interactive) +{ + pkcs11_interactive = interactive; + TAILQ_INIT(&pkcs11_providers); + return (0); +} + +/* + * finalize a provider shared libarary, it's no longer usable. + * however, there might still be keys referencing this provider, + * so the actuall freeing of memory is handled by pkcs11_provider_unref(). + * this is called when a provider gets unregistered. + */ +static void +pkcs11_provider_finalize(struct pkcs11_provider *p) +{ + CK_RV rv; + CK_ULONG i; + + debug("pkcs11_provider_finalize: %p refcount %d valid %d", + p, p->refcount, p->valid); + if (!p->valid) + return; + for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) { + if (p->slotinfo[i].session && + (rv = p->function_list->C_CloseSession( + p->slotinfo[i].session)) != CKR_OK) + error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv); + } + if ((rv = p->function_list->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) + error("C_Finalize failed: %lu", rv); + p->valid = 0; + p->function_list = NULL; + dlclose(p->handle); +} + +/* + * remove a reference to the provider. + * called when a key gets destroyed or when the provider is unregistered. + */ +static void +pkcs11_provider_unref(struct pkcs11_provider *p) +{ + debug("pkcs11_provider_unref: %p refcount %d", p, p->refcount); + if (--p->refcount <= 0) { + if (p->valid) + error("pkcs11_provider_unref: %p still valid", p); + xfree(p->slotlist); + xfree(p->slotinfo); + xfree(p); + } +} + +/* unregister all providers, keys might still point to the providers */ +void +pkcs11_terminate(void) +{ + struct pkcs11_provider *p; + + while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&pkcs11_providers)) != NULL) { + TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); + pkcs11_provider_finalize(p); + pkcs11_provider_unref(p); + } +} + +/* lookup provider by name */ +static struct pkcs11_provider * +pkcs11_provider_lookup(char *provider_id) +{ + struct pkcs11_provider *p; + + TAILQ_FOREACH(p, &pkcs11_providers, next) { + debug("check %p %s", p, p->name); + if (!strcmp(provider_id, p->name)) + return (p); + } + return (NULL); +} + +/* unregister provider by name */ +int +pkcs11_del_provider(char *provider_id) +{ + struct pkcs11_provider *p; + + if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL) { + TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); + pkcs11_provider_finalize(p); + pkcs11_provider_unref(p); + return (0); + } + return (-1); +} + +/* openssl callback for freeing an RSA key */ +static int +pkcs11_rsa_finish(RSA *rsa) +{ + struct pkcs11_key *k11; + int rv = -1; + + if ((k11 = RSA_get_app_data(rsa)) != NULL) { + if (k11->orig_finish) + rv = k11->orig_finish(rsa); + if (k11->provider) + pkcs11_provider_unref(k11->provider); + if (k11->keyid) + xfree(k11->keyid); + xfree(k11); + } + return (rv); +} + +/* openssl callback doing the actual signing operation */ +static int +pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, + int padding) +{ + struct pkcs11_key *k11; + struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si; + CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj; + CK_ULONG tlen = 0, nfound = 0; + CK_RV rv; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS private_key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; + CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE; + CK_MECHANISM mech = { + CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL_PTR, 0 + }; + CK_ATTRIBUTE key_filter[] = { + {CKA_CLASS, &private_key_class, sizeof(private_key_class) }, + {CKA_ID, NULL, 0}, + {CKA_SIGN, &true, sizeof(true) } + }; + char *pin, prompt[1024]; + int rval = -1; + + if ((k11 = RSA_get_app_data(rsa)) == NULL) { + error("RSA_get_app_data failed for rsa %p", rsa); + return (-1); + } + if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid) { + error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider for rsa %p", rsa); + return (-1); + } + f = k11->provider->function_list; + si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; + if ((si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) && !si->logged_in) { + if (!pkcs11_interactive) { + error("need pin"); + return (-1); + } + snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter PIN for '%s': ", + si->token.label); + pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF); + if (pin == NULL) + return (-1); /* bail out */ + if ((rv = f->C_Login(si->session, CKU_USER, pin, strlen(pin))) + != CKR_OK) { + xfree(pin); + error("C_Login failed: %lu", rv); + return (-1); + } + xfree(pin); + si->logged_in = 1; + } + key_filter[1].pValue = k11->keyid; + key_filter[1].ulValueLen = k11->keyid_len; + if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(si->session, key_filter, 3)) != CKR_OK) { + error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv); + return (-1); + } + if ((rv = f->C_FindObjects(si->session, &obj, 1, &nfound)) != CKR_OK || + nfound != 1) { + error("C_FindObjects failed (%lu nfound): %lu", nfound, rv); + } else if ((rv = f->C_SignInit(si->session, &mech, obj)) != CKR_OK) { + error("C_SignInit failed: %lu", rv); + } else { + /* XXX handle CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */ + tlen = RSA_size(rsa); + rv = f->C_Sign(si->session, (CK_BYTE *)from, flen, to, &tlen); + if (rv == CKR_OK) + rval = tlen; + else + error("C_Sign failed: %lu", rv); + } + if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(si->session)) != CKR_OK) + error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv); + return (rval); +} + +static int +pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, + int padding) +{ + return (-1); +} + +/* redirect private key operations for rsa key to pkcs11 token */ +static int +pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx, + CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, RSA *rsa) +{ + struct pkcs11_key *k11; + const RSA_METHOD *def = RSA_get_default_method(); + + k11 = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*k11)); + k11->provider = provider; + provider->refcount++; /* provider referenced by RSA key */ + k11->slotidx = slotidx; + /* identify key object on smartcard */ + k11->keyid_len = keyid_attrib->ulValueLen; + k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len); + memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len); + k11->orig_finish = def->finish; + memcpy(&k11->rsa_method, def, sizeof(k11->rsa_method)); + k11->rsa_method.name = "pkcs11"; + k11->rsa_method.rsa_priv_enc = pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt; + k11->rsa_method.rsa_priv_dec = pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt; + k11->rsa_method.finish = pkcs11_rsa_finish; + RSA_set_method(rsa, &k11->rsa_method); + RSA_set_app_data(rsa, k11); + return (0); +} + +/* remove trailing spaces */ +static void +rmspace(char *buf, size_t len) +{ + size_t i; + + if (!len) + return; + for (i = len - 1; i > 0; i--) + if (i == len - 1 || buf[i] == ' ') + buf[i] = '\0'; + else + break; +} + +/* + * open a pkcs11 session and login if required. + * if pin == NULL we delay login until key use + */ +static int +pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, char *pin) +{ + CK_RV rv; + CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; + CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; + int login_required; + + f = p->function_list; + login_required = p->slotinfo[slotidx].token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED; + if (pin && login_required && !strlen(pin)) { + error("pin required"); + return (-1); + } + if ((rv = f->C_OpenSession(p->slotlist[slotidx], CKF_RW_SESSION| + CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL, NULL, &session)) + != CKR_OK) { + error("C_OpenSession failed: %lu", rv); + return (-1); + } + if (login_required && pin) { + if ((rv = f->C_Login(session, CKU_USER, pin, strlen(pin))) + != CKR_OK) { + error("C_Login failed: %lu", rv); + if ((rv = f->C_CloseSession(session)) != CKR_OK) + error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv); + return (-1); + } + p->slotinfo[slotidx].logged_in = 1; + } + p->slotinfo[slotidx].session = session; + return (0); +} + +/* + * lookup public keys for token in slot identified by slotidx, + * add 'wrapped' public keys to the 'keysp' array and increment nkeys. + * keysp points to an (possibly empty) array with *nkeys keys. + */ +static int +pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, Key ***keysp, + int *nkeys) +{ + Key *key; + RSA *rsa; + int i; + CK_RV rv; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj; + CK_ULONG nfound; + CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; + CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS pubkey_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; + CK_ATTRIBUTE pubkey_filter[] = { + { CKA_CLASS, &pubkey_class, sizeof(pubkey_class) } + }; + CK_ATTRIBUTE attribs[] = { + { CKA_ID, NULL, 0 }, + { CKA_MODULUS, NULL, 0 }, + { CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, NULL, 0 } + }; + + f = p->function_list; + session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; + /* setup a filter the looks for public keys */ + if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, pubkey_filter, 1)) != CKR_OK) { + error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv); + return (-1); + } + while (1) { + /* XXX 3 attributes in attribs[] */ + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { + attribs[i].pValue = NULL; + attribs[i].ulValueLen = 0; + } + if ((rv = f->C_FindObjects(session, &obj, 1, &nfound)) != CKR_OK + || nfound == 0) + break; + /* found a key, so figure out size of the attributes */ + if ((rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attribs, 3)) + != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); + continue; + } + /* allocate buffers for attributes, XXX check ulValueLen? */ + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) + attribs[i].pValue = xmalloc(attribs[i].ulValueLen); + /* retrieve ID, modulus and public exponent of RSA key */ + if ((rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attribs, 3)) + != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); + } else if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) { + error("RSA_new failed"); + } else { + rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(attribs[1].pValue, + attribs[1].ulValueLen, NULL); + rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(attribs[2].pValue, + attribs[2].ulValueLen, NULL); + if (rsa->n && rsa->e && + pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &attribs[0], rsa) == 0) { + key = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC); + key->rsa = rsa; + key->type = KEY_RSA; + key->flags |= KEY_FLAG_EXT; + /* expand key array and add key */ + *keysp = xrealloc(*keysp, *nkeys + 1, + sizeof(Key *)); + (*keysp)[*nkeys] = key; + *nkeys = *nkeys + 1; + debug("have %d keys", *nkeys); + } else { + RSA_free(rsa); + } + } + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) + xfree(attribs[i].pValue); + } + if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session)) != CKR_OK) + error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv); + return (0); +} + +/* register a new provider, fails if provider already exists */ +int +pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, Key ***keyp) +{ + int nkeys, need_finalize = 0; + struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL; + void *handle = NULL; + CK_RV (*getfunctionlist)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST **); + CK_RV rv; + CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL; + CK_TOKEN_INFO *token; + CK_ULONG i; + + *keyp = NULL; + if (pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id) != NULL) { + error("provider already registered: %s", provider_id); + goto fail; + } + /* open shared pkcs11-libarary */ + if ((handle = dlopen(provider_id, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) { + error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_id, dlerror()); + goto fail; + } + if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) { + error("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror()); + goto fail; + } + p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p)); + p->name = xstrdup(provider_id); + p->handle = handle; + /* setup the pkcs11 callbacks */ + if ((rv = (*getfunctionlist)(&f)) != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetFunctionList failed: %lu", rv); + goto fail; + } + p->function_list = f; + if ((rv = f->C_Initialize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) { + error("C_Initialize failed: %lu", rv); + goto fail; + } + need_finalize = 1; + if ((rv = f->C_GetInfo(&p->info)) != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetInfo failed: %lu", rv); + goto fail; + } + rmspace(p->info.manufacturerID, sizeof(p->info.manufacturerID)); + rmspace(p->info.libraryDescription, sizeof(p->info.libraryDescription)); + debug("manufacturerID <%s> cryptokiVersion %d.%d" + " libraryDescription <%s> libraryVersion %d.%d", + p->info.manufacturerID, + p->info.cryptokiVersion.major, + p->info.cryptokiVersion.minor, + p->info.libraryDescription, + p->info.libraryVersion.major, + p->info.libraryVersion.minor); + if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, NULL, &p->nslots)) != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetSlotList failed: %lu", rv); + goto fail; + } + if (p->nslots == 0) { + error("no slots"); + goto fail; + } + p->slotlist = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID)); + if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, p->slotlist, &p->nslots)) + != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetSlotList failed: %lu", rv); + goto fail; + } + p->slotinfo = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(struct pkcs11_slotinfo)); + p->valid = 1; + nkeys = 0; + for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) { + token = &p->slotinfo[i].token; + if ((rv = f->C_GetTokenInfo(p->slotlist[i], token)) + != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetTokenInfo failed: %lu", rv); + continue; + } + rmspace(token->label, sizeof(token->label)); + rmspace(token->manufacturerID, sizeof(token->manufacturerID)); + rmspace(token->model, sizeof(token->model)); + rmspace(token->serialNumber, sizeof(token->serialNumber)); + debug("label <%s> manufacturerID <%s> model <%s> serial <%s>" + " flags 0x%lx", + token->label, token->manufacturerID, token->model, + token->serialNumber, token->flags); + /* open session, login with pin and retrieve public keys */ + if (pkcs11_open_session(p, i, pin) == 0) + pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, &nkeys); + } + if (nkeys > 0) { + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); + p->refcount++; /* add to provider list */ + return (nkeys); + } + error("no keys"); + /* don't add the provider, since it does not have any keys */ +fail: + if (need_finalize && (rv = f->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) + error("C_Finalize failed: %lu", rv); + if (p) { + if (p->slotlist) + xfree(p->slotlist); + if (p->slotinfo) + xfree(p->slotinfo); + xfree(p); + } + if (handle) + dlclose(handle); + return (-1); +} diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.h b/ssh-pkcs11.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fae41a7b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh-pkcs11.h @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ +int pkcs11_init(int); +void pkcs11_terminate(void); +int pkcs11_add_provider(char *, char *, Key ***); +int pkcs11_del_provider(char *); diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1 index 1ff2cce4d..97a2455ab 100644 --- a/ssh.1 +++ b/ssh.1 @@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.290 2010/01/11 01:39:46 dtucker Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: January 11 2010 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.291 2010/02/08 10:50:20 markus Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: February 8 2010 $ .Dt SSH 1 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -284,12 +284,12 @@ will wait for all remote port forwards to be successfully established before placing itself in the background. .It Fl g Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports. -.It Fl I Ar smartcard_device -Specify the device +.It Fl I Ar pkcs11 +Specify the PKCS#11 shared libarary .Nm -should use to communicate with a smartcard used for storing the user's +should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token used for storing the user's private RSA key. -This option is only available if support for smartcard devices +This option is only available if support for PKCS#11 is compiled in (default is no support). .It Fl i Ar identity_file Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for @@ -469,6 +469,7 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see .It NumberOfPasswordPrompts .It PasswordAuthentication .It PermitLocalCommand +.It PKCS11Provider .It Port .It PreferredAuthentications .It Protocol @@ -481,7 +482,6 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see .It SendEnv .It ServerAliveInterval .It ServerAliveCountMax -.It SmartcardDevice .It StrictHostKeyChecking .It TCPKeepAlive .It Tunnel diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c index 97afdcfee..63523b42a 100644 --- a/ssh.c +++ b/ssh.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.332 2010/01/26 01:28:35 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.333 2010/02/08 10:50:20 markus Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ #include "roaming.h" #include "version.h" -#ifdef SMARTCARD -#include "scard.h" +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 +#include "ssh-pkcs11.h" #endif extern char *__progname; @@ -362,10 +362,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'I': -#ifdef SMARTCARD - options.smartcard_device = xstrdup(optarg); +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + options.pkcs11_provider = xstrdup(optarg); #else - fprintf(stderr, "no support for smartcards.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "no support for PKCS#11.\n"); #endif break; case 't': @@ -1305,14 +1305,17 @@ load_public_identity_files(void) int i = 0; Key *public; struct passwd *pw; -#ifdef SMARTCARD +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 Key **keys; + int nkeys; - if (options.smartcard_device != NULL && + if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL && options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES && - (keys = sc_get_keys(options.smartcard_device, NULL)) != NULL) { + (pkcs11_init(!options.batch_mode) == 0) && + (nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(options.pkcs11_provider, NULL, + &keys)) > 0) { int count = 0; - for (i = 0; keys[i] != NULL; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { count++; memmove(&options.identity_files[1], &options.identity_files[0], @@ -1322,14 +1325,16 @@ load_public_identity_files(void) sizeof(Key *) * (SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES - 1)); options.num_identity_files++; options.identity_keys[0] = keys[i]; - options.identity_files[0] = sc_get_key_label(keys[i]); + options.identity_files[0] = + xstrdup(options.pkcs11_provider); /* XXX */ } if (options.num_identity_files > SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) options.num_identity_files = SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES; i = count; xfree(keys); + /* XXX leaks some keys */ } -#endif /* SMARTCARD */ +#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ if ((pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid)) == NULL) fatal("load_public_identity_files: getpwuid failed"); pwname = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 index 01f5f4304..350a8eacd 100644 --- a/ssh_config.5 +++ b/ssh_config.5 @@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.126 2010/01/09 23:04:13 dtucker Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: January 9 2010 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.127 2010/02/08 10:50:20 markus Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: February 8 2010 $ .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -711,6 +711,13 @@ or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . +.It Cm PKCS11Provider +Specifies which PKCS#11 provider to use. +The argument to this keyword is the PKCS#11 shared libary +.Xr ssh 1 +should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token used for storing the user's +private RSA key. +By default, no device is specified and PKCS#11 support is not activated. .It Cm Port Specifies the port number to connect on the remote host. The default is 22. @@ -927,13 +934,6 @@ channel to request a response from the server. The default is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server. This option applies to protocol version 2 only. -.It Cm SmartcardDevice -Specifies which smartcard device to use. -The argument to this keyword is the device -.Xr ssh 1 -should use to communicate with a smartcard used for storing the user's -private RSA key. -By default, no device is specified and smartcard support is not activated. .It Cm StrictHostKeyChecking If this flag is set to .Dq yes , -- cgit v1.2.3 From 86cbb44d47c49b108b94854b02dd5c3eae19123d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Damien Miller Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 09:22:57 +1100 Subject: - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/02/09 00:50:59 [ssh-keygen.c] fix -Wall --- ChangeLog | 3 +++ ssh-keygen.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'ssh-keygen.c') diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index 506ea7dab..2ca5ec707 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/02/09 00:50:36 [ssh-agent.c] fallout from PKCS#11: unbreak -D + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/02/09 00:50:59 + [ssh-keygen.c] + fix -Wall 20100210 - (djm) add -lselinux to LIBS before calling AC_CHECK_FUNCS for diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c index 005f9c7ab..b6b7a2d9f 100644 --- a/ssh-keygen.c +++ b/ssh-keygen.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.177 2010/02/08 10:50:20 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.178 2010/02/09 00:50:59 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ do_print_public(struct passwd *pw) } static void -do_download(struct passwd *pw, const char *pkcs11provider) +do_download(struct passwd *pw, char *pkcs11provider) { #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 Key **keys = NULL; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0a80ca190a39943029719facf7edb990def7ae62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Damien Miller Date: Sat, 27 Feb 2010 07:55:05 +1100 Subject: - OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/02/26 20:29:54 [PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys addrmatch.c auth-options.c] [auth-options.h auth.h auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c dns.c dns.h hostfile.c] [hostfile.h kex.h kexdhs.c kexgexs.c key.c key.h match.h monitor.c] [myproposal.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c] [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h sshconnect.c] [sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5] Add support for certificate key types for users and hosts. OpenSSH certificate key types are not X.509 certificates, but a much simpler format that encodes a public key, identity information and some validity constraints and signs it with a CA key. CA keys are regular SSH keys. This certificate style avoids the attack surface of X.509 certificates and is very easy to deploy. Certified host keys allow automatic acceptance of new host keys when a CA certificate is marked as sh/known_hosts. see VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1) for details. Certified user keys allow authentication of users when the signing CA key is marked as trusted in authorized_keys. See "AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT" in sshd(8) for details. Certificates are minted using ssh-keygen(1), documentation is in the "CERTIFICATES" section of that manpage. Documentation on the format of certificates is in the file PROTOCOL.certkeys feedback and ok markus@ --- ChangeLog | 33 +++ PROTOCOL | 23 ++- PROTOCOL.agent | 24 ++- PROTOCOL.certkeys | 191 ++++++++++++++++++ addrmatch.c | 78 ++++++- auth-options.c | 150 +++++++++++++- auth-options.h | 4 +- auth.h | 5 +- auth2-pubkey.c | 37 +++- authfd.c | 24 ++- dns.c | 8 +- dns.h | 6 +- hostfile.c | 31 ++- hostfile.h | 4 +- kex.h | 5 +- kexdhs.c | 19 +- kexgexs.c | 20 +- key.c | 595 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- key.h | 32 ++- match.h | 4 +- monitor.c | 5 +- myproposal.h | 6 +- servconf.c | 19 +- servconf.h | 5 +- ssh-add.c | 34 +++- ssh-agent.c | 24 ++- ssh-dss.c | 10 +- ssh-keygen.1 | 178 +++++++++++++++- ssh-keygen.c | 433 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- ssh-rsa.c | 10 +- ssh.1 | 23 ++- ssh.c | 71 +++++-- ssh2.h | 5 +- sshconnect.c | 78 +++++-- sshconnect2.c | 4 +- sshd.8 | 25 ++- sshd.c | 117 +++++++++-- sshd_config.5 | 12 +- 38 files changed, 2164 insertions(+), 188 deletions(-) create mode 100644 PROTOCOL.certkeys (limited to 'ssh-keygen.c') diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index 10c074c26..fec38e028 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -1,3 +1,36 @@ +20100226 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/02/26 20:29:54 + [PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys addrmatch.c auth-options.c] + [auth-options.h auth.h auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c dns.c dns.h hostfile.c] + [hostfile.h kex.h kexdhs.c kexgexs.c key.c key.h match.h monitor.c] + [myproposal.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c] + [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h sshconnect.c] + [sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5] + Add support for certificate key types for users and hosts. + + OpenSSH certificate key types are not X.509 certificates, but a much + simpler format that encodes a public key, identity information and + some validity constraints and signs it with a CA key. CA keys are + regular SSH keys. This certificate style avoids the attack surface + of X.509 certificates and is very easy to deploy. + + Certified host keys allow automatic acceptance of new host keys + when a CA certificate is marked as trusted in ~/.ssh/known_hosts. + see VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1) for details. + + Certified user keys allow authentication of users when the signing + CA key is marked as trusted in authorized_keys. See "AUTHORIZED_KEYS + FILE FORMAT" in sshd(8) for details. + + Certificates are minted using ssh-keygen(1), documentation is in + the "CERTIFICATES" section of that manpage. + + Documentation on the format of certificates is in the file + PROTOCOL.certkeys + + feedback and ok markus@ + 20100224 - (djm) [pkcs11.h ssh-pkcs11-client.c ssh-pkcs11-helper.c ssh-pkcs11.c] [ssh-pkcs11.h] Add $OpenBSD$ RCS idents so we can sync portable diff --git a/PROTOCOL b/PROTOCOL index 9b74b9475..5fc31eade 100644 --- a/PROTOCOL +++ b/PROTOCOL @@ -31,7 +31,14 @@ The method is documented in: http://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-compression-delayed-00.txt -3. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com" +3. transport: New public key algorithms "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com" and + "ssh-dsa-cert-v00@openssh.com" + +OpenSSH introduces two new public key algorithms to support certificate +authentication for users and hostkeys. These methods are documented in +the file PROTOCOL.certkeys + +4. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com" The SSH connection protocol (rfc4254) provides the SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF message to allow an endpoint to signal its peer that it will send no @@ -70,7 +77,7 @@ message is only sent to OpenSSH peers (identified by banner). Other SSH implementations may be whitelisted to receive this message upon request. -4. connection: disallow additional sessions extension +5. connection: disallow additional sessions extension "no-more-sessions@openssh.com" Most SSH connections will only ever request a single session, but a @@ -98,7 +105,7 @@ of this message, the no-more-sessions request is only sent to OpenSSH servers (identified by banner). Other SSH implementations may be whitelisted to receive this message upon request. -5. connection: Tunnel forward extension "tun@openssh.com" +6. connection: Tunnel forward extension "tun@openssh.com" OpenSSH supports layer 2 and layer 3 tunnelling via the "tun@openssh.com" channel type. This channel type supports forwarding of network packets @@ -159,7 +166,7 @@ The contents of the "data" field for layer 2 packets is: The "frame" field contains an IEEE 802.3 Ethernet frame, including header. -6. sftp: Reversal of arguments to SSH_FXP_SYMLINK +7. sftp: Reversal of arguments to SSH_FXP_SYMLINK When OpenSSH's sftp-server was implemented, the order of the arguments to the SSH_FXP_SYMLINK method was inadvertently reversed. Unfortunately, @@ -172,7 +179,7 @@ SSH_FXP_SYMLINK as follows: string targetpath string linkpath -7. sftp: Server extension announcement in SSH_FXP_VERSION +8. sftp: Server extension announcement in SSH_FXP_VERSION OpenSSH's sftp-server lists the extensions it supports using the standard extension announcement mechanism in the SSH_FXP_VERSION server @@ -193,7 +200,7 @@ ever changed in an incompatible way. The server MAY advertise the same extension with multiple versions (though this is unlikely). Clients MUST check the version number before attempting to use the extension. -8. sftp: Extension request "posix-rename@openssh.com" +9. sftp: Extension request "posix-rename@openssh.com" This operation provides a rename operation with POSIX semantics, which are different to those provided by the standard SSH_FXP_RENAME in @@ -210,7 +217,7 @@ rename(oldpath, newpath) and will respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message. This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version "1". -9. sftp: Extension requests "statvfs@openssh.com" and +10. sftp: Extension requests "statvfs@openssh.com" and "fstatvfs@openssh.com" These requests correspond to the statvfs and fstatvfs POSIX system @@ -251,4 +258,4 @@ The values of the f_flag bitmask are as follows: Both the "statvfs@openssh.com" and "fstatvfs@openssh.com" extensions are advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version "2". -$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.14 2010/01/09 00:57:10 djm Exp $ +$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.15 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ diff --git a/PROTOCOL.agent b/PROTOCOL.agent index 49adbdd5c..b34fcd318 100644 --- a/PROTOCOL.agent +++ b/PROTOCOL.agent @@ -173,6 +173,15 @@ be added using the following request string key_comment constraint[] key_constraints +DSA certificates may be added with: + byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or + SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED + string "ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com" + string certificate + mpint dsa_private_key + string key_comment + constraint[] key_constraints + RSA keys may be added with this request: byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or @@ -187,6 +196,19 @@ RSA keys may be added with this request: string key_comment constraint[] key_constraints +RSA certificates may be added with this request: + + byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or + SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED + string "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com" + string certificate + mpint rsa_d + mpint rsa_iqmp + mpint rsa_p + mpint rsa_q + string key_comment + constraint[] key_constraints + Note that the 'rsa_p' and 'rsa_q' parameters are sent in the reverse order to the protocol 1 add keys message. As with the corresponding protocol 1 "add key" request, the private key is overspecified to avoid @@ -513,4 +535,4 @@ Locking and unlocking affects both protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys. SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME 1 SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM 2 -$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.agent,v 1.4 2008/07/01 23:12:47 stevesk Exp $ +$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.agent,v 1.5 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ diff --git a/PROTOCOL.certkeys b/PROTOCOL.certkeys new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0b887a240 --- /dev/null +++ b/PROTOCOL.certkeys @@ -0,0 +1,191 @@ +This document describes a simple public-key certificate authentication +system for use by SSH. + +Background +---------- + +The SSH protocol currently supports a simple public key authentication +mechanism. Unlike other public key implementations, SSH eschews the +use of X.509 certificates and uses raw keys. This approach has some +benefits relating to simplicity of configuration and minimisation +of attack surface, but it does not support the important use-cases +of centrally managed, passwordless authentication and centrally +certified host keys. + +These protocol extensions build on the simple public key authentication +system already in SSH to allow certificate-based authentication. +The certificates used are not traditional X.509 certificates, with +numerous options and complex encoding rules, but something rather +more minimal: a key, some identity information and usage constraints +that have been signed with some other trusted key. + +A sshd server may be configured to allow authentication via certified +keys, by extending the existing ~/.ssh/authorized_keys mechanism +to allow specification of certification authority keys in addition +to raw user keys. The ssh client will support automatic verification +of acceptance of certified host keys, by adding a similar ability +to specify CA keys in ~/.ssh/known_hosts. + +Certified keys are represented using two new key types: +ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com and ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com that +include certification information along with the public key that is used +to sign challenges. ssh-keygen performs the CA signing operation. + +Protocol extensions +------------------- + +The SSH wire protocol includes several extensibility mechanisms. +These modifications shall take advantage of namespaced public key +algorithm names to add support for certificate authentication without +breaking the protocol - implementations that do not support the +extensions will simply ignore them. + +Authentication using the new key formats described below proceeds +using the existing SSH "publickey" authentication method described +in RFC4252 section 7. + +New public key formats +---------------------- + +The ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com and ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com key +types take a similar same high-level format (note: data types and +encoding are as per RFC4251 section 5). The serialised wire encoding of +these certificates is also used for storing them on disk. + +#define SSH_CERT_TYPE_USER 1 +#define SSH_CERT_TYPE_HOST 2 + +RSA certificate + + string "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com" + mpint e + mpint n + uint32 type + string key id + string valid principals + uint64 valid after + uint64 valid before + string constraints + string nonce + string reserved + string signature key + string signature + +DSA certificate + + string "ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com" + mpint p + mpint q + mpint g + mpint y + uint32 type + string key id + string valid principals + uint64 valid after + uint64 valid before + string constraints + string nonce + string reserved + string signature key + string signature + +e and n are the RSA exponent and public modulus respectively. + +p, q, g, y are the DSA parameters as described in FIPS-186-2. + +type specifies whether this certificate is for identification of a user +or a host using a SSH_CERT_TYPE_... value. + +key id is a free-form text field that is filled in by the CA at the time +of signing; the intention is that the contents of this field are used to +identify the identity principal in log messages. + +"valid principals" is a string containing zero or more principals as +strings packed inside it. These principals list the names for which this +certificate is valid; hostnames for SSH_CERT_TYPE_HOST certificates and +usernames for SSH_CERT_TYPE_USER certificates. As a special case, a +zero-length "valid principals" field means the certificate is valid for +any principal of the specified type. XXX DNS wildcards? + +"valid after" and "valid before" specify a validity period for the +certificate. Each represents a time in seconds since 1970-01-01 +00:00:00. A certificate is considered valid if: + valid after <= current time < valid before + +constraints is a set of zero or more key constraints encoded as below. + +The nonce field is a CA-provided random bitstring of arbitrary length +(but typically 16 or 32 bytes) included to make attacks that depend on +inducing collisions in the signature hash infeasible. + +The reserved field is current unused and is ignored in this version of +the protocol. + +signature key contains the CA key used to sign the certificate. +The valid key types for CA keys are ssh-rsa and ssh-dss. "Chained" +certificates, where the signature key type is a certificate type itself +are NOT supported. Note that it is possible for a RSA certificate key to +be signed by a DSS CA key and vice-versa. + +signature is computed over all preceding fields from the initial string +up to, and including the signature key. Signatures are computed and +encoded according to the rules defined for the CA's public key algorithm +(RFC4253 section 6.6 for ssh-rsa and ssh-dss). + +Constraints +----------- + +The constraints section of the certificate specifies zero or more +constraints on the certificates validity. The format of this field +is a sequence of zero or more tuples: + + string name + string data + +The name field identifies the constraint and the data field encodes +constraint-specific information (see below). All constraints are +"critical", if an implementation does not recognise a constraint +then the validating party should refuse to accept the certificate. + +The supported constraints and the contents and structure of their +data fields are: + +Name Format Description +----------------------------------------------------------------------------- +force-command string Specifies a command that is executed + (replacing any the user specified on the + ssh command-line) whenever this key is + used for authentication. + +permit-X11-forwarding empty Flag indicating that X11 forwarding + should be permitted. X11 forwarding will + be refused if this constraint is absent. + +permit-agent-forwarding empty Flag indicating that agent forwarding + should be allowed. Agent forwarding + must not be permitted unless this + constraint is present. + +permit-port-forwarding empty Flag indicating that port-forwarding + should be allowed. If this constraint is + not present then no port forwarding will + be allowed. + +permit-pty empty Flag indicating that PTY allocation + should be permitted. In the absence of + this constraint PTY allocation will be + disabled. + +permit-user-rc empty Flag indicating that execution of + ~/.ssh/rc should be permitted. Execution + of this script will not be permitted if + this constraint is not present. + +source-address string Comma-separated list of source addresses + from which this certificate is accepted + for authentication. Addresses are + specified in CIDR format (nn.nn.nn.nn/nn + or hhhh::hhhh/nn). + If this constraint is not present then + certificates may be presented from any + source address. diff --git a/addrmatch.c b/addrmatch.c index d39885b7b..5b6773cce 100644 --- a/addrmatch.c +++ b/addrmatch.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: addrmatch.c,v 1.4 2008/12/10 03:55:20 stevesk Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: addrmatch.c,v 1.5 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2004-2008 Damien Miller @@ -126,6 +126,8 @@ addr_netmask(int af, u_int l, struct xaddr *n) switch (af) { case AF_INET: n->af = AF_INET; + if (l == 0) + return 0; n->v4.s_addr = htonl((0xffffffff << (32 - l)) & 0xffffffff); return 0; case AF_INET6: @@ -422,3 +424,77 @@ addr_match_list(const char *addr, const char *_list) return ret; } + +/* + * Match "addr" against list CIDR list "_list". Lexical wildcards and + * negation are not supported. If "addr" == NULL, will verify structure + * of "_list". + * + * Returns 1 on match found (never returned when addr == NULL). + * Returns 0 on if no match found, or no errors found when addr == NULL. + * Returns -1 on error + */ +int +addr_match_cidr_list(const char *addr, const char *_list) +{ + char *list, *cp, *o; + struct xaddr try_addr, match_addr; + u_int masklen; + int ret = 0, r; + + if (addr != NULL && addr_pton(addr, &try_addr) != 0) { + debug2("%s: couldn't parse address %.100s", __func__, addr); + return 0; + } + if ((o = list = strdup(_list)) == NULL) + return -1; + while ((cp = strsep(&list, ",")) != NULL) { + if (*cp == '\0') { + error("%s: empty entry in list \"%.100s\"", + __func__, o); + ret = -1; + break; + } + + /* + * NB. This function is called in pre-auth with untrusted data, + * so be extra paranoid about junk reaching getaddrino (via + * addr_pton_cidr). + */ + + /* Stop junk from reaching getaddrinfo. +3 is for masklen */ + if (strlen(cp) > INET6_ADDRSTRLEN + 3) { + error("%s: list entry \"%.100s\" too long", + __func__, cp); + ret = -1; + break; + } +#define VALID_CIDR_CHARS "0123456789abcdefABCDEF.:/" + if (strspn(cp, VALID_CIDR_CHARS) != strlen(cp)) { + error("%s: list entry \"%.100s\" contains invalid " + "characters", __func__, cp); + ret = -1; + } + + /* Prefer CIDR address matching */ + r = addr_pton_cidr(cp, &match_addr, &masklen); + if (r == -1) { + error("Invalid network entry \"%.100s\"", cp); + ret = -1; + break; + } else if (r == -2) { + error("Inconsistent mask length for " + "network \"%.100s\"", cp); + ret = -1; + break; + } else if (r == 0 && addr != NULL) { + if (addr_netmatch(&try_addr, &match_addr, + masklen) == 0) + ret = 1; + continue; + } + } + xfree(o); + + return ret; +} diff --git a/auth-options.c b/auth-options.c index ab085c233..396bda62f 100644 --- a/auth-options.c +++ b/auth-options.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.44 2009/01/22 10:09:16 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.45 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ int no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0; int no_x11_forwarding_flag = 0; int no_pty_flag = 0; int no_user_rc = 0; +int key_is_cert_authority = 0; /* "command=" option. */ char *forced_command = NULL; @@ -64,6 +65,7 @@ auth_clear_options(void) no_pty_flag = 0; no_x11_forwarding_flag = 0; no_user_rc = 0; + key_is_cert_authority = 0; while (custom_environment) { struct envstring *ce = custom_environment; custom_environment = ce->next; @@ -96,6 +98,12 @@ auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum) return 1; while (*opts && *opts != ' ' && *opts != '\t') { + cp = "cert-authority"; + if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { + key_is_cert_authority = 1; + opts += strlen(cp); + goto next_option; + } cp = "no-port-forwarding"; if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { auth_debug_add("Port forwarding disabled."); @@ -374,3 +382,143 @@ bad_option: /* deny access */ return 0; } + +/* + * Set options from certificate constraints. These supersede user key options + * so this must be called after auth_parse_options(). + */ +int +auth_cert_constraints(Buffer *c_orig, struct passwd *pw) +{ + u_char *name = NULL, *data_blob = NULL; + u_int len; + Buffer c, data; + int ret = -1; + + int cert_no_port_forwarding_flag = 1; + int cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1; + int cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1; + int cert_no_pty_flag = 1; + int cert_no_user_rc = 1; + char *cert_forced_command = NULL; + int cert_source_address_done = 0; + + buffer_init(&data); + + /* Make copy to avoid altering original */ + buffer_init(&c); + buffer_append(&c, buffer_ptr(c_orig), buffer_len(c_orig)); + + while (buffer_len(&c) > 0) { + if ((name = buffer_get_string_ret(&c, NULL)) == NULL || + (data_blob = buffer_get_string_ret(&c, &len)) == NULL) { + error("Certificate constraints corrupt"); + goto out; + } + buffer_append(&data, data_blob, len); + debug3("found certificate constraint \"%.100s\" len %u", + name, len); + if (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0) + cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag = 0; + else if (strcmp(name, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0) + cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0; + else if (strcmp(name, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0) + cert_no_port_forwarding_flag = 0; + else if (strcmp(name, "permit-pty") == 0) + cert_no_pty_flag = 0; + else if (strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0) + cert_no_user_rc = 0; + else if (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0) { + char *command = buffer_get_string_ret(&data, NULL); + + if (command == NULL) { + error("Certificate constraint \"%s\" corrupt", + name); + goto out; + } + if (cert_forced_command != NULL) { + error("Certificate has multiple " + "forced-command constraints"); + xfree(command); + goto out; + } + cert_forced_command = command; + } else if (strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0) { + char *allowed = buffer_get_string_ret(&data, NULL); + const char *remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr(); + + if (allowed == NULL) { + error("Certificate constraint \"%s\" corrupt", + name); + goto out; + } + if (cert_source_address_done++) { + error("Certificate has multiple " + "source-address constraints"); + xfree(allowed); + goto out; + } + switch (addr_match_cidr_list(remote_ip, allowed)) { + case 1: + /* accepted */ + xfree(allowed); + break; + case 0: + /* no match */ + logit("Authentication tried for %.100s with " + "valid certificate but not from a " + "permitted host (ip=%.200s).", + pw->pw_name, remote_ip); + auth_debug_add("Your address '%.200s' is not " + "permitted to use this certificate for " + "login.", remote_ip); + xfree(allowed); + goto out; + case -1: + error("Certificate source-address contents " + "invalid"); + xfree(allowed); + goto out; + } + } else { + error("Certificate constraint \"%s\" is not supported", + name); + goto out; + } + + if (buffer_len(&data) != 0) { + error("Certificate constraint \"%s\" corrupt " + "(extra data)", name); + goto out; + } + buffer_clear(&data); + xfree(name); + xfree(data_blob); + name = data_blob = NULL; + } + + /* successfully parsed all constraints */ + ret = 0; + + no_port_forwarding_flag |= cert_no_port_forwarding_flag; + no_agent_forwarding_flag |= cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag; + no_x11_forwarding_flag |= cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag; + no_pty_flag |= cert_no_pty_flag; + no_user_rc |= cert_no_user_rc; + /* CA-specified forced command supersedes key option */ + if (cert_forced_command != NULL) { + if (forced_command != NULL) + xfree(forced_command); + forced_command = cert_forced_command; + } + + out: + if (name != NULL) + xfree(name); + if (data_blob != NULL) + xfree(data_blob); + buffer_free(&data); + buffer_free(&c); + return ret; +} + diff --git a/auth-options.h b/auth-options.h index 14488f72d..694edc842 100644 --- a/auth-options.h +++ b/auth-options.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.17 2008/03/26 21:28:14 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.18 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen @@ -30,8 +30,10 @@ extern int no_user_rc; extern char *forced_command; extern struct envstring *custom_environment; extern int forced_tun_device; +extern int key_is_cert_authority; int auth_parse_options(struct passwd *, char *, char *, u_long); void auth_clear_options(void); +int auth_cert_constraints(Buffer *, struct passwd *); #endif diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h index bebfb672d..117485ca9 100644 --- a/auth.h +++ b/auth.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.63 2009/08/15 18:56:34 fgsch Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.64 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -178,7 +178,8 @@ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *, Key *, const char *, /* hostkey handling */ Key *get_hostkey_by_index(int); -Key *get_hostkey_by_type(int); +Key *get_hostkey_public_by_type(int); +Key *get_hostkey_private_by_type(int); int get_hostkey_index(Key *); int ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *); diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c index 2886f1275..66ca5266b 100644 --- a/auth2-pubkey.c +++ b/auth2-pubkey.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.19 2008/07/03 21:46:58 otto Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.20 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include #include #include "xmalloc.h" @@ -178,6 +180,7 @@ static int user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file) { char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES]; + const char *reason; int found_key = 0; FILE *f; u_long linenum = 0; @@ -196,11 +199,13 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file) } found_key = 0; - found = key_new(key->type); + found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type); while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) { char *cp, *key_options = NULL; + auth_clear_options(); + /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */ for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; @@ -227,8 +232,32 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file) continue; } } - if (key_equal(found, key) && - auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file, linenum) == 1) { + if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file, linenum) != 1) + continue; + if (key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT || key->type == KEY_DSA_CERT) { + if (!key_is_cert_authority) + continue; + if (!key_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key)) + continue; + debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu", + file, linenum); + fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, + SSH_FP_HEX); + verbose("Found matching %s CA: %s", + key_type(found), fp); + xfree(fp); + if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 0, pw->pw_name, + &reason) != 0) { + error("%s", reason); + auth_debug_add("%s", reason); + continue; + } + if (auth_cert_constraints(&key->cert->constraints, + pw) != 0) + continue; + found_key = 1; + break; + } else if (!key_is_cert_authority && key_equal(found, key)) { found_key = 1; debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu", file, linenum); diff --git a/authfd.c b/authfd.c index 78a53c7a6..28a8cf2d7 100644 --- a/authfd.c +++ b/authfd.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.81 2009/08/27 17:44:52 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.82 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -483,6 +483,16 @@ ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(Buffer *b, Key *key, const char *comment) buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->p); buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->q); break; + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + if (key->cert == NULL || buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob) == 0) + fatal("%s: no cert/certblob", __func__); + buffer_put_string(b, buffer_ptr(&key->cert->certblob), + buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob)); + buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->d); + buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->iqmp); + buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->p); + buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->q); + break; case KEY_DSA: buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p); buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q); @@ -490,6 +500,13 @@ ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(Buffer *b, Key *key, const char *comment) buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key); buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->priv_key); break; + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + if (key->cert == NULL || buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob) == 0) + fatal("%s: no cert/certblob", __func__); + buffer_put_string(b, buffer_ptr(&key->cert->certblob), + buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob)); + buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->priv_key); + break; } buffer_put_cstring(b, comment); } @@ -517,7 +534,9 @@ ssh_add_identity_constrained(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key, ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(&msg, key->rsa, comment); break; case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: type = constrained ? SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED : SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY; @@ -565,7 +584,8 @@ ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key) buffer_put_int(&msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)); buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->e); buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->n); - } else if (key->type == KEY_DSA || key->type == KEY_RSA) { + } else if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_DSA || + key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA) { key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen); buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY); buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen); diff --git a/dns.c b/dns.c index a7da03fa3..2e7bb5aae 100644 --- a/dns.c +++ b/dns.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.25 2008/06/12 00:03:49 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.26 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved. @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ dns_result_totext(unsigned int res) */ static int dns_read_key(u_int8_t *algorithm, u_int8_t *digest_type, - u_char **digest, u_int *digest_len, const Key *key) + u_char **digest, u_int *digest_len, Key *key) { int success = 0; @@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ is_numeric_hostname(const char *hostname) */ int verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address, - const Key *hostkey, int *flags) + Key *hostkey, int *flags) { u_int counter; int result; @@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address, * Export the fingerprint of a key as a DNS resource record */ int -export_dns_rr(const char *hostname, const Key *key, FILE *f, int generic) +export_dns_rr(const char *hostname, Key *key, FILE *f, int generic) { u_int8_t rdata_pubkey_algorithm = 0; u_int8_t rdata_digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA1; diff --git a/dns.h b/dns.h index b2633a1fe..90cfd7b92 100644 --- a/dns.h +++ b/dns.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: dns.h,v 1.10 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: dns.h,v 1.11 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved. @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ enum sshfp_hashes { #define DNS_VERIFY_MATCH 0x00000002 #define DNS_VERIFY_SECURE 0x00000004 -int verify_host_key_dns(const char *, struct sockaddr *, const Key *, int *); -int export_dns_rr(const char *, const Key *, FILE *, int); +int verify_host_key_dns(const char *, struct sockaddr *, Key *, int *); +int export_dns_rr(const char *, Key *, FILE *, int); #endif /* DNS_H */ diff --git a/hostfile.c b/hostfile.c index cd28bf446..fc7f84c79 100644 --- a/hostfile.c +++ b/hostfile.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.46 2009/10/11 23:03:15 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.47 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ check_host_in_hostfile_by_key_or_type(const char *filename, { FILE *f; char line[8192]; - int linenum = 0; + int linenum = 0, want_cert = key_is_cert(key); u_int kbits; char *cp, *cp2, *hashed_host; HostStatus end_return; @@ -229,6 +229,23 @@ check_host_in_hostfile_by_key_or_type(const char *filename, if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n') continue; + /* + * Ignore CA keys when looking for raw keys. + * Ignore raw keys when looking for CA keys. + */ + if (strncasecmp(cp, CA_MARKER, sizeof(CA_MARKER) - 1) == 0 && + (cp[sizeof(CA_MARKER) - 1] == ' ' || + cp[sizeof(CA_MARKER) - 1] == '\t')) { + if (want_cert) { + /* Skip the marker and following whitespace */ + cp += sizeof(CA_MARKER); + for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) + ; + } else + continue; + } else if (want_cert) + continue; + /* Find the end of the host name portion. */ for (cp2 = cp; *cp2 && *cp2 != ' ' && *cp2 != '\t'; cp2++) ; @@ -273,8 +290,14 @@ check_host_in_hostfile_by_key_or_type(const char *filename, continue; /* Check if the current key is the same as the given key. */ - if (key_equal(key, found)) { - /* Ok, they match. */ + if (want_cert && key_equal(key->cert->signature_key, found)) { + /* Found CA cert for key */ + debug3("check_host_in_hostfile: CA match line %d", + linenum); + fclose(f); + return HOST_OK; + } else if (!want_cert && key_equal(key, found)) { + /* Found identical key */ debug3("check_host_in_hostfile: match line %d", linenum); fclose(f); return HOST_OK; diff --git a/hostfile.h b/hostfile.h index d1983b3e0..ebac1e4f1 100644 --- a/hostfile.h +++ b/hostfile.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.h,v 1.16 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.h,v 1.17 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ int lookup_key_in_hostfile_by_type(const char *, const char *, #define HASH_MAGIC "|1|" #define HASH_DELIM '|' +#define CA_MARKER "@cert-authority" + char *host_hash(const char *, const char *, u_int); #endif diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h index 1fa13799d..62fa2ea50 100644 --- a/kex.h +++ b/kex.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.48 2009/10/24 11:13:54 andreas Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.49 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -126,7 +126,8 @@ struct Kex { char *client_version_string; char *server_version_string; int (*verify_host_key)(Key *); - Key *(*load_host_key)(int); + Key *(*load_host_public_key)(int); + Key *(*load_host_private_key)(int); int (*host_key_index)(Key *); void (*kex[KEX_MAX])(Kex *); }; diff --git a/kexdhs.c b/kexdhs.c index a6719f672..e722877d5 100644 --- a/kexdhs.c +++ b/kexdhs.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kexdhs.c,v 1.10 2009/06/21 07:37:15 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kexdhs.c,v 1.11 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ kexdh_server(Kex *kex) { BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL, *dh_client_pub = NULL; DH *dh; - Key *server_host_key; + Key *server_host_public, *server_host_private; u_char *kbuf, *hash, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL; u_int sbloblen, klen, hashlen, slen; int kout; @@ -71,11 +71,16 @@ kexdh_server(Kex *kex) debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT"); packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT); - if (kex->load_host_key == NULL) + if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL || + kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) fatal("Cannot load hostkey"); - server_host_key = kex->load_host_key(kex->hostkey_type); - if (server_host_key == NULL) + server_host_public = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type); + if (server_host_public == NULL) fatal("Unsupported hostkey type %d", kex->hostkey_type); + server_host_private = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type); + if (server_host_private == NULL) + fatal("Missing private key for hostkey type %d", + kex->hostkey_type); /* key, cert */ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL) @@ -113,7 +118,7 @@ kexdh_server(Kex *kex) memset(kbuf, 0, klen); xfree(kbuf); - key_to_blob(server_host_key, &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen); + key_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen); /* calc H */ kex_dh_hash( @@ -137,7 +142,7 @@ kexdh_server(Kex *kex) } /* sign H */ - if (PRIVSEP(key_sign(server_host_key, &signature, &slen, hash, + if (PRIVSEP(key_sign(server_host_private, &signature, &slen, hash, hashlen)) < 0) fatal("kexdh_server: key_sign failed"); diff --git a/kexgexs.c b/kexgexs.c index 8515568b3..f4156af96 100644 --- a/kexgexs.c +++ b/kexgexs.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.12 2009/06/21 07:37:15 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.13 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -52,18 +52,24 @@ void kexgex_server(Kex *kex) { BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL, *dh_client_pub = NULL; - Key *server_host_key; + Key *server_host_public, *server_host_private; DH *dh; u_char *kbuf, *hash, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL; u_int sbloblen, klen, slen, hashlen; int omin = -1, min = -1, omax = -1, max = -1, onbits = -1, nbits = -1; int type, kout; - if (kex->load_host_key == NULL) + if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL || + kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) fatal("Cannot load hostkey"); - server_host_key = kex->load_host_key(kex->hostkey_type); - if (server_host_key == NULL) + server_host_public = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type); + if (server_host_public == NULL) fatal("Unsupported hostkey type %d", kex->hostkey_type); + server_host_private = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type); + if (server_host_private == NULL) + fatal("Missing private key for hostkey type %d", + kex->hostkey_type); + type = packet_read(); switch (type) { @@ -149,7 +155,7 @@ kexgex_server(Kex *kex) memset(kbuf, 0, klen); xfree(kbuf); - key_to_blob(server_host_key, &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen); + key_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen); if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD) omin = min = omax = max = -1; @@ -179,7 +185,7 @@ kexgex_server(Kex *kex) } /* sign H */ - if (PRIVSEP(key_sign(server_host_key, &signature, &slen, hash, + if (PRIVSEP(key_sign(server_host_private, &signature, &slen, hash, hashlen)) < 0) fatal("kexgex_server: key_sign failed"); diff --git a/key.c b/key.c index 5aea416b3..387190b53 100644 --- a/key.c +++ b/key.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.82 2010/01/13 01:10:56 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.83 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * read_bignum(): * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -52,6 +52,21 @@ #include "uuencode.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "log.h" +#include "ssh2.h" + +static struct KeyCert * +cert_new(void) +{ + struct KeyCert *cert; + + cert = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cert)); + buffer_init(&cert->certblob); + buffer_init(&cert->constraints); + cert->key_id = NULL; + cert->principals = NULL; + cert->signature_key = NULL; + return cert; +} Key * key_new(int type) @@ -63,9 +78,11 @@ key_new(int type) k->type = type; k->dsa = NULL; k->rsa = NULL; + k->cert = NULL; switch (k->type) { case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) fatal("key_new: RSA_new failed"); if ((rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL) @@ -75,6 +92,7 @@ key_new(int type) k->rsa = rsa; break; case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL) fatal("key_new: DSA_new failed"); if ((dsa->p = BN_new()) == NULL) @@ -93,16 +111,20 @@ key_new(int type) fatal("key_new: bad key type %d", k->type); break; } + + if (key_is_cert(k)) + k->cert = cert_new(); + return k; } -Key * -key_new_private(int type) +void +key_add_private(Key *k) { - Key *k = key_new(type); switch (k->type) { case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: if ((k->rsa->d = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed"); if ((k->rsa->iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL) @@ -117,6 +139,7 @@ key_new_private(int type) fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed"); break; case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: if ((k->dsa->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed"); break; @@ -125,9 +148,34 @@ key_new_private(int type) default: break; } +} + +Key * +key_new_private(int type) +{ + Key *k = key_new(type); + + key_add_private(k); return k; } +static void +cert_free(struct KeyCert *cert) +{ + u_int i; + + buffer_free(&cert->certblob); + buffer_free(&cert->constraints); + if (cert->key_id != NULL) + xfree(cert->key_id); + for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) + xfree(cert->principals[i]); + if (cert->principals != NULL) + xfree(cert->principals); + if (cert->signature_key != NULL) + key_free(cert->signature_key); +} + void key_free(Key *k) { @@ -136,11 +184,13 @@ key_free(Key *k) switch (k->type) { case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: if (k->rsa != NULL) RSA_free(k->rsa); k->rsa = NULL; break; case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: if (k->dsa != NULL) DSA_free(k->dsa); k->dsa = NULL; @@ -151,20 +201,49 @@ key_free(Key *k) fatal("key_free: bad key type %d", k->type); break; } + if (key_is_cert(k)) { + if (k->cert != NULL) + cert_free(k->cert); + k->cert = NULL; + } + xfree(k); } +static int +cert_compare(struct KeyCert *a, struct KeyCert *b) +{ + if (a == NULL && b == NULL) + return 1; + if (a == NULL || b == NULL) + return 0; + if (buffer_len(&a->certblob) != buffer_len(&b->certblob)) + return 0; + if (memcmp(buffer_ptr(&a->certblob), buffer_ptr(&b->certblob), + buffer_len(&a->certblob)) != 0) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +/* + * Compare public portions of key only, allowing comparisons between + * certificates and plain keys too. + */ int -key_equal(const Key *a, const Key *b) +key_equal_public(const Key *a, const Key *b) { - if (a == NULL || b == NULL || a->type != b->type) + if (a == NULL || b == NULL || + key_type_plain(a->type) != key_type_plain(b->type)) return 0; + switch (a->type) { case KEY_RSA1: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_RSA: return a->rsa != NULL && b->rsa != NULL && BN_cmp(a->rsa->e, b->rsa->e) == 0 && BN_cmp(a->rsa->n, b->rsa->n) == 0; + case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_DSA: return a->dsa != NULL && b->dsa != NULL && BN_cmp(a->dsa->p, b->dsa->p) == 0 && @@ -177,16 +256,27 @@ key_equal(const Key *a, const Key *b) /* NOTREACHED */ } +int +key_equal(const Key *a, const Key *b) +{ + if (a == NULL || b == NULL || a->type != b->type) + return 0; + if (key_is_cert(a)) { + if (!cert_compare(a->cert, b->cert)) + return 0; + } + return key_equal_public(a, b); +} + u_char* -key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type, - u_int *dgst_raw_length) +key_fingerprint_raw(Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type, u_int *dgst_raw_length) { const EVP_MD *md = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX ctx; u_char *blob = NULL; u_char *retval = NULL; u_int len = 0; - int nlen, elen; + int nlen, elen, otype; *dgst_raw_length = 0; @@ -214,6 +304,14 @@ key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type, case KEY_RSA: key_to_blob(k, &blob, &len); break; + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + /* We want a fingerprint of the _key_ not of the cert */ + otype = k->type; + k->type = key_type_plain(k->type); + key_to_blob(k, &blob, &len); + k->type = otype; + break; case KEY_UNSPEC: return retval; default: @@ -408,7 +506,7 @@ key_fingerprint_randomart(u_char *dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len, const Key *k) } char * -key_fingerprint(const Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type, enum fp_rep dgst_rep) +key_fingerprint(Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type, enum fp_rep dgst_rep) { char *retval = NULL; u_char *dgst_raw; @@ -533,6 +631,8 @@ key_read(Key *ret, char **cpp) case KEY_UNSPEC: case KEY_RSA: case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: space = strchr(cp, ' '); if (space == NULL) { debug3("key_read: missing whitespace"); @@ -577,25 +677,36 @@ key_read(Key *ret, char **cpp) return -1; } /*XXXX*/ - if (ret->type == KEY_RSA) { + if (key_is_cert(ret)) { + if (!key_is_cert(k)) { + error("key_read: loaded key is not a cert"); + key_free(k); + return -1; + } + if (ret->cert != NULL) + cert_free(ret->cert); + ret->cert = k->cert; + k->cert = NULL; + } + if (key_type_plain(ret->type) == KEY_RSA) { if (ret->rsa != NULL) RSA_free(ret->rsa); ret->rsa = k->rsa; k->rsa = NULL; - success = 1; #ifdef DEBUG_PK RSA_print_fp(stderr, ret->rsa, 8); #endif - } else { + } + if (key_type_plain(ret->type) == KEY_DSA) { if (ret->dsa != NULL) DSA_free(ret->dsa); ret->dsa = k->dsa; k->dsa = NULL; - success = 1; #ifdef DEBUG_PK DSA_print_fp(stderr, ret->dsa, 8); #endif } + success = 1; /*XXXX*/ key_free(k); if (success != 1) @@ -622,28 +733,53 @@ key_write(const Key *key, FILE *f) u_char *blob; char *uu; - if (key->type == KEY_RSA1 && key->rsa != NULL) { + if (key_is_cert(key)) { + if (key->cert == NULL) { + error("%s: no cert data", __func__); + return 0; + } + if (buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob) == 0) { + error("%s: no signed certificate blob", __func__); + return 0; + } + } + + switch (key->type) { + case KEY_RSA1: + if (key->rsa == NULL) + return 0; /* size of modulus 'n' */ bits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n); fprintf(f, "%u", bits); if (write_bignum(f, key->rsa->e) && - write_bignum(f, key->rsa->n)) { - success = 1; - } else { - error("key_write: failed for RSA key"); - } - } else if ((key->type == KEY_DSA && key->dsa != NULL) || - (key->type == KEY_RSA && key->rsa != NULL)) { - key_to_blob(key, &blob, &len); - uu = xmalloc(2*len); - n = uuencode(blob, len, uu, 2*len); - if (n > 0) { - fprintf(f, "%s %s", key_ssh_name(key), uu); - success = 1; - } - xfree(blob); - xfree(uu); + write_bignum(f, key->rsa->n)) + return 1; + error("key_write: failed for RSA key"); + return 0; + case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + if (key->dsa == NULL) + return 0; + break; + case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + if (key->rsa == NULL) + return 0; + break; + default: + return 0; } + + key_to_blob(key, &blob, &len); + uu = xmalloc(2*len); + n = uuencode(blob, len, uu, 2*len); + if (n > 0) { + fprintf(f, "%s %s", key_ssh_name(key), uu); + success = 1; + } + xfree(blob); + xfree(uu); + return success; } @@ -657,6 +793,10 @@ key_type(const Key *k) return "RSA"; case KEY_DSA: return "DSA"; + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + return "RSA-CERT"; + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + return "DSA-CERT"; } return "unknown"; } @@ -669,6 +809,10 @@ key_ssh_name(const Key *k) return "ssh-rsa"; case KEY_DSA: return "ssh-dss"; + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + return "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com"; + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + return "ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com"; } return "ssh-unknown"; } @@ -679,8 +823,10 @@ key_size(const Key *k) switch (k->type) { case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: return BN_num_bits(k->rsa->n); case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: return BN_num_bits(k->dsa->p); } return 0; @@ -723,6 +869,9 @@ key_generate(int type, u_int bits) case KEY_RSA1: k->rsa = rsa_generate_private_key(bits); break; + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + fatal("key_generate: cert keys cannot be generated directly"); default: fatal("key_generate: unknown type %d", type); } @@ -730,12 +879,55 @@ key_generate(int type, u_int bits) return k; } +void +key_cert_copy(const Key *from_key, struct Key *to_key) +{ + u_int i; + const struct KeyCert *from; + struct KeyCert *to; + + if (to_key->cert != NULL) { + cert_free(to_key->cert); + to_key->cert = NULL; + } + + if ((from = from_key->cert) == NULL) + return; + + to = to_key->cert = cert_new(); + + buffer_append(&to->certblob, buffer_ptr(&from->certblob), + buffer_len(&from->certblob)); + + buffer_append(&to->constraints, buffer_ptr(&from->constraints), + buffer_len(&from->constraints)); + + to->type = from->type; + to->key_id = from->key_id == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(from->key_id); + to->valid_after = from->valid_after; + to->valid_before = from->valid_before; + to->signature_key = from->signature_key == NULL ? + NULL : key_from_private(from->signature_key); + + to->nprincipals = from->nprincipals; + if (to->nprincipals > CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS) + fatal("%s: nprincipals (%u) > CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS (%u)", + __func__, to->nprincipals, CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS); + if (to->nprincipals > 0) { + to->principals = xcalloc(from->nprincipals, + sizeof(*to->principals)); + for (i = 0; i < to->nprincipals; i++) + to->principals[i] = xstrdup(from->principals[i]); + } +} + Key * key_from_private(const Key *k) { Key *n = NULL; switch (k->type) { case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: n = key_new(k->type); if ((BN_copy(n->dsa->p, k->dsa->p) == NULL) || (BN_copy(n->dsa->q, k->dsa->q) == NULL) || @@ -745,6 +937,7 @@ key_from_private(const Key *k) break; case KEY_RSA: case KEY_RSA1: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: n = key_new(k->type); if ((BN_copy(n->rsa->n, k->rsa->n) == NULL) || (BN_copy(n->rsa->e, k->rsa->e) == NULL)) @@ -754,6 +947,8 @@ key_from_private(const Key *k) fatal("key_from_private: unknown type %d", k->type); break; } + if (key_is_cert(k)) + key_cert_copy(k, n); return n; } @@ -770,6 +965,10 @@ key_type_from_name(char *name) return KEY_RSA; } else if (strcmp(name, "ssh-dss") == 0) { return KEY_DSA; + } else if (strcmp(name, "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com") == 0) { + return KEY_RSA_CERT; + } else if (strcmp(name, "ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com") == 0) { + return KEY_DSA_CERT; } debug2("key_type_from_name: unknown key type '%s'", name); return KEY_UNSPEC; @@ -797,6 +996,117 @@ key_names_valid2(const char *names) return 1; } +static int +cert_parse(Buffer *b, Key *key, const u_char *blob, u_int blen) +{ + u_char *principals, *constraints, *sig_key, *sig; + u_int signed_len, plen, clen, sklen, slen; + Buffer tmp; + char *principal; + int ret = -1; + + buffer_init(&tmp); + + /* Copy the entire key blob for verification and later serialisation */ + buffer_append(&key->cert->certblob, blob, blen); + + principals = constraints = sig_key = sig = NULL; + if (buffer_get_int_ret(&key->cert->type, b) != 0 || + (key->cert->key_id = buffer_get_string_ret(b, NULL)) == NULL || + (principals = buffer_get_string_ret(b, &plen)) == NULL || + buffer_get_int64_ret(&key->cert->valid_after, b) != 0 || + buffer_get_int64_ret(&key->cert->valid_before, b) != 0 || + (constraints = buffer_get_string_ret(b, &clen)) == NULL || + /* skip nonce */ buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(b, NULL) == NULL || + /* skip reserved */ buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(b, NULL) == NULL || + (sig_key = buffer_get_string_ret(b, &sklen)) == NULL) { + error("%s: parse error", __func__); + goto out; + } + + /* Signature is left in the buffer so we can calculate this length */ + signed_len = buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob) - buffer_len(b); + + if ((sig = buffer_get_string_ret(b, &slen)) == NULL) { + error("%s: parse error", __func__); + goto out; + } + + if (key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER && + key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST) { + error("Unknown certificate type %u", key->cert->type); + goto out; + } + + buffer_append(&tmp, principals, plen); + while (buffer_len(&tmp) > 0) { + if (key->cert->nprincipals >= CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS) { + error("Too many principals"); + goto out; + } + if ((principal = buffer_get_string_ret(&tmp, NULL)) == NULL) { + error("Principals data invalid"); + goto out; + } + key->cert->principals = xrealloc(key->cert->principals, + key->cert->nprincipals + 1, sizeof(*key->cert->principals)); + key->cert->principals[key->cert->nprincipals++] = principal; + } + + buffer_clear(&tmp); + + buffer_append(&key->cert->constraints, constraints, clen); + buffer_append(&tmp, constraints, clen); + /* validate structure */ + while (buffer_len(&tmp) != 0) { + if (buffer_get_string_ptr(&tmp, NULL) == NULL || + buffer_get_string_ptr(&tmp, NULL) == NULL) { + error("Constraints data invalid"); + goto out; + } + } + buffer_clear(&tmp); + + if ((key->cert->signature_key = key_from_blob(sig_key, + sklen)) == NULL) { + error("Signature key invalid"); + goto out; + } + if (key->cert->signature_key->type != KEY_RSA && + key->cert->signature_key->type != KEY_DSA) { + error("Invalid signature key type %s (%d)", + key_type(key->cert->signature_key), + key->cert->signature_key->type); + goto out; + } + + switch (key_verify(key->cert->signature_key, sig, slen, + buffer_ptr(&key->cert->certblob), signed_len)) { + case 1: + break; /* Good signature */ + case 0: + error("Invalid signature on certificate"); + goto out; + case -1: + error("Certificate signature verification failed"); + goto out; + } + + ret = 0; + + out: + buffer_free(&tmp); + if (principals != NULL) + xfree(principals); + if (constraints != NULL) + xfree(constraints); + if (sig_key != NULL) + xfree(sig_key); + if (sig != NULL) + xfree(sig); + return ret; +} + Key * key_from_blob(const u_char *blob, u_int blen) { @@ -819,10 +1129,12 @@ key_from_blob(const u_char *blob, u_int blen) switch (type) { case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: key = key_new(type); if (buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->rsa->e) == -1 || buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->rsa->n) == -1) { error("key_from_blob: can't read rsa key"); + badkey: key_free(key); key = NULL; goto out; @@ -832,15 +1144,14 @@ key_from_blob(const u_char *blob, u_int blen) #endif break; case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: key = key_new(type); if (buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->p) == -1 || buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->q) == -1 || buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->g) == -1 || buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->pub_key) == -1) { error("key_from_blob: can't read dsa key"); - key_free(key); - key = NULL; - goto out; + goto badkey; } #ifdef DEBUG_PK DSA_print_fp(stderr, key->dsa, 8); @@ -853,6 +1164,10 @@ key_from_blob(const u_char *blob, u_int blen) error("key_from_blob: cannot handle type %s", ktype); goto out; } + if (key_is_cert(key) && cert_parse(&b, key, blob, blen) == -1) { + error("key_from_blob: can't parse cert data"); + goto badkey; + } rlen = buffer_len(&b); if (key != NULL && rlen != 0) error("key_from_blob: remaining bytes in key blob %d", rlen); @@ -875,6 +1190,12 @@ key_to_blob(const Key *key, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp) } buffer_init(&b); switch (key->type) { + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + /* Use the existing blob */ + buffer_append(&b, buffer_ptr(&key->cert->certblob), + buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob)); + break; case KEY_DSA: buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(key)); buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->p); @@ -911,8 +1232,10 @@ key_sign( const u_char *data, u_int datalen) { switch (key->type) { + case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_DSA: return ssh_dss_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen); + case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_RSA: return ssh_rsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen); default: @@ -935,8 +1258,10 @@ key_verify( return -1; switch (key->type) { + case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_DSA: return ssh_dss_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); + case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_RSA: return ssh_rsa_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); default: @@ -958,6 +1283,9 @@ key_demote(const Key *k) pk->rsa = NULL; switch (k->type) { + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + key_cert_copy(k, pk); + /* FALLTHROUGH */ case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA: if ((pk->rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) @@ -967,6 +1295,9 @@ key_demote(const Key *k) if ((pk->rsa->n = BN_dup(k->rsa->n)) == NULL) fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed"); break; + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + key_cert_copy(k, pk); + /* FALLTHROUGH */ case KEY_DSA: if ((pk->dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL) fatal("key_demote: DSA_new failed"); @@ -986,3 +1317,199 @@ key_demote(const Key *k) return (pk); } + +int +key_is_cert(const Key *k) +{ + return k != NULL && + (k->type == KEY_RSA_CERT || k->type == KEY_DSA_CERT); +} + +/* Return the cert-less equivalent to a certified key type */ +int +key_type_plain(int type) +{ + switch (type) { + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + return KEY_RSA; + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + return KEY_DSA; + default: + return type; + } +} + +/* Convert a KEY_RSA or KEY_DSA to their _CERT equivalent */ +int +key_to_certified(Key *k) +{ + switch (k->type) { + case KEY_RSA: + k->cert = cert_new(); + k->type = KEY_RSA_CERT; + return 0; + case KEY_DSA: + k->cert = cert_new(); + k->type = KEY_DSA_CERT; + return 0; + default: + error("%s: key has incorrect type %s", __func__, key_type(k)); + return -1; + } +} + +/* Convert a KEY_RSA_CERT or KEY_DSA_CERT to their raw key equivalent */ +int +key_drop_cert(Key *k) +{ + switch (k->type) { + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + cert_free(k->cert); + k->type = KEY_RSA; + return 0; + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + cert_free(k->cert); + k->type = KEY_DSA; + return 0; + default: + error("%s: key has incorrect type %s", __func__, key_type(k)); + return -1; + } +} + +/* Sign a KEY_RSA_CERT or KEY_DSA_CERT, (re-)generating the signed certblob */ +int +key_certify(Key *k, Key *ca) +{ + Buffer principals; + u_char *ca_blob, *sig_blob, nonce[32]; + u_int i, ca_len, sig_len; + + if (k->cert == NULL) { + error("%s: key lacks cert info", __func__); + return -1; + } + + if (!key_is_cert(k)) { + error("%s: certificate has unknown type %d", __func__, + k->cert->type); + return -1; + } + + if (ca->type != KEY_RSA && ca->type != KEY_DSA) { + error("%s: CA key has unsupported type %s", __func__, + key_type(ca)); + return -1; + } + + key_to_blob(ca, &ca_blob, &ca_len); + + buffer_clear(&k->cert->certblob); + buffer_put_cstring(&k->cert->certblob, key_ssh_name(k)); + + switch (k->type) { + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + buffer_put_bignum2(&k->cert->certblob, k->dsa->p); + buffer_put_bignum2(&k->cert->certblob, k->dsa->q); + buffer_put_bignum2(&k->cert->certblob, k->dsa->g); + buffer_put_bignum2(&k->cert->certblob, k->dsa->pub_key); + break; + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + buffer_put_bignum2(&k->cert->certblob, k->rsa->e); + buffer_put_bignum2(&k->cert->certblob, k->rsa->n); + break; + default: + error("%s: key has incorrect type %s", __func__, key_type(k)); + buffer_clear(&k->cert->certblob); + xfree(ca_blob); + return -1; + } + + buffer_put_int(&k->cert->certblob, k->cert->type); + buffer_put_cstring(&k->cert->certblob, k->cert->key_id); + + buffer_init(&principals); + for (i = 0; i < k->cert->nprincipals; i++) + buffer_put_cstring(&principals, k->cert->principals[i]); + buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, buffer_ptr(&principals), + buffer_len(&principals)); + buffer_free(&principals); + + buffer_put_int64(&k->cert->certblob, k->cert->valid_after); + buffer_put_int64(&k->cert->certblob, k->cert->valid_before); + buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, + buffer_ptr(&k->cert->constraints), + buffer_len(&k->cert->constraints)); + + arc4random_buf(&nonce, sizeof(nonce)); + buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, nonce, sizeof(nonce)); + buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, NULL, 0); /* reserved */ + buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, ca_blob, ca_len); + xfree(ca_blob); + + /* Sign the whole mess */ + if (key_sign(ca, &sig_blob, &sig_len, buffer_ptr(&k->cert->certblob), + buffer_len(&k->cert->certblob)) != 0) { + error("%s: signature operation failed", __func__); + buffer_clear(&k->cert->certblob); + return -1; + } + /* Append signature and we are done */ + buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, sig_blob, sig_len); + xfree(sig_blob); + + return 0; +} + +int +key_cert_check_authority(const Key *k, int want_host, int require_principal, + const char *name, const char **reason) +{ + u_int i, principal_matches; + time_t now = time(NULL); + + if (want_host) { + if (k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST) { + *reason = "Certificate invalid: not a host certificate"; + return -1; + } + } else { + if (k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) { + *reason = "Certificate invalid: not a user certificate"; + return -1; + } + } + if (now < 0) { + error("%s: system clock lies before epoch", __func__); + *reason = "Certificate invalid: not yet valid"; + return -1; + } + if ((u_int64_t)now < k->cert->valid_after) { + *reason = "Certificate invalid: not yet valid"; + return -1; + } + if ((u_int64_t)now >= k->cert->valid_before) { + *reason = "Certificate invalid: expired"; + return -1; + } + if (k->cert->nprincipals == 0) { + if (require_principal) { + *reason = "Certificate lacks principal list"; + return -1; + } + } else { + principal_matches = 0; + for (i = 0; i < k->cert->nprincipals; i++) { + if (strcmp(name, k->cert->principals[i]) == 0) { + principal_matches = 1; + break; + } + } + if (!principal_matches) { + *reason = "Certificate invalid: name is not a listed " + "principal"; + return -1; + } + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/key.h b/key.h index 14aac79c2..6a2e049af 100644 --- a/key.h +++ b/key.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.27 2008/06/11 21:01:35 grunk Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.28 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ #ifndef KEY_H #define KEY_H +#include "buffer.h" #include #include @@ -34,6 +35,8 @@ enum types { KEY_RSA1, KEY_RSA, KEY_DSA, + KEY_RSA_CERT, + KEY_DSA_CERT, KEY_UNSPEC }; enum fp_type { @@ -49,20 +52,35 @@ enum fp_rep { /* key is stored in external hardware */ #define KEY_FLAG_EXT 0x0001 +#define CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS 256 +struct KeyCert { + Buffer certblob; /* Kept around for use on wire */ + u_int type; /* SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER or SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST */ + char *key_id; + u_int nprincipals; + char **principals; + u_int64_t valid_after, valid_before; + Buffer constraints; + Key *signature_key; +}; + struct Key { int type; int flags; RSA *rsa; DSA *dsa; + struct KeyCert *cert; }; Key *key_new(int); +void key_add_private(Key *); Key *key_new_private(int); void key_free(Key *); Key *key_demote(const Key *); +int key_equal_public(const Key *, const Key *); int key_equal(const Key *, const Key *); -char *key_fingerprint(const Key *, enum fp_type, enum fp_rep); -u_char *key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *, enum fp_type, u_int *); +char *key_fingerprint(Key *, enum fp_type, enum fp_rep); +u_char *key_fingerprint_raw(Key *, enum fp_type, u_int *); const char *key_type(const Key *); int key_write(const Key *, FILE *); int key_read(Key *, char **); @@ -71,6 +89,14 @@ u_int key_size(const Key *); Key *key_generate(int, u_int); Key *key_from_private(const Key *); int key_type_from_name(char *); +int key_is_cert(const Key *); +int key_type_plain(int); +int key_to_certified(Key *); +int key_drop_cert(Key *); +int key_certify(Key *, Key *); +void key_cert_copy(const Key *, struct Key *); +int key_cert_check_authority(const Key *, int, int, const char *, + const char **); Key *key_from_blob(const u_char *, u_int); int key_to_blob(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *); diff --git a/match.h b/match.h index 18f683070..3d7f70fc0 100644 --- a/match.h +++ b/match.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: match.h,v 1.14 2008/06/10 03:57:27 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: match.h,v 1.15 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen @@ -23,5 +23,5 @@ char *match_list(const char *, const char *, u_int *); /* addrmatch.c */ int addr_match_list(const char *, const char *); - +int addr_match_cidr_list(const char *, const char *); #endif diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c index ace25c404..f67cb7670 100644 --- a/monitor.c +++ b/monitor.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.104 2009/06/12 20:43:22 andreas Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.105 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl @@ -1721,7 +1721,8 @@ mm_get_kex(Buffer *m) kex->flags = buffer_get_int(m); kex->client_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); kex->server_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); - kex->load_host_key=&get_hostkey_by_type; + kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type; + kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type; kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index; return (kex); diff --git a/myproposal.h b/myproposal.h index 7bca3bcae..98f27fd15 100644 --- a/myproposal.h +++ b/myproposal.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.23 2009/01/23 07:58:11 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.24 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -40,7 +40,9 @@ "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1" #endif -#define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG "ssh-rsa,ssh-dss" +#define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com," \ + "ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com," \ + "ssh-rsa,ssh-dss" #define KEX_DEFAULT_ENCRYPT \ "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \ diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c index 09296c9cf..0a6cdb655 100644 --- a/servconf.c +++ b/servconf.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.202 2010/01/13 03:48:12 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.203 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options) options->listen_addrs = NULL; options->address_family = -1; options->num_host_key_files = 0; + options->num_host_cert_files = 0; options->pid_file = NULL; options->server_key_bits = -1; options->login_grace_time = -1; @@ -152,6 +153,7 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE; } } + /* No certificates by default */ if (options->num_ports == 0) options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; if (options->listen_addrs == NULL) @@ -305,7 +307,7 @@ typedef enum { sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel, sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory, sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding, - sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, + sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, sHostCertificate, sDeprecated, sUnsupported } ServerOpCodes; @@ -424,6 +426,7 @@ static struct { { "permitopen", sPermitOpen, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "forcecommand", sForceCommand, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "chrootdirectory", sChrootDirectory, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "hostcertificate", sHostCertificate, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { NULL, sBadOption, 0 } }; @@ -816,6 +819,16 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, } break; + case sHostCertificate: + intptr = &options->num_host_cert_files; + if (*intptr >= MAX_HOSTKEYS) + fatal("%s line %d: too many host certificates " + "specified (max %d).", filename, linenum, + MAX_HOSTCERTS); + charptr = &options->host_cert_files[*intptr]; + goto parse_filename; + break; + case sPidFile: charptr = &options->pid_file; goto parse_filename; @@ -1651,6 +1664,8 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) /* string array arguments */ dump_cfg_strarray(sHostKeyFile, o->num_host_key_files, o->host_key_files); + dump_cfg_strarray(sHostKeyFile, o->num_host_cert_files, + o->host_cert_files); dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowUsers, o->num_allow_users, o->allow_users); dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyUsers, o->num_deny_users, o->deny_users); dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowGroups, o->num_allow_groups, o->allow_groups); diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h index c9b8619cd..c5c9c6ecd 100644 --- a/servconf.h +++ b/servconf.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.90 2010/01/13 03:48:13 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.91 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #define MAX_DENY_GROUPS 256 /* Max # groups on deny list. */ #define MAX_SUBSYSTEMS 256 /* Max # subsystems. */ #define MAX_HOSTKEYS 256 /* Max # hostkeys. */ +#define MAX_HOSTCERTS 256 /* Max # host certificates. */ #define MAX_ACCEPT_ENV 256 /* Max # of env vars. */ #define MAX_MATCH_GROUPS 256 /* Max # of groups for Match. */ @@ -49,6 +50,8 @@ typedef struct { int address_family; /* Address family used by the server. */ char *host_key_files[MAX_HOSTKEYS]; /* Files containing host keys. */ int num_host_key_files; /* Number of files for host keys. */ + char *host_cert_files[MAX_HOSTCERTS]; /* Files containing host certs. */ + int num_host_cert_files; /* Number of files for host certs. */ char *pid_file; /* Where to put our pid */ int server_key_bits;/* Size of the server key. */ int login_grace_time; /* Disconnect if no auth in this time diff --git a/ssh-add.c b/ssh-add.c index 90e5be20b..a7963223a 100644 --- a/ssh-add.c +++ b/ssh-add.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.92 2010/02/08 10:50:20 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.93 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -138,9 +138,9 @@ delete_all(AuthenticationConnection *ac) static int add_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename) { - Key *private; + Key *private, *cert; char *comment = NULL; - char msg[1024]; + char msg[1024], *certpath; int fd, perms_ok, ret = -1; if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0) { @@ -199,6 +199,34 @@ add_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename) fprintf(stderr, "Could not add identity: %s\n", filename); } + + /* Now try to add the certificate flavour too */ + xasprintf(&certpath, "%s-cert.pub", filename); + if ((cert = key_load_public(certpath, NULL)) != NULL) { + /* Graft with private bits */ + if (key_to_certified(private) != 0) + fatal("%s: key_to_certified failed", __func__); + key_cert_copy(cert, private); + key_free(cert); + + if (ssh_add_identity_constrained(ac, private, comment, + lifetime, confirm)) { + fprintf(stderr, "Certificate added: %s (%s)\n", + certpath, private->cert->key_id); + if (lifetime != 0) + fprintf(stderr, "Lifetime set to %d seconds\n", + lifetime); + if (confirm != 0) + fprintf(stderr, "The user has to confirm each " + "use of the key\n"); + } else { + error("Certificate %s (%s) add failed", certpath, + private->cert->key_id); + } + } else + fprintf(stderr, "Unable to load certificate %s", certpath); + + xfree(certpath); xfree(comment); key_free(private); diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c index 46a744f4e..b5c565271 100644 --- a/ssh-agent.c +++ b/ssh-agent.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.164 2010/02/09 00:50:36 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.165 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -468,6 +468,8 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version) int type, success = 0, death = 0, confirm = 0; char *type_name, *comment; Key *k = NULL; + u_char *cert; + u_int len; switch (version) { case 1: @@ -498,6 +500,14 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version) buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->dsa->pub_key); buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->dsa->priv_key); break; + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + cert = buffer_get_string(&e->request, &len); + if ((k = key_from_blob(cert, len)) == NULL) + fatal("Certificate parse failed"); + xfree(cert); + key_add_private(k); + buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->dsa->priv_key); + break; case KEY_RSA: k = key_new_private(type); buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->rsa->n); @@ -510,6 +520,17 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version) /* Generate additional parameters */ rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa); break; + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + cert = buffer_get_string(&e->request, &len); + if ((k = key_from_blob(cert, len)) == NULL) + fatal("Certificate parse failed"); + xfree(cert); + key_add_private(k); + buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->rsa->d); + buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->rsa->iqmp); + buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->rsa->p); + buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->rsa->q); + break; default: buffer_clear(&e->request); goto send; @@ -519,6 +540,7 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version) /* enable blinding */ switch (k->type) { case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_RSA1: if (RSA_blinding_on(k->rsa, NULL) != 1) { error("process_add_identity: RSA_blinding_on failed"); diff --git a/ssh-dss.c b/ssh-dss.c index 51a06e98f..449f493b4 100644 --- a/ssh-dss.c +++ b/ssh-dss.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-dss.c,v 1.24 2006/11/06 21:25:28 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-dss.c,v 1.25 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -53,7 +53,9 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, u_int rlen, slen, len, dlen; Buffer b; - if (key == NULL || key->type != KEY_DSA || key->dsa == NULL) { + if (key == NULL || + (key->type != KEY_DSA && key->type != KEY_DSA_CERT) || + key->dsa == NULL) { error("ssh_dss_sign: no DSA key"); return -1; } @@ -116,7 +118,9 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen, int rlen, ret; Buffer b; - if (key == NULL || key->type != KEY_DSA || key->dsa == NULL) { + if (key == NULL || + (key->type != KEY_DSA && key->type != KEY_DSA_CERT) || + key->dsa == NULL) { error("ssh_dss_verify: no DSA key"); return -1; } diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1 index f09e1a100..772caf7ad 100644 --- a/ssh-keygen.1 +++ b/ssh-keygen.1 @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.83 2010/02/10 23:20:38 markus Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.84 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ .\" .\" -*- nroff -*- .\" @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.Dd $Mdocdate: February 10 2010 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: February 26 2010 $ .Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -106,6 +106,14 @@ .Op Fl v .Op Fl a Ar num_trials .Op Fl W Ar generator +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Fl s Ar ca_key +.Fl I Ar certificate_identity +.Op Fl h +.Op Fl n Ar principals +.Op Fl O Ar constraint +.Op Fl V Ar validity_interval +.Ar .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm generates, manages and converts authentication keys for @@ -245,6 +253,17 @@ but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents be disclosed. This option will not modify existing hashed hostnames and is therefore safe to use on files that mix hashed and non-hashed names. +.It Fl h +When signing a key, create a host certificate instead of a user +certificate. +Please see the +.Sx CERTIFICATES +section for details. +.It Fl I +Specify the key identity when signing a public key. +Please see the +.Sx CERTIFICATES +section for details. .It Fl i This option will read an unencrypted private (or public) key file in SSH2-compatible format and print an OpenSSH compatible private @@ -268,6 +287,67 @@ Specify the amount of memory to use (in megabytes) when generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX. .It Fl N Ar new_passphrase Provides the new passphrase. +.It Fl n Ar principals +Specify one or more principals (user or host names) to be included in +a certificate when signing a key. +Multiple principals may be specified, separated by commas. +Please see the +.Sx CERTIFICATES +section for details. +.It Fl O Ar constraint +Specify a certificate constraint when signing a key. +This option may be specified multiple times. +Please see the +.Sx CERTIFICATES +section for details. +The constraints that are valid for user certificates are: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Ic no-x11-forwarding +Disable X11 forwarding. (permitted by default) +.It Ic no-agent-forwarding +Disable +.Xr ssh-agent 1 +forwarding. (permitted by default) +.It Ic no-port-forwarding +Disable port forwarding. (permitted by default) +.It Ic no-pty +Disable PTY allocation. (permitted by default) +.It Ic no-user-rc +Disable execution of +.Pa ~/.ssh/rc +by +.Xr sshd 8 . +(permitted by default) +.It Ic clear +Clear all enabled permissions. +This is useful for clearing the default set of permissions so permissions may +be added individually. +.It Ic permit-x11-forwarding +Allows X11 forwarding. +.It Ic permit-port-forwarding +Allows port forwarding. +.It Ic permit-pty +Allows PTY allocation. +.It Ic permit-user-rc +Allows execution of +.Pa ~/.ssh/rc +by +.Xr sshd 8 . +.It Ic force-command=command +Forces the execution of +.Ar command +instead of any shell or command specified by the user when +the certificate is used for authentication. +.It Ic source-address=address_list +Restrict the source addresses from which the certificate is considered valid +from. +The +.Ar address_list +is a comma-separated list of one or more address/netmask pairs in CIDR +format. +.El +.Pp +At present, no constraints are valid for host keys. .It Fl P Ar passphrase Provides the (old) passphrase. .It Fl p @@ -297,6 +377,11 @@ Print the SSHFP fingerprint resource record named for the specified public key file. .It Fl S Ar start Specify start point (in hex) when generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX. +.It Fl s Ar ca_key +Certify (sign) a public key using the specified CA key. +Please see the +.Sx CERTIFICATES +section for details. .It Fl T Ar output_file Test DH group exchange candidate primes (generated using the .Fl G @@ -310,6 +395,29 @@ for protocol version 1 and or .Dq dsa for protocol version 2. +.It Fl V Ar validity_interval +Specify a validity interval when signing a certificate. +A validity interval may consist of a single time, indicating that the +certificate is valid beginning now and expiring at that time, or may consist +of two times separated by a colon to indicate an explicit time interval. +The start time may be specified as a date in YYYYMMDD format, a time +in YYYYMMDDHHMMSS format or a relative time (to the current time) consisting +of a minus sign followed by a relative time in the format described in the +.Sx TIME FORMATS +section of +.Xr ssh_config 5 . +The end time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD date, a YYYYMMDDHHMMSS time or +a relative time starting with a plus character. +.Pp +For example: +.Dq +52w1d +(valid from now to 52 weeks and one day from now), +.Dq -4w:+4w +(valid from four weeks ago to four weeks from now), +.Dq 20100101123000:20110101123000 +(valid from 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2010 to 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2011), +.Dq -1d:20110101 +(valid from yesterday to midnight, January 1st, 2011). .It Fl v Verbose mode. Causes @@ -380,6 +488,72 @@ Screened DH groups may be installed in .Pa /etc/moduli . It is important that this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths and that both ends of a connection share common moduli. +.Sh CERTIFICATES +.Nm +supports signing of keys to produce certificates that may be used for +user or host authentication. +Certificates consist of a public key, some identity information, zero or +more principal (user or host) names and an optional set of constraints that +are signed by a Certification Authority (CA) key. +Clients or servers may then trust only the CA key and verify its signature +on a certificate rather than trusting many user/host keys. +Note that OpenSSH certificates are a different, and much simpler, format to +the X.509 certificates used in +.Xr ssl 8 . +.Pp +.Nm +supports two types of certificates: user and host. +User certificates authenticate users to servers, whereas host certificates +authenticate server hosts to users. To generate a user certificate: +.Pp +.Dl $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id /path/to/user_key.pub +.Pp +The resultant certificate will be placed in +.Pa /path/to/user_key_cert.pub . +A host certificate requires the +.Fl h +option: +.Pp +.Dl $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id -h /path/to/host_key.pub +.Pp +The host certificate will be output to +.Pa /path/to/host_key_cert.pub . +In both cases, +.Ar key_id +is a "key identifier" that is logged by the server when the certificate +is used for authentication. +.Pp +Certificates may be limited to be valid for a set of principal (user/host) +names. +By default, generated certificates are valid for all users or hosts. +To generate a certificate for a specified set of principals: +.Pp +.Dl $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -n user1,user2 user_key.pub +.Dl $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -h -n host.domain user_key.pub +.Pp +Additional limitations on the validity and use of user certificates may +be specified through certificate constraints. +A constrained certificate may disable features of the SSH session, may be +valid only when presented from particular source addresses or may +force the use of a specific command. +For a list of valid certificate constraints, see the documentation for the +.Fl O +option above. +.Pp +Finally, certificates may be defined with a validity lifetime. +The +.Fl V +option allows specification of certificate start and end times. +A certificate that is presented at a time outside this range will not be +considered valid. +By default, certificates have a maximum validity interval. +.Pp +For certificates to be used for user or host authentication, the CA +public key must be trusted by +.Xr sshd 8 +or +.Xr ssh 1 . +Please refer to those manual pages for details. .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Pa ~/.ssh/identity diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c index b6b7a2d9f..60261c210 100644 --- a/ssh-keygen.c +++ b/ssh-keygen.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.178 2010/02/09 00:50:59 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.179 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ #include "match.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "dns.h" +#include "ssh2.h" #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" @@ -98,6 +99,35 @@ char *identity_new_passphrase = NULL; /* This is set to the new comment if given on the command line. */ char *identity_comment = NULL; +/* Path to CA key when certifying keys. */ +char *ca_key_path = NULL; + +/* Key type when certifying */ +u_int cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER; + +/* "key ID" of signed key */ +char *cert_key_id = NULL; + +/* Comma-separated list of principal names for certifying keys */ +char *cert_principals = NULL; + +/* Validity period for certificates */ +u_int64_t cert_valid_from = 0; +u_int64_t cert_valid_to = ~0ULL; + +/* Certificate constraints */ +#define CONSTRAINT_X_FWD (1) +#define CONSTRAINT_AGENT_FWD (1<<1) +#define CONSTRAINT_PORT_FWD (1<<2) +#define CONSTRAINT_PTY (1<<3) +#define CONSTRAINT_USER_RC (1<<4) +#define CONSTRAINT_DEFAULT (CONSTRAINT_X_FWD|CONSTRAINT_AGENT_FWD| \ + CONSTRAINT_PORT_FWD|CONSTRAINT_PTY| \ + CONSTRAINT_USER_RC) +u_int32_t constraint_flags = CONSTRAINT_DEFAULT; +char *constraint_command = NULL; +char *constraint_src_addr = NULL; + /* Dump public key file in format used by real and the original SSH 2 */ int convert_to_ssh2 = 0; int convert_from_ssh2 = 0; @@ -591,7 +621,7 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) } static void -print_host(FILE *f, const char *name, Key *public, int hash) +printhost(FILE *f, const char *name, Key *public, int ca, int hash) { if (print_fingerprint) { enum fp_rep rep; @@ -611,7 +641,7 @@ print_host(FILE *f, const char *name, Key *public, int hash) } else { if (hash && (name = host_hash(name, NULL, 0)) == NULL) fatal("hash_host failed"); - fprintf(f, "%s ", name); + fprintf(f, "%s%s%s ", ca ? CA_MARKER : "", ca ? " " : "", name); if (!key_write(public, f)) fatal("key_write failed"); fprintf(f, "\n"); @@ -622,10 +652,11 @@ static void do_known_hosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *name) { FILE *in, *out = stdout; - Key *public; + Key *pub; char *cp, *cp2, *kp, *kp2; char line[16*1024], tmp[MAXPATHLEN], old[MAXPATHLEN]; int c, skip = 0, inplace = 0, num = 0, invalid = 0, has_unhashed = 0; + int ca; if (!have_identity) { cp = tilde_expand_filename(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE, pw->pw_uid); @@ -681,9 +712,19 @@ do_known_hosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *name) fprintf(out, "%s\n", cp); continue; } + /* Check whether this is a CA key */ + if (strncasecmp(cp, CA_MARKER, sizeof(CA_MARKER) - 1) == 0 && + (cp[sizeof(CA_MARKER) - 1] == ' ' || + cp[sizeof(CA_MARKER) - 1] == '\t')) { + ca = 1; + cp += sizeof(CA_MARKER); + } else + ca = 0; + /* Find the end of the host name portion. */ for (kp = cp; *kp && *kp != ' ' && *kp != '\t'; kp++) ; + if (*kp == '\0' || *(kp + 1) == '\0') { error("line %d missing key: %.40s...", num, line); @@ -693,15 +734,15 @@ do_known_hosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *name) *kp++ = '\0'; kp2 = kp; - public = key_new(KEY_RSA1); - if (key_read(public, &kp) != 1) { + pub = key_new(KEY_RSA1); + if (key_read(pub, &kp) != 1) { kp = kp2; - key_free(public); - public = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC); - if (key_read(public, &kp) != 1) { + key_free(pub); + pub = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC); + if (key_read(pub, &kp) != 1) { error("line %d invalid key: %.40s...", num, line); - key_free(public); + key_free(pub); invalid = 1; continue; } @@ -719,43 +760,52 @@ do_known_hosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *name) c = (strcmp(cp2, cp) == 0); if (find_host && c) { printf("# Host %s found: " - "line %d type %s\n", name, - num, key_type(public)); - print_host(out, cp, public, 0); + "line %d type %s%s\n", name, + num, key_type(pub), + ca ? " (CA key)" : ""); + printhost(out, cp, pub, ca, 0); } - if (delete_host && !c) - print_host(out, cp, public, 0); + if (delete_host && !c && !ca) + printhost(out, cp, pub, ca, 0); } else if (hash_hosts) - print_host(out, cp, public, 0); + printhost(out, cp, pub, ca, 0); } else { if (find_host || delete_host) { c = (match_hostname(name, cp, strlen(cp)) == 1); if (find_host && c) { printf("# Host %s found: " - "line %d type %s\n", name, - num, key_type(public)); - print_host(out, name, public, - hash_hosts); + "line %d type %s%s\n", name, + num, key_type(pub), + ca ? " (CA key)" : ""); + printhost(out, name, pub, + ca, hash_hosts && !ca); } - if (delete_host && !c) - print_host(out, cp, public, 0); + if (delete_host && !c && !ca) + printhost(out, cp, pub, ca, 0); } else if (hash_hosts) { for (cp2 = strsep(&cp, ","); cp2 != NULL && *cp2 != '\0'; cp2 = strsep(&cp, ",")) { - if (strcspn(cp2, "*?!") != strlen(cp2)) + if (ca) { + fprintf(stderr, "Warning: " + "ignoring CA key for host: " + "%.64s\n", cp2); + printhost(out, cp2, pub, ca, 0); + } else if (strcspn(cp2, "*?!") != + strlen(cp2)) { fprintf(stderr, "Warning: " "ignoring host name with " "metacharacters: %.64s\n", cp2); - else - print_host(out, cp2, public, 1); + printhost(out, cp2, pub, ca, 0); + } else + printhost(out, cp2, pub, ca, 1); } has_unhashed = 1; } } - key_free(public); + key_free(pub); } fclose(in); @@ -1012,6 +1062,293 @@ do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw) exit(0); } +static const char * +fmt_validity(void) +{ + char from[32], to[32]; + static char ret[64]; + time_t tt; + struct tm *tm; + + *from = *to = '\0'; + if (cert_valid_from == 0 && + cert_valid_to == 0xffffffffffffffffULL) + return "forever"; + + if (cert_valid_from != 0) { + /* XXX revisit INT_MAX in 2038 :) */ + tt = cert_valid_from > INT_MAX ? INT_MAX : cert_valid_from; + tm = localtime(&tt); + strftime(from, sizeof(from), "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", tm); + } + if (cert_valid_to != 0xffffffffffffffffULL) { + /* XXX revisit INT_MAX in 2038 :) */ + tt = cert_valid_to > INT_MAX ? INT_MAX : cert_valid_to; + tm = localtime(&tt); + strftime(to, sizeof(to), "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", tm); + } + + if (cert_valid_from == 0) { + snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "before %s", to); + return ret; + } + if (cert_valid_to == 0xffffffffffffffffULL) { + snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "after %s", from); + return ret; + } + + snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "from %s to %s", from, to); + return ret; +} + +static void +add_flag_constraint(Buffer *c, const char *name) +{ + debug3("%s: %s", __func__, name); + buffer_put_cstring(c, name); + buffer_put_string(c, NULL, 0); +} + +static void +add_string_constraint(Buffer *c, const char *name, const char *value) +{ + Buffer b; + + debug3("%s: %s=%s", __func__, name, value); + buffer_init(&b); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, value); + + buffer_put_cstring(c, name); + buffer_put_string(c, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b)); + + buffer_free(&b); +} + +static void +prepare_constraint_buf(Buffer *c) +{ + + buffer_clear(c); + if ((constraint_flags & CONSTRAINT_X_FWD) != 0) + add_flag_constraint(c, "permit-X11-forwarding"); + if ((constraint_flags & CONSTRAINT_AGENT_FWD) != 0) + add_flag_constraint(c, "permit-agent-forwarding"); + if ((constraint_flags & CONSTRAINT_PORT_FWD) != 0) + add_flag_constraint(c, "permit-port-forwarding"); + if ((constraint_flags & CONSTRAINT_PTY) != 0) + add_flag_constraint(c, "permit-pty"); + if ((constraint_flags & CONSTRAINT_USER_RC) != 0) + add_flag_constraint(c, "permit-user-rc"); + if (constraint_command != NULL) + add_string_constraint(c, "forced-command", constraint_command); + if (constraint_src_addr != NULL) + add_string_constraint(c, "source-address", constraint_src_addr); +} + +static void +do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv) +{ + int i, fd; + u_int n; + Key *ca, *public; + char *otmp, *tmp, *cp, *out, *comment, **plist = NULL; + FILE *f; + + tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid); + if ((ca = load_identity(tmp)) == NULL) + fatal("Couldn't load CA key \"%s\"", tmp); + xfree(tmp); + + for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { + /* Split list of principals */ + n = 0; + if (cert_principals != NULL) { + otmp = tmp = xstrdup(cert_principals); + plist = NULL; + for (; (cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL; n++) { + plist = xrealloc(plist, n + 1, sizeof(*plist)); + if (*(plist[n] = xstrdup(cp)) == '\0') + fatal("Empty principal name"); + } + xfree(otmp); + } + + tmp = tilde_expand_filename(argv[i], pw->pw_uid); + if ((public = key_load_public(tmp, &comment)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: unable to open \"%s\"", __func__, tmp); + if (public->type != KEY_RSA && public->type != KEY_DSA) + fatal("%s: key \"%s\" type %s cannot be certified", + __func__, tmp, key_type(public)); + + /* Prepare certificate to sign */ + if (key_to_certified(public) != 0) + fatal("Could not upgrade key %s to certificate", tmp); + public->cert->type = cert_key_type; + public->cert->key_id = xstrdup(cert_key_id); + public->cert->nprincipals = n; + public->cert->principals = plist; + public->cert->valid_after = cert_valid_from; + public->cert->valid_before = cert_valid_to; + prepare_constraint_buf(&public->cert->constraints); + public->cert->signature_key = key_from_private(ca); + + if (key_certify(public, ca) != 0) + fatal("Couldn't not certify key %s", tmp); + + if ((cp = strrchr(tmp, '.')) != NULL && strcmp(cp, ".pub") == 0) + *cp = '\0'; + xasprintf(&out, "%s-cert.pub", tmp); + xfree(tmp); + + if ((fd = open(out, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1) + fatal("Could not open \"%s\" for writing: %s", out, + strerror(errno)); + if ((f = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) + fatal("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + if (!key_write(public, f)) + fatal("Could not write certified key to %s", out); + fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment); + fclose(f); + + if (!quiet) + logit("Signed %s key %s: id \"%s\"%s%s valid %s", + cert_key_type == SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER?"user":"host", + out, cert_key_id, + cert_principals != NULL ? " for " : "", + cert_principals != NULL ? cert_principals : "", + fmt_validity()); + + key_free(public); + xfree(out); + } + exit(0); +} + +static u_int64_t +parse_relative_time(const char *s, time_t now) +{ + int64_t mul, secs; + + mul = *s == '-' ? -1 : 1; + + if ((secs = convtime(s + 1)) == -1) + fatal("Invalid relative certificate time %s", s); + if (mul == -1 && secs > now) + fatal("Certificate time %s cannot be represented", s); + return now + (u_int64_t)(secs * mul); +} + +static u_int64_t +parse_absolute_time(const char *s) +{ + struct tm tm; + time_t tt; + + if (strlen(s) != 8 && strlen(s) != 14) + fatal("Invalid certificate time format %s", s); + + bzero(&tm, sizeof(tm)); + if (strptime(s, + strlen(s) == 8 ? "%Y%m%d" : "%Y%m%d%H%M%S", &tm) == NULL) + fatal("Invalid certificate time %s", s); + if ((tt = mktime(&tm)) < 0) + fatal("Certificate time %s cannot be represented", s); + return (u_int64_t)tt; +} + +static void +parse_cert_times(char *timespec) +{ + char *from, *to; + time_t now = time(NULL); + int64_t secs; + + /* +timespec relative to now */ + if (*timespec == '+' && strchr(timespec, ':') == NULL) { + if ((secs = convtime(timespec + 1)) == -1) + fatal("Invalid relative certificate life %s", timespec); + cert_valid_to = now + secs; + /* + * Backdate certificate one minute to avoid problems on hosts + * with poorly-synchronised clocks. + */ + cert_valid_from = ((now - 59)/ 60) * 60; + return; + } + + /* + * from:to, where + * from := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS + * to := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS + */ + from = xstrdup(timespec); + to = strchr(from, ':'); + if (to == NULL || from == to || *(to + 1) == '\0') + fatal("Invalid certificate life specification %s", optarg); + *to++ = '\0'; + + if (*from == '-' || *from == '+') + cert_valid_from = parse_relative_time(from, now); + else + cert_valid_from = parse_absolute_time(from); + + if (*to == '-' || *to == '+') + cert_valid_to = parse_relative_time(to, cert_valid_from); + else + cert_valid_to = parse_absolute_time(to); + + if (cert_valid_to <= cert_valid_from) + fatal("Empty certificate validity interval"); + xfree(from); +} + +static void +add_cert_constraint(char *opt) +{ + char *val; + + if (strcmp(opt, "clear") == 0) + constraint_flags = 0; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-x11-forwarding") == 0) + constraint_flags &= ~CONSTRAINT_X_FWD; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-x11-forwarding") == 0) + constraint_flags |= CONSTRAINT_X_FWD; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-agent-forwarding") == 0) + constraint_flags &= ~CONSTRAINT_AGENT_FWD; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0) + constraint_flags |= CONSTRAINT_AGENT_FWD; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-port-forwarding") == 0) + constraint_flags &= ~CONSTRAINT_PORT_FWD; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0) + constraint_flags |= CONSTRAINT_PORT_FWD; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-pty") == 0) + constraint_flags &= ~CONSTRAINT_PTY; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-pty") == 0) + constraint_flags |= CONSTRAINT_PTY; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-user-rc") == 0) + constraint_flags &= ~CONSTRAINT_USER_RC; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-user-rc") == 0) + constraint_flags |= CONSTRAINT_USER_RC; + else if (strncasecmp(opt, "force-command=", 14) == 0) { + val = opt + 14; + if (*val == '\0') + fatal("Empty force-command constraint"); + if (constraint_command != NULL) + fatal("force-command already specified"); + constraint_command = xstrdup(val); + } else if (strncasecmp(opt, "source-address=", 15) == 0) { + val = opt + 15; + if (*val == '\0') + fatal("Empty source-address constraint"); + if (constraint_src_addr != NULL) + fatal("source-address already specified"); + if (addr_match_cidr_list(NULL, val) != 0) + fatal("Invalid source-address list"); + constraint_src_addr = xstrdup(val); + } else + fatal("Unsupported certificate constraint \"%s\"", opt); +} + static void usage(void) { @@ -1031,18 +1368,24 @@ usage(void) fprintf(stderr, " -G file Generate candidates for DH-GEX moduli.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -g Use generic DNS resource record format.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -H Hash names in known_hosts file.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -h Generate host certificate instead of a user certificate.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -I key_id Key identifier to include in certificate.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -i Convert RFC 4716 to OpenSSH key file.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -l Show fingerprint of key file.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -M memory Amount of memory (MB) to use for generating DH-GEX moduli.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -n name,... User/host principal names to include in certificate\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -N phrase Provide new passphrase.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -O cnstr Specify a certificate constraint.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -P phrase Provide old passphrase.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -p Change passphrase of private key file.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -q Quiet.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -R hostname Remove host from known_hosts file.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -r hostname Print DNS resource record.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -s ca_key Certify keys with CA key.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -S start Start point (hex) for generating DH-GEX moduli.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -T file Screen candidates for DH-GEX moduli.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -t type Specify type of key to create.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -V from:to Specify certificate validity interval.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -v Verbose.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -W gen Generator to use for generating DH-GEX moduli.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -y Read private key file and print public key.\n"); @@ -1094,8 +1437,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) exit(1); } - while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, - "degiqpclBHvxXyF:b:f:t:D:P:N:C:r:g:R:T:G:M:S:a:W:")) != -1) { + while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "degiqpclBHhvxXyF:b:f:t:D:I:P:N:n:" + "O:C:r:g:R:T:G:M:S:s:a:V:W:")) != -1) { switch (opt) { case 'b': bits = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 768, 32768, &errstr); @@ -1110,6 +1453,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) case 'H': hash_hosts = 1; break; + case 'I': + cert_key_id = optarg; + break; case 'R': delete_host = 1; rr_hostname = optarg; @@ -1120,6 +1466,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) case 'B': print_bubblebabble = 1; break; + case 'n': + cert_principals = optarg; + break; case 'p': change_passphrase = 1; break; @@ -1141,6 +1490,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) case 'N': identity_new_passphrase = optarg; break; + case 'O': + add_cert_constraint(optarg); + break; case 'C': identity_comment = optarg; break; @@ -1152,6 +1504,10 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) /* export key */ convert_to_ssh2 = 1; break; + case 'h': + cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST; + constraint_flags = 0; + break; case 'i': case 'X': /* import key */ @@ -1163,6 +1519,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) case 'd': key_type_name = "dsa"; break; + case 's': + ca_key_path = optarg; + break; case 't': key_type_name = optarg; break; @@ -1217,6 +1576,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) if (BN_hex2bn(&start, optarg) == 0) fatal("Invalid start point."); break; + case 'V': + parse_cert_times(optarg); + break; case '?': default: usage(); @@ -1226,7 +1588,15 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) /* reinit */ log_init(argv[0], log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); - if (optind < argc) { + argv += optind; + argc -= optind; + + if (ca_key_path != NULL) { + if (argc < 1) { + printf("Too few arguments.\n"); + usage(); + } + } else if (argc > 0) { printf("Too many arguments.\n"); usage(); } @@ -1238,6 +1608,11 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) printf("Cannot use -l with -D or -R.\n"); usage(); } + if (ca_key_path != NULL) { + if (cert_key_id == NULL) + fatal("Must specify key id (-I) when certifying"); + do_ca_sign(pw, argc, argv); + } if (delete_host || hash_hosts || find_host) do_known_hosts(pw, rr_hostname); if (print_fingerprint || print_bubblebabble) diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c index 0e16ff85f..842857fee 100644 --- a/ssh-rsa.c +++ b/ssh-rsa.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.39 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.40 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2003 Markus Friedl * @@ -46,7 +46,9 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, int ok, nid; Buffer b; - if (key == NULL || key->type != KEY_RSA || key->rsa == NULL) { + if (key == NULL || + (key->type != KEY_RSA && key->type != KEY_RSA_CERT) || + key->rsa == NULL) { error("ssh_rsa_sign: no RSA key"); return -1; } @@ -113,7 +115,9 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen, u_int len, dlen, modlen; int rlen, ret, nid; - if (key == NULL || key->type != KEY_RSA || key->rsa == NULL) { + if (key == NULL || + (key->type != KEY_RSA && key->type != KEY_RSA_CERT) || + key->rsa == NULL) { error("ssh_rsa_verify: no RSA key"); return -1; } diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1 index 6964cd09c..7d8f92aba 100644 --- a/ssh.1 +++ b/ssh.1 @@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.294 2010/02/11 13:23:29 jmc Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: February 11 2010 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.295 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: February 26 2010 $ .Dt SSH 1 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -1103,6 +1103,25 @@ See the option in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information. +.Pp +Host keys may also be presented as certificates signed by a trusted +certification authority (CA). +In this case, trust of the CA key alone is sufficient for the host key +to be accepted. +To specify a public key as a trusted CA key in a known hosts file, +it should be added after a +.Dq @cert-authority +tag and a set of one or more domain-name wildcards separated by commas. +For example: +.Pp +.Dl @cert-authority *.mydomain.org,*.mydomain.com ssh-rsa AAAAB5W... +.Pp +See the +.Sx CERTIFICATES +section of +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 +for more details. +.Pp .Sh SSH-BASED VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS .Nm contains support for Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnelling diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c index 25ccdcaa5..b9553d3e1 100644 --- a/ssh.c +++ b/ssh.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.334 2010/02/08 22:03:05 jmc Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.335 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -1306,34 +1306,35 @@ load_public_identity_files(void) int i = 0; Key *public; struct passwd *pw; + u_int n_ids; + char *identity_files[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; + Key *identity_keys[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 Key **keys; int nkeys; +#endif /* PKCS11 */ + n_ids = 0; + bzero(identity_files, sizeof(identity_files)); + bzero(identity_keys, sizeof(identity_keys)); + +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL && options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES && (pkcs11_init(!options.batch_mode) == 0) && (nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(options.pkcs11_provider, NULL, &keys)) > 0) { - int count = 0; for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { - count++; - memmove(&options.identity_files[1], - &options.identity_files[0], - sizeof(char *) * (SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES - 1)); - memmove(&options.identity_keys[1], - &options.identity_keys[0], - sizeof(Key *) * (SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES - 1)); - options.num_identity_files++; - options.identity_keys[0] = keys[i]; - options.identity_files[0] = + if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) { + key_free(keys[i]); + continue; + } + identity_keys[n_ids] = keys[i]; + identity_files[n_ids] = xstrdup(options.pkcs11_provider); /* XXX */ + n_ids++; } - if (options.num_identity_files > SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) - options.num_identity_files = SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES; - i = count; xfree(keys); - /* XXX leaks some keys */ } #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ if ((pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid)) == NULL) @@ -1343,7 +1344,11 @@ load_public_identity_files(void) if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1) fatal("load_public_identity_files: gethostname: %s", strerror(errno)); - for (; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) { + if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) { + xfree(options.identity_files[i]); + continue; + } cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_files[i], original_real_uid); filename = percent_expand(cp, "d", pwdir, @@ -1354,9 +1359,37 @@ load_public_identity_files(void) debug("identity file %s type %d", filename, public ? public->type : -1); xfree(options.identity_files[i]); - options.identity_files[i] = filename; - options.identity_keys[i] = public; + identity_files[n_ids] = filename; + identity_keys[n_ids] = public; + + if (++n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) + continue; + + /* Try to add the certificate variant too */ + xasprintf(&cp, "%s-cert", filename); + public = key_load_public(cp, NULL); + debug("identity file %s type %d", cp, + public ? public->type : -1); + if (public == NULL) { + xfree(cp); + continue; + } + if (!key_is_cert(public)) { + debug("%s: key %s type %s is not a certificate", + __func__, cp, key_type(public)); + key_free(public); + xfree(cp); + continue; + } + identity_keys[n_ids] = public; + /* point to the original path, most likely the private key */ + identity_files[n_ids] = xstrdup(filename); + n_ids++; } + options.num_identity_files = n_ids; + memcpy(options.identity_files, identity_files, sizeof(identity_files)); + memcpy(options.identity_keys, identity_keys, sizeof(identity_keys)); + bzero(pwname, strlen(pwname)); xfree(pwname); bzero(pwdir, strlen(pwdir)); diff --git a/ssh2.h b/ssh2.h index b01af7b1a..3ffaf686b 100644 --- a/ssh2.h +++ b/ssh2.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh2.h,v 1.12 2009/10/24 11:19:17 andreas Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh2.h,v 1.13 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -173,3 +173,6 @@ #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_ROAMING_AUTH_OK 33 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_ROAMING_AUTH_FAIL 34 +/* Certificate types for OpenSSH certificate keys extension */ +#define SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER 1 +#define SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST 2 diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c index 63c4650f7..35c2f49be 100644 --- a/sshconnect.c +++ b/sshconnect.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.218 2010/01/13 00:19:04 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.219 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ #include "misc.h" #include "dns.h" #include "roaming.h" +#include "ssh2.h" #include "version.h" char *client_version_string = NULL; @@ -576,6 +577,23 @@ confirm(const char *prompt) } } +static int +check_host_cert(const char *host, const Key *host_key) +{ + const char *reason; + + if (key_cert_check_authority(host_key, 1, 0, host, &reason) != 0) { + error("%s", reason); + return 0; + } + if (buffer_len(&host_key->cert->constraints) != 0) { + error("Certificate for %s contains unsupported constraint(s)", + host); + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + /* * check whether the supplied host key is valid, return -1 if the key * is not valid. the user_hostfile will not be updated if 'readonly' is true. @@ -588,13 +606,13 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, Key *host_key, int readonly, const char *user_hostfile, const char *system_hostfile) { - Key *file_key; - const char *type = key_type(host_key); + Key *file_key, *raw_key = NULL; + const char *type; char *ip = NULL, *host = NULL; char hostline[1000], *hostp, *fp, *ra; HostStatus host_status; HostStatus ip_status; - int r, local = 0, host_ip_differ = 0; + int r, want_cert, local = 0, host_ip_differ = 0; int salen; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST]; char msg[1024]; @@ -667,11 +685,15 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, host = put_host_port(hostname, port); } + retry: + want_cert = key_is_cert(host_key); + type = key_type(host_key); + /* * Store the host key from the known host file in here so that we can * compare it with the key for the IP address. */ - file_key = key_new(host_key->type); + file_key = key_new(key_is_cert(host_key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : host_key->type); /* * Check if the host key is present in the user's list of known @@ -687,9 +709,10 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, } /* * Also perform check for the ip address, skip the check if we are - * localhost or the hostname was an ip address to begin with + * localhost, looking for a certificate, or the hostname was an ip + * address to begin with. */ - if (options.check_host_ip) { + if (!want_cert && options.check_host_ip) { Key *ip_key = key_new(host_key->type); ip_file = user_hostfile; @@ -713,11 +736,14 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, switch (host_status) { case HOST_OK: /* The host is known and the key matches. */ - debug("Host '%.200s' is known and matches the %s host key.", - host, type); - debug("Found key in %s:%d", host_file, host_line); + debug("Host '%.200s' is known and matches the %s host %s.", + host, type, want_cert ? "certificate" : "key"); + debug("Found %s in %s:%d", + want_cert ? "certificate" : "key", host_file, host_line); + if (want_cert && !check_host_cert(hostname, host_key)) + goto fail; if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) { - if (readonly) + if (readonly || want_cert) logit("%s host key for IP address " "'%.128s' not in list of known hosts.", type, ip); @@ -749,7 +775,7 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, break; } } - if (readonly) + if (readonly || want_cert) goto fail; /* The host is new. */ if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 1) { @@ -834,6 +860,17 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, "list of known hosts.", hostp, type); break; case HOST_CHANGED: + if (want_cert) { + /* + * This is only a debug() since it is valid to have + * CAs with wildcard DNS matches that don't match + * all hosts that one might visit. + */ + debug("Host certificate authority does not " + "match %s in %s:%d", CA_MARKER, + host_file, host_line); + goto fail; + } if (readonly == ROQUIET) goto fail; if (options.check_host_ip && host_ip_differ) { @@ -970,6 +1007,20 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, return 0; fail: + if (want_cert) { + /* + * No matching certificate. Downgrade cert to raw key and + * search normally. + */ + debug("No matching CA found. Retry with plain key"); + raw_key = key_from_private(host_key); + if (key_drop_cert(raw_key) != 0) + fatal("Couldn't drop certificate"); + host_key = raw_key; + goto retry; + } + if (raw_key != NULL) + key_free(raw_key); xfree(ip); xfree(host); return -1; @@ -982,7 +1033,8 @@ verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key) struct stat st; int flags = 0; - if (options.verify_host_key_dns && + /* XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS */ + if (!key_is_cert(host_key) && options.verify_host_key_dns && verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, host_key, &flags) == 0) { if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) { diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c index e81064dae..2a5943e7e 100644 --- a/sshconnect2.c +++ b/sshconnect2.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.179 2010/01/13 01:20:20 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.180 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. @@ -1311,6 +1311,8 @@ pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *authctxt) key = options.identity_keys[i]; if (key && key->type == KEY_RSA1) continue; + if (key && key->cert && key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) + continue; options.identity_keys[i] = NULL; id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id)); id->key = key; diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8 index 76b7e2987..fcd5195db 100644 --- a/sshd.8 +++ b/sshd.8 @@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.250 2010/01/30 21:08:33 djm Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: January 30 2010 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.251 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: February 26 2010 $ .Dt SSHD 8 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ .Op Fl 46DdeiqTt .Op Fl b Ar bits .Op Fl C Ar connection_spec +.Op Fl c Ar host_certificate_file .Op Fl f Ar config_file .Op Fl g Ar login_grace_time .Op Fl h Ar host_key_file @@ -101,6 +102,15 @@ to use IPv6 addresses only. .It Fl b Ar bits Specifies the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key (default 1024). +.It Fl c Ar host_certificate_file +Specifies a path to a certificate file to identify +.Nm +during key exchange. +The certificate file must match a host key file specified using the +.Fl -h +option or the +.Cm HostKey +configuration directive. .It Fl C Ar connection_spec Specify the connection parameters to use for the .Fl T @@ -498,6 +508,13 @@ No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes. The following option specifications are supported (note that option keywords are case-insensitive): .Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Cm from="cert-authority" +Specifies that the listed key is a certification authority (CA) that is +trusted to validate signed certificates for user authentication. +.Pp +Certificates may encode access restrictions similar to these key options. +If both certificate restrictions and key options are present, the most +restrictive union of the two is applied. .It Cm command="command" Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used for authentication. @@ -517,6 +534,10 @@ The command originally supplied by the client is available in the .Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environment variable. Note that this option applies to shell, command or subsystem execution. +Also note that this command may be superseded by either a +.Xr sshd_config 5 +.Cm ForceCommand +directive or a command embedded in a certificate. .It Cm environment="NAME=value" Specifies that the string is to be added to the environment when logging in using this key. diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c index bf2e76cc8..0c3c04e4e 100644 --- a/sshd.c +++ b/sshd.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.372 2010/01/29 00:20:41 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.373 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ struct { Key *server_key; /* ephemeral server key */ Key *ssh1_host_key; /* ssh1 host key */ Key **host_keys; /* all private host keys */ + Key **host_certificates; /* all public host certificates */ int have_ssh1_key; int have_ssh2_key; u_char ssh1_cookie[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; @@ -545,6 +546,10 @@ destroy_sensitive_data(void) key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; } + if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) { + key_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]); + sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL; + } } sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL; memset(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, 0, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH); @@ -571,6 +576,7 @@ demote_sensitive_data(void) if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1) sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp; } + /* Certs do not need demotion */ } /* We do not clear ssh1_host key and cookie. XXX - Okay Niels? */ @@ -717,10 +723,11 @@ list_hostkey_types(void) const char *p; char *ret; int i; + Key *key; buffer_init(&b); for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { - Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i]; + key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i]; if (key == NULL) continue; switch (key->type) { @@ -732,6 +739,19 @@ list_hostkey_types(void) buffer_append(&b, p, strlen(p)); break; } + /* If the private key has a cert peer, then list that too */ + key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]; + if (key == NULL) + continue; + switch (key->type) { + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + if (buffer_len(&b) > 0) + buffer_append(&b, ",", 1); + p = key_ssh_name(key); + buffer_append(&b, p, strlen(p)); + break; + } } buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1); ret = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b)); @@ -740,19 +760,36 @@ list_hostkey_types(void) return ret; } -Key * -get_hostkey_by_type(int type) +static Key * +get_hostkey_by_type(int type, int need_private) { int i; + Key *key; for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { - Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i]; + if (type == KEY_RSA_CERT || type == KEY_DSA_CERT) + key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]; + else + key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i]; if (key != NULL && key->type == type) - return key; + return need_private ? + sensitive_data.host_keys[i] : key; } return NULL; } +Key * +get_hostkey_public_by_type(int type) +{ + return get_hostkey_by_type(type, 0); +} + +Key * +get_hostkey_private_by_type(int type) +{ + return get_hostkey_by_type(type, 1); +} + Key * get_hostkey_by_index(int ind) { @@ -767,8 +804,13 @@ get_hostkey_index(Key *key) int i; for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { - if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) - return (i); + if (key_is_cert(key)) { + if (key == sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) + return (i); + } else { + if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) + return (i); + } } return (-1); } @@ -807,9 +849,9 @@ usage(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n", SSH_RELEASE, SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION)); fprintf(stderr, -"usage: sshd [-46DdeiqTt] [-b bits] [-C connection_spec] [-f config_file]\n" -" [-g login_grace_time] [-h host_key_file] [-k key_gen_time]\n" -" [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]\n" +"usage: sshd [-46DdeiqTt] [-b bits] [-C connection_spec] [-c host_cert_file]\n" +" [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time] [-h host_key_file]\n" +" [-k key_gen_time] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]\n" ); exit(1); } @@ -1236,7 +1278,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) { extern char *optarg; extern int optind; - int opt, i, on = 1; + int opt, i, j, on = 1; int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, newsock = -1; const char *remote_ip; char *test_user = NULL, *test_host = NULL, *test_addr = NULL; @@ -1289,6 +1331,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av) case 'f': config_file_name = optarg; break; + case 'c': + if (options.num_host_cert_files >= MAX_HOSTCERTS) { + fprintf(stderr, "too many host certificates.\n"); + exit(1); + } + options.host_cert_files[options.num_host_cert_files++] = + derelativise_path(optarg); + break; case 'd': if (debug_flag == 0) { debug_flag = 1; @@ -1536,6 +1586,46 @@ main(int ac, char **av) exit(1); } + /* + * Load certificates. They are stored in an array at identical + * indices to the public keys that they relate to. + */ + sensitive_data.host_certificates = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files, + sizeof(Key *)); + for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) + sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL; + + for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_cert_files; i++) { + key = key_load_public(options.host_cert_files[i], NULL); + if (key == NULL) { + error("Could not load host certificate: %s", + options.host_cert_files[i]); + continue; + } + if (!key_is_cert(key)) { + error("Certificate file is not a certificate: %s", + options.host_cert_files[i]); + key_free(key); + continue; + } + /* Find matching private key */ + for (j = 0; j < options.num_host_key_files; j++) { + if (key_equal_public(key, + sensitive_data.host_keys[j])) { + sensitive_data.host_certificates[j] = key; + break; + } + } + if (j >= options.num_host_key_files) { + error("No matching private key for certificate: %s", + options.host_cert_files[i]); + key_free(key); + continue; + } + sensitive_data.host_certificates[j] = key; + debug("host certificate: #%d type %d %s", j, key->type, + key_type(key)); + } /* Check certain values for sanity. */ if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) { if (options.server_key_bits < 512 || @@ -2205,7 +2295,8 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) kex->server = 1; kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; - kex->load_host_key=&get_hostkey_by_type; + kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type; + kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type; kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index; xxx_kex = kex; diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 index bf3319c4d..001114655 100644 --- a/sshd_config.5 +++ b/sshd_config.5 @@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.116 2010/01/09 23:04:13 dtucker Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: January 9 2010 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.117 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: February 26 2010 $ .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -411,6 +411,14 @@ uses the name supplied by the client rather than attempting to resolve the name from the TCP connection itself. The default is .Dq no . +.It Cm HostCertificate +Specifies a file containing a public host certificate. +The certificate's public key must match a private host key already specified +by +.Cm HostKey . +The default behaviour of +.Xr sshd 8 +is not to load any certificates. .It Cm HostKey Specifies a file containing a private host key used by SSH. -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2ca342b84bca89e35931cbe34f19d7ab4d200d9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Damien Miller Date: Wed, 3 Mar 2010 12:14:15 +1100 Subject: - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/02 23:20:57 [ssh-keygen.c] POSIX strptime is stricter than OpenBSD's so do a little dance to appease it. --- ssh-keygen.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'ssh-keygen.c') diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c index 60261c210..7dc10808c 100644 --- a/ssh-keygen.c +++ b/ssh-keygen.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.179 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.180 2010/03/02 23:20:57 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -1243,13 +1243,29 @@ parse_absolute_time(const char *s) { struct tm tm; time_t tt; + char buf[32], *fmt; - if (strlen(s) != 8 && strlen(s) != 14) + /* + * POSIX strptime says "The application shall ensure that there + * is white-space or other non-alphanumeric characters between + * any two conversion specifications" so arrange things this way. + */ + switch (strlen(s)) { + case 8: + fmt = "%Y/%m/%d"; + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s/%.2s/%.2s", s, s + 4, s + 6); + break; + case 14: + fmt = "%Y/%m/%d %H:%M:%S"; + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s/%.2s/%.2s %.2s:%.2s:%.2s", + s, s + 4, s + 6, s + 8, s + 10, s + 12); + break; + default: fatal("Invalid certificate time format %s", s); + } bzero(&tm, sizeof(tm)); - if (strptime(s, - strlen(s) == 8 ? "%Y%m%d" : "%Y%m%d%H%M%S", &tm) == NULL) + if (strptime(buf, fmt, &tm) == NULL) fatal("Invalid certificate time %s", s); if ((tt = mktime(&tm)) < 0) fatal("Certificate time %s cannot be represented", s); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 910f209c1d08b9b91f744c571fbf805206f04729 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Damien Miller Date: Thu, 4 Mar 2010 14:17:22 +1100 Subject: - (djm) [ssh-keygen.c] Use correct local variable, instead of maybe-undefined global "optarg" --- ChangeLog | 4 ++++ ssh-keygen.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'ssh-keygen.c') diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index 21417e6be..c5398522b 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -1,3 +1,7 @@ +20100304 + - (djm) [ssh-keygen.c] Use correct local variable, instead of + maybe-undefined global "optarg" + 20100303 - (djm) [PROTOCOL.certkeys] Add RCS Ident - OpenBSD CVS Sync diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c index 7dc10808c..f910dce38 100644 --- a/ssh-keygen.c +++ b/ssh-keygen.c @@ -1300,7 +1300,7 @@ parse_cert_times(char *timespec) from = xstrdup(timespec); to = strchr(from, ':'); if (to == NULL || from == to || *(to + 1) == '\0') - fatal("Invalid certificate life specification %s", optarg); + fatal("Invalid certificate life specification %s", timespec); *to++ = '\0'; if (*from == '-' || *from == '+') -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1aed65eb27feec505997c98621bdf158f9ab8b99 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Damien Miller Date: Thu, 4 Mar 2010 21:53:35 +1100 Subject: - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/04 10:36:03 [auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rsa.c auth.c auth.h auth2-hostbased.c auth2-pubkey.c] [authfile.c authfile.h hostfile.c hostfile.h servconf.c servconf.h] [ssh-keygen.c ssh.1 sshconnect.c sshd_config.5] Add a TrustedUserCAKeys option to sshd_config to specify CA keys that are trusted to authenticate users (in addition than doing it per-user in authorized_keys). Add a RevokedKeys option to sshd_config and a @revoked marker to known_hosts to allow keys to me revoked and banned for user or host authentication. feedback and ok markus@ --- ChangeLog | 13 +++++++ auth-rh-rsa.c | 5 ++- auth-rsa.c | 5 ++- auth.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++- auth.h | 3 +- auth2-hostbased.c | 5 ++- auth2-pubkey.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++- authfile.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- authfile.h | 3 +- hostfile.c | 102 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- hostfile.h | 5 +-- servconf.c | 19 +++++++++- servconf.h | 4 ++- ssh-keygen.c | 2 +- ssh.1 | 20 +++++++++-- sshconnect.c | 24 +++++++++++-- sshd_config.5 | 25 +++++++++++-- 17 files changed, 343 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-) (limited to 'ssh-keygen.c') diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index 0b5663ba4..07d4aeb05 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -22,6 +22,19 @@ [key.c] use buffer_get_string_ptr_ret() where we are checking the return value explicitly instead of the fatal()-causing buffer_get_string_ptr() + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/04 10:36:03 + [auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rsa.c auth.c auth.h auth2-hostbased.c auth2-pubkey.c] + [authfile.c authfile.h hostfile.c hostfile.h servconf.c servconf.h] + [ssh-keygen.c ssh.1 sshconnect.c sshd_config.5] + Add a TrustedUserCAKeys option to sshd_config to specify CA keys that + are trusted to authenticate users (in addition than doing it per-user + in authorized_keys). + + Add a RevokedKeys option to sshd_config and a @revoked marker to + known_hosts to allow keys to me revoked and banned for user or host + authentication. + + feedback and ok markus@ 20100303 - (djm) [PROTOCOL.certkeys] Add RCS Ident diff --git a/auth-rh-rsa.c b/auth-rh-rsa.c index eca750275..b21a0f4a2 100644 --- a/auth-rh-rsa.c +++ b/auth-rh-rsa.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth-rh-rsa.c,v 1.42 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth-rh-rsa.c,v 1.43 2010/03/04 10:36:03 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, char *cuser, char *chost, { HostStatus host_status; + if (auth_key_is_revoked(client_host_key)) + return 0; + /* Check if we would accept it using rhosts authentication. */ if (!auth_rhosts(pw, cuser)) return 0; diff --git a/auth-rsa.c b/auth-rsa.c index bf5462076..65571a890 100644 --- a/auth-rsa.c +++ b/auth-rsa.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.73 2008/07/02 12:03:51 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.74 2010/03/04 10:36:03 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -94,6 +94,9 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16]) MD5_CTX md; int len; + if (auth_key_is_revoked(key)) + return 0; + /* don't allow short keys */ if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) { error("auth_rsa_verify_response: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits", diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c index ab9c69fb8..e680efbcc 100644 --- a/auth.c +++ b/auth.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.84 2010/02/09 06:18:46 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.85 2010/03/04 10:36:03 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif +#include "authfile.h" #include "monitor_wrap.h" /* import */ @@ -582,6 +583,34 @@ getpwnamallow(const char *user) return (NULL); } +/* Returns 1 if key is revoked by revoked_keys_file, 0 otherwise */ +int +auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key) +{ + char *key_fp; + + if (options.revoked_keys_file == NULL) + return 0; + + switch (key_in_file(key, options.revoked_keys_file, 0)) { + case 0: + /* key not revoked */ + return 0; + case -1: + /* Error opening revoked_keys_file: refuse all keys */ + error("Revoked keys file is unreadable: refusing public key " + "authentication"); + return 1; + case 1: + /* Key revoked */ + key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); + error("%s key %s is revoked", key_type(key), key_fp); + xfree(key_fp); + return 1; + } + fatal("key_in_file returned junk"); +} + void auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) { diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h index 117485ca9..a65b87dd1 100644 --- a/auth.h +++ b/auth.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.64 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.65 2010/03/04 10:36:03 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ char *authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *); char *authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *); FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int); +int auth_key_is_revoked(Key *); HostStatus check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *, Key *, const char *, diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c index 041051c53..721646520 100644 --- a/auth2-hostbased.c +++ b/auth2-hostbased.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.12 2008/07/17 08:51:07 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.13 2010/03/04 10:36:03 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -145,6 +145,9 @@ hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost, HostStatus host_status; int len; + if (auth_key_is_revoked(key)) + return 0; + resolvedname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns); ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr(); diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c index 66ca5266b..51aa77487 100644 --- a/auth2-pubkey.c +++ b/auth2-pubkey.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.20 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.21 2010/03/04 10:36:03 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "misc.h" +#include "authfile.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; @@ -276,6 +277,47 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file) return found_key; } +/* Authenticate a certificate key against TrustedUserCAKeys */ +static int +user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key) +{ + char *key_fp, *ca_fp; + const char *reason; + int ret = 0; + + if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL) + return 0; + + key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); + ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); + + if (key_in_file(key->cert->signature_key, + options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1) != 1) { + debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s", __func__, + key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp, + options.trusted_user_ca_keys); + goto out; + } + if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1, pw->pw_name, &reason) != 0) { + error("%s", reason); + auth_debug_add("%s", reason); + goto out; + } + if (auth_cert_constraints(&key->cert->constraints, pw) != 0) + goto out; + + verbose("%s certificate %s allowed by trusted %s key %s", + key_type(key), key_fp, key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp); + ret = 1; + + out: + if (key_fp != NULL) + xfree(key_fp); + if (ca_fp != NULL) + xfree(ca_fp); + return ret; +} + /* check whether given key is in .ssh/authorized_keys* */ int user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key) @@ -283,6 +325,15 @@ user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key) int success; char *file; + if (auth_key_is_revoked(key)) + return 0; + if (key_is_cert(key) && auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key)) + return 0; + + success = user_cert_trusted_ca(pw, key); + if (success) + return success; + file = authorized_keys_file(pw); success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file); xfree(file); diff --git a/authfile.c b/authfile.c index 2c615709d..224c6aa80 100644 --- a/authfile.c +++ b/authfile.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.79 2010/01/12 00:16:47 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.80 2010/03/04 10:36:03 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -692,3 +692,65 @@ key_load_public(const char *filename, char **commentp) key_free(pub); return NULL; } + +/* + * Returns 1 if the specified "key" is listed in the file "filename", + * 0 if the key is not listed or -1 on error. + * If strict_type is set then the key type must match exactly, + * otherwise a comparison that ignores certficiate data is performed. + */ +int +key_in_file(Key *key, const char *filename, int strict_type) +{ + FILE *f; + char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES]; + char *cp; + u_long linenum = 0; + int ret = 0; + Key *pub; + int (*key_compare)(const Key *, const Key *) = strict_type ? + key_equal : key_equal_public; + + if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) { + if (errno == ENOENT) { + debug("%s: keyfile \"%s\" missing", __func__, filename); + return 0; + } else { + error("%s: could not open keyfile \"%s\": %s", __func__, + filename, strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + } + + while (read_keyfile_line(f, filename, line, sizeof(line), + &linenum) != -1) { + cp = line; + + /* Skip leading whitespace. */ + for (; *cp && (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'); cp++) + ; + + /* Skip comments and empty lines */ + switch (*cp) { + case '#': + case '\n': + case '\0': + continue; + } + + pub = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC); + if (key_read(pub, &cp) != 1) { + key_free(pub); + continue; + } + if (key_compare(key, pub)) { + ret = 1; + key_free(pub); + break; + } + key_free(pub); + } + fclose(f); + return ret; +} + diff --git a/authfile.h b/authfile.h index a6c74934d..6dfa478e7 100644 --- a/authfile.h +++ b/authfile.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: authfile.h,v 1.13 2006/04/25 08:02:27 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: authfile.h,v 1.14 2010/03/04 10:36:03 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen @@ -22,5 +22,6 @@ Key *key_load_private(const char *, const char *, char **); Key *key_load_private_type(int, const char *, const char *, char **, int *); Key *key_load_private_pem(int, int, const char *, char **); int key_perm_ok(int, const char *); +int key_in_file(Key *, const char *, int); #endif diff --git a/hostfile.c b/hostfile.c index fc7f84c79..afab6dad1 100644 --- a/hostfile.c +++ b/hostfile.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.47 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.48 2010/03/04 10:36:03 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -183,6 +183,41 @@ hostfile_check_key(int bits, const Key *key, const char *host, const char *filen return 1; } +static enum { MRK_ERROR, MRK_NONE, MRK_REVOKE, MRK_CA } +check_markers(char **cpp) +{ + char marker[32], *sp, *cp = *cpp; + int ret = MRK_NONE; + + while (*cp == '@') { + /* Only one marker is allowed */ + if (ret != MRK_NONE) + return MRK_ERROR; + /* Markers are terminated by whitespace */ + if ((sp = strchr(cp, ' ')) == NULL && + (sp = strchr(cp, '\t')) == NULL) + return MRK_ERROR; + /* Extract marker for comparison */ + if (sp <= cp + 1 || sp >= cp + sizeof(marker)) + return MRK_ERROR; + memcpy(marker, cp, sp - cp); + marker[sp - cp] = '\0'; + if (strcmp(marker, CA_MARKER) == 0) + ret = MRK_CA; + else if (strcmp(marker, REVOKE_MARKER) == 0) + ret = MRK_REVOKE; + else + return MRK_ERROR; + + /* Skip past marker and any whitespace that follows it */ + cp = sp; + for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) + ; + } + *cpp = cp; + return ret; +} + /* * Checks whether the given host (which must be in all lowercase) is already * in the list of our known hosts. Returns HOST_OK if the host is known and @@ -195,17 +230,21 @@ hostfile_check_key(int bits, const Key *key, const char *host, const char *filen static HostStatus check_host_in_hostfile_by_key_or_type(const char *filename, - const char *host, const Key *key, int keytype, Key *found, int *numret) + const char *host, const Key *key, int keytype, Key *found, + int want_revocation, int *numret) { FILE *f; char line[8192]; - int linenum = 0, want_cert = key_is_cert(key); + int want, have, linenum = 0, want_cert = key_is_cert(key); u_int kbits; char *cp, *cp2, *hashed_host; HostStatus end_return; debug3("check_host_in_hostfile: host %s filename %s", host, filename); + if (want_revocation && (key == NULL || keytype != 0 || found != NULL)) + fatal("%s: invalid arguments", __func__); + /* Open the file containing the list of known hosts. */ f = fopen(filename, "r"); if (!f) @@ -229,21 +268,18 @@ check_host_in_hostfile_by_key_or_type(const char *filename, if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n') continue; - /* - * Ignore CA keys when looking for raw keys. - * Ignore raw keys when looking for CA keys. - */ - if (strncasecmp(cp, CA_MARKER, sizeof(CA_MARKER) - 1) == 0 && - (cp[sizeof(CA_MARKER) - 1] == ' ' || - cp[sizeof(CA_MARKER) - 1] == '\t')) { - if (want_cert) { - /* Skip the marker and following whitespace */ - cp += sizeof(CA_MARKER); - for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) - ; - } else - continue; - } else if (want_cert) + if (want_revocation) + want = MRK_REVOKE; + else if (want_cert) + want = MRK_CA; + else + want = MRK_NONE; + + if ((have = check_markers(&cp)) == MRK_ERROR) { + verbose("%s: invalid marker at %s:%d", + __func__, filename, linenum); + continue; + } else if (want != have) continue; /* Find the end of the host name portion. */ @@ -267,6 +303,9 @@ check_host_in_hostfile_by_key_or_type(const char *filename, /* Got a match. Skip host name. */ cp = cp2; + if (want_revocation) + found = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC); + /* * Extract the key from the line. This will skip any leading * whitespace. Ignore badly formatted lines. @@ -289,6 +328,24 @@ check_host_in_hostfile_by_key_or_type(const char *filename, if (!hostfile_check_key(kbits, found, host, filename, linenum)) continue; + if (want_revocation) { + if (key_is_cert(key) && + key_equal_public(key->cert->signature_key, found)) { + verbose("check_host_in_hostfile: revoked CA " + "line %d", linenum); + key_free(found); + return HOST_REVOKED; + } + if (key_equal_public(key, found)) { + verbose("check_host_in_hostfile: revoked key " + "line %d", linenum); + key_free(found); + return HOST_REVOKED; + } + key_free(found); + continue; + } + /* Check if the current key is the same as the given key. */ if (want_cert && key_equal(key->cert->signature_key, found)) { /* Found CA cert for key */ @@ -325,8 +382,11 @@ check_host_in_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host, const Key *key, { if (key == NULL) fatal("no key to look up"); - return (check_host_in_hostfile_by_key_or_type(filename, host, key, 0, - found, numret)); + if (check_host_in_hostfile_by_key_or_type(filename, host, + key, 0, NULL, 1, NULL) == HOST_REVOKED) + return HOST_REVOKED; + return check_host_in_hostfile_by_key_or_type(filename, host, key, 0, + found, 0, numret); } int @@ -334,7 +394,7 @@ lookup_key_in_hostfile_by_type(const char *filename, const char *host, int keytype, Key *found, int *numret) { return (check_host_in_hostfile_by_key_or_type(filename, host, NULL, - keytype, found, numret) == HOST_FOUND); + keytype, found, 0, numret) == HOST_FOUND); } /* diff --git a/hostfile.h b/hostfile.h index ebac1e4f1..1d460c1a9 100644 --- a/hostfile.h +++ b/hostfile.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.h,v 1.17 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.h,v 1.18 2010/03/04 10:36:03 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ #define HOSTFILE_H typedef enum { - HOST_OK, HOST_NEW, HOST_CHANGED, HOST_FOUND + HOST_OK, HOST_NEW, HOST_CHANGED, HOST_REVOKED, HOST_FOUND } HostStatus; int hostfile_read_key(char **, u_int *, Key *); @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ int lookup_key_in_hostfile_by_type(const char *, const char *, #define HASH_DELIM '|' #define CA_MARKER "@cert-authority" +#define REVOKE_MARKER "@revoked" char *host_hash(const char *, const char *, u_int); diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c index 0a6cdb655..f9e2f2dfd 100644 --- a/servconf.c +++ b/servconf.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.203 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.204 2010/03/04 10:36:03 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved @@ -129,6 +129,8 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options) options->adm_forced_command = NULL; options->chroot_directory = NULL; options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = -1; + options->revoked_keys_file = NULL; + options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL; } void @@ -308,6 +310,7 @@ typedef enum { sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory, sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding, sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, sHostCertificate, + sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sDeprecated, sUnsupported } ServerOpCodes; @@ -427,6 +430,8 @@ static struct { { "forcecommand", sForceCommand, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "chrootdirectory", sChrootDirectory, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hostcertificate", sHostCertificate, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "revokedkeys", sRevokedKeys, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL }, { NULL, sBadOption, 0 } }; @@ -1323,6 +1328,14 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; + case sTrustedUserCAKeys: + charptr = &options->trusted_user_ca_keys; + goto parse_filename; + + case sRevokedKeys: + charptr = &options->revoked_keys_file; + goto parse_filename; + case sDeprecated: logit("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s", filename, linenum, arg); @@ -1437,6 +1450,8 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth) return; M_CP_STROPT(adm_forced_command); M_CP_STROPT(chroot_directory); + M_CP_STROPT(trusted_user_ca_keys); + M_CP_STROPT(revoked_keys_file); } #undef M_CP_INTOPT @@ -1656,6 +1671,8 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysFile2, o->authorized_keys_file2); dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command); dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory); + dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys); + dump_cfg_string(sRevokedKeys, o->revoked_keys_file); /* string arguments requiring a lookup */ dump_cfg_string(sLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level)); diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h index c5c9c6ecd..860009f9c 100644 --- a/servconf.h +++ b/servconf.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.91 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.92 2010/03/04 10:36:03 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen @@ -154,6 +154,8 @@ typedef struct { int num_permitted_opens; char *chroot_directory; + char *revoked_keys_file; + char *trusted_user_ca_keys; } ServerOptions; void initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *); diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c index f910dce38..c2120bbc1 100644 --- a/ssh-keygen.c +++ b/ssh-keygen.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.180 2010/03/02 23:20:57 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.181 2010/03/04 10:36:03 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1 index 183dc277f..e8a4e5953 100644 --- a/ssh.1 +++ b/ssh.1 @@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.296 2010/02/26 22:09:28 jmc Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: February 26 2010 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.297 2010/03/04 10:36:03 djm Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: March 4 2010 $ .Dt SSH 1 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -1121,6 +1121,22 @@ See the section of .Xr ssh-keygen 1 for more details. +.Pp +Keys may be also be marked as revoked using the +.Dq @revoked +marker. +Revoked keys will always trigger a warning when encountered and the host +that presented them will be treated as untrusted. +For example: +.Pp +.Dl @revoked * ssh-rsa AAAAB5W... +.Pp +Revoking a key revokes it for direct use and as a certification authority. +Do not use both the +.Dq @cert-authority and +.Dq @revoked +markers on the same line. +.Pp .Sh SSH-BASED VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS .Nm contains support for Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnelling diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c index 35c2f49be..9de52224d 100644 --- a/sshconnect.c +++ b/sshconnect.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.219 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.220 2010/03/04 10:36:03 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -859,6 +859,25 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, logit("Warning: Permanently added '%.200s' (%s) to the " "list of known hosts.", hostp, type); break; + case HOST_REVOKED: + error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); + error("@ WARNING: REVOKED HOST KEY DETECTED! @"); + error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); + error("The %s host key for %s is marked as revoked.", type, host); + error("This could mean that a stolen key is being used to"); + error("impersonate this host."); + + /* + * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have + * to edit the key manually and we can only abort. + */ + if (options.strict_host_key_checking) { + error("%s host key for %.200s was revoked and you have " + "requested strict checking.", type, host); + goto fail; + } + goto continue_unsafe; + case HOST_CHANGED: if (want_cert) { /* @@ -908,6 +927,7 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, goto fail; } + continue_unsafe: /* * If strict host key checking has not been requested, allow * the connection but without MITM-able authentication or @@ -1007,7 +1027,7 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, return 0; fail: - if (want_cert) { + if (want_cert && host_status != HOST_REVOKED) { /* * No matching certificate. Downgrade cert to raw key and * search normally. diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 index 001114655..07e74e2b7 100644 --- a/sshd_config.5 +++ b/sshd_config.5 @@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.117 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: February 26 2010 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.118 2010/03/04 10:36:03 djm Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: March 4 2010 $ .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -814,6 +814,11 @@ Specifies whether public key authentication is allowed. The default is .Dq yes . Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. +.It Cm RevokedKeys +Specifies a list of revoked public keys. +Keys listed in this file will be refused for public key authentication. +Note that if this file is not readable, then public key authentication will +be refused for all users. .It Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together with successful RSA host authentication is allowed. @@ -889,6 +894,22 @@ This avoids infinitely hanging sessions. .Pp To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to .Dq no . +.It Cm TrustedUserCAKeys +Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate authorities that are +trusted sign user certificates for authentication. +Keys are listed one per line, empty lines and comments starting with +.Ql # +are allowed. +If a certificate is presented for authentication and has its signing CA key +listed in this file, then it may be used for authentication for any user +listed in the certificate's principals list. +Note that certificates that lack a list of principals will not be permitted +for authentication using +.Cm TrustedUserCAKeys . +For more details in certificates, please see the +.Sx CERTIFICATES +section in +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 . .It Cm UseDNS Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 -- cgit v1.2.3 From f2b70cad7585a67f7098119ccb6ae31573f2dc60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Damien Miller Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2010 07:39:35 +1100 Subject: - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/04 20:35:08 [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c] Add a -L flag to print the contents of a certificate; ok markus@ --- ChangeLog | 3 ++ ssh-keygen.1 | 10 ++++-- ssh-keygen.c | 115 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 3 files changed, 114 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) (limited to 'ssh-keygen.c') diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index ab7f88fe2..3f0ba4237 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -3,6 +3,9 @@ - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/04 12:51:25 [ssh.1 sshd_config.5] tweak previous; + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/04 20:35:08 + [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c] + Add a -L flag to print the contents of a certificate; ok markus@ 20100304 - (djm) [ssh-keygen.c] Use correct local variable, instead of diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1 index d704f0660..dccf5eabc 100644 --- a/ssh-keygen.1 +++ b/ssh-keygen.1 @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.85 2010/02/26 22:09:28 jmc Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.86 2010/03/04 20:35:08 djm Exp $ .\" .\" -*- nroff -*- .\" @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.Dd $Mdocdate: February 26 2010 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: March 4 2010 $ .Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -115,6 +115,10 @@ .Op Fl O Ar constraint .Op Fl V Ar validity_interval .Ar +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Bk -words +.Fl L +.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile .Ek .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm @@ -275,6 +279,8 @@ also reads the RFC 4716 SSH Public Key File Format. This option allows importing keys from several commercial SSH implementations. +.It Fl L +Prints the contents of a certificate. .It Fl l Show fingerprint of specified public key file. Private RSA1 keys are also supported. diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c index c2120bbc1..492c301d3 100644 --- a/ssh-keygen.c +++ b/ssh-keygen.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.181 2010/03/04 10:36:03 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.182 2010/03/04 20:35:08 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -82,6 +82,9 @@ int find_host = 0; /* Flag indicating that we want to delete a host from a known_hosts file */ int delete_host = 0; +/* Flag indicating that we want to show the contents of a certificate */ +int show_cert = 0; + /* Flag indicating that we just want to see the key fingerprint */ int print_fingerprint = 0; int print_bubblebabble = 0; @@ -1063,7 +1066,7 @@ do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw) } static const char * -fmt_validity(void) +fmt_validity(u_int64_t valid_from, u_int64_t valid_to) { char from[32], to[32]; static char ret[64]; @@ -1071,28 +1074,27 @@ fmt_validity(void) struct tm *tm; *from = *to = '\0'; - if (cert_valid_from == 0 && - cert_valid_to == 0xffffffffffffffffULL) + if (valid_from == 0 && valid_to == 0xffffffffffffffffULL) return "forever"; - if (cert_valid_from != 0) { + if (valid_from != 0) { /* XXX revisit INT_MAX in 2038 :) */ - tt = cert_valid_from > INT_MAX ? INT_MAX : cert_valid_from; + tt = valid_from > INT_MAX ? INT_MAX : valid_from; tm = localtime(&tt); strftime(from, sizeof(from), "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", tm); } - if (cert_valid_to != 0xffffffffffffffffULL) { + if (valid_to != 0xffffffffffffffffULL) { /* XXX revisit INT_MAX in 2038 :) */ - tt = cert_valid_to > INT_MAX ? INT_MAX : cert_valid_to; + tt = valid_to > INT_MAX ? INT_MAX : valid_to; tm = localtime(&tt); strftime(to, sizeof(to), "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", tm); } - if (cert_valid_from == 0) { + if (valid_from == 0) { snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "before %s", to); return ret; } - if (cert_valid_to == 0xffffffffffffffffULL) { + if (valid_to == 0xffffffffffffffffULL) { snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "after %s", from); return ret; } @@ -1216,7 +1218,7 @@ do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv) out, cert_key_id, cert_principals != NULL ? " for " : "", cert_principals != NULL ? cert_principals : "", - fmt_validity()); + fmt_validity(cert_valid_from, cert_valid_to)); key_free(public); xfree(out); @@ -1365,6 +1367,89 @@ add_cert_constraint(char *opt) fatal("Unsupported certificate constraint \"%s\"", opt); } +static void +do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw) +{ + Key *key; + struct stat st; + char *key_fp, *ca_fp; + Buffer constraints, constraint; + u_char *name, *data; + u_int i, dlen; + + if (!have_identity) + ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); + if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) { + perror(identity_file); + exit(1); + } + if ((key = key_load_public(identity_file, NULL)) == NULL) + fatal("%s is not a public key", identity_file); + if (!key_is_cert(key)) + fatal("%s is not a certificate", identity_file); + + key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); + ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, + SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); + + printf("%s:\n", identity_file); + printf(" %s certificate %s\n", key_type(key), key_fp); + printf(" Signed by %s CA %s\n", + key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp); + printf(" Key ID \"%s\"\n", key->cert->key_id); + printf(" Valid: %s\n", + fmt_validity(key->cert->valid_after, key->cert->valid_before)); + printf(" Principals: "); + if (key->cert->nprincipals == 0) + printf("(none)\n"); + else { + for (i = 0; i < key->cert->nprincipals; i++) + printf("\n %s", + key->cert->principals[i]); + printf("\n"); + } + printf(" Constraints: "); + if (buffer_len(&key->cert->constraints) == 0) + printf("(none)\n"); + else { + printf("\n"); + buffer_init(&constraints); + buffer_append(&constraints, + buffer_ptr(&key->cert->constraints), + buffer_len(&key->cert->constraints)); + buffer_init(&constraint); + while (buffer_len(&constraints) != 0) { + name = buffer_get_string(&constraints, NULL); + data = buffer_get_string_ptr(&constraints, &dlen); + buffer_append(&constraint, data, dlen); + printf(" %s", name); + if (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0 || + strcmp(name, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0 || + strcmp(name, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0 || + strcmp(name, "permit-pty") == 0 || + strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0) + printf("\n"); + else if (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0 || + strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0) { + data = buffer_get_string(&constraint, NULL); + printf(" %s\n", data); + xfree(data); + } else { + printf(" UNKNOWN CONSTRAINT (len %u)\n", + buffer_len(&constraint)); + buffer_clear(&constraint); + } + xfree(name); + if (buffer_len(&constraint) != 0) + fatal("Constraint corrupt: extra data at end"); + } + buffer_free(&constraint); + buffer_free(&constraints); + } + + exit(0); +} + static void usage(void) { @@ -1387,6 +1472,7 @@ usage(void) fprintf(stderr, " -h Generate host certificate instead of a user certificate.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -I key_id Key identifier to include in certificate.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -i Convert RFC 4716 to OpenSSH key file.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -L Print the contents of a certificate.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -l Show fingerprint of key file.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -M memory Amount of memory (MB) to use for generating DH-GEX moduli.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -n name,... User/host principal names to include in certificate\n"); @@ -1453,7 +1539,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) exit(1); } - while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "degiqpclBHhvxXyF:b:f:t:D:I:P:N:n:" + while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "degiqpclBHLhvxXyF:b:f:t:D:I:P:N:n:" "O:C:r:g:R:T:G:M:S:s:a:V:W:")) != -1) { switch (opt) { case 'b': @@ -1476,6 +1562,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) delete_host = 1; rr_hostname = optarg; break; + case 'L': + show_cert = 1; + break; case 'l': print_fingerprint = 1; break; @@ -1629,6 +1718,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) fatal("Must specify key id (-I) when certifying"); do_ca_sign(pw, argc, argv); } + if (show_cert) + do_show_cert(pw); if (delete_host || hash_hosts || find_host) do_known_hosts(pw, rr_hostname); if (print_fingerprint || print_bubblebabble) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 689b872842ba2e64d2bf52abe0c9b1b1f6a6663f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Damien Miller Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2010 10:42:24 +1100 Subject: - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/04 23:27:25 [auth-options.c ssh-keygen.c] "force-command" is not spelled "forced-command"; spotted by imorgan AT nas.nasa.gov --- ChangeLog | 4 ++++ auth-options.c | 4 ++-- ssh-keygen.c | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'ssh-keygen.c') diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index c441b2013..7b50de5d3 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -16,6 +16,10 @@ [ssh.1 sshd.8] move section on CA and revoked keys from ssh.1 to sshd.8's known hosts format section and rework it a bit; requested by jmc@ + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/04 23:27:25 + [auth-options.c ssh-keygen.c] + "force-command" is not spelled "forced-command"; spotted by + imorgan AT nas.nasa.gov - (tim) [ssh-pkcs11.c] Fix "non-constant initializer" errors in older compilers. OK djm@ diff --git a/auth-options.c b/auth-options.c index d14624bf4..bcf5589d7 100644 --- a/auth-options.c +++ b/auth-options.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.46 2010/03/03 01:44:36 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.47 2010/03/04 23:27:25 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ auth_cert_constraints(Buffer *c_orig, struct passwd *pw) } if (cert_forced_command != NULL) { error("Certificate has multiple " - "forced-command constraints"); + "force-command constraints"); xfree(command); goto out; } diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c index 492c301d3..fc7ca4b0c 100644 --- a/ssh-keygen.c +++ b/ssh-keygen.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.182 2010/03/04 20:35:08 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.183 2010/03/04 23:27:25 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -1142,7 +1142,7 @@ prepare_constraint_buf(Buffer *c) if ((constraint_flags & CONSTRAINT_USER_RC) != 0) add_flag_constraint(c, "permit-user-rc"); if (constraint_command != NULL) - add_string_constraint(c, "forced-command", constraint_command); + add_string_constraint(c, "force-command", constraint_command); if (constraint_src_addr != NULL) add_string_constraint(c, "source-address", constraint_src_addr); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3e1ee491f3fa4fa7e44a998799e251a3b08e66d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Damien Miller Date: Mon, 8 Mar 2010 09:24:11 +1100 Subject: - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/07 22:16:01 [ssh-keygen.c] make internal strptime string match strftime format; suggested by vinschen AT redhat.com and markus@ --- ChangeLog | 4 ++++ ssh-keygen.c | 10 +++++----- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'ssh-keygen.c') diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index 0b26749a1..707be2dd6 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -1,5 +1,9 @@ 20100307 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/07 22:16:01 + [ssh-keygen.c] + make internal strptime string match strftime format; + suggested by vinschen AT redhat.com and markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/07 22:01:32 [version.h] openssh-5.4 diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c index fc7ca4b0c..dd662c907 100644 --- a/ssh-keygen.c +++ b/ssh-keygen.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.183 2010/03/04 23:27:25 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.184 2010/03/07 22:16:01 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -1254,12 +1254,12 @@ parse_absolute_time(const char *s) */ switch (strlen(s)) { case 8: - fmt = "%Y/%m/%d"; - snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s/%.2s/%.2s", s, s + 4, s + 6); + fmt = "%Y-%m-%d"; + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2s", s, s + 4, s + 6); break; case 14: - fmt = "%Y/%m/%d %H:%M:%S"; - snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s/%.2s/%.2s %.2s:%.2s:%.2s", + fmt = "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S"; + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2sT%.2s:%.2s:%.2s", s, s + 4, s + 6, s + 8, s + 10, s + 12); break; default: -- cgit v1.2.3