From db7606d4a62fee67b0cb2f32dfcbd7b3642bfef5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "schwarze@openbsd.org" Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 12:47:17 +0000 Subject: upstream: Delete some .Sx macros that were used in a wrong way. Part of a patch from Stephen Gregoratto . OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 15501ed13c595f135e7610b1a5d8345ccdb513b7 --- ssh_config.5 | 8 +++----- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'ssh_config.5') diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 index 412629637..234ca7a9a 100644 --- a/ssh_config.5 +++ b/ssh_config.5 @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.292 2019/03/01 02:16:47 djm Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: March 1 2019 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.293 2019/05/14 12:47:17 schwarze Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: May 14 2019 $ .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -1326,9 +1326,7 @@ and .Sq 4G , depending on the cipher. The optional second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the -units documented in the -.Sx TIME FORMATS -section of +units documented in the TIME FORMATS section of .Xr sshd_config 5 . The default value for .Cm RekeyLimit -- cgit v1.2.3 From d1bbfdd932db9b9b799db865ee1ff50060dfc895 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "jmc@openbsd.org" Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2019 13:39:40 +0000 Subject: upstream: consistent lettering for "HostName" keyword; from lauri tirkkonen OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c267a1257ed7482b13ef550837b6496e657d563 --- ssh_config.5 | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'ssh_config.5') diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 index 234ca7a9a..9601ce46c 100644 --- a/ssh_config.5 +++ b/ssh_config.5 @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.293 2019/05/14 12:47:17 schwarze Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: May 14 2019 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.294 2019/06/11 13:39:40 jmc Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: June 11 2019 $ .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ The criteria for the .Cm host keyword are matched against the target hostname, after any substitution by the -.Cm Hostname +.Cm HostName or .Cm CanonicalizeHostname options. -- cgit v1.2.3 From 76af9c57387243556d38935555c227d0b34062c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "jmc@openbsd.org" Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 05:53:21 +0000 Subject: upstream: deraadt noticed some inconsistency in the way we denote the "Hostname" and "X11UseLocalhost" keywords; this makes things consistent (effectively reversing my commit of yesterday); ok deraadt markus djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 255c02adb29186ac91dcf47dfad7adb1b1e54667 --- ssh_config.5 | 14 +++++++------- sshd_config.5 | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) (limited to 'ssh_config.5') diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 index 9601ce46c..4e72d2ea9 100644 --- a/ssh_config.5 +++ b/ssh_config.5 @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.294 2019/06/11 13:39:40 jmc Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: June 11 2019 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.295 2019/06/12 05:53:21 jmc Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: June 12 2019 $ .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ The criteria for the .Cm host keyword are matched against the target hostname, after any substitution by the -.Cm HostName +.Cm Hostname or .Cm CanonicalizeHostname options. @@ -845,16 +845,16 @@ real host name when looking up or saving the host key in the host key database files and when validating host certificates. This option is useful for tunneling SSH connections or for multiple servers running on a single host. -.It Cm HostName +.It Cm Hostname Specifies the real host name to log into. This can be used to specify nicknames or abbreviations for hosts. Arguments to -.Cm HostName +.Cm Hostname accept the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. Numeric IP addresses are also permitted (both on the command line and in -.Cm HostName +.Cm Hostname specifications). The default is the name given on the command line. .It Cm IdentitiesOnly @@ -1785,7 +1785,7 @@ accepts the tokens %%, %d, %h, %i, %l, %r, and %u. .Cm ControlPath accepts the tokens %%, %C, %h, %i, %L, %l, %n, %p, %r, and %u. .Pp -.Cm HostName +.Cm Hostname accepts the tokens %% and %h. .Pp .Cm IdentityAgent diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 index 9f59584f2..fd83bcef1 100644 --- a/sshd_config.5 +++ b/sshd_config.5 @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.285 2019/05/14 12:47:17 schwarze Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: May 14 2019 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.286 2019/06/12 05:53:21 jmc Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: June 12 2019 $ .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -1155,7 +1155,7 @@ Available keywords are .Cm X11DisplayOffset , .Cm X11Forwarding and -.Cm X11UseLocalHost . +.Cm X11UseLocalhost . .It Cm MaxAuthTries Specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts permitted per connection. -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7349149da1074d82b71722338e05b6a282f126cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "jmc@openbsd.org" Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 11:31:50 +0000 Subject: upstream: Hostname->HostName cleanup; from lauri tirkkonen ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4ade73629ede63b691f36f9a929f943d4e7a44e4 --- clientloop.c | 4 ++-- readconf.c | 12 ++++++------ scp.1 | 6 +++--- sftp.1 | 6 +++--- ssh.1 | 6 +++--- ssh.c | 4 ++-- ssh_config.5 | 6 +++--- 7 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) (limited to 'ssh_config.5') diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c index 755f29231..244de9871 100644 --- a/clientloop.c +++ b/clientloop.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.323 2019/04/23 11:56:41 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.324 2019/06/12 11:31:50 jmc Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ extern int muxserver_sock; /* XXX use mux_client_cleanup() instead */ /* * Name of the host we are connecting to. This is the name given on the - * command line, or the HostName specified for the user-supplied name in a + * command line, or the Hostname specified for the user-supplied name in a * configuration file. */ extern char *host; diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c index c143fa2e2..ec30ab30a 100644 --- a/readconf.c +++ b/readconf.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.305 2019/06/07 14:18:48 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.306 2019/06/12 11:31:50 jmc Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ User foo Host fake.com - HostName another.host.name.real.org + Hostname another.host.name.real.org User blaah Port 34289 ForwardX11 no @@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ typedef enum { oGatewayPorts, oExitOnForwardFailure, oPasswordAuthentication, oRSAAuthentication, oChallengeResponseAuthentication, oXAuthLocation, - oIdentityFile, oHostName, oPort, oCipher, oRemoteForward, oLocalForward, + oIdentityFile, oHostname, oPort, oCipher, oRemoteForward, oLocalForward, oCertificateFile, oAddKeysToAgent, oIdentityAgent, oUser, oEscapeChar, oRhostsRSAAuthentication, oProxyCommand, oGlobalKnownHostsFile, oUserKnownHostsFile, oConnectionAttempts, @@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ static struct { { "certificatefile", oCertificateFile }, { "addkeystoagent", oAddKeysToAgent }, { "identityagent", oIdentityAgent }, - { "hostname", oHostName }, + { "hostname", oHostname }, { "hostkeyalias", oHostKeyAlias }, { "proxycommand", oProxyCommand }, { "port", oPort }, @@ -1117,7 +1117,7 @@ parse_char_array: max_entries = SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES; goto parse_char_array; - case oHostName: + case oHostname: charptr = &options->hostname; goto parse_string; @@ -2593,7 +2593,7 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host) /* Most interesting options first: user, host, port */ dump_cfg_string(oUser, o->user); - dump_cfg_string(oHostName, host); + dump_cfg_string(oHostname, host); dump_cfg_int(oPort, o->port); /* Flag options */ diff --git a/scp.1 b/scp.1 index a2833dab0..dee7fcead 100644 --- a/scp.1 +++ b/scp.1 @@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ .\" .\" Created: Sun May 7 00:14:37 1995 ylo .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.85 2019/01/26 22:41:28 djm Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.86 2019/06/12 11:31:50 jmc Exp $ .\" -.Dd $Mdocdate: January 26 2019 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: June 12 2019 $ .Dt SCP 1 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see .It HostbasedKeyTypes .It HostKeyAlgorithms .It HostKeyAlias -.It HostName +.It Hostname .It IdentitiesOnly .It IdentityAgent .It IdentityFile diff --git a/sftp.1 b/sftp.1 index 259095885..4554ae4f3 100644 --- a/sftp.1 +++ b/sftp.1 @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -.\" $OpenBSD: sftp.1,v 1.125 2019/01/22 06:58:31 jmc Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: sftp.1,v 1.126 2019/06/12 11:31:50 jmc Exp $ .\" .\" Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. .\" @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.Dd $Mdocdate: January 22 2019 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: June 12 2019 $ .Dt SFTP 1 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see .It HostbasedKeyTypes .It HostKeyAlgorithms .It HostKeyAlias -.It HostName +.It Hostname .It IdentitiesOnly .It IdentityAgent .It IdentityFile diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1 index 9480eba8d..424d6c3e8 100644 --- a/ssh.1 +++ b/ssh.1 @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.402 2019/03/16 19:14:21 jmc Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: March 16 2019 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.403 2019/06/12 11:31:50 jmc Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: June 12 2019 $ .Dt SSH 1 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see .It HostbasedKeyTypes .It HostKeyAlgorithms .It HostKeyAlias -.It HostName +.It Hostname .It IdentitiesOnly .It IdentityAgent .It IdentityFile diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c index d8d614111..a9903b6f9 100644 --- a/ssh.c +++ b/ssh.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.502 2019/06/06 05:13:13 otto Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.503 2019/06/12 11:31:50 jmc Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ char *config = NULL; /* * Name of the host we are connecting to. This is the name given on the - * command line, or the HostName specified for the user-supplied name in a + * command line, or the Hostname specified for the user-supplied name in a * configuration file. */ char *host; diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 index 4e72d2ea9..806676bba 100644 --- a/ssh_config.5 +++ b/ssh_config.5 @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.295 2019/06/12 05:53:21 jmc Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.296 2019/06/12 11:31:50 jmc Exp $ .Dd $Mdocdate: June 12 2019 $ .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5 .Os @@ -1222,8 +1222,8 @@ server running on some machine, or execute .Ic sshd -i somewhere. Host key management will be done using the -HostName of the host being connected (defaulting to the name typed by -the user). +.Cm Hostname +of the host being connected (defaulting to the name typed by the user). Setting the command to .Cm none disables this option entirely. -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6e76e69dc0c7712e9ac599af34bd091b0e7dcdb5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "djm@openbsd.org" Date: Fri, 2 Aug 2019 01:23:19 +0000 Subject: upstream: typo; from Christian Hesse OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 82f6de7438ea7ee5a14f44fdf5058ed57688fdc3 --- ssh_config.5 | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'ssh_config.5') diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 index 806676bba..03321432f 100644 --- a/ssh_config.5 +++ b/ssh_config.5 @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.296 2019/06/12 11:31:50 jmc Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: June 12 2019 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.297 2019/08/02 01:23:19 djm Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: August 2 2019 $ .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates by certificate authorities (CAs). The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256.ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, +ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa .Ed .Pp -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8fdbc7247f432578abaaca1b72a0dbf5058d67e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "dtucker@openbsd.org" Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2019 04:24:03 +0000 Subject: upstream: Change description of TCPKeepAlive from "inactive" to "unresponsive" to clarify what it checks for. Patch from jblaine at kickflop.net via github pr#129, ok djm@. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3682f8ec7227f5697945daa25d11ce2d933899e9 --- ssh_config.5 | 6 +++--- sshd_config.5 | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'ssh_config.5') diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 index 03321432f..53cb5abfe 100644 --- a/ssh_config.5 +++ b/ssh_config.5 @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.297 2019/08/02 01:23:19 djm Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: August 2 2019 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.298 2019/08/09 04:24:03 dtucker Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: August 9 2019 $ .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -1460,7 +1460,7 @@ The TCP keepalive option enabled by .Cm TCPKeepAlive is spoofable. The server alive mechanism is valuable when the client or -server depend on knowing when a connection has become inactive. +server depend on knowing when a connection has become unresponsive. .Pp The default value is 3. If, for example, diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 index 9b155f6c1..e6ae87145 100644 --- a/sshd_config.5 +++ b/sshd_config.5 @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.287 2019/07/23 23:06:57 dtucker Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: July 23 2019 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.288 2019/08/09 04:24:03 dtucker Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: August 9 2019 $ .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ The TCP keepalive option enabled by .Cm TCPKeepAlive is spoofable. The client alive mechanism is valuable when the client or -server depend on knowing when a connection has become inactive. +server depend on knowing when a connection has become unresponsive. .Pp The default value is 3. If -- cgit v1.2.3 From dc2ca588144f088a54febebfde3414568dc73d5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "kn@openbsd.org" Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2019 11:16:32 +0000 Subject: upstream: Call comma-separated lists as such to clarify semantics Options such as Ciphers take values that may be a list of ciphers; the complete list, not indiviual elements, may be prefixed with a dash or plus character to remove from or append to the default list respectively. Users might read the current text as if each elment took an optional prefix, so tweak the wording from "values" to "list" to prevent such ambiguity for all options supporting this semantics (those that provide a list of available elements via "ssh -Q ..."). Input and OK jmc OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4fdd175b0e5f5cb10ab3f26ccc38a93bb6515d57 --- ssh_config.5 | 20 ++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) (limited to 'ssh_config.5') diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 index 53cb5abfe..14d57d77d 100644 --- a/ssh_config.5 +++ b/ssh_config.5 @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.298 2019/08/09 04:24:03 dtucker Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: August 9 2019 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.299 2019/08/16 11:16:32 kn Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: August 16 2019 $ .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -422,11 +422,11 @@ the check will not be executed. .It Cm Ciphers Specifies the ciphers allowed and their order of preference. Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. -If the specified value begins with a +If the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. -If the specified value begins with a +If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. @@ -1043,11 +1043,11 @@ and .It Cm KexAlgorithms Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. -Alternately if the specified value begins with a +If the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. -If the specified value begins with a +If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. @@ -1124,11 +1124,11 @@ Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms in order of preference. The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. -If the specified value begins with a +If the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. -If the specified value begins with a +If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. @@ -1281,11 +1281,11 @@ The default is .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes Specifies the key types that will be used for public key authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns. -Alternately if the specified value begins with a +If the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the key types after it will be appended to the default instead of replacing it. -If the specified value begins with a +If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4f9d75fbafde83d428e291516f8ce98e6b3a7c4b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "naddy@openbsd.org" Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2019 20:31:15 +0000 Subject: upstream: Call comma-separated lists as such to clarify semantics. Options such as Ciphers take values that may be a list of ciphers; the complete list, not indiviual elements, may be prefixed with a dash or plus character to remove from or append to the default list, respectively. Users might read the current text as if each elment took an optional prefix, so tweak the wording from "values" to "list" to prevent such ambiguity for all options supporting these semantics. Fix instances missed in first commit. ok jmc@ kn@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7112522430a54fb9f15a7a26d26190ed84d5e417 --- ssh_config.5 | 12 ++++++------ sshd_config.5 | 24 ++++++++++++------------ 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) (limited to 'ssh_config.5') diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 index 14d57d77d..14d96beaf 100644 --- a/ssh_config.5 +++ b/ssh_config.5 @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.299 2019/08/16 11:16:32 kn Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: August 16 2019 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.300 2019/09/04 20:31:15 naddy Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: September 4 2019 $ .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -786,11 +786,11 @@ or .It Cm HostbasedKeyTypes Specifies the key types that will be used for hostbased authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns. -Alternately if the specified value begins with a +Alternately if the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. -If the specified value begins with a +If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. @@ -814,11 +814,11 @@ may be used to list supported key types. .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms Specifies the host key algorithms that the client wants to use in order of preference. -Alternately if the specified value begins with a +Alternately if the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. -If the specified value begins with a +If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 index e6ae87145..f42d10417 100644 --- a/sshd_config.5 +++ b/sshd_config.5 @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.288 2019/08/09 04:24:03 dtucker Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: August 9 2019 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.289 2019/09/04 20:31:15 naddy Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: September 4 2019 $ .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -454,11 +454,11 @@ indicating not to .It Cm Ciphers Specifies the ciphers allowed. Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. -If the specified value begins with a +If the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. -If the specified value begins with a +If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. @@ -668,11 +668,11 @@ The default is .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns. -Alternately if the specified value begins with a +Alternately if the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. -If the specified value begins with a +If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. @@ -873,11 +873,11 @@ The default is .It Cm KexAlgorithms Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. -Alternately if the specified value begins with a +Alternately if the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. -If the specified value begins with a +If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. @@ -990,11 +990,11 @@ Logging with a DEBUG level violates the privacy of users and is not recommended. Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms. The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. -If the specified value begins with a +If the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. -If the specified value begins with a +If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. @@ -1395,11 +1395,11 @@ The default is .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes Specifies the key types that will be accepted for public key authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns. -Alternately if the specified value begins with a +Alternately if the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. -If the specified value begins with a +If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. -- cgit v1.2.3 From 91a2135f32acdd6378476c5bae475a6e7811a6a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "naddy@openbsd.org" Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2019 14:45:34 +0000 Subject: upstream: Allow prepending a list of algorithms to the default set by starting the list with the '^' character, e.g. HostKeyAlgorithms ^ssh-ed25519 Ciphers ^aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com ok djm@ dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1e1996fac0dc8a4b0d0ff58395135848287f6f97 --- kex.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- readconf.c | 14 +++++++++----- servconf.c | 14 +++++++++----- ssh.c | 4 ++-- ssh_config.5 | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- sshd_config.5 | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- 6 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) (limited to 'ssh_config.5') diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c index 84f8e2aa9..5a8a03aad 100644 --- a/kex.c +++ b/kex.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.153 2019/09/06 01:58:50 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.154 2019/09/06 14:45:34 naddy Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -213,8 +213,9 @@ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b) /* * Assemble a list of algorithms from a default list and a string from a * configuration file. The user-provided string may begin with '+' to - * indicate that it should be appended to the default or '-' that the - * specified names should be removed. + * indicate that it should be appended to the default, '-' that the + * specified names should be removed, or '^' that they should be placed + * at the head. */ int kex_assemble_names(char **listp, const char *def, const char *all) @@ -251,6 +252,14 @@ kex_assemble_names(char **listp, const char *def, const char *all) free(list); /* filtering has already been done */ return 0; + } else if (*list == '^') { + /* Place names at head of default list */ + if ((tmp = kex_names_cat(list + 1, def)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto fail; + } + free(list); + list = tmp; } else { /* Explicit list, overrides default - just use "list" as is */ } diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c index d1b7871ec..f78b4d6fe 100644 --- a/readconf.c +++ b/readconf.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.308 2019/08/09 05:05:54 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.309 2019/09/06 14:45:34 naddy Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -1199,7 +1199,8 @@ parse_int: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); - if (*arg != '-' && !ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) + if (*arg != '-' && + !ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg)) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && options->ciphers == NULL) @@ -1210,7 +1211,8 @@ parse_int: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); - if (*arg != '-' && !mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) + if (*arg != '-' && + !mac_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg)) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 MAC spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && options->macs == NULL) @@ -1223,7 +1225,8 @@ parse_int: fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (*arg != '-' && - !kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) + !kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? + arg + 1 : arg)) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && options->kex_algorithms == NULL) @@ -1238,7 +1241,8 @@ parse_keytypes: fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (*arg != '-' && - !sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1)) + !sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? + arg + 1 : arg, 1)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c index 340045b28..e76f9c39e 100644 --- a/servconf.c +++ b/servconf.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.351 2019/04/18 18:56:16 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.352 2019/09/06 14:45:34 naddy Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved @@ -1444,7 +1444,8 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (*arg != '-' && - !sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1)) + !sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? + arg + 1 : arg, 1)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) @@ -1715,7 +1716,8 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); - if (*arg != '-' && !ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) + if (*arg != '-' && + !ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (options->ciphers == NULL) @@ -1726,7 +1728,8 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); - if (*arg != '-' && !mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) + if (*arg != '-' && + !mac_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 mac spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (options->macs == NULL) @@ -1739,7 +1742,8 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (*arg != '-' && - !kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) + !kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? + arg + 1 : arg)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (options->kex_algorithms == NULL) diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c index 654376981..cb321bcf3 100644 --- a/ssh.c +++ b/ssh.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.505 2019/06/28 13:35:04 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.506 2019/09/06 14:45:34 naddy Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -877,7 +877,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) } break; case 'c': - if (!ciphers_valid(*optarg == '+' ? + if (!ciphers_valid(*optarg == '+' || *optarg == '^' ? optarg + 1 : optarg)) { fprintf(stderr, "Unknown cipher type '%s'\n", optarg); diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 index 14d96beaf..e114b1dfe 100644 --- a/ssh_config.5 +++ b/ssh_config.5 @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.300 2019/09/04 20:31:15 naddy Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: September 4 2019 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.301 2019/09/06 14:45:34 naddy Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: September 6 2019 $ .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -430,6 +430,10 @@ If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. +If the specified list begins with a +.Sq ^ +character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the +default set. .Pp The supported ciphers are: .Bd -literal -offset indent @@ -794,6 +798,10 @@ If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. +If the specified list begins with a +.Sq ^ +character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the +default set. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, @@ -822,6 +830,10 @@ If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. +If the specified list begins with a +.Sq ^ +character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the +default set. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, @@ -1051,6 +1063,10 @@ If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. +If the specified list begins with a +.Sq ^ +character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the +default set. The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, @@ -1132,6 +1148,10 @@ If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. +If the specified list begins with a +.Sq ^ +character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the +default set. .Pp The algorithms that contain .Qq -etm @@ -1289,6 +1309,10 @@ If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. +If the specified list begins with a +.Sq ^ +character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the +default set. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 index f42d10417..9486f2a1c 100644 --- a/sshd_config.5 +++ b/sshd_config.5 @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.289 2019/09/04 20:31:15 naddy Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: September 4 2019 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.290 2019/09/06 14:45:34 naddy Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: September 6 2019 $ .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -462,6 +462,10 @@ If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. +If the specified list begins with a +.Sq ^ +character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the +default set. .Pp The supported ciphers are: .Pp @@ -676,6 +680,10 @@ If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. +If the specified list begins with a +.Sq ^ +character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the +default set. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, @@ -881,6 +889,10 @@ If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. +If the specified list begins with a +.Sq ^ +character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the +default set. The supported algorithms are: .Pp .Bl -item -compact -offset indent @@ -998,6 +1010,10 @@ If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. +If the specified list begins with a +.Sq ^ +character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the +default set. .Pp The algorithms that contain .Qq -etm @@ -1403,6 +1419,10 @@ If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. +If the specified list begins with a +.Sq ^ +character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the +default set. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2ce1d11600e13bee0667d6b717ffcc18a057b821 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "djm@openbsd.org" Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2019 04:07:42 +0000 Subject: upstream: clarify that ConnectTimeout applies both to the TCP connection and to the protocol handshake/KEX. From Jean-Charles Longuet via Github PR140 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ce1766abc6da080f0d88c09c2c5585a32b2256bf --- ssh_config.5 | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'ssh_config.5') diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 index e114b1dfe..b10c55492 100644 --- a/ssh_config.5 +++ b/ssh_config.5 @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.301 2019/09/06 14:45:34 naddy Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: September 6 2019 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.302 2019/09/13 04:07:42 djm Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: September 13 2019 $ .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -489,8 +489,8 @@ The default is 1. .It Cm ConnectTimeout Specifies the timeout (in seconds) used when connecting to the SSH server, instead of using the default system TCP timeout. -This value is used only when the target is down or really unreachable, -not when it refuses the connection. +This timeout is applied both to establishing the connection and to performing +the initial SSH protocol handshake and key exchange. .It Cm ControlMaster Enables the sharing of multiple sessions over a single network connection. When set to -- cgit v1.2.3 From fbe24b142915331ceb2a3a76be3dc5b6d204fddf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "djm@openbsd.org" Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2019 04:27:35 +0000 Subject: upstream: allow %n to be expanded in ProxyCommand strings From Zachary Harmany via github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/118 ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7eebf1b7695f50c66d42053d352a4db9e8fb84b6 --- ssh.c | 4 ++-- ssh_config.5 | 4 ++-- sshconnect.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------- sshconnect.h | 7 ++++--- 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) (limited to 'ssh_config.5') diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c index cb321bcf3..ee51823cd 100644 --- a/ssh.c +++ b/ssh.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.506 2019/09/06 14:45:34 naddy Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.507 2019/09/13 04:27:35 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -1369,7 +1369,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000; /* Open a connection to the remote host. */ - if (ssh_connect(ssh, host, addrs, &hostaddr, options.port, + if (ssh_connect(ssh, host_arg, host, addrs, &hostaddr, options.port, options.address_family, options.connection_attempts, &timeout_ms, options.tcp_keep_alive) != 0) exit(255); diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 index b10c55492..867c916a7 100644 --- a/ssh_config.5 +++ b/ssh_config.5 @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.302 2019/09/13 04:07:42 djm Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.303 2019/09/13 04:27:35 djm Exp $ .Dd $Mdocdate: September 13 2019 $ .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5 .Os @@ -1821,7 +1821,7 @@ accept the tokens %%, %d, %h, %i, %l, %r, and %u. accepts the tokens %%, %C, %d, %h, %i, %l, %n, %p, %r, %T, and %u. .Pp .Cm ProxyCommand -accepts the tokens %%, %h, %p, and %r. +accepts the tokens %%, %h, %n, %p, and %r. .Pp .Cm RemoteCommand accepts the tokens %%, %C, %d, %h, %i, %l, %n, %p, %r, and %u. diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c index ed44fccb8..740780443 100644 --- a/sshconnect.c +++ b/sshconnect.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.317 2019/06/28 13:35:04 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.318 2019/09/13 04:27:35 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -87,14 +87,18 @@ static void warn_changed_key(struct sshkey *); /* Expand a proxy command */ static char * expand_proxy_command(const char *proxy_command, const char *user, - const char *host, int port) + const char *host, const char *host_arg, int port) { char *tmp, *ret, strport[NI_MAXSERV]; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); xasprintf(&tmp, "exec %s", proxy_command); - ret = percent_expand(tmp, "h", host, "p", strport, - "r", options.user, (char *)NULL); + ret = percent_expand(tmp, + "h", host, + "n", host_arg, + "p", strport, + "r", options.user, + (char *)NULL); free(tmp); return ret; } @@ -122,8 +126,8 @@ stderr_null(void) * a connected fd back to us. */ static int -ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, u_short port, - const char *proxy_command) +ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, + const char *host_arg, u_short port, const char *proxy_command) { char *command_string; int sp[2], sock; @@ -138,7 +142,7 @@ ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, u_short port, "proxy dialer: %.100s", strerror(errno)); command_string = expand_proxy_command(proxy_command, options.user, - host, port); + host_arg, host, port); debug("Executing proxy dialer command: %.500s", command_string); /* Fork and execute the proxy command. */ @@ -204,8 +208,8 @@ ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, u_short port, * Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command. */ static int -ssh_proxy_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, u_short port, - const char *proxy_command) +ssh_proxy_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, const char *host_arg, + u_short port, const char *proxy_command) { char *command_string; int pin[2], pout[2]; @@ -221,7 +225,7 @@ ssh_proxy_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, u_short port, strerror(errno)); command_string = expand_proxy_command(proxy_command, options.user, - host, port); + host_arg, host, port); debug("Executing proxy command: %.500s", command_string); /* Fork and execute the proxy command. */ @@ -543,9 +547,9 @@ ssh_connect_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, struct addrinfo *aitop, } int -ssh_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, struct addrinfo *addrs, - struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, int family, - int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive) +ssh_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, const char *host_arg, + struct addrinfo *addrs, struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, + int family, int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive) { int in, out; @@ -564,10 +568,11 @@ ssh_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, struct addrinfo *addrs, return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */ return 0; } else if (options.proxy_use_fdpass) { - return ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(ssh, host, port, + return ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(ssh, host, host_arg, port, options.proxy_command); } - return ssh_proxy_connect(ssh, host, port, options.proxy_command); + return ssh_proxy_connect(ssh, host, host_arg, port, + options.proxy_command); } /* defaults to 'no' */ diff --git a/sshconnect.h b/sshconnect.h index b455d7c20..2e84b8bc5 100644 --- a/sshconnect.h +++ b/sshconnect.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.h,v 1.38 2019/06/21 04:21:05 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.h,v 1.39 2019/09/13 04:27:35 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -33,8 +33,9 @@ struct Sensitive { struct addrinfo; struct ssh; -int ssh_connect(struct ssh *, const char *, struct addrinfo *, - struct sockaddr_storage *, u_short, int, int, int *, int); +int ssh_connect(struct ssh *, const char *, const char *, + struct addrinfo *, struct sockaddr_storage *, u_short, + int, int, int *, int); void ssh_kill_proxy_command(void); void ssh_login(struct ssh *, Sensitive *, const char *, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7047d5afe3103f0f07966c05b810682d92add359 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "djm@openbsd.org" Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2019 04:52:34 +0000 Subject: upstream: clarify that IdentitiesOnly also applies to the default ~/.ssh/id_* keys; bz#3062 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 604be570e04646f0f4a17026f8b2aada6a585dfa --- ssh_config.5 | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'ssh_config.5') diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 index 867c916a7..02a87892d 100644 --- a/ssh_config.5 +++ b/ssh_config.5 @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.303 2019/09/13 04:27:35 djm Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.304 2019/09/13 04:52:34 djm Exp $ .Dd $Mdocdate: September 13 2019 $ .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5 .Os @@ -872,13 +872,13 @@ The default is the name given on the command line. .It Cm IdentitiesOnly Specifies that .Xr ssh 1 -should only use the authentication identity and certificate files explicitly -configured in the +should only use the configured authentication identity and certificate files +(either the default files, or those explicitly configured in the .Nm files or passed on the .Xr ssh 1 -command-line, +command-line), even if .Xr ssh-agent 1 or a -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9da806e67101afdc0d3a1d304659927acf18f5c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Simon Wilkinson Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:48 +0000 Subject: GSSAPI key exchange support This patch has been rejected upstream: "None of the OpenSSH developers are in favour of adding this, and this situation has not changed for several years. This is not a slight on Simon's patch, which is of fine quality, but just that a) we don't trust GSSAPI implementations that much and b) we don't like adding new KEX since they are pre-auth attack surface. This one is particularly scary, since it requires hooks out to typically root-owned system resources." However, quite a lot of people rely on this in Debian, and it's better to have it merged into the main openssh package rather than having separate -krb5 packages (as we used to have). It seems to have a generally good security history. Origin: other, https://github.com/openssh-gsskex/openssh-gsskex/commits/debian/master Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1242 Last-Updated: 2019-10-09 Patch-Name: gssapi.patch --- Makefile.in | 3 +- auth-krb5.c | 17 +- auth.c | 96 +-------- auth2-gss.c | 56 +++++- auth2.c | 2 + canohost.c | 93 +++++++++ canohost.h | 3 + clientloop.c | 15 +- configure.ac | 24 +++ gss-genr.c | 300 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++- gss-serv-krb5.c | 85 +++++++- gss-serv.c | 186 +++++++++++++++-- hmac.c | 1 + kex.c | 66 +++++- kex.h | 29 +++ kexdh.c | 10 + kexgen.c | 2 +- kexgssc.c | 606 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kexgsss.c | 474 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ mac.c | 1 + monitor.c | 139 ++++++++++++- monitor.h | 2 + monitor_wrap.c | 57 +++++- monitor_wrap.h | 4 +- readconf.c | 70 +++++++ readconf.h | 6 + servconf.c | 47 +++++ servconf.h | 3 + session.c | 10 +- ssh-gss.h | 50 ++++- ssh.1 | 8 + ssh.c | 4 +- ssh_config | 2 + ssh_config.5 | 57 ++++++ sshconnect2.c | 140 ++++++++++++- sshd.c | 120 ++++++++++- sshd_config | 2 + sshd_config.5 | 30 +++ sshkey.c | 3 +- sshkey.h | 1 + 40 files changed, 2664 insertions(+), 160 deletions(-) create mode 100644 kexgssc.c create mode 100644 kexgsss.c (limited to 'ssh_config.5') diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in index adb1977e2..ab29e4f05 100644 --- a/Makefile.in +++ b/Makefile.in @@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \ kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \ kexgexc.o kexgexs.o \ sntrup4591761.o kexsntrup4591761x25519.o kexgen.o \ + kexgssc.o \ platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o @@ -114,7 +115,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \ auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \ auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \ monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \ - auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \ + auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \ loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-realpath.o \ sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \ diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c index 3096f1c8e..204752e1b 100644 --- a/auth-krb5.c +++ b/auth-krb5.c @@ -182,8 +182,13 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6; authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len); +#ifdef USE_CCAPI + snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s", + authctxt->krb5_ticket_file); +#else snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s", authctxt->krb5_ticket_file); +#endif #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) @@ -240,15 +245,22 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt) #ifndef HEIMDAL krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) { - int tmpfd, ret, oerrno; + int ret, oerrno; char ccname[40]; mode_t old_umask; +#ifdef USE_CCAPI + char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d"; +#else + char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX"; + int tmpfd; +#endif ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname), - "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid()); + cctemplate, geteuid()); if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname)) return ENOMEM; +#ifndef USE_CCAPI old_umask = umask(0177); tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:")); oerrno = errno; @@ -265,6 +277,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) { return oerrno; } close(tmpfd); +#endif return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache)); } diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c index ca450f4e4..47c27773c 100644 --- a/auth.c +++ b/auth.c @@ -399,7 +399,8 @@ auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method) case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD: if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 || strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 || - strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0) + strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0 || + strcmp(method, "gssapi-keyex") == 0) return 1; break; case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY: @@ -723,99 +724,6 @@ fakepw(void) return (&fake); } -/* - * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not - * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is - * called. - * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some - * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication. - * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these? - * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?) - */ - -static char * -remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh) -{ - struct sockaddr_storage from; - socklen_t fromlen; - struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; - char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST]; - const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); - - /* Get IP address of client. */ - fromlen = sizeof(from); - memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); - if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), - (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) { - debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); - return strdup(ntop); - } - - ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen); - if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) - fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); - - debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop); - /* Map the IP address to a host name. */ - if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name), - NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) { - /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */ - return strdup(ntop); - } - - /* - * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname, - * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following: - * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5 - */ - memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); - hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/ - hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; - if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) { - logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring", - name, ntop); - freeaddrinfo(ai); - return strdup(ntop); - } - - /* Names are stored in lowercase. */ - lowercase(name); - - /* - * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given - * address actually is an address of this host. This is - * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can - * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from - * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be - * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of - * the domain). - */ - memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); - hints.ai_family = from.ss_family; - hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; - if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) { - logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s " - "[%s] failed.", name, ntop); - return strdup(ntop); - } - /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */ - for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { - if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2, - sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 && - (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0)) - break; - } - freeaddrinfo(aitop); - /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */ - if (ai == NULL) { - /* Address not found for the host name. */ - logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not " - "map back to the address.", ntop, name); - return strdup(ntop); - } - return strdup(name); -} - /* * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c index 9351e0428..d6446c0cf 100644 --- a/auth2-gss.c +++ b/auth2-gss.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.29 2018/07/31 03:10:27 djm Exp $ */ /* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions @@ -54,6 +54,48 @@ static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh); static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh); static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +/* + * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism. + */ +static int +userauth_gsskeyex(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + int r, authenticated = 0; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf; + u_char *p; + size_t len; + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + + mic.value = p; + mic.length = len; + + ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service, + "gssapi-keyex"); + + if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed", __func__); + gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b); + + /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */ + if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context, + &gssbuf, &mic)))) + authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, + authctxt->pw, 1)); + + sshbuf_free(b); + free(mic.value); + + return (authenticated); +} + /* * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know * how to check local user kuserok and the like) @@ -260,7 +302,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user)); + authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, + authctxt->pw, 1)); if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) && (displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL) @@ -306,7 +349,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b); if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic)))) - authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user)); + authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, + authctxt->pw, 0)); else logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed"); @@ -326,6 +370,12 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) return 0; } +Authmethod method_gsskeyex = { + "gssapi-keyex", + userauth_gsskeyex, + &options.gss_authentication +}; + Authmethod method_gssapi = { "gssapi-with-mic", userauth_gssapi, diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c index 0e7762242..1c217268c 100644 --- a/auth2.c +++ b/auth2.c @@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd; extern Authmethod method_kbdint; extern Authmethod method_hostbased; #ifdef GSSAPI +extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex; extern Authmethod method_gssapi; #endif @@ -80,6 +81,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = { &method_none, &method_pubkey, #ifdef GSSAPI + &method_gsskeyex, &method_gssapi, #endif &method_passwd, diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c index abea9c6e6..9a00fc2cf 100644 --- a/canohost.c +++ b/canohost.c @@ -35,6 +35,99 @@ #include "canohost.h" #include "misc.h" +/* + * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not + * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is + * called. + * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some + * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication. + * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these? + * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?) + */ + +char * +remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct sockaddr_storage from; + socklen_t fromlen; + struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; + char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST]; + const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); + + /* Get IP address of client. */ + fromlen = sizeof(from); + memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); + if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), + (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) { + debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + return strdup(ntop); + } + + ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen); + if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) + fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); + + debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop); + /* Map the IP address to a host name. */ + if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name), + NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) { + /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */ + return strdup(ntop); + } + + /* + * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname, + * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following: + * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5 + */ + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/ + hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; + if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) { + logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring", + name, ntop); + freeaddrinfo(ai); + return strdup(ntop); + } + + /* Names are stored in lowercase. */ + lowercase(name); + + /* + * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given + * address actually is an address of this host. This is + * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can + * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from + * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be + * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of + * the domain). + */ + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = from.ss_family; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) { + logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s " + "[%s] failed.", name, ntop); + return strdup(ntop); + } + /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */ + for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { + if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2, + sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 && + (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0)) + break; + } + freeaddrinfo(aitop); + /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */ + if (ai == NULL) { + /* Address not found for the host name. */ + logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not " + "map back to the address.", ntop, name); + return strdup(ntop); + } + return strdup(name); +} + void ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *addr, socklen_t *len) { diff --git a/canohost.h b/canohost.h index 26d62855a..0cadc9f18 100644 --- a/canohost.h +++ b/canohost.h @@ -15,6 +15,9 @@ #ifndef _CANOHOST_H #define _CANOHOST_H +struct ssh; + +char *remote_hostname(struct ssh *); char *get_peer_ipaddr(int); int get_peer_port(int); char *get_local_ipaddr(int); diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c index b5a1f7038..9def2a1a9 100644 --- a/clientloop.c +++ b/clientloop.c @@ -112,6 +112,10 @@ #include "ssherr.h" #include "hostfile.h" +#ifdef GSSAPI +#include "ssh-gss.h" +#endif + /* import options */ extern Options options; @@ -1373,9 +1377,18 @@ client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, break; /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */ - if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) + if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) { channel_after_select(ssh, readset, writeset); +#ifdef GSSAPI + if (options.gss_renewal_rekey && + ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(NULL)) { + debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey"); + need_rekeying = 1; + } +#endif + } + /* Buffer input from the connection. */ client_process_net_input(ssh, readset); diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac index 3e93c0276..1c2512314 100644 --- a/configure.ac +++ b/configure.ac @@ -666,6 +666,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16)) [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1], [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic]) + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have the Security Authorization Session API]) + AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include ], + [SessionCreate(0, 0);], + [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes" + AC_DEFINE([USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API], [1], + [platform has the Security Authorization Session API]) + LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security" + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], + [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no" + AC_MSG_RESULT([no])]) + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have an in-memory credentials cache]) + AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [#include ], + [cc_context_t c; + (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);], + [AC_DEFINE([USE_CCAPI], [1], + [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache]) + LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security" + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***]) + fi], + [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])] + ) m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv]) AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [], AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records]) diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c index d56257b4a..763a63ffa 100644 --- a/gss-genr.c +++ b/gss-genr.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.26 2018/07/10 09:13:30 djm Exp $ */ /* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions @@ -41,12 +41,36 @@ #include "sshbuf.h" #include "log.h" #include "ssh2.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "digest.h" +#include "packet.h" #include "ssh-gss.h" extern u_char *session_id2; extern u_int session_id2_len; +typedef struct { + char *encoded; + gss_OID oid; +} ssh_gss_kex_mapping; + +/* + * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the + * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines + */ + +Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL; + +static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL; + +int +ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void) { + return (gss_enc2oid != NULL); +} + /* sshbuf_get for gss_buffer_desc */ int ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g) @@ -62,6 +86,162 @@ ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g) return 0; } +/* sshpkt_get of gss_buffer_desc */ +int +ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(struct ssh *ssh, gss_buffer_desc *g) +{ + int r; + u_char *p; + size_t len; + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0) + return r; + g->value = p; + g->length = len; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program + * + * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting + * a key exchange with a bad mechanism + */ + +char * +ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client, + const char *kex) { + gss_OID_set gss_supported = NULL; + OM_uint32 min_status; + + if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported))) + return NULL; + + return ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism, + host, client, kex); +} + +char * +ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check, + const char *host, const char *client, const char *kex) { + struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; + size_t i; + int r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + int oidpos, enclen; + char *mechs, *encoded; + u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; + char deroid[2]; + struct ssh_digest_ctx *md = NULL; + char *s, *cp, *p; + + if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) { + for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++) + free(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded); + free(gss_enc2oid); + } + + gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) * + (gss_supported->count + 1)); + + if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + + oidpos = 0; + s = cp = xstrdup(kex); + for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) { + if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 && + (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) { + + deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE; + deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length; + + if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL || + (r = ssh_digest_update(md, deroid, 2)) != 0 || + (r = ssh_digest_update(md, + gss_supported->elements[i].elements, + gss_supported->elements[i].length)) != 0 || + (r = ssh_digest_final(md, digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) + fatal("%s: digest failed: %s", __func__, + ssh_err(r)); + ssh_digest_free(md); + md = NULL; + + encoded = xmalloc(ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5) + * 2); + enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, + ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5), encoded, + ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5) * 2); + + cp = strncpy(s, kex, strlen(kex)); + for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; + (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { + if (sshbuf_len(buf) != 0 && + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ',')) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u8 error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, p, strlen(p))) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put(buf, encoded, enclen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_put error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + + gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]); + gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded; + oidpos++; + } + } + free(s); + gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL; + gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL; + + if ((mechs = sshbuf_dup_string(buf)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__); + + sshbuf_free(buf); + + if (strlen(mechs) == 0) { + free(mechs); + mechs = NULL; + } + + return (mechs); +} + +gss_OID +ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) { + int i = 0; + +#define SKIP_KEX_NAME(type) \ + case type: \ + if (strlen(name) < sizeof(type##_ID)) \ + return GSS_C_NO_OID; \ + name += sizeof(type##_ID) - 1; \ + break; + + switch (kex_type) { + SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1) + SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1) + SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256) + SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512) + SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1) + SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256) + SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256) + default: + return GSS_C_NO_OID; + } + +#undef SKIP_KEX_NAME + + while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL && + strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0) + i++; + + if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL) + ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid); + + return gss_enc2oid[i].oid; +} + /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */ int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len) @@ -218,7 +398,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int deleg_creds, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok, } ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor, - GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid, + ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid, GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag, 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL); @@ -247,9 +427,43 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host) return (ctx->major); } +OM_uint32 +ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name) +{ + gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; + gss_name_t gssname; + OM_uint32 status; + gss_OID_set oidset; + + gssbuf.value = (void *) name; + gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value); + + gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); + gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); + + ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf, + GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname); + + if (!ctx->major) + ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, + gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE, + &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL); + + gss_release_name(&status, &gssname); + gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); + + if (ctx->major) + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); + + return(ctx->major); +} + OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash) { + if (ctx == NULL) + return -1; + if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash))) ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); @@ -257,6 +471,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash) return (ctx->major); } +/* Priviledged when used by server */ +OM_uint32 +ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) + return -1; + + ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, + gssbuf, gssmic, NULL); + + return (ctx->major); +} + void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, const char *user, const char *service, const char *context) @@ -273,11 +500,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, const char *user, const char *service, } int -ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host) +ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host, + const char *client) { gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; OM_uint32 major, minor; gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"}; + Gssctxt *intctx = NULL; + + if (ctx == NULL) + ctx = &intctx; /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */ if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length && @@ -287,6 +519,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host) ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx); ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid); major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host); + + if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client) + major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client); + if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) { major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, NULL); @@ -296,10 +532,66 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host) GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); } - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL) ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx); return (!GSS_ERROR(major)); } +int +ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) { + static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; + static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0; + static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID; + static gss_name_t name; + static OM_uint32 last_call = 0; + OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor; + int equal; + + now = time(NULL); + + if (ctxt) { + debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions"); + + if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) + gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name); + + major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, + &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL); + + if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) { + saved_mech = ctxt->oid; + saved_lifetime+= now; + } else { + /* Handle the error */ + } + return 0; + } + + if (now - last_call < 10) + return 0; + + last_call = now; + + if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID) + return 0; + + major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, + &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL); + if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED) + return 0; + else if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + return 0; + + major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal); + gss_release_name(&minor, &name); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + return 0; + + if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10)) + return 1; + + return 0; +} + #endif /* GSSAPI */ diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c index a151bc1e4..ef9beb67c 100644 --- a/gss-serv-krb5.c +++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.9 2018/07/09 21:37:55 markus Exp $ */ /* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions @@ -120,8 +120,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client) krb5_error_code problem; krb5_principal princ; OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; - int len; const char *errmsg; + const char *new_ccname; if (client->creds == NULL) { debug("No credentials stored"); @@ -180,11 +180,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client) return; } - client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache)); + new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache); + client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME"; - len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6; - client->store.envval = xmalloc(len); - snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename); +#ifdef USE_CCAPI + xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname); + client->store.filename = NULL; +#else + xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "FILE:%s", new_ccname); + client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname); +#endif #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) @@ -196,6 +201,71 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client) return; } +int +ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store, + ssh_gssapi_client *client) +{ + krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; + krb5_principal principal = NULL; + char *name = NULL; + krb5_error_code problem; + OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; + + if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) { + logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", + krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); + return 0; + } + + /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */ + if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache, + &principal))) { + logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s", + krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); + krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); + return 0; + } + + if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) { + logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s", + krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); + krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); + krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); + return 0; + } + + + if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) { + debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing"); + krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); + krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); + krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name); + return 0; + } + krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name); + + /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */ + + if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) { + logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s", + krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); + krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); + krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); + return 0; + } + + krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); + + if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds, + ccache))) { + logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!"); + krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = { "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==", "Kerberos", @@ -203,7 +273,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = { NULL, &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok, NULL, - &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds + &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds, + &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds }; #endif /* KRB5 */ diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c index ab3a15f0f..1d47870e7 100644 --- a/gss-serv.c +++ b/gss-serv.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.31 2018/07/09 21:37:55 markus Exp $ */ /* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions @@ -44,17 +44,19 @@ #include "session.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" +#include "uidswap.h" #include "ssh-gss.h" +#include "monitor_wrap.h" extern ServerOptions options; static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client = - { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, - GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}}; + { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, + GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0}; ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech = - { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; + { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; #ifdef KRB5 extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech; @@ -140,6 +142,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid) return (ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(*ctx)); } +/* Unprivileged */ +char * +ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void) { + if (supported_oids == NULL) + ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(); + return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported_oids, + &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech, NULL, NULL, + options.gss_kex_algorithms)); +} + +/* Unprivileged */ +int +ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data, + const char *dummy) { + Gssctxt *ctx = NULL; + int res; + + res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid))); + ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx); + + return (res); +} + /* Unprivileged */ void ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset) @@ -150,7 +175,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset) gss_OID_set supported; gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset); - gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported); + + if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported))) + return; while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) { if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status, @@ -276,8 +303,48 @@ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) { int i = 0; + int equal = 0; + gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; + gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; + + if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) { + if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length || + (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements, + ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) { + debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism"); + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } + + if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, + ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name, + NULL, NULL, NULL))) { + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); + return (ctx->major); + } + + ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name, + new_name, &equal); + + if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) { + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); + return (ctx->major); + } + + if (!equal) { + debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name"); + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } - gss_buffer_desc ename; + debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export"); + + gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name); + gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds); + client->name = new_name; + client->creds = ctx->client_creds; + ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; + client->updated = 1; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } client->mech = NULL; @@ -292,6 +359,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) if (client->mech == NULL) return GSS_S_FAILURE; + if (ctx->client_creds && + (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, + ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) { + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); + return (ctx->major); + } + if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client, &client->displayname, NULL))) { ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); @@ -309,6 +383,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) return (ctx->major); } + gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename); + /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */ client->creds = ctx->client_creds; ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; @@ -356,19 +432,23 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep) /* Privileged */ int -ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) +ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int kex) { OM_uint32 lmin; + (void) kex; /* used in privilege separation */ + if (gssapi_client.exportedname.length == 0 || gssapi_client.exportedname.value == NULL) { debug("No suitable client data"); return 0; } if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok) - if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) + if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) { + gssapi_client.used = 1; + gssapi_client.store.owner = pw; return 1; - else { + } else { /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */ gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname); gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname); @@ -382,14 +462,90 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) return (0); } -/* Privileged */ -OM_uint32 -ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) +/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running + * as the user, the monitor is root. + * + * In the child, we want to : + * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify + * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update + */ + +/* Stuff for PAM */ + +#ifdef USE_PAM +static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg, + struct pam_response **resp, void *data) { - ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, - gssbuf, gssmic, NULL); + return (PAM_CONV_ERR); +} +#endif - return (ctx->major); +void +ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) { + int ok; +#ifdef USE_PAM + int ret; + pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL; + struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL}; + char *envstr; +#endif + + if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL && + gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL && + gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL) + return; + + ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store)); + + if (!ok) + return; + + debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully"); + + /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will + * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options + * for rekeying. So, use our own :) + */ +#ifdef USE_PAM + if (!use_privsep) { + debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled"); + return; + } + + ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name, + &pamconv, &pamh); + if (ret) + return; + + xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar, + gssapi_client.store.envval); + + ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr); + if (!ret) + pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED); + pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS); +#endif +} + +int +ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) { + int ok = 0; + + /* Check we've got credentials to store */ + if (!gssapi_client.updated) + return 0; + + gssapi_client.updated = 0; + + temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner); + if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds) + ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client); + else + debug("No update function for this mechanism"); + + restore_uid(); + + return ok; } /* Privileged */ diff --git a/hmac.c b/hmac.c index 32688876d..a79e8569c 100644 --- a/hmac.c +++ b/hmac.c @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #include #include +#include #include "sshbuf.h" #include "digest.h" diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c index 49d701568..e09355dbd 100644 --- a/kex.c +++ b/kex.c @@ -55,11 +55,16 @@ #include "misc.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "monitor.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "digest.h" +#ifdef GSSAPI +#include "ssh-gss.h" +#endif + /* prototype */ static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *); static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); @@ -113,15 +118,28 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = { #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */ { NULL, 0, -1, -1}, }; +static const struct kexalg gss_kexalgs[] = { +#ifdef GSSAPI + { KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, + { KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, + { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, + { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, + { KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 }, + { KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256, + NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, + { KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, +#endif + { NULL, 0, -1, -1 }, +}; -char * -kex_alg_list(char sep) +static char * +kex_alg_list_internal(char sep, const struct kexalg *algs) { char *ret = NULL, *tmp; size_t nlen, rlen = 0; const struct kexalg *k; - for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) { + for (k = algs; k->name != NULL; k++) { if (ret != NULL) ret[rlen++] = sep; nlen = strlen(k->name); @@ -136,6 +154,18 @@ kex_alg_list(char sep) return ret; } +char * +kex_alg_list(char sep) +{ + return kex_alg_list_internal(sep, kexalgs); +} + +char * +kex_gss_alg_list(char sep) +{ + return kex_alg_list_internal(sep, gss_kexalgs); +} + static const struct kexalg * kex_alg_by_name(const char *name) { @@ -145,6 +175,10 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name) if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0) return k; } + for (k = gss_kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) { + if (strncmp(k->name, name, strlen(k->name)) == 0) + return k; + } return NULL; } @@ -313,6 +347,29 @@ kex_assemble_names(char **listp, const char *def, const char *all) return r; } +/* Validate GSS KEX method name list */ +int +kex_gss_names_valid(const char *names) +{ + char *s, *cp, *p; + + if (names == NULL || *names == '\0') + return 0; + s = cp = xstrdup(names); + for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; + (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { + if (strncmp(p, "gss-", 4) != 0 + || kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) { + error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p); + free(s); + return 0; + } + } + debug3("gss kex names ok: [%s]", names); + free(s); + return 1; +} + /* put algorithm proposal into buffer */ int kex_prop2buf(struct sshbuf *b, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]) @@ -696,6 +753,9 @@ kex_free(struct kex *kex) sshbuf_free(kex->server_version); sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub); free(kex->session_id); +#ifdef GSSAPI + free(kex->gss_host); +#endif /* GSSAPI */ free(kex->failed_choice); free(kex->hostkey_alg); free(kex->name); diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h index a5ae6ac05..fe7141414 100644 --- a/kex.h +++ b/kex.h @@ -102,6 +102,15 @@ enum kex_exchange { KEX_ECDH_SHA2, KEX_C25519_SHA256, KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512, +#ifdef GSSAPI + KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, + KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, + KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256, + KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512, + KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, + KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256, + KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256, +#endif KEX_MAX }; @@ -153,6 +162,12 @@ struct kex { u_int flags; int hash_alg; int ec_nid; +#ifdef GSSAPI + int gss_deleg_creds; + int gss_trust_dns; + char *gss_host; + char *gss_client; +#endif char *failed_choice; int (*verify_host_key)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *); struct sshkey *(*load_host_public_key)(int, int, struct ssh *); @@ -174,8 +189,10 @@ struct kex { int kex_names_valid(const char *); char *kex_alg_list(char); +char *kex_gss_alg_list(char); char *kex_names_cat(const char *, const char *); int kex_assemble_names(char **, const char *, const char *); +int kex_gss_names_valid(const char *); int kex_exchange_identification(struct ssh *, int, const char *); @@ -202,6 +219,12 @@ int kexgex_client(struct ssh *); int kexgex_server(struct ssh *); int kex_gen_client(struct ssh *); int kex_gen_server(struct ssh *); +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) +int kexgssgex_client(struct ssh *); +int kexgssgex_server(struct ssh *); +int kexgss_client(struct ssh *); +int kexgss_server(struct ssh *); +#endif int kex_dh_keypair(struct kex *); int kex_dh_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **, @@ -234,6 +257,12 @@ int kexgex_hash(int, const struct sshbuf *, const struct sshbuf *, const BIGNUM *, const u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t *); +int kex_gen_hash(int hash_alg, const struct sshbuf *client_version, + const struct sshbuf *server_version, const struct sshbuf *client_kexinit, + const struct sshbuf *server_kexinit, const struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob, + const struct sshbuf *client_pub, const struct sshbuf *server_pub, + const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char *hash, size_t *hashlen); + void kexc25519_keygen(u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE]) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE))); diff --git a/kexdh.c b/kexdh.c index 67133e339..edaa46762 100644 --- a/kexdh.c +++ b/kexdh.c @@ -48,13 +48,23 @@ kex_dh_keygen(struct kex *kex) { switch (kex->kex_type) { case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1: +#ifdef GSSAPI + case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: +#endif kex->dh = dh_new_group1(); break; case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1: case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256: +#ifdef GSSAPI + case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: + case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256: +#endif kex->dh = dh_new_group14(); break; case KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512: +#ifdef GSSAPI + case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512: +#endif kex->dh = dh_new_group16(); break; case KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512: diff --git a/kexgen.c b/kexgen.c index bb996b504..d353ed8b0 100644 --- a/kexgen.c +++ b/kexgen.c @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static int input_kex_gen_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh); -static int +int kex_gen_hash( int hash_alg, const struct sshbuf *client_version, diff --git a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f6e1405eb --- /dev/null +++ b/kexgssc.c @@ -0,0 +1,606 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include + +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "dh.h" +#include "digest.h" +#include "ssherr.h" + +#include "ssh-gss.h" + +int +kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; + gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, + recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, + gssbuf, msg_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, *token_ptr; + Gssctxt *ctxt; + OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags; + struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL; + struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; + struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob = NULL; + struct sshbuf *empty = NULL; + u_char *msg; + int type = 0; + int first = 1; + u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; + size_t hashlen; + u_char c; + int r; + + /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */ + ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt); + if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type) + == GSS_C_NO_OID) + fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange"); + + if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host)) + fatal("Couldn't import hostname"); + + if (kex->gss_client && + ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client)) + fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials"); + + /* Step 1 */ + switch (kex->kex_type) { + case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: + case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: + case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256: + case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512: + r = kex_dh_keypair(kex); + break; + case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256: + r = kex_ecdh_keypair(kex); + break; + case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256: + r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex); + break; + default: + fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); + } + if (r != 0) + return r; + + token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER; + + do { + debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context"); + + maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt, + kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok, + &ret_flags); + + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { + /* XXX Useles code: Missing send? */ + if (send_tok.length != 0) { + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, + SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, + send_tok.length)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + } + fatal("gss_init_context failed"); + } + + /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */ + if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) + gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok); + + if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */ + if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) + fatal("Mutual authentication failed"); + + /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */ + if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) + fatal("Integrity check failed"); + } + + /* + * If we have data to send, then the last message that we + * received cannot have been a 'complete'. + */ + if (send_tok.length != 0) { + if (first) { + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, + send_tok.length)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, kex->client_pub)) != 0) + fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); + first = 0; + } else { + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, + send_tok.length)) != 0) + fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); + } + if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("failed to send packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); + gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); + + /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */ + do { + type = ssh_packet_read(ssh); + if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) { + debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY"); + if (server_host_key_blob) + fatal("Server host key received more than once"); + if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_host_key_blob)) != 0) + fatal("Failed to read server host key: %s", ssh_err(r)); + } + } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY); + + switch (type) { + case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: + debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); + if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) + fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete"); + if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, + &recv_tok)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r)); + break; + case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE: + debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE"); + if (msg_tok.value != NULL) + fatal("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE twice?"); + if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_blob)) != 0 || + (r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, + &msg_tok)) != 0) + fatal("Failed to read message: %s", ssh_err(r)); + + /* Is there a token included? */ + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &c)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + if (c) { + if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc( + ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0) + fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r)); + /* If we're already complete - protocol error */ + if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) + sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: received token when complete"); + } else { + /* No token included */ + if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) + sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: did not receive final token"); + } + if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) { + fatal("Expecting end of packet."); + } + break; + case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR: + debug("Received Error"); + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &maj_status)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min_status)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* lang tag */ + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt_get failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s", msg); + default: + sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", + type); + } + token_ptr = &recv_tok; + } else { + /* No data, and not complete */ + if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) + fatal("Not complete, and no token output"); + } + } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); + + /* + * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the + * server, which will have set server_blob and msg_tok + */ + + if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE) + fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it"); + + /* compute shared secret */ + switch (kex->kex_type) { + case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: + case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: + case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256: + case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512: + r = kex_dh_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret); + break; + case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256: + if (sshbuf_ptr(server_blob)[sshbuf_len(server_blob)] & 0x80) + fatal("The received key has MSB of last octet set!"); + r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret); + break; + case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256: + if (sshbuf_len(server_blob) != 65) + fatal("The received NIST-P256 key did not match" + "expected length (expected 65, got %zu)", sshbuf_len(server_blob)); + + if (sshbuf_ptr(server_blob)[0] != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) + fatal("The received NIST-P256 key does not have first octet 0x04"); + + r = kex_ecdh_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret); + break; + default: + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + break; + } + if (r != 0) + goto out; + + if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + + hashlen = sizeof(hash); + if ((r = kex_gen_hash( + kex->hash_alg, + kex->client_version, + kex->server_version, + kex->my, + kex->peer, + (server_host_key_blob ? server_host_key_blob : empty), + kex->client_pub, + server_blob, + shared_secret, + hash, &hashlen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); + + gssbuf.value = hash; + gssbuf.length = hashlen; + + /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */ + if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))) + sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Hash's MIC didn't verify"); + + gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok); + + if (kex->gss_deleg_creds) + ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt); + + if (gss_kex_context == NULL) + gss_kex_context = ctxt; + else + ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); + + if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) + r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); + +out: + explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); + explicit_bzero(kex->c25519_client_key, sizeof(kex->c25519_client_key)); + sshbuf_free(empty); + sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob); + sshbuf_free(server_blob); + sshbuf_free(shared_secret); + sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub); + kex->client_pub = NULL; + return r; +} + +int +kexgssgex_client(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; + gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, + recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, gssbuf, + msg_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, *token_ptr; + Gssctxt *ctxt; + OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags; + struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; + BIGNUM *p = NULL; + BIGNUM *g = NULL; + struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; + struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob = NULL; + struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL; + BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL; + u_char *msg; + int type = 0; + int first = 1; + u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; + size_t hashlen; + const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g; + int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX; + struct sshbuf *empty = NULL; + u_char c; + int r; + + /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */ + ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt); + if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type) + == GSS_C_NO_OID) + fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange"); + + if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host)) + fatal("Couldn't import hostname"); + + if (kex->gss_client && + ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client)) + fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials"); + + debug("Doing group exchange"); + nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8); + + kex->min = DH_GRP_MIN; + kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX; + kex->nbits = nbits; + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, min)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, nbits)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, max)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("Failed to construct a packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); + + if ((r = ssh_packet_read_expect(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP)) != 0) + fatal("Error: %s", ssh_err(r)); + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &p)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &g)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("shpkt_get_bignum2 failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + + if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max) + fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d", + min, BN_num_bits(p), max); + + if ((kex->dh = dh_new_group(g, p)) == NULL) + fatal("dn_new_group() failed"); + p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */ + + if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) + goto out; + DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); + + token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER; + + do { + /* Step 2 - call GSS_Init_sec_context() */ + debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context"); + + maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt, + kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok, + &ret_flags); + + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { + /* XXX Useles code: Missing send? */ + if (send_tok.length != 0) { + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, + SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, + send_tok.length)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + } + fatal("gss_init_context failed"); + } + + /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */ + if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) + gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok); + + if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */ + if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) + fatal("Mutual authentication failed"); + + /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */ + if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) + fatal("Integrity check failed"); + } + + /* + * If we have data to send, then the last message that we + * received cannot have been a 'complete'. + */ + if (send_tok.length != 0) { + if (first) { + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, + send_tok.length)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + first = 0; + } else { + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh,send_tok.value, + send_tok.length)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + } + if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt_send failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); + + /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */ + do { + type = ssh_packet_read(ssh); + if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) { + debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY"); + if (server_host_key_blob) + fatal("Server host key received more than once"); + if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_host_key_blob)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + } + } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY); + + switch (type) { + case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: + debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); + if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) + fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete"); + if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, + &recv_tok)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + break; + case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE: + debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE"); + if (msg_tok.value != NULL) + fatal("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE twice?"); + if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_blob)) != 0 || + (r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, + &msg_tok)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + + /* Is there a token included? */ + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &c)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + if (c) { + if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc( + ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + /* If we're already complete - protocol error */ + if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) + sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: received token when complete"); + } else { + /* No token included */ + if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) + sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: did not receive final token"); + } + break; + case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR: + debug("Received Error"); + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &maj_status)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min_status)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* lang tag */ + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s", msg); + default: + sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", + type); + } + token_ptr = &recv_tok; + } else { + /* No data, and not complete */ + if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) + fatal("Not complete, and no token output"); + } + } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); + + /* + * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the + * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok + */ + + if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE) + fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it"); + + /* 7. C verifies that the key Q_S is valid */ + /* 8. C computes shared secret */ + if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, server_blob)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dh_server_pub)) != 0) + goto out; + sshbuf_free(buf); + buf = NULL; + + if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + + if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_server_pub, shared_secret)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + + DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g); + hashlen = sizeof(hash); + if ((r = kexgex_hash( + kex->hash_alg, + kex->client_version, + kex->server_version, + kex->my, + kex->peer, + (server_host_key_blob ? server_host_key_blob : empty), + kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max, + dh_p, dh_g, + pub_key, + dh_server_pub, + sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret), + hash, &hashlen)) != 0) + fatal("Failed to calculate hash: %s", ssh_err(r)); + + gssbuf.value = hash; + gssbuf.length = hashlen; + + /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */ + if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))) + sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Hash's MIC didn't verify"); + + gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok); + + /* save session id */ + if (kex->session_id == NULL) { + kex->session_id_len = hashlen; + kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len); + memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); + } + + if (kex->gss_deleg_creds) + ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt); + + if (gss_kex_context == NULL) + gss_kex_context = ctxt; + else + ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); + + /* Finally derive the keys and send them */ + if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) + r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); +out: + sshbuf_free(buf); + sshbuf_free(server_blob); + sshbuf_free(empty); + explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); + DH_free(kex->dh); + kex->dh = NULL; + BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub); + sshbuf_free(shared_secret); + sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob); + return r; +} +#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) */ diff --git a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..60bc02deb --- /dev/null +++ b/kexgsss.c @@ -0,0 +1,474 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) + +#include + +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "dh.h" +#include "ssh-gss.h" +#include "monitor_wrap.h" +#include "misc.h" /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */ +#include "servconf.h" +#include "ssh-gss.h" +#include "digest.h" +#include "ssherr.h" + +extern ServerOptions options; + +int +kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; + OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; + + /* + * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an + * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific + * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently + * activating this non-standard behaviour. + */ + + OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0; + gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok; + gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; + Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL; + struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; + struct sshbuf *client_pubkey = NULL; + struct sshbuf *server_pubkey = NULL; + struct sshbuf *empty = sshbuf_new(); + int type = 0; + gss_OID oid; + char *mechs; + u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; + size_t hashlen; + int r; + + /* Initialise GSSAPI */ + + /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures + * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back + * into life + */ + if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) { + mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(); + free(mechs); + } + + debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name); + oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type); + if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID) + fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism"); + + debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__); + + if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid)))) + fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server"); + + do { + debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT"); + type = ssh_packet_read(ssh); + switch(type) { + case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT: + if (client_pubkey != NULL) + fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising"); + if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, + &recv_tok)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &client_pubkey)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + + switch (kex->kex_type) { + case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: + case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: + case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256: + case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512: + r = kex_dh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey, + &shared_secret); + break; + case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256: + r = kex_ecdh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey, + &shared_secret); + break; + case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256: + r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey, + &shared_secret); + break; + default: + fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); + } + if (r != 0) + goto out; + + /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */ + break; + case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: + if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, + &recv_tok)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + break; + default: + sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, + "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", + type); + } + + maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok, + &send_tok, &ret_flags)); + + gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok); + + if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0) + fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete"); + + if (client_pubkey == NULL) + fatal("No client public key"); + + if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { + debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); + } + } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); + + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { + if (send_tok.length > 0) { + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + } + fatal("accept_ctx died"); + } + + if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) + fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set"); + + if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) + fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set"); + + hashlen = sizeof(hash); + if ((r = kex_gen_hash( + kex->hash_alg, + kex->client_version, + kex->server_version, + kex->peer, + kex->my, + empty, + client_pubkey, + server_pubkey, + shared_secret, + hash, &hashlen)) != 0) + goto out; + + gssbuf.value = hash; + gssbuf.length = hashlen; + + if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))) + fatal("Couldn't get MIC"); + + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, server_pubkey)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, msg_tok.value, msg_tok.length)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + + if (send_tok.length != 0) { + if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* true */ + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + } else { + if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0) /* false */ + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + } + if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt_send failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + + gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); + gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok); + + if (gss_kex_context == NULL) + gss_kex_context = ctxt; + else + ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); + + if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) + r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); + + /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we + * just exchanged. */ + if (options.gss_store_rekey) + ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(); +out: + sshbuf_free(empty); + explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); + sshbuf_free(shared_secret); + sshbuf_free(client_pubkey); + sshbuf_free(server_pubkey); + return r; +} + +int +kexgssgex_server(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; + OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; + + /* + * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an + * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific + * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently + * activating this non-standard behaviour. + */ + + OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0; + gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok; + gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; + Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL; + struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; + int type = 0; + gss_OID oid; + char *mechs; + u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; + size_t hashlen; + BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL; + const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g; + int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1; + int cmin = -1, cmax = -1; /* client proposal */ + struct sshbuf *empty = sshbuf_new(); + int r; + + /* Initialise GSSAPI */ + + /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures + * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back + * into life + */ + if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) + if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms())) + free(mechs); + + debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name); + oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type); + if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID) + fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism"); + + debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__); + + if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid)))) + fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server"); + + /* 5. S generates an ephemeral key pair (do the allocations early) */ + debug("Doing group exchange"); + ssh_packet_read_expect(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ); + /* store client proposal to provide valid signature */ + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &cmin)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nbits)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &cmax)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + kex->nbits = nbits; + kex->min = cmin; + kex->max = cmax; + min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, cmin); + max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, cmax); + nbits = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits); + nbits = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits); + if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits) + fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d", + min, nbits, max); + kex->dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max)); + if (kex->dh == NULL) { + sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: no matching group found"); + fatal("Protocol error: no matching group found"); + } + + DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, dh_p)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, dh_g)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + + if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("ssh_packet_write_wait: %s", ssh_err(r)); + + /* Compute our exchange value in parallel with the client */ + if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) + goto out; + + do { + debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT"); + type = ssh_packet_read(ssh); + switch(type) { + case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT: + if (dh_client_pub != NULL) + fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising"); + if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, + &recv_tok)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &dh_client_pub)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + + /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */ + break; + case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: + if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, + &recv_tok)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + break; + default: + sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, + "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", + type); + } + + maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok, + &send_tok, &ret_flags)); + + gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok); + + if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0) + fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete"); + + if (dh_client_pub == NULL) + fatal("No client public key"); + + if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { + debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); + } + } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); + + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { + if (send_tok.length > 0) { + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + } + fatal("accept_ctx died"); + } + + if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) + fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set"); + + if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) + fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set"); + + /* calculate shared secret */ + if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_client_pub, shared_secret)) != 0) + goto out; + + DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); + DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g); + hashlen = sizeof(hash); + if ((r = kexgex_hash( + kex->hash_alg, + kex->client_version, + kex->server_version, + kex->peer, + kex->my, + empty, + cmin, nbits, cmax, + dh_p, dh_g, + dh_client_pub, + pub_key, + sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret), + hash, &hashlen)) != 0) + fatal("kexgex_hash failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + + gssbuf.value = hash; + gssbuf.length = hashlen; + + if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))) + fatal("Couldn't get MIC"); + + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, msg_tok.value, msg_tok.length)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + + if (send_tok.length != 0) { + if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* true */ + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + } else { + if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0) /* false */ + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + } + if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + + gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); + gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok); + + if (gss_kex_context == NULL) + gss_kex_context = ctxt; + else + ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); + + /* Finally derive the keys and send them */ + if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) + r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); + + /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we + * just exchanged. */ + if (options.gss_store_rekey) + ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(); +out: + sshbuf_free(empty); + explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); + DH_free(kex->dh); + kex->dh = NULL; + BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub); + sshbuf_free(shared_secret); + return r; +} +#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) */ diff --git a/mac.c b/mac.c index f3dda6692..de346ed20 100644 --- a/mac.c +++ b/mac.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "digest.h" #include "hmac.h" diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c index 00af44f98..bead9e204 100644 --- a/monitor.c +++ b/monitor.c @@ -147,6 +147,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); +int mm_answer_gss_sign(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); +int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS @@ -219,11 +221,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = { {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok}, {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic}, + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign}, #endif {0, 0, NULL} }; struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = { +#ifdef GSSAPI + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx}, + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign}, + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds}, +#endif #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli}, #endif @@ -292,6 +301,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); +#ifdef GSSAPI + /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */ + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1); +#endif /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */ while (!authenticated) { @@ -405,6 +418,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1); +#ifdef GSSAPI + /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */ + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1); +#endif if (auth_opts->permit_pty_flag) { monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1); @@ -1687,6 +1704,17 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server; # endif +# ifdef GSSAPI + if (options.gss_keyex) { + kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server; + kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server; + kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256] = kexgss_server; + kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512] = kexgss_server; + kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgssgex_server; + kex->kex[KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256] = kexgss_server; + kex->kex[KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256] = kexgss_server; + } +# endif #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server; kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server; @@ -1780,8 +1808,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) u_char *p; int r; - if (!options.gss_authentication) - fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__); + if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) + fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); @@ -1813,8 +1841,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */ int r; - if (!options.gss_authentication) - fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__); + if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) + fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__); if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &in)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); @@ -1834,6 +1862,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1); } return (0); } @@ -1845,8 +1874,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) OM_uint32 ret; int r; - if (!options.gss_authentication) - fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__); + if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) + fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__); if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &gssbuf)) != 0 || (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &mic)) != 0) @@ -1872,13 +1901,17 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) int mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { - int r, authenticated; + int r, authenticated, kex; const char *displayname; - if (!options.gss_authentication) - fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__); + if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) + fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__); - authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + authenticated = authctxt->valid && + ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw, kex); sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0) @@ -1887,7 +1920,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m); - auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic"; + if (kex) { + auth_method = "gssapi-keyex"; + } else { + auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic"; + } if ((displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL) auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname); @@ -1895,5 +1932,85 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */ return (authenticated); } + +int +mm_answer_gss_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + gss_buffer_desc data; + gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; + OM_uint32 major, minor; + size_t len; + u_char *p = NULL; + int r; + + if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) + fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + data.value = p; + data.length = len; + /* Lengths of SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512 hashes that are used */ + if (data.length != 20 && data.length != 32 && data.length != 64) + fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__, + (int) data.length); + + /* Save the session ID on the first time around */ + if (session_id2_len == 0) { + session_id2_len = data.length; + session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len); + memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len); + } + major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash); + + free(data.value); + + sshbuf_reset(m); + + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m); + + gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash); + + /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */ + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1); + + /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */ + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1); + + return (0); +} + +int +mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m) { + ssh_gssapi_ccache store; + int r, ok; + + if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) + fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, (u_char **)&store.filename, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, (u_char **)&store.envvar, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, (u_char **)&store.envval, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store); + + free(store.filename); + free(store.envvar); + free(store.envval); + + sshbuf_reset(m); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ok)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m); + + return(0); +} + #endif /* GSSAPI */ diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h index 683e5e071..2b1a2d590 100644 --- a/monitor.h +++ b/monitor.h @@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype { MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113, + MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151, + MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153, }; struct ssh; diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c index 4169b7604..fdca39a6a 100644 --- a/monitor_wrap.c +++ b/monitor_wrap.c @@ -978,13 +978,15 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) } int -mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) +mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int kex) { struct sshbuf *m; int r, authenticated = 0; if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, @@ -997,4 +999,57 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not "); return (authenticated); } + +OM_uint32 +mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + OM_uint32 major; + int r; + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, data->value, data->length)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0 || + (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, hash)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + sshbuf_free(m); + + return (major); +} + +int +mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + int r, ok; + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, + store->filename ? store->filename : "")) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, + store->envvar ? store->envvar : "")) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, + store->envval ? store->envval : "")) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ok)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + sshbuf_free(m); + + return (ok); +} + #endif /* GSSAPI */ diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h index 191277f3a..92dda574b 100644 --- a/monitor_wrap.h +++ b/monitor_wrap.h @@ -63,8 +63,10 @@ int mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t, OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *); -int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user); +int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *, int kex); OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); +OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); +int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *); #endif #ifdef USE_PAM diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c index f78b4d6fe..3c68d1a88 100644 --- a/readconf.c +++ b/readconf.c @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ #include "uidswap.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "digest.h" +#include "ssh-gss.h" /* Format of the configuration file: @@ -162,6 +163,8 @@ typedef enum { oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout, oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, + oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey, + oGssServerIdentity, oGssKexAlgorithms, oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly, oSendEnv, oSetEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist, oHashKnownHosts, @@ -202,10 +205,22 @@ static struct { /* Sometimes-unsupported options */ #if defined(GSSAPI) { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication }, + { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx }, { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds }, + { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns }, + { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity }, + { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity }, + { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey }, + { "gssapikexalgorithms", oGssKexAlgorithms }, # else { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported }, + { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported }, { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported }, + { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported }, + { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported }, + { "gssapiserveridentity", oUnsupported }, + { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported }, + { "gssapikexalgorithms", oUnsupported }, #endif #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 { "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider }, @@ -988,10 +1003,42 @@ parse_time: intptr = &options->gss_authentication; goto parse_flag; + case oGssKeyEx: + intptr = &options->gss_keyex; + goto parse_flag; + case oGssDelegateCreds: intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds; goto parse_flag; + case oGssTrustDns: + intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns; + goto parse_flag; + + case oGssClientIdentity: + charptr = &options->gss_client_identity; + goto parse_string; + + case oGssServerIdentity: + charptr = &options->gss_server_identity; + goto parse_string; + + case oGssRenewalRekey: + intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey; + goto parse_flag; + + case oGssKexAlgorithms: + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", + filename, linenum); + if (!kex_gss_names_valid(arg)) + fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad GSSAPI KexAlgorithms '%s'.", + filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); + if (*activep && options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL) + options->gss_kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg); + break; + case oBatchMode: intptr = &options->batch_mode; goto parse_flag; @@ -1863,7 +1910,13 @@ initialize_options(Options * options) options->pubkey_authentication = -1; options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; options->gss_authentication = -1; + options->gss_keyex = -1; options->gss_deleg_creds = -1; + options->gss_trust_dns = -1; + options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1; + options->gss_client_identity = NULL; + options->gss_server_identity = NULL; + options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL; options->password_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL; @@ -2009,8 +2062,18 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) options->challenge_response_authentication = 1; if (options->gss_authentication == -1) options->gss_authentication = 0; + if (options->gss_keyex == -1) + options->gss_keyex = 0; if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1) options->gss_deleg_creds = 0; + if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1) + options->gss_trust_dns = 0; + if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1) + options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0; +#ifdef GSSAPI + if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL) + options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX); +#endif if (options->password_authentication == -1) options->password_authentication = 1; if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) @@ -2625,7 +2688,14 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host) dump_cfg_fmtint(oGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports); #ifdef GSSAPI dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex); dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssDelegateCreds, o->gss_deleg_creds); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssTrustDns, o->gss_trust_dns); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssRenewalRekey, o->gss_renewal_rekey); + dump_cfg_string(oGssClientIdentity, o->gss_client_identity); + dump_cfg_string(oGssServerIdentity, o->gss_server_identity); + dump_cfg_string(oGssKexAlgorithms, o->gss_kex_algorithms ? + o->gss_kex_algorithms : GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX); #endif /* GSSAPI */ dump_cfg_fmtint(oHashKnownHosts, o->hash_known_hosts); dump_cfg_fmtint(oHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication); diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h index 8e36bf32a..0bff6d80a 100644 --- a/readconf.h +++ b/readconf.h @@ -40,7 +40,13 @@ typedef struct { int challenge_response_authentication; /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */ int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */ + int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */ int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */ + int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */ + int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */ + char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */ + char *gss_server_identity; /* GSSAPI target principal */ + char *gss_kex_algorithms; /* GSSAPI kex methods to be offered by client. */ int password_authentication; /* Try password * authentication. */ int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */ diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c index e76f9c39e..f63eb0b94 100644 --- a/servconf.c +++ b/servconf.c @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ #include "auth.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "digest.h" +#include "ssh-gss.h" static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *, const char *, int); @@ -124,8 +125,11 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options) options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1; options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1; options->gss_authentication=-1; + options->gss_keyex = -1; options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1; options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1; + options->gss_store_rekey = -1; + options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL; options->password_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; @@ -351,10 +355,18 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0; if (options->gss_authentication == -1) options->gss_authentication = 0; + if (options->gss_keyex == -1) + options->gss_keyex = 0; if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1) options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1; if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1) options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1; + if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1) + options->gss_store_rekey = 0; +#ifdef GSSAPI + if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL) + options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX); +#endif if (options->password_authentication == -1) options->password_authentication = 1; if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) @@ -498,6 +510,7 @@ typedef enum { sHostKeyAlgorithms, sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor, + sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey, sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel, sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory, sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding, @@ -572,12 +585,22 @@ static struct { #ifdef GSSAPI { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #else { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif + { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, @@ -1488,6 +1511,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, intptr = &options->gss_authentication; goto parse_flag; + case sGssKeyEx: + intptr = &options->gss_keyex; + goto parse_flag; + case sGssCleanupCreds: intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds; goto parse_flag; @@ -1496,6 +1523,22 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor; goto parse_flag; + case sGssStoreRekey: + intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey; + goto parse_flag; + + case sGssKexAlgorithms: + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", + filename, linenum); + if (!kex_gss_names_valid(arg)) + fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad GSSAPI KexAlgorithms '%s'.", + filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); + if (*activep && options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL) + options->gss_kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg); + break; + case sPasswordAuthentication: intptr = &options->password_authentication; goto parse_flag; @@ -2585,6 +2628,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) #ifdef GSSAPI dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey); + dump_cfg_string(sGssKexAlgorithms, o->gss_kex_algorithms); #endif dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h index 5483da051..29329ba1f 100644 --- a/servconf.h +++ b/servconf.h @@ -126,8 +126,11 @@ typedef struct { int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if * authenticated with Kerberos. */ int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */ + int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */ int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */ int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */ + int gss_store_rekey; + char *gss_kex_algorithms; /* GSSAPI kex methods to be offered by client. */ int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password * authentication. */ int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */ diff --git a/session.c b/session.c index 8f5d7e0a4..f1a47f766 100644 --- a/session.c +++ b/session.c @@ -2674,13 +2674,19 @@ do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) #ifdef KRB5 if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup && - authctxt->krb5_ctx) + authctxt->krb5_ctx) { + temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt); + restore_uid(); + } #endif #ifdef GSSAPI - if (options.gss_cleanup_creds) + if (options.gss_cleanup_creds) { + temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(); + restore_uid(); + } #endif /* remove agent socket */ diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h index 36180d07a..70dd36658 100644 --- a/ssh-gss.h +++ b/ssh-gss.h @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.14 2018/07/10 09:13:30 djm Exp $ */ /* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions @@ -61,10 +61,30 @@ #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06 +#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30 +#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31 +#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32 +#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33 +#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34 +#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40 +#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41 +#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-" +#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-" +#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID "gss-group14-sha256-" +#define KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID "gss-group16-sha512-" +#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-" +#define KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID "gss-nistp256-sha256-" +#define KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID "gss-curve25519-sha256-" + +#define GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX \ + KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "," \ + KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID + typedef struct { char *filename; char *envvar; char *envval; + struct passwd *owner; void *data; } ssh_gssapi_ccache; @@ -72,8 +92,11 @@ typedef struct { gss_buffer_desc displayname; gss_buffer_desc exportedname; gss_cred_id_t creds; + gss_name_t name; struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech; ssh_gssapi_ccache store; + int used; + int updated; } ssh_gssapi_client; typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { @@ -84,6 +107,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *); int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **); void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *); + int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *); } ssh_gssapi_mech; typedef struct { @@ -94,10 +118,11 @@ typedef struct { gss_OID oid; /* client */ gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */ gss_name_t client; /* server */ - gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */ + gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */ } Gssctxt; extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[]; +extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context; int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); @@ -109,6 +134,7 @@ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(OM_uint32 *, gss_OID, int *); struct sshbuf; int ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *, gss_buffer_desc *); +int ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(struct ssh *, gss_buffer_desc *); OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *, const char *); OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *, int, @@ -123,17 +149,33 @@ void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **); OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *, const char *, const char *, const char *); -int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *); +int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *); +OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *); +int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *); /* In the server */ +typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, + const char *); +char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *, const char *); +char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *, + const char *, const char *); +gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int); +int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *, + const char *); OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); -int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name); +int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *, int kex); OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *); void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void); void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void); const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void); +char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void); +int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void); + +int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store); +void ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void); + #endif /* GSSAPI */ #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */ diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1 index 424d6c3e8..26940ad55 100644 --- a/ssh.1 +++ b/ssh.1 @@ -497,7 +497,13 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see .It GatewayPorts .It GlobalKnownHostsFile .It GSSAPIAuthentication +.It GSSAPIKeyExchange +.It GSSAPIClientIdentity .It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials +.It GSSAPIKexAlgorithms +.It GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey +.It GSSAPIServerIdentity +.It GSSAPITrustDns .It HashKnownHosts .It Host .It HostbasedAuthentication @@ -573,6 +579,8 @@ flag), (supported message integrity codes), .Ar kex (key exchange algorithms), +.Ar kex-gss +(GSSAPI key exchange algorithms), .Ar key (key types), .Ar key-cert diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c index ee51823cd..2da9f5d0d 100644 --- a/ssh.c +++ b/ssh.c @@ -736,6 +736,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) cp = mac_alg_list('\n'); else if (strcmp(optarg, "kex") == 0) cp = kex_alg_list('\n'); + else if (strcmp(optarg, "kex-gss") == 0) + cp = kex_gss_alg_list('\n'); else if (strcmp(optarg, "key") == 0) cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 0, '\n'); else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-cert") == 0) @@ -748,7 +750,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) cp = xstrdup("2"); else if (strcmp(optarg, "help") == 0) { cp = xstrdup( - "cipher\ncipher-auth\nkex\nkey\n" + "cipher\ncipher-auth\nkex\nkex-gss\nkey\n" "key-cert\nkey-plain\nmac\n" "protocol-version\nsig"); } diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config index 5e8ef548b..1ff999b68 100644 --- a/ssh_config +++ b/ssh_config @@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ # HostbasedAuthentication no # GSSAPIAuthentication no # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no +# GSSAPIKeyExchange no +# GSSAPITrustDNS no # BatchMode no # CheckHostIP yes # AddressFamily any diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 index 02a87892d..f4668673b 100644 --- a/ssh_config.5 +++ b/ssh_config.5 @@ -758,10 +758,67 @@ The default is Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed. The default is .Cm no . +.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity +If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when +connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default +identity will be used. .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. The default is .Cm no . +.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange +Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using +GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key. +The default is +.Dq no . +.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey +If set to +.Dq yes +then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the +ssh connection. With a compatible server, this will delegate the renewed +credentials to a session on the server. +.Pp +Checks are made to ensure that credentials are only propagated when the new +credentials match the old ones on the originating client and where the +receiving server still has the old set in its cache. +.Pp +The default is +.Dq no . +.Pp +For this to work +.Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange +needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client. +.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity +If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when +connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the +expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target +hostname. +.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns +Set to +.Dq yes +to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize +the name of the host being connected to. If +.Dq no , +the hostname entered on the +command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library. +The default is +.Dq no . +.It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms +The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI +key exchange. Possible values are +.Bd -literal -offset 3n +gss-gex-sha1-, +gss-group1-sha1-, +gss-group14-sha1-, +gss-group14-sha256-, +gss-group16-sha512-, +gss-nistp256-sha256-, +gss-curve25519-sha256- +.Ed +.Pp +The default is +.Dq gss-gex-sha1-,gss-group14-sha1- . +This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI. .It Cm HashKnownHosts Indicates that .Xr ssh 1 diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c index 87fa70a40..a4ec75ca1 100644 --- a/sshconnect2.c +++ b/sshconnect2.c @@ -78,8 +78,6 @@ #endif /* import */ -extern char *client_version_string; -extern char *server_version_string; extern Options options; /* @@ -161,6 +159,11 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) char *s, *all_key; int r; +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) + char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL; + char *gss_host = NULL; +#endif + xxx_host = host; xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr; @@ -193,6 +196,35 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port)); } +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) + if (options.gss_keyex) { + /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this + * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */ + orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; + + if (options.gss_server_identity) + gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity); + else if (options.gss_trust_dns) + gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh); + else + gss_host = xstrdup(host); + + gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, + options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms); + if (gss) { + debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss); + xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], + "%s,%s", gss, orig); + + /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the + * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */ + orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]; + xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], + "%s,null", orig); + } + } +#endif + if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit, options.rekey_interval); @@ -211,16 +243,46 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_client; # endif +# ifdef GSSAPI + if (options.gss_keyex) { + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client; + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client; + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256] = kexgss_client; + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512] = kexgss_client; + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgssgex_client; + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256] = kexgss_client; + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256] = kexgss_client; + } +# endif #endif ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client; ssh->kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback; +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) + if (options.gss_keyex) { + ssh->kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds; + ssh->kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns; + ssh->kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity; + ssh->kex->gss_host = gss_host; + } +#endif + ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &ssh->kex->done); /* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(options.kex_algorithms); +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) + /* repair myproposal after it was crumpled by the */ + /* ext-info removal above */ + if (gss) { + orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; + xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], + "%s,%s", gss, orig); + free(gss); + } +#endif if ((r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, myproposal)) != 0) fatal("kex_prop2buf: %s", ssh_err(r)); @@ -317,6 +379,7 @@ static int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +static int userauth_gsskeyex(struct ssh *); #endif void userauth(struct ssh *, char *); @@ -333,6 +396,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void); Authmethod authmethods[] = { #ifdef GSSAPI + {"gssapi-keyex", + userauth_gsskeyex, + NULL, + &options.gss_keyex, + NULL}, {"gssapi-with-mic", userauth_gssapi, userauth_gssapi_cleanup, @@ -697,12 +765,25 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh) OM_uint32 min; int r, ok = 0; gss_OID mech = NULL; + char *gss_host; + + if (options.gss_server_identity) + gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity); + else if (options.gss_trust_dns) + gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh); + else + gss_host = xstrdup(authctxt->host); /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at * once. */ if (authctxt->gss_supported_mechs == NULL) - gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &authctxt->gss_supported_mechs); + if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, + &authctxt->gss_supported_mechs))) { + authctxt->gss_supported_mechs = NULL; + free(gss_host); + return 0; + } /* Check to see whether the mechanism is usable before we offer it */ while (authctxt->mech_tried < authctxt->gss_supported_mechs->count && @@ -711,13 +792,15 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh) elements[authctxt->mech_tried]; /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */ if (mech->length < 128 && ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, - mech, authctxt->host)) { + mech, gss_host, options.gss_client_identity)) { ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */ } else { authctxt->mech_tried++; } } + free(gss_host); + if (!ok || mech == NULL) return 0; @@ -957,6 +1040,55 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) free(lang); return r; } + +int +userauth_gsskeyex(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; + gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; + OM_uint32 ms; + int r; + + static int attempt = 0; + if (attempt++ >= 1) + return (0); + + if (gss_kex_context == NULL) { + debug("No valid Key exchange context"); + return (0); + } + + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + + ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service, + "gssapi-keyex"); + + if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed", __func__); + gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b); + + if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) { + sshbuf_free(b); + return (0); + } + + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, mic.value, mic.length)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + sshbuf_free(b); + gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic); + + return (1); +} + #endif /* GSSAPI */ static int diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c index 11571c010..3a5c1ea78 100644 --- a/sshd.c +++ b/sshd.c @@ -123,6 +123,10 @@ #include "version.h" #include "ssherr.h" +#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API +#include +#endif + /* Re-exec fds */ #define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1) #define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2) @@ -796,8 +800,8 @@ notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh) } debug3("%s: sent %u hostkeys", __func__, nkeys); if (nkeys == 0) - fatal("%s: no hostkeys", __func__); - if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + debug3("%s: no hostkeys", __func__); + else if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send", __func__); sshbuf_free(buf); } @@ -1773,7 +1777,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) free(fp); } accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, NULL); - if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) { + /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */ + if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key && !options.gss_keyex) { logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting."); exit(1); } @@ -2069,6 +2074,60 @@ main(int ac, char **av) rdomain == NULL ? "" : "\""); free(laddr); +#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API + /* + * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if + * the current session is the root session or we are not launched + * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode). We do not + * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from + * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us. + * + * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an + * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating + * new sessions for us. Then all the users will end up in the + * same session (bad). + * + * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us + * automatically. + * + * We must create the session before any credentials are stored + * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below). + */ + { + OSStatus err = 0; + SecuritySessionId sid = 0; + SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0; + + err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs); + if (err) + error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X", + (unsigned) err); + else + debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X", + (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs); + + if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot)) + debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... " + "assuming inetd created the session for us."); + else { + debug("Creating new security session..."); + err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote); + if (err) + error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X", + (unsigned) err); + + err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, + &sattrs); + if (err) + error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X", + (unsigned) err); + else + debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X", + (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs); + } + } +#endif + /* * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is @@ -2265,6 +2324,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh) myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal( list_hostkey_types()); +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) + { + char *orig; + char *gss = NULL; + char *newstr = NULL; + orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; + + /* + * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising + * the other key exchange algorithms + */ + + if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0) + orig = NULL; + + if (options.gss_keyex) + gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(); + else + gss = NULL; + + if (gss && orig) + xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig); + else if (gss) + newstr = gss; + else if (orig) + newstr = orig; + + /* + * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host + * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only + * host key algorithm we support + */ + if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0) + myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null"; + + if (newstr) + myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr; + else + fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms"); + } +#endif + /* start key exchange */ if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0) fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r)); @@ -2280,7 +2381,18 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh) # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server; # endif -#endif +# ifdef GSSAPI + if (options.gss_keyex) { + kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server; + kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server; + kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256] = kexgss_server; + kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512] = kexgss_server; + kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgssgex_server; + kex->kex[KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256] = kexgss_server; + kex->kex[KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256] = kexgss_server; + } +# endif +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server; kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server; kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type; diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config index 19b7c91a1..2c48105f8 100644 --- a/sshd_config +++ b/sshd_config @@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys # GSSAPI options #GSSAPIAuthentication no #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes +#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes +#GSSAPIKeyExchange no # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 index 9486f2a1c..cec3c3c4e 100644 --- a/sshd_config.5 +++ b/sshd_config.5 @@ -655,6 +655,11 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache on logout. The default is .Cm yes . +.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange +Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange +doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity. +The default is +.Cm no . .It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor a client authenticates against. @@ -669,6 +674,31 @@ machine's default store. This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines. The default is .Cm yes . +.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey +Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a +successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed +or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is +.Dq no . +.Pp +For this to work +.Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange +needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client. +.It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms +The list of key exchange algorithms that are accepted by GSSAPI +key exchange. Possible values are +.Bd -literal -offset 3n +gss-gex-sha1-, +gss-group1-sha1-, +gss-group14-sha1-, +gss-group14-sha256-, +gss-group16-sha512-, +gss-nistp256-sha256-, +gss-curve25519-sha256- +.Ed +.Pp +The default is +.Dq gss-gex-sha1-,gss-group14-sha1- . +This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI. .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns. diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c index ef90563b3..4d2048b6a 100644 --- a/sshkey.c +++ b/sshkey.c @@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] = { # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + { "null", "null", NULL, KEY_NULL, 0, 0, 0 }, { NULL, NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0 } }; @@ -233,7 +234,7 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep) const struct keytype *kt; for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { - if (kt->name == NULL) + if (kt->name == NULL || kt->type == KEY_NULL) continue; if (!include_sigonly && kt->sigonly) continue; diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h index 1119a7b07..1bf30d055 100644 --- a/sshkey.h +++ b/sshkey.h @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ enum sshkey_types { KEY_ED25519_CERT, KEY_XMSS, KEY_XMSS_CERT, + KEY_NULL, KEY_UNSPEC }; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 26d9fe60e31c78018bdfd49bba1196ea7c44405d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Kettlewell Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:52 +0000 Subject: Various keepalive extensions Add compatibility aliases for ProtocolKeepAlives and SetupTimeOut, supported in previous versions of Debian's OpenSSH package but since superseded by ServerAliveInterval. (We're probably stuck with this bit for compatibility.) In batch mode, default ServerAliveInterval to five minutes. Adjust documentation to match and to give some more advice on use of keepalives. Author: Ian Jackson Author: Matthew Vernon Author: Colin Watson Last-Update: 2018-10-19 Patch-Name: keepalive-extensions.patch --- readconf.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- ssh_config.5 | 21 +++++++++++++++++++-- sshd_config.5 | 3 +++ 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'ssh_config.5') diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c index a7fb7ca15..09787c0e5 100644 --- a/readconf.c +++ b/readconf.c @@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ typedef enum { oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys, oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedKeyTypes, oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, oCASignatureAlgorithms, oProxyJump, + oProtocolKeepAlives, oSetupTimeOut, oIgnore, oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported } OpCodes; @@ -326,6 +327,8 @@ static struct { { "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes }, { "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown }, { "proxyjump", oProxyJump }, + { "protocolkeepalives", oProtocolKeepAlives }, + { "setuptimeout", oSetupTimeOut }, { NULL, oBadOption } }; @@ -1449,6 +1452,8 @@ parse_keytypes: goto parse_flag; case oServerAliveInterval: + case oProtocolKeepAlives: /* Debian-specific compatibility alias */ + case oSetupTimeOut: /* Debian-specific compatibility alias */ intptr = &options->server_alive_interval; goto parse_time; @@ -2142,8 +2147,13 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) options->rekey_interval = 0; if (options->verify_host_key_dns == -1) options->verify_host_key_dns = 0; - if (options->server_alive_interval == -1) - options->server_alive_interval = 0; + if (options->server_alive_interval == -1) { + /* in batch mode, default is 5mins */ + if (options->batch_mode == 1) + options->server_alive_interval = 300; + else + options->server_alive_interval = 0; + } if (options->server_alive_count_max == -1) options->server_alive_count_max = 3; if (options->control_master == -1) diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 index f4668673b..bc04d8d02 100644 --- a/ssh_config.5 +++ b/ssh_config.5 @@ -265,8 +265,12 @@ Valid arguments are If set to .Cm yes , passphrase/password querying will be disabled. +In addition, the +.Cm ServerAliveInterval +option will be set to 300 seconds by default (Debian-specific). This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no user -is present to supply the password. +is present to supply the password, +and where it is desirable to detect a broken network swiftly. The argument must be .Cm yes or @@ -1557,7 +1561,14 @@ from the server, will send a message through the encrypted channel to request a response from the server. The default -is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server. +is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server, +or 300 if the +.Cm BatchMode +option is set (Debian-specific). +.Cm ProtocolKeepAlives +and +.Cm SetupTimeOut +are Debian-specific compatibility aliases for this option. .It Cm SetEnv Directly specify one or more environment variables and their contents to be sent to the server. @@ -1637,6 +1648,12 @@ Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the other side. If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed. +This option only uses TCP keepalives (as opposed to using ssh level +keepalives), so takes a long time to notice when the connection dies. +As such, you probably want +the +.Cm ServerAliveInterval +option as well. However, this means that connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people find it annoying. diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 index cec3c3c4e..eec224158 100644 --- a/sshd_config.5 +++ b/sshd_config.5 @@ -1615,6 +1615,9 @@ This avoids infinitely hanging sessions. .Pp To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to .Cm no . +.Pp +This option was formerly called +.Cm KeepAlive . .It Cm TrustedUserCAKeys Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate authorities that are trusted to sign user certificates for authentication, or -- cgit v1.2.3 From 19f1d075a06f4d3c9b440d7272272569d8bb0a17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Colin Watson Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:58 +0000 Subject: Allow harmless group-writability Allow secure files (~/.ssh/config, ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, etc.) to be group-writable, provided that the group in question contains only the file's owner. Rejected upstream for IMO incorrect reasons (e.g. a misunderstanding about the contents of gr->gr_mem). Given that per-user groups and umask 002 are the default setup in Debian (for good reasons - this makes operating in setgid directories with other groups much easier), we need to permit this by default. Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1060 Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=314347 Last-Update: 2019-10-09 Patch-Name: user-group-modes.patch --- auth-rhosts.c | 6 ++---- auth.c | 3 +-- misc.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- misc.h | 2 ++ readconf.c | 3 +-- ssh.1 | 2 ++ ssh_config.5 | 2 ++ 7 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) (limited to 'ssh_config.5') diff --git a/auth-rhosts.c b/auth-rhosts.c index 7a10210b6..587f53721 100644 --- a/auth-rhosts.c +++ b/auth-rhosts.c @@ -260,8 +260,7 @@ auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname, return 0; } if (options.strict_modes && - ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) || - (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) { + !secure_permissions(&st, pw->pw_uid)) { logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: " "bad ownership or modes for home directory.", pw->pw_name); auth_debug_add("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: " @@ -287,8 +286,7 @@ auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname, * allowing access to their account by anyone. */ if (options.strict_modes && - ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) || - (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) { + !secure_permissions(&st, pw->pw_uid)) { logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: bad modes for %.200s", pw->pw_name, buf); auth_debug_add("Bad file modes for %.200s", buf); diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c index 47c27773c..fc0c05bae 100644 --- a/auth.c +++ b/auth.c @@ -473,8 +473,7 @@ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, const char *host, user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid); if (options.strict_modes && (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) && - ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) || - (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) { + !secure_permissions(&st, pw->pw_uid)) { logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: " "bad owner or modes for %.200s", pw->pw_name, user_hostfile); diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c index 88833d7ff..42eeb425a 100644 --- a/misc.c +++ b/misc.c @@ -59,8 +59,9 @@ #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include -#include #endif +#include +#include #ifdef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD #include #endif @@ -1112,6 +1113,55 @@ percent_expand(const char *string, ...) #undef EXPAND_MAX_KEYS } +int +secure_permissions(struct stat *st, uid_t uid) +{ + if (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st->st_uid) && st->st_uid != uid) + return 0; + if ((st->st_mode & 002) != 0) + return 0; + if ((st->st_mode & 020) != 0) { + /* If the file is group-writable, the group in question must + * have exactly one member, namely the file's owner. + * (Zero-member groups are typically used by setgid + * binaries, and are unlikely to be suitable.) + */ + struct passwd *pw; + struct group *gr; + int members = 0; + + gr = getgrgid(st->st_gid); + if (!gr) + return 0; + + /* Check primary group memberships. */ + while ((pw = getpwent()) != NULL) { + if (pw->pw_gid == gr->gr_gid) { + ++members; + if (pw->pw_uid != uid) + return 0; + } + } + endpwent(); + + pw = getpwuid(st->st_uid); + if (!pw) + return 0; + + /* Check supplementary group memberships. */ + if (gr->gr_mem[0]) { + ++members; + if (strcmp(pw->pw_name, gr->gr_mem[0]) || + gr->gr_mem[1]) + return 0; + } + + if (!members) + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + int tun_open(int tun, int mode, char **ifname) { @@ -1869,8 +1919,7 @@ safe_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir, snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf); return -1; } - if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) || - (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) { + if (!secure_permissions(stp, uid)) { snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s", buf); return -1; @@ -1885,8 +1934,7 @@ safe_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir, strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf)); if (stat(buf, &st) == -1 || - (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) || - (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) { + !secure_permissions(&st, uid)) { snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf); return -1; diff --git a/misc.h b/misc.h index bcc34f980..869895d3a 100644 --- a/misc.h +++ b/misc.h @@ -181,6 +181,8 @@ int opt_match(const char **opts, const char *term); char *read_passphrase(const char *, int); int ask_permission(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); +int secure_permissions(struct stat *st, uid_t uid); + #define MINIMUM(a, b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b)) #define MAXIMUM(a, b) (((a) > (b)) ? (a) : (b)) #define ROUNDUP(x, y) ((((x)+((y)-1))/(y))*(y)) diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c index 09787c0e5..16d2729dd 100644 --- a/readconf.c +++ b/readconf.c @@ -1855,8 +1855,7 @@ read_config_file_depth(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw, if (fstat(fileno(f), &sb) == -1) fatal("fstat %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno)); - if (((sb.st_uid != 0 && sb.st_uid != getuid()) || - (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0)) + if (!secure_permissions(&sb, getuid())) fatal("Bad owner or permissions on %s", filename); } diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1 index 26940ad55..20e4c4efa 100644 --- a/ssh.1 +++ b/ssh.1 @@ -1484,6 +1484,8 @@ The file format and configuration options are described in .Xr ssh_config 5 . Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions: read/write for the user, and not writable by others. +It may be group-writable provided that the group in question contains only +the user. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/environment Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 index bc04d8d02..2c74b57c0 100644 --- a/ssh_config.5 +++ b/ssh_config.5 @@ -1907,6 +1907,8 @@ The format of this file is described above. This file is used by the SSH client. Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions: read/write for the user, and not writable by others. +It may be group-writable provided that the group in question contains only +the user. .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config Systemwide configuration file. This file provides defaults for those -- cgit v1.2.3 From 944653642de12f09baa546011429fb69ffc0065a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Colin Watson Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:11 +0000 Subject: Document that HashKnownHosts may break tab-completion Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1727 Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/430154 Last-Update: 2013-09-14 Patch-Name: doc-hash-tab-completion.patch --- ssh_config.5 | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) (limited to 'ssh_config.5') diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 index 2c74b57c0..4b42aab9d 100644 --- a/ssh_config.5 +++ b/ssh_config.5 @@ -840,6 +840,9 @@ Note that existing names and addresses in known hosts files will not be converted automatically, but may be manually hashed using .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . +Use of this option may break facilities such as tab-completion that rely +on being able to read unhashed host names from +.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts . .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key authentication. -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7abde40896668ce9debfe056c7dabc6a70ef7da4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Colin Watson Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:18 +0000 Subject: Various Debian-specific configuration changes ssh: Enable ForwardX11Trusted, returning to earlier semantics which cause fewer problems with existing setups (http://bugs.debian.org/237021). ssh: Set 'SendEnv LANG LC_*' by default (http://bugs.debian.org/264024). ssh: Enable HashKnownHosts by default to try to limit the spread of ssh worms. ssh: Enable GSSAPIAuthentication by default. sshd: Enable PAM, disable ChallengeResponseAuthentication, and disable PrintMotd. sshd: Enable X11Forwarding. sshd: Set 'AcceptEnv LANG LC_*' by default. sshd: Change sftp subsystem path to /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server. Document all of this. Author: Russ Allbery Forwarded: not-needed Last-Update: 2017-10-04 Patch-Name: debian-config.patch --- readconf.c | 2 +- ssh.1 | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ ssh_config | 6 +++++- ssh_config.5 | 19 ++++++++++++++++++- sshd_config | 16 ++++++++++------ sshd_config.5 | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) (limited to 'ssh_config.5') diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c index 16d2729dd..253574ce0 100644 --- a/readconf.c +++ b/readconf.c @@ -2037,7 +2037,7 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) if (options->forward_x11 == -1) options->forward_x11 = 0; if (options->forward_x11_trusted == -1) - options->forward_x11_trusted = 0; + options->forward_x11_trusted = 1; if (options->forward_x11_timeout == -1) options->forward_x11_timeout = 1200; /* diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1 index 24530e511..fd495da2c 100644 --- a/ssh.1 +++ b/ssh.1 @@ -795,6 +795,16 @@ directive in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information. .Pp +(Debian-specific: X11 forwarding is not subjected to X11 SECURITY extension +restrictions by default, because too many programs currently crash in this +mode. +Set the +.Cm ForwardX11Trusted +option to +.Dq no +to restore the upstream behaviour. +This may change in future depending on client-side improvements.) +.Pp .It Fl x Disables X11 forwarding. .Pp @@ -803,6 +813,17 @@ Enables trusted X11 forwarding. Trusted X11 forwardings are not subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension controls. .Pp +(Debian-specific: This option does nothing in the default configuration: it +is equivalent to +.Dq Cm ForwardX11Trusted No yes , +which is the default as described above. +Set the +.Cm ForwardX11Trusted +option to +.Dq no +to restore the upstream behaviour. +This may change in future depending on client-side improvements.) +.Pp .It Fl y Send log information using the .Xr syslog 3 diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config index 1ff999b68..6dd6ecf87 100644 --- a/ssh_config +++ b/ssh_config @@ -17,9 +17,10 @@ # list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the # ssh_config(5) man page. -# Host * +Host * # ForwardAgent no # ForwardX11 no +# ForwardX11Trusted yes # PasswordAuthentication yes # HostbasedAuthentication no # GSSAPIAuthentication no @@ -45,3 +46,6 @@ # VisualHostKey no # ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com # RekeyLimit 1G 1h + SendEnv LANG LC_* + HashKnownHosts yes + GSSAPIAuthentication yes diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 index 4b42aab9d..d27655e15 100644 --- a/ssh_config.5 +++ b/ssh_config.5 @@ -71,6 +71,22 @@ Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more host-specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the file, and general defaults at the end. .Pp +Note that the Debian +.Ic openssh-client +package sets several options as standard in +.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config +which are not the default in +.Xr ssh 1 : +.Pp +.Bl -bullet -offset indent -compact +.It +.Cm SendEnv No LANG LC_* +.It +.Cm HashKnownHosts No yes +.It +.Cm GSSAPIAuthentication No yes +.El +.Pp The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line. Lines starting with .Ql # @@ -721,11 +737,12 @@ elapsed. .It Cm ForwardX11Trusted If this option is set to .Cm yes , +(the Debian-specific default), remote X11 clients will have full access to the original X11 display. .Pp If this option is set to .Cm no -(the default), +(the upstream default), remote X11 clients will be considered untrusted and prevented from stealing or tampering with data belonging to trusted X11 clients. diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config index 2c48105f8..ed8272f6d 100644 --- a/sshd_config +++ b/sshd_config @@ -57,8 +57,9 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys #PasswordAuthentication yes #PermitEmptyPasswords no -# Change to no to disable s/key passwords -#ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes +# Change to yes to enable challenge-response passwords (beware issues with +# some PAM modules and threads) +ChallengeResponseAuthentication no # Kerberos options #KerberosAuthentication no @@ -81,16 +82,16 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'. -#UsePAM no +UsePAM yes #AllowAgentForwarding yes #AllowTcpForwarding yes #GatewayPorts no -#X11Forwarding no +X11Forwarding yes #X11DisplayOffset 10 #X11UseLocalhost yes #PermitTTY yes -#PrintMotd yes +PrintMotd no #PrintLastLog yes #TCPKeepAlive yes #PermitUserEnvironment no @@ -107,8 +108,11 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys # no default banner path #Banner none +# Allow client to pass locale environment variables +AcceptEnv LANG LC_* + # override default of no subsystems -Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server +Subsystem sftp /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis #Match User anoncvs diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 index 270805060..02e29cb6f 100644 --- a/sshd_config.5 +++ b/sshd_config.5 @@ -56,6 +56,28 @@ Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes .Pq \&" in order to represent arguments containing spaces. .Pp +Note that the Debian +.Ic openssh-server +package sets several options as standard in +.Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config +which are not the default in +.Xr sshd 8 : +.Pp +.Bl -bullet -offset indent -compact +.It +.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication No no +.It +.Cm X11Forwarding No yes +.It +.Cm PrintMotd No no +.It +.Cm AcceptEnv No LANG LC_* +.It +.Cm Subsystem No sftp /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server +.It +.Cm UsePAM No yes +.El +.Pp The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive): -- cgit v1.2.3 From efef12825b9582c1710da3b7e50135870963d4f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Colin Watson Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2019 10:46:29 +0100 Subject: Revert "upstream: Update default IPQoS in ssh(1), sshd(8) to DSCP AF21 for" This reverts commit 5ee8448ad7c306f05a9f56769f95336a8269f379. The IPQoS default changes have some unfortunate interactions with iptables (see https://bugs.debian.org/923880) and VMware, so I'm temporarily reverting them until those have been fixed. Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/923879 Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/926229 Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/1822370 Last-Update: 2019-04-08 Patch-Name: revert-ipqos-defaults.patch --- readconf.c | 4 ++-- servconf.c | 4 ++-- ssh_config.5 | 6 ++---- sshd_config.5 | 6 ++---- 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) (limited to 'ssh_config.5') diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c index 253574ce0..9812b8d98 100644 --- a/readconf.c +++ b/readconf.c @@ -2174,9 +2174,9 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) if (options->visual_host_key == -1) options->visual_host_key = 0; if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1) - options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_DSCP_AF21; + options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_LOWDELAY; if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1) - options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_DSCP_CS1; + options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_THROUGHPUT; if (options->request_tty == -1) options->request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_AUTO; if (options->proxy_use_fdpass == -1) diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c index 5576098a5..4464d51a5 100644 --- a/servconf.c +++ b/servconf.c @@ -423,9 +423,9 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) if (options->permit_tun == -1) options->permit_tun = SSH_TUNMODE_NO; if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1) - options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_DSCP_AF21; + options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_LOWDELAY; if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1) - options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_DSCP_CS1; + options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_THROUGHPUT; if (options->version_addendum == NULL) options->version_addendum = xstrdup(""); if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1) diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 index d27655e15..b71d5ede9 100644 --- a/ssh_config.5 +++ b/ssh_config.5 @@ -1110,11 +1110,9 @@ If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally. If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions. The default is -.Cm af21 -(Low-Latency Data) +.Cm lowdelay for interactive sessions and -.Cm cs1 -(Lower Effort) +.Cm throughput for non-interactive sessions. .It Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication Specifies whether to use keyboard-interactive authentication. diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 index 02e29cb6f..ba533af9e 100644 --- a/sshd_config.5 +++ b/sshd_config.5 @@ -892,11 +892,9 @@ If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally. If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions. The default is -.Cm af21 -(Low-Latency Data) +.Cm lowdelay for interactive sessions and -.Cm cs1 -(Lower Effort) +.Cm throughput for non-interactive sessions. .It Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication Specifies whether to allow keyboard-interactive authentication. -- cgit v1.2.3