From eb8b60e320cdade9f4c07e2abacfb92c52e01348 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 2010 22:41:14 +1000
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/08/31 11:54:45      [PROTOCOL
 PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys auth2-jpake.c authfd.c]      [authfile.c
 buffer.h dns.c kex.c kex.h key.c key.h monitor.c]      [monitor_wrap.c
 myproposal.h packet.c packet.h pathnames.h readconf.c]      [ssh-add.1
 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1 ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]     
 [ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.8 ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h]     
 [ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5]     
 [uuencode.c uuencode.h bufec.c kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c ssh-ecdsa.c]  
    Implement Elliptic Curve Cryptography modes for key exchange (ECDH) and   
   host/user keys (ECDSA) as specified by RFC5656. ECDH and ECDSA offer     
 better performance than plain DH and DSA at the same equivalent symmetric    
  key length, as well as much shorter keys.

     Only the mandatory sections of RFC5656 are implemented, specifically the
     three REQUIRED curves nistp256, nistp384 and nistp521 and only ECDH and
     ECDSA. Point compression (optional in RFC5656 is NOT implemented).

     Certificate host and user keys using the new ECDSA key types are supported.

     Note that this code has not been tested for interoperability and may be
     subject to change.

     feedback and ok markus@
---
 sshconnect2.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'sshconnect2.c')

diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
index 4c379ae59..a31a663d4 100644
--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.183 2010/04/26 22:28:24 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.184 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
+	kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client;
 	kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
 	kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
 	kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From d5f62bf280b0798d7009d4424594a648a4e887fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Fri, 24 Sep 2010 22:11:14 +1000
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/09/22 05:01:30      [kex.c kex.h
 kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c readconf.c readconf.h]      [servconf.c
 servconf.h ssh_config.5 sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshd_config.5]      add a
 KexAlgorithms knob to the client and server configuration to allow     
 selection of which key exchange methods are used by ssh(1) and sshd(8)     
 and their order of preference.      ok markus@

---
 ChangeLog     |  7 +++++++
 kex.c         | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 kex.h         |  7 +++++--
 kexecdh.c     | 12 ++++--------
 kexecdhc.c    |  5 +++--
 kexecdhs.c    |  5 +++--
 readconf.c    | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
 readconf.h    |  3 ++-
 servconf.c    | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
 servconf.h    |  3 ++-
 ssh_config.5  | 15 +++++++++++++--
 sshconnect2.c |  4 +++-
 sshd.c        |  4 +++-
 sshd_config.5 | 15 +++++++++++++--
 14 files changed, 120 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

(limited to 'sshconnect2.c')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 7d9e994d1..5cb4c880d 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -31,6 +31,13 @@
      either ready or stale without races. stale server sockets are now
      automatically removed
      ok deraadt
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/09/22 05:01:30
+     [kex.c kex.h kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c readconf.c readconf.h]
+     [servconf.c servconf.h ssh_config.5 sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshd_config.5]
+     add a KexAlgorithms knob to the client and server configuration to allow
+     selection of which key exchange methods are used by ssh(1) and sshd(8)
+     and their order of preference.
+     ok markus@
 
 20100910
  - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/port-linux.c] Check is_selinux_enabled for exact
diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
index 7c8763191..c65e28f94 100644
--- a/kex.c
+++ b/kex.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.85 2010/09/09 10:45:45 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.86 2010/09/22 05:01:29 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -62,6 +62,34 @@ extern const EVP_MD *evp_ssh_sha256(void);
 static void kex_kexinit_finish(Kex *);
 static void kex_choose_conf(Kex *);
 
+/* Validate KEX method name list */
+int
+kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+{
+	char *s, *cp, *p;
+
+	if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
+		return 0;
+	s = cp = xstrdup(names);
+	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
+	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+	    	if (strcmp(p, KEX_DHGEX_SHA256) != 0 &&
+		    strcmp(p, KEX_DHGEX_SHA1) != 0 &&
+		    strcmp(p, KEX_DH14) != 0 &&
+		    strcmp(p, KEX_DH1) != 0 &&
+		    (strncmp(p, KEX_ECDH_SHA2_STEM,
+		    sizeof(KEX_ECDH_SHA2_STEM) - 1) != 0 ||
+		    kex_ecdh_name_to_nid(p) == -1)) {
+			error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
+			xfree(s);
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+	debug3("kex names ok: [%s]", names);
+	xfree(s);
+	return 1;
+}
+
 /* put algorithm proposal into buffer */
 static void
 kex_prop2buf(Buffer *b, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
index 3e312fb44..7373d3c78 100644
--- a/kex.h
+++ b/kex.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.51 2010/09/09 10:45:45 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.52 2010/09/22 05:01:29 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -138,6 +138,8 @@ struct Kex {
 	void	(*kex[KEX_MAX])(Kex *);
 };
 
+int	 kex_names_valid(const char *);
+
 Kex	*kex_setup(char *[PROPOSAL_MAX]);
 void	 kex_finish(Kex *);
 
@@ -169,7 +171,8 @@ kex_ecdh_hash(const EVP_MD *, const EC_GROUP *, char *, char *, char *, int,
 int	kex_ecdh_name_to_nid(const char *);
 const EVP_MD *kex_ecdh_name_to_evpmd(const char *);
 #else
-# define kex_ecdh_name_to_evpmd(x) NULL
+# define kex_ecdh_name_to_nid(x) (-1)
+# define kex_ecdh_name_to_evpmd(x) (NULL)
 #endif
 
 void
diff --git a/kexecdh.c b/kexecdh.c
index 4c58a5122..f13f69d3b 100644
--- a/kexecdh.c
+++ b/kexecdh.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexecdh.c,v 1.2 2010/09/09 10:45:45 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexecdh.c,v 1.3 2010/09/22 05:01:29 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -48,15 +48,9 @@
 int
 kex_ecdh_name_to_nid(const char *kexname)
 {
-	int ret;
-
 	if (strlen(kexname) < sizeof(KEX_ECDH_SHA2_STEM) - 1)
 		fatal("%s: kexname too short \"%s\"", __func__, kexname);
-	ret = key_curve_name_to_nid(kexname + sizeof(KEX_ECDH_SHA2_STEM) - 1);
-	if (ret == -1)
-		fatal("%s: unsupported curve negotiated \"%s\"", __func__,
-		    kexname);
-	return ret;
+	return key_curve_name_to_nid(kexname + sizeof(KEX_ECDH_SHA2_STEM) - 1);
 }
 
 const EVP_MD *
@@ -64,6 +58,8 @@ kex_ecdh_name_to_evpmd(const char *kexname)
 {
 	int nid = kex_ecdh_name_to_nid(kexname);
 
+	if (nid == -1)
+		fatal("%s: unsupported ECDH curve \"%s\"", __func__, kexname);
 	return key_ec_nid_to_evpmd(nid);
 }
 
diff --git a/kexecdhc.c b/kexecdhc.c
index 297a0e5a9..115d4bf83 100644
--- a/kexecdhc.c
+++ b/kexecdhc.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexecdhc.c,v 1.1 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexecdhc.c,v 1.2 2010/09/22 05:01:29 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -59,7 +59,8 @@ kexecdh_client(Kex *kex)
 	u_int klen, slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
 	int curve_nid;
 
-	curve_nid = kex_ecdh_name_to_nid(kex->name);
+	if ((curve_nid = kex_ecdh_name_to_nid(kex->name)) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: unsupported ECDH curve \"%s\"", __func__, kex->name);
 	if ((client_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid)) == NULL)
 		fatal("%s: EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name failed", __func__);
 	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(client_key) != 1)
diff --git a/kexecdhs.c b/kexecdhs.c
index d2c3feb09..8c515dfa6 100644
--- a/kexecdhs.c
+++ b/kexecdhs.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexecdhs.c,v 1.1 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexecdhs.c,v 1.2 2010/09/22 05:01:29 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -61,7 +61,8 @@ kexecdh_server(Kex *kex)
 	u_int klen, slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
 	int curve_nid;
 
-	curve_nid = kex_ecdh_name_to_nid(kex->name);
+	if ((curve_nid = kex_ecdh_name_to_nid(kex->name)) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: unsupported ECDH curve \"%s\"", __func__, kex->name);
 	if ((server_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid)) == NULL)
 		fatal("%s: EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name failed", __func__);
 	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(server_key) != 1)
diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
index 586422930..da7efd193 100644
--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.188 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.189 2010/09/22 05:01:29 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ typedef enum {
 	oHashKnownHosts,
 	oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand,
 	oVisualHostKey, oUseRoaming, oZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication,
+	oKexAlgorithms,
 	oDeprecated, oUnsupported
 } OpCodes;
 
@@ -240,6 +241,7 @@ static struct {
 #else
 	{ "zeroknowledgepasswordauthentication", oUnsupported },
 #endif
+	{ "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms },
 
 	{ NULL, oBadOption }
 };
@@ -699,6 +701,18 @@ parse_int:
 			options->macs = xstrdup(arg);
 		break;
 
+	case oKexAlgorithms:
+		arg = strdelim(&s);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		if (!kex_names_valid(arg))
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
+			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+		if (*activep && options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
+			options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
+		break;
+
 	case oHostKeyAlgorithms:
 		arg = strdelim(&s);
 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
@@ -1078,6 +1092,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
 	options->cipher = -1;
 	options->ciphers = NULL;
 	options->macs = NULL;
+	options->kex_algorithms = NULL;
 	options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL;
 	options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN;
 	options->num_identity_files = 0;
@@ -1191,6 +1206,7 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
 		options->cipher = SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET;
 	/* options->ciphers, default set in myproposals.h */
 	/* options->macs, default set in myproposals.h */
+	/* options->kex_algorithms, default set in myproposals.h */
 	/* options->hostkeyalgorithms, default set in myproposals.h */
 	if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
 		options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_2;
diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
index 95d104674..ae61466df 100644
--- a/readconf.h
+++ b/readconf.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.86 2010/07/19 09:15:12 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.87 2010/09/22 05:01:29 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ typedef struct {
 	char   *ciphers;	/* SSH2 ciphers in order of preference. */
 	char   *macs;		/* SSH2 macs in order of preference. */
 	char   *hostkeyalgorithms;	/* SSH2 server key types in order of preference. */
+	char   *kex_algorithms;	/* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */
 	int	protocol;	/* Protocol in order of preference. */
 	char   *hostname;	/* Real host to connect. */
 	char   *host_key_alias;	/* hostname alias for .ssh/known_hosts */
diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
index def6b716a..d26a7db05 100644
--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.210 2010/09/01 15:21:35 naddy Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.211 2010/09/22 05:01:29 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
  *                    All rights reserved
@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 	options->num_deny_groups = 0;
 	options->ciphers = NULL;
 	options->macs = NULL;
+	options->kex_algorithms = NULL;
 	options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN;
 	options->gateway_ports = -1;
 	options->num_subsystems = 0;
@@ -314,6 +315,7 @@ typedef enum {
 	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
 	sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, sHostCertificate,
 	sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
+	sKexAlgorithms,
 	sDeprecated, sUnsupported
 } ServerOpCodes;
 
@@ -436,6 +438,7 @@ static struct {
 	{ "revokedkeys", sRevokedKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
 };
 
@@ -1131,6 +1134,18 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 			options->macs = xstrdup(arg);
 		break;
 
+	case sKexAlgorithms:
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		if (!kex_names_valid(arg))
+			fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
+			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+		if (options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
+			options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
+		break;
+
 	case sProtocol:
 		intptr = &options->protocol;
 		arg = strdelim(&cp);
diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
index 45d2a2ae3..ad13f2edd 100644
--- a/servconf.h
+++ b/servconf.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.93 2010/05/07 11:30:30 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.94 2010/09/22 05:01:29 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ typedef struct {
 	int     tcp_keep_alive;	/* If true, set SO_KEEPALIVE. */
 	char   *ciphers;	/* Supported SSH2 ciphers. */
 	char   *macs;		/* Supported SSH2 macs. */
+	char   *kex_algorithms;	/* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */
 	int	protocol;	/* Supported protocol versions. */
 	int     gateway_ports;	/* If true, allow remote connects to forwarded ports. */
 	SyslogFacility log_facility;	/* Facility for system logging. */
diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
index 33038ffcf..6e49842a7 100644
--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.139 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: August 31 2010 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.140 2010/09/22 05:01:29 djm Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: September 22 2010 $
 .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -646,6 +646,17 @@ it may be zero or more of:
 .Dq pam ,
 and
 .Dq skey .
+.It Cm KexAlgorithms
+Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
+Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+The default is
+.Dq ecdh-sha2-nistp256 ,
+.Dq ecdh-sha2-nistp384 ,
+.Dq ecdh-sha2-nistp521 ,
+.Dq diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 , 
+.Dq diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 ,
+.Dq diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 ,
+.Dq diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 .
 .It Cm LocalCommand
 Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after successfully
 connecting to the server.
diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
index a31a663d4..6fe356cca 100644
--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.184 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.185 2010/09/22 05:01:29 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -135,6 +135,8 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
 	if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL)
 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
 		    options.hostkeyalgorithms;
+	if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL)
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms;
 
 	if (options.rekey_limit)
 		packet_set_rekey_limit((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit);
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 7995f5a1d..5d4d14ae2 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.379 2010/08/31 12:33:38 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.380 2010/09/22 05:01:29 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -2297,6 +2297,8 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none,zlib@openssh.com";
 	}
+	if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL)
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms;
 
 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types();
 
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index af3d89b80..d87f60246 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.126 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: August 31 2010 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.127 2010/09/22 05:01:30 djm Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: September 22 2010 $
 .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -538,6 +538,17 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache
 file on logout.
 The default is
 .Dq yes .
+.It Cm KexAlgorithms
+Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
+Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+The default is
+.Dq ecdh-sha2-nistp256 ,
+.Dq ecdh-sha2-nistp384 ,
+.Dq ecdh-sha2-nistp521 ,
+.Dq diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 , 
+.Dq diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 ,
+.Dq diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 ,
+.Dq diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 .
 .It Cm KeyRegenerationInterval
 In protocol version 1, the ephemeral server key is automatically regenerated
 after this many seconds (if it has been used).
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From d925dcd8a5d1a3070061006788352bed93260582 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2010 12:21:51 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/11/29 23:45:51      [auth.c hostfile.c
 hostfile.h ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c]      [sshconnect.h sshconnect2.c]
      automatically order the hostkeys requested by the client based on     
 which hostkeys are already recorded in known_hosts. This avoids      hostkey
 warnings when connecting to servers with new ECDSA keys      that are
 preferred by default; with markus@

---
 ChangeLog     |   7 ++
 auth.c        |  30 +++---
 hostfile.c    | 301 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
 hostfile.h    |  30 ++++--
 ssh.c         |   4 +-
 ssh_config.5  |   7 +-
 sshconnect.c  | 291 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
 sshconnect.h  |  11 ++-
 sshconnect2.c |  62 +++++++++++-
 9 files changed, 452 insertions(+), 291 deletions(-)

(limited to 'sshconnect2.c')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 44e45eb8a..6ee7c0014 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -38,6 +38,13 @@
      [authfile.c]
      correctly load comment for encrypted rsa1 keys;
      report/fix Joachim Schipper; ok djm@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/11/29 23:45:51
+     [auth.c hostfile.c hostfile.h ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c]
+     [sshconnect.h sshconnect2.c]
+     automatically order the hostkeys requested by the client based on
+     which hostkeys are already recorded in known_hosts. This avoids
+     hostkey warnings when connecting to servers with new ECDSA keys
+     that are preferred by default; with markus@
 
 20101124
  - (dtucker) [platform.c session.c] Move the getluid call out of session.c and
diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index 6fe1b21a4..33680b91b 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.90 2010/11/23 02:35:50 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.91 2010/11/29 23:45:51 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -379,16 +379,15 @@ HostStatus
 check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
     const char *sysfile, const char *userfile)
 {
-	Key *found;
 	char *user_hostfile;
 	struct stat st;
 	HostStatus host_status;
+	struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
+	const struct hostkey_entry *found;
 
-	/* Check if we know the host and its host key. */
-	found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type);
-	host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(sysfile, host, key, found, NULL);
-
-	if (host_status != HOST_OK && userfile != NULL) {
+	hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
+	load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, sysfile);
+	if (userfile != NULL) {
 		user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
 		if (options.strict_modes &&
 		    (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
@@ -401,16 +400,23 @@ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
 			    user_hostfile);
 		} else {
 			temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-			host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(user_hostfile,
-			    host, key, found, NULL);
+			load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, user_hostfile);
 			restore_uid();
 		}
 		xfree(user_hostfile);
 	}
-	key_free(found);
+	host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, key, &found);
+	if (host_status == HOST_REVOKED)
+		error("WARNING: revoked key for %s attempted authentication",
+		    found->host);
+	else if (host_status == HOST_OK)
+		debug("%s: key for %s found at %s:%ld", __func__,
+		    found->host, found->file, found->line);
+	else
+		debug("%s: key for host %s not found", __func__, host);
+
+	free_hostkeys(hostkeys);
 
-	debug2("check_key_in_hostfiles: key %s for %s", host_status == HOST_OK ?
-	    "ok" : "not found", host);
 	return host_status;
 }
 
diff --git a/hostfile.c b/hostfile.c
index afab6dad1..9145529cb 100644
--- a/hostfile.c
+++ b/hostfile.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.48 2010/03/04 10:36:03 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.49 2010/11/29 23:45:51 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -56,6 +56,12 @@
 #include "key.h"
 #include "hostfile.h"
 #include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+struct hostkeys {
+	struct hostkey_entry *entries;
+	u_int num_entries;
+};
 
 static int
 extract_salt(const char *s, u_int l, char *salt, size_t salt_len)
@@ -164,26 +170,28 @@ hostfile_read_key(char **cpp, u_int *bitsp, Key *ret)
 
 	/* Return results. */
 	*cpp = cp;
-	*bitsp = key_size(ret);
+	if (bitsp != NULL)
+		*bitsp = key_size(ret);
 	return 1;
 }
 
 static int
-hostfile_check_key(int bits, const Key *key, const char *host, const char *filename, int linenum)
+hostfile_check_key(int bits, const Key *key, const char *host,
+    const char *filename, u_long linenum)
 {
 	if (key == NULL || key->type != KEY_RSA1 || key->rsa == NULL)
 		return 1;
 	if (bits != BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)) {
-		logit("Warning: %s, line %d: keysize mismatch for host %s: "
+		logit("Warning: %s, line %lu: keysize mismatch for host %s: "
 		    "actual %d vs. announced %d.",
 		    filename, linenum, host, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
-		logit("Warning: replace %d with %d in %s, line %d.",
+		logit("Warning: replace %d with %d in %s, line %lu.",
 		    bits, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), filename, linenum);
 	}
 	return 1;
 }
 
-static enum { MRK_ERROR, MRK_NONE, MRK_REVOKE, MRK_CA }
+static HostkeyMarker
 check_markers(char **cpp)
 {
 	char marker[32], *sp, *cp = *cpp;
@@ -218,49 +226,32 @@ check_markers(char **cpp)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-/*
- * Checks whether the given host (which must be in all lowercase) is already
- * in the list of our known hosts. Returns HOST_OK if the host is known and
- * has the specified key, HOST_NEW if the host is not known, and HOST_CHANGED
- * if the host is known but used to have a different host key.
- *
- * If no 'key' has been specified and a key of type 'keytype' is known
- * for the specified host, then HOST_FOUND is returned.
- */
+struct hostkeys *
+init_hostkeys(void)
+{
+	struct hostkeys *ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret));
 
-static HostStatus
-check_host_in_hostfile_by_key_or_type(const char *filename,
-    const char *host, const Key *key, int keytype, Key *found,
-    int want_revocation, int *numret)
+	ret->entries = NULL;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void
+load_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, const char *host, const char *path)
 {
 	FILE *f;
 	char line[8192];
-	int want, have, linenum = 0, want_cert = key_is_cert(key);
-	u_int kbits;
+	u_long linenum = 0, num_loaded = 0;
 	char *cp, *cp2, *hashed_host;
-	HostStatus end_return;
-
-	debug3("check_host_in_hostfile: host %s filename %s", host, filename);
-
-	if (want_revocation && (key == NULL || keytype != 0 || found != NULL))
-		fatal("%s: invalid arguments", __func__);
-
-	/* Open the file containing the list of known hosts. */
-	f = fopen(filename, "r");
-	if (!f)
-		return HOST_NEW;
-
-	/*
-	 * Return value when the loop terminates.  This is set to
-	 * HOST_CHANGED if we have seen a different key for the host and have
-	 * not found the proper one.
-	 */
-	end_return = HOST_NEW;
-
-	/* Go through the file. */
-	while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
+	HostkeyMarker marker;
+	Key *key;
+	int kbits;
+
+	if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL)
+		return;
+	debug3("%s: loading entries for host \"%.100s\" from file \"%s\"",
+	    __func__, host, path);
+	while (read_keyfile_line(f, path, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) == 0) {
 		cp = line;
-		linenum++;
 
 		/* Skip any leading whitespace, comments and empty lines. */
 		for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
@@ -268,19 +259,11 @@ check_host_in_hostfile_by_key_or_type(const char *filename,
 		if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n')
 			continue;
 
-		if (want_revocation)
-			want = MRK_REVOKE;
-		else if (want_cert)
-			want = MRK_CA;
-		else
-			want = MRK_NONE;
-
-		if ((have = check_markers(&cp)) == MRK_ERROR) {
-			verbose("%s: invalid marker at %s:%d",
-			    __func__, filename, linenum);
-			continue;
-		} else if (want != have)
+		if ((marker = check_markers(&cp)) == MRK_ERROR) {
+			verbose("%s: invalid marker at %s:%lu",
+			    __func__, path, linenum);
 			continue;
+		}
 
 		/* Find the end of the host name portion. */
 		for (cp2 = cp; *cp2 && *cp2 != ' ' && *cp2 != '\t'; cp2++)
@@ -292,8 +275,8 @@ check_host_in_hostfile_by_key_or_type(const char *filename,
 				continue;
 			hashed_host = host_hash(host, cp, (u_int) (cp2 - cp));
 			if (hashed_host == NULL) {
-				debug("Invalid hashed host line %d of %s",
-				    linenum, filename);
+				debug("Invalid hashed host line %lu of %s",
+				    linenum, path);
 				continue;
 			}
 			if (strncmp(hashed_host, cp, (u_int) (cp2 - cp)) != 0)
@@ -303,98 +286,166 @@ check_host_in_hostfile_by_key_or_type(const char *filename,
 		/* Got a match.  Skip host name. */
 		cp = cp2;
 
-		if (want_revocation)
-			found = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
-
 		/*
 		 * Extract the key from the line.  This will skip any leading
 		 * whitespace.  Ignore badly formatted lines.
 		 */
-		if (!hostfile_read_key(&cp, &kbits, found))
+		key = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+		if (!hostfile_read_key(&cp, &kbits, key)) {
+			key_free(key);
+			key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+			if (!hostfile_read_key(&cp, &kbits, key)) {
+				key_free(key);
+				continue;
+			}
+		}
+		if (!hostfile_check_key(kbits, key, host, path, linenum))
 			continue;
 
-		if (numret != NULL)
-			*numret = linenum;
+		debug3("%s: found %skey type %s in file %s:%lu", __func__,
+		    marker == MRK_NONE ? "" :
+		    (marker == MRK_CA ? "ca " : "revoked "),
+		    key_type(key), path, linenum);
+		hostkeys->entries = xrealloc(hostkeys->entries,
+		    hostkeys->num_entries + 1, sizeof(*hostkeys->entries));
+		hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].host = xstrdup(host);
+		hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].file = xstrdup(path);
+		hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].line = linenum;
+		hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].key = key;
+		hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].marker = marker;
+		hostkeys->num_entries++;
+		num_loaded++;
+	}
+	debug3("%s: loaded %lu keys", __func__, num_loaded);
+	return;
+}	
 
-		if (key == NULL) {
-			/* we found a key of the requested type */
-			if (found->type == keytype) {
-				fclose(f);
-				return HOST_FOUND;
-			}
-			continue;
-		}
+void
+free_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) {
+		xfree(hostkeys->entries[i].host);
+		xfree(hostkeys->entries[i].file);
+		key_free(hostkeys->entries[i].key);
+		bzero(hostkeys->entries + i, sizeof(*hostkeys->entries));
+	}
+	if (hostkeys->entries != NULL)
+		xfree(hostkeys->entries);
+	hostkeys->entries = NULL;
+	hostkeys->num_entries = 0;
+	xfree(hostkeys);
+}
 
-		if (!hostfile_check_key(kbits, found, host, filename, linenum))
+static int
+check_key_not_revoked(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, Key *k)
+{
+	int is_cert = key_is_cert(k);
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) {
+		if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker != MRK_REVOKE)
 			continue;
+		if (key_equal_public(k, hostkeys->entries[i].key))
+			return -1;
+		if (is_cert &&
+		    key_equal_public(k->cert->signature_key,
+		    hostkeys->entries[i].key))
+			return -1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
 
-		if (want_revocation) {
-			if (key_is_cert(key) &&
-			    key_equal_public(key->cert->signature_key, found)) {
-				verbose("check_host_in_hostfile: revoked CA "
-				    "line %d", linenum);
-				key_free(found);
-				return HOST_REVOKED;
-			}
-			if (key_equal_public(key, found)) {
-				verbose("check_host_in_hostfile: revoked key "
-				    "line %d", linenum);
-				key_free(found);
-				return HOST_REVOKED;
-			}
-			key_free(found);
+/*
+ * Match keys against a specified key, or look one up by key type.
+ *
+ * If looking for a keytype (key == NULL) and one is found then return
+ * HOST_FOUND, otherwise HOST_NEW.
+ *
+ * If looking for a key (key != NULL):
+ *  1. If the key is a cert and a matching CA is found, return HOST_OK
+ *  2. If the key is not a cert and a matching key is found, return HOST_OK
+ *  3. If no key matches but a key with a different type is found, then
+ *     return HOST_CHANGED
+ *  4. If no matching keys are found, then return HOST_NEW.
+ *
+ * Finally, check any found key is not revoked.
+ */
+static HostStatus
+check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(struct hostkeys *hostkeys,
+    Key *k, int keytype, const struct hostkey_entry **found)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	HostStatus end_return = HOST_NEW;
+	int want_cert = key_is_cert(k);
+	HostkeyMarker want_marker = want_cert ? MRK_CA : MRK_NONE;
+	int proto = (k ? k->type : keytype) == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2;
+
+	if (found != NULL)
+		*found = NULL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) {
+		if (proto == 1 && hostkeys->entries[i].key->type != KEY_RSA1)
+			continue;
+		if (proto == 2 && hostkeys->entries[i].key->type == KEY_RSA1)
 			continue;
+		if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker != want_marker)
+			continue;
+		if (k == NULL) {
+			if (hostkeys->entries[i].key->type != keytype)
+				continue;
+			end_return = HOST_FOUND;
+			if (found != NULL)
+				*found = hostkeys->entries + i;
+			k = hostkeys->entries[i].key;
+			break;
 		}
-
-		/* Check if the current key is the same as the given key. */
-		if (want_cert && key_equal(key->cert->signature_key, found)) {
-			/* Found CA cert for key */
-			debug3("check_host_in_hostfile: CA match line %d",
-			    linenum);
-			fclose(f);
-			return HOST_OK;
-		} else if (!want_cert && key_equal(key, found)) {
-			/* Found identical key */
-			debug3("check_host_in_hostfile: match line %d", linenum);
-			fclose(f);
-			return HOST_OK;
+		if (want_cert) {
+			if (key_equal_public(k->cert->signature_key,
+			    hostkeys->entries[i].key)) {
+				/* A matching CA exists */
+				end_return = HOST_OK;
+				if (found != NULL)
+					*found = hostkeys->entries + i;
+				break;
+			}
+		} else {
+			if (key_equal(k, hostkeys->entries[i].key)) {
+				end_return = HOST_OK;
+				if (found != NULL)
+					*found = hostkeys->entries + i;
+				break;
+			}
+			/* A non-maching key exists */
+			end_return = HOST_CHANGED;
+			if (found != NULL)
+				*found = hostkeys->entries + i;
 		}
-		/*
-		 * They do not match.  We will continue to go through the
-		 * file; however, we note that we will not return that it is
-		 * new.
-		 */
-		end_return = HOST_CHANGED;
 	}
-	/* Clear variables and close the file. */
-	fclose(f);
-
-	/*
-	 * Return either HOST_NEW or HOST_CHANGED, depending on whether we
-	 * saw a different key for the host.
-	 */
+	if (check_key_not_revoked(hostkeys, k) != 0) {
+		end_return = HOST_REVOKED;
+		if (found != NULL)
+			*found = NULL;
+	}
 	return end_return;
 }
-
+	
 HostStatus
-check_host_in_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host, const Key *key,
-    Key *found, int *numret)
+check_key_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, Key *key,
+    const struct hostkey_entry **found)
 {
 	if (key == NULL)
 		fatal("no key to look up");
-	if (check_host_in_hostfile_by_key_or_type(filename, host,
-	    key, 0, NULL, 1, NULL) == HOST_REVOKED)
-		return HOST_REVOKED;
-	return check_host_in_hostfile_by_key_or_type(filename, host, key, 0,
-	    found, 0, numret);
+	return check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(hostkeys, key, 0, found);
 }
 
 int
-lookup_key_in_hostfile_by_type(const char *filename, const char *host,
-    int keytype, Key *found, int *numret)
+lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, int keytype,
+    const struct hostkey_entry **found)
 {
-	return (check_host_in_hostfile_by_key_or_type(filename, host, NULL,
-	    keytype, found, 0, numret) == HOST_FOUND);
+	return (check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(hostkeys, NULL, keytype,
+	    found) == HOST_FOUND);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/hostfile.h b/hostfile.h
index 1d460c1a9..d84d422ff 100644
--- a/hostfile.h
+++ b/hostfile.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.h,v 1.18 2010/03/04 10:36:03 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.h,v 1.19 2010/11/29 23:45:51 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -18,12 +18,30 @@ typedef enum {
 	HOST_OK, HOST_NEW, HOST_CHANGED, HOST_REVOKED, HOST_FOUND
 }       HostStatus;
 
+typedef enum {
+	MRK_ERROR, MRK_NONE, MRK_REVOKE, MRK_CA
+}	HostkeyMarker;
+
+struct hostkey_entry {
+	char *host;
+	char *file;
+	u_long line;
+	Key *key;
+	HostkeyMarker marker;
+};
+struct hostkeys;
+
+struct hostkeys *init_hostkeys(void);
+void	 load_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *, const char *, const char *);
+void	 free_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *);
+
+HostStatus check_key_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *, Key *,
+    const struct hostkey_entry **);
+int	 lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(struct hostkeys *, int,
+    const struct hostkey_entry **);
+
 int	 hostfile_read_key(char **, u_int *, Key *);
-HostStatus check_host_in_hostfile(const char *, const char *,
-	    const Key *, Key *, int *);
-int	add_host_to_hostfile(const char *, const char *, const Key *, int);
-int	lookup_key_in_hostfile_by_type(const char *, const char *,
-	    int, Key *, int *);
+int	 add_host_to_hostfile(const char *, const char *, const Key *, int);
 
 #define HASH_MAGIC	"|1|"
 #define HASH_DELIM	'|'
diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
index f413f8a5c..ec690ae38 100644
--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.354 2010/11/13 23:27:50 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.355 2010/11/29 23:45:51 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -880,7 +880,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 
 	/* Log into the remote system.  Never returns if the login fails. */
 	ssh_login(&sensitive_data, host, (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr,
-	    pw, timeout_ms);
+	    options.port, pw, timeout_ms);
 
 	if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
 		verbose("Authenticated to %s ([%s]:%d).", host,
diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
index a51a37dde..5c6673de3 100644
--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.144 2010/11/15 07:40:14 jmc Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: November 15 2010 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.145 2010/11/29 23:45:51 djm Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: November 29 2010 $
 .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -555,6 +555,9 @@ ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com,ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com,
 ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
 ssh-rsa,ssh-dss
 .Ed
+.Pp
+If hostkeys are known for the destination host then this default is modified
+to prefer their algorithms.
 .It Cm HostKeyAlias
 Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the
 real host name when looking up or saving the host key
diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
index 78068c602..064bb74b3 100644
--- a/sshconnect.c
+++ b/sshconnect.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.228 2010/10/06 21:10:21 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.229 2010/11/29 23:45:51 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ extern char *__progname;
 extern uid_t original_real_uid;
 extern uid_t original_effective_uid;
 
-static int show_other_keys(const char *, Key *);
+static int show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *, Key *);
 static void warn_changed_key(Key *);
 
 /*
@@ -607,6 +607,79 @@ check_host_cert(const char *host, const Key *host_key)
 	return 1;
 }
 
+static int
+sockaddr_is_local(struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
+{
+	switch (hostaddr->sa_family) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		return (ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *)hostaddr)->
+		    sin_addr.s_addr) >> 24) == IN_LOOPBACKNET;
+	case AF_INET6:
+		return IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(
+		    &(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)hostaddr)->sin6_addr));
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Prepare the hostname and ip address strings that are used to lookup
+ * host keys in known_hosts files. These may have a port number appended.
+ */
+void
+get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr,
+    u_short port, char **hostfile_hostname, char **hostfile_ipaddr)
+{
+	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST];
+	socklen_t addrlen;
+
+	switch (hostaddr == NULL ? -1 : hostaddr->sa_family) {
+	case -1:
+		addrlen = 0;
+		break;
+	case AF_INET:
+		addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+		break;
+	case AF_INET6:
+		addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+		break;
+	default:
+		addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We don't have the remote ip-address for connections
+	 * using a proxy command
+	 */
+	if (hostfile_ipaddr != NULL) {
+		if (options.proxy_command == NULL) {
+			if (getnameinfo(hostaddr, addrlen,
+			    ntop, sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0)
+			fatal("check_host_key: getnameinfo failed");
+			*hostfile_ipaddr = put_host_port(ntop, port);
+		} else {
+			*hostfile_ipaddr = xstrdup("<no hostip for proxy "
+			    "command>");
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Allow the user to record the key under a different name or
+	 * differentiate a non-standard port.  This is useful for ssh
+	 * tunneling over forwarded connections or if you run multiple
+	 * sshd's on different ports on the same machine.
+	 */
+	if (hostfile_hostname != NULL) {
+		if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) {
+			*hostfile_hostname = xstrdup(options.host_key_alias);
+			debug("using hostkeyalias: %s", *hostfile_hostname);
+		} else {
+			*hostfile_hostname = put_host_port(hostname, port);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 /*
  * check whether the supplied host key is valid, return -1 if the key
  * is not valid. the user_hostfile will not be updated if 'readonly' is true.
@@ -616,21 +689,21 @@ check_host_cert(const char *host, const Key *host_key)
 #define ROQUIET	2
 static int
 check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
-    Key *host_key, int readonly, const char *user_hostfile,
-    const char *system_hostfile)
+    Key *host_key, int readonly, char *user_hostfile,
+    char *system_hostfile)
 {
-	Key *file_key, *raw_key = NULL;
+	Key *raw_key = NULL;
 	const char *type;
 	char *ip = NULL, *host = NULL;
 	char hostline[1000], *hostp, *fp, *ra;
 	HostStatus host_status;
 	HostStatus ip_status;
-	int r, want_cert, local = 0, host_ip_differ = 0;
-	int salen;
-	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST];
+	int r, want_cert = key_is_cert(host_key), host_ip_differ = 0;
+	int local = sockaddr_is_local(hostaddr);
 	char msg[1024];
-	int len, host_line, ip_line, cancelled_forwarding = 0;
-	const char *host_file = NULL, *ip_file = NULL;
+	int len, cancelled_forwarding = 0;
+	struct hostkeys *host_hostkeys, *ip_hostkeys;
+	const struct hostkey_entry *host_found, *ip_found;
 
 	/*
 	 * Force accepting of the host key for loopback/localhost. The
@@ -640,23 +713,6 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
 	 * essentially disables host authentication for localhost; however,
 	 * this is probably not a real problem.
 	 */
-	/**  hostaddr == 0! */
-	switch (hostaddr->sa_family) {
-	case AF_INET:
-		local = (ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *)hostaddr)->
-		    sin_addr.s_addr) >> 24) == IN_LOOPBACKNET;
-		salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
-		break;
-	case AF_INET6:
-		local = IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(
-		    &(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)hostaddr)->sin6_addr));
-		salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
-		break;
-	default:
-		local = 0;
-		salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
-		break;
-	}
 	if (options.no_host_authentication_for_localhost == 1 && local &&
 	    options.host_key_alias == NULL) {
 		debug("Forcing accepting of host key for "
@@ -665,17 +721,10 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * We don't have the remote ip-address for connections
-	 * using a proxy command
+	 * Prepare the hostname and address strings used for hostkey lookup.
+	 * In some cases, these will have a port number appended.
 	 */
-	if (options.proxy_command == NULL) {
-		if (getnameinfo(hostaddr, salen, ntop, sizeof(ntop),
-		    NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0)
-			fatal("check_host_key: getnameinfo failed");
-		ip = put_host_port(ntop, port);
-	} else {
-		ip = xstrdup("<no hostip for proxy command>");
-	}
+	get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(hostname, hostaddr, port, &host, &ip);
 
 	/*
 	 * Turn off check_host_ip if the connection is to localhost, via proxy
@@ -685,74 +734,52 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
 	    strcmp(hostname, ip) == 0 || options.proxy_command != NULL))
 		options.check_host_ip = 0;
 
-	/*
-	 * Allow the user to record the key under a different name or
-	 * differentiate a non-standard port.  This is useful for ssh
-	 * tunneling over forwarded connections or if you run multiple
-	 * sshd's on different ports on the same machine.
-	 */
-	if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) {
-		host = xstrdup(options.host_key_alias);
-		debug("using hostkeyalias: %s", host);
-	} else {
-		host = put_host_port(hostname, port);
+	host_hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
+	load_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host, user_hostfile);
+	load_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host, system_hostfile);
+
+	ip_hostkeys = NULL;
+	if (!want_cert && options.check_host_ip) {
+		ip_hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
+		load_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, ip, user_hostfile);
+		load_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, ip, system_hostfile);
 	}
 
  retry:
+	/* Reload these as they may have changed on cert->key downgrade */
 	want_cert = key_is_cert(host_key);
 	type = key_type(host_key);
 
-	/*
-	 * Store the host key from the known host file in here so that we can
-	 * compare it with the key for the IP address.
-	 */
-	file_key = key_new(key_is_cert(host_key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : host_key->type);
-
 	/*
 	 * Check if the host key is present in the user's list of known
 	 * hosts or in the systemwide list.
 	 */
-	host_file = user_hostfile;
-	host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(host_file, host, host_key,
-	    file_key, &host_line);
-	if (host_status == HOST_NEW) {
-		host_file = system_hostfile;
-		host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(host_file, host, host_key,
-		    file_key, &host_line);
-	}
+	host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host_key,
+	    &host_found);
+
 	/*
 	 * Also perform check for the ip address, skip the check if we are
 	 * localhost, looking for a certificate, or the hostname was an ip
 	 * address to begin with.
 	 */
-	if (!want_cert && options.check_host_ip) {
-		Key *ip_key = key_new(host_key->type);
-
-		ip_file = user_hostfile;
-		ip_status = check_host_in_hostfile(ip_file, ip, host_key,
-		    ip_key, &ip_line);
-		if (ip_status == HOST_NEW) {
-			ip_file = system_hostfile;
-			ip_status = check_host_in_hostfile(ip_file, ip,
-			    host_key, ip_key, &ip_line);
-		}
+	if (!want_cert && ip_hostkeys != NULL) {
+		ip_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, host_key,
+		    &ip_found);
 		if (host_status == HOST_CHANGED &&
-		    (ip_status != HOST_CHANGED || !key_equal(ip_key, file_key)))
+		    (ip_status != HOST_CHANGED || 
+		    (ip_found != NULL &&
+		    !key_equal(ip_found->key, host_found->key))))
 			host_ip_differ = 1;
-
-		key_free(ip_key);
 	} else
 		ip_status = host_status;
 
-	key_free(file_key);
-
 	switch (host_status) {
 	case HOST_OK:
 		/* The host is known and the key matches. */
 		debug("Host '%.200s' is known and matches the %s host %s.",
 		    host, type, want_cert ? "certificate" : "key");
-		debug("Found %s in %s:%d",
-		    want_cert ? "CA key" : "key", host_file, host_line);
+		debug("Found %s in %s:%lu", want_cert ? "CA key" : "key",
+		    host_found->file, host_found->line);
 		if (want_cert && !check_host_cert(hostname, host_key))
 			goto fail;
 		if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) {
@@ -803,7 +830,7 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
 		} else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) {
 			char msg1[1024], msg2[1024];
 
-			if (show_other_keys(host, host_key))
+			if (show_other_keys(host_hostkeys, host_key))
 				snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1),
 				    "\nbut keys of different type are already"
 				    " known for this host.");
@@ -844,8 +871,7 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
 		 * local known_hosts file.
 		 */
 		if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) {
-			snprintf(hostline, sizeof(hostline), "%s,%s",
-			    host, ip);
+			snprintf(hostline, sizeof(hostline), "%s,%s", host, ip);
 			hostp = hostline;
 			if (options.hash_known_hosts) {
 				/* Add hash of host and IP separately */
@@ -899,8 +925,8 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
 			 * all hosts that one might visit.
 			 */
 			debug("Host certificate authority does not "
-			    "match %s in %s:%d", CA_MARKER,
-			    host_file, host_line);
+			    "match %s in %s:%lu", CA_MARKER,
+			    host_found->file, host_found->line);
 			goto fail;
 		}
 		if (readonly == ROQUIET)
@@ -922,13 +948,15 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
 			error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host");
 			error("and its host key have changed at the same time.");
 			if (ip_status != HOST_NEW)
-				error("Offending key for IP in %s:%d", ip_file, ip_line);
+				error("Offending key for IP in %s:%lu",
+				    ip_found->file, ip_found->line);
 		}
 		/* The host key has changed. */
 		warn_changed_key(host_key);
 		error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.",
 		    user_hostfile);
-		error("Offending key in %s:%d", host_file, host_line);
+		error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu", key_type(host_found->key),
+		    host_found->file, host_found->line);
 
 		/*
 		 * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
@@ -1013,13 +1041,13 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
 		snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
 		    "Warning: the %s host key for '%.200s' "
 		    "differs from the key for the IP address '%.128s'"
-		    "\nOffending key for IP in %s:%d",
-		    type, host, ip, ip_file, ip_line);
+		    "\nOffending key for IP in %s:%lu",
+		    type, host, ip, ip_found->file, ip_found->line);
 		if (host_status == HOST_OK) {
 			len = strlen(msg);
 			snprintf(msg + len, sizeof(msg) - len,
-			    "\nMatching host key in %s:%d",
-			    host_file, host_line);
+			    "\nMatching host key in %s:%lu",
+			    host_found->file, host_found->line);
 		}
 		if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 1) {
 			logit("%s", msg);
@@ -1037,6 +1065,10 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
 
 	xfree(ip);
 	xfree(host);
+	if (host_hostkeys != NULL)
+		free_hostkeys(host_hostkeys);
+	if (ip_hostkeys != NULL)
+		free_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys);
 	return 0;
 
 fail:
@@ -1056,6 +1088,10 @@ fail:
 		key_free(raw_key);
 	xfree(ip);
 	xfree(host);
+	if (host_hostkeys != NULL)
+		free_hostkeys(host_hostkeys);
+	if (ip_hostkeys != NULL)
+		free_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys);
 	return -1;
 }
 
@@ -1065,6 +1101,11 @@ verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key)
 {
 	struct stat st;
 	int flags = 0;
+	char *fp;
+
+	fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+	debug("Server host key: %s %s", key_type(host_key), fp);
+	xfree(fp);
 
 	/* XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS */
 	if (!key_is_cert(host_key) && options.verify_host_key_dns &&
@@ -1108,7 +1149,7 @@ verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key)
  */
 void
 ssh_login(Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost,
-    struct sockaddr *hostaddr, struct passwd *pw, int timeout_ms)
+    struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, struct passwd *pw, int timeout_ms)
 {
 	char *host, *cp;
 	char *server_user, *local_user;
@@ -1131,7 +1172,7 @@ ssh_login(Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost,
 	/* key exchange */
 	/* authenticate user */
 	if (compat20) {
-		ssh_kex2(host, hostaddr);
+		ssh_kex2(host, hostaddr, port);
 		ssh_userauth2(local_user, server_user, host, sensitive);
 	} else {
 		ssh_kex(host, hostaddr);
@@ -1158,61 +1199,35 @@ ssh_put_password(char *password)
 	xfree(padded);
 }
 
-static int
-show_key_from_file(const char *file, const char *host, int keytype)
-{
-	Key *found;
-	char *fp, *ra;
-	int line, ret;
-
-	found = key_new(keytype);
-	if ((ret = lookup_key_in_hostfile_by_type(file, host,
-	    keytype, found, &line))) {
-		fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-		ra = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-		logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n"
-		    "in %s:%d\n"
-		    "%s key fingerprint %s.\n%s\n",
-		    key_type(found), host, file, line,
-		    key_type(found), fp, ra);
-		xfree(ra);
-		xfree(fp);
-	}
-	key_free(found);
-	return (ret);
-}
-
 /* print all known host keys for a given host, but skip keys of given type */
 static int
-show_other_keys(const char *host, Key *key)
+show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, Key *key)
 {
 	int type[] = { KEY_RSA1, KEY_RSA, KEY_DSA, KEY_ECDSA, -1};
-	int i, found = 0;
+	int i, ret = 0;
+	char *fp, *ra;
+	const struct hostkey_entry *found;
 
 	for (i = 0; type[i] != -1; i++) {
 		if (type[i] == key->type)
 			continue;
-		if (type[i] != KEY_RSA1 &&
-		    show_key_from_file(options.user_hostfile2, host, type[i])) {
-			found = 1;
-			continue;
-		}
-		if (type[i] != KEY_RSA1 &&
-		    show_key_from_file(options.system_hostfile2, host, type[i])) {
-			found = 1;
-			continue;
-		}
-		if (show_key_from_file(options.user_hostfile, host, type[i])) {
-			found = 1;
+		if (!lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, type[i], &found))
 			continue;
-		}
-		if (show_key_from_file(options.system_hostfile, host, type[i])) {
-			found = 1;
-			continue;
-		}
-		debug2("no key of type %d for host %s", type[i], host);
+		fp = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+		ra = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+		logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n"
+		    "in %s:%lu\n"
+		    "%s key fingerprint %s.",
+		    key_type(found->key),
+		    found->host, found->file, found->line,
+		    key_type(found->key), fp);
+		if (options.visual_host_key)
+			logit("%s", ra);
+		xfree(ra);
+		xfree(fp);
+		ret = 1;
 	}
-	return (found);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static void
diff --git a/sshconnect.h b/sshconnect.h
index 69163afbc..fd7f7f7c6 100644
--- a/sshconnect.h
+++ b/sshconnect.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.h,v 1.26 2010/10/06 06:39:28 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.h,v 1.27 2010/11/29 23:45:51 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -36,15 +36,18 @@ ssh_connect(const char *, struct sockaddr_storage *, u_short, int, int,
     int *, int, int, const char *);
 void	 ssh_kill_proxy_command(void);
 
-void
-ssh_login(Sensitive *, const char *, struct sockaddr *, struct passwd *, int);
+void	 ssh_login(Sensitive *, const char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short,
+    struct passwd *, int);
 
 void	 ssh_exchange_identification(int);
 
 int	 verify_host_key(char *, struct sockaddr *, Key *);
 
+void	 get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short,
+    char **, char **);
+
 void	 ssh_kex(char *, struct sockaddr *);
-void	 ssh_kex2(char *, struct sockaddr *);
+void	 ssh_kex2(char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short);
 
 void	 ssh_userauth1(const char *, const char *, char *, Sensitive *);
 void	 ssh_userauth2(const char *, const char *, char *, Sensitive *);
diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
index 6fe356cca..3cb9b101c 100644
--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.185 2010/09/22 05:01:29 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.186 2010/11/29 23:45:51 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
 #include "msg.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
 #include "uidswap.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
 #include "schnorr.h"
 #include "jpake.h"
 
@@ -101,8 +102,60 @@ verify_host_key_callback(Key *hostkey)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static char *
+order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
+{
+	char *oavail, *avail, *first, *last, *alg, *hostname, *ret;
+	size_t maxlen;
+	struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
+	int ktype;
+
+	/* Find all hostkeys for this hostname */
+	get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(host, hostaddr, port, &hostname, NULL);
+	hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
+	load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.user_hostfile2);
+	load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.system_hostfile2);
+	load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.user_hostfile);
+	load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.system_hostfile);
+
+	oavail = avail = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
+	maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1;
+	first = xmalloc(maxlen);
+	last = xmalloc(maxlen);
+	*first = *last = '\0';
+
+#define ALG_APPEND(to, from) \
+	do { \
+		if (*to != '\0') \
+			strlcat(to, ",", maxlen); \
+		strlcat(to, from, maxlen); \
+	} while (0)
+
+	while ((alg = strsep(&avail, ",")) && *alg != '\0') {
+		if ((ktype = key_type_from_name(alg)) == KEY_UNSPEC)
+			fatal("%s: unknown alg %s", __func__, alg);
+		if (lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys,
+		    key_type_plain(ktype), NULL))
+			ALG_APPEND(first, alg);
+		else
+			ALG_APPEND(last, alg);
+	}
+#undef ALG_APPEND
+	xasprintf(&ret, "%s%s%s", first, *first == '\0' ? "" : ",", last);
+	if (*first != '\0')
+		debug3("%s: prefer hostkeyalgs: %s", __func__, first);
+
+	xfree(first);
+	xfree(last);
+	xfree(hostname);
+	xfree(oavail);
+	free_hostkeys(hostkeys);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 void
-ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
+ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
 {
 	Kex *kex;
 
@@ -135,6 +188,11 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
 	if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL)
 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
 		    options.hostkeyalgorithms;
+	else {
+		/* Prefer algorithms that we already have keys for */
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
+		    order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port);
+	}
 	if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL)
 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms;
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 4e8aa4da57000c7bba8e5c49163bc0c0ca383f78 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2011 11:40:46 +0000
Subject: import openssh-5.6p1-gsskex-all-20110101.patch

---
 ChangeLog.gssapi | 18 ++++++++++++++----
 Makefile.in      |  4 ++--
 key.c            |  2 ++
 readconf.c       |  7 +++++++
 readconf.h       |  1 +
 servconf.c       |  7 +++++++
 ssh_config.5     |  5 +++++
 sshconnect2.c    | 10 ++++++++--
 8 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

(limited to 'sshconnect2.c')

diff --git a/ChangeLog.gssapi b/ChangeLog.gssapi
index 0c3f5a44f..f117a336a 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.gssapi
+++ b/ChangeLog.gssapi
@@ -1,10 +1,20 @@
+20110101
+  - Finally update for OpenSSH 5.6p1
+  - Add GSSAPIServerIdentity option from Jim Basney
+ 
+20100308
+  - [ Makefile.in, key.c, key.h ]
+    Updates for OpenSSH 5.4p1
+  - [ servconf.c ]
+    Include GSSAPI options in the sshd -T configuration dump, and flag
+    some older configuration options as being unsupported. Thanks to Colin 
+    Watson.
+  -
+
 20100124
   - [ sshconnect2.c ]
     Adapt to deal with additional element in Authmethod structure. Thanks to
-    Colin Wilson
-  - [ clientloop.c ]
-    Protect credentials updated code with suitable #ifdefs. Thanks to Colin
-    Wilson
+    Colin Watson
 
 20090615
   - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c
diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
index 8678a1dc5..eaf362652 100644
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -73,8 +73,8 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=acss.o authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
 	atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
 	monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o kexdh.o \
 	kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o \
-	entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o jpake.o schnorr.o \
-	ssh-pkcs11.o kexgssc.o
+	entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o jpake.o schnorr.o kexgssc.o \
+	ssh-pkcs11.o
 
 SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
 	sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \
diff --git a/key.c b/key.c
index 57ad9fd02..020f503b6 100644
--- a/key.c
+++ b/key.c
@@ -851,6 +851,8 @@ key_ssh_name(const Key *k)
 		return "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com";
 	case KEY_DSA_CERT:
 		return "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com";
+	case KEY_NULL:
+		return "null";
 	}
 	return "ssh-unknown";
 }
diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
index 36750a843..0d551b9ae 100644
--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ typedef enum {
 	oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
 	oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
 	oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey,
+	oGssServerIdentity, 
 	oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
 	oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
 	oHashKnownHosts,
@@ -171,6 +172,7 @@ static struct {
 	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
 	{ "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
 	{ "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity },
+	{ "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity },
 	{ "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey },
 #else
 	{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
@@ -499,6 +501,10 @@ parse_flag:
 		charptr = &options->gss_client_identity;
 		goto parse_string;
 
+	case oGssServerIdentity:
+		charptr = &options->gss_server_identity;
+		goto parse_string;
+
 	case oGssRenewalRekey:
 		intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey;
 		goto parse_flag;
@@ -1088,6 +1094,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
 	options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
 	options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1;
 	options->gss_client_identity = NULL;
+	options->gss_server_identity = NULL;
 	options->password_authentication = -1;
 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
 	options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
index f81eaff47..bb3ff0481 100644
--- a/readconf.h
+++ b/readconf.h
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ typedef struct {
 	int	gss_trust_dns;		/* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
 	int	gss_renewal_rekey;	/* Credential renewal forces rekey */
 	char    *gss_client_identity;   /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */
+	char    *gss_server_identity;   /* GSSAPI target principal */
 	int     password_authentication;	/* Try password
 						 * authentication. */
 	int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
index 2aa516b2a..3ce2397c3 100644
--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
@@ -381,16 +381,20 @@ static struct {
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 #else
 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 #endif
+	{ "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -1684,7 +1688,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
 #endif
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
 #endif
 #ifdef JPAKE
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication,
diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
index 91c2cd2c6..321a94db6 100644
--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
@@ -519,6 +519,11 @@ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
 If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when 
 connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default 
 identity will be used.
+.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity
+If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when 
+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the
+expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target
+hostname.
 .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
 Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
 The default is
diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
index d045365f3..1a03c6bf3 100644
--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
@@ -197,7 +197,11 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
 		kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
 		kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
 		kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity;
-		kex->gss_host = gss_host;
+		if (options.gss_server_identity) {
+			kex->gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
+		} else {
+			kex->gss_host = gss_host;
+        }
 	}
 #endif
 
@@ -624,7 +628,9 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	int ok = 0;
 	const char *gss_host;
 
-	if (options.gss_trust_dns)
+	if (options.gss_server_identity)
+		gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
+	else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
 		gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1);
 	else
 		gss_host = authctxt->host;
-- 
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