From ffe6549c2f7a999cc5264b873a60322e91862581 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "naddy@openbsd.org" <naddy@openbsd.org>
Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2016 12:32:04 +0000
Subject: upstream commit

Catch up with the SSH1 code removal and delete all
mention of protocol 1 particularities, key files and formats, command line
options, and configuration keywords from the server documentation and
examples.  ok jmc@

Upstream-ID: 850328854675b4b6a0d4a90f0b4a9dd9ca4e905f
---
 sshd.8 | 108 ++++++++++++++---------------------------------------------------
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 85 deletions(-)

(limited to 'sshd.8')

diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
index 6c521f23e..148a8b923 100644
--- a/sshd.8
+++ b/sshd.8
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.284 2016/02/17 07:38:19 jmc Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: February 17 2016 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.285 2016/08/15 12:32:04 naddy Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: August 15 2016 $
 .Dt SSHD 8
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -44,14 +44,12 @@
 .Nm sshd
 .Bk -words
 .Op Fl 46DdeiqTt
-.Op Fl b Ar bits
 .Op Fl C Ar connection_spec
 .Op Fl c Ar host_certificate_file
 .Op Fl E Ar log_file
 .Op Fl f Ar config_file
 .Op Fl g Ar login_grace_time
 .Op Fl h Ar host_key_file
-.Op Fl k Ar key_gen_time
 .Op Fl o Ar option
 .Op Fl p Ar port
 .Op Fl u Ar len
@@ -96,9 +94,6 @@ to use IPv4 addresses only.
 Forces
 .Nm
 to use IPv6 addresses only.
-.It Fl b Ar bits
-Specifies the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1
-server key (default 1024).
 .It Fl C Ar connection_spec
 Specify the connection parameters to use for the
 .Fl T
@@ -169,36 +164,18 @@ This option must be given if
 is not run as root (as the normal
 host key files are normally not readable by anyone but root).
 The default is
-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
-for protocol version 1, and
 .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key ,
-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key .
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key ,
 .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
 and
-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
-for protocol version 2.
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key .
 It is possible to have multiple host key files for
-the different protocol versions and host key algorithms.
+the different host key algorithms.
 .It Fl i
 Specifies that
 .Nm
 is being run from
 .Xr inetd 8 .
-If SSH protocol 1 is enabled,
-.Nm
-should not  normally be run
-from inetd because it needs to generate the server key before it can
-respond to the client, and this may take some time.
-Clients may have to wait too long if the key was regenerated every time.
-.It Fl k Ar key_gen_time
-Specifies how often the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key is
-regenerated (default 3600 seconds, or one hour).
-The motivation for regenerating the key fairly
-often is that the key is not stored anywhere, and after about an hour
-it becomes impossible to recover the key for decrypting intercepted
-communications even if the machine is cracked into or physically
-seized.
-A value of zero indicates that the key will never be regenerated.
 .It Fl o Ar option
 Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file.
 This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate
@@ -257,8 +234,7 @@ may also be used to prevent
 from making DNS requests unless the authentication
 mechanism or configuration requires it.
 Authentication mechanisms that may require DNS include
-.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication ,
-.Cm HostbasedAuthentication ,
+.Cm HostbasedAuthentication
 and using a
 .Cm from="pattern-list"
 option in a key file.
@@ -269,42 +245,14 @@ or
 .Cm DenyUsers .
 .El
 .Sh AUTHENTICATION
-The OpenSSH SSH daemon supports SSH protocols 1 and 2.
-The default is to use protocol 2 only,
-though this can be changed via the
-.Cm Protocol
-option in
-.Xr sshd_config 5 .
-Protocol 1 should not be used
-and is only offered to support legacy devices.
-.Pp
+The OpenSSH SSH daemon supports SSH protocol 2 only.
 Each host has a host-specific key,
 used to identify the host.
-Partial forward security for protocol 1 is provided through
-an additional server key,
-normally 1024 bits,
-generated when the server starts.
-This key is normally regenerated every hour if it has been used, and
-is never stored on disk.
 Whenever a client connects, the daemon responds with its public
-host and server keys.
+host key.
 The client compares the
-RSA host key against its own database to verify that it has not changed.
-The client then generates a 256-bit random number.
-It encrypts this
-random number using both the host key and the server key, and sends
-the encrypted number to the server.
-Both sides then use this
-random number as a session key which is used to encrypt all further
-communications in the session.
-The rest of the session is encrypted
-using a conventional cipher, currently Blowfish or 3DES, with 3DES
-being used by default.
-The client selects the encryption algorithm
-to use from those offered by the server.
-.Pp
-For protocol 2,
-forward security is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
+host key against its own database to verify that it has not changed.
+Forward security is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
 This key agreement results in a shared session key.
 The rest of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher, currently
 128-bit AES, Blowfish, 3DES, CAST128, Arcfour, 192-bit AES, or 256-bit AES.
@@ -477,32 +425,25 @@ key (empty lines and lines starting with a
 .Ql #
 are ignored as
 comments).
-Protocol 1 public keys consist of the following space-separated fields:
-options, bits, exponent, modulus, comment.
-Protocol 2 public key consist of:
+Public keys consist of the following space-separated fields:
 options, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment.
-The options field is optional;
-its presence is determined by whether the line starts
-with a number or not (the options field never starts with a number).
-The bits, exponent, modulus, and comment fields give the RSA key for
-protocol version 1; the
-comment field is not used for anything (but may be convenient for the
-user to identify the key).
-For protocol version 2 the keytype is
+The options field is optional.
+The keytype is
 .Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 ,
 .Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 ,
 .Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 ,
 .Dq ssh-ed25519 ,
 .Dq ssh-dss
 or
-.Dq ssh-rsa .
+.Dq ssh-rsa ;
+the comment field is not used for anything (but may be convenient for the
+user to identify the key).
 .Pp
-Note that lines in this file are usually several hundred bytes long
+Note that lines in this file can be several hundred bytes long
 (because of the size of the public key encoding) up to a limit of
 8 kilobytes, which permits DSA keys up to 8 kilobits and RSA
 keys up to 16 kilobits.
 You don't want to type them in; instead, copy the
-.Pa identity.pub ,
 .Pa id_dsa.pub ,
 .Pa id_ecdsa.pub ,
 .Pa id_ed25519.pub ,
@@ -511,8 +452,7 @@ or the
 file and edit it.
 .Pp
 .Nm
-enforces a minimum RSA key modulus size for protocol 1
-and protocol 2 keys of 768 bits.
+enforces a minimum RSA key modulus size of 768 bits.
 .Pp
 The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option
 specifications.
@@ -690,7 +630,7 @@ maintained automatically: whenever the user connects from an unknown host,
 its key is added to the per-user file.
 .Pp
 Each line in these files contains the following fields: markers (optional),
-hostnames, bits, exponent, modulus, comment.
+hostnames, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment.
 The fields are separated by spaces.
 .Pp
 The marker is optional, but if it is present then it must be one of
@@ -731,9 +671,9 @@ character.
 Only one hashed hostname may appear on a single line and none of the above
 negation or wildcard operators may be applied.
 .Pp
-Bits, exponent, and modulus are taken directly from the RSA host key; they
+The keytype and base64-encoded key are taken directly from the host key; they
 can be obtained, for example, from
-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub .
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub .
 The optional comment field continues to the end of the line, and is not used.
 .Pp
 Lines starting with
@@ -772,8 +712,8 @@ Note that the lines in these files are typically hundreds of characters
 long, and you definitely don't want to type in the host keys by hand.
 Rather, generate them by a script,
 .Xr ssh-keyscan 1
-or by taking
-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub
+or by taking, for example,
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
 and adding the host names at the front.
 .Xr ssh-keygen 1
 also offers some basic automated editing for
@@ -912,7 +852,6 @@ This file is used in exactly the same way as
 but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
 rlogin/rsh.
 .Pp
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
 .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
 .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
 .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
@@ -924,7 +863,6 @@ Note that
 .Nm
 does not start if these files are group/world-accessible.
 .Pp
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub
 .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub
 .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub
 .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 83b581862a1dbb06fc859959f829dde2654aef3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
Date: Fri, 19 Aug 2016 03:18:06 +0000
Subject: upstream commit

remove UseLogin option and support for having /bin/login
manage login sessions; ok deraadt markus dtucker

Upstream-ID: bea7213fbf158efab7e602d9d844fba4837d2712
---
 monitor.c     |   5 +-
 servconf.c    |  14 ++---
 servconf.h    |   3 +-
 session.c     | 171 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------------------
 sshd.8        |   7 +--
 sshd.c        |   4 +-
 sshd_config.5 |  26 +--------
 7 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 158 deletions(-)

(limited to 'sshd.8')

diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index 59b05a98f..a86b77936 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.162 2016/08/13 17:47:41 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.163 2016/08/19 03:18:06 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -1395,9 +1395,6 @@ mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
 	socklen_t fromlen;
 	struct sockaddr_storage from;
 
-	if (options.use_login)
-		return;
-
 	/*
 	 * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
 	 * the address be 0.0.0.0.
diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
index 9bd659c41..8a4a7091a 100644
--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.293 2016/08/15 12:27:56 naddy Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.294 2016/08/19 03:18:06 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
  *                    All rights reserved
@@ -120,7 +120,6 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
 	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
 	options->permit_user_env = -1;
-	options->use_login = -1;
 	options->compression = -1;
 	options->rekey_limit = -1;
 	options->rekey_interval = -1;
@@ -281,8 +280,6 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 		options->permit_empty_passwd = 0;
 	if (options->permit_user_env == -1)
 		options->permit_user_env = 0;
-	if (options->use_login == -1)
-		options->use_login = 0;
 	if (options->compression == -1)
 		options->compression = COMP_DELAYED;
 	if (options->rekey_limit == -1)
@@ -397,7 +394,7 @@ typedef enum {
 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
 	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
 	sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
-	sPermitUserEnvironment, sUseLogin, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
+	sPermitUserEnvironment, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
 	sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups,
 	sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sPidFile,
 	sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes,
@@ -508,7 +505,7 @@ static struct {
 	{ "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "permituserenvironment", sPermitUserEnvironment, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-	{ "uselogin", sUseLogin, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "uselogin", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "compression", sCompression, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "rekeylimit", sRekeyLimit, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "tcpkeepalive", sTCPKeepAlive, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -1283,10 +1280,6 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 		intptr = &options->permit_user_env;
 		goto parse_flag;
 
-	case sUseLogin:
-		intptr = &options->use_login;
-		goto parse_flag;
-
 	case sCompression:
 		intptr = &options->compression;
 		multistate_ptr = multistate_compression;
@@ -2261,7 +2254,6 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sTCPKeepAlive, o->tcp_keep_alive);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sEmptyPasswd, o->permit_empty_passwd);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitUserEnvironment, o->permit_user_env);
-	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseLogin, o->use_login);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sCompression, o->compression);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns);
diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
index 16b1467d2..8af460f5a 100644
--- a/servconf.h
+++ b/servconf.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.121 2016/08/15 12:27:56 naddy Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.122 2016/08/19 03:18:06 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -121,7 +121,6 @@ typedef struct {
 	int     permit_empty_passwd;	/* If false, do not permit empty
 					 * passwords. */
 	int     permit_user_env;	/* If true, read ~/.ssh/environment */
-	int     use_login;	/* If true, login(1) is used */
 	int     compression;	/* If true, compression is allowed */
 	int	allow_tcp_forwarding; /* One of FORWARD_* */
 	int	allow_streamlocal_forwarding; /* One of FORWARD_* */
diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
index 9bad653fc..fcfa80000 100644
--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.283 2016/08/13 17:47:41 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.284 2016/08/19 03:18:06 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
  *                    All rights reserved
@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command)
 
 		/* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */
 #ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
-		if (!(options.use_login && command == NULL)) {
+		if (command != NULL) {
 #ifdef _UNICOS
 			cray_init_job(s->pw); /* set up cray jid and tmpdir */
 #endif /* _UNICOS */
@@ -1019,69 +1019,63 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell)
 	ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize);
 #endif
 
-	if (!options.use_login) {
-		/* Set basic environment. */
-		for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++)
-			child_set_env(&env, &envsize, s->env[i].name,
-			    s->env[i].val);
+	/* Set basic environment. */
+	for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++)
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, s->env[i].name, s->env[i].val);
 
-		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
-		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
+	child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
+	child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
 #ifdef _AIX
-		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGIN", pw->pw_name);
+	child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGIN", pw->pw_name);
 #endif
-		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
+	child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
-		if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETPATH) < 0)
-			child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
-		else
-			child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", getenv("PATH"));
+	if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETPATH) < 0)
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
+	else
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", getenv("PATH"));
 #else /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
 # ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
-		/*
-		 * There's no standard path on Windows. The path contains
-		 * important components pointing to the system directories,
-		 * needed for loading shared libraries. So the path better
-		 * remains intact here.
-		 */
+	/*
+	 * There's no standard path on Windows. The path contains
+	 * important components pointing to the system directories,
+	 * needed for loading shared libraries. So the path better
+	 * remains intact here.
+	 */
 #  ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN
-		read_etc_default_login(&env, &envsize, pw->pw_uid);
-		path = child_get_env(env, "PATH");
+	read_etc_default_login(&env, &envsize, pw->pw_uid);
+	path = child_get_env(env, "PATH");
 #  endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */
-		if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') {
-			child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH",
-			    s->pw->pw_uid == 0 ?
-				SUPERUSER_PATH : _PATH_STDPATH);
-		}
+	if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') {
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH",
+		    s->pw->pw_uid == 0 ?  SUPERUSER_PATH : _PATH_STDPATH);
+	}
 # endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
 #endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
 
-		snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/%.50s",
-			 _PATH_MAILDIR, pw->pw_name);
-		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "MAIL", buf);
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/%.50s", _PATH_MAILDIR, pw->pw_name);
+	child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "MAIL", buf);
+
+	/* Normal systems set SHELL by default. */
+	child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SHELL", shell);
 
-		/* Normal systems set SHELL by default. */
-		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SHELL", shell);
-	}
 	if (getenv("TZ"))
 		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TZ", getenv("TZ"));
 
 	/* Set custom environment options from RSA authentication. */
-	if (!options.use_login) {
-		while (custom_environment) {
-			struct envstring *ce = custom_environment;
-			char *str = ce->s;
-
-			for (i = 0; str[i] != '=' && str[i]; i++)
-				;
-			if (str[i] == '=') {
-				str[i] = 0;
-				child_set_env(&env, &envsize, str, str + i + 1);
-			}
-			custom_environment = ce->next;
-			free(ce->s);
-			free(ce);
+	while (custom_environment) {
+		struct envstring *ce = custom_environment;
+		char *str = ce->s;
+
+		for (i = 0; str[i] != '=' && str[i]; i++)
+			;
+		if (str[i] == '=') {
+			str[i] = 0;
+			child_set_env(&env, &envsize, str, str + i + 1);
 		}
+		custom_environment = ce->next;
+		free(ce->s);
+		free(ce);
 	}
 
 	/* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */
@@ -1143,7 +1137,7 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell)
 	 * Pull in any environment variables that may have
 	 * been set by PAM.
 	 */
-	if (options.use_pam && !options.use_login) {
+	if (options.use_pam) {
 		char **p;
 
 		p = fetch_pam_child_environment();
@@ -1161,7 +1155,7 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell)
 		    auth_sock_name);
 
 	/* read $HOME/.ssh/environment. */
-	if (options.permit_user_env && !options.use_login) {
+	if (options.permit_user_env) {
 		snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/.ssh/environment",
 		    strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? pw->pw_dir : "");
 		read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf);
@@ -1442,27 +1436,6 @@ do_pwchange(Session *s)
 	exit(1);
 }
 
-static void
-launch_login(struct passwd *pw, const char *hostname)
-{
-	/* Launch login(1). */
-
-	execl(LOGIN_PROGRAM, "login", "-h", hostname,
-#ifdef xxxLOGIN_NEEDS_TERM
-		    (s->term ? s->term : "unknown"),
-#endif /* LOGIN_NEEDS_TERM */
-#ifdef LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT
-	    "-p", "-f", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
-#else
-	    "-p", "-f", "--", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
-#endif
-
-	/* Login couldn't be executed, die. */
-
-	perror("login");
-	exit(1);
-}
-
 static void
 child_close_fds(void)
 {
@@ -1510,11 +1483,10 @@ child_close_fds(void)
 void
 do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
 {
-	struct ssh *ssh = active_state;	/* XXX */
 	extern char **environ;
 	char **env;
 	char *argv[ARGV_MAX];
-	const char *shell, *shell0, *hostname = NULL;
+	const char *shell, *shell0;
 	struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
 	int r = 0;
 
@@ -1529,10 +1501,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
 		exit(1);
 	}
 
-	/* login(1) is only called if we execute the login shell */
-	if (options.use_login && command != NULL)
-		options.use_login = 0;
-
 #ifdef _UNICOS
 	cray_setup(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_name, command);
 #endif /* _UNICOS */
@@ -1541,28 +1509,26 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
 	 * Login(1) does this as well, and it needs uid 0 for the "-h"
 	 * switch, so we let login(1) to this for us.
 	 */
-	if (!options.use_login) {
 #ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
-		session_setup_sia(pw, s->ttyfd == -1 ? NULL : s->tty);
-		if (!check_quietlogin(s, command))
-			do_motd();
+	session_setup_sia(pw, s->ttyfd == -1 ? NULL : s->tty);
+	if (!check_quietlogin(s, command))
+		do_motd();
 #else /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
-		/* When PAM is enabled we rely on it to do the nologin check */
-		if (!options.use_pam)
-			do_nologin(pw);
-		do_setusercontext(pw);
-		/*
-		 * PAM session modules in do_setusercontext may have
-		 * generated messages, so if this in an interactive
-		 * login then display them too.
-		 */
-		if (!check_quietlogin(s, command))
-			display_loginmsg();
+	/* When PAM is enabled we rely on it to do the nologin check */
+	if (!options.use_pam)
+		do_nologin(pw);
+	do_setusercontext(pw);
+	/*
+	 * PAM session modules in do_setusercontext may have
+	 * generated messages, so if this in an interactive
+	 * login then display them too.
+	 */
+	if (!check_quietlogin(s, command))
+		display_loginmsg();
 #endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
-	}
 
 #ifdef USE_PAM
-	if (options.use_pam && !options.use_login && !is_pam_session_open()) {
+	if (options.use_pam && !is_pam_session_open()) {
 		debug3("PAM session not opened, exiting");
 		display_loginmsg();
 		exit(254);
@@ -1585,10 +1551,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
 	shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", (char *)shell, (char *)shell);
 #endif
 
-	/* we have to stash the hostname before we close our socket. */
-	if (options.use_login)
-		hostname = session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len,
-		    options.use_dns);
 	/*
 	 * Close the connection descriptors; note that this is the child, and
 	 * the server will still have the socket open, and it is important
@@ -1647,8 +1609,7 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
 
 	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
 
-	if (!options.use_login)
-		do_rc_files(s, shell);
+	do_rc_files(s, shell);
 
 	/* restore SIGPIPE for child */
 	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
@@ -1678,11 +1639,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
 
 	fflush(NULL);
 
-	if (options.use_login) {
-		launch_login(pw, hostname);
-		/* NEVERREACHED */
-	}
-
 	/* Get the last component of the shell name. */
 	if ((shell0 = strrchr(shell, '/')) != NULL)
 		shell0++;
@@ -2502,11 +2458,6 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s)
 		packet_send_debug("No xauth program; cannot forward with spoofing.");
 		return 0;
 	}
-	if (options.use_login) {
-		packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled; "
-		    "not compatible with UseLogin=yes.");
-		return 0;
-	}
 	if (s->display != NULL) {
 		debug("X11 display already set.");
 		return 0;
diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
index 148a8b923..4cf8fee48 100644
--- a/sshd.8
+++ b/sshd.8
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.285 2016/08/15 12:32:04 naddy Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: August 15 2016 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.286 2016/08/19 03:18:06 djm Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: August 19 2016 $
 .Dt SSHD 8
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -504,9 +504,6 @@ Environment processing is disabled by default and is
 controlled via the
 .Cm PermitUserEnvironment
 option.
-This option is automatically disabled if
-.Cm UseLogin
-is enabled.
 .It Cm from="pattern-list"
 Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, either the canonical
 name of the remote host or its IP address must be present in the
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index fd89acbb9..a561c7b3e 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.473 2016/08/15 12:27:56 naddy Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.474 2016/08/19 03:18:07 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
 #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
 	if (1) {
 #else
-	if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 || options.use_login) {
+	if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) {
 #endif
 		/* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */
 		use_privsep = 0;
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index d1a5d1d33..fe3b23d6e 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.229 2016/08/15 12:32:04 naddy Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: August 15 2016 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.230 2016/08/19 03:18:07 djm Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: August 19 2016 $
 .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -1489,25 +1489,6 @@ and
 .Cm Match
 .Cm Host
 directives.
-.It Cm UseLogin
-Specifies whether
-.Xr login 1
-is used for interactive login sessions.
-The default is
-.Dq no .
-Note that
-.Xr login 1
-is never used for remote command execution.
-Note also, that if this is enabled,
-.Cm X11Forwarding
-will be disabled because
-.Xr login 1
-does not know how to handle
-.Xr xauth 1
-cookies.
-If
-.Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation
-is specified, it will be disabled after authentication.
 .It Cm UsePAM
 Enables the Pluggable Authentication Module interface.
 If set to
@@ -1596,9 +1577,6 @@ setting.
 .Pp
 Note that disabling X11 forwarding does not prevent users from
 forwarding X11 traffic, as users can always install their own forwarders.
-X11 forwarding is automatically disabled if
-.Cm UseLogin
-is enabled.
 .It Cm X11UseLocalhost
 Specifies whether
 .Xr sshd 8
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From fd6dcef2030d23c43f986d26979f84619c10589d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2016 02:57:40 +0000
Subject: upstream commit

When a forced-command appears in both a certificate and
an authorized keys/principals command= restriction, refuse to accept the
certificate unless they are identical.

The previous (documented) behaviour of having the certificate forced-
command override the other could be a bit confused and more error-prone.

Pointed out by Jann Horn of Project Zero; ok dtucker@

Upstream-ID: 79d811b6eb6bbe1221bf146dde6928f92d2cd05f
---
 auth-options.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++------
 auth-options.h |  4 ++--
 auth2-pubkey.c | 18 ++++++++----------
 sshd.8         | 18 +++++++++++++-----
 4 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

(limited to 'sshd.8')

diff --git a/auth-options.c b/auth-options.c
index b399b91e3..57b49f7fd 100644
--- a/auth-options.c
+++ b/auth-options.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.71 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.72 2016/11/30 02:57:40 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -601,7 +601,7 @@ parse_option_list(struct sshbuf *oblob, struct passwd *pw,
  * options so this must be called after auth_parse_options().
  */
 int
-auth_cert_options(struct sshkey *k, struct passwd *pw)
+auth_cert_options(struct sshkey *k, struct passwd *pw, const char **reason)
 {
 	int cert_no_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
 	int cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
@@ -611,6 +611,8 @@ auth_cert_options(struct sshkey *k, struct passwd *pw)
 	char *cert_forced_command = NULL;
 	int cert_source_address_done = 0;
 
+	*reason = "invalid certificate options";
+
 	/* Separate options and extensions for v01 certs */
 	if (parse_option_list(k->cert->critical, pw,
 	    OPTIONS_CRITICAL, 1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
@@ -632,11 +634,24 @@ auth_cert_options(struct sshkey *k, struct passwd *pw)
 	no_x11_forwarding_flag |= cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag;
 	no_pty_flag |= cert_no_pty_flag;
 	no_user_rc |= cert_no_user_rc;
-	/* CA-specified forced command supersedes key option */
-	if (cert_forced_command != NULL) {
-		free(forced_command);
+	/*
+	 * Only permit both CA and key option forced-command if they match.
+	 * Otherwise refuse the certificate.
+	 */
+	if (cert_forced_command != NULL && forced_command != NULL) {
+		if (strcmp(forced_command, cert_forced_command) == 0) {
+			free(forced_command);
+			forced_command = cert_forced_command;
+		} else {
+			*reason = "certificate and key options forced command "
+			    "do not match";
+			free(cert_forced_command);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	} else if (cert_forced_command != NULL)
 		forced_command = cert_forced_command;
-	}
+	/* success */
+	*reason = NULL;
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/auth-options.h b/auth-options.h
index 34852e5c0..52cbb42aa 100644
--- a/auth-options.h
+++ b/auth-options.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.21 2015/01/14 10:30:34 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.22 2016/11/30 02:57:40 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -35,6 +35,6 @@ extern char *authorized_principals;
 
 int	auth_parse_options(struct passwd *, char *, char *, u_long);
 void	auth_clear_options(void);
-int	auth_cert_options(struct sshkey *, struct passwd *);
+int	auth_cert_options(struct sshkey *, struct passwd *, const char **);
 
 #endif
diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
index 375d91cbd..20f3309e1 100644
--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.59 2016/09/21 17:44:20 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.60 2016/11/30 02:57:40 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -757,17 +757,17 @@ static int
 check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
 {
 	char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
-	const char *reason;
 	int found_key = 0;
 	u_long linenum = 0;
 	Key *found;
-	char *fp;
 
 	found_key = 0;
 
 	found = NULL;
 	while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
-		char *cp, *key_options = NULL;
+		char *cp, *key_options = NULL, *fp = NULL;
+		const char *reason = NULL;
+
 		if (found != NULL)
 			key_free(found);
 		found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type);
@@ -832,10 +832,8 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
 			    authorized_principals == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL,
 			    &reason) != 0)
 				goto fail_reason;
-			if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0) {
-				free(fp);
-				continue;
-			}
+			if (auth_cert_options(key, pw, &reason) != 0)
+				goto fail_reason;
 			verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) "
 			    "signed by %s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id,
 			    (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
@@ -913,8 +911,8 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
 	if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1,
 	    use_authorized_principals ? NULL : pw->pw_name, &reason) != 0)
 		goto fail_reason;
-	if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0)
-		goto out;
+	if (auth_cert_options(key, pw, &reason) != 0)
+		goto fail_reason;
 
 	verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) signed by "
 	    "%s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id,
diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
index 4cf8fee48..41fc5051a 100644
--- a/sshd.8
+++ b/sshd.8
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.286 2016/08/19 03:18:06 djm Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: August 19 2016 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.287 2016/11/30 02:57:40 djm Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: November 30 2016 $
 .Dt SSHD 8
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -481,19 +481,27 @@ If an 8-bit clean channel is required,
 one must not request a pty or should specify
 .Cm no-pty .
 A quote may be included in the command by quoting it with a backslash.
+.Pp
 This option might be useful
 to restrict certain public keys to perform just a specific operation.
 An example might be a key that permits remote backups but nothing else.
 Note that the client may specify TCP and/or X11
-forwarding unless they are explicitly prohibited.
+forwarding unless they are explicitly prohibited, e.g. using the
+.Cm restrict
+key option.
+.Pp
 The command originally supplied by the client is available in the
 .Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND
 environment variable.
 Note that this option applies to shell, command or subsystem execution.
-Also note that this command may be superseded by either a
+Also note that this command may be superseded by a
 .Xr sshd_config 5
 .Cm ForceCommand
-directive or a command embedded in a certificate.
+directive.
+.Pp
+If a command is specified and a forced-command is embedded in a certificate
+used for authentication, then the certificate will be accepted only if the
+two commands are identical.
 .It Cm environment="NAME=value"
 Specifies that the string is to be added to the environment when
 logging in using this key.
-- 
cgit v1.2.3