From 0f56ed16b8e463e16c3a8f78544943a9e6f8ea1f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Sun, 29 Aug 2004 16:38:41 +1000
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2004/08/28 01:01:48      [sshd.c]      don't
 erroneously close stdin for !reexec case, from Dave Johnson;      ok markus@

---
 sshd.c | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'sshd.c')

diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 60f63ef7b..2a28ece03 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.301 2004/08/11 11:50:09 dtucker Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.302 2004/08/28 01:01:48 djm Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
@@ -884,7 +884,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
 	char *line;
 	int listen_sock, maxfd;
-	int startup_p[2], config_s[2];
+	int startup_p[2] = { -1 , -1 }, config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 };
 	int startups = 0;
 	Key *key;
 	Authctxt *authctxt;
@@ -1507,7 +1507,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 						sock_in = newsock;
 						sock_out = newsock;
 						log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
-						close(config_s[0]);
+						if (rexec_flag)
+							close(config_s[0]);
 						break;
 					}
 				}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 2aa6d3cfce738f57c31ae676e11399382bd5660e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Date: Sun, 12 Sep 2004 16:53:04 +1000
Subject:  - (djm) [ssh.c sshd.c version.h] Don't divulge portable version in
 protocol    banner. Suggested by deraadt@, ok mouring@, dtucker@

---
 ChangeLog | 4 +++-
 ssh.c     | 2 +-
 sshd.c    | 4 ++--
 version.h | 5 ++++-
 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'sshd.c')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index e1cf4153f..714591df6 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@
    No change in resultant binary
  - (djm) [loginrec.c] __func__ifiy
  - (djm) [loginrec.c] xmalloc
+ - (djm) [ssh.c sshd.c version.h] Don't divulge portable version in protocol
+   banner. Suggested by deraadt@, ok mouring@, dtucker@
 
 20040911
  - (djm) [ssh-agent.c] unifdef some cygwin code; ok dtucker@
@@ -1740,4 +1742,4 @@
    - (djm) Trim deprecated options from INSTALL. Mention UsePAM
    - (djm) Fix quote handling in sftp; Patch from admorten AT umich.edu
 
-$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3550 2004/09/12 05:26:00 djm Exp $
+$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3551 2004/09/12 06:53:04 djm Exp $
diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
index e69d73807..6f0ba26ad 100644
--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ again:
 			/* fallthrough */
 		case 'V':
 			fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n",
-			    SSH_VERSION, SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
+			    SSH_RELEASE, SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
 			if (opt == 'V')
 				exit(0);
 			break;
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 2a28ece03..4b2d10af9 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -774,7 +774,7 @@ static void
 usage(void)
 {
 	fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n",
-	    SSH_VERSION, SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
+	    SSH_RELEASE, SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
 	fprintf(stderr,
 "usage: sshd [-46Ddeiqt] [-b bits] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]\n"
 "            [-h host_key_file] [-k key_gen_time] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]\n"
@@ -1081,7 +1081,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		exit(1);
 	}
 
-	debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_VERSION);
+	debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_RELEASE);
 
 	/* load private host keys */
 	sensitive_data.host_keys = xmalloc(options.num_host_key_files *
diff --git a/version.h b/version.h
index aae2c3b37..d0c867b87 100644
--- a/version.h
+++ b/version.h
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
 /* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.42 2004/08/16 08:17:01 markus Exp $ */
 
-#define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH_3.9p1"
+#define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH_3.9"
+
+#define SSH_PORTABLE	"p1"
+#define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 178fa66a6451d890083d2441a2de207bdb74a348 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 5 Nov 2004 20:09:09 +1100
Subject:    - mickey@cvs.openbsd.org 2004/09/15 18:42:27      [sshd.c]     
 use less doubles in daemons; markus@ ok

---
 ChangeLog | 5 ++++-
 sshd.c    | 9 ++++-----
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

(limited to 'sshd.c')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 6316a4de0..70fc70cc3 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@
      From Michael Knudsen, with wording changed slightly to match the
      PrintMotd description.
      ok djm
+   - mickey@cvs.openbsd.org 2004/09/15 18:42:27
+     [sshd.c]
+     use less doubles in daemons; markus@ ok
 
 20041102
  - (dtucker) [configure.ac includes.h] Bug #947: Fix compile error on HP-UX
@@ -1802,4 +1805,4 @@
    - (djm) Trim deprecated options from INSTALL. Mention UsePAM
    - (djm) Fix quote handling in sftp; Patch from admorten AT umich.edu
 
-$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3567 2004/11/05 09:06:59 dtucker Exp $
+$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3568 2004/11/05 09:09:09 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 4b2d10af9..2afe316cf 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.302 2004/08/28 01:01:48 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.303 2004/09/15 18:42:27 mickey Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
@@ -750,7 +750,7 @@ get_hostkey_index(Key *key)
 static int
 drop_connection(int startups)
 {
-	double p, r;
+	int p, r;
 
 	if (startups < options.max_startups_begin)
 		return 0;
@@ -761,10 +761,9 @@ drop_connection(int startups)
 
 	p  = 100 - options.max_startups_rate;
 	p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin;
-	p /= (double) (options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin);
+	p /= options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin;
 	p += options.max_startups_rate;
-	p /= 100.0;
-	r = arc4random() / (double) UINT_MAX;
+	r = arc4random() % 100;
 
 	debug("drop_connection: p %g, r %g", p, r);
 	return (r < p) ? 1 : 0;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 3269b13817f7da680a4da4a00b13948ccbb17a22 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Fri, 5 Nov 2004 20:20:59 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2004/09/25 03:45:14      [sshd.c]      these
 printf args are no longer double; ok deraadt@ markus@

---
 ChangeLog | 5 ++++-
 sshd.c    | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'sshd.c')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 17750e92c..8361e329e 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@
    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2004/09/23 13:00:04
      [ssh.c]
      correctly honour -n in multiplex client mode; spotted by sturm@ ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2004/09/25 03:45:14
+     [sshd.c]
+     these printf args are no longer double; ok deraadt@ markus@
 
 20041102
  - (dtucker) [configure.ac includes.h] Bug #947: Fix compile error on HP-UX
@@ -1811,4 +1814,4 @@
    - (djm) Trim deprecated options from INSTALL. Mention UsePAM
    - (djm) Fix quote handling in sftp; Patch from admorten AT umich.edu
 
-$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3570 2004/11/05 09:19:51 dtucker Exp $
+$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3571 2004/11/05 09:20:59 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 2afe316cf..92b1df10c 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.303 2004/09/15 18:42:27 mickey Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.304 2004/09/25 03:45:14 djm Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
@@ -765,7 +765,7 @@ drop_connection(int startups)
 	p += options.max_startups_rate;
 	r = arc4random() % 100;
 
-	debug("drop_connection: p %g, r %g", p, r);
+	debug("drop_connection: p %d, r %d", p, r);
 	return (r < p) ? 1 : 0;
 }
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 0f3832322230ebc4b0fe5a2aca5cf9aaa8b0c3c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2005 10:57:56 +1100
Subject:    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2004/12/23 23:11:00      [servconf.c
 servconf.h sshd.c sshd_config sshd_config.5]      bz #898: support
 AddressFamily in sshd_config. from      peak@argo.troja.mff.cuni.cz; ok
 deraadt@

---
 ChangeLog     |  6 +++++-
 servconf.c    | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 servconf.h    |  3 ++-
 sshd.c        | 16 ++++++----------
 sshd_config   |  3 ++-
 sshd_config.5 | 13 ++++++++++++-
 6 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

(limited to 'sshd.c')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index b5fdc2e4a..369fcbfbf 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@
    - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2004/12/23 17:38:07
      [ssh-keygen.c]
      leak; from mpech
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2004/12/23 23:11:00
+     [servconf.c servconf.h sshd.c sshd_config sshd_config.5]
+     bz #898: support AddressFamily in sshd_config. from
+     peak@argo.troja.mff.cuni.cz; ok deraadt@
 
 20050118
  - (dtucker) [INSTALL Makefile.in configure.ac survey.sh.in] Implement
@@ -1978,4 +1982,4 @@
    - (djm) Trim deprecated options from INSTALL. Mention UsePAM
    - (djm) Fix quote handling in sftp; Patch from admorten AT umich.edu
 
-$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3610 2005/01/19 23:56:31 dtucker Exp $
+$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3611 2005/01/19 23:57:56 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
index fae3c658e..541a9c85b 100644
--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.137 2004/08/13 11:09:24 dtucker Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.138 2004/12/23 23:11:00 djm Exp $");
 
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "log.h"
@@ -26,8 +26,6 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.137 2004/08/13 11:09:24 dtucker Exp $");
 static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, u_short);
 static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, u_short);
 
-/* AF_UNSPEC or AF_INET or AF_INET6 */
-extern int IPv4or6;
 /* Use of privilege separation or not */
 extern int use_privsep;
 
@@ -45,6 +43,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 	options->num_ports = 0;
 	options->ports_from_cmdline = 0;
 	options->listen_addrs = NULL;
+	options->address_family = -1;
 	options->num_host_key_files = 0;
 	options->pid_file = NULL;
 	options->server_key_bits = -1;
@@ -258,7 +257,8 @@ typedef enum {
 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
 	sKerberosGetAFSToken,
 	sKerberosTgtPassing, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
-	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress,
+	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
 	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
 	sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
@@ -335,6 +335,7 @@ static struct {
 	{ "skeyauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */
 	{ "checkmail", sDeprecated },
 	{ "listenaddress", sListenAddress },
+	{ "addressfamily", sAddressFamily },
 	{ "printmotd", sPrintMotd },
 	{ "printlastlog", sPrintLastLog },
 	{ "ignorerhosts", sIgnoreRhosts },
@@ -401,6 +402,8 @@ add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, u_short port)
 
 	if (options->num_ports == 0)
 		options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
+	if (options->address_family == -1)
+		options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
 	if (port == 0)
 		for (i = 0; i < options->num_ports; i++)
 			add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, options->ports[i]);
@@ -416,7 +419,7 @@ add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, u_short port)
 	int gaierr;
 
 	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
-	hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
+	hints.ai_family = options->address_family;
 	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
 	hints.ai_flags = (addr == NULL) ? AI_PASSIVE : 0;
 	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port);
@@ -544,6 +547,25 @@ parse_time:
 			    filename, linenum);
 		break;
 
+	case sAddressFamily:
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		intptr = &options->address_family;
+		if (options->listen_addrs != NULL)
+			fatal("%s line %d: address family must be specified before "
+			    "ListenAddress.", filename, linenum);
+		if (strcasecmp(arg, "inet") == 0)
+			value = AF_INET;
+		else if (strcasecmp(arg, "inet6") == 0)
+			value = AF_INET6;
+		else if (strcasecmp(arg, "any") == 0)
+			value = AF_UNSPEC;
+		else
+			fatal("%s line %d: unsupported address family \"%s\".",
+			    filename, linenum, arg);
+		if (*intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
+
 	case sHostKeyFile:
 		intptr = &options->num_host_key_files;
 		if (*intptr >= MAX_HOSTKEYS)
diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
index ebd056814..f7e56d521 100644
--- a/servconf.h
+++ b/servconf.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.70 2004/06/24 19:30:54 djm Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.71 2004/12/23 23:11:00 djm Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ typedef struct {
 	u_short ports[MAX_PORTS];	/* Port number to listen on. */
 	char   *listen_addr;		/* Address on which the server listens. */
 	struct addrinfo *listen_addrs;	/* Addresses on which the server listens. */
+	int     address_family;		/* Address family used by the server. */
 	char   *host_key_files[MAX_HOSTKEYS];	/* Files containing host keys. */
 	int     num_host_key_files;     /* Number of files for host keys. */
 	char   *pid_file;	/* Where to put our pid */
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 92b1df10c..89f36a474 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.304 2004/09/25 03:45:14 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.305 2004/12/23 23:11:00 djm Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
@@ -111,12 +111,6 @@ ServerOptions options;
 /* Name of the server configuration file. */
 char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
 
-/*
- * Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6.  This can be set on the command line.
- * Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6.
- */
-int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC;
-
 /*
  * Debug mode flag.  This can be set on the command line.  If debug
  * mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system
@@ -920,10 +914,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:u:o:dDeiqrtQR46")) != -1) {
 		switch (opt) {
 		case '4':
-			IPv4or6 = AF_INET;
+			options.address_family = AF_INET;
 			break;
 		case '6':
-			IPv4or6 = AF_INET6;
+			options.address_family = AF_INET6;
 			break;
 		case 'f':
 			config_file_name = optarg;
@@ -1024,7 +1018,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD);
 
 	SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
-	channel_set_af(IPv4or6);
 
 	/*
 	 * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host
@@ -1074,6 +1067,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
 	fill_default_server_options(&options);
 
+	/* set default channel AF */
+	channel_set_af(options.address_family);
+
 	/* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */
 	if (optind < ac) {
 		fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]);
diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
index 65e6f1c32..53ae9942e 100644
--- a/sshd_config
+++ b/sshd_config
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.69 2004/05/23 23:59:53 dtucker Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.70 2004/12/23 23:11:00 djm Exp $
 
 # This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file.  See
 # sshd_config(5) for more information.
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 
 #Port 22
 #Protocol 2,1
+#AddressFamily any
 #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
 #ListenAddress ::
 
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index 50b9a89b1..07f91b6ed 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.36 2004/09/15 03:25:41 jaredy Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.37 2004/12/23 23:11:00 djm Exp $
 .Dd September 25, 1999
 .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
 .Os
@@ -83,6 +83,17 @@ Be warned that some environment variables could be used to bypass restricted
 user environments.
 For this reason, care should be taken in the use of this directive.
 The default is not to accept any environment variables.
+.It Cm AddressFamily
+Specifies which address family should be used by
+.Nm sshd .
+Valid arguments are
+.Dq any ,
+.Dq inet
+(use IPv4 only) or
+.Dq inet6
+(use IPv6 only).
+The default is
+.Dq any .
 .It Cm AllowGroups
 This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated
 by spaces.
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From ea7c8127ce64879f81d6267897162a2fbf173124 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2005 11:03:08 +1100
Subject:    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2005/01/17 22:48:39      [sshd.c]     
 Make debugging output continue after reexec; ok djm@

---
 ChangeLog | 5 ++++-
 sshd.c    | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'sshd.c')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 925239349..33a2aaf4b 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@
    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2005/01/17 03:25:46
      [moduli.c]
      Correct spelling: SCHNOOR->SCHNORR; ok djm@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2005/01/17 22:48:39
+     [sshd.c]
+     Make debugging output continue after reexec; ok djm@
 
 20050118
  - (dtucker) [INSTALL Makefile.in configure.ac survey.sh.in] Implement
@@ -1991,4 +1994,4 @@
    - (djm) Trim deprecated options from INSTALL. Mention UsePAM
    - (djm) Fix quote handling in sftp; Patch from admorten AT umich.edu
 
-$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3614 2005/01/20 00:02:26 dtucker Exp $
+$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3615 2005/01/20 00:03:08 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 89f36a474..76aec80b0 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.305 2004/12/23 23:11:00 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.306 2005/01/17 22:48:39 dtucker Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
@@ -1192,7 +1192,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	}
 
 	/* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */
-	if (debug_flag && !inetd_flag)
+	if (debug_flag && (!inetd_flag || rexeced_flag))
 		log_stderr = 1;
 	log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 5c14c734295b9a30d71d110deb8307d5610d4c01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2005 21:55:49 +1100
Subject:    - otto@cvs.openbsd.org 2005/01/21 08:32:02      [auth-passwd.c
 sshd.c]      Warn in advance for password and account expiry; initialize
 loginmsg      buffer earlier and clear it after privsep fork. ok and help
 dtucker@      markus@

---
 ChangeLog     | 10 +++++++++-
 auth-passwd.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 sshd.c        | 11 ++++-------
 3 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

(limited to 'sshd.c')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 8af4ea5f7..f33f2c242 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,11 @@
+20050124
+ - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - otto@cvs.openbsd.org 2005/01/21 08:32:02
+     [auth-passwd.c sshd.c]
+     Warn in advance for password and account expiry; initialize loginmsg
+     buffer earlier and clear it after privsep fork. ok and help dtucker@
+     markus@
+
 20050120
  - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
    - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2004/12/23 17:35:48
@@ -2015,4 +2023,4 @@
    - (djm) Trim deprecated options from INSTALL. Mention UsePAM
    - (djm) Fix quote handling in sftp; Patch from admorten AT umich.edu
 
-$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3620 2005/01/20 11:20:50 dtucker Exp $
+$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3621 2005/01/24 10:55:49 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/auth-passwd.c b/auth-passwd.c
index 7a68e0562..2e5fbc73a 100644
--- a/auth-passwd.c
+++ b/auth-passwd.c
@@ -36,17 +36,27 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.31 2004/01/30 09:48:57 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.32 2005/01/21 08:32:02 otto Exp $");
 
 #include "packet.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "auth-options.h"
 
+extern Buffer loginmsg;
 extern ServerOptions options;
 int sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
 
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+extern login_cap_t *lc;
+#endif
+
+
+#define DAY		(24L * 60 * 60) /* 1 day in seconds */
+#define TWO_WEEKS	(2L * 7 * DAY)	/* 2 weeks in seconds */
+
 void
 disable_forwarding(void)
 {
@@ -111,11 +121,46 @@ auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 }
 
 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
+static void
+warn_expiry(Authctxt *authctxt, auth_session_t *as)
+{
+	char buf[256];
+	quad_t pwtimeleft, actimeleft, daysleft, pwwarntime, acwarntime;
+
+	pwwarntime = acwarntime = TWO_WEEKS;
+
+	pwtimeleft = auth_check_change(as);
+	actimeleft = auth_check_expire(as);
+#if HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+	if (authctxt->valid) {
+		pwwarntime = login_getcaptime(lc, "password-warn", TWO_WEEKS,
+		    TWO_WEEKS);
+		acwarntime = login_getcaptime(lc, "expire-warn", TWO_WEEKS,
+		    TWO_WEEKS);
+	}
+#endif
+	if (pwtimeleft != 0 && pwtimeleft < pwwarntime) {
+		daysleft = pwtimeleft / DAY + 1;
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
+		    "Your password will expire in %lld day%s.\n",
+		    daysleft, daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s");
+		buffer_append(&loginmsg, buf, strlen(buf));
+	}
+	if (actimeleft != 0 && actimeleft < acwarntime) {
+		daysleft = actimeleft / DAY + 1;
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
+		    "Your account will expire in %lld day%s.\n",
+		    daysleft, daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s");
+		buffer_append(&loginmsg, buf, strlen(buf));
+	}
+}
+
 int
 sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 {
 	struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
 	auth_session_t *as;
+	static int expire_checked = 0;
 
 	as = auth_usercheck(pw->pw_name, authctxt->style, "auth-ssh",
 	    (char *)password);
@@ -125,6 +170,10 @@ sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 		authctxt->force_pwchange = 1;
 		return (1);
 	} else {
+		if (!expire_checked) {
+			expire_checked = 1;
+			warn_expiry(authctxt, as);
+		}
 		return (auth_close(as));
 	}
 }
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 76aec80b0..7f268526f 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.306 2005/01/17 22:48:39 dtucker Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.307 2005/01/21 08:32:02 otto Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
@@ -1664,9 +1664,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 
 	packet_set_nonblocking();
 
-	/* prepare buffers to collect authentication messages */
-	buffer_init(&loginmsg);
-
 	/* allocate authentication context */
 	authctxt = xmalloc(sizeof(*authctxt));
 	memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
@@ -1674,13 +1671,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	/* XXX global for cleanup, access from other modules */
 	the_authctxt = authctxt;
 
+	/* prepare buffer to collect messages to display to user after login */
+	buffer_init(&loginmsg);
+
 	if (use_privsep)
 		if (privsep_preauth(authctxt) == 1)
 			goto authenticated;
 
-	/* prepare buffer to collect messages to display to user after login */
-	buffer_init(&loginmsg);
-
 	/* perform the key exchange */
 	/* authenticate user and start session */
 	if (compat20) {
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 9dc6c7dbec0716157e561036c480bca1bc3c7e47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2005 18:30:33 +1100
Subject:  - (dtucker) [session.c sshd.c] Bug #445: Propogate KRB5CCNAME if set
 to child    the process.  Since we also unset KRB5CCNAME at startup, if it's
 set after    authentication it must have been set by the platform's native
 auth system.    This was already done for AIX; this enables it for the
 general case.

---
 ChangeLog |  6 +++++-
 session.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
 sshd.c    |  6 +++---
 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

(limited to 'sshd.c')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 82758ca10..d9670f361 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@
    Make record_failed_login() call provide hostname rather than having the
    implementations having to do lookups themselves.  Only affects AIX and
    UNICOS (the latter only uses the "user" parameter anyway).  ok djm@
+ - (dtucker) [session.c sshd.c] Bug #445: Propogate KRB5CCNAME if set to child
+   the process.  Since we also unset KRB5CCNAME at startup, if it's set after
+   authentication it must have been set by the platform's native auth system.
+   This was already done for AIX; this enables it for the general case.
 
 20050201
  - (dtucker) [log.c] Bug #973: force log_init() to open syslog, since on some
@@ -2059,4 +2063,4 @@
    - (djm) Trim deprecated options from INSTALL. Mention UsePAM
    - (djm) Fix quote handling in sftp; Patch from admorten AT umich.edu
 
-$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3630 2005/02/02 06:10:11 dtucker Exp $
+$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3631 2005/02/02 07:30:33 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
index 7f10abf7c..4d7ac9de7 100644
--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
@@ -1090,14 +1090,24 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell)
 		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TMPDIR", cray_tmpdir);
 #endif /* _UNICOS */
 
+	/*
+	 * Since we clear KRB5CCNAME at startup, if it's set now then it
+	 * must have been set by a native authentication method (eg AIX or
+	 * SIA), so copy it to the child.
+	 */
+	{
+		char *cp;
+
+		if ((cp = getenv("KRB5CCNAME")) != NULL)
+			child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", cp);
+	}
+
 #ifdef _AIX
 	{
 		char *cp;
 
 		if ((cp = getenv("AUTHSTATE")) != NULL)
 			child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "AUTHSTATE", cp);
-		if ((cp = getenv("KRB5CCNAME")) != NULL)
-			child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", cp);
 		read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, "/etc/environment");
 	}
 #endif
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 7f268526f..23d6962c0 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1030,13 +1030,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	    SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility,
 	    log_stderr || !inetd_flag);
 
-#ifdef _AIX
 	/*
 	 * Unset KRB5CCNAME, otherwise the user's session may inherit it from
 	 * root's environment
 	 */ 
-	unsetenv("KRB5CCNAME");
-#endif /* _AIX */
+	if (getenv("KRB5CCNAME") != NULL)
+		unsetenv("KRB5CCNAME");
+
 #ifdef _UNICOS
 	/* Cray can define user privs drop all privs now!
 	 * Not needed on PRIV_SU systems!
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 269a1ea1c80a855d1eb74fccba6dd5c75947c5d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2005 00:20:53 +1100
Subject:  - (dtucker) [Makefile.in auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2.c loginrec.c
 monitor.c    monitor.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h session.c sshd.c] Bug
 #125:    (first stage) Add audit instrumentation to sshd, currently disabled
 by    default.  with suggestions from and djm@

---
 ChangeLog      |  6 +++++-
 Makefile.in    |  4 ++--
 auth.c         | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 auth.h         |  1 +
 auth1.c        | 12 +++++++++--
 auth2.c        | 15 ++++++++++++--
 loginrec.c     |  9 +++++++-
 monitor.c      | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 monitor.h      |  1 +
 monitor_wrap.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 monitor_wrap.h |  6 ++++++
 session.c      | 16 +++++++++++++++
 sshd.c         | 12 +++++++++++
 13 files changed, 211 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

(limited to 'sshd.c')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 07ae663d7..e2dc30e5a 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -14,6 +14,10 @@
    attempts (currently only for password, kbdint and C/R, only on Linux and
    HP-UX), based on code from login.c from util-linux. With ashok_kovai at
    hotmail.com, ok djm@
+ - (dtucker) [Makefile.in auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2.c loginrec.c monitor.c
+   monitor.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h session.c sshd.c] Bug #125:
+   (first stage) Add audit instrumentation to sshd, currently disabled by
+   default.  with suggestions from and djm@
 
 20050201
  - (dtucker) [log.c] Bug #973: force log_init() to open syslog, since on some
@@ -2068,4 +2072,4 @@
    - (djm) Trim deprecated options from INSTALL. Mention UsePAM
    - (djm) Fix quote handling in sftp; Patch from admorten AT umich.edu
 
-$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3632 2005/02/02 12:30:24 dtucker Exp $
+$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3633 2005/02/02 13:20:53 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
index 8a1c9f7c0..c6cfef11a 100644
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.267 2005/01/18 01:05:18 dtucker Exp $
+# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.268 2005/02/02 13:20:53 dtucker Exp $
 
 # uncomment if you run a non bourne compatable shell. Ie. csh
 #SHELL = @SH@
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \
 	monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o \
 	auth-krb5.o \
 	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
-	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o
+	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o audit.o
 
 MANPAGES	= scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-rand-helper.8.out ssh-keysign.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out
 MANPAGES_IN	= scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-rand-helper.8 ssh-keysign.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5
diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index b6c00c12b..bbf3a54a4 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.57 2005/01/22 08:17:59 dtucker Exp $");
 #include "bufaux.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "loginrec.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
 
 /* import */
 extern ServerOptions options;
@@ -251,6 +252,44 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
 		record_failed_login(authctxt->user,
 		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
 #endif
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed) {
+		ssh_audit_event_t event;
+
+		debug3("audit failed auth attempt, method %s euid %d",
+		    method, (int)geteuid());
+		/*
+		 * Because the auth loop is used in both monitor and slave,
+		 * we must be careful to send each event only once and with
+		 * enough privs to write the event.
+		 */
+		event = audit_classify_auth(method);
+		switch(event) {
+		case AUTH_FAIL_NONE:
+		case AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
+		case AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
+			if (geteuid() == 0)
+				audit_event(event);
+			break;
+		case AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
+		case AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
+		case AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
+			/*
+			 * This is required to handle the case where privsep
+			 * is enabled but it's root logging in, since
+			 * use_privsep won't be cleared until after a
+			 * successful login.
+			 */
+			if (geteuid() == 0)
+				audit_event(event);
+			else
+				PRIVSEP(audit_event(event));
+			break;
+		default:
+			error("unknown authentication audit event %d", event);
+		}
+	}
+#endif
 }
 
 /*
@@ -476,6 +515,9 @@ getpwnamallow(const char *user)
 		record_failed_login(user,
 		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
 #endif
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+		audit_event(INVALID_USER);
+#endif /* AUDIT_EVENTS */
 		return (NULL);
 	}
 	if (!allowed_user(pw))
diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
index 6c0089dc7..8d1f93403 100644
--- a/auth.h
+++ b/auth.h
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ int auth_shadow_pwexpired(Authctxt *);
 #endif
 
 #include "auth-pam.h"
+#include "audit.h"
 void remove_kbdint_device(const char *);
 
 void disable_forwarding(void);
diff --git a/auth1.c b/auth1.c
index 2a9d18b9a..aeb5d8cb9 100644
--- a/auth1.c
+++ b/auth1.c
@@ -247,8 +247,12 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 #else
 		/* Special handling for root */
 		if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
-		    !auth_root_allowed(get_authname(type)))
+		    !auth_root_allowed(get_authname(type))) {
 			authenticated = 0;
+# ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+			PRIVSEP(audit_event(LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED));
+# endif
+		}
 #endif
 
 #ifdef USE_PAM
@@ -283,8 +287,12 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		if (authenticated)
 			return;
 
-		if (authctxt->failures++ > options.max_authtries)
+		if (authctxt->failures++ > options.max_authtries) {
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+			PRIVSEP(audit_event(LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
+#endif
 			packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user);
+		}
 
 		packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
 		packet_send();
diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
index 60e261f7f..2727e0ff5 100644
--- a/auth2.c
+++ b/auth2.c
@@ -166,6 +166,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 #ifdef USE_PAM
 			if (options.use_pam)
 				PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt));
+#endif
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+			PRIVSEP(audit_event(INVALID_USER));
 #endif
 		}
 		setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
@@ -214,8 +217,12 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
 
 	/* Special handling for root */
 	if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
-	    !auth_root_allowed(method))
+	    !auth_root_allowed(method)) {
 		authenticated = 0;
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+		PRIVSEP(audit_event(LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED));
+#endif
+	}
 
 #ifdef USE_PAM
 	if (options.use_pam && authenticated) {
@@ -255,8 +262,12 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
 		/* now we can break out */
 		authctxt->success = 1;
 	} else {
-		if (authctxt->failures++ > options.max_authtries)
+		if (authctxt->failures++ > options.max_authtries) {
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+			PRIVSEP(audit_event(LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
+#endif
 			packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user);
+		}
 		methods = authmethods_get();
 		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE);
 		packet_put_cstring(methods);
diff --git a/loginrec.c b/loginrec.c
index e77318ba3..0fa9bdea7 100644
--- a/loginrec.c
+++ b/loginrec.c
@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@
 #include "atomicio.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "canohost.h"
+#include "auth.h"
 
 #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
 # include <util.h>
@@ -163,7 +164,7 @@
 # include <libutil.h>
 #endif
 
-RCSID("$Id: loginrec.c,v 1.63 2005/02/02 12:30:25 dtucker Exp $");
+RCSID("$Id: loginrec.c,v 1.64 2005/02/02 13:20:53 dtucker Exp $");
 
 /**
  ** prototypes for helper functions in this file
@@ -442,6 +443,12 @@ login_write(struct logininfo *li)
 	if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN && 
 	   !sys_auth_record_login(li->username,li->hostname,li->line))
 		logit("Writing login record failed for %s", li->username);
+#endif
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+	if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN)
+		audit_session_open(li->line);
+	else if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT)
+		audit_session_close(li->line);
 #endif
 	return (0);
 }
diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index 00d4a785f..ce7784aa1 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -143,6 +143,11 @@ int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
 #endif
 
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
+#endif
+
 static Authctxt *authctxt;
 static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL;	/* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
 
@@ -186,6 +191,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
 #endif
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, 0, mm_answer_audit_event},
+#endif
 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH,mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
@@ -211,6 +219,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
     {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
     {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
+#endif
     {0, 0, NULL}
 };
 
@@ -238,6 +250,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
+#endif
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, 0, mm_answer_audit_event},
 #endif
     {0, 0, NULL}
 };
@@ -246,6 +261,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
     {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
     {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
+#endif
     {0, 0, NULL}
 };
 
@@ -609,6 +628,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
 	if (options.use_pam)
 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1);
 #endif
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, 1);
+#endif
 
 	return (0);
 }
@@ -1491,6 +1513,49 @@ mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
 	exit(res);
 }
 
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+/* Report that an audit event occurred */
+int
+mm_answer_audit_event(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+	ssh_audit_event_t event;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	event = buffer_get_int(m);
+	buffer_free(m);
+	switch(event) {
+	case AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
+	case AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
+	case AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
+	case LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
+	case LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
+	case CONNECTION_CLOSE:
+		audit_event(event);
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal("Audit event type %d not permitted", event);
+	}
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+	u_int len;
+	char *cmd;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+	cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+	/* sanity check command, if so how? */
+	audit_run_command(cmd);
+	xfree(cmd);
+	buffer_free(m);
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif /* AUDIT_EVENTS */
+
 void
 monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
 {
diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
index 621a4ad18..13ce3e1ca 100644
--- a/monitor.h
+++ b/monitor.h
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY,
 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND,
 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX,
+	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND,
 	MONITOR_REQ_TERM
 };
 
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
index 23857639b..983b24072 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -1103,6 +1103,36 @@ mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *p, u_char response[16])
 	return (success);
 }
 
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+void
+mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_int(&m, event);
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, &m);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+void
+mm_audit_run_command(const char *command)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+
+	debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, command);
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+}
+#endif /* AUDIT_EVENTS */
+
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 OM_uint32
 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID goid)
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
index e5cf5718c..7ed241aa8 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
@@ -74,6 +74,12 @@ int mm_sshpam_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
 void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
 #endif
 
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+#include "audit.h"
+void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
+void mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
+#endif
+
 struct Session;
 void mm_terminate(void);
 int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, int);
diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
index 4d7ac9de7..b645144c5 100644
--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
@@ -665,6 +665,18 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
 		debug("Forced command '%.900s'", command);
 	}
 
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+	if (command != NULL)
+		PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
+	else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
+		char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell;
+
+		if (shell[0] == '\0')	/* empty shell means /bin/sh */
+			shell =_PATH_BSHELL;
+		PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell));
+	}
+#endif
+
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 	if (options.gss_authentication) {
 		temporarily_use_uid(s->pw);
@@ -2321,6 +2333,10 @@ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	}
 #endif
 
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+	PRIVSEP(audit_event(CONNECTION_CLOSE));
+#endif
+
 	/* remove agent socket */
 	auth_sock_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw);
 
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 23d6962c0..e61870ea5 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1628,6 +1628,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	remote_port = get_remote_port();
 	remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
 
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+	audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
+#endif
 #ifdef LIBWRAP
 	/* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */
 	if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
@@ -1697,6 +1700,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	}
 
  authenticated:
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+	audit_event(AUTH_SUCCESS);
+#endif
+
 	/*
 	 * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare
 	 * file descriptor passing.
@@ -2010,5 +2017,10 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
 {
 	if (the_authctxt)
 		do_cleanup(the_authctxt);
+#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+	/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
+	if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
+		audit_event(CONNECTION_ABANDON);
+#endif
 	_exit(i);
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 2e0cf0dca20e56eb5d95a80ba0004769c5bc4ba7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2005 21:52:47 +1100
Subject:  - (dtucker) [audit.c audit.h auth.c auth1.c auth2.c loginrec.c
 monitor.c    monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h session.c sshd.c]: Prepend all of
 the audit    defines and enums with SSH_ to prevent namespace collisions on
 some    platforms (eg AIX).

---
 ChangeLog      |  6 +++++-
 audit.c        | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------
 audit.h        | 30 +++++++++++++++---------------
 auth.c         | 20 ++++++++++----------
 auth1.c        |  8 ++++----
 auth2.c        | 12 ++++++------
 loginrec.c     |  4 ++--
 monitor.c      | 30 +++++++++++++++---------------
 monitor_wrap.c |  4 ++--
 monitor_wrap.h |  2 +-
 session.c      |  6 +++---
 sshd.c         | 10 +++++-----
 12 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 92 deletions(-)

(limited to 'sshd.c')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 89424da03..60e5374ee 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -3,6 +3,10 @@
    regress tests so newer versions of GNU head(1) behave themselves.  Patch
    by djm, so ok me.
  - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/port-aix.c] Silence compiler warnings.
+ - (dtucker) [audit.c audit.h auth.c auth1.c auth2.c loginrec.c monitor.c
+   monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h session.c sshd.c]: Prepend all of the audit
+   defines and enums with SSH_ to prevent namespace collisions on some
+   platforms (eg AIX).
 
 20050204
  - (dtucker) [monitor.c] Permit INVALID_USER audit events from slave too.
@@ -2082,4 +2086,4 @@
    - (djm) Trim deprecated options from INSTALL. Mention UsePAM
    - (djm) Fix quote handling in sftp; Patch from admorten AT umich.edu
 
-$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3638 2005/02/08 10:06:55 dtucker Exp $
+$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3639 2005/02/08 10:52:47 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/audit.c b/audit.c
index 13852a05e..18fc41047 100644
--- a/audit.c
+++ b/audit.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: audit.c,v 1.1 2005/02/02 13:37:14 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: audit.c,v 1.2 2005/02/08 10:52:48 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 
 #include "audit.h"
 #include "log.h"
@@ -44,22 +44,22 @@ ssh_audit_event_t
 audit_classify_auth(const char *method)
 {
 	if (strcmp(method, "none") == 0)
-		return AUTH_FAIL_NONE;
+		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE;
 	else if (strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
-		return AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD;
+		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD;
 	else if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
 	    strcmp(method, "rsa") == 0)
-		return AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY;
+		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY;
 	else if (strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 ||
 	    strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0)
-		return AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT;
+		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT;
 	else if (strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
 	    strcmp(method, "rhosts-rsa") == 0)
-		return AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED;
+		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED;
 	else if (strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0)
-		return AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI;
+		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI;
 	else
-		return AUDIT_UNKNOWN;
+		return SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN;
 }
 
 /* helper to return supplied username */
@@ -84,32 +84,32 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)
 		ssh_audit_event_t event;
 		const char *name;
 	} event_lookup[] = {
-		{LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES,	"LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES"},
-		{LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED,	"LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED"},
-		{AUTH_SUCCESS,		"AUTH_SUCCESS"},
-		{AUTH_FAIL_NONE,	"AUTH_FAIL_NONE"},
-		{AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD,	"AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD"},
-		{AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT,	"AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT"},
-		{AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY,	"AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY"},
-		{AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED,	"AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED"},
-		{AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI,	"AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI"},
-		{INVALID_USER,		"INVALID_USER"},
-		{NOLOGIN,		"NOLOGIN"},
-		{CONNECTION_CLOSE,	"CONNECTION_CLOSE"},
-		{CONNECTION_ABANDON,	"CONNECTION_ABANDON"},
-		{AUDIT_UNKNOWN,		"AUDIT_UNKNOWN"}
+		{SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES,	"LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES"},
+		{SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED,		"LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS,		"AUTH_SUCCESS"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE,		"AUTH_FAIL_NONE"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD,		"AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT,		"AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY,		"AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED,	"AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI,		"AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI"},
+		{SSH_INVALID_USER,		"INVALID_USER"},
+		{SSH_NOLOGIN,			"NOLOGIN"},
+		{SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE,		"CONNECTION_CLOSE"},
+		{SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON,	"CONNECTION_ABANDON"},
+		{SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN,		"AUDIT_UNKNOWN"}
 	};
 
-	for (i = 0; event_lookup[i].event != AUDIT_UNKNOWN; i++)
+	for (i = 0; event_lookup[i].event != SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN; i++)
 		if (event_lookup[i].event == ev)
 			break;
 	return(event_lookup[i].name);
 }
 
-# ifndef CUSTOM_AUDIT_EVENTS
+# ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 /*
  * Null implementations of audit functions.
- * These get used if AUDIT_EVENTS is defined but no audit module is enabled.
+ * These get used if SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS is defined but no audit module is enabled.
  */
 
 /*
@@ -177,5 +177,5 @@ audit_run_command(const char *command)
 	debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
 	    audit_username(), command);
 }
-# endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-#endif /* AUDIT_EVENTS */
+# endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff --git a/audit.h b/audit.h
index 2c1437391..78e58966f 100644
--- a/audit.h
+++ b/audit.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: audit.h,v 1.1 2005/02/02 13:37:14 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: audit.h,v 1.2 2005/02/08 10:52:48 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
@@ -29,20 +29,20 @@
 #ifndef _SSH_AUDIT_H
 # define _SSH_AUDIT_H
 enum ssh_audit_event_type {
-	LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES,
-	LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED,
-	AUTH_SUCCESS,
-	AUTH_FAIL_NONE,
-	AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD,
-	AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT,	/* keyboard-interactive or challenge-response */
-	AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY,	/* ssh2 pubkey or ssh1 rsa */
-	AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED,	/* ssh2 hostbased or ssh1 rhostsrsa */
-	AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI,
-	INVALID_USER,
-	NOLOGIN,		/* denied by /etc/nologin, not implemented */
-	CONNECTION_CLOSE,	/* closed after attempting auth or session */
-	CONNECTION_ABANDON,	/* closed without completing auth */
-	AUDIT_UNKNOWN
+	SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES,
+	SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED,
+	SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS,
+	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE,
+	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD,
+	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT,	/* keyboard-interactive or challenge-response */
+	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY,	/* ssh2 pubkey or ssh1 rsa */
+	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED,	/* ssh2 hostbased or ssh1 rhostsrsa */
+	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI,
+	SSH_INVALID_USER,
+	SSH_NOLOGIN,		/* denied by /etc/nologin, not implemented */
+	SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE,	/* closed after attempting auth or session */
+	SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON,	/* closed without completing auth */
+	SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN
 };
 typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t;
 
diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index 4b62ad8f7..e6dcab209 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
 		record_failed_login(authctxt->user,
 		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
 #endif
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed) {
 		ssh_audit_event_t event;
 
@@ -265,15 +265,15 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
 		 */
 		event = audit_classify_auth(method);
 		switch(event) {
-		case AUTH_FAIL_NONE:
-		case AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
-		case AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
+		case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE:
+		case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
+		case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
 			if (geteuid() == 0)
 				audit_event(event);
 			break;
-		case AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
-		case AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
-		case AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
+		case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
+		case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
+		case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
 			/*
 			 * This is required to handle the case where privsep
 			 * is enabled but it's root logging in, since
@@ -515,9 +515,9 @@ getpwnamallow(const char *user)
 		record_failed_login(user,
 		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
 #endif
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
-		audit_event(INVALID_USER);
-#endif /* AUDIT_EVENTS */
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+		audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER);
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
 		return (NULL);
 	}
 	if (!allowed_user(pw))
diff --git a/auth1.c b/auth1.c
index aeb5d8cb9..d08928455 100644
--- a/auth1.c
+++ b/auth1.c
@@ -249,8 +249,8 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
 		    !auth_root_allowed(get_authname(type))) {
 			authenticated = 0;
-# ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
-			PRIVSEP(audit_event(LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED));
+# ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+			PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED));
 # endif
 		}
 #endif
@@ -288,8 +288,8 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 			return;
 
 		if (authctxt->failures++ > options.max_authtries) {
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
-			PRIVSEP(audit_event(LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+			PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
 #endif
 			packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user);
 		}
diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
index 2727e0ff5..2265d311e 100644
--- a/auth2.c
+++ b/auth2.c
@@ -167,8 +167,8 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 			if (options.use_pam)
 				PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt));
 #endif
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
-			PRIVSEP(audit_event(INVALID_USER));
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+			PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER));
 #endif
 		}
 		setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
@@ -219,8 +219,8 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
 	if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
 	    !auth_root_allowed(method)) {
 		authenticated = 0;
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
-		PRIVSEP(audit_event(LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED));
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+		PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED));
 #endif
 	}
 
@@ -263,8 +263,8 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
 		authctxt->success = 1;
 	} else {
 		if (authctxt->failures++ > options.max_authtries) {
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
-			PRIVSEP(audit_event(LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+			PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
 #endif
 			packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user);
 		}
diff --git a/loginrec.c b/loginrec.c
index 0fa9bdea7..c033582ad 100644
--- a/loginrec.c
+++ b/loginrec.c
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@
 # include <libutil.h>
 #endif
 
-RCSID("$Id: loginrec.c,v 1.64 2005/02/02 13:20:53 dtucker Exp $");
+RCSID("$Id: loginrec.c,v 1.65 2005/02/08 10:52:48 dtucker Exp $");
 
 /**
  ** prototypes for helper functions in this file
@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ login_write(struct logininfo *li)
 	   !sys_auth_record_login(li->username,li->hostname,li->line))
 		logit("Writing login record failed for %s", li->username);
 #endif
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 	if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN)
 		audit_session_open(li->line);
 	else if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT)
diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index 04534d759..d6df656b0 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
 #endif
 
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
 #endif
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
 #endif
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, 0, mm_answer_audit_event},
 #endif
 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
     {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
     {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
 #endif
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
 #endif
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, 0, mm_answer_audit_event},
 #endif
     {0, 0, NULL}
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
     {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
     {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
 #endif
@@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
 	if (options.use_pam)
 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1);
 #endif
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, 1);
 #endif
 
@@ -1513,7 +1513,7 @@ mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
 	exit(res);
 }
 
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 /* Report that an audit event occurred */
 int
 mm_answer_audit_event(int socket, Buffer *m)
@@ -1525,13 +1525,13 @@ mm_answer_audit_event(int socket, Buffer *m)
 	event = buffer_get_int(m);
 	buffer_free(m);
 	switch(event) {
-	case AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
-	case AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
-	case AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
-	case LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
-	case LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
-	case CONNECTION_CLOSE:
-	case INVALID_USER:
+	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
+	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
+	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
+	case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
+	case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
+	case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
+	case SSH_INVALID_USER:
 		audit_event(event);
 		break;
 	default:
@@ -1555,7 +1555,7 @@ mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buffer *m)
 	buffer_free(m);
 	return (0);
 }
-#endif /* AUDIT_EVENTS */
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
 
 void
 monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
index 983b24072..e1b6512b4 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -1103,7 +1103,7 @@ mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *p, u_char response[16])
 	return (success);
 }
 
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 void
 mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
 {
@@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ mm_audit_run_command(const char *command)
 	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m);
 	buffer_free(&m);
 }
-#endif /* AUDIT_EVENTS */
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
 
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 OM_uint32
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
index 7ed241aa8..310b42513 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ int mm_sshpam_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
 void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
 #endif
 
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 #include "audit.h"
 void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
 void mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
index b645144c5..a50bfcff7 100644
--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
@@ -665,7 +665,7 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
 		debug("Forced command '%.900s'", command);
 	}
 
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 	if (command != NULL)
 		PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
 	else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
@@ -2333,8 +2333,8 @@ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	}
 #endif
 
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
-	PRIVSEP(audit_event(CONNECTION_CLOSE));
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+	PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE));
 #endif
 
 	/* remove agent socket */
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index e61870ea5..6b379521b 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1628,7 +1628,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	remote_port = get_remote_port();
 	remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
 
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 	audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
 #endif
 #ifdef LIBWRAP
@@ -1700,8 +1700,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	}
 
  authenticated:
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
-	audit_event(AUTH_SUCCESS);
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+	audit_event(SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS);
 #endif
 
 	/*
@@ -2017,10 +2017,10 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
 {
 	if (the_authctxt)
 		do_cleanup(the_authctxt);
-#ifdef AUDIT_EVENTS
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 	/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
 	if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
-		audit_event(CONNECTION_ABANDON);
+		audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
 #endif
 	_exit(i);
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 96d4710e3838af8c03a55ce37913568877dd0283 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2005 09:53:48 +1100
Subject:    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2005/02/08 22:24:57      [sshd.c]     
 Provide reason in error message if getnameinfo fails; ok markus@

---
 ChangeLog |  5 ++++-
 sshd.c    | 10 ++++++----
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'sshd.c')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 9a7351396..98cdf96aa 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@
    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2005/01/30 11:18:08
      [monitor.c]
      Make code match intent; ok djm@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2005/02/08 22:24:57
+     [sshd.c]
+     Provide reason in error message if getnameinfo fails; ok markus@
 
 20050208
  - (dtucker) [regress/test-exec.sh] Bug #912: Set _POSIX2_VERSION for the
@@ -2104,4 +2107,4 @@
    - (djm) Trim deprecated options from INSTALL. Mention UsePAM
    - (djm) Fix quote handling in sftp; Patch from admorten AT umich.edu
 
-$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3643 2005/02/08 22:52:17 dtucker Exp $
+$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3644 2005/02/08 22:53:48 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 6b379521b..a5b7f1ca3 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.307 2005/01/21 08:32:02 otto Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.308 2005/02/08 22:24:57 dtucker Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
@@ -1268,10 +1268,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS)
 				fatal("Too many listen sockets. "
 				    "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS");
-			if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
+			if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
 			    ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
-			    NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
-				error("getnameinfo failed");
+			    NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) {
+				error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s",
+				    (ret != EAI_SYSTEM) ? gai_strerror(ret) :
+				    strerror(errno));
 				continue;
 			}
 			/* Create socket for listening. */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 2b59a6dad6ed7c127a2942fe941dac7092337ea4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
Date: Sun, 6 Mar 2005 22:38:51 +1100
Subject:  - (dtucker) [session.c sshd.c] Bug #125 comment #49: Send disconnect
 audit    events earlier, prevents mm_request_send errors reported by Matt
 Goebel.

---
 ChangeLog | 4 +++-
 session.c | 4 ----
 sshd.c    | 4 ++++
 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'sshd.c')

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index bf2ca3620..a96605e9d 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 20050306
  - (dtucker) [monitor.c] Bug #125 comment #47: fix errors returned by monitor
    when attempting to audit disconnect events.  Reported by Phil Dibowitz.
+ - (dtucker) [session.c sshd.c] Bug #125 comment #49: Send disconnect audit
+   events earlier, prevents mm_request_send errors reported by Matt Goebel.
 
 20050305
  - (djm) [contrib/cygwin/README] Improve Cygwin build documentation. Patch 
@@ -2281,4 +2283,4 @@
    - (djm) Trim deprecated options from INSTALL. Mention UsePAM
    - (djm) Fix quote handling in sftp; Patch from admorten AT umich.edu
 
-$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3692 2005/03/06 11:31:35 dtucker Exp $
+$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3693 2005/03/06 11:38:51 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
index df7552334..b32c9e2ca 100644
--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
@@ -2344,10 +2344,6 @@ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	}
 #endif
 
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-	PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE));
-#endif
-
 	/* remove agent socket */
 	auth_sock_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw);
 
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index a5b7f1ca3..11d618d11 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1728,6 +1728,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		finish_pam();
 #endif /* USE_PAM */
 
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+	PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE));
+#endif
+
 	packet_close();
 
 	if (use_privsep)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3