From 06879e71614170580ffa7568ec5c009f60a9d084 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Simon Wilkinson Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:48 +0000 Subject: GSSAPI key exchange support This patch has been rejected upstream: "None of the OpenSSH developers are in favour of adding this, and this situation has not changed for several years. This is not a slight on Simon's patch, which is of fine quality, but just that a) we don't trust GSSAPI implementations that much and b) we don't like adding new KEX since they are pre-auth attack surface. This one is particularly scary, since it requires hooks out to typically root-owned system resources." However, quite a lot of people rely on this in Debian, and it's better to have it merged into the main openssh package rather than having separate -krb5 packages (as we used to have). It seems to have a generally good security history. Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1242 Last-Updated: 2015-08-19 Patch-Name: gssapi.patch --- sshkey.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'sshkey.c') diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c index 476879033..cd5992ecb 100644 --- a/sshkey.c +++ b/sshkey.c @@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] = { { "ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com", "DSA-CERT-V00", KEY_DSA_CERT_V00, 0, 1 }, #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + { "null", "null", KEY_NULL, 0, 0 }, { NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0 } }; @@ -204,7 +205,7 @@ key_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only) const struct keytype *kt; for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { - if (kt->name == NULL) + if (kt->name == NULL || kt->type == KEY_NULL) continue; if ((certs_only && !kt->cert) || (plain_only && kt->cert)) continue; -- cgit v1.2.3