From ae32d626ed3d15cfd7f432358b63c005961921df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Manoj Srivastava <srivasta@debian.org>
Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:49 +0000
Subject: Handle SELinux authorisation roles

Rejected upstream due to discomfort with magic usernames; a better approach
will need an SSH protocol change.  In the meantime, this came from Debian's
SELinux maintainer, so we'll keep it until we have something better.

Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1641
Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/394795
Last-Update: 2013-09-14

Patch-Name: selinux-role.patch
---
 auth.h                      |    1 +
 auth1.c                     |    8 +++++++-
 auth2.c                     |   10 ++++++++--
 monitor.c                   |   32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 monitor.h                   |    2 ++
 monitor_wrap.c              |   22 ++++++++++++++++++++--
 monitor_wrap.h              |    3 ++-
 openbsd-compat/port-linux.c |   27 ++++++++++++++++++++-------
 openbsd-compat/port-linux.h |    4 ++--
 platform.c                  |    4 ++--
 platform.h                  |    2 +-
 session.c                   |   10 +++++-----
 session.h                   |    2 +-
 sshd.c                      |    2 +-
 sshpty.c                    |    4 ++--
 sshpty.h                    |    2 +-
 16 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)

diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
index 124e597..79e4ea5 100644
--- a/auth.h
+++ b/auth.h
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
 	char		*service;
 	struct passwd	*pw;		/* set if 'valid' */
 	char		*style;
+	char		*role;
 	void		*kbdintctxt;
 	char		*info;		/* Extra info for next auth_log */
 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
diff --git a/auth1.c b/auth1.c
index 0f870b3..c707390 100644
--- a/auth1.c
+++ b/auth1.c
@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ void
 do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
 	u_int ulen;
-	char *user, *style = NULL;
+	char *user, *style = NULL, *role = NULL;
 
 	/* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */
 	packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_USER);
@@ -389,11 +389,17 @@ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	user = packet_get_cstring(&ulen);
 	packet_check_eom();
 
+	if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
+		*role++ = '\0';
+
 	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
 		*style++ = '\0';
+	else if (role && (style = strchr(role, ':')) != NULL)
+		*style++ = '\0';
 
 	authctxt->user = user;
 	authctxt->style = style;
+	authctxt->role = role;
 
 	/* Verify that the user is a valid user. */
 	if ((authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user))) != NULL)
diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
index fbe3e1b..70f2925 100644
--- a/auth2.c
+++ b/auth2.c
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
 	Authmethod *m = NULL;
-	char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL;
+	char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL, *role = NULL;
 	int authenticated = 0;
 
 	if (authctxt == NULL)
@@ -228,8 +228,13 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
 	debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
 
+	if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
+		*role++ = 0;
+
 	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
 		*style++ = 0;
+	else if (role && (style = strchr(role, ':')) != NULL)
+		*style++ = '\0';
 
 	if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) {
 		/* setup auth context */
@@ -253,8 +258,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
 		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
 		authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
+		authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
 		if (use_privsep)
-			mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
+			mm_inform_authserv(service, style, role);
 		userauth_banner();
 		if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
 			packet_disconnect("no authentication methods enabled");
diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index 2918814..11eac63 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_authrole(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
@@ -221,6 +222,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole},
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
 #ifdef USE_PAM
@@ -822,6 +824,7 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
 	else {
 		/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1);
 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
 	}
 #ifdef USE_PAM
@@ -852,14 +855,37 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
 
 	authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
 	authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
-	debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
-	    __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
+	authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+	debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s, role=%s",
+	    __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style, authctxt->role);
 
 	if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
 		free(authctxt->style);
 		authctxt->style = NULL;
 	}
 
+	if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
+		free(authctxt->role);
+		authctxt->role = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_authrole(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	monitor_permit_authentications(1);
+
+	authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+	debug3("%s: role=%s",
+	    __func__, authctxt->role);
+
+	if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
+		free(authctxt->role);
+		authctxt->role = NULL;
+	}
+
 	return (0);
 }
 
@@ -1464,7 +1490,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
 	res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
 	if (res == 0)
 		goto error;
-	pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
+	pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty, authctxt->role);
 
 	buffer_put_int(m, 1);
 	buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
index 7f32b0c..4d5e8fa 100644
--- a/monitor.h
+++ b/monitor.h
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
 	MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151,
 	MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153,
 
+	MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 154,
+
 };
 
 struct mm_master;
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
index 60b987d..f75dc9d 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -318,10 +318,10 @@ mm_auth2_read_banner(void)
 	return (banner);
 }
 
-/* Inform the privileged process about service and style */
+/* Inform the privileged process about service, style, and role */
 
 void
-mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
+mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style, char *role)
 {
 	Buffer m;
 
@@ -330,12 +330,30 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
 	buffer_init(&m);
 	buffer_put_cstring(&m, service);
 	buffer_put_cstring(&m, style ? style : "");
+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : "");
 
 	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, &m);
 
 	buffer_free(&m);
 }
 
+/* Inform the privileged process about role */
+
+void
+mm_inform_authrole(char *role)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : "");
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, &m);
+
+	buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
 /* Do the password authentication */
 int
 mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password)
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
index a4e9d24..9c2ee49 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
@@ -41,7 +41,8 @@ void mm_log_handler(LogLevel, const char *, void *);
 int mm_is_monitor(void);
 DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
 int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int);
-void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
+void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *, char *);
+void mm_inform_authrole(char *);
 struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *);
 char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
 int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *);
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
index 4637a7a..de6ad3f 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
@@ -29,6 +29,12 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#endif
+
 #include "log.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "port-linux.h"
@@ -58,7 +64,7 @@ ssh_selinux_enabled(void)
 
 /* Return the default security context for the given username */
 static security_context_t
-ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
+ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, const char *role)
 {
 	security_context_t sc = NULL;
 	char *sename = NULL, *lvl = NULL;
@@ -73,9 +79,16 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
 #endif
 
 #ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
-	r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
+	if (role != NULL && role[0])
+		r = get_default_context_with_rolelevel(sename, role, lvl, NULL,
+						       &sc);
+	else
+		r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
 #else
-	r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
+	if (role != NULL && role[0])
+		r = get_default_context_with_role(sename, role, NULL, &sc);
+	else
+		r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
 #endif
 
 	if (r != 0) {
@@ -105,7 +118,7 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
 
 /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
 void
-ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname, const char *role)
 {
 	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
 
@@ -114,7 +127,7 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
 
 	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
 
-	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, role);
 	if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
 		switch (security_getenforce()) {
 		case -1:
@@ -136,7 +149,7 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
 
 /* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
 void
-ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
+ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty, const char *role)
 {
 	security_context_t new_tty_ctx = NULL;
 	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
@@ -147,7 +160,7 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
 
 	debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
 
-	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, role);
 
 	/* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
 
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
index e3d1004..80ce13a 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
@@ -21,8 +21,8 @@
 
 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
-void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
-void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *, const char *);
+void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *, const char *);
 void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
 void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
 #endif
diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
index 30fc609..4aab9a9 100644
--- a/platform.c
+++ b/platform.c
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
  * called if sshd is running as root.
  */
 void
-platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
+platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw, const char *role)
 {
 #if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(USE_PAM)
 	/*
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
 	}
 #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-	ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
+	ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name, role);
 #endif
 }
 
diff --git a/platform.h b/platform.h
index 1c7a45d..436ae7c 100644
--- a/platform.h
+++ b/platform.h
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ void platform_post_fork_parent(pid_t child_pid);
 void platform_post_fork_child(void);
 int  platform_privileged_uidswap(void);
 void platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
-void platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *);
+void platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *, const char *);
 char *platform_get_krb5_client(const char *);
 char *platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *);
 int platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t);
diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
index 2bcf818..6848df4 100644
--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
@@ -1502,7 +1502,7 @@ safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid)
 
 /* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */
 void
-do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw, const char *role)
 {
 	char *chroot_path, *tmp;
 
@@ -1530,7 +1530,7 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
 		endgrent();
 #endif
 
-		platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw);
+		platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw, role);
 
 		if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
 		    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
@@ -1679,7 +1679,7 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
 
 	/* Force a password change */
 	if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
-		do_setusercontext(pw);
+		do_setusercontext(pw, s->authctxt->role);
 		child_close_fds();
 		do_pwchange(s);
 		exit(1);
@@ -1706,7 +1706,7 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
 		/* When PAM is enabled we rely on it to do the nologin check */
 		if (!options.use_pam)
 			do_nologin(pw);
-		do_setusercontext(pw);
+		do_setusercontext(pw, s->authctxt->role);
 		/*
 		 * PAM session modules in do_setusercontext may have
 		 * generated messages, so if this in an interactive
@@ -2117,7 +2117,7 @@ session_pty_req(Session *s)
 	tty_parse_modes(s->ttyfd, &n_bytes);
 
 	if (!use_privsep)
-		pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty);
+		pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty, s->authctxt->role);
 
 	/* Set window size from the packet. */
 	pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
diff --git a/session.h b/session.h
index 6a2f35e..ef6593c 100644
--- a/session.h
+++ b/session.h
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ void	 session_pty_cleanup2(Session *);
 Session	*session_new(void);
 Session	*session_by_tty(char *);
 void	 session_close(Session *);
-void	 do_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
+void	 do_setusercontext(struct passwd *, const char *);
 void	 child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
 		       const char *value);
 
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index d787fea..e343d90 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -769,7 +769,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
 
 	/* Drop privileges */
-	do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
+	do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw, authctxt->role);
 
  skip:
 	/* It is safe now to apply the key state */
diff --git a/sshpty.c b/sshpty.c
index bbbc0fe..8cc26a2 100644
--- a/sshpty.c
+++ b/sshpty.c
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ pty_change_window_size(int ptyfd, u_int row, u_int col,
 }
 
 void
-pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty)
+pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty, const char *role)
 {
 	struct group *grp;
 	gid_t gid;
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty)
 		    strerror(errno));
 
 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-	ssh_selinux_setup_pty(pw->pw_name, tty);
+	ssh_selinux_setup_pty(pw->pw_name, tty, role);
 #endif
 
 	if (st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid || st.st_gid != gid) {
diff --git a/sshpty.h b/sshpty.h
index cfa3224..edf2436 100644
--- a/sshpty.h
+++ b/sshpty.h
@@ -24,4 +24,4 @@ int	 pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
 void	 pty_release(const char *);
 void	 pty_make_controlling_tty(int *, const char *);
 void	 pty_change_window_size(int, u_int, u_int, u_int, u_int);
-void	 pty_setowner(struct passwd *, const char *);
+void	 pty_setowner(struct passwd *, const char *, const char *);