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|
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
{-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving #-}
{-# LANGUAGE KindSignatures #-}
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TypeOperators #-}
module ToxTransport
( toxTransport
, TransportCrypto(..)
, SymmetricKey(..)
, Encrypted8(..)
, UDPTransport
-- DHTTransport
, DHTMessage(..)
, Ping
, Pong
, GetNodes
, SendNodes
, CookieRequest
, Cookie
, DHTRequest
-- OnionTransport
, OnionToOwner(..)
, OnionMessage(..)
, DataToRoute(..)
, AnnounceResponse(..)
, AnnounceRequest(..)
, Forwarding(..)
, ReturnPath(..)
, OnionRequest(..)
, OnionResponse(..)
, Addressed(..)
-- CryptoTransport
, NetCrypto(..)
, CryptoData(..)
, CryptoMessage(..)
, CryptoPacket(..)
, HandshakeData(..)
, Handshake(..)
) where
import Network.QueryResponse
import ToxAddress as Tox hiding (OnionToOwner, ReturnPath)
import ToxCrypto
import ToxPacket
import Control.Applicative
import Control.Arrow
import Control.Concurrent.STM
import Control.Monad
import Crypto.Hash
import Crypto.Hash.Algorithms
import qualified Data.ByteString as B
;import Data.ByteString (ByteString)
import Data.Serialize as S (Get, Put, Serialize, decode, get, put,
runGet)
import Data.Typeable
import Data.Word
import GHC.TypeLits
import Network.Socket
newtype SymmetricKey = SymmetricKey ByteString
data TransportCrypto = TransportCrypto
{ transportSecret :: SecretKey
, transportPublic :: PublicKey
, transportSymmetric :: STM SymmetricKey
}
type UDPTransport = Transport String SockAddr ByteString
type DHTTransport = Transport String NodeInfo (DHTMessage Encrypted8)
toxTransport ::
TransportCrypto
-> (PublicKey -> IO (Maybe NodeInfo))
-> UDPTransport
-> IO ( Transport String NodeInfo (DHTMessage Encrypted8)
, Transport String OnionToOwner (OnionMessage Encrypted)
, Transport String SockAddr NetCrypto )
toxTransport crypto closeLookup udp = do
(dht,udp1) <- partitionTransport parseDHTAddr encodeDHTAddr id $ forwardOnions crypto udp
(onion,udp2) <- partitionTransport parseOnionAddr encodeOnionAddr id udp1
let netcrypto = layerTransport parseNetCrypto encodeNetCrypto udp2
return ( forwardDHTRequests crypto closeLookup dht
, onion
, netcrypto
)
type HandleHi a = Maybe (Either String (DHTMessage Encrypted8, NodeInfo)) -> IO a
type HandleLo a = Maybe (Either String (ByteString, SockAddr)) -> IO a
data DHTMessage (f :: * -> *)
= DHTPing (Assym (f Ping))
| DHTPong (Assym (f Pong))
| DHTGetNodes (Assym (f GetNodes))
| DHTSendNodes (Assym (f SendNodes))
| DHTCookieRequest (Assym (f CookieRequest))
| DHTCookie Nonce24 (f Cookie)
| DHTDHTRequest PublicKey (Assym (f DHTRequest))
instance Sized GetNodes where
size = ConstSize 32 -- TODO This right?
instance Sized SendNodes where
size = VarSize $ \(SendNodes ns) -> _nodeFormatSize * length ns
instance Sized Ping where size = ConstSize 1
instance Sized Pong where size = ConstSize 1
newtype Encrypted8 a = E8 (Encrypted (a,Nonce8))
deriving Serialize
-- instance (Sized a, Sized b) => Sized (a,b) where size = _todo
getDHT :: Sized a => Get (Assym (Encrypted8 a))
getDHT = _todo
getOnionAssym :: Get (Assym (Encrypted DataToRoute))
getOnionAssym = _todo
getCookie :: Get (Nonce24, Encrypted8 Cookie)
getCookie = get
getDHTReqest :: Get (PublicKey, Assym (Encrypted8 DHTRequest))
getDHTReqest = _todo
fanGet :: ByteString -> Get x -> (x -> a) -> (x -> b) -> Either String (a,b)
fanGet bs getIt f nid = fmap (f &&& nid) $ runGet getIt bs
-- Throws an error if called with a non-internet socket.
direct :: Sized a => ByteString
-> SockAddr
-> (Assym (Encrypted8 a)
-> DHTMessage Encrypted8)
-> Either String (DHTMessage Encrypted8, NodeInfo)
direct bs saddr f = fanGet bs getDHT f (asymNodeInfo saddr)
-- Throws an error if called with a non-internet socket.
asymNodeInfo saddr asym = either (error . mappend "asymNodeInfo: ") id $ nodeInfo (NodeId $ senderKey asym) saddr
-- Throws an error if called with a non-internet socket.
noReplyAddr saddr = either (error . mappend "noReplyAddr: ") id $ nodeInfo zeroID saddr
parseDHTAddr :: (ByteString, SockAddr) -> Either (DHTMessage Encrypted8,NodeInfo) (ByteString,SockAddr)
parseDHTAddr (msg,saddr)
| Just (typ,bs) <- B.uncons msg
, let right = Right (msg,saddr)
left = either (const right) Left
= case typ of
0x00 -> left $ direct bs saddr DHTPing
0x01 -> left $ direct bs saddr DHTPong
0x02 -> left $ direct bs saddr DHTGetNodes
0x04 -> left $ direct bs saddr DHTSendNodes
0x18 -> left $ direct bs saddr DHTCookieRequest
0x19 -> left $ fanGet bs getCookie (uncurry DHTCookie) (const $ noReplyAddr saddr)
0x20 -> left $ fanGet bs getDHTReqest (uncurry DHTDHTRequest) (asymNodeInfo saddr . snd)
_ -> right
encodeDHTAddr :: (DHTMessage Encrypted8,NodeInfo) -> (ByteString, SockAddr)
encodeDHTAddr = _todo
data OnionMessage (f :: * -> *)
= OnionAnnounce (Assym (f (AnnounceRequest,Nonce8)))
| OnionAnnounceResponse Nonce8 Nonce24 (f AnnounceResponse)
| OnionToRoute PublicKey (Assym (f DataToRoute)) -- destination key, aliased Assym
| OnionToRouteResponse (Assym (f DataToRoute))
data OnionToOwner = OnionToOwner NodeInfo (ReturnPath 3)
| OnionToMe SockAddr -- SockAddr is immediate peer in route
onionToOwner assym ret3 saddr = do
ni <- nodeInfo (NodeId $ senderKey assym) saddr
return $ OnionToOwner ni ret3
onion bs saddr getf = do (f,(assym,ret3)) <- runGet ((,) <$> getf <*> getOnionRequest) bs
oaddr <- onionToOwner assym ret3 saddr
return (f assym, oaddr)
parseOnionAddr :: (ByteString, SockAddr) -> Either (OnionMessage Encrypted,OnionToOwner) (ByteString,SockAddr)
parseOnionAddr (msg,saddr)
| Just (typ,bs) <- B.uncons msg
, let right = Right (msg,saddr)
query = either (const right) Left
response = either (const right) (Left . (, OnionToMe saddr))
= case typ of
0x83 -> query $ onion bs saddr (pure OnionAnnounce) -- Announce Request
0x85 -> query $ onion bs saddr (OnionToRoute <$> getPublicKey) -- Onion Data Request
0x84 -> response $ runGet (OnionAnnounceResponse <$> get <*> get <*> get) bs -- Announce Response
0x86 -> response $ runGet (OnionToRouteResponse <$> getOnionAssym) bs -- Onion Data Response
_ -> right
encodeOnionAddr :: (OnionMessage Encrypted,OnionToOwner) -> (ByteString, SockAddr)
encodeOnionAddr = _todo
-- data CookieAddress = WithoutCookie NodeInfo | CookieAddress Cookie SockAddr
data NetCrypto
= NetHandshake (Handshake Encrypted)
| NetCrypto (CryptoPacket Encrypted)
parseNetCrypto :: ByteString -> SockAddr -> Either String (NetCrypto, SockAddr)
parseNetCrypto = _todo
encodeNetCrypto :: NetCrypto -> SockAddr -> (ByteString, SockAddr)
encodeNetCrypto = _todo
data Handshake (f :: * -> *) = Handshake
{ handshakeCookie :: Cookie
, handshakeNonce :: Nonce24
, hadshakeData :: f HandshakeData
}
data HandshakeData = HandshakeData
{ baseNonce :: Nonce24
, sessionKey :: PublicKey
, cookieHash :: Digest SHA512
, otherCookie :: Cookie
}
data CryptoPacket (f :: * -> *) = CryptoPacket
{ pktNonce :: Word16
, pktData :: f CryptoData
}
data CryptoData = CryptoData
{ -- | [our recvbuffers buffer_start, (highest packet number handled + 1), (big endian)]
bufferStart :: Word32
-- | [ uint32_t packet number if lossless
-- , sendbuffer buffer_end if lossy , (big endian)]
, bufferEnd :: Word32
-- | [data]
, bufferData :: CryptoMessage
}
-- TODO: Flesh this out.
data CryptoMessage -- First byte indicates data
= Padding -- ^ 0 padding (skipped until we hit a non zero (data id) byte)
| PacketRequest -- ^ 1 packet request packet (lossy packet)
| KillPacket -- ^ 2 connection kill packet (lossy packet)
| UnspecifiedPacket -- ^ 3+ unspecified
| MessengerLossless -- ^ 16+ reserved for Messenger usage (lossless packets)
| MessengerLossy -- ^ 192+ reserved for Messenger usage (lossy packets)
| Messenger255 -- ^ 255 reserved for Messenger usage (lossless packet)
-- --> CookieRequest WithoutCookie
-- <-- CookieResponse CookieAddress
-- --> Handshake CookieAddress
-- <-- Handshake CookieAddress
-- Handshake packet:
-- [uint8_t 26] (0x1a)
-- [Cookie]
-- [nonce (24 bytes)]
-- [Encrypted message containing:
-- [24 bytes base nonce]
-- [session public key of the peer (32 bytes)]
-- [sha512 hash of the entire Cookie sitting outside the encrypted part]
-- [Other Cookie (used by the other to respond to the handshake packet)]
-- ]
-- cookie response packet (161 bytes):
--
-- [uint8_t 25]
-- [Random nonce (24 bytes)]
-- [Encrypted message containing:
-- [Cookie]
-- [uint64_t echo id (that was sent in the request)]
-- ]
--
-- Encrypted message is encrypted with the exact same symmetric key as the
-- cookie request packet it responds to but with a different nonce.
-- (Encrypted message is encrypted with reqesters's DHT private key,
-- responders's DHT public key and the nonce.)
--
-- Since we don't receive the public key, we will need to lookup the key by
-- the SockAddr... I don't understand why the CookieResponse message is
-- special this way. TODO: implement a multimap (SockAddr -> SharedSecret)
-- and wrap cookie queries with store/delete. TODO: Should the entire
-- SharedScret cache be keyed on only SockAddr ? Perhaps the secret cache
-- should be (NodeId -> Secret) and the cookie-request map should be
-- (SockAddr -> NodeId)
-- Encrypted packets:
--
-- Length Contents
-- :---------:--------------------------------------------------------------
-- `1` `uint8_t` (0x1b)
-- `2` `uint16_t` The last 2 bytes of the nonce used to encrypt this
-- variable Payload
--
-- The payload is encrypted with the session key and 'base nonce' set by the
-- receiver in their handshake + packet number (starting at 0, big endian math).
-- Byte value Packet Kind Return address
-- :----------- :--------------------
-- `0x00` Ping Request DHTNode
-- `0x01` Ping Response -
-- `0x02` Nodes Request DHTNode
-- `0x04` Nodes Response -
-- `0x18` Cookie Request DHTNode, but without sending pubkey in response
-- `0x19` Cookie Response - (no pubkey)
--
-- `0x21` LAN Discovery DHTNode (No reply, port 33445, trigger Nodes Request/Response)
--
-- `0x20` DHT Request DHTNode/-forward
--
-- `0x1a` Crypto Handshake CookieAddress
--
-- `0x1b` Crypto Data SessionAddress
--
-- `0x83` Announce Request OnionToOwner
-- `0x84` Announce Response -
-- `0x85` Onion Data Request OnionToOwner
-- `0x86` Onion Data Response -
--
-- `0xf0` Bootstrap Info SockAddr?
--
-- `0x80` Onion Request 0 -forward
-- `0x81` Onion Request 1 -forward
-- `0x82` Onion Request 2 -forward
-- `0x8c` Onion Response 3 -return
-- `0x8d` Onion Response 2 -return
-- `0x8e` Onion Response 1 -return
forwardOnions :: TransportCrypto -> UDPTransport -> UDPTransport -- HandleHi a -> IO a -> HandleLo a
forwardOnions crypto udp = udp { awaitMessage = await' }
where
-- forMe :: HandleHi
-- forThem :: handleLo
await' :: HandleLo a -> IO a
await' forThem = awaitMessage udp $ \case
m@(Just (Right (bs,saddr))) -> case B.head bs of
0x80 -> forward forThem bs $ handleOnionRequest (Proxy :: Proxy 0) crypto saddr (forThem m)
0x81 -> forward forThem bs $ handleOnionRequest (Proxy :: Proxy 1) crypto saddr (forThem m)
0x82 -> forward forThem bs $ handleOnionRequest (Proxy :: Proxy 2) crypto saddr (forThem m)
0x8c -> forward forThem bs $ handleOnionResponse (Proxy :: Proxy 3) crypto saddr (forThem m)
0x8d -> forward forThem bs $ handleOnionResponse (Proxy :: Proxy 2) crypto saddr (forThem m)
0x8e -> forward forThem bs $ handleOnionResponse (Proxy :: Proxy 1) crypto saddr (forThem m)
_ -> forThem m
m -> forThem m
forward :: forall c b b1.
Serialize b =>
(Maybe (Either String b1) -> c) -> ByteString -> (b -> c) -> c
forward forMe bs f = either (forMe . Just . Left) f $ decode $ B.tail bs
forwardDHTRequests :: TransportCrypto -> (PublicKey -> IO (Maybe NodeInfo)) -> DHTTransport -> DHTTransport
forwardDHTRequests crypto closeLookup dht = dht { awaitMessage = await' }
where
await' :: HandleHi a -> IO a
await' pass = awaitMessage dht $ \case
Just (Right (m@(DHTDHTRequest target payload),src)) | target /= transportPublic crypto
-> do mni <- closeLookup target
-- Forward the message if the target is in our close list.
forM_ mni $ \ni -> sendMessage dht ni m
await' pass
m -> pass m
-- n = 0, 1, 2
data OnionRequest (n :: Nat) = OnionRequest
{ onionNonce :: Nonce24
, onionForward :: Forwarding (3 - n) (OnionMessage Encrypted)
, pathFromOwner :: ReturnPath n
}
instance Serialize (OnionRequest n) where { get = _todo; put = _todo }
instance Serialize (OnionResponse n) where { get = _todo; put = _todo }
-- n = 1, 2, 3
-- Attributed (Encrypted (
data OnionResponse (n :: Nat) = OnionResponse
{ pathToOwner :: ReturnPath n
, msgToOwner :: OnionMessage Encrypted
}
data Addressed a = Addressed { sockAddr :: SockAddr, unaddressed :: a }
data ReturnPath (n :: Nat) where
NoReturnPath :: ReturnPath 0
ReturnPath :: Nonce24 -> Encrypted (Addressed (ReturnPath n)) -> ReturnPath (n + 1)
data Forwarding (n :: Nat) msg where
NotForwarded :: msg -> Forwarding 0 msg
Forwarding :: Assym (Encrypted (Addressed (Forwarding n msg))) -> Forwarding (n + 1) msg
handleOnionRequest :: KnownNat n => proxy n -> TransportCrypto -> SockAddr -> IO a -> OnionRequest n -> IO a
handleOnionRequest = _todo
handleOnionResponse :: KnownNat n => proxy n -> TransportCrypto -> SockAddr -> IO a -> OnionResponse n -> IO a
handleOnionResponse = _todo
data AnnounceRequest = AnnounceRequest
{ announcePingId :: Nonce32 -- Ping ID
, announceSeeking :: NodeId -- Public key we are searching for
, announceKey :: NodeId -- Public key that we want those sending back data packets to use
}
instance S.Serialize AnnounceRequest where
get = AnnounceRequest <$> S.get <*> S.get <*> S.get
put (AnnounceRequest p s k) = S.put (p,s,k)
getOnionRequest :: Get (Assym (Encrypted msg), ReturnPath 3)
getOnionRequest = _todo
data KeyRecord = NotStored Nonce32
| SendBackKey PublicKey
| Acknowledged Nonce32
getPublicKey :: Get PublicKey
getPublicKey = _todo
putPublicKey :: PublicKey -> Put
putPublicKey = _todo
instance S.Serialize KeyRecord where
get = do
is_stored <- S.get :: S.Get Word8
case is_stored of
1 -> SendBackKey <$> getPublicKey
2 -> Acknowledged <$> S.get
_ -> NotStored <$> S.get
put (NotStored n32) = S.put (0 :: Word8) >> S.put n32
put (SendBackKey key) = S.put (1 :: Word8) >> putPublicKey key
put (Acknowledged n32) = S.put (2 :: Word8) >> S.put n32
data AnnounceResponse = AnnounceResponse
{ is_stored :: KeyRecord
, announceNodes :: SendNodes
}
instance Sized AnnounceResponse where
size = VarSize $ \AnnounceResponse {} -> _todo
instance S.Serialize AnnounceResponse where
get = AnnounceResponse <$> S.get <*> S.get
put (AnnounceResponse st ns) = S.put st >> S.put ns
data DataToRoute = DataToRoute
{ dataFromKey :: PublicKey
, dataToRoute :: Encrypted (Word8,ByteString)
}
|