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|
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-}
{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleInstances #-}
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
{-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving #-}
{-# LANGUAGE KindSignatures #-}
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE MultiParamTypeClasses #-}
{-# LANGUAGE PartialTypeSignatures #-}
{-# LANGUAGE RankNTypes #-}
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
{-# LANGUAGE StandaloneDeriving #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TypeOperators #-}
{-# LANGUAGE UndecidableInstances #-}
module Network.Tox.Onion.Transport
( parseOnionAddr
, encodeOnionAddr
, parseDataToRoute
, encodeDataToRoute
, forwardOnions
, AliasSelector(..)
, OnionDestination(..)
, OnionMessage(..)
, Rendezvous(..)
, DataToRoute(..)
, OnionData(..)
, AnnouncedRendezvous(..)
, AnnounceResponse(..)
, AnnounceRequest(..)
, Forwarding(..)
, ReturnPath(..)
, OnionRequest(..)
, OnionResponse(..)
, Addressed(..)
, UDPTransport
, KeyRecord(..)
, encrypt
, decrypt
, peelSymmetric
, OnionRoute(..)
, N3
, onionKey
, onionAliasSelector
, selectAlias
, RouteId(..)
, routeId
) where
import Network.Address (fromSockAddr,toSockAddr,setPort,either4or6,sockAddrPort)
import Network.QueryResponse
import Crypto.Tox hiding (encrypt,decrypt)
import Network.Tox.NodeId
import qualified Crypto.Tox as ToxCrypto
import Network.Tox.DHT.Transport (NodeInfo(..),NodeId(..),SendNodes(..),nodeInfo,DHTPublicKey(..),FriendRequest,asymNodeInfo)
import Control.Applicative
import Control.Arrow
import Control.Concurrent.STM
import Control.Monad
import qualified Data.ByteString as B
;import Data.ByteString (ByteString)
import Data.Coerce
import Data.Function
import Data.Functor.Contravariant
import Data.Functor.Identity
import Data.IP
import Data.Maybe
import Data.Monoid
import Data.Serialize as S
import Data.Type.Equality
import Data.Typeable
import Data.Word
import Debug.Trace
import GHC.Generics ()
import GHC.TypeLits
import Network.Socket
import System.IO
import qualified Text.ParserCombinators.ReadP as RP
import Data.Hashable
type HandleLo a = Maybe (Either String (ByteString, SockAddr)) -> IO a
type UDPTransport = Transport String SockAddr ByteString
getOnionAsymm :: Get (Asymm (Encrypted DataToRoute))
getOnionAsymm = getAliasedAsymm
putOnionAsymm :: Serialize a => Word8 -> Put -> Asymm a -> Put
putOnionAsymm typ p a = put typ >> p >> putAliasedAsymm a
data OnionMessage (f :: * -> *)
= OnionAnnounce (Asymm (f (AnnounceRequest,Nonce8)))
| OnionAnnounceResponse Nonce8 Nonce24 (f AnnounceResponse)
| OnionToRoute PublicKey (Asymm (Encrypted DataToRoute)) -- destination key, aliased Asymm
| OnionToRouteResponse (Asymm (Encrypted DataToRoute))
deriving instance ( Show (f (AnnounceRequest, Nonce8))
, Show (f AnnounceResponse)
, Show (f DataToRoute)
) => Show (OnionMessage f)
msgNonce :: OnionMessage f -> Nonce24
msgNonce (OnionAnnounce a) = asymmNonce a
msgNonce (OnionAnnounceResponse _ n24 _) = n24
msgNonce (OnionToRoute _ a) = asymmNonce a
msgNonce (OnionToRouteResponse a) = asymmNonce a
data AliasSelector = SearchingAlias | AnnouncingAlias SecretKey PublicKey
deriving (Eq,Show)
data OnionDestination r
= OnionToOwner
{ onionNodeInfo :: NodeInfo
, onionReturnPath :: ReturnPath N3 -- ^ Somebody else's path to us.
}
| OnionDestination
{ onionAliasSelector' :: AliasSelector
, onionNodeInfo :: NodeInfo
, onionRouteSpec :: Maybe r -- ^ Our own onion-path.
}
deriving Show
onionAliasSelector :: OnionDestination r -> AliasSelector
onionAliasSelector (OnionToOwner {} ) = SearchingAlias
onionAliasSelector (OnionDestination{onionAliasSelector' = sel}) = sel
onionKey :: OnionDestination r -> PublicKey
onionKey od = id2key . nodeId $ onionNodeInfo od
instance Sized (OnionMessage Encrypted) where
size = VarSize $ \case
OnionAnnounce a -> case size of ConstSize n -> n + 1
VarSize f -> f a + 1
OnionAnnounceResponse n8 n24 x -> case size of ConstSize n -> n + 33
VarSize f -> f x + 33
OnionToRoute pubkey a -> case size of ConstSize n -> n + 33
VarSize f -> f a + 33
OnionToRouteResponse a -> case size of ConstSize n -> n + 1
VarSize f -> f a + 1
instance Serialize (OnionMessage Encrypted) where
get = do
typ <- get
case typ :: Word8 of
0x83 -> OnionAnnounce <$> getAliasedAsymm
0x85 -> OnionToRoute <$> getPublicKey <*> getAliasedAsymm
t -> fail ("Unknown onion payload: " ++ show t)
`fromMaybe` getOnionReply t
put (OnionAnnounce a) = putWord8 0x83 >> putAliasedAsymm a
put (OnionToRoute k a) = putWord8 0x85 >> putPublicKey k >> putAliasedAsymm a
put (OnionAnnounceResponse n8 n24 x) = putWord8 0x84 >> put n8 >> put n24 >> put x
put (OnionToRouteResponse a) = putWord8 0x86 >> putAliasedAsymm a
onionToOwner :: Asymm a -> ReturnPath N3 -> SockAddr -> Either String (OnionDestination r)
onionToOwner asymm ret3 saddr = do
ni <- nodeInfo (key2id $ senderKey asymm) saddr
return $ OnionToOwner ni ret3
-- data CookieAddress = WithoutCookie NodeInfo | CookieAddress Cookie SockAddr
onion :: Sized msg =>
ByteString
-> SockAddr
-> Get (Asymm (Encrypted msg) -> t)
-> Either String (t, OnionDestination r)
onion bs saddr getf = do (f,(asymm,ret3)) <- runGet ((,) <$> getf <*> getOnionRequest) bs
oaddr <- onionToOwner asymm ret3 saddr
return (f asymm, oaddr)
parseOnionAddr :: (SockAddr -> Nonce8 -> IO (Maybe (OnionDestination r)))
-> (ByteString, SockAddr)
-> IO (Either (OnionMessage Encrypted,OnionDestination r)
(ByteString,SockAddr))
parseOnionAddr lookupSender (msg,saddr)
| Just (typ,bs) <- B.uncons msg
, let right = Right (msg,saddr)
query = return . either (const right) Left
= case typ of
0x83 -> query $ onion bs saddr (pure OnionAnnounce) -- Announce Request
0x85 -> query $ onion bs saddr (OnionToRoute <$> getPublicKey) -- Onion Data Request
_ -> case flip runGet bs <$> getOnionReply typ of
Just (Right msg@(OnionAnnounceResponse n8 _ _)) -> do
maddr <- lookupSender saddr n8
maybe (return right) -- Response unsolicited or too late.
(return . Left . \od -> (msg,od))
maddr
Just (Right msg@(OnionToRouteResponse asym)) -> do
let ni = asymNodeInfo saddr asym
return $ Left (msg, OnionDestination SearchingAlias ni Nothing)
_ -> return right
getOnionReply :: Word8 -> Maybe (Get (OnionMessage Encrypted))
getOnionReply 0x84 = Just $ OnionAnnounceResponse <$> get <*> get <*> get
getOnionReply 0x86 = Just $ OnionToRouteResponse <$> getOnionAsymm
getOnionReply _ = Nothing
putOnionMsg :: OnionMessage Encrypted -> Put
putOnionMsg (OnionAnnounce a) = putOnionAsymm 0x83 (return ()) a
putOnionMsg (OnionToRoute pubkey a) = putOnionAsymm 0x85 (putPublicKey pubkey) a
putOnionMsg (OnionAnnounceResponse n8 n24 x) = put (0x84 :: Word8) >> put n8 >> put n24 >> put x
putOnionMsg (OnionToRouteResponse a) = putOnionAsymm 0x86 (return ()) a
newtype RouteId = RouteId Int
deriving Show
-- We used to derive the RouteId from the Nonce8 associated with the query.
-- This is problematic because a nonce generated by toxcore will not validate
-- if it is received via a different route than it was issued. This is
-- described by the Tox spec:
--
-- Toxcore generates `ping_id`s by taking a 32 byte sha hash of the current
-- time, some secret bytes generated when the instance is created, the
-- current time divided by a 20 second timeout, the public key of the
-- requester and the source ip/port that the packet was received from. Since
-- the ip/port that the packet was received from is in the `ping_id`, the
-- announce packets being sent with a ping id must be sent using the same
-- path as the packet that we received the `ping_id` from or announcing will
-- fail.
--
-- The original idea was:
--
-- > routeId :: Nonce8 -> RouteId
-- > routeId (Nonce8 w8) = RouteId $ mod (fromIntegral w8) 12
--
-- Instead, we'll just hash the destination node id.
routeId :: NodeId -> RouteId
routeId nid = RouteId $ mod (hash nid) 12
encodeOnionAddr :: (NodeInfo -> RouteId -> IO (Maybe OnionRoute))
-> (OnionMessage Encrypted,OnionDestination RouteId)
-> IO (Maybe (ByteString, SockAddr))
encodeOnionAddr _ (msg,OnionToOwner ni p) =
return $ Just ( runPut $ putResponse (OnionResponse p msg)
, nodeAddr ni )
encodeOnionAddr getRoute (msg,OnionDestination x ni Nothing) = do
encodeOnionAddr getRoute (msg,OnionDestination x ni (Just $ routeId $ nodeId ni) )
-- hPutStrLn stderr $ "ONION encode missing routeid"
-- return Nothing
encodeOnionAddr getRoute (msg,OnionDestination _ ni (Just rid)) = do
let go route = do
return ( runPut $ putRequest $ wrapForRoute msg ni route
, nodeAddr $ routeNodeA route)
mapM' f x = do
let _ = x :: Maybe OnionRoute
-- hPutStrLn stderr $ "ONION encode sending to " ++ show ni
-- hPutStrLn stderr $ "ONION encode getRoute -> " ++ show (fmap (\y -> map ($ y) [routeNodeA,routeNodeB,routeNodeC]) x)
mapM f x -- ONION encode getRoute -> Nothing
getRoute ni rid >>= mapM' go
forwardOnions :: TransportCrypto -> UDPTransport -> UDPTransport
forwardOnions crypto udp = udp { awaitMessage = forwardAwait crypto udp }
forwardAwait :: TransportCrypto -> UDPTransport -> HandleLo a -> IO a
forwardAwait crypto udp kont = do
fix $ \another -> do
awaitMessage udp $ \case
m@(Just (Right (bs,saddr))) -> case B.head bs of
0x80 -> forward kont bs $ handleOnionRequest (Proxy :: Proxy N0) crypto saddr udp another
0x81 -> forward kont bs $ handleOnionRequest (Proxy :: Proxy N1) crypto saddr udp another
0x82 -> forward kont bs $ handleOnionRequest (Proxy :: Proxy N2) crypto saddr udp another
0x8c -> forward kont bs $ handleOnionResponse (Proxy :: Proxy N3) crypto saddr udp another
0x8d -> forward kont bs $ handleOnionResponse (Proxy :: Proxy N2) crypto saddr udp another
0x8e -> forward kont bs $ handleOnionResponse (Proxy :: Proxy N1) crypto saddr udp another
_ -> kont m
m -> kont m
forward :: forall c b b1. (Serialize b, Show b) =>
(Maybe (Either String b1) -> c) -> ByteString -> (b -> c) -> c
forward kont bs f = either (kont . Just . Left) f $ decode $ B.tail bs
class SumToThree a b
instance SumToThree N0 N3
instance SumToThree (S a) b => SumToThree a (S b)
class ( Serialize (ReturnPath n)
, Serialize (ReturnPath (S n))
, Serialize (Forwarding (ThreeMinus (S n)) (OnionMessage Encrypted))
, ThreeMinus n ~ S (ThreeMinus (S n))
) => LessThanThree n
instance LessThanThree N0
instance LessThanThree N1
instance LessThanThree N2
type family ThreeMinus n where
ThreeMinus N3 = N0
ThreeMinus N2 = N1
ThreeMinus N1 = N2
ThreeMinus N0 = N3
-- n = 0, 1, 2
data OnionRequest n = OnionRequest
{ onionNonce :: Nonce24
, onionForward :: Forwarding (ThreeMinus n) (OnionMessage Encrypted)
, pathFromOwner :: ReturnPath n
}
deriving instance ( Show (Forwarding (ThreeMinus n) (OnionMessage Encrypted))
, KnownNat (PeanoNat n)
) => Show (OnionRequest n)
instance ( Serialize (Forwarding (ThreeMinus n) (OnionMessage Encrypted))
, Sized (ReturnPath n)
, Serialize (ReturnPath n)
, Typeable n
) => Serialize (OnionRequest n) where
get = do
-- TODO share code with 'getOnionRequest'
n24 <- case eqT :: Maybe (n :~: N3) of
Just Refl -> return $ Nonce24 zeros24
Nothing -> get
cnt <- remaining
let fwdsize = case size :: Size (ReturnPath n) of ConstSize n -> cnt - n
fwd <- isolate fwdsize get
rpath <- get
return $ OnionRequest n24 fwd rpath
put (OnionRequest n f p) = maybe (put n) (\Refl -> return ()) (eqT :: Maybe (n :~: N3)) >> put f >> put p
-- getRequest :: _
-- getRequest = OnionRequest <$> get <*> get <*> get
-- n = 1, 2, 3
-- Attributed (Encrypted (
data OnionResponse n = OnionResponse
{ pathToOwner :: ReturnPath n
, msgToOwner :: OnionMessage Encrypted
}
deriving instance KnownNat (PeanoNat n) => Show (OnionResponse n)
instance ( Serialize (ReturnPath n) ) => Serialize (OnionResponse n) where
get = OnionResponse <$> get <*> (get >>= fromMaybe (fail "illegal onion forwarding")
. getOnionReply)
put (OnionResponse p m) = put p >> putOnionMsg m
data Addressed a = Addressed { sockAddr :: SockAddr, unaddressed :: a }
deriving (Eq,Show)
instance Sized a => Sized (Addressed a) where
size = case size :: Size a of
ConstSize n -> ConstSize $ 1{-family-} + 16{-ip-} + 2{-port-} + n
VarSize f -> VarSize $ \x -> 1{-family-} + 16{-ip-} + 2{-port-} + f (unaddressed x)
getForwardAddr :: S.Get SockAddr
getForwardAddr = do
addrfam <- S.get :: S.Get Word8
ip <- getIP addrfam
case ip of IPv4 _ -> S.skip 12 -- compliant peers would zero-fill this.
IPv6 _ -> return ()
port <- S.get :: S.Get PortNumber
return $ setPort port $ toSockAddr ip
putForwardAddr :: SockAddr -> S.Put
putForwardAddr saddr = fromMaybe (return $ error "unsupported SockAddr family") $ do
port <- sockAddrPort saddr
ip <- fromSockAddr $ either id id $ either4or6 saddr
return $ do
case ip of
IPv4 ip4 -> S.put (0x02 :: Word8) >> S.put ip4 >> S.putByteString (B.replicate 12 0)
IPv6 ip6 -> S.put (0x0a :: Word8) >> S.put ip6
S.put port
instance Serialize a => Serialize (Addressed a) where
get = Addressed <$> getForwardAddr <*> get
put (Addressed addr x) = putForwardAddr addr >> put x
data N0
data S n
type N1 = S N0
type N2 = S N1
type N3 = S N2
class KnownPeanoNat n where
peanoVal :: p n -> Int
instance KnownPeanoNat N0 where
peanoVal _ = 0
instance KnownPeanoNat n => KnownPeanoNat (S n) where
peanoVal _ = 1 + peanoVal (Proxy :: Proxy n)
type family PeanoNat p where
PeanoNat N0 = 0
PeanoNat (S n) = 1 + PeanoNat n
data ReturnPath n where
NoReturnPath :: ReturnPath N0
ReturnPath :: Nonce24 -> Encrypted (Addressed (ReturnPath n)) -> ReturnPath (S n)
-- Size: 59 = 1(family) + 16(ip) + 2(port) +16(mac) + 24(nonce)
instance Sized (ReturnPath N0) where size = ConstSize 0
instance Sized (ReturnPath n) => Sized (ReturnPath (S n)) where
size = ConstSize 59 <> contramap (\x -> let _ = x :: ReturnPath (S n)
in error "non-constant ReturnPath size")
(size :: Size (ReturnPath n))
{-
instance KnownNat (PeanoNat n) => Sized (ReturnPath n) where
size = ConstSize $ 59 * fromIntegral (natVal (Proxy :: Proxy (PeanoNat n)))
-}
instance Serialize (ReturnPath N0) where get = pure NoReturnPath
put NoReturnPath = pure ()
instance Serialize (ReturnPath N1) where
get = ReturnPath <$> get <*> get
put (ReturnPath n24 p) = put n24 >> put p
instance (Sized (ReturnPath n), Serialize (ReturnPath n)) => Serialize (ReturnPath (S (S n))) where
get = ReturnPath <$> get <*> get
put (ReturnPath n24 p) = put n24 >> put p
{-
-- This doesn't work because it tried to infer it for (0 - 1)
instance (Serialize (Encrypted (Addressed (ReturnPath (n - 1))))) => Serialize (ReturnPath n) where
get = ReturnPath <$> get <*> get
put (ReturnPath n24 p) = put n24 >> put p
-}
instance KnownNat (PeanoNat n) => Show (ReturnPath n) where
show rpath = "ReturnPath" ++ show (natVal (Proxy :: Proxy (PeanoNat n)))
-- instance KnownNat n => Serialize (ReturnPath n) where
-- -- Size: 59 = 1(family) + 16(ip) + 2(port) +16(mac) + 24(nonce)
-- get = ReturnPath <$> getBytes ( 59 * (fromIntegral $ natVal $ Proxy @n) )
-- put (ReturnPath bs) = putByteString bs
data Forwarding n msg where
NotForwarded :: msg -> Forwarding N0 msg
Forwarding :: PublicKey -> Encrypted (Addressed (Forwarding n msg)) -> Forwarding (S n) msg
instance Show msg => Show (Forwarding N0 msg) where
show (NotForwarded x) = "NotForwarded "++show x
instance ( KnownNat (PeanoNat (S n))
, Show (Encrypted (Addressed (Forwarding n msg)))
) => Show (Forwarding (S n) msg) where
show (Forwarding k a) = unwords [ "Forwarding"
, "("++show (natVal (Proxy :: Proxy (PeanoNat (S n))))++")"
, show (key2id k)
, show a
]
instance Sized msg => Sized (Forwarding N0 msg)
where size = case size :: Size msg of
ConstSize n -> ConstSize n
VarSize f -> VarSize $ \(NotForwarded x) -> f x
instance Sized (Forwarding n msg) => Sized (Forwarding (S n) msg)
where size = ConstSize 32
<> contramap (\(Forwarding _ e) -> e)
(size :: Size (Encrypted (Addressed (Forwarding n msg))))
instance Serialize msg => Serialize (Forwarding N0 msg) where
get = NotForwarded <$> get
put (NotForwarded msg) = put msg
instance (Serialize (Encrypted (Addressed (Forwarding n msg)))) => Serialize (Forwarding (S n) msg) where
get = Forwarding <$> getPublicKey <*> get
put (Forwarding k x) = putPublicKey k >> put x
handleOnionRequest :: forall a proxy n.
( LessThanThree n
, KnownPeanoNat n
, Sized (ReturnPath n)
, Typeable n
) => proxy n -> TransportCrypto -> SockAddr -> UDPTransport -> IO a -> OnionRequest n -> IO a
handleOnionRequest proxy crypto saddr udp kont (OnionRequest nonce msg rpath) = do
let n = peanoVal rpath
hPutStrLn stderr $ "handleOnionRequest " ++ show n
(sym, snonce) <- atomically ( (,) <$> transportSymmetric crypto
<*> transportNewNonce crypto )
case peelOnion crypto nonce msg of
Left e -> do
-- todo report encryption error
hPutStrLn stderr $ unwords [ "peelOnion:", show n, either show show (either4or6 saddr), e]
kont
Right (Addressed dst msg') -> do
hPutStrLn stderr $ unwords [ "peelOnion:", show n, either show show (either4or6 saddr), "-->", either show show (either4or6 dst), "SUCCESS"]
sendMessage udp dst (runPut $ putRequest $ OnionRequest nonce msg' $ wrapSymmetric sym snonce saddr rpath)
kont
wrapSymmetric :: Serialize (ReturnPath n) =>
SymmetricKey -> Nonce24 -> SockAddr -> ReturnPath n -> ReturnPath (S n)
wrapSymmetric sym n saddr rpath = ReturnPath n $ encryptSymmetric sym n (encodePlain $ Addressed saddr rpath)
peelSymmetric :: Serialize (Addressed (ReturnPath n))
=> SymmetricKey -> ReturnPath (S n) -> Either String (Addressed (ReturnPath n))
peelSymmetric sym (ReturnPath nonce e) = decryptSymmetric sym nonce e >>= decodePlain
peelOnion :: Serialize (Addressed (Forwarding n t))
=> TransportCrypto
-> Nonce24
-> Forwarding (S n) t
-> Either String (Addressed (Forwarding n t))
peelOnion crypto nonce (Forwarding k fwd) =
fmap runIdentity $ uncomposed $ decryptMessage (dhtKey crypto) nonce (Right $ Asymm k nonce fwd)
handleOnionResponse :: (KnownPeanoNat n, Sized (ReturnPath n), Serialize (ReturnPath n)) => proxy (S n) -> TransportCrypto -> SockAddr -> UDPTransport -> IO a -> OnionResponse (S n) -> IO a
handleOnionResponse proxy crypto saddr udp kont (OnionResponse path msg) = do
sym <- atomically $ transportSymmetric crypto
case peelSymmetric sym path of
Left e -> do
-- todo report encryption error
let n = peanoVal path
hPutStrLn stderr $ unwords [ "peelSymmetric:", show n, either show show (either4or6 saddr), e]
kont
Right (Addressed dst path') -> do
sendMessage udp dst (runPut $ putResponse $ OnionResponse path' msg)
kont
data AnnounceRequest = AnnounceRequest
{ announcePingId :: Nonce32 -- Ping ID
, announceSeeking :: NodeId -- Public key we are searching for
, announceKey :: NodeId -- Public key that we want those sending back data packets to use
}
deriving Show
instance Sized AnnounceRequest where size = ConstSize (32*3)
instance S.Serialize AnnounceRequest where
get = AnnounceRequest <$> S.get <*> S.get <*> S.get
put (AnnounceRequest p s k) = S.put (p,s,k)
getOnionRequest :: Sized msg => Get (Asymm (Encrypted msg), ReturnPath N3)
getOnionRequest = do
-- Assumes return path is constant size so that we can isolate
-- the variable-sized prefix.
cnt <- remaining
a <- isolate (case size :: Size (ReturnPath N3) of ConstSize n -> cnt - n)
getAliasedAsymm
path <- get
return (a,path)
putRequest :: ( KnownPeanoNat n
, Serialize (OnionRequest n)
, Typeable n
) => OnionRequest n -> Put
putRequest req = do
let tag = 0x80 + fromIntegral (peanoVal req)
when (tag <= 0x82) (putWord8 tag)
put req
putResponse :: (KnownPeanoNat n, Serialize (OnionResponse n)) => OnionResponse n -> Put
putResponse resp = do
let tag = 0x8f - fromIntegral (peanoVal resp)
-- OnionResponse N0 is an alias for the OnionMessage Encrypted type which includes a tag
-- in it's Serialize instance.
when (tag /= 0x8f) (putWord8 tag)
put resp
data KeyRecord = NotStored Nonce32
| SendBackKey PublicKey
| Acknowledged Nonce32
deriving Show
instance Sized KeyRecord where size = ConstSize 33
instance S.Serialize KeyRecord where
get = do
is_stored <- S.get :: S.Get Word8
case is_stored of
1 -> SendBackKey <$> getPublicKey
2 -> Acknowledged <$> S.get
_ -> NotStored <$> S.get
put (NotStored n32) = S.put (0 :: Word8) >> S.put n32
put (SendBackKey key) = S.put (1 :: Word8) >> putPublicKey key
put (Acknowledged n32) = S.put (2 :: Word8) >> S.put n32
data AnnounceResponse = AnnounceResponse
{ is_stored :: KeyRecord
, announceNodes :: SendNodes
}
deriving Show
instance Sized AnnounceResponse where
size = contramap is_stored size <> contramap announceNodes size
getNodeList :: S.Get [NodeInfo]
getNodeList = do
n <- S.get
(:) n <$> (getNodeList <|> pure [])
instance S.Serialize AnnounceResponse where
get = AnnounceResponse <$> S.get <*> (SendNodes <$> getNodeList)
put (AnnounceResponse st (SendNodes ns)) = S.put st >> mapM_ S.put ns
data DataToRoute = DataToRoute
{ dataFromKey :: PublicKey -- Real public key of sender
, dataToRoute :: Encrypted OnionData -- (Word8,ByteString) -- DHTPK 0x9c
}
instance Sized DataToRoute where
size = ConstSize 32 <> contramap dataToRoute size
instance Serialize DataToRoute where
get = DataToRoute <$> getPublicKey <*> get
put (DataToRoute k dta) = putPublicKey k >> put dta
data OnionData
= -- | type 0x9c
--
-- We send this packet every 30 seconds if there is more than one peer (in
-- the 8) that says they our friend is announced on them. This packet can
-- also be sent through the DHT module as a DHT request packet (see DHT) if
-- we know the DHT public key of the friend and are looking for them in the
-- DHT but have not connected to them yet. 30 second is a reasonable
-- timeout to not flood the network with too many packets while making sure
-- the other will eventually receive the packet. Since packets are sent
-- through every peer that knows the friend, resending it right away
-- without waiting has a high likelihood of failure as the chances of
-- packet loss happening to all (up to to 8) packets sent is low.
--
-- If a friend is online and connected to us, the onion will stop all of
-- its actions for that friend. If the peer goes offline it will restart
-- searching for the friend as if toxcore was just started.
OnionDHTPublicKey DHTPublicKey
| -- | type 0x20
--
--
OnionFriendRequest FriendRequest -- 0x20
deriving (Eq,Show)
instance Sized OnionData where
size = VarSize $ \case
OnionDHTPublicKey dhtpk -> case size of
ConstSize n -> n -- Override because OnionData probably
-- should be treated as variable sized.
VarSize f -> f dhtpk
-- FIXME: inconsitantly, we have to add in the tag byte for this case.
OnionFriendRequest req -> 1 + case size of
ConstSize n -> n
VarSize f -> f req
instance Serialize OnionData where
get = do
tag <- get
case tag :: Word8 of
0x9c -> OnionDHTPublicKey <$> get
0x20 -> OnionFriendRequest <$> get
_ -> fail $ "Unknown onion data: "++show tag
put (OnionDHTPublicKey dpk) = put (0x9c :: Word8) >> put dpk
put (OnionFriendRequest fr) = put (0x20 :: Word8) >> put fr
selectKey :: TransportCrypto -> OnionMessage f -> OnionDestination r -> IO (SecretKey, PublicKey)
selectKey crypto _ rpath@(OnionDestination (AnnouncingAlias skey pkey) _ _)
= return (skey, pkey)
selectKey crypto msg rpath = return $ aliasKey crypto rpath
encrypt :: TransportCrypto -> OnionMessage Identity -> OnionDestination r -> IO (OnionMessage Encrypted, OnionDestination r)
encrypt crypto msg rpath = do
(skey,pkey) <- selectKey crypto msg rpath -- source key
let okey = onionKey rpath -- destination key
return ( transcode ( (. (runIdentity . either id asymmData))
. encryptMessage skey okey)
msg
, rpath)
encryptMessage :: Serialize a =>
SecretKey -> PublicKey -> Nonce24 -> a -> Encrypted a
encryptMessage skey destKey n a = ToxCrypto.encrypt secret plain
where
secret = computeSharedSecret skey destKey n
plain = encodePlain a
decrypt :: TransportCrypto -> OnionMessage Encrypted -> OnionDestination r -> IO (Either String (OnionMessage Identity, OnionDestination r))
decrypt crypto msg addr = do
(skey,pkey) <- selectKey crypto msg addr
return $ do
msg <- sequenceMessage $ transcode (\n -> decryptMessage (skey,pkey) n . left (senderkey addr)) msg
Right (msg, addr)
senderkey :: OnionDestination r -> t -> (PublicKey, t)
senderkey addr e = (onionKey addr, e)
aliasKey :: TransportCrypto -> OnionDestination r -> (SecretKey,PublicKey)
aliasKey crypto (OnionToOwner {}) = (transportSecret &&& transportPublic) crypto
aliasKey crypto (OnionDestination {}) = (onionAliasSecret &&& onionAliasPublic) crypto
dhtKey :: TransportCrypto -> (SecretKey,PublicKey)
dhtKey crypto = (transportSecret &&& transportPublic) crypto
decryptMessage :: Serialize x =>
(SecretKey,PublicKey)
-> Nonce24
-> Either (PublicKey, Encrypted x)
(Asymm (Encrypted x))
-> (Either String ∘ Identity) x
decryptMessage crypto n arg = plain $ ToxCrypto.decrypt secret e
where
secret = computeSharedSecret (fst crypto) sender n
(sender,e) = either id (senderKey &&& asymmData) arg
plain = Composed . fmap Identity . (>>= decodePlain)
sequenceMessage :: Applicative m => OnionMessage (m ∘ f) -> m (OnionMessage f)
sequenceMessage (OnionAnnounce a) = fmap OnionAnnounce $ sequenceA $ fmap uncomposed a
sequenceMessage (OnionAnnounceResponse n8 n24 dta) = OnionAnnounceResponse n8 n24 <$> uncomposed dta
sequenceMessage (OnionToRoute pub a) = pure $ OnionToRoute pub a
sequenceMessage (OnionToRouteResponse a) = pure $ OnionToRouteResponse a
-- sequenceMessage (OnionToRouteResponse a) = fmap OnionToRouteResponse $ sequenceA $ fmap uncomposed a
transcode :: forall f g. (forall a. Serialize a => Nonce24 -> Either (f a) (Asymm (f a)) -> g a) -> OnionMessage f -> OnionMessage g
transcode f (OnionAnnounce a) = OnionAnnounce $ a { asymmData = f (asymmNonce a) (Right a) }
transcode f (OnionAnnounceResponse n8 n24 dta) = OnionAnnounceResponse n8 n24 $ f n24 $ Left dta
transcode f (OnionToRoute pub a) = OnionToRoute pub a
transcode f (OnionToRouteResponse a) = OnionToRouteResponse a
-- transcode f (OnionToRouteResponse a) = OnionToRouteResponse $ a { asymmData = f (asymmNonce a) (Right a) }
data OnionRoute = OnionRoute
{ routeAliasA :: SecretKey
, routeAliasB :: SecretKey
, routeAliasC :: SecretKey
, routeNodeA :: NodeInfo
, routeNodeB :: NodeInfo
, routeNodeC :: NodeInfo
}
wrapForRoute :: OnionMessage Encrypted -> NodeInfo -> OnionRoute -> OnionRequest N0
wrapForRoute msg ni r =
-- We needn't use the same nonce value here, but I think it is safe to do so.
let nonce = msgNonce msg
in OnionRequest
{ onionNonce = nonce
, onionForward = wrapOnion (routeAliasA r)
nonce
(id2key . nodeId $ routeNodeA r)
(nodeAddr $ routeNodeB r)
$ wrapOnion (routeAliasB r)
nonce
(id2key . nodeId $ routeNodeB r)
(nodeAddr $ routeNodeC r)
$ wrapOnion (routeAliasC r)
nonce
(id2key . nodeId $ routeNodeC r)
(nodeAddr ni)
$ NotForwarded msg
, pathFromOwner = NoReturnPath
}
wrapOnion :: Serialize (Forwarding n msg) =>
SecretKey
-> Nonce24
-> PublicKey
-> SockAddr
-> Forwarding n msg
-> Forwarding (S n) msg
wrapOnion skey nonce destkey saddr fwd =
Forwarding (toPublic skey) $ encryptMessage skey destkey nonce (Addressed saddr fwd)
-- TODO
-- Two types of packets may be sent to Rendezvous via OnionToRoute requests.
--
-- (1) DHT public key packet (0x9c)
--
-- (2) Friend request
data Rendezvous = Rendezvous
{ rendezvousKey :: PublicKey
, rendezvousNode :: NodeInfo
}
deriving Eq
instance Show Rendezvous where
showsPrec d (Rendezvous k ni)
= showsPrec d (key2id k)
. (':' :)
. showsPrec d ni
data AnnouncedRendezvous = AnnouncedRendezvous
{ remoteUserKey :: PublicKey
, rendezvous :: Rendezvous
}
deriving Eq
instance Show AnnouncedRendezvous where
showsPrec d (AnnouncedRendezvous remote rendez)
= showsPrec d (key2id remote)
. (':' :)
. showsPrec d rendez
instance Read AnnouncedRendezvous where
readsPrec d = RP.readP_to_S $ do
ukstr <- RP.munch (/=':')
RP.char ':'
rkstr <- RP.munch (/=':')
RP.char ':'
nistr <- RP.munch (const True)
return AnnouncedRendezvous
{ remoteUserKey = id2key $ read ukstr
, rendezvous = Rendezvous
{ rendezvousKey = id2key $ read rkstr
, rendezvousNode = read nistr
}
}
selectAlias :: TransportCrypto -> NodeId -> STM AliasSelector
selectAlias crypto pkey = do
ks <- filter (\(sk,pk) -> pk == id2key pkey)
<$> readTVar (userKeys crypto)
maybe (return SearchingAlias)
(return . uncurry AnnouncingAlias)
(listToMaybe ks)
parseDataToRoute
:: TransportCrypto
-> (OnionMessage Encrypted,OnionDestination r)
-> IO (Either ((PublicKey,OnionData),AnnouncedRendezvous) (OnionMessage Encrypted, OnionDestination r))
parseDataToRoute crypto (OnionToRouteResponse dta, od) = do
ks <- atomically $ readTVar $ userKeys crypto
let eOuter = do
fmap runIdentity
$ uncomposed
$ decryptMessage (rendezvousSecret crypto,rendezvousPublic crypto)
(asymmNonce dta)
(Right dta) -- using Asymm{senderKey} as remote key
-- TODO: We don't currently have a way to look up which user key we
-- announced using along this onion route. Therefore, for now, we will
-- try all our user keys to see if any can decrypt the packet.
eInners = flip map ks $ \(sk,pk) -> do
dtr <- eOuter
omsg <- fmap runIdentity
$ uncomposed
$ decryptMessage (sk,pk)
(asymmNonce dta)
(Left (dataFromKey dtr, dataToRoute dtr))
return (pk,dtr,omsg)
eInner = foldr (<|>) (Left "no user key") eInners
e = do
(pk,dtr,omsg) <- eInner
return ( (pk, omsg)
, AnnouncedRendezvous
(dataFromKey dtr)
$ Rendezvous (rendezvousPublic crypto) $ onionNodeInfo od )
r = either (const $ Right (OnionToRouteResponse dta,od)) Left e
-- parseDataToRoute OnionToRouteResponse decipherAndAuth: auth fail
hPutStrLn stderr $ unlines
[ "parseDataToRoute " ++ either id (const "Right") e
, " crypto inner.me =" ++ either id (\(pk,_,_) -> show $ key2id pk) eInner
, " inner.you=" ++ either id (show . key2id . dataFromKey) eOuter
, " outer.me =" ++ show (key2id $ rendezvousPublic crypto)
, " outer.you=" ++ show (key2id $ senderKey dta)
]
return r
parseDataToRoute _ msg = return $ Right msg
encodeDataToRoute :: TransportCrypto
-> ((PublicKey,OnionData),AnnouncedRendezvous)
-> IO (Maybe (OnionMessage Encrypted,OnionDestination r))
encodeDataToRoute crypto ((me,omsg), AnnouncedRendezvous toxid (Rendezvous pub ni)) = do
nonce <- atomically $ transportNewNonce crypto
asel <- atomically $ selectAlias crypto (key2id me)
let (sk,pk) = case asel of
AnnouncingAlias sk pk -> (sk,pk)
_ -> (onionAliasSecret crypto, onionAliasPublic crypto)
let plain = DataToRoute { dataFromKey = pk
, dataToRoute = encryptMessage sk toxid nonce omsg
}
let dta = encryptMessage (onionAliasSecret crypto) pub nonce plain
hPutStrLn stderr $ unlines
[ "encodeDataToRoute me=" ++ show (key2id me)
, " dhtpk=" ++ case omsg of
OnionDHTPublicKey dmsg -> show (key2id $ dhtpk dmsg)
OnionFriendRequest fr -> "friend request"
, " ns=" ++ case omsg of
OnionDHTPublicKey dmsg -> show (dhtpkNodes dmsg)
OnionFriendRequest fr -> "friend request"
, " crypto inner.me =" ++ show (key2id pk)
, " inner.you=" ++ show (key2id toxid)
, " outer.me =" ++ show (key2id $ onionAliasPublic crypto)
, " outer.you=" ++ show (key2id pub)
, " " ++ show (AnnouncedRendezvous toxid (Rendezvous pub ni))
, " " ++ show dta
]
return $ Just ( OnionToRoute toxid -- Public key of destination node
Asymm { senderKey = onionAliasPublic crypto
, asymmNonce = nonce
, asymmData = dta
}
, OnionDestination SearchingAlias ni Nothing )
|