Convert to source format 3.0 (quilt).

author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org> 2010-02-27 14:05:10 +0000
committer: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org> 2010-02-27 14:05:10 +0000
commit: 8dcc7c5ef45cf5032dca7a308ffe17d3935e62d5 (patch)
tree: 2e0d8058bdfc24a60a20c5bcbfd1075ef1048ff3
parent: e44a1fb6e8e59e67e5c8b6e83c0d8566d146aad9 (diff)
40 files changed, 6625 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/.bzrignore b/.bzrignore
index fd133fec7..0f130a704 100644
--- a/.bzrignore
+++ b/.bzrignore
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+./.pc
 ./*.out
 ./Makefile
 ./autom4te.cache
diff --git a/debian/changelog b/debian/changelog
index d076877ba..a92370243 100644
--- a/debian/changelog
+++ b/debian/changelog
@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
+openssh (1:5.3p1-3) UNRELEASED; urgency=low
+  * Convert to source format 3.0 (quilt).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sat, 27 Feb 2010 01:07:15 +0000
 openssh (1:5.3p1-2) unstable; urgency=low
  * Link with -Wl,--as-needed (closes: #560155).
diff --git a/debian/patches/authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch b/debian/patches/authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1e8aab147
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+Index: b/Makefile.in
+===================================================================
+--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
+@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@
+        $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5
+        $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/ssh_config.5
+        $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8
+       ln -s ../$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/authorized_keys.5
+        if [ ! -z "$(INSTALL_SSH_RAND_HELPER)" ]; then \
+                $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-rand-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-rand-helper.8 ; \
+        fi
diff --git a/debian/patches/banner-noslash.patch b/debian/patches/banner-noslash.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8002791bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/banner-noslash.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+Index: b/sshconnect2.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@
+                if (len > 65536)
+                        len = 65536;
+                msg = xmalloc(len * 4 + 1); /* max expansion from strnvis() */
+-               strnvis(msg, raw, len * 4 + 1, VIS_SAFE|VIS_OCTAL);
+               strnvis(msg, raw, len * 4 + 1, VIS_SAFE|VIS_OCTAL|VIS_NOSLASH);
+                fprintf(stderr, "%s", msg);
+                xfree(msg);
+        }
diff --git a/debian/patches/config-guess-sub.patch b/debian/patches/config-guess-sub.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d5c016b87
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/config-guess-sub.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,381 @@
+Index: b/config.guess
+===================================================================
+--- a/config.guess
+++ b/config.guess
+@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
+ #! /bin/sh
+ # Attempt to guess a canonical system name.
+ #   Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999,
+-#   2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008
+#   2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009
+ #   Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ 
+-timestamp='2008-04-14'
+timestamp='2009-06-10'
+ 
+ # This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ # under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@
+            arm*|i386|m68k|ns32k|sh3*|sparc|vax)
+                eval $set_cc_for_build
+                if echo __ELF__ | $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null \
+-                       | grep __ELF__ >/dev/null
+                       | grep -q __ELF__
+                then
+                    # Once all utilities can be ECOFF (netbsdecoff) or a.out (netbsdaout).
+                    # Return netbsd for either.  FIX?
+@@ -324,6 +324,9 @@
+        case `/usr/bin/uname -p` in
+            sparc) echo sparc-icl-nx7; exit ;;
+        esac ;;
+    s390x:SunOS:*:*)
+       echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-ibm-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
+       exit ;;
+     sun4H:SunOS:5.*:*)
+        echo sparc-hal-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
+        exit ;;
+@@ -331,7 +334,20 @@
+        echo sparc-sun-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
+        exit ;;
+     i86pc:SunOS:5.*:* | i86xen:SunOS:5.*:*)
+-       echo i386-pc-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
+       eval $set_cc_for_build
+       SUN_ARCH="i386"
+       # If there is a compiler, see if it is configured for 64-bit objects.
+       # Note that the Sun cc does not turn __LP64__ into 1 like gcc does.
+       # This test works for both compilers.
+       if [ "$CC_FOR_BUILD" != 'no_compiler_found' ]; then
+           if (echo '#ifdef __amd64'; echo IS_64BIT_ARCH; echo '#endif') | \
+               (CCOPTS= $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null) | \
+               grep IS_64BIT_ARCH >/dev/null
+           then
+               SUN_ARCH="x86_64"
+           fi
+       fi
+       echo ${SUN_ARCH}-pc-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
+        exit ;;
+     sun4*:SunOS:6*:*)
+        # According to config.sub, this is the proper way to canonicalize
+@@ -640,7 +656,7 @@
+            # => hppa64-hp-hpux11.23
+ 
+            if echo __LP64__ | (CCOPTS= $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null) |
+-               grep __LP64__ >/dev/null
+               grep -q __LP64__
+            then
+                HP_ARCH="hppa2.0w"
+            else
+@@ -796,7 +812,7 @@
+            x86)
+                echo i586-pc-interix${UNAME_RELEASE}
+                exit ;;
+-           EM64T | authenticamd)
+           EM64T | authenticamd | genuineintel)
+                echo x86_64-unknown-interix${UNAME_RELEASE}
+                exit ;;
+            IA64)
+@@ -806,6 +822,9 @@
+     [345]86:Windows_95:* | [345]86:Windows_98:* | [345]86:Windows_NT:*)
+        echo i${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-mks
+        exit ;;
+    8664:Windows_NT:*)
+       echo x86_64-pc-mks
+       exit ;;
+     i*:Windows_NT*:* | Pentium*:Windows_NT*:*)
+        # How do we know it's Interix rather than the generic POSIX subsystem?
+        # It also conflicts with pre-2.0 versions of AT&T UWIN. Should we
+@@ -866,40 +885,17 @@
+     m68*:Linux:*:*)
+        echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
+        exit ;;
+-    mips:Linux:*:*)
+    mips:Linux:*:* | mips64:Linux:*:*)
+        eval $set_cc_for_build
+        sed 's/^        //' << EOF >$dummy.c
+        #undef CPU
+-       #undef mips
+-       #undef mipsel
+       #undef ${UNAME_MACHINE}
+       #undef ${UNAME_MACHINE}el
+        #if defined(__MIPSEL__) || defined(__MIPSEL) || defined(_MIPSEL) || defined(MIPSEL)
+-       CPU=mipsel
+       CPU=${UNAME_MACHINE}el
+        #else
+        #if defined(__MIPSEB__) || defined(__MIPSEB) || defined(_MIPSEB) || defined(MIPSEB)
+-       CPU=mips
+-       #else
+-       CPU=
+-       #endif
+-       #endif
+-EOF
+-       eval "`$CC_FOR_BUILD -E $dummy.c 2>/dev/null | sed -n '
+-           /^CPU/{
+-               s: ::g
+-               p
+-           }'`"
+-       test x"${CPU}" != x && { echo "${CPU}-unknown-linux-gnu"; exit; }
+-       ;;
+-    mips64:Linux:*:*)
+-       eval $set_cc_for_build
+-       sed 's/^        //' << EOF >$dummy.c
+-       #undef CPU
+-       #undef mips64
+-       #undef mips64el
+-       #if defined(__MIPSEL__) || defined(__MIPSEL) || defined(_MIPSEL) || defined(MIPSEL)
+-       CPU=mips64el
+-       #else
+-       #if defined(__MIPSEB__) || defined(__MIPSEB) || defined(_MIPSEB) || defined(MIPSEB)
+-       CPU=mips64
+       CPU=${UNAME_MACHINE}
+        #else
+        CPU=
+        #endif
+@@ -931,10 +927,13 @@
+          EV67)  UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev67 ;;
+          EV68*) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev68 ;;
+         esac
+-       objdump --private-headers /bin/sh | grep ld.so.1 >/dev/null
+       objdump --private-headers /bin/sh | grep -q ld.so.1
+        if test "$?" = 0 ; then LIBC="libc1" ; else LIBC="" ; fi
+        echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu${LIBC}
+        exit ;;
+    padre:Linux:*:*)
+       echo sparc-unknown-linux-gnu
+       exit ;;
+     parisc:Linux:*:* | hppa:Linux:*:*)
+        # Look for CPU level
+        case `grep '^cpu[^a-z]*:' /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d' ' -f2` in
+@@ -982,14 +981,6 @@
+          elf32-i386)
+                TENTATIVE="${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-gnu"
+                ;;
+-         a.out-i386-linux)
+-               echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-gnuaout"
+-               exit ;;
+-         "")
+-               # Either a pre-BFD a.out linker (linux-gnuoldld) or
+-               # one that does not give us useful --help.
+-               echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-gnuoldld"
+-               exit ;;
+        esac
+        # Determine whether the default compiler is a.out or elf
+        eval $set_cc_for_build
+@@ -1055,7 +1046,7 @@
+     i*86:syllable:*:*)
+        echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-syllable
+        exit ;;
+-    i*86:LynxOS:2.*:* | i*86:LynxOS:3.[01]*:* | i*86:LynxOS:4.0*:*)
+    i*86:LynxOS:2.*:* | i*86:LynxOS:3.[01]*:* | i*86:LynxOS:4.[02]*:*)
+        echo i386-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+        exit ;;
+     i*86:*DOS:*:*)
+@@ -1099,8 +1090,11 @@
+     pc:*:*:*)
+        # Left here for compatibility:
+         # uname -m prints for DJGPP always 'pc', but it prints nothing about
+-        # the processor, so we play safe by assuming i386.
+-       echo i386-pc-msdosdjgpp
+        # the processor, so we play safe by assuming i586.
+       # Note: whatever this is, it MUST be the same as what config.sub
+       # prints for the "djgpp" host, or else GDB configury will decide that
+       # this is a cross-build.
+       echo i586-pc-msdosdjgpp
+         exit ;;
+     Intel:Mach:3*:*)
+        echo i386-pc-mach3
+@@ -1138,6 +1132,16 @@
+     3[34]??:*:4.0:* | 3[34]??,*:*:4.0:*)
+         /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | grep 86 >/dev/null \
+           && { echo i486-ncr-sysv4; exit; } ;;
+    NCR*:*:4.2:* | MPRAS*:*:4.2:*)
+       OS_REL='.3'
+       test -r /etc/.relid \
+           && OS_REL=.`sed -n 's/[^ ]* [^ ]* \([0-9][0-9]\).*/\1/p' < /etc/.relid`
+       /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | grep 86 >/dev/null \
+           && { echo i486-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL}; exit; }
+       /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | /bin/grep entium >/dev/null \
+           && { echo i586-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL}; exit; }
+       /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | /bin/grep pteron >/dev/null \
+           && { echo i586-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL}; exit; } ;;
+     m68*:LynxOS:2.*:* | m68*:LynxOS:3.0*:*)
+        echo m68k-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+        exit ;;
+@@ -1150,7 +1154,7 @@
+     rs6000:LynxOS:2.*:*)
+        echo rs6000-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+        exit ;;
+-    PowerPC:LynxOS:2.*:* | PowerPC:LynxOS:3.[01]*:* | PowerPC:LynxOS:4.0*:*)
+    PowerPC:LynxOS:2.*:* | PowerPC:LynxOS:3.[01]*:* | PowerPC:LynxOS:4.[02]*:*)
+        echo powerpc-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+        exit ;;
+     SM[BE]S:UNIX_SV:*:*)
+@@ -1324,6 +1328,9 @@
+     i*86:rdos:*:*)
+        echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-rdos
+        exit ;;
+    i*86:AROS:*:*)
+       echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-aros
+       exit ;;
+ esac
+ 
+ #echo '(No uname command or uname output not recognized.)' 1>&2
+Index: b/config.sub
+===================================================================
+--- a/config.sub
+++ b/config.sub
+@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
+ #! /bin/sh
+ # Configuration validation subroutine script.
+ #   Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999,
+-#   2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008
+#   2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009
+ #   Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ 
+-timestamp='2008-06-16'
+timestamp='2009-06-11'
+ 
+ # This file is (in principle) common to ALL GNU software.
+ # The presence of a machine in this file suggests that SOME GNU software
+@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@
+ case $maybe_os in
+   nto-qnx* | linux-gnu* | linux-dietlibc | linux-newlib* | linux-uclibc* | \
+   uclinux-uclibc* | uclinux-gnu* | kfreebsd*-gnu* | knetbsd*-gnu* | netbsd*-gnu* | \
+  kopensolaris*-gnu* | \
+   storm-chaos* | os2-emx* | rtmk-nova*)
+     os=-$maybe_os
+     basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed 's/^\(.*\)-\([^-]*-[^-]*\)$/\1/'`
+@@ -152,6 +153,9 @@
+                os=
+                basic_machine=$1
+                ;;
+        -bluegene*)
+               os=-cnk
+               ;;
+        -sim | -cisco | -oki | -wec | -winbond)
+                os=
+                basic_machine=$1
+@@ -249,6 +253,7 @@
+        | h8300 | h8500 | hppa | hppa1.[01] | hppa2.0 | hppa2.0[nw] | hppa64 \
+        | i370 | i860 | i960 | ia64 \
+        | ip2k | iq2000 \
+       | lm32 \
+        | m32c | m32r | m32rle | m68000 | m68k | m88k \
+        | maxq | mb | microblaze | mcore | mep | metag \
+        | mips | mipsbe | mipseb | mipsel | mipsle \
+@@ -270,6 +275,7 @@
+        | mipsisa64sr71k | mipsisa64sr71kel \
+        | mipstx39 | mipstx39el \
+        | mn10200 | mn10300 \
+       | moxie \
+        | mt \
+        | msp430 \
+        | nios | nios2 \
+@@ -279,7 +285,7 @@
+        | powerpc | powerpc64 | powerpc64le | powerpcle | ppcbe \
+        | pyramid \
+        | score \
+-       | sh | sh[1234] | sh[24]a | sh[23]e | sh[34]eb | sheb | shbe | shle | sh[1234]le | sh3ele \
+       | sh | sh[1234] | sh[24]a | sh[24]aeb | sh[23]e | sh[34]eb | sheb | shbe | shle | sh[1234]le | sh3ele \
+        | sh64 | sh64le \
+        | sparc | sparc64 | sparc64b | sparc64v | sparc86x | sparclet | sparclite \
+        | sparcv8 | sparcv9 | sparcv9b | sparcv9v \
+@@ -288,7 +294,7 @@
+        | v850 | v850e \
+        | we32k \
+        | x86 | xc16x | xscale | xscalee[bl] | xstormy16 | xtensa \
+-       | z8k)
+       | z8k | z80)
+                basic_machine=$basic_machine-unknown
+                ;;
+        m6811 | m68hc11 | m6812 | m68hc12)
+@@ -331,6 +337,7 @@
+        | hppa-* | hppa1.[01]-* | hppa2.0-* | hppa2.0[nw]-* | hppa64-* \
+        | i*86-* | i860-* | i960-* | ia64-* \
+        | ip2k-* | iq2000-* \
+       | lm32-* \
+        | m32c-* | m32r-* | m32rle-* \
+        | m68000-* | m680[012346]0-* | m68360-* | m683?2-* | m68k-* \
+        | m88110-* | m88k-* | maxq-* | mcore-* | metag-* \
+@@ -362,7 +369,7 @@
+        | powerpc-* | powerpc64-* | powerpc64le-* | powerpcle-* | ppcbe-* \
+        | pyramid-* \
+        | romp-* | rs6000-* \
+-       | sh-* | sh[1234]-* | sh[24]a-* | sh[23]e-* | sh[34]eb-* | sheb-* | shbe-* \
+       | sh-* | sh[1234]-* | sh[24]a-* | sh[24]aeb-* | sh[23]e-* | sh[34]eb-* | sheb-* | shbe-* \
+        | shle-* | sh[1234]le-* | sh3ele-* | sh64-* | sh64le-* \
+        | sparc-* | sparc64-* | sparc64b-* | sparc64v-* | sparc86x-* | sparclet-* \
+        | sparclite-* \
+@@ -375,7 +382,7 @@
+        | x86-* | x86_64-* | xc16x-* | xps100-* | xscale-* | xscalee[bl]-* \
+        | xstormy16-* | xtensa*-* \
+        | ymp-* \
+-       | z8k-*)
+       | z8k-* | z80-*)
+                ;;
+        # Recognize the basic CPU types without company name, with glob match.
+        xtensa*)
+@@ -443,6 +450,10 @@
+                basic_machine=m68k-apollo
+                os=-bsd
+                ;;
+       aros)
+               basic_machine=i386-pc
+               os=-aros
+               ;;
+        aux)
+                basic_machine=m68k-apple
+                os=-aux
+@@ -459,6 +470,10 @@
+                basic_machine=bfin-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'`
+                os=-linux
+                ;;
+       bluegene*)
+               basic_machine=powerpc-ibm
+               os=-cnk
+               ;;
+        c90)
+                basic_machine=c90-cray
+                os=-unicos
+@@ -1140,6 +1155,10 @@
+                basic_machine=z8k-unknown
+                os=-sim
+                ;;
+       z80-*-coff)
+               basic_machine=z80-unknown
+               os=-sim
+               ;;
+        none)
+                basic_machine=none-none
+                os=-none
+@@ -1178,7 +1197,7 @@
+        we32k)
+                basic_machine=we32k-att
+                ;;
+-       sh[1234] | sh[24]a | sh[34]eb | sh[1234]le | sh[23]ele)
+       sh[1234] | sh[24]a | sh[24]aeb | sh[34]eb | sh[1234]le | sh[23]ele)
+                basic_machine=sh-unknown
+                ;;
+        sparc | sparcv8 | sparcv9 | sparcv9b | sparcv9v)
+@@ -1248,10 +1267,11 @@
+        # Each alternative MUST END IN A *, to match a version number.
+        # -sysv* is not here because it comes later, after sysvr4.
+        -gnu* | -bsd* | -mach* | -minix* | -genix* | -ultrix* | -irix* \
+-             | -*vms* | -sco* | -esix* | -isc* | -aix* | -sunos | -sunos[34]*\
+             | -*vms* | -sco* | -esix* | -isc* | -aix* | -cnk* | -sunos | -sunos[34]*\
+              | -hpux* | -unos* | -osf* | -luna* | -dgux* | -solaris* | -sym* \
+             | -kopensolaris* \
+              | -amigaos* | -amigados* | -msdos* | -newsos* | -unicos* | -aof* \
+-             | -aos* \
+             | -aos* | -aros* \
+              | -nindy* | -vxsim* | -vxworks* | -ebmon* | -hms* | -mvs* \
+              | -clix* | -riscos* | -uniplus* | -iris* | -rtu* | -xenix* \
+              | -hiux* | -386bsd* | -knetbsd* | -mirbsd* | -netbsd* \
+@@ -1600,7 +1620,7 @@
+                        -sunos*)
+                                vendor=sun
+                                ;;
+-                       -aix*)
+                       -cnk*|-aix*)
+                                vendor=ibm
+                                ;;
+                        -beos*)
diff --git a/debian/patches/debian-banner.patch b/debian/patches/debian-banner.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..814294e26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/debian-banner.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+Index: b/servconf.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@
+        options->adm_forced_command = NULL;
+        options->chroot_directory = NULL;
+        options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = -1;
+       options->debian_banner = -1;
+ }
+ 
+ void
+@@ -273,6 +274,8 @@
+                options->permit_tun = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
+        if (options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication == -1)
+                options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = 0;
+       if (options->debian_banner == -1)
+               options->debian_banner = 1;
+ 
+        /* Turn privilege separation on by default */
+        if (use_privsep == -1)
+@@ -320,6 +323,7 @@
+        sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+        sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
+        sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication,
+       sDebianBanner,
+        sDeprecated, sUnsupported
+ } ServerOpCodes;
+ 
+@@ -449,6 +453,7 @@
+        { "permitopen", sPermitOpen, SSHCFG_ALL },
+        { "forcecommand", sForceCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
+        { "chrootdirectory", sChrootDirectory, SSHCFG_ALL },
+       { "debianbanner", sDebianBanner, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+@@ -1335,6 +1340,10 @@
+                        *charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+                break;
+ 
+       case sDebianBanner:
+               intptr = &options->debian_banner;
+               goto parse_int;
+
+        case sDeprecated:
+                logit("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s",
+                    filename, linenum, arg);
+Index: b/servconf.h
+===================================================================
+--- a/servconf.h
+++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -154,6 +154,8 @@
+ 
+        int     num_permitted_opens;
+ 
+       int     debian_banner;
+
+        char   *chroot_directory;
+ }       ServerOptions;
+ 
+Index: b/sshd.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -426,7 +426,8 @@
+                minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1;
+        }
+        snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s", major, minor,
+-           SSH_RELEASE, newline);
+           options.debian_banner ? SSH_RELEASE : SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM,
+           newline);
+        server_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
+ 
+        /* Send our protocol version identification. */
+Index: b/sshd_config.5
+===================================================================
+--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -295,6 +295,11 @@
+ .Dq no .
+ The default is
+ .Dq delayed .
+.It Cm DebianBanner
+Specifies whether the distribution-specified extra version suffix is
+included during initial protocol handshake.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+ .It Cm DenyGroups
+ This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated
+ by spaces.
diff --git a/debian/patches/debian-config.patch b/debian/patches/debian-config.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5aa0035c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/debian-config.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+Index: b/readconf.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -1150,7 +1150,7 @@
+        if (options->forward_x11 == -1)
+                options->forward_x11 = 0;
+        if (options->forward_x11_trusted == -1)
+-               options->forward_x11_trusted = 0;
+               options->forward_x11_trusted = 1;
+        if (options->exit_on_forward_failure == -1)
+                options->exit_on_forward_failure = 0;
+        if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
+Index: b/ssh_config
+===================================================================
+--- a/ssh_config
+++ b/ssh_config
+@@ -17,9 +17,10 @@
+ # list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the
+ # ssh_config(5) man page.
+ 
+-# Host *
+Host *
+ #   ForwardAgent no
+ #   ForwardX11 no
+#   ForwardX11Trusted yes
+ #   RhostsRSAAuthentication no
+ #   RSAAuthentication yes
+ #   PasswordAuthentication yes
+@@ -46,3 +47,7 @@
+ #   TunnelDevice any:any
+ #   PermitLocalCommand no
+ #   VisualHostKey no
+    SendEnv LANG LC_*
+    HashKnownHosts yes
+    GSSAPIAuthentication yes
+    GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
+Index: b/ssh_config.5
+===================================================================
+--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -72,6 +72,22 @@
+ host-specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the
+ file, and general defaults at the end.
+ .Pp
+Note that the Debian
+.Ic openssh-client
+package sets several options as standard in
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+which are not the default in
+.Xr ssh 1 :
+.Pp
+.Bl -bullet -offset indent -compact
+.It
+.Cm SendEnv No LANG LC_*
+.It
+.Cm HashKnownHosts No yes
+.It
+.Cm GSSAPIAuthentication No yes
+.El
+.Pp
+ The configuration file has the following format:
+ .Pp
+ Empty lines and lines starting with
+@@ -452,7 +468,8 @@
+ Remote clients will be refused access after this time.
+ .Pp
+ The default is
+-.Dq no .
+.Dq yes
+(Debian-specific).
+ .Pp
+ See the X11 SECURITY extension specification for full details on
+ the restrictions imposed on untrusted clients.
+Index: b/sshd_config
+===================================================================
+--- a/sshd_config
+++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
+ # Authentication:
+ 
+ #LoginGraceTime 2m
+# See /usr/share/doc/openssh-server/README.Debian.gz.
+ #PermitRootLogin yes
+ #StrictModes yes
+ #MaxAuthTries 6
+Index: b/sshd_config.5
+===================================================================
+--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -58,6 +58,33 @@
+ .Pq \&"
+ in order to represent arguments containing spaces.
+ .Pp
+Note that the Debian
+.Ic openssh-server
+package sets several options as standard in
+.Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+which are not the default in
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+The exact list depends on whether the package was installed fresh or
+upgraded from various possible previous versions, but includes at least the
+following:
+.Pp
+.Bl -bullet -offset indent -compact
+.It
+.Cm Protocol No 2
+.It
+.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication No no
+.It
+.Cm X11Forwarding No yes
+.It
+.Cm PrintMotd No no
+.It
+.Cm AcceptEnv No LANG LC_*
+.It
+.Cm Subsystem No sftp /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server
+.It
+.Cm UsePAM No yes
+.El
+.Pp
+ The possible
+ keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
+ keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
diff --git a/debian/patches/doc-connection-sharing.patch b/debian/patches/doc-connection-sharing.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..69a11c590
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/doc-connection-sharing.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+Index: b/ssh.1
+===================================================================
+--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
+@@ -559,7 +559,10 @@
+ the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported
+ to the client at run time.
+ .It Fl S Ar ctl_path
+-Specifies the location of a control socket for connection sharing.
+Specifies the location of a control socket for connection sharing,
+or the string
+.Dq none
+to disable connection sharing.
+ Refer to the description of
+ .Cm ControlPath
+ and
diff --git a/debian/patches/doc-hash-tab-completion.patch b/debian/patches/doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c878b213e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+Index: b/ssh_config.5
+===================================================================
+--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -531,6 +531,9 @@
+ will not be converted automatically,
+ but may be manually hashed using
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+Use of this option may break facilities such as tab-completion that rely
+on being able to read unhashed host names from
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts .
+ .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
+ Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key
+ authentication.
diff --git a/debian/patches/epfnosupport.patch b/debian/patches/epfnosupport.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..aceb71ff8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/epfnosupport.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+Index: b/channels.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/channels.c
+++ b/channels.c
+@@ -3098,7 +3098,11 @@
+                        sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype,
+                            ai->ai_protocol);
+                        if (sock < 0) {
+-                               if ((errno != EINVAL) && (errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)) {
+                               if ((errno != EINVAL) && (errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
+#ifdef EPFNOSUPPORT
+                                   && (errno != EPFNOSUPPORT)
+#endif 
+                                   ) {
+                                        error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+                                        freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+                                        return -1;
diff --git a/debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch b/debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..aaf804841
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+Index: b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+++ b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+@@ -207,6 +207,8 @@
+ 
+        gtk_init(&argc, &argv);
+ 
+       gtk_window_set_default_icon_from_file ("/usr/share/pixmaps/ssh-askpass-gnome.png", NULL);
+
+        if (argc > 1) {
+                message = g_strjoinv(" ", argv + 1);
+        } else {
diff --git a/debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-link.patch b/debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-link.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6e1a341b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-link.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+Index: b/contrib/Makefile
+===================================================================
+--- a/contrib/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/Makefile
+@@ -7,9 +7,9 @@
+                `gnome-config --libs gnome gnomeui`
+ 
+ gnome-ssh-askpass2: gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+-       $(CC) `pkg-config --cflags gtk+-2.0` \
+       $(CC) `pkg-config --cflags gtk+-2.0 x11` \
+                gnome-ssh-askpass2.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass2 \
+-               `pkg-config --libs gtk+-2.0`
+               `pkg-config --libs gtk+-2.0 x11`
+ 
+ clean:
+        rm -f *.o gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass2 gnome-ssh-askpass
diff --git a/debian/patches/gssapi-autoconf.patch b/debian/patches/gssapi-autoconf.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1e7949116
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/gssapi-autoconf.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+Index: b/config.h.in
+===================================================================
+--- a/config.h.in
+++ b/config.h.in
+@@ -1372,6 +1372,9 @@
+ /* Use btmp to log bad logins */
+ #undef USE_BTMP
+ 
+/* platform uses an in-memory credentials cache */
+#undef USE_CCAPI
+
+ /* Use libedit for sftp */
+ #undef USE_LIBEDIT
+ 
+@@ -1390,6 +1393,9 @@
+ /* Define if you want smartcard support using sectok */
+ #undef USE_SECTOK
+ 
+/* platform has the Security Authorization Session API */
+#undef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
+
+ /* Define if you have Solaris process contracts */
+ #undef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
+ 
diff --git a/debian/patches/gssapi.patch b/debian/patches/gssapi.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a60a8b4e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/gssapi.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,2975 @@
+Index: b/ChangeLog.gssapi
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.gssapi
+@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+20100124
+  - [ sshconnect2.c ]
+    Adapt to deal with additional element in Authmethod structure. Thanks to
+    Colin Wilson
+  - [ clientloop.c ]
+    Protect credentials updated code with suitable #ifdefs. Thanks to Colin
+    Wilson
+
+20090615
+  - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c
+      sshd.c ]
+    Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review
+       Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs
+       Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled
+       Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange
+       Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value
+       Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust
+       Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled
+       Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list
+       Cast data.length before printing
+       If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL
+
+20090201
+  - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h
+      ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ]
+    Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user
+    to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server
+
+20080404
+  - [ gss-serv.c ]
+    Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow
+    been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav
+    Stoichkov
+
+20070317
+  - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
+    Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a 
+    function
+
+20061220
+  - [ servconf.c ]
+    Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and 
+    documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson.
+
+20060910
+  - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c
+      ssh-gss.h ]
+    add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms
+  - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ]
+    Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of
+    acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines.
+    <Bugzilla #928>
+  - [ sshd_config ssh_config ]
+    Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample
+    configuration files
+  - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ]
+    Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf()
+    Limit length of error messages displayed by client
+
+20060909
+  - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ]
+    move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server
+    only, where they belong 
+    <Bugzilla #1225>
+
+20060829
+  - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
+    Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment 
+    variable
+
+20060828
+  - [ gss-genr.c ]
+    Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem
+    <Fixed upstream 20060829>
+
+20060818
+  - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ]
+    Make sure that SPENGO is disabled 
+    <Bugzilla #1218 - Fixed upstream 20060818>
+
+20060421
+  - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ]
+    a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to
+    fix compiler errors/warnings 
+    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
+  - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ]
+    fix uninitialized variable warnings
+    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
+  - [ gssgenr.c ]
+    pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue)
+    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
+    <Bugzilla #1220 >
+  - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
+    #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
+    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
+    <Fixed upstream 20060304>
+  - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c 
+    add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option
+    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
+  - [ sshconnect2.c ]
+    add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic
+    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
+    <gssapi-with-mic support is Bugzilla #1008>
+Index: b/Makefile.in
+===================================================================
+--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
+@@ -71,7 +71,8 @@
+        atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
+        monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o kexdh.o \
+        kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o scard.o msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o \
+-       entropy.o scard-opensc.o gss-genr.o umac.o jpake.o schnorr.o
+       entropy.o scard-opensc.o gss-genr.o umac.o jpake.o schnorr.o \
+       kexgssc.o
+ 
+ SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
+        sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \
+@@ -85,7 +86,7 @@
+        auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-jpake.o \
+        monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o \
+        auth-krb5.o \
+-       auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
+       auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o\
+        loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
+        audit.o audit-bsm.o platform.o sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+        roaming_common.o
+Index: b/auth-krb5.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/auth-krb5.c
+++ b/auth-krb5.c
+@@ -166,8 +166,13 @@
+ 
+        len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
+        authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
+       snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s",
+           authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
+#else
+        snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
+            authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
+#endif
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+        if (options.use_pam)
+@@ -219,15 +224,22 @@
+ #ifndef HEIMDAL
+ krb5_error_code
+ ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+-       int tmpfd, ret;
+       int ret;
+        char ccname[40];
+        mode_t old_umask;
+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
+       char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d";
+#else
+       char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX";
+       int tmpfd;
+#endif
+ 
+        ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
+-           "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
+           cctemplate, geteuid());
+        if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
+                return ENOMEM;
+ 
+#ifndef USE_CCAPI
+        old_umask = umask(0177);
+        tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
+        umask(old_umask);
+@@ -242,6 +254,7 @@
+                return errno;
+        }
+        close(tmpfd);
+#endif
+ 
+        return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
+ }
+Index: b/auth.h
+===================================================================
+--- a/auth.h
+++ b/auth.h
+@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
+        int              valid;         /* user exists and is allowed to login */
+        int              attempt;
+        int              failures;
+       int              server_caused_failure; 
+        int              force_pwchange;
+        char            *user;          /* username sent by the client */
+        char            *service;
+Index: b/auth2-gss.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/auth2-gss.c
+++ b/auth2-gss.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.16 2007/10/29 00:52:45 dtucker Exp $ */
+ 
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+  *
+  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -52,6 +52,40 @@
+ static void input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
+ static void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+ 
+/* 
+ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
+ */
+static int
+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+       int authenticated = 0;
+       Buffer b;
+       gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
+       u_int len;
+
+       mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
+       mic.length = len;
+
+       packet_check_eom();
+
+       ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
+           "gssapi-keyex");
+
+       gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
+       gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
+
+       /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
+       if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context, 
+           &gssbuf, &mic))))
+               authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
+                   authctxt->pw));
+       
+       buffer_free(&b);
+       xfree(mic.value);
+
+       return (authenticated);
+}
+
+ /*
+  * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
+  * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
+@@ -102,6 +136,7 @@
+ 
+        if (!present) {
+                xfree(doid);
+               authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
+                return (0);
+        }
+ 
+@@ -109,6 +144,7 @@
+                if (ctxt != NULL)
+                        ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
+                xfree(doid);
+               authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
+                return (0);
+        }
+ 
+@@ -242,7 +278,8 @@
+ 
+        packet_check_eom();
+ 
+-       authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
+       authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
+           authctxt->pw));
+ 
+        authctxt->postponed = 0;
+        dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+@@ -277,7 +314,8 @@
+        gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
+ 
+        if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
+-               authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
+               authenticated = 
+                   PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw));
+        else
+                logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
+ 
+@@ -292,6 +330,12 @@
+        userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic");
+ }
+ 
+Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
+       "gssapi-keyex",
+       userauth_gsskeyex,
+       &options.gss_authentication
+};
+
+ Authmethod method_gssapi = {
+        "gssapi-with-mic",
+        userauth_gssapi,
+Index: b/auth2.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/auth2.c
+++ b/auth2.c
+@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
+ extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
+ extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex;
+ extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
+ #endif
+ #ifdef JPAKE
+@@ -79,6 +80,7 @@
+        &method_none,
+        &method_pubkey,
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+       &method_gsskeyex,
+        &method_gssapi,
+ #endif
+ #ifdef JPAKE
+@@ -274,6 +276,7 @@
+ #endif
+ 
+        authctxt->postponed = 0;
+       authctxt->server_caused_failure = 0;
+ 
+        /* try to authenticate user */
+        m = authmethod_lookup(method);
+@@ -346,7 +349,8 @@
+        } else {
+ 
+                /* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty */
+-               if (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0)
+               if (!authctxt->server_caused_failure &&
+                   (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0))
+                        authctxt->failures++;
+                if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) {
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+Index: b/clientloop.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/clientloop.c
+++ b/clientloop.c
+@@ -111,6 +111,10 @@
+ #include "msg.h"
+ #include "roaming.h"
+ 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+
+ /* import options */
+ extern Options options;
+ 
+@@ -1430,6 +1434,15 @@
+                /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
+                if (!rekeying) {
+                        channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+                       if (options.gss_renewal_rekey &&
+                           ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)) {
+                               debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey");
+                               need_rekeying = 1;
+                       }
+#endif
+
+                        if (need_rekeying || packet_need_rekeying()) {
+                                debug("need rekeying");
+                                xxx_kex->done = 0;
+Index: b/configure.ac
+===================================================================
+--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -477,6 +477,30 @@
+            [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
+        AC_DEFINE(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF, 1,
+            [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
+       AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have the Security Authorization Session API)
+       AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <Security/AuthSession.h>],
+               [SessionCreate(0, 0);],
+               [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes"
+                AC_DEFINE(USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API, 1, 
+                       [platform has the Security Authorization Session API])
+                LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
+                AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
+               [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no"
+                AC_MSG_RESULT(no)])
+       AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have an in-memory credentials cache)
+       AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+               [#include <Kerberos/Kerberos.h>],
+               [cc_context_t c;
+                (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);],
+               [AC_DEFINE(USE_CCAPI, 1, 
+                       [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache])
+                LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
+                AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+                if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then
+                       AC_MSG_ERROR(*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***)
+               fi],
+               [AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]
+       )
+        m4_pattern_allow(AU_IPv)
+        AC_CHECK_DECL(AU_IPv4, [], 
+            AC_DEFINE(AU_IPv4, 0, [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
+Index: b/gss-genr.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/gss-genr.c
+++ b/gss-genr.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.20 2009/06/22 05:39:28 dtucker Exp $ */
+ 
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+  *
+  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -39,12 +39,167 @@
+ #include "buffer.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+ 
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+ 
+ extern u_char *session_id2;
+ extern u_int session_id2_len;
+ 
+typedef struct {
+       char *encoded;
+       gss_OID oid;
+} ssh_gss_kex_mapping;
+
+/*
+ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the
+ * XXX   passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines
+ */
+
+Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL;
+
+static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL;
+
+int 
+ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok() {
+       return (gss_enc2oid != NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program
+ *
+ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting
+ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism
+ */
+
+char *
+ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) {
+       gss_OID_set gss_supported;
+       OM_uint32 min_status;
+
+       if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported)))
+               return NULL;
+
+       return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
+           host, client));
+}
+
+char *
+ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
+    const char *host, const char *client) {
+       Buffer buf;
+       size_t i;
+       int oidpos, enclen;
+       char *mechs, *encoded;
+       u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+       char deroid[2];
+       const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
+       EVP_MD_CTX md;
+
+       if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
+               for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++)
+                       xfree(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded);
+               xfree(gss_enc2oid);
+       }
+
+       gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) *
+           (gss_supported->count + 1));
+
+       buffer_init(&buf);
+
+       oidpos = 0;
+       for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
+               if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
+                   (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
+
+                       deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
+                       deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
+
+                       EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
+                       EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2);
+                       EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,
+                           gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
+                           gss_supported->elements[i].length);
+                       EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
+
+                       encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
+                       enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md),
+                           encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
+
+                       if (oidpos != 0)
+                               buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
+
+                       buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
+                           sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1);
+                       buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
+                       buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
+                       buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, 
+                           sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1);
+                       buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
+                       buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
+                       buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
+                           sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1);
+                       buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
+
+                       gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
+                       gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
+                       oidpos++;
+               }
+       }
+       gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
+       gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
+
+       buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0');
+
+       mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf));
+       buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf));
+       buffer_free(&buf);
+
+       if (strlen(mechs) == 0) {
+               xfree(mechs);
+               mechs = NULL;
+       }
+       
+       return (mechs);
+}
+
+gss_OID
+ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) {
+       int i = 0;
+       
+       switch (kex_type) {
+       case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
+               if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID))
+                       return GSS_C_NO_OID;
+               name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1;
+               break;
+       case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
+               if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID))
+                       return GSS_C_NO_OID;
+               name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1;
+               break;
+       case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
+               if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID))
+                       return GSS_C_NO_OID;
+               name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1;
+               break;
+       default:
+               return GSS_C_NO_OID;
+       }
+
+       while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL &&
+           strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0)
+               i++;
+
+       if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL)
+               ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid);
+
+       return gss_enc2oid[i].oid;
+}
+
+ /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
+ int
+ ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
+@@ -197,7 +352,7 @@
+        }
+ 
+        ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
+-           GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
+           ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
+            GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
+            0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
+ 
+@@ -227,8 +382,42 @@
+ }
+ 
+ OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name)
+{
+       gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
+       gss_name_t gssname;
+       OM_uint32 status;
+       gss_OID_set oidset;
+
+       gssbuf.value = (void *) name;
+       gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
+
+       gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+       gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
+
+       ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf,
+           GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname);
+
+       if (!ctx->major)
+               ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, 
+                   gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE, 
+                   &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL);
+
+       gss_release_name(&status, &gssname);
+       gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+
+       if (ctx->major)
+               ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+
+       return(ctx->major);
+}
+
+OM_uint32
+ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
+ {
+       if (ctx == NULL) 
+               return -1;
+
+        if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+            GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
+                ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+@@ -236,6 +425,19 @@
+        return (ctx->major);
+ }
+ 
+/* Priviledged when used by server */
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
+{
+       if (ctx == NULL)
+               return -1;
+
+       ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+           gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
+
+       return (ctx->major);
+}
+
+ void
+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
+     const char *context)
+@@ -249,11 +451,16 @@
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
+ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host, 
+    const char *client)
+ {
+        gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+        OM_uint32 major, minor;
+        gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
+       Gssctxt *intctx = NULL;
+
+       if (ctx == NULL)
+               ctx = &intctx;
+ 
+        /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
+        if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length && 
+@@ -263,6 +470,10 @@
+        ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
+        ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
+        major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
+
+       if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client)
+               major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client);
+
+        if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+                major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, 
+                    NULL);
+@@ -272,10 +483,67 @@
+                            GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+        }
+ 
+-       if (GSS_ERROR(major)) 
+       if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL) 
+                ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
+ 
+        return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
+ }
+ 
+int
+ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) {
+       static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+       static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0;
+       static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
+       static gss_name_t name;
+       static OM_uint32 last_call = 0;
+       OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor;
+       int equal;
+       gss_cred_usage_t usage = GSS_C_INITIATE;
+       
+       now = time(NULL);
+
+       if (ctxt) {
+               debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions");
+
+               if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
+                       gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name);
+
+               major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
+                   &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL);
+
+               if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+                       saved_mech = ctxt->oid;
+                       saved_lifetime+= now;
+               } else {
+                       /* Handle the error */
+               }
+               return 0;
+       }
+
+       if (now - last_call < 10)
+               return 0;
+
+       last_call = now;
+
+       if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID)
+               return 0;
+       
+       major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, 
+           &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL);
+       if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED)
+               return 0;
+       else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+               return 0;
+
+       major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal);
+       gss_release_name(&minor, &name);
+       if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+               return 0;
+
+       if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10))
+               return 1;
+
+       return 0;
+}
+
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+Index: b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.7 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+ 
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+  *
+  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@
+        krb5_principal princ;
+        OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+        int len;
+       const char *new_ccname;
+ 
+        if (client->creds == NULL) {
+                debug("No credentials stored");
+@@ -168,11 +169,16 @@
+                return;
+        }
+ 
+-       client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache));
+       new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
+
+        client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
+-       len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6;
+-       client->store.envval = xmalloc(len);
+-       snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename);
+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
+       xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
+       client->store.filename = NULL;
+#else
+       xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "FILE:%s", new_ccname);
+       client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
+#endif
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+        if (options.use_pam)
+@@ -184,6 +190,71 @@
+        return;
+ }
+ 
+int
+ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store, 
+    ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+{
+       krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
+       krb5_principal principal = NULL;
+       char *name = NULL;
+       krb5_error_code problem;
+       OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+
+       if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) {
+                logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
+                    krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+                return 0;
+               }
+       
+       /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */
+       if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache, 
+           &principal))) {
+               logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s",
+                   krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+               krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+               return 0;
+       }
+
+       if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) {
+               logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s",
+                   krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+               krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
+               krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+               return 0;
+       }
+
+
+       if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) {
+               debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing");
+               krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
+               krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+               krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
+               return 0;
+       }
+       krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
+
+       /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */
+
+       if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) {
+               logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s",
+                   krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+               krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
+               krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+               return 0;
+       }
+
+       krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
+
+       if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds,
+           ccache))) {
+               logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!");
+               krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+               return 0;
+       }
+
+       return 1;
+}
+
+ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
+        "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
+        "Kerberos",
+@@ -191,7 +262,8 @@
+        NULL,
+        &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
+        NULL,
+-       &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds
+       &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds,
+       &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds
+ };
+ 
+ #endif /* KRB5 */
+Index: b/gss-serv.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/gss-serv.c
+++ b/gss-serv.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.22 2008/05/08 12:02:23 djm Exp $ */
+ 
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+  *
+  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -45,15 +45,20 @@
+ #include "channels.h"
+ #include "session.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+ 
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+ 
+ static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
+     { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
+-    GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL}};
+    GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME,  NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
+ 
+ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
+-    { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
+    { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
+ 
+ #ifdef KRB5
+ extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
+@@ -81,25 +86,32 @@
+        char lname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
+        gss_OID_set oidset;
+ 
+-       gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+-       gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
+       if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) {
+               gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+               gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
+
+               if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
+                       gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+                       return (-1);
+               }
+ 
+-       if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
+-               gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+-               return (-1);
+-       }
+               if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
+                       gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+                       return (ctx->major);
+               }
+
+               if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
+                   ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, 
+                   NULL, NULL)))
+                       ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+ 
+-       if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
+                gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+                return (ctx->major);
+       } else {
+               ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+               ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+        }
+-
+-       if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
+-           ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL)))
+-               ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+-
+-       gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+-       return (ctx->major);
+       return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Privileged */
+@@ -114,6 +126,29 @@
+ }
+ 
+ /* Unprivileged */
+char *
+ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() {
+       gss_OID_set     supported;
+
+       ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported);
+       return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech,
+           NULL, NULL));
+}
+
+/* Unprivileged */
+int
+ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data,
+    const char *dummy) {
+       Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
+       int res;
+ 
+       res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
+       ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
+
+       return (res);
+}
+
+/* Unprivileged */
+ void
+ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
+ {
+@@ -123,7 +158,9 @@
+        gss_OID_set supported;
+ 
+        gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
+-       gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
+
+       if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported)))
+               return;
+ 
+        while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
+                if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
+@@ -247,8 +284,48 @@
+ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ {
+        int i = 0;
+       int equal = 0;
+       gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+       gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+
+       if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
+               if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
+                   (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements,
+                    ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) {
+                       debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
+                       return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+               }
+
+               if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, 
+                   ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name, 
+                   NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
+                       ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+                       return (ctx->major);
+               }
+
+               ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name, 
+                   new_name, &equal);
+ 
+-       gss_buffer_desc ename;
+               if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
+                       ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+                       return (ctx->major);
+               }
+ 
+               if (!equal) {
+                       debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name");
+                       return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+               }
+
+               debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
+
+               gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
+               gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds);
+               client->name = new_name;
+               client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
+               ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+               client->updated = 1;
+               return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+       }
+ 
+        client->mech = NULL;
+ 
+@@ -263,6 +340,13 @@
+        if (client->mech == NULL)
+                return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ 
+       if (ctx->client_creds &&
+           (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
+            ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
+               ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+               return (ctx->major);
+       }
+
+        if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
+            &client->displayname, NULL))) {
+                ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+@@ -280,6 +364,8 @@
+                return (ctx->major);
+        }
+ 
+       gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
+
+        /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
+        client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
+        ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+@@ -327,7 +413,7 @@
+ 
+ /* Privileged */
+ int
+-ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
+ {
+        OM_uint32 lmin;
+ 
+@@ -337,9 +423,11 @@
+                return 0;
+        }
+        if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
+-               if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
+               if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
+                       gssapi_client.used = 1;
+                       gssapi_client.store.owner = pw;
+                        return 1;
+-               else {
+               } else {
+                        /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
+                        gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
+                        gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
+@@ -352,14 +440,90 @@
+        return (0);
+ }
+ 
+-/* Privileged */
+-OM_uint32
+-ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
+/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running 
+ * as the user, the monitor is root.
+ *
+ * In the child, we want to :
+ *    *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify
+ *    *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update
+ */
+
+/* Stuff for PAM */
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg, 
+    struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+ {
+-       ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+-           gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
+       return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+}
+#endif
+ 
+-       return (ctx->major);
+void
+ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() {
+       int ok;
+       int ret;
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+       pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
+       struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
+       char *envstr;
+#endif
+
+       if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL && 
+           gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
+           gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
+               return;
+ 
+       ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
+
+       if (!ok)
+               return;
+
+       debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully");
+
+       /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will
+        * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options
+        * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
+        */
+#ifdef USE_PAM 
+       if (!use_privsep) {
+               debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
+               return;
+       }
+
+       ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
+           &pamconv, &pamh);
+       if (ret)
+               return;
+
+       xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar, 
+           gssapi_client.store.envval);
+
+       ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr);
+       if (!ret)
+               pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
+       pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
+#endif
+}
+
+int 
+ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) {
+       int ok = 0;
+
+       /* Check we've got credentials to store */
+       if (!gssapi_client.updated)
+               return 0;
+
+       gssapi_client.updated = 0;
+
+       temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner);
+       if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)
+               ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client);
+       else
+               debug("No update function for this mechanism");
+
+       restore_uid();
+
+       return ok;
+ }
+ 
+ #endif
+Index: b/kex.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/kex.c
+++ b/kex.c
+@@ -49,6 +49,10 @@
+ #include "dispatch.h"
+ #include "monitor.h"
+ 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+
+ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
+ # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
+ # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256
+@@ -325,6 +329,20 @@
+                k->kex_type = KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256;
+                k->evp_md = evp_ssh_sha256();
+ #endif
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
+           sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) {
+               k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1;
+               k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
+       } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
+           sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) {
+               k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1;
+               k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
+       } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
+           sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) {
+               k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1;
+               k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
+#endif
+        } else
+                fatal("bad kex alg %s", k->name);
+ }
+Index: b/kex.h
+===================================================================
+--- a/kex.h
+++ b/kex.h
+@@ -66,6 +66,9 @@
+        KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1,
+        KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1,
+        KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
+       KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
+       KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
+       KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1,
+        KEX_MAX
+ };
+ 
+@@ -121,6 +124,12 @@
+        sig_atomic_t done;
+        int     flags;
+        const EVP_MD *evp_md;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       int     gss_deleg_creds;
+       int     gss_trust_dns;
+       char    *gss_host;
+       char    *gss_client;
+#endif
+        char    *client_version_string;
+        char    *server_version_string;
+        int     (*verify_host_key)(Key *);
+@@ -143,6 +152,11 @@
+ void    kexgex_client(Kex *);
+ void    kexgex_server(Kex *);
+ 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+void   kexgss_client(Kex *);
+void   kexgss_server(Kex *);
+#endif
+
+ void
+ kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int,
+     BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
+Index: b/kexgssc.c
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/kexgssc.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+
+void
+kexgss_client(Kex *kex) {
+       gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+       gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr;
+       Gssctxt *ctxt;
+       OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
+       u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, hashlen, strlen;
+       DH *dh; 
+       BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
+       BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
+       BIGNUM *p = NULL;
+       BIGNUM *g = NULL;       
+       u_char *kbuf, *hash;
+       u_char *serverhostkey = NULL;
+       u_char *empty = "";
+       char *msg;
+       char *lang;
+       int type = 0;
+       int first = 1;
+       int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
+
+       /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */       
+       ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
+       if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type) 
+           == GSS_C_NO_OID)
+               fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
+
+       if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host))
+               fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
+
+       if (kex->gss_client && 
+           ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client))
+               fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
+
+       switch (kex->kex_type) {
+       case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
+               dh = dh_new_group1();
+               break;
+       case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
+               dh = dh_new_group14();
+               break;
+       case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
+               debug("Doing group exchange\n");
+               nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8);
+               packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
+               packet_put_int(min);
+               packet_put_int(nbits);
+               packet_put_int(max);
+
+               packet_send();
+
+               packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
+
+               if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
+                       fatal("BN_new() failed");
+               packet_get_bignum2(p);
+               if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
+                       fatal("BN_new() failed");
+               packet_get_bignum2(g);
+               packet_check_eom();
+
+               if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
+                       fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
+                           min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
+
+               dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
+               break;
+       default:
+               fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
+       }
+       
+       /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */
+       dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
+
+       /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */
+       dh_server_pub = BN_new();
+       if (dh_server_pub == NULL)
+               fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
+
+       token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
+                        
+       do {
+               debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
+               
+               maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
+                   kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
+                   &ret_flags);
+
+               if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
+                       if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+                               packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
+                               packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
+                                   send_tok.length);
+                       }
+                       fatal("gss_init_context failed");
+               }
+
+               /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
+               if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
+                       xfree(recv_tok.value);
+
+               if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+                       /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
+                       if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
+                               fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
+
+                       /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
+                       if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
+                               fatal("Integrity check failed");
+               }
+
+               /* 
+                * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
+                * received cannot have been a 'complete'. 
+                */
+               if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+                       if (first) {
+                               packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT);
+                               packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
+                                   send_tok.length);
+                               packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
+                               first = 0;
+                       } else {
+                               packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
+                               packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
+                                   send_tok.length);
+                       }
+                       packet_send();
+                       gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
+
+                       /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
+                       do {    
+                               type = packet_read();
+                               if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
+                                       debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
+                                       if (serverhostkey)
+                                               fatal("Server host key received more than once");
+                                       serverhostkey = 
+                                           packet_get_string(&slen);
+                               }
+                       } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
+
+                       switch (type) {
+                       case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
+                               debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
+                               if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) 
+                                       fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
+                               recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
+                               recv_tok.length = strlen; 
+                               break;
+                       case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
+                               debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
+                               packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
+                               msg_tok.value =  packet_get_string(&strlen);
+                               msg_tok.length = strlen; 
+
+                               /* Is there a token included? */
+                               if (packet_get_char()) {
+                                       recv_tok.value=
+                                           packet_get_string(&strlen);
+                                       recv_tok.length = strlen;
+                                       /* If we're already complete - protocol error */
+                                       if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+                                               packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete");
+                                       } else {
+                                               /* No token included */
+                                               if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+                                                       packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token");
+                               }
+                               break;
+                       case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
+                               debug("Received Error");
+                               maj_status = packet_get_int();
+                               min_status = packet_get_int();
+                               msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
+                               lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
+                               fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg);
+                       default:
+                               packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
+                               type);
+                       }
+                       token_ptr = &recv_tok;
+               } else {
+                       /* No data, and not complete */
+                       if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+                               fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
+               }
+       } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+
+       /* 
+        * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the 
+        * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok 
+        */
+
+       if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
+               fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
+
+       /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */
+       if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
+               packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
+
+       /* compute K=f^x mod p */
+       klen = DH_size(dh);
+       kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
+       kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh);
+       if (kout < 0)
+               fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
+
+       shared_secret = BN_new();
+       if (shared_secret == NULL)
+               fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed");
+
+       if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
+               fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
+
+       memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
+       xfree(kbuf);
+
+       switch (kex->kex_type) {
+       case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
+       case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
+               kex_dh_hash( kex->client_version_string, 
+                   kex->server_version_string,
+                   buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
+                   buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
+                   (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
+                   dh->pub_key,        /* e */
+                   dh_server_pub,      /* f */
+                   shared_secret,      /* K */
+                   &hash, &hashlen
+               );
+               break;
+       case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
+               kexgex_hash(
+                   kex->evp_md,
+                   kex->client_version_string,
+                   kex->server_version_string,
+                   buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
+                   buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
+                   (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
+                   min, nbits, max,
+                   dh->p, dh->g,
+                   dh->pub_key,
+                   dh_server_pub,
+                   shared_secret,
+                   &hash, &hashlen
+               );
+               break;
+       default:
+               fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
+       }
+
+       gssbuf.value = hash;
+       gssbuf.length = hashlen;
+
+       /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
+       if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
+               packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify");
+
+       xfree(msg_tok.value);
+
+       DH_free(dh);
+       if (serverhostkey)
+               xfree(serverhostkey);
+       BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
+
+       /* save session id */
+       if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+               kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
+               kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
+               memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
+       }
+
+       if (kex->gss_deleg_creds)
+               ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
+
+       if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
+               gss_kex_context = ctxt;
+       else
+               ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
+
+       kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
+       BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+       kex_finish(kex);
+}
+
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
+Index: b/kexgsss.c
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/kexgsss.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+void
+kexgss_server(Kex *kex)
+{
+       OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+       
+       /* 
+        * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
+        * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific 
+        * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently 
+        * activating this non-standard behaviour.
+        */
+
+       OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
+       gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
+       gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+       Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
+       u_int slen, klen, kout, hashlen;
+       u_char *kbuf, *hash;
+       DH *dh;
+       int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
+       BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
+       BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
+       int type = 0;
+       gss_OID oid;
+       char *mechs;
+
+       /* Initialise GSSAPI */
+
+       /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures
+        * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
+        * into life
+        */
+       if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) 
+               if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms()))
+                       xfree(mechs);
+
+       debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name);
+       oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
+       if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
+          fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
+
+       debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
+
+       if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
+               fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
+
+       switch (kex->kex_type) {
+       case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
+               dh = dh_new_group1();
+               break;
+       case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
+               dh = dh_new_group14();
+               break;
+       case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
+               debug("Doing group exchange");
+               packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
+               min = packet_get_int();
+               nbits = packet_get_int();
+               max = packet_get_int();
+               min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
+               max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
+               packet_check_eom();
+               if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
+                       fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
+                           min, nbits, max);
+               dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
+               if (dh == NULL)
+                       packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found");
+
+               packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
+               packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
+               packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
+               packet_send();
+
+               packet_write_wait();
+               break;
+       default:
+               fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
+       }
+
+       dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
+
+       do {
+               debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
+               type = packet_read();
+               switch(type) {
+               case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
+                       if (dh_client_pub != NULL) 
+                               fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
+                       recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
+                       recv_tok.length = slen; 
+
+                       if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
+                               fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
+
+                       packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
+
+                       /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
+                       break;
+               case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
+                       recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
+                       recv_tok.length = slen; 
+                       break;
+               default:
+                       packet_disconnect(
+                           "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
+                           type);
+               }
+
+               maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok, 
+                   &send_tok, &ret_flags));
+
+               xfree(recv_tok.value);
+
+               if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
+                       fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
+
+               if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
+                       fatal("No client public key");
+               
+               if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
+                       debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
+                       packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
+                       packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
+                       packet_send();
+                       gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
+               }
+       } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+
+       if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
+               if (send_tok.length > 0) {
+                       packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
+                       packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
+                       packet_send();
+               }
+               fatal("accept_ctx died");
+       }
+
+       if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
+               fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
+
+       if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
+               fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
+       
+       if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
+               packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
+
+       klen = DH_size(dh);
+       kbuf = xmalloc(klen); 
+       kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
+       if (kout < 0)
+               fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
+
+       shared_secret = BN_new();
+       if (shared_secret == NULL)
+               fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed");
+
+       if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
+               fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
+
+       memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
+       xfree(kbuf);
+
+       switch (kex->kex_type) {
+       case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
+       case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
+               kex_dh_hash(
+                   kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
+                   buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
+                   buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
+                   NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */
+                   dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret,
+                   &hash, &hashlen
+               );
+               break;
+       case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
+               kexgex_hash(
+                   kex->evp_md,
+                   kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
+                   buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
+                   buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
+                   NULL, 0,
+                   min, nbits, max,
+                   dh->p, dh->g,
+                   dh_client_pub,
+                   dh->pub_key,
+                   shared_secret,
+                   &hash, &hashlen
+               );
+               break;
+       default:
+               fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
+       }
+
+       BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
+
+       if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+               kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
+               kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
+               memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
+       }
+
+       gssbuf.value = hash;
+       gssbuf.length = hashlen;
+
+       if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok))))
+               fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
+
+       packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE);
+       packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
+       packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length);
+
+       if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+               packet_put_char(1); /* true */
+               packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
+       } else {
+               packet_put_char(0); /* false */
+       }
+       packet_send();
+
+       gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
+       gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
+
+       if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
+               gss_kex_context = ctxt;
+       else 
+               ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
+
+       DH_free(dh);
+
+       kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
+       BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+       kex_finish(kex);
+
+       /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
+        * just exchanged.  */
+       if (options.gss_store_rekey)
+               ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
+}
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
+Index: b/key.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/key.c
+++ b/key.c
+@@ -764,6 +764,8 @@
+                return KEY_RSA;
+        } else if (strcmp(name, "ssh-dss") == 0) {
+                return KEY_DSA;
+       } else if (strcmp(name, "null") == 0) {
+               return KEY_NULL;
+        }
+        debug2("key_type_from_name: unknown key type '%s'", name);
+        return KEY_UNSPEC;
+Index: b/key.h
+===================================================================
+--- a/key.h
+++ b/key.h
+@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
+        KEY_RSA1,
+        KEY_RSA,
+        KEY_DSA,
+       KEY_NULL,
+        KEY_UNSPEC
+ };
+ enum fp_type {
+Index: b/monitor.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -172,6 +172,8 @@
+ int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+@@ -241,6 +243,7 @@
+     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign},
+ #endif
+ #ifdef JPAKE
+     {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata},
+@@ -253,6 +256,12 @@
+ };
+ 
+ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
+#endif
+     {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
+@@ -357,6 +366,10 @@
+                /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+                monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+                monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+               /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
+               monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
+#endif
+        } else {
+                mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
+ 
+@@ -443,6 +456,10 @@
+                monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+                monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+                monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+               /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
+               monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
+#endif         
+        } else {
+                mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
+                monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
+@@ -1706,6 +1723,13 @@
+        kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+        kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+        kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       if (options.gss_keyex) {
+               kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+               kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+               kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+       }
+#endif
+        kex->server = 1;
+        kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
+        kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
+@@ -1911,6 +1935,9 @@
+        OM_uint32 major;
+        u_int len;
+ 
+       if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+               fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
+
+        goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+        goid.length = len;
+ 
+@@ -1938,6 +1965,9 @@
+        OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
+        u_int len;
+ 
+       if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+               fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
+
+        in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+        in.length = len;
+        major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
+@@ -1955,6 +1985,7 @@
+                monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
+                monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
+                monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
+               monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1);
+        }
+        return (0);
+ }
+@@ -1966,6 +1997,9 @@
+        OM_uint32 ret;
+        u_int len;
+ 
+       if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+               fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
+
+        gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+        gssbuf.length = len;
+        mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+@@ -1992,7 +2026,11 @@
+ {
+        int authenticated;
+ 
+-       authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
+       if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+               fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
+
+       authenticated = authctxt->valid && 
+           ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw);
+ 
+        buffer_clear(m);
+        buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
+@@ -2005,6 +2043,74 @@
+        /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
+        return (authenticated);
+ }
+
+int 
+mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+       gss_buffer_desc data;
+       gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+       OM_uint32 major, minor;
+       u_int len;
+
+       if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+               fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
+
+       data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+       data.length = len;
+       if (data.length != 20) 
+               fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__, 
+                   (int) data.length);
+
+       /* Save the session ID on the first time around */
+       if (session_id2_len == 0) {
+               session_id2_len = data.length;
+               session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
+               memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
+       }
+       major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
+
+       xfree(data.value);
+
+       buffer_clear(m);
+       buffer_put_int(m, major);
+       buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length);
+
+       mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
+
+       gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
+
+       /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
+       monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
+       
+       /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */
+       monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1);
+
+       return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) {
+       ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
+       int ok;
+
+       store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+       store.envvar   = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+       store.envval   = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+
+       ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
+
+       xfree(store.filename);
+       xfree(store.envvar);
+       xfree(store.envval);
+
+       buffer_clear(m);
+       buffer_put_int(m, ok);
+
+       mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
+
+       return(0);
+}
+
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+ 
+ #ifdef JPAKE
+Index: b/monitor.h
+===================================================================
+--- a/monitor.h
+++ b/monitor.h
+@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@
+        MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP,
+        MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK,
+        MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC,
+       MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN,
+       MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS,
+        MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START,
+        MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT,
+        MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX,
+Index: b/monitor_wrap.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
+@@ -1248,7 +1248,7 @@
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
+ {
+        Buffer m;
+        int authenticated = 0;
+@@ -1265,6 +1265,51 @@
+        debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
+        return (authenticated);
+ }
+
+OM_uint32
+mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
+{
+       Buffer m;
+       OM_uint32 major;
+       u_int len;
+
+       buffer_init(&m);
+       buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length);
+
+       mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m);
+       mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m);
+
+       major = buffer_get_int(&m);
+       hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
+       hash->length = len;
+
+       buffer_free(&m);
+
+       return(major);
+}
+
+int
+mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store)
+{
+       Buffer m;
+       int ok;
+
+       buffer_init(&m);
+
+       buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : "");
+       buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : "");
+       buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : "");
+       
+       mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
+       mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
+
+       ok = buffer_get_int(&m);
+
+       buffer_free(&m);
+       
+       return (ok);
+}
+
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+ 
+ #ifdef JPAKE
+Index: b/monitor_wrap.h
+===================================================================
+--- a/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
+@@ -57,8 +57,10 @@
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
+    gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
+-int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
+int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *);
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+Index: b/readconf.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@
+        oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
+        oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
+        oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
+       oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey,
+        oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
+        oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oHashKnownHosts,
+        oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand,
+@@ -164,10 +165,18 @@
+        { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
+ #if defined(GSSAPI)
+        { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
+       { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx },
+        { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
+       { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
+       { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity },
+       { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey },
+ #else
+        { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
+       { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
+        { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
+       { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
+       { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported },
+       { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported },
+ #endif
+        { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
+        { "usersh", oDeprecated },
+@@ -454,10 +463,26 @@
+                intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+                goto parse_flag;
+ 
+       case oGssKeyEx:
+               intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
+               goto parse_flag;
+
+        case oGssDelegateCreds:
+                intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
+                goto parse_flag;
+ 
+       case oGssTrustDns:
+               intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
+               goto parse_flag;
+
+       case oGssClientIdentity:
+               charptr = &options->gss_client_identity;
+               goto parse_string;
+
+       case oGssRenewalRekey:
+               intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey;
+               goto parse_flag;
+
+        case oBatchMode:
+                intptr = &options->batch_mode;
+                goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1013,7 +1038,11 @@
+        options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
+        options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+        options->gss_authentication = -1;
+       options->gss_keyex = -1;
+        options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
+       options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
+       options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1;
+       options->gss_client_identity = NULL;
+        options->password_authentication = -1;
+        options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+        options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
+@@ -1105,8 +1134,14 @@
+                options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
+        if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+                options->gss_authentication = 0;
+       if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
+               options->gss_keyex = 0;
+        if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
+                options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
+       if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
+               options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
+       if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
+               options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0;
+        if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+                options->password_authentication = 1;
+        if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+Index: b/readconf.h
+===================================================================
+--- a/readconf.h
+++ b/readconf.h
+@@ -44,7 +44,11 @@
+        int     challenge_response_authentication;
+                                        /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
+        int     gss_authentication;     /* Try GSS authentication */
+       int     gss_keyex;              /* Try GSS key exchange */
+        int     gss_deleg_creds;        /* Delegate GSS credentials */
+       int     gss_trust_dns;          /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
+       int     gss_renewal_rekey;      /* Credential renewal forces rekey */
+       char    *gss_client_identity;   /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */
+        int     password_authentication;        /* Try password
+                                                 * authentication. */
+        int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
+Index: b/servconf.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@
+        options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
+        options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
+        options->gss_authentication=-1;
+       options->gss_keyex = -1;
+        options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
+       options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
+       options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
+        options->password_authentication = -1;
+        options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+        options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+@@ -210,8 +213,14 @@
+                options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
+        if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+                options->gss_authentication = 0;
+       if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
+               options->gss_keyex = 0;
+        if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
+                options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
+       if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
+               options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
+       if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
+               options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
+        if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+                options->password_authentication = 1;
+        if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+@@ -302,7 +311,9 @@
+        sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
+        sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
+        sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, sAuthorizedKeysFile2,
+-       sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+       sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
+       sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey,
+       sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+        sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+        sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
+        sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication,
+@@ -364,9 +375,15 @@
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+        { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+        { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+       { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+       { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+       { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #else
+        { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+        { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+       { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+       { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+       { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
+        { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+        { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+@@ -891,10 +908,22 @@
+                intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+                goto parse_flag;
+ 
+       case sGssKeyEx:
+               intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
+               goto parse_flag;
+
+        case sGssCleanupCreds:
+                intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
+                goto parse_flag;
+ 
+       case sGssStrictAcceptor:
+               intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
+               goto parse_flag;
+
+       case sGssStoreRekey:
+               intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey;
+               goto parse_flag;
+
+        case sPasswordAuthentication:
+                intptr = &options->password_authentication;
+                goto parse_flag;
+Index: b/servconf.h
+===================================================================
+--- a/servconf.h
+++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -91,7 +91,10 @@
+        int     kerberos_get_afs_token;         /* If true, try to get AFS token if
+                                                 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
+        int     gss_authentication;     /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
+       int     gss_keyex;              /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
+        int     gss_cleanup_creds;      /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
+       int     gss_strict_acceptor;    /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
+       int     gss_store_rekey;
+        int     password_authentication;        /* If true, permit password
+                                                 * authentication. */
+        int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
+Index: b/ssh-gss.h
+===================================================================
+--- a/ssh-gss.h
+++ b/ssh-gss.h
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.10 2007/06/12 08:20:00 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+  *
+  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -60,10 +60,22 @@
+ 
+ #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
+ 
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT                            30
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE                        31
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE                        32
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY                         33
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR                           34
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ                       40
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP                          41
+#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID                           "gss-group1-sha1-"
+#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID                          "gss-group14-sha1-"
+#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID                            "gss-gex-sha1-"
+
+ typedef struct {
+        char *filename;
+        char *envvar;
+        char *envval;
+       struct passwd *owner;
+        void *data;
+ } ssh_gssapi_ccache;
+ 
+@@ -71,8 +83,11 @@
+        gss_buffer_desc displayname;
+        gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
+        gss_cred_id_t creds;
+       gss_name_t name;
+        struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
+        ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
+       int used;
+       int updated;
+ } ssh_gssapi_client;
+ 
+ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+@@ -83,6 +98,7 @@
+        int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
+        int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
+        void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+       int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ } ssh_gssapi_mech;
+ 
+ typedef struct {
+@@ -93,10 +109,11 @@
+        gss_OID         oid; /* client */
+        gss_cred_id_t   creds; /* server */
+        gss_name_t      client; /* server */
+-       gss_cred_id_t   client_creds; /* server */
+       gss_cred_id_t   client_creds; /* both */
+ } Gssctxt;
+ 
+ extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
+extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context;
+ 
+ int  ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
+@@ -116,16 +133,30 @@
+ void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+-int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
+int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *);
+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
+int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
+ 
+ /* In the server */
+typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, 
+    const char *);
+char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *);
+char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
+    const char *);
+gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
+int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *, 
+    const char *);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+-int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
+int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
+ void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
+ void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
+ 
+char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
+int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok();
+
+int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store);
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+ 
+ #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
+Index: b/ssh_config
+===================================================================
+--- a/ssh_config
+++ b/ssh_config
+@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
+ #   HostbasedAuthentication no
+ #   GSSAPIAuthentication no
+ #   GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
+#   GSSAPIKeyExchange no
+#   GSSAPITrustDNS no
+ #   BatchMode no
+ #   CheckHostIP yes
+ #   AddressFamily any
+Index: b/ssh_config.5
+===================================================================
+--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -478,11 +478,38 @@
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
+ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using
+GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity
+If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when 
+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default 
+identity will be used.
+ .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+ Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
+-Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
+.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
+If set to 
+.Dq yes
+then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the
+ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed 
+credentials to a session on the server.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
+Set to 
+.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
+the name of the host being connected to. If 
+.Dq no, the hostname entered on the
+command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
+ .It Cm HashKnownHosts
+ Indicates that
+ .Xr ssh 1
+Index: b/sshconnect2.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -105,9 +105,34 @@
+ {
+        Kex *kex;
+ 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL;
+       char *gss_host = NULL;
+#endif
+
+        xxx_host = host;
+        xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
+ 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       if (options.gss_keyex) {
+               /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this 
+                * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
+               orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+
+               if (options.gss_trust_dns)
+                       gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1);
+               else
+                       gss_host = host;
+
+               gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity);
+               if (gss) {
+                       debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
+                       xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
+                           "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+               }
+       }
+#endif
+
+        if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) {
+                logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults.");
+                options.ciphers = NULL;
+@@ -135,6 +160,17 @@
+                myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
+                    options.hostkeyalgorithms;
+ 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
+        * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
+       if (options.gss_keyex && gss) {
+               orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
+               xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], 
+                   "%s,null", orig);
+               xfree(gss);
+       }
+#endif
+
+        if (options.rekey_limit)
+                packet_set_rekey_limit((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit);
+ 
+@@ -144,10 +180,26 @@
+        kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
+        kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
+        kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       if (options.gss_keyex) {
+               kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
+               kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
+               kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
+       }
+#endif
+        kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+        kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+        kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
+ 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       if (options.gss_keyex) {
+               kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
+               kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
+               kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity;
+               kex->gss_host = gss_host;
+       }
+#endif
+
+        xxx_kex = kex;
+ 
+        dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex);
+@@ -236,6 +288,7 @@
+ void   input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
+ void   input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+ void   input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int    userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt);
+ #endif
+ 
+ void   userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
+@@ -251,6 +304,11 @@
+ 
+ Authmethod authmethods[] = {
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+       {"gssapi-keyex",
+               userauth_gsskeyex,
+               NULL,
+               &options.gss_authentication,
+               NULL},
+        {"gssapi-with-mic",
+                userauth_gssapi,
+                NULL,
+@@ -542,19 +600,29 @@
+        static u_int mech = 0;
+        OM_uint32 min;
+        int ok = 0;
+       const char *gss_host;
+
+       if (options.gss_trust_dns)
+               gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1);
+       else
+               gss_host = authctxt->host;
+ 
+        /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
+         * once. */
+ 
+        if (gss_supported == NULL)
+-               gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported);
+               if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) {
+                       gss_supported = NULL;
+                       return 0;
+               }
+ 
+        /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
+        while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
+                /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
+                if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
+                    ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, 
+-                   &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
+                   &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host, 
+                    options.gss_client_identity)) {
+                        ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
+                } else {
+                        mech++;
+@@ -651,8 +719,8 @@
+ {
+        Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+        Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+-       int oidlen;
+-       char *oidv;
+       u_int oidlen;
+       u_char *oidv;
+ 
+        if (authctxt == NULL)
+                fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
+@@ -762,6 +830,48 @@
+        xfree(msg);
+        xfree(lang);
+ }
+
+int
+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+       Buffer b;
+       gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
+       gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+       OM_uint32 ms;
+
+       static int attempt = 0;
+       if (attempt++ >= 1)
+               return (0);
+
+       if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
+               debug("No valid Key exchange context"); 
+               return (0);
+       }
+
+       ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
+           "gssapi-keyex");
+
+       gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
+       gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
+
+       if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
+               buffer_free(&b);
+               return (0);
+       }
+
+       packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+       packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+       packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
+       packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
+       packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
+       packet_send();
+
+       buffer_free(&b);
+       gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
+
+       return (1);
+}
+
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+ 
+ int
+Index: b/sshd.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -120,6 +120,10 @@
+ #include "roaming.h"
+ #include "version.h"
+ 
+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
+#include <Security/AuthSession.h>
+#endif
+
+ #ifdef LIBWRAP
+ #include <tcpd.h>
+ #include <syslog.h>
+@@ -1531,10 +1535,13 @@
+                logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
+                options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
+        }
+#ifndef GSSAPI
+       /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
+        if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
+                logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
+                options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
+        }
+#endif
+        if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
+                logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
+                exit(1);
+@@ -1818,6 +1825,60 @@
+        /* Log the connection. */
+        verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
+ 
+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
+       /*
+        * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if
+        * the current session is the root session or we are not launched
+        * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode).  We do not
+        * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from
+        * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us.
+        *
+        * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an
+        * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating
+        * new sessions for us.  Then all the users will end up in the
+        * same session (bad).
+        *
+        * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us
+        * automatically.
+        *
+        * We must create the session before any credentials are stored
+        * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below).
+        */
+       {
+               OSStatus err = 0;
+               SecuritySessionId sid = 0;
+               SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0;
+
+               err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs);
+               if (err)
+                       error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
+                           (unsigned) err);
+               else
+                       debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
+                           (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
+
+               if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot))
+                       debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... "
+                           "assuming inetd created the session for us.");
+               else {
+                       debug("Creating new security session...");
+                       err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote);
+                       if (err)
+                               error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X",
+                                   (unsigned) err);
+
+                       err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, 
+                           &sattrs);
+                       if (err)
+                               error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
+                                   (unsigned) err);
+                       else
+                               debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
+                                   (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
+               }
+       }
+#endif
+
+        /*
+         * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
+         * successfully authenticates itself.  So we set up an alarm which is
+@@ -2195,12 +2256,61 @@
+ 
+        myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types();
+ 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       {
+       char *orig;
+       char *gss = NULL;
+       char *newstr = NULL;
+       orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+
+       /* 
+        * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
+        * the other key exchange algorithms
+        */
+
+       if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
+               orig = NULL;
+
+       if (options.gss_keyex)
+               gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
+       else
+               gss = NULL;
+
+       if (gss && orig)
+               xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+       else if (gss)
+               newstr = gss;
+       else if (orig)
+               newstr = orig;
+
+       /* 
+        * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
+        * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
+        * host key algorithm we support
+        */
+       if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
+               myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
+
+       if (newstr)
+               myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
+       else
+               fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
+       }
+#endif
+
+        /* start key exchange */
+        kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
+        kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+        kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+        kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+        kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       if (options.gss_keyex) {
+               kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+               kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+               kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+       }
+#endif
+        kex->server = 1;
+        kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+        kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+Index: b/sshd_config
+===================================================================
+--- a/sshd_config
+++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@
+ # GSSAPI options
+ #GSSAPIAuthentication no
+ #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
+#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
+#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
+ 
+ # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, 
+ # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will 
+Index: b/sshd_config.5
+===================================================================
+--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -379,12 +379,40 @@
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
+ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
+doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+ .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
+ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
+ on logout.
+ The default is
+ .Dq yes .
+ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
+Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor 
+a client authenticates against. If
+.Dq yes
+then the client must authenticate against the
+.Pa host
+service on the current hostname. If 
+.Dq no
+then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the 
+machine's default store. This facility is provided to assist with operation 
+on multi homed machines. 
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+Note that this option applies only to protocol version 2 GSSAPI connections,
+and setting it to 
+.Dq no
+may only work with recent Kerberos GSSAPI libraries.
+.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey
+Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a 
+successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed 
+or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is
+.Dq no .
+ .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
+ Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
+ with successful public key client host authentication is allowed
diff --git a/debian/patches/helpful-wait-terminate.patch b/debian/patches/helpful-wait-terminate.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f4baa88ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/helpful-wait-terminate.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+Index: b/serverloop.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/serverloop.c
+++ b/serverloop.c
+@@ -680,7 +680,7 @@
+                        if (!channel_still_open())
+                                break;
+                        if (!waiting_termination) {
+-                               const char *s = "Waiting for forwarded connections to terminate...\r\n";
+                               const char *s = "Waiting for forwarded connections to terminate... (press ~& to background)\r\n";
+                                char *cp;
+                                waiting_termination = 1;
+                                buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, s, strlen(s));
diff --git a/debian/patches/keepalive-extensions.patch b/debian/patches/keepalive-extensions.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cb9c2823c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/keepalive-extensions.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+Index: b/readconf.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@
+        oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oHashKnownHosts,
+        oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand,
+        oVisualHostKey, oUseRoaming, oZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication,
+       oProtocolKeepAlives, oSetupTimeOut,
+        oDeprecated, oUnsupported
+ } OpCodes;
+ 
+@@ -246,6 +247,8 @@
+ #else
+        { "zeroknowledgepasswordauthentication", oUnsupported },
+ #endif
+       { "protocolkeepalives", oProtocolKeepAlives },
+       { "setuptimeout", oSetupTimeOut },
+ 
+        { NULL, oBadOption }
+ };
+@@ -845,6 +848,8 @@
+                goto parse_flag;
+ 
+        case oServerAliveInterval:
+       case oProtocolKeepAlives: /* Debian-specific compatibility alias */
+       case oSetupTimeOut:       /* Debian-specific compatibility alias */
+                intptr = &options->server_alive_interval;
+                goto parse_time;
+ 
+@@ -1233,8 +1238,13 @@
+                options->rekey_limit = 0;
+        if (options->verify_host_key_dns == -1)
+                options->verify_host_key_dns = 0;
+-       if (options->server_alive_interval == -1)
+-               options->server_alive_interval = 0;
+       if (options->server_alive_interval == -1) {
+               /* in batch mode, default is 5mins */
+               if (options->batch_mode == 1)
+                       options->server_alive_interval = 300;
+               else
+                       options->server_alive_interval = 0;
+       }
+        if (options->server_alive_count_max == -1)
+                options->server_alive_count_max = 3;
+        if (options->control_master == -1)
+Index: b/ssh_config.5
+===================================================================
+--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -128,8 +128,12 @@
+ If set to
+ .Dq yes ,
+ passphrase/password querying will be disabled.
+In addition, the 
+.Cm ServerAliveInterval 
+option will be set to 300 seconds by default.
+ This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no user
+-is present to supply the password.
+is present to supply the password,
+and where it is desirable to detect a broken network swiftly.
+ The argument must be
+ .Dq yes
+ or
+@@ -946,8 +950,15 @@
+ will send a message through the encrypted
+ channel to request a response from the server.
+ The default
+-is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server.
+is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server,
+or 300 if the
+.Cm BatchMode
+option is set.
+ This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.Cm ProtocolKeepAlives
+and
+.Cm SetupTimeOut
+are Debian-specific compatibility aliases for this option.
+ .It Cm SmartcardDevice
+ Specifies which smartcard device to use.
+ The argument to this keyword is the device
+@@ -993,6 +1004,12 @@
+ other side.
+ If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one
+ of the machines will be properly noticed.
+This option only uses TCP keepalives (as opposed to using ssh level
+keepalives), so takes a long time to notice when the connection dies.
+As such, you probably want
+the
+.Cm ServerAliveInterval
+option as well.
+ However, this means that
+ connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people
+ find it annoying.
+Index: b/sshd_config.5
+===================================================================
+--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -919,6 +919,9 @@
+ .Pp
+ To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
+ .Dq no .
+.Pp
+This option was formerly called
+.Cm KeepAlive .
+ .It Cm UseDNS
+ Specifies whether
+ .Xr sshd 8
diff --git a/debian/patches/keyfile-debug.patch b/debian/patches/keyfile-debug.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7a46a78d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/keyfile-debug.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+Index: b/auth.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
+@@ -516,8 +516,12 @@
+         * Open the file containing the authorized keys
+         * Fail quietly if file does not exist
+         */
+-       if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1)
+       if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) {
+               if (errno != ENOENT)
+                       debug("Could not open keyfile '%s': %s", file,
+                          strerror(errno));
+                return NULL;
+       }
+ 
+        if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
+                close(fd);
diff --git a/debian/patches/lintian-symlink-pickiness.patch b/debian/patches/lintian-symlink-pickiness.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..33acec411
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/lintian-symlink-pickiness.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+Index: b/Makefile.in
+===================================================================
+--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
+@@ -293,9 +293,9 @@
+        $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
+        $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-vulnkey.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-vulnkey.1
+        -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
+-       ln -s ./ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
+       ln -s ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
+        -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
+-       ln -s ./ssh.1 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
+       ln -s ssh.1 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
+ 
+ install-sysconf:
+        if [ ! -d $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir) ]; then \
diff --git a/debian/patches/no-constraint-fallback.patch b/debian/patches/no-constraint-fallback.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..139d1ec73
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/no-constraint-fallback.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+Index: b/authfd.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/authfd.c
+++ b/authfd.c
+@@ -545,12 +545,6 @@
+        return decode_reply(type);
+ }
+ 
+-int
+-ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key, const char *comment)
+-{
+-       return ssh_add_identity_constrained(auth, key, comment, 0, 0);
+-}
+-
+ /*
+  * Removes an identity from the authentication server.  This call is not
+  * meant to be used by normal applications.
+Index: b/authfd.h
+===================================================================
+--- a/authfd.h
+++ b/authfd.h
+@@ -75,7 +75,6 @@
+ int     ssh_get_num_identities(AuthenticationConnection *, int);
+ Key    *ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *, char **, int);
+ Key    *ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *, char **, int);
+-int     ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *, Key *, const char *);
+ int     ssh_add_identity_constrained(AuthenticationConnection *, Key *,
+     const char *, u_int, u_int);
+ int     ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *, Key *);
+Index: b/ssh-add.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/ssh-add.c
+++ b/ssh-add.c
+@@ -203,9 +203,6 @@
+                if (confirm != 0)
+                        fprintf(stderr,
+                            "The user has to confirm each use of the key\n");
+-       } else if (ssh_add_identity(ac, private, comment)) {
+-               fprintf(stderr, "Identity added: %s (%s)\n", filename, comment);
+-               ret = 0;
+        } else {
+                fprintf(stderr, "Could not add identity: %s\n", filename);
+        }
diff --git a/debian/patches/no-openssl-version-check.patch b/debian/patches/no-openssl-version-check.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9001f6565
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/no-openssl-version-check.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+Index: b/entropy.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/entropy.c
+++ b/entropy.c
+@@ -151,6 +151,8 @@
+ void
+ init_rng(void)
+ {
+#if defined (DISABLED_BY_DEBIAN)
+  /* drow: Is this check still too strict for Debian?  */
+        /*
+         * OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
+         * We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch)
+@@ -158,6 +160,7 @@
+        if ((SSLeay() ^ OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) & ~0xff0L)
+                fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you "
+                    "have %lx", OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay());
+#endif
+ 
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+        original_uid = getuid();
diff --git a/debian/patches/old-gssapi.patch b/debian/patches/old-gssapi.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..272654fd8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/old-gssapi.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+Index: b/servconf.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -375,16 +375,20 @@
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+        { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+        { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+       { "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #else
+        { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+        { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+       { "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
+       { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+       { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+        { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+        { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1620,7 +1624,9 @@
+ #endif
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+        dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
+       dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
+        dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
+       dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
+ #endif
+ #ifdef JPAKE
+        dump_cfg_fmtint(sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication,
+Index: b/sshconnect2.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -314,6 +314,11 @@
+                NULL,
+                &options.gss_authentication,
+                NULL},
+       {"gssapi",
+               userauth_gssapi,
+               NULL,
+               &options.gss_authentication,
+               NULL},
+ #endif
+        {"hostbased",
+                userauth_hostbased,
+@@ -601,6 +606,7 @@
+        OM_uint32 min;
+        int ok = 0;
+        const char *gss_host;
+       int old_gssapi_method;
+ 
+        if (options.gss_trust_dns)
+                gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1);
+@@ -639,13 +645,25 @@
+        packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
+        packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
+ 
+-       packet_put_int(1);
+       old_gssapi_method = !strcmp(authctxt->method->name, "gssapi");
+
+       /* Versions of Debian ssh-krb5 prior to 3.8.1p1-1 don't expect
+        * tagged OIDs.  As such we include both tagged and untagged oids
+        * for the old gssapi method.
+        * We only include tagged oids for the new gssapi-with-mic method.
+        */
+       packet_put_int(old_gssapi_method ? 2 : 1);
+ 
+        packet_put_int((gss_supported->elements[mech].length) + 2);
+        packet_put_char(SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE);
+        packet_put_char(gss_supported->elements[mech].length);
+        packet_put_raw(gss_supported->elements[mech].elements,
+            gss_supported->elements[mech].length);
+       if (old_gssapi_method) {
+               packet_put_int(gss_supported->elements[mech].length);
+               packet_put_raw(gss_supported->elements[mech].elements,
+                              gss_supported->elements[mech].length);
+       }
+ 
+        packet_send();
+ 
+@@ -685,8 +703,10 @@
+        }
+ 
+        if (status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+               int old_gssapi_method = !strcmp(authctxt->method->name,
+                                               "gssapi");
+                /* send either complete or MIC, depending on mechanism */
+-               if (!(flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) {
+               if (old_gssapi_method || !(flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) {
+                        packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE);
+                        packet_send();
+                } else {
+@@ -720,7 +740,7 @@
+        Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+        Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+        u_int oidlen;
+-       u_char *oidv;
+       u_char *oidv, *oidv_free;
+ 
+        if (authctxt == NULL)
+                fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
+@@ -728,22 +748,28 @@
+ 
+        /* Setup our OID */
+        oidv = packet_get_string(&oidlen);
+       oidv_free = oidv;
+ 
+        if (oidlen <= 2 ||
+            oidv[0] != SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE ||
+            oidv[1] != oidlen - 2) {
+-               xfree(oidv);
+                debug("Badly encoded mechanism OID received");
+-               userauth(authctxt, NULL);
+-               return;
+               if (oidlen < 2) {
+                       xfree(oidv_free);
+                       userauth(authctxt, NULL);
+                       return;
+               }
+       } else {
+               oidlen -= 2;
+               oidv += 2;
+        }
+ 
+-       if (!ssh_gssapi_check_oid(gssctxt, oidv + 2, oidlen - 2))
+       if (!ssh_gssapi_check_oid(gssctxt, oidv, oidlen))
+                fatal("Server returned different OID than expected");
+ 
+        packet_check_eom();
+ 
+-       xfree(oidv);
+       xfree(oidv_free);
+ 
+        if (GSS_ERROR(process_gssapi_token(ctxt, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER))) {
+                /* Start again with next method on list */
diff --git a/debian/patches/oom-adjust.patch b/debian/patches/oom-adjust.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d01f1f3ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/oom-adjust.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+Index: b/config.h.in
+===================================================================
+--- a/config.h.in
+++ b/config.h.in
+@@ -1238,6 +1238,9 @@
+ /* Define if X11 doesn't support AF_UNIX sockets on that system */
+ #undef NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS
+ 
+/* Adjust Linux out-of-memory killer */
+#undef OOM_ADJUST
+
+ /* Define if EVP_DigestUpdate returns void */
+ #undef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID
+ 
+Index: b/configure
+===================================================================
+--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
+@@ -8369,6 +8369,11 @@
+ _ACEOF
+ 
+        fi
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define OOM_ADJUST 1
+_ACEOF
+
+        ;;
+ mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
+ 
+Index: b/configure.ac
+===================================================================
+--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -630,6 +630,7 @@
+                AC_DEFINE(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF, 1,
+                    [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
+        fi
+       AC_DEFINE(OOM_ADJUST, 1, [Adjust Linux out-of-memory killer])
+        ;;
+ mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
+        AC_DEFINE(NEED_SETPGRP, 1, [Need setpgrp to acquire controlling tty])
+Index: b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
+  */
+ 
+ /*
+- * Linux-specific portability code - just SELinux support at present
+ * Linux-specific portability code
+  */
+ 
+ #include "includes.h"
+@@ -27,6 +27,15 @@
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ 
+#ifdef OOM_ADJUST
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "log.h"
+
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ #include "key.h"
+ #include "hostfile.h"
+@@ -34,7 +43,6 @@
+ #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #endif
+-#include "log.h"
+ #include "port-linux.h"
+ 
+ #include <selinux/selinux.h>
+@@ -186,3 +194,47 @@
+        debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+ }
+ #endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
+
+#ifdef OOM_ADJUST
+/* Get the out-of-memory adjustment file for the current process */
+static int
+oom_adj_open(int oflag)
+{
+       int fd = open("/proc/self/oom_adj", oflag);
+       if (fd < 0)
+               logit("error opening /proc/self/oom_adj: %s", strerror(errno));
+       return fd;
+}
+
+/* Get the current OOM adjustment */
+int
+oom_adj_get(char *buf, size_t maxlen)
+{
+       ssize_t n;
+       int fd = oom_adj_open(O_RDONLY);
+       if (fd < 0)
+               return -1;
+       n = read(fd, buf, maxlen);
+       if (n < 0)
+               logit("error reading /proc/self/oom_adj: %s", strerror(errno));
+       else
+               buf[n] = '\0';
+       close(fd);
+       return n < 0 ? -1 : 0;
+}
+
+/* Set the current OOM adjustment */
+int
+oom_adj_set(const char *buf)
+{
+       ssize_t n;
+       int fd = oom_adj_open(O_WRONLY);
+       if (fd < 0)
+               return -1;
+       n = write(fd, buf, strlen(buf));
+       if (n < 0)
+               logit("error writing /proc/self/oom_adj: %s", strerror(errno));
+       close(fd);
+       return n < 0 ? -1 : 0;
+}
+#endif
+Index: b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+===================================================================
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+@@ -25,4 +25,9 @@
+ void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ #endif
+ 
+#ifdef OOM_ADJUST
+int oom_adj_get(char *buf, size_t maxlen);
+int oom_adj_set(const char *buf);
+#endif
+
+ #endif /* ! _PORT_LINUX_H */
+Index: b/sshd.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -254,6 +254,11 @@
+ /* Unprivileged user */
+ struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;
+ 
+#ifdef OOM_ADJUST
+/* Linux out-of-memory killer adjustment */
+static char oom_adj_save[8];
+#endif
+
+ /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
+ void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
+ void demote_sensitive_data(void);
+@@ -908,6 +913,31 @@
+        debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+ }
+ 
+#ifdef OOM_ADJUST
+/*
+ * If requested in the environment, tell the Linux kernel's out-of-memory
+ * killer to avoid sshd. The old state will be restored when forking child
+ * processes.
+ */
+static void
+oom_adjust_startup(void)
+{
+       const char *oom_adj = getenv("SSHD_OOM_ADJUST");
+
+       if (!oom_adj || !*oom_adj)
+               return;
+       oom_adj_get(oom_adj_save, sizeof(oom_adj_save));
+       oom_adj_set(oom_adj);
+}
+
+static void
+oom_restore(void)
+{
+       if (oom_adj_save[0])
+               oom_adj_set(oom_adj_save);
+}
+#endif
+
+ /* Accept a connection from inetd */
+ static void
+ server_accept_inetd(int *sock_in, int *sock_out)
+@@ -1670,6 +1700,11 @@
+        /* ignore SIGPIPE */
+        signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+ 
+#ifdef OOM_ADJUST
+       /* Adjust out-of-memory killer */
+       oom_adjust_startup();
+#endif
+
+        /* Get a connection, either from inetd or a listening TCP socket */
+        if (inetd_flag) {
+                server_accept_inetd(&sock_in, &sock_out);
+@@ -1708,6 +1743,10 @@
+        /* This is the child processing a new connection. */
+        setproctitle("%s", "[accepted]");
+ 
+#ifdef OOM_ADJUST
+       oom_restore();
+#endif
+
+        /*
+         * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
+         * setlogin() affects the entire process group.  We don't
diff --git a/debian/patches/openbsd-docs.patch b/debian/patches/openbsd-docs.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..851e6adfb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/openbsd-docs.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+Index: b/moduli.5
+===================================================================
+--- a/moduli.5
+++ b/moduli.5
+@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
+ .Nd Diffie Hellman moduli
+ .Sh DESCRIPTION
+ The
+-.Pa /etc/moduli
+.Pa /etc/ssh/moduli
+ file contains prime numbers and generators for use by 
+ .Xr sshd 8
+ in the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange key exchange method.
+@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@
+ Diffie Hellman output to sufficiently key the selected symmetric cipher.
+ .Xr sshd 8
+ then randomly selects a modulus from
+-.Fa /etc/moduli
+.Fa /etc/ssh/moduli
+ that best meets the size requirement.
+ .Pp
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+Index: b/ssh-keygen.1
+===================================================================
+--- a/ssh-keygen.1
+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
+@@ -137,9 +137,7 @@
+ .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+ or
+ .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa .
+-Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys,
+-as seen in
+-.Pa /etc/rc .
+Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys.
+ .Pp
+ Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which
+ to store the private key.
+@@ -282,9 +280,7 @@
+ .It Fl q
+ Silence
+ .Nm ssh-keygen .
+-Used by
+-.Pa /etc/rc
+-when creating a new key.
+Used by system administration scripts when creating a new key.
+ .It Fl R Ar hostname
+ Removes all keys belonging to
+ .Ar hostname
+Index: b/ssh.1
+===================================================================
+--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
+@@ -749,6 +749,10 @@
+ .Sx HISTORY
+ section of
+ .Xr ssl 8
+(on non-OpenBSD systems, see
+.nh
+http://www.openbsd.org/cgi\-bin/man.cgi?query=ssl&sektion=8#HISTORY)
+.hy
+ contains a brief discussion of the two algorithms.
+ .Pp
+ The file
+Index: b/sshd.8
+===================================================================
+--- a/sshd.8
+++ b/sshd.8
+@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
+ .Nm
+ listens for connections from clients.
+ It is normally started at boot from
+-.Pa /etc/rc .
+.Pa /etc/init.d/ssh .
+ It forks a new
+ daemon for each incoming connection.
+ The forked daemons handle
+@@ -781,7 +781,7 @@
+ .Xr ssh 1 ) .
+ It should only be writable by root.
+ .Pp
+-.It /etc/moduli
+.It /etc/ssh/moduli
+ Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange".
+ The file format is described in
+ .Xr moduli 5 .
+@@ -877,7 +877,6 @@
+ .Xr ssh-vulnkey 1 ,
+ .Xr chroot 2 ,
+ .Xr hosts_access 5 ,
+-.Xr login.conf 5 ,
+ .Xr moduli 5 ,
+ .Xr sshd_config 5 ,
+ .Xr inetd 8 ,
+Index: b/sshd_config.5
+===================================================================
+--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -177,8 +177,7 @@
+ By default, no banner is displayed.
+ .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+ Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
+-PAM or though authentication styles supported in
+-.Xr login.conf 5 )
+PAM).
+ The default is
+ .Dq yes .
+ .It Cm ChrootDirectory
diff --git a/debian/patches/package-versioning.patch b/debian/patches/package-versioning.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4c227f054
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/package-versioning.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+Index: b/sshconnect.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/sshconnect.c
+++ b/sshconnect.c
+@@ -537,7 +537,7 @@
+        snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s",
+            compat20 ? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1,
+            compat20 ? PROTOCOL_MINOR_2 : minor1,
+-           SSH_VERSION, compat20 ? "\r\n" : "\n");
+           SSH_RELEASE, compat20 ? "\r\n" : "\n");
+        if (roaming_atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, buf, strlen(buf))
+            != strlen(buf))
+                fatal("write: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+Index: b/sshd.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@
+                minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1;
+        }
+        snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s", major, minor,
+-           SSH_VERSION, newline);
+           SSH_RELEASE, newline);
+        server_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
+ 
+        /* Send our protocol version identification. */
+Index: b/version.h
+===================================================================
+--- a/version.h
+++ b/version.h
+@@ -3,4 +3,9 @@
+ #define SSH_VERSION    "OpenSSH_5.3"
+ 
+ #define SSH_PORTABLE   "p1"
+-#define SSH_RELEASE    SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
+#define SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM    SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
+#ifdef SSH_EXTRAVERSION
+#define SSH_RELEASE    SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM " " SSH_EXTRAVERSION
+#else
+#define SSH_RELEASE    SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM
+#endif
diff --git a/debian/patches/quieter-signals.patch b/debian/patches/quieter-signals.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bf36b5498
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/quieter-signals.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+Index: b/clientloop.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/clientloop.c
+++ b/clientloop.c
+@@ -1526,8 +1526,10 @@
+                exit_status = 0;
+        }
+ 
+-       if (received_signal)
+-               fatal("Killed by signal %d.", (int) received_signal);
+       if (received_signal) {
+               debug("Killed by signal %d.", (int) received_signal);
+               cleanup_exit((int) received_signal + 128);
+       }
+ 
+        /*
+         * In interactive mode (with pseudo tty) display a message indicating
diff --git a/debian/patches/scp-quoting.patch b/debian/patches/scp-quoting.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..80c1b2a24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/scp-quoting.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+Index: b/scp.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/scp.c
+++ b/scp.c
+@@ -168,8 +168,16 @@
+ 
+        if (verbose_mode) {
+                fprintf(stderr, "Executing:");
+-               for (i = 0; i < a->num; i++)
+-                       fprintf(stderr, " %s", a->list[i]);
+               for (i = 0; i < a->num; i++) {
+                       if (i == 0)
+                               fprintf(stderr, " %s", a->list[i]);
+                       else
+                               /*
+                                * TODO: misbehaves if a->list[i] contains a
+                                * single quote
+                                */
+                               fprintf(stderr, " '%s'", a->list[i]);
+               }
+                fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+        }
+        if ((pid = fork()) == -1)
diff --git a/debian/patches/selinux-autoconf.patch b/debian/patches/selinux-autoconf.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..934f885c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/selinux-autoconf.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+Index: b/configure
+===================================================================
+--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
+@@ -28011,6 +28011,8 @@
+ $as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon" >&6; }
+ if test $ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon = yes; then
+    LIBSELINUX="-lselinux"
+                         LIBS="$LIBS -lselinux"
+
+ else
+   { { $as_echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: SELinux support requires libselinux library" >&5
+ $as_echo "$as_me: error: SELinux support requires libselinux library" >&2;}
+Index: b/configure.ac
+===================================================================
+--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -3422,9 +3422,12 @@
+                AC_DEFINE(WITH_SELINUX,1,[Define if you want SELinux support.])
+                SELINUX_MSG="yes"
+                AC_CHECK_HEADER([selinux/selinux.h], ,
+-                   AC_MSG_ERROR(SELinux support requires selinux.h header))
+-               AC_CHECK_LIB(selinux, setexeccon, [ LIBSELINUX="-lselinux" ],
+-                   AC_MSG_ERROR(SELinux support requires libselinux library))
+                       AC_MSG_ERROR(SELinux support requires selinux.h header))
+               AC_CHECK_LIB(selinux, setexeccon,
+                       [ LIBSELINUX="-lselinux"
+                         LIBS="$LIBS -lselinux"
+                       ],
+                       AC_MSG_ERROR(SELinux support requires libselinux library))
+                SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
+                AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level)
+                LIBS="$save_LIBS"
diff --git a/debian/patches/selinux-fix-chroot-directory.patch b/debian/patches/selinux-fix-chroot-directory.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a69ded59b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/selinux-fix-chroot-directory.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+Index: b/session.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
+@@ -1522,6 +1522,10 @@
+ # endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
+ #endif
+ 
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+               ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
+#endif
+
+                if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
+                    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
+                         tmp = tilde_expand_filename(options.chroot_directory,
+@@ -1550,10 +1554,6 @@
+ 
+        if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid)
+                fatal("Failed to set uids to %u.", (u_int) pw->pw_uid);
+-
+-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-       ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
+-#endif
+ }
+ 
+ static void
diff --git a/debian/patches/selinux-role.patch b/debian/patches/selinux-role.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5e2a9ecb6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/selinux-role.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+Index: b/auth.h
+===================================================================
+--- a/auth.h
+++ b/auth.h
+@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
+        char            *service;
+        struct passwd   *pw;            /* set if 'valid' */
+        char            *style;
+       char            *role;
+        void            *kbdintctxt;
+        void            *jpake_ctx;
+ #ifdef BSD_AUTH
+Index: b/auth1.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/auth1.c
+++ b/auth1.c
+@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@
+ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ {
+        u_int ulen;
+-       char *user, *style = NULL;
+       char *user, *style = NULL, *role = NULL;
+ 
+        /* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */
+        packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_USER);
+@@ -392,11 +392,17 @@
+        user = packet_get_string(&ulen);
+        packet_check_eom();
+ 
+       if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
+               *role++ = '\0';
+
+        if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
+                *style++ = '\0';
+       else if (role && (style = strchr(role, ':')) != NULL)
+               *style++ = '\0';
+ 
+        authctxt->user = user;
+        authctxt->style = style;
+       authctxt->role = role;
+ 
+        /* Verify that the user is a valid user. */
+        if ((authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user))) != NULL)
+Index: b/auth2.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/auth2.c
+++ b/auth2.c
+@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@
+ {
+        Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+        Authmethod *m = NULL;
+-       char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL;
+       char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL, *role = NULL;
+        int authenticated = 0;
+ 
+        if (authctxt == NULL)
+@@ -229,8 +229,13 @@
+        debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
+        debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
+ 
+       if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
+               *role++ = 0;
+
+        if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
+                *style++ = 0;
+       else if (role && (style = strchr(role, ':')) != NULL)
+               *style++ = '\0';
+ 
+        if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) {
+                /* setup auth context */
+@@ -254,8 +259,9 @@
+                    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
+                authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
+                authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
+               authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
+                if (use_privsep)
+-                       mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
+                       mm_inform_authserv(service, style, role);
+                userauth_banner();
+        } else if (strcmp(user, authctxt->user) != 0 ||
+            strcmp(service, authctxt->service) != 0) {
+Index: b/monitor.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@
+ int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_authrole(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
+@@ -215,6 +216,7 @@
+     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+@@ -699,6 +701,7 @@
+        else {
+                /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
+                monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
+               monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1);
+                monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
+        }
+ 
+@@ -732,14 +735,37 @@
+ 
+        authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+        authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+-       debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
+-           __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
+       authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+       debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s, role=%s",
+           __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style, authctxt->role);
+ 
+        if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
+                xfree(authctxt->style);
+                authctxt->style = NULL;
+        }
+ 
+       if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
+               xfree(authctxt->role);
+               authctxt->role = NULL;
+       }
+
+       return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_authrole(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+       monitor_permit_authentications(1);
+
+       authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+       debug3("%s: role=%s",
+           __func__, authctxt->role);
+
+       if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
+               xfree(authctxt->role);
+               authctxt->role = NULL;
+       }
+
+        return (0);
+ }
+ 
+Index: b/monitor.h
+===================================================================
+--- a/monitor.h
+++ b/monitor.h
+@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
+ 
+ enum monitor_reqtype {
+        MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI,
+-       MONITOR_REQ_FREE, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV,
+       MONITOR_REQ_FREE, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE,
+        MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN,
+        MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM,
+        MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER,
+Index: b/monitor_wrap.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
+@@ -279,10 +279,10 @@
+        return (banner);
+ }
+ 
+-/* Inform the privileged process about service and style */
+/* Inform the privileged process about service, style, and role */
+ 
+ void
+-mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
+mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style, char *role)
+ {
+        Buffer m;
+ 
+@@ -291,11 +291,29 @@
+        buffer_init(&m);
+        buffer_put_cstring(&m, service);
+        buffer_put_cstring(&m, style ? style : "");
+       buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : "");
+ 
+        mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, &m);
+ 
+        buffer_free(&m);
+ }
+
+/* Inform the privileged process about role */
+
+void
+mm_inform_authrole(char *role)
+{
+       Buffer m;
+
+       debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+       buffer_init(&m);
+       buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : "");
+
+       mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, &m);
+
+       buffer_free(&m);
+}
+ 
+ /* Do the password authentication */
+ int
+Index: b/monitor_wrap.h
+===================================================================
+--- a/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
+@@ -40,7 +40,8 @@
+ int mm_is_monitor(void);
+ DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
+ int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int);
+-void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
+void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *, char *);
+void mm_inform_authrole(char *);
+ struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *);
+ char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
+ int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *);
+Index: b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+@@ -28,6 +28,12 @@
+ #include <string.h>
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#endif
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "port-linux.h"
+ 
+@@ -35,6 +41,8 @@
+ #include <selinux/flask.h>
+ #include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
+ 
+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+
+ /* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
+ int
+ ssh_selinux_enabled(void)
+@@ -53,8 +61,8 @@
+ static security_context_t
+ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
+ {
+-       security_context_t sc;
+-       char *sename = NULL, *lvl = NULL;
+       security_context_t sc = NULL;
+       char *sename = NULL, *role = NULL, *lvl = NULL;
+        int r;
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
+@@ -64,11 +72,20 @@
+        sename = pwname;
+        lvl = NULL;
+ #endif
+       if (the_authctxt)
+               role = the_authctxt->role;
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
+-       r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
+       if (role != NULL && role[0])
+               r = get_default_context_with_rolelevel(sename, role, lvl, NULL,
+                                                      &sc);
+       else
+               r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
+ #else
+-       r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
+       if (role != NULL && role[0])
+               r = get_default_context_with_role(sename, role, NULL, &sc);
+       else
+               r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
+ #endif
+ 
+        if (r != 0) {
diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fa74a5ee6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/series
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+# GSSAPI
+gssapi.patch
+gssapi-autoconf.patch
+old-gssapi.patch
+# Autotools
+config-guess-sub.patch
+# SELinux
+selinux-role.patch
+selinux-autoconf.patch
+selinux-fix-chroot-directory.patch
+# Key blacklisting
+ssh-vulnkey.patch
+# Keepalive handling
+ssh1-keepalive.patch
+keepalive-extensions.patch
+# Linux OOM handling
+oom-adjust.patch
+# Message adjustments
+syslog-level-silent.patch
+quieter-signals.patch
+helpful-wait-terminate.patch
+banner-noslash.patch
+keyfile-debug.patch
+# Miscellaneous bug fixes
+gnome-ssh-askpass2-link.patch
+user-group-modes.patch
+epfnosupport.patch
+scp-quoting.patch
+shell-path.patch
+ssh-copy-id-status-check.patch
+ssh-copy-id-trailing-colons.patch
+no-constraint-fallback.patch
+sshd-ignore-sighup.patch
+# Versioning
+package-versioning.patch
+debian-banner.patch
+# File system layout
+authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
+lintian-symlink-pickiness.patch
+# Documentation
+openbsd-docs.patch
+ssh-argv0.patch
+doc-connection-sharing.patch
+doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
+# Debian-specific configuration
+no-openssl-version-check.patch
+gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
+debian-config.patch
diff --git a/debian/patches/shell-path.patch b/debian/patches/shell-path.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9501972b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/shell-path.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+Index: b/sshconnect.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/sshconnect.c
+++ b/sshconnect.c
+@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@
+ 
+                /* Execute the proxy command.  Note that we gave up any
+                   extra privileges above. */
+-               execv(argv[0], argv);
+               execvp(argv[0], argv);
+                perror(argv[0]);
+                exit(1);
+        }
+@@ -1167,7 +1167,7 @@
+        pid = fork();
+        if (pid == 0) {
+                debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args);
+-               execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
+               execlp(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
+                error("Couldn't execute %s -c \"%s\": %s",
+                    shell, args, strerror(errno));
+                _exit(1);
diff --git a/debian/patches/ssh-argv0.patch b/debian/patches/ssh-argv0.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0d5412374
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/ssh-argv0.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+Index: b/ssh.1
+===================================================================
+--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
+@@ -1405,6 +1405,7 @@
+ .Xr sftp 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-argv0 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-vulnkey 1 ,
diff --git a/debian/patches/ssh-copy-id-status-check.patch b/debian/patches/ssh-copy-id-status-check.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4f7fb4dfb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/ssh-copy-id-status-check.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+Index: b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
+===================================================================
+--- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
+++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
+@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
+     shift         # and this should leave $1 as the target name
+   fi
+ else
+-  if [ x$SSH_AUTH_SOCK != x ] ; then
+  if [ x$SSH_AUTH_SOCK != x ] && ssh-add -L >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+     GET_ID="$GET_ID ssh-add -L"
+   fi
+ fi
diff --git a/debian/patches/ssh-copy-id-trailing-colons.patch b/debian/patches/ssh-copy-id-trailing-colons.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..624e8d5a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/ssh-copy-id-trailing-colons.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+Index: b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
+===================================================================
+--- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
+++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
+@@ -38,10 +38,10 @@
+   exit 1
+ fi
+ 
+-{ eval "$GET_ID" ; } | ssh $1 "umask 077; test -d .ssh || mkdir .ssh ; cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys" || exit 1
+{ eval "$GET_ID" ; } | ssh ${1%:} "umask 077; test -d .ssh || mkdir .ssh ; cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys" || exit 1
+ 
+ cat <<EOF
+-Now try logging into the machine, with "ssh '$1'", and check in:
+Now try logging into the machine, with "ssh '${1%:}'", and check in:
+ 
+   .ssh/authorized_keys
+ 
diff --git a/debian/patches/ssh-vulnkey.patch b/debian/patches/ssh-vulnkey.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3e4e96493
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/ssh-vulnkey.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,1376 @@
+Index: b/Makefile.in
+===================================================================
+--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
+@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
+ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
+ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
+ RAND_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-rand-helper
+SSH_DATADIR=$(datadir)/ssh
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
+ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
+ STRIP_OPT=@STRIP_OPT@
+@@ -37,7 +38,8 @@
+        -D_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN=\"$(SSH_KEYSIGN)\" \
+        -D_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR=\"$(piddir)\" \
+        -D_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR=\"$(PRIVSEP_PATH)\" \
+-       -DSSH_RAND_HELPER=\"$(RAND_HELPER)\"
+       -DSSH_RAND_HELPER=\"$(RAND_HELPER)\" \
+       -D_PATH_SSH_DATADIR=\"$(SSH_DATADIR)\"
+ 
+ CC=@CC@
+ LD=@LD@
+@@ -60,7 +62,7 @@
+ INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS=@INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS@
+ INSTALL_SSH_RAND_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_RAND_HELPER@
+ 
+-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) ssh-rand-helper${EXEEXT} sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT)
+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) ssh-rand-helper${EXEEXT} sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-vulnkey$(EXEEXT)
+ 
+ LIBSSH_OBJS=acss.o authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
+        canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-acss.o cipher-aes.o \
+@@ -91,8 +93,8 @@
+        audit.o audit-bsm.o platform.o sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+        roaming_common.o
+ 
+-MANPAGES       = moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-rand-helper.8.out ssh-keysign.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out
+-MANPAGES_IN    = moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-rand-helper.8 ssh-keysign.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5
+MANPAGES       = moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-rand-helper.8.out ssh-keysign.8.out ssh-vulnkey.1.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out
+MANPAGES_IN    = moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-rand-helper.8 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-vulnkey.1 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5
+ MANTYPE                = @MANTYPE@
+ 
+ CONFIGFILES=sshd_config.out ssh_config.out moduli.out
+@@ -169,6 +171,9 @@
+ ssh-rand-helper${EXEEXT}: $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-rand-helper.o
+        $(LD) -o $@ ssh-rand-helper.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+ 
+ssh-vulnkey$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-vulnkey.o
+       $(LD) -o $@ ssh-vulnkey.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+ # test driver for the loginrec code - not built by default
+ logintest: logintest.o $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a loginrec.o
+        $(LD) -o $@ logintest.o $(LDFLAGS) loginrec.o -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+@@ -268,6 +273,7 @@
+        $(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)
+        $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp
+        $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)
+       $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-vulnkey $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-vulnkey
+        $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
+        $(INSTALL) -m 644 scp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1
+        $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-add.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1
+@@ -284,6 +290,7 @@
+        $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
+        $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
+        $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
+       $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-vulnkey.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-vulnkey.1
+        -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
+        ln -s ./ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
+        -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
+@@ -365,6 +372,7 @@
+        -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT)
+        -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
+        -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT)
+       -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-vulnkey$(EXEEXT)
+        -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
+        -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT)
+        -rm -r $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
+@@ -377,6 +385,7 @@
+        -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1
+        -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
+        -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1
+       -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-vulnkey.1
+        -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8
+        -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-rand-helper.8
+        -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
+Index: b/auth-rh-rsa.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/auth-rh-rsa.c
+++ b/auth-rh-rsa.c
+@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@
+ {
+        HostStatus host_status;
+ 
+       if (reject_blacklisted_key(client_host_key, 0) == 1)
+               return 0;
+
+        /* Check if we would accept it using rhosts authentication. */
+        if (!auth_rhosts(pw, cuser))
+                return 0;
+Index: b/auth-rsa.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/auth-rsa.c
+++ b/auth-rsa.c
+@@ -246,6 +246,9 @@
+                            "actual %d vs. announced %d.",
+                            file, linenum, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
+ 
+               if (reject_blacklisted_key(key, 0) == 1)
+                       continue;
+
+                /* We have found the desired key. */
+                /*
+                 * If our options do not allow this key to be used,
+Index: b/auth.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
+@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
+ #include "servconf.h"
+ #include "key.h"
+ #include "hostfile.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+ #include "auth.h"
+ #include "auth-options.h"
+ #include "canohost.h"
+@@ -398,6 +399,38 @@
+        return host_status;
+ }
+ 
+int
+reject_blacklisted_key(Key *key, int hostkey)
+{
+       char *fp;
+
+       if (blacklisted_key(key, &fp) != 1)
+               return 0;
+
+       if (options.permit_blacklisted_keys) {
+               if (hostkey)
+                       error("Host key %s blacklisted (see "
+                           "ssh-vulnkey(1)); continuing anyway", fp);
+               else
+                       logit("Public key %s from %s blacklisted (see "
+                           "ssh-vulnkey(1)); continuing anyway",
+                           fp, get_remote_ipaddr());
+               xfree(fp);
+       } else {
+               if (hostkey)
+                       error("Host key %s blacklisted (see "
+                           "ssh-vulnkey(1))", fp);
+               else
+                       logit("Public key %s from %s blacklisted (see "
+                           "ssh-vulnkey(1))",
+                           fp, get_remote_ipaddr());
+               xfree(fp);
+               return 1;
+       }
+
+       return 0;
+}
+
+ 
+ /*
+  * Check a given file for security. This is defined as all components
+Index: b/auth.h
+===================================================================
+--- a/auth.h
+++ b/auth.h
+@@ -178,6 +178,8 @@
+ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *, Key *, const char *,
+     const char *, const char *);
+ 
+int    reject_blacklisted_key(Key *, int);
+
+ /* hostkey handling */
+ Key    *get_hostkey_by_index(int);
+ Key    *get_hostkey_by_type(int);
+Index: b/auth2-hostbased.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/auth2-hostbased.c
+++ b/auth2-hostbased.c
+@@ -145,6 +145,9 @@
+        HostStatus host_status;
+        int len;
+ 
+       if (reject_blacklisted_key(key, 0) == 1)
+               return 0;
+
+        resolvedname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
+        ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
+ 
+Index: b/auth2-pubkey.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
+@@ -254,6 +254,9 @@
+        int success;
+        char *file;
+ 
+       if (reject_blacklisted_key(key, 0) == 1)
+               return 0;
+
+        file = authorized_keys_file(pw);
+        success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file);
+        xfree(file);
+Index: b/authfile.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/authfile.c
+++ b/authfile.c
+@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
+ #include "rsa.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "atomicio.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+ 
+ /* Version identification string for SSH v1 identity files. */
+ static const char authfile_id_string[] =
+@@ -677,3 +678,140 @@
+        key_free(pub);
+        return NULL;
+ }
+
+/* Scan a blacklist of known-vulnerable keys in blacklist_file. */
+static int
+blacklisted_key_in_file(const Key *key, const char *blacklist_file, char **fp)
+{
+       int fd = -1;
+       char *dgst_hex = NULL;
+       char *dgst_packed = NULL, *p;
+       int i;
+       size_t line_len;
+       struct stat st;
+       char buf[256];
+       off_t start, lower, upper;
+       int ret = 0;
+
+       debug("Checking blacklist file %s", blacklist_file);
+       fd = open(blacklist_file, O_RDONLY);
+       if (fd < 0) {
+               ret = -1;
+               goto out;
+       }
+
+       dgst_hex = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+       /* Remove all colons */
+       dgst_packed = xcalloc(1, strlen(dgst_hex) + 1);
+       for (i = 0, p = dgst_packed; dgst_hex[i]; i++)
+               if (dgst_hex[i] != ':')
+                       *p++ = dgst_hex[i];
+       /* Only compare least-significant 80 bits (to keep the blacklist
+        * size down)
+        */
+       line_len = strlen(dgst_packed + 12);
+       if (line_len > 32)
+               goto out;
+
+       /* Skip leading comments */
+       start = 0;
+       for (;;) {
+               ssize_t r;
+               char *newline;
+
+               r = atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
+               if (r <= 0)
+                       goto out;
+               if (buf[0] != '#')
+                       break;
+
+               newline = memchr(buf, '\n', sizeof(buf));
+               if (!newline)
+                       goto out;
+               start += newline + 1 - buf;
+               if (lseek(fd, start, SEEK_SET) < 0)
+                       goto out;
+       }
+
+       /* Initialise binary search record numbers */
+       if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
+               goto out;
+       lower = 0;
+       upper = (st.st_size - start) / (line_len + 1);
+
+       while (lower != upper) {
+               off_t cur;
+               int cmp;
+
+               cur = lower + (upper - lower) / 2;
+
+               /* Read this line and compare to digest; this is
+                * overflow-safe since cur < max(off_t) / (line_len + 1) */
+               if (lseek(fd, start + cur * (line_len + 1), SEEK_SET) < 0)
+                       break;
+               if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, line_len) != line_len)
+                       break;
+               cmp = memcmp(buf, dgst_packed + 12, line_len);
+               if (cmp < 0) {
+                       if (cur == lower)
+                               break;
+                       lower = cur;
+               } else if (cmp > 0) {
+                       if (cur == upper)
+                               break;
+                       upper = cur;
+               } else {
+                       debug("Found %s in blacklist", dgst_hex);
+                       ret = 1;
+                       break;
+               }
+       }
+
+out:
+       if (dgst_packed)
+               xfree(dgst_packed);
+       if (ret != 1 && dgst_hex) {
+               xfree(dgst_hex);
+               dgst_hex = NULL;
+       }
+       if (fp)
+               *fp = dgst_hex;
+       if (fd >= 0)
+               close(fd);
+       return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Scan blacklists of known-vulnerable keys. If a vulnerable key is found,
+ * its fingerprint is returned in *fp, unless fp is NULL.
+ */
+int
+blacklisted_key(const Key *key, char **fp)
+{
+       Key *public;
+       char *blacklist_file;
+       int ret, ret2;
+
+       public = key_demote(key);
+       if (public->type == KEY_RSA1)
+               public->type = KEY_RSA;
+
+       xasprintf(&blacklist_file, "%s.%s-%u",
+           _PATH_BLACKLIST, key_type(public), key_size(public));
+       ret = blacklisted_key_in_file(public, blacklist_file, fp);
+       xfree(blacklist_file);
+       if (ret > 0) {
+               key_free(public);
+               return ret;
+       }
+
+       xasprintf(&blacklist_file, "%s.%s-%u",
+           _PATH_BLACKLIST_CONFIG, key_type(public), key_size(public));
+       ret2 = blacklisted_key_in_file(public, blacklist_file, fp);
+       xfree(blacklist_file);
+       if (ret2 > ret)
+               ret = ret2;
+
+       key_free(public);
+       return ret;
+}
+Index: b/authfile.h
+===================================================================
+--- a/authfile.h
+++ b/authfile.h
+@@ -23,4 +23,6 @@
+ Key    *key_load_private_pem(int, int, const char *, char **);
+ int     key_perm_ok(int, const char *);
+ 
+int     blacklisted_key(const Key *key, char **fp);
+
+ #endif
+Index: b/pathnames.h
+===================================================================
+--- a/pathnames.h
+++ b/pathnames.h
+@@ -18,6 +18,10 @@
+ #define SSHDIR                         ETCDIR "/ssh"
+ #endif
+ 
+#ifndef _PATH_SSH_DATADIR
+#define _PATH_SSH_DATADIR              "/usr/share/ssh"
+#endif
+
+ #ifndef _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR
+ #define _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR               "/var/run"
+ #endif
+@@ -43,6 +47,9 @@
+ /* Backwards compatibility */
+ #define _PATH_DH_PRIMES                        SSHDIR "/primes"
+ 
+#define _PATH_BLACKLIST                        _PATH_SSH_DATADIR "/blacklist"
+#define _PATH_BLACKLIST_CONFIG         SSHDIR "/blacklist"
+
+ #ifndef _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM
+ #define _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM              "/usr/bin/ssh"
+ #endif
+Index: b/readconf.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@
+        oGlobalKnownHostsFile2, oUserKnownHostsFile2, oPubkeyAuthentication,
+        oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveDevices, oHostKeyAlias,
+        oDynamicForward, oPreferredAuthentications, oHostbasedAuthentication,
+       oUseBlacklistedKeys,
+        oHostKeyAlgorithms, oBindAddress, oSmartcardDevice,
+        oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
+        oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
+@@ -152,6 +153,7 @@
+        { "passwordauthentication", oPasswordAuthentication },
+        { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication },
+        { "kbdinteractivedevices", oKbdInteractiveDevices },
+       { "useblacklistedkeys", oUseBlacklistedKeys },
+        { "rsaauthentication", oRSAAuthentication },
+        { "pubkeyauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication },
+        { "dsaauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication },             /* alias */
+@@ -459,6 +461,10 @@
+                intptr = &options->challenge_response_authentication;
+                goto parse_flag;
+ 
+       case oUseBlacklistedKeys:
+               intptr = &options->use_blacklisted_keys;
+               goto parse_flag;
+
+        case oGssAuthentication:
+                intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+                goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1048,6 +1054,7 @@
+        options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
+        options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = -1;
+        options->hostbased_authentication = -1;
+       options->use_blacklisted_keys = -1;
+        options->batch_mode = -1;
+        options->check_host_ip = -1;
+        options->strict_host_key_checking = -1;
+@@ -1150,6 +1157,8 @@
+                options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = 0;
+        if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1)
+                options->hostbased_authentication = 0;
+       if (options->use_blacklisted_keys == -1)
+               options->use_blacklisted_keys = 0;
+        if (options->batch_mode == -1)
+                options->batch_mode = 0;
+        if (options->check_host_ip == -1)
+Index: b/readconf.h
+===================================================================
+--- a/readconf.h
+++ b/readconf.h
+@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
+        int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
+        char    *kbd_interactive_devices; /* Keyboard-interactive auth devices. */
+        int     zero_knowledge_password_authentication; /* Try jpake */
+       int     use_blacklisted_keys;   /* If true, send */
+        int     batch_mode;     /* Batch mode: do not ask for passwords. */
+        int     check_host_ip;  /* Also keep track of keys for IP address */
+        int     strict_host_key_checking;       /* Strict host key checking. */
+Index: b/servconf.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -99,6 +99,7 @@
+        options->password_authentication = -1;
+        options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+        options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+       options->permit_blacklisted_keys = -1;
+        options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
+        options->permit_user_env = -1;
+        options->use_login = -1;
+@@ -227,6 +228,8 @@
+                options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 0;
+        if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1)
+                options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
+       if (options->permit_blacklisted_keys == -1)
+               options->permit_blacklisted_keys = 0;
+        if (options->permit_empty_passwd == -1)
+                options->permit_empty_passwd = 0;
+        if (options->permit_user_env == -1)
+@@ -302,7 +305,7 @@
+        sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+        sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+        sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
+-       sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
+       sStrictModes, sPermitBlacklistedKeys, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
+        sPermitUserEnvironment, sUseLogin, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
+        sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups,
+        sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sProtocol, sPidFile,
+@@ -410,6 +413,7 @@
+        { "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
+        { "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+       { "permitblacklistedkeys", sPermitBlacklistedKeys, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd, SSHCFG_ALL },
+        { "permituserenvironment", sPermitUserEnvironment, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { "uselogin", sUseLogin, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -976,6 +980,10 @@
+                intptr = &options->tcp_keep_alive;
+                goto parse_flag;
+ 
+       case sPermitBlacklistedKeys:
+               intptr = &options->permit_blacklisted_keys;
+               goto parse_flag;
+
+        case sEmptyPasswd:
+                intptr = &options->permit_empty_passwd;
+                goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1643,6 +1651,7 @@
+        dump_cfg_fmtint(sX11UseLocalhost, o->x11_use_localhost);
+        dump_cfg_fmtint(sStrictModes, o->strict_modes);
+        dump_cfg_fmtint(sTCPKeepAlive, o->tcp_keep_alive);
+       dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitBlacklistedKeys, o->permit_blacklisted_keys);
+        dump_cfg_fmtint(sEmptyPasswd, o->permit_empty_passwd);
+        dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitUserEnvironment, o->permit_user_env);
+        dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseLogin, o->use_login);
+Index: b/servconf.h
+===================================================================
+--- a/servconf.h
+++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@
+        int     challenge_response_authentication;
+        int     zero_knowledge_password_authentication;
+                                        /* If true, permit jpake auth */
+       int     permit_blacklisted_keys;        /* If true, permit */
+        int     permit_empty_passwd;    /* If false, do not permit empty
+                                         * passwords. */
+        int     permit_user_env;        /* If true, read ~/.ssh/environment */
+Index: b/ssh-add.1
+===================================================================
+--- a/ssh-add.1
+++ b/ssh-add.1
+@@ -75,6 +75,10 @@
+ .Nm
+ to work.
+ .Pp
+Any keys recorded in the blacklist of known-compromised keys (see
+.Xr ssh-vulnkey 1 )
+will be refused.
+.Pp
+ The options are as follows:
+ .Bl -tag -width Ds
+ .It Fl c
+@@ -174,6 +178,7 @@
+ .Xr ssh 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-vulnkey 1 ,
+ .Xr sshd 8
+ .Sh AUTHORS
+ OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+Index: b/ssh-add.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/ssh-add.c
+++ b/ssh-add.c
+@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@
+ add_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename)
+ {
+        Key *private;
+-       char *comment = NULL;
+       char *comment = NULL, *fp;
+        char msg[1024];
+        int fd, perms_ok, ret = -1;
+ 
+@@ -184,6 +184,14 @@
+                            "Bad passphrase, try again for %.200s: ", comment);
+                }
+        }
+       if (blacklisted_key(private, &fp) == 1) {
+               fprintf(stderr, "Public key %s blacklisted (see "
+                   "ssh-vulnkey(1)); refusing to add it\n", fp);
+               xfree(fp);
+               key_free(private);
+               xfree(comment);
+               return -1;
+       }
+ 
+        if (ssh_add_identity_constrained(ac, private, comment, lifetime,
+            confirm)) {
+Index: b/ssh-keygen.1
+===================================================================
+--- a/ssh-keygen.1
+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
+@@ -451,6 +451,7 @@
+ .Xr ssh 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-vulnkey 1 ,
+ .Xr moduli 5 ,
+ .Xr sshd 8
+ .Rs
+Index: b/ssh-vulnkey.1
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-vulnkey.1
+@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
+.\" Copyright (c) 2008 Canonical Ltd.  All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\"    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.Dd $Mdocdate: May 12 2008 $
+.Dt SSH-VULNKEY 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh-vulnkey
+.Nd check blacklist of compromised keys
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm
+.Op Fl q | Fl v
+.Ar file ...
+.Nm
+.Fl a
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+checks a key against a blacklist of compromised keys.
+.Pp
+A substantial number of keys are known to have been generated using a broken
+version of OpenSSL distributed by Debian which failed to seed its random
+number generator correctly.
+Keys generated using these OpenSSL versions should be assumed to be
+compromised.
+This tool may be useful in checking for such keys.
+.Pp
+Keys that are compromised cannot be repaired; replacements must be generated
+using
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+Make sure to update
+.Pa authorized_keys
+files on all systems where compromised keys were permitted to authenticate.
+.Pp
+The argument list will be interpreted as a list of paths to public key files
+or
+.Pa authorized_keys
+files.
+If no suitable file is found at a given path,
+.Nm
+will append
+.Pa .pub
+and retry, in case it was given a private key file.
+If no files are given as arguments,
+.Nm
+will check
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/identity ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+and
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2 ,
+as well as the system's host keys if readable.
+.Pp
+If
+.Dq -
+is given as an argument,
+.Nm
+will read from standard input.
+This can be used to process output from
+.Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
+for example:
+.Pp
+.Dl $ ssh-keyscan -t rsa remote.example.org | ssh-vulnkey -
+.Pp
+Unless the
+.Cm PermitBlacklistedKeys
+option is used,
+.Xr sshd 8
+will reject attempts to authenticate with keys in the compromised list.
+.Pp
+The output from
+.Nm
+looks like this:
+.Pp
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key:1: COMPROMISED: RSA1 2048 xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx root@host
+/home/user/.ssh/id_dsa:1: Not blacklisted: DSA 1024 xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx /home/user/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
+/home/user/.ssh/authorized_keys:3: Unknown (blacklist file not installed): RSA 1024 xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx user@host
+.Ed
+.Pp
+Each line is of the following format (any lines beginning with
+.Dq #
+should be ignored by scripts):
+.Pp
+.Dl Ar filename : Ns Ar line : Ar status : Ar type Ar size Ar fingerprint Ar comment
+.Pp
+It is important to distinguish between the possible values of
+.Ar status :
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It COMPROMISED
+These keys are listed in a blacklist file, normally because their
+corresponding private keys are well-known.
+Replacements must be generated using
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+.It Not blacklisted
+A blacklist file exists for this key type and size, but this key is not
+listed in it.
+Unless there is some particular reason to believe otherwise, this key
+may be used safely.
+(Note that DSA keys used with the broken version of OpenSSL distributed
+by Debian may be compromised in the event that anyone captured a network
+trace, even if they were generated with a secure version of OpenSSL.)
+.It Unknown (blacklist file not installed)
+No blacklist file exists for this key type and size.
+You should find a suitable published blacklist and install it before
+deciding whether this key is safe to use.
+.El
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl a
+Check keys of all users on the system.
+You will typically need to run
+.Nm
+as root to use this option.
+For each user,
+.Nm
+will check
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/identity ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+and
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2 .
+It will also check the system's host keys.
+.It Fl q
+Quiet mode.
+Normally,
+.Nm
+outputs the fingerprint of each key scanned, with a description of its
+status.
+This option suppresses that output.
+.It Fl v
+Verbose mode.
+Normally,
+.Nm
+does not output anything for keys that are not listed in their corresponding
+blacklist file (although it still produces output for keys for which there
+is no blacklist file, since their status is unknown).
+This option causes
+.Nm
+to produce output for all keys.
+.El
+.Sh EXIT STATUS
+.Nm
+will exit zero if any of the given keys were in the compromised list,
+otherwise non-zero.
+.Sh BLACKLIST FILE FORMAT
+The blacklist file may start with comments, on lines starting with
+.Dq # .
+After these initial comments, it must follow a strict format:
+.Pp
+.Bl -bullet -offset indent -compact
+.It
+All the lines must be exactly the same length (20 characters followed by a
+newline) and must be in sorted order.
+.It
+Each line must consist of the lower-case hexadecimal MD5 key fingerprint,
+without colons, and with the first 12 characters removed (that is, the least
+significant 80 bits of the fingerprint).
+.El
+.Pp
+The key fingerprint may be generated using
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 :
+.Pp
+.Dl $ ssh-keygen -l -f /path/to/key
+.Pp
+This strict format is necessary to allow the blacklist file to be checked
+quickly, using a binary-search algorithm.
+.Sh FILES
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+If present, contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of
+the user.
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+If present, contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of
+the user.
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity
+If present, contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of
+the user.
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+If present, lists the public keys (RSA/DSA) that can be used for logging in
+as this user.
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2
+Obsolete name for
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys .
+This file may still be present on some old systems, but should not be
+created if it is missing.
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+If present, contains the protocol version 2 RSA identity of the system.
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+If present, contains the protocol version 2 DSA identity of the system.
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
+If present, contains the protocol version 1 RSA identity of the system.
+.It Pa /usr/share/ssh/blacklist. Ns Ar TYPE Ns Pa - Ns Ar LENGTH
+If present, lists the blacklisted keys of type
+.Ar TYPE
+.Pf ( Dq RSA
+or
+.Dq DSA )
+and bit length
+.Ar LENGTH .
+The format of this file is described above.
+RSA1 keys are converted to RSA before being checked in the blacklist.
+Note that the fingerprints of RSA1 keys are computed differently, so you
+will not be able to find them in the blacklist by hand.
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/blacklist. Ns Ar TYPE Ns Pa - Ns Ar LENGTH
+Same as
+.Pa /usr/share/ssh/blacklist. Ns Ar TYPE Ns Pa - Ns Ar LENGTH ,
+but may be edited by the system administrator to add new blacklist entries.
+.El
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Sh AUTHORS
+.An -nosplit
+.An Colin Watson Aq cjwatson@ubuntu.com
+.Pp
+Florian Weimer suggested the option to check keys of all users, and the idea
+of processing
+.Xr ssh-keyscan 1
+output.
+Index: b/ssh-vulnkey.c
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-vulnkey.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,388 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Canonical Ltd.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+/* Default files to check */
+static char *default_host_files[] = {
+       _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE,
+       _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE,
+       _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE,
+       NULL
+};
+static char *default_files[] = {
+       _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA,
+       _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA,
+       _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY,
+       _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS,
+       _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS2,
+       NULL
+};
+
+static int verbosity = 0;
+
+static int some_keys = 0;
+static int some_unknown = 0;
+static int some_compromised = 0;
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+       fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-aqv] [file ...]\n", __progname);
+       fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n");
+       fprintf(stderr, "  -a          Check keys of all users.\n");
+       fprintf(stderr, "  -q          Quiet mode.\n");
+       fprintf(stderr, "  -v          Verbose mode.\n");
+       exit(1);
+}
+
+void
+describe_key(const char *filename, u_long linenum, const char *msg,
+    const Key *key, const char *comment, int min_verbosity)
+{
+       char *fp;
+
+       fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+       if (verbosity >= min_verbosity) {
+               if (strchr(filename, ':'))
+                       printf("\"%s\"", filename);
+               else
+                       printf("%s", filename);
+               printf(":%lu: %s: %s %u %s %s\n", linenum, msg,
+                   key_type(key), key_size(key), fp, comment);
+       }
+       xfree(fp);
+}
+
+int
+do_key(const char *filename, u_long linenum,
+    const Key *key, const char *comment)
+{
+       Key *public;
+       int blacklist_status;
+       int ret = 1;
+
+       some_keys = 1;
+
+       public = key_demote(key);
+       if (public->type == KEY_RSA1)
+               public->type = KEY_RSA;
+
+       blacklist_status = blacklisted_key(public, NULL);
+       if (blacklist_status == -1) {
+               describe_key(filename, linenum,
+                   "Unknown (blacklist file not installed)", key, comment, 0);
+               some_unknown = 1;
+       } else if (blacklist_status == 1) {
+               describe_key(filename, linenum,
+                   "COMPROMISED", key, comment, 0);
+               some_compromised = 1;
+               ret = 0;
+       } else
+               describe_key(filename, linenum,
+                   "Not blacklisted", key, comment, 1);
+
+       key_free(public);
+
+       return ret;
+}
+
+int
+do_filename(const char *filename, int quiet_open)
+{
+       FILE *f;
+       char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
+       char *cp;
+       u_long linenum = 0;
+       Key *key;
+       char *comment = NULL;
+       int found = 0, ret = 1;
+
+       /* Copy much of key_load_public's logic here so that we can read
+        * several keys from a single file (e.g. authorized_keys).
+        */
+
+       if (strcmp(filename, "-") != 0) {
+               int save_errno;
+               f = fopen(filename, "r");
+               save_errno = errno;
+               if (!f) {
+                       char pubfile[MAXPATHLEN];
+                       if (strlcpy(pubfile, filename, sizeof pubfile) <
+                           sizeof(pubfile) &&
+                           strlcat(pubfile, ".pub", sizeof pubfile) <
+                           sizeof(pubfile))
+                               f = fopen(pubfile, "r");
+               }
+               errno = save_errno; /* earlier errno is more useful */
+               if (!f) {
+                       if (!quiet_open)
+                               perror(filename);
+                       return -1;
+               }
+               if (verbosity > 0)
+                       printf("# %s\n", filename);
+       } else
+               f = stdin;
+       while (read_keyfile_line(f, filename, line, sizeof(line),
+                   &linenum) != -1) {
+               int i;
+               char *space;
+               int type;
+               char *end;
+
+               /* Chop trailing newline. */
+               i = strlen(line) - 1;
+               if (line[i] == '\n')
+                       line[i] = '\0';
+
+               /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
+               for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+                       ;
+               if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
+                       continue;
+
+               /* Cope with ssh-keyscan output and options in
+                * authorized_keys files.
+                */
+               space = strchr(cp, ' ');
+               if (!space)
+                       continue;
+               *space = '\0';
+               type = key_type_from_name(cp);
+               *space = ' ';
+               /* Leading number (RSA1) or valid type (RSA/DSA) indicates
+                * that we have no host name or options to skip.
+                */
+               if ((strtol(cp, &end, 10) == 0 || *end != ' ') &&
+                   type == KEY_UNSPEC) {
+                       int quoted = 0;
+
+                       for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
+                               if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
+                                       cp++;   /* Skip both */
+                               else if (*cp == '"')
+                                       quoted = !quoted;
+                       }
+                       /* Skip remaining whitespace. */
+                       for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+                               ;
+                       if (!*cp)
+                               continue;
+               }
+
+               /* Read and process the key itself. */
+               key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+               if (key_read(key, &cp) == 1) {
+                       while (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t')
+                               cp++;
+                       if (!do_key(filename, linenum,
+                           key, *cp ? cp : filename))
+                               ret = 0;
+                       found = 1;
+               } else {
+                       key_free(key);
+                       key = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+                       if (key_read(key, &cp) == 1) {
+                               while (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t')
+                                       cp++;
+                               if (!do_key(filename, linenum,
+                                   key, *cp ? cp : filename))
+                                       ret = 0;
+                               found = 1;
+                       }
+               }
+               key_free(key);
+       }
+       if (f != stdin)
+               fclose(f);
+
+       if (!found && filename) {
+               key = key_load_public(filename, &comment);
+               if (key) {
+                       if (!do_key(filename, 1, key, comment))
+                               ret = 0;
+                       found = 1;
+               }
+               if (comment)
+                       xfree(comment);
+       }
+
+       return ret;
+}
+
+int
+do_host(int quiet_open)
+{
+       int i;
+       struct stat st;
+       int ret = 1;
+
+       for (i = 0; default_host_files[i]; i++) {
+               if (stat(default_host_files[i], &st) < 0 && errno == ENOENT)
+                       continue;
+               if (!do_filename(default_host_files[i], quiet_open))
+                       ret = 0;
+       }
+
+       return ret;
+}
+
+int
+do_user(const char *dir)
+{
+       int i;
+       char *file;
+       struct stat st;
+       int ret = 1;
+
+       for (i = 0; default_files[i]; i++) {
+               xasprintf(&file, "%s/%s", dir, default_files[i]);
+               if (stat(file, &st) < 0 && errno == ENOENT) {
+                       xfree(file);
+                       continue;
+               }
+               if (!do_filename(file, 0))
+                       ret = 0;
+               xfree(file);
+       }
+
+       return ret;
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+       int opt, all_users = 0;
+       int ret = 1;
+       extern int optind;
+
+       /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+       sanitise_stdfd();
+
+       __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+
+       SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+       log_init(argv[0], SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+
+       /* We don't need the RNG ourselves, but symbol references here allow
+        * ld to link us properly.
+        */
+       init_rng();
+       seed_rng();
+
+       while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "ahqv")) != -1) {
+               switch (opt) {
+               case 'a':
+                       all_users = 1;
+                       break;
+               case 'q':
+                       verbosity--;
+                       break;
+               case 'v':
+                       verbosity++;
+                       break;
+               case 'h':
+               default:
+                       usage();
+               }
+       }
+
+       if (all_users) {
+               struct passwd *pw;
+
+               if (!do_host(0))
+                       ret = 0;
+
+               while ((pw = getpwent()) != NULL) {
+                       if (pw->pw_dir) {
+                               temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+                               if (!do_user(pw->pw_dir))
+                                       ret = 0;
+                               restore_uid();
+                       }
+               }
+       } else if (optind == argc) {
+               struct passwd *pw;
+
+               if (!do_host(1))
+                       ret = 0;
+
+               if ((pw = getpwuid(geteuid())) == NULL)
+                       fprintf(stderr, "No user found with uid %u\n",
+                           (u_int)geteuid());
+               else {
+                       if (!do_user(pw->pw_dir))
+                               ret = 0;
+               }
+       } else {
+               while (optind < argc)
+                       if (!do_filename(argv[optind++], 0))
+                               ret = 0;
+       }
+
+       if (verbosity >= 0) {
+               if (some_unknown) {
+                       printf("#\n");
+                       printf("# The status of some keys on your system is unknown.\n");
+                       printf("# You may need to install additional blacklist files.\n");
+               }
+               if (some_compromised) {
+                       printf("#\n");
+                       printf("# Some keys on your system have been compromised!\n");
+                       printf("# You must replace them using ssh-keygen(1).\n");
+               }
+               if (some_unknown || some_compromised) {
+                       printf("#\n");
+                       printf("# See the ssh-vulnkey(1) manual page for further advice.\n");
+               } else if (some_keys && verbosity > 0) {
+                       printf("#\n");
+                       printf("# No blacklisted keys!\n");
+               }
+       }
+
+       return ret;
+}
+Index: b/ssh.1
+===================================================================
+--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
+@@ -1396,6 +1396,7 @@
+ .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-vulnkey 1 ,
+ .Xr tun 4 ,
+ .Xr hosts.equiv 5 ,
+ .Xr ssh_config 5 ,
+Index: b/ssh.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
+@@ -1229,7 +1229,7 @@
+ static void
+ load_public_identity_files(void)
+ {
+-       char *filename, *cp, thishost[NI_MAXHOST];
+       char *filename, *cp, thishost[NI_MAXHOST], *fp;
+        char *pwdir = NULL, *pwname = NULL;
+        int i = 0;
+        Key *public;
+@@ -1276,6 +1276,22 @@
+                public = key_load_public(filename, NULL);
+                debug("identity file %s type %d", filename,
+                    public ? public->type : -1);
+               if (public && blacklisted_key(public, &fp) == 1) {
+                       if (options.use_blacklisted_keys)
+                               logit("Public key %s blacklisted (see "
+                                   "ssh-vulnkey(1)); continuing anyway", fp);
+                       else
+                               logit("Public key %s blacklisted (see "
+                                   "ssh-vulnkey(1)); refusing to send it",
+                                   fp);
+                       xfree(fp);
+                       if (!options.use_blacklisted_keys) {
+                               key_free(public);
+                               xfree(filename);
+                               filename = NULL;
+                               public = NULL;
+                       }
+               }
+                xfree(options.identity_files[i]);
+                options.identity_files[i] = filename;
+                options.identity_keys[i] = public;
+Index: b/ssh_config.5
+===================================================================
+--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -1041,6 +1041,23 @@
+ .Dq any .
+ The default is
+ .Dq any:any .
+.It Cm UseBlacklistedKeys
+Specifies whether
+.Xr ssh 1
+should use keys recorded in its blacklist of known-compromised keys (see
+.Xr ssh-vulnkey 1 )
+for authentication.
+If
+.Dq yes ,
+then attempts to use compromised keys for authentication will be logged but
+accepted.
+It is strongly recommended that this be used only to install new authorized
+keys on the remote system, and even then only with the utmost care.
+If
+.Dq no ,
+then attempts to use compromised keys for authentication will be prevented.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+ .It Cm UsePrivilegedPort
+ Specifies whether to use a privileged port for outgoing connections.
+ The argument must be
+Index: b/sshconnect2.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -1418,6 +1418,8 @@
+ 
+        /* list of keys stored in the filesystem */
+        for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
+               if (options.identity_files[i] == NULL)
+                       continue;
+                key = options.identity_keys[i];
+                if (key && key->type == KEY_RSA1)
+                        continue;
+@@ -1508,7 +1510,7 @@
+                if (id->key && id->key->type != KEY_RSA1) {
+                        debug("Offering public key: %s", id->filename);
+                        sent = send_pubkey_test(authctxt, id);
+-               } else if (id->key == NULL) {
+               } else if (id->key == NULL && id->filename) {
+                        debug("Trying private key: %s", id->filename);
+                        id->key = load_identity_file(id->filename);
+                        if (id->key != NULL) {
+Index: b/sshd.8
+===================================================================
+--- a/sshd.8
+++ b/sshd.8
+@@ -871,6 +871,7 @@
+ .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-vulnkey 1 ,
+ .Xr chroot 2 ,
+ .Xr hosts_access 5 ,
+ .Xr login.conf 5 ,
+Index: b/sshd.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -1518,6 +1518,11 @@
+                        sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
+                        continue;
+                }
+               if (reject_blacklisted_key(key, 1) == 1) {
+                       key_free(key);
+                       sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
+                       continue;
+               }
+                switch (key->type) {
+                case KEY_RSA1:
+                        sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = key;
+Index: b/sshd_config.5
+===================================================================
+--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -685,6 +685,20 @@
+ Specifies whether password authentication is allowed.
+ The default is
+ .Dq yes .
+.It Cm PermitBlacklistedKeys
+Specifies whether
+.Xr sshd 8
+should allow keys recorded in its blacklist of known-compromised keys (see
+.Xr ssh-vulnkey 1 ) .
+If
+.Dq yes ,
+then attempts to authenticate with compromised keys will be logged but
+accepted.
+If
+.Dq no ,
+then attempts to authenticate with compromised keys will be rejected.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+ .It Cm PermitEmptyPasswords
+ When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the
+ server allows login to accounts with empty password strings.
diff --git a/debian/patches/ssh1-keepalive.patch b/debian/patches/ssh1-keepalive.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..37b8052eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/ssh1-keepalive.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+Index: b/clientloop.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/clientloop.c
+++ b/clientloop.c
+@@ -502,16 +502,21 @@
+ static void
+ server_alive_check(void)
+ {
+-       if (packet_inc_alive_timeouts() > options.server_alive_count_max) {
+-               logit("Timeout, server not responding.");
+-               cleanup_exit(255);
+       if (compat20) {
+               if (packet_inc_alive_timeouts() > options.server_alive_count_max) {
+                       logit("Timeout, server not responding.");
+                       cleanup_exit(255);
+               }
+               packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
+               packet_put_cstring("keepalive@openssh.com");
+               packet_put_char(1);     /* boolean: want reply */
+               packet_send();
+               /* Insert an empty placeholder to maintain ordering */
+               client_register_global_confirm(NULL, NULL);
+       } else {
+               packet_send_ignore(0);
+               packet_send();
+        }
+-       packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
+-       packet_put_cstring("keepalive@openssh.com");
+-       packet_put_char(1);     /* boolean: want reply */
+-       packet_send();
+-       /* Insert an empty placeholder to maintain ordering */
+-       client_register_global_confirm(NULL, NULL);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -572,7 +577,7 @@
+         * event pending.
+         */
+ 
+-       if (options.server_alive_interval == 0 || !compat20)
+       if (options.server_alive_interval == 0)
+                tvp = NULL;
+        else {
+                tv.tv_sec = options.server_alive_interval;
+Index: b/ssh_config.5
+===================================================================
+--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -935,7 +935,10 @@
+ .Cm ServerAliveCountMax
+ is left at the default, if the server becomes unresponsive,
+ ssh will disconnect after approximately 45 seconds.
+-This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+This option applies to protocol version 2 only; in protocol version
+1 there is no mechanism to request a response from the server to the
+server alive messages, so disconnection is the responsibility of the TCP
+stack.
+ .It Cm ServerAliveInterval
+ Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received
+ from the server,
diff --git a/debian/patches/sshd-ignore-sighup.patch b/debian/patches/sshd-ignore-sighup.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..652b3fa66
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/sshd-ignore-sighup.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+Index: b/sshd.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -318,6 +318,7 @@
+        close_listen_socks();
+        close_startup_pipes();
+        alarm(0);  /* alarm timer persists across exec */
+       signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* will be restored after exec */
+        execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv);
+        logit("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0],
+            strerror(errno));
diff --git a/debian/patches/syslog-level-silent.patch b/debian/patches/syslog-level-silent.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..492d61983
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/syslog-level-silent.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+Index: b/clientloop.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/clientloop.c
+++ b/clientloop.c
+@@ -1533,7 +1533,7 @@
+         * In interactive mode (with pseudo tty) display a message indicating
+         * that the connection has been closed.
+         */
+-       if (have_pty && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) {
+       if (have_pty && options.log_level > SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) {
+                snprintf(buf, sizeof buf,
+                    "Connection to %.64s closed.\r\n", host);
+                buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
+Index: b/log.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/log.c
+++ b/log.c
+@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@
+        LogLevel val;
+ } log_levels[] =
+ {
+       { "SILENT",     SYSLOG_LEVEL_SILENT },
+        { "QUIET",      SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET },
+        { "FATAL",      SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL },
+        { "ERROR",      SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR },
+@@ -244,6 +245,7 @@
+        argv0 = av0;
+ 
+        switch (level) {
+       case SYSLOG_LEVEL_SILENT:
+        case SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET:
+        case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL:
+        case SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR:
+Index: b/log.h
+===================================================================
+--- a/log.h
+++ b/log.h
+@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
+ }       SyslogFacility;
+ 
+ typedef enum {
+       SYSLOG_LEVEL_SILENT,
+        SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET,
+        SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL,
+        SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
+Index: b/mux.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/mux.c
+++ b/mux.c
+@@ -721,7 +721,7 @@
+        } else
+                debug2("Received exit status from master %d", exitval[0]);
+ 
+-       if (tty_flag && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
+       if (tty_flag && options.log_level > SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
+                fprintf(stderr, "Shared connection to %s closed.\r\n", host);
+ 
+        exit(exitval[0]);
+Index: b/sftp-server.8
+===================================================================
+--- a/sftp-server.8
+++ b/sftp-server.8
+@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@
+ Specifies which messages will be logged by
+ .Nm .
+ The possible values are:
+-QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.
+SILENT, QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.
+ INFO and VERBOSE log transactions that
+ .Nm
+ performs on behalf of the client.
+Index: b/ssh.1
+===================================================================
+--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
+@@ -500,6 +500,11 @@
+ .It Fl q
+ Quiet mode.
+ Causes most warning and diagnostic messages to be suppressed.
+Only fatal errors are displayed.
+If a second
+.Fl q
+is given then even fatal errors are suppressed, except for those produced
+due solely to bad arguments.
+ .It Fl R Xo
+ .Sm off
+ .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
+Index: b/ssh.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
+@@ -389,7 +389,12 @@
+                        }
+                        break;
+                case 'q':
+-                       options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
+                       if (options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) {
+                               options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_SILENT;
+                       }
+                       else if (options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_SILENT) {
+                               options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
+                       }
+                        break;
+                case 'e':
+                        if (optarg[0] == '^' && optarg[2] == 0 &&
+@@ -592,7 +597,7 @@
+                tty_flag = 0;
+        /* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */
+        if ((!isatty(fileno(stdin)) || stdin_null_flag) && !force_tty_flag) {
+-               if (tty_flag)
+               if (tty_flag && options.log_level > SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
+                        logit("Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because "
+                            "stdin is not a terminal.");
+                tty_flag = 0;
+Index: b/ssh_config.5
+===================================================================
+--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -685,7 +685,7 @@
+ Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
+ .Xr ssh 1 .
+ The possible values are:
+-QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.
+SILENT, QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.
+ The default is INFO.
+ DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
+ DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of verbose output.
+Index: b/sshd.8
+===================================================================
+--- a/sshd.8
+++ b/sshd.8
+@@ -207,9 +207,12 @@
+ option override command-line ports.
+ .It Fl q
+ Quiet mode.
+-Nothing is sent to the system log.
+Only fatal errors are sent to the system log.
+ Normally the beginning,
+ authentication, and termination of each connection is logged.
+If a second 
+.Fl q
+is given then nothing is sent to the system log.
+ .It Fl T
+ Extended test mode.
+ Check the validity of the configuration file, output the effective configuration
+Index: b/sshd.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -1355,7 +1355,12 @@
+                        /* ignored */
+                        break;
+                case 'q':
+-                       options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
+                       if (options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) { 
+                               options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_SILENT; 
+                       } 
+                       else if (options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_SILENT) { 
+                               options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET; 
+                       } 
+                        break;
+                case 'b':
+                        options.server_key_bits = (int)strtonum(optarg, 256,
+Index: b/sshd_config.5
+===================================================================
+--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -567,7 +567,7 @@
+ Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
+ .Xr sshd 8 .
+ The possible values are:
+-QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.
+SILENT, QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.
+ The default is INFO.
+ DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
+ DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output.
diff --git a/debian/patches/user-group-modes.patch b/debian/patches/user-group-modes.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..47bb458e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/user-group-modes.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+Index: b/readconf.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+ 
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "ssh.h"
+@@ -998,11 +1000,30 @@
+ 
+        if (checkperm) {
+                struct stat sb;
+               int bad_modes = 0;
+ 
+                if (fstat(fileno(f), &sb) == -1)
+                        fatal("fstat %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno));
+-               if (((sb.st_uid != 0 && sb.st_uid != getuid()) ||
+-                   (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0))
+               if (sb.st_uid != 0 && sb.st_uid != getuid())
+                       bad_modes = 1;
+               if ((sb.st_mode & 020) != 0) {
+                       /* If the file is group-writable, the group in
+                        * question must have at most one member, namely the
+                        * file's owner.
+                        */
+                       struct passwd *pw = getpwuid(sb.st_uid);
+                       struct group *gr = getgrgid(sb.st_gid);
+                       if (!pw || !gr)
+                               bad_modes = 1;
+                       else if (gr->gr_mem[0]) {
+                               if (strcmp(pw->pw_name, gr->gr_mem[0]) ||
+                                   gr->gr_mem[1])
+                                       bad_modes = 1;
+                       }
+               }
+               if ((sb.st_mode & 002) != 0)
+                       bad_modes = 1;
+               if (bad_modes)
+                        fatal("Bad owner or permissions on %s", filename);
+        }
+ 
+Index: b/ssh.1
+===================================================================
+--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
+@@ -1299,6 +1299,8 @@
+ .Xr ssh_config 5 .
+ Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
+ read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
+It may be group-writable provided that the group in question contains only
+the user.
+ .Pp
+ .It ~/.ssh/environment
+ Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see
+Index: b/ssh_config.5
+===================================================================
+--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -1194,6 +1194,8 @@
+ This file is used by the SSH client.
+ Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
+ read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
+It may be group-writable provided that the group in question contains only
+the user.
+ .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+ Systemwide configuration file.
+ This file provides defaults for those
diff --git a/debian/source/format b/debian/source/format
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..163aaf8d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/source/format
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+3.0 (quilt)
author	Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>	2010-02-27 14:05:10 +0000
committer	Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>	2010-02-27 14:05:10 +0000
commit	8dcc7c5ef45cf5032dca7a308ffe17d3935e62d5 (patch)
tree	2e0d8058bdfc24a60a20c5bcbfd1075ef1048ff3
parent	e44a1fb6e8e59e67e5c8b6e83c0d8566d146aad9 (diff)