- (djm) Pick up LOGIN_PROGRAM from environment or PATH if not set by headers

 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS updates:
   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:07:23
     [ssh.c]
     accept remsh as a valid name as well; roman@buildpoint.com
   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:17:13
     [deattack.c crc32.c packet.c]
     rename crc32() to ssh_crc32() to avoid zlib name clash.  do not move to
     libz crc32 function yet, because it has ugly "long"'s in it;
     oneill@cs.sfu.ca
   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:26:08
     [scp.1 scp.c]
     -S prog support; tv@debian.org
   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:50:07
     [scp.c]
     knf
   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:57:33
     [log-client.c]
     shorten
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/08/19 12:48:11
     [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c ssh.c ssh.h]
     support for ~. in ssh2
   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:29:40
     [crc32.h]
     proper prototype
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/08/19 15:34:44
     [authfd.c authfd.h key.c key.h ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1]
     [ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c Makefile]
     [fingerprint.c fingerprint.h]
     add SSH2/DSA support to the agent and some other DSA related cleanups.
     (note that we cannot talk to ssh.com's ssh2 agents)
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/08/19 15:55:52
     [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c]
     more ~ support for ssh2
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/08/19 16:21:19
     [clientloop.c]
     oops
   - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:25:53
     [session.c]
     We have to stash the result of get_remote_name_or_ip() before we
     close our socket or getpeername() will get EBADF and the process
     will exit.  Only a problem for "UseLogin yes".
   - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:30:59
     [session.c]
     Only check /etc/nologin if "UseLogin no" since login(1) may have its
     own policy on determining who is allowed to login when /etc/nologin
     is present.  Also use the _PATH_NOLOGIN define.
   - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:42:43
     [auth1.c auth2.c session.c ssh.c]
     Add calls to setusercontext() and login_get*().  We basically call
     setusercontext() in most places where previously we did a setlogin().
     Add default login.conf file and put root in the "daemon" login class.
   - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/21 10:23:31
     [session.c]
     Fix incorrect PATH setting; noted by Markus.

1 files changed, 155 insertions, 80 deletions

diff --git a/authfd.c b/authfd.c
index a34e111ac..d9427d377 100644
--- a/authfd.c
+++ b/authfd.c
@@ -11,10 +11,13 @@
  *
  * Functions for connecting the local authentication agent.
  *
+ * SSH2 implementation,
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.24 2000/08/15 19:20:46 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.25 2000/08/19 21:34:42 markus Exp $");
 
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "rsa.h"
@@ -29,6 +32,7 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.24 2000/08/15 19:20:46 markus Exp $");
 #include "key.h"
 #include "authfd.h"
 #include "kex.h"
+#include "dsa.h"
 
 /* helper */
 int     decode_reply(int type);
@@ -71,8 +75,7 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket()
 }
 
 int
-ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
-    Buffer *request, Buffer *reply)
+ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply)
 {
         int l, len;
         char buf[1024];
@@ -162,7 +165,6 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection()
 
         auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth));
         auth->fd = sock;
-        buffer_init(&auth->packet);
         buffer_init(&auth->identities);
         auth->howmany = 0;
 
@@ -175,46 +177,57 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection()
  */
 
 void
-ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection *ac)
+ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection *auth)
 {
-        buffer_free(&ac->packet);
-        buffer_free(&ac->identities);
-        close(ac->fd);
-        xfree(ac);
+        buffer_free(&auth->identities);
+        close(auth->fd);
+        xfree(auth);
 }
 
 /*
  * Returns the first authentication identity held by the agent.
- * Returns true if an identity is available, 0 otherwise.
- * The caller must initialize the integers before the call, and free the
- * comment after a successful call (before calling ssh_get_next_identity).
  */
 
-int
-ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
-    BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n, char **comment)
+Key *
+ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version)
 {
+        int type, code1 = 0, code2 = 0;
         Buffer request;
-        int type;
+
+        switch(version){
+        case 1:
+                code1 = SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES;
+                code2 = SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER;
+                break;
+        case 2:
+                code1 = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES;
+                code2 = SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER;
+                break;
+        default:
+                return NULL;
+        }
 
         /*
          * Send a message to the agent requesting for a list of the
          * identities it can represent.
          */
         buffer_init(&request);
-        buffer_put_char(&request, SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES);
+        buffer_put_char(&request, code1);
 
         buffer_clear(&auth->identities);
         if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &request, &auth->identities) == 0) {
                 buffer_free(&request);
-                return 0;
+                return NULL;
         }
         buffer_free(&request);
 
         /* Get message type, and verify that we got a proper answer. */
         type = buffer_get_char(&auth->identities);
-        if (type != SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)
+        if (type == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) {
+                return NULL;
+        } else if (type != code2) {
                 fatal("Bad authentication reply message type: %d", type);
+        }
 
         /* Get the number of entries in the response and check it for sanity. */
         auth->howmany = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
@@ -223,43 +236,49 @@ ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
                     auth->howmany);
 
         /* Return the first entry (if any). */
-        return ssh_get_next_identity(auth, e, n, comment);
+        return ssh_get_next_identity(auth, comment, version);
 }
 
-/*
- * Returns the next authentication identity for the agent.  Other functions
- * can be called between this and ssh_get_first_identity or two calls of this
- * function.  This returns 0 if there are no more identities.  The caller
- * must free comment after a successful return.
- */
-
-int
-ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
-    BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n, char **comment)
+Key *
+ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version)
 {
         unsigned int bits;
+        unsigned char *blob;
+        unsigned int blen;
+        Key *key = NULL;
 
         /* Return failure if no more entries. */
         if (auth->howmany <= 0)
-                return 0;
+                return NULL;
 
         /*
          * Get the next entry from the packet.  These will abort with a fatal
          * error if the packet is too short or contains corrupt data.
          */
-        bits = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
-        buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, e);
-        buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, n);
-        *comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
-
-        if (bits != BN_num_bits(n))
-                log("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u",
-                    BN_num_bits(n), bits);
-
+        switch(version){
+        case 1:
+                key = key_new(KEY_RSA);
+                bits = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
+                buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->e);
+                buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->n);
+                *comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
+                if (bits != BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))
+                        log("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u",
+                            BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
+                break;
+        case 2:
+                blob = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, &blen);
+                *comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
+                key = dsa_key_from_blob(blob, blen);
+                xfree(blob);
+                break;
+        default:
+                return NULL;
+                break;
+        }
         /* Decrement the number of remaining entries. */
         auth->howmany--;
-
-        return 1;
+        return key;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -272,7 +291,7 @@ ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
 
 int
 ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
-    BIGNUM* e, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *challenge,
+    Key* key, BIGNUM *challenge,
     unsigned char session_id[16],
     unsigned int response_type,
     unsigned char response[16])
@@ -282,15 +301,17 @@ ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
         int i;
         int type;
 
-        if (response_type == 0)
-                fatal("Compatibility with ssh protocol version "
-                    "1.0 no longer supported.");
-
+        if (key->type != KEY_RSA)
+                return 0;
+        if (response_type == 0) {
+                log("Compatibility with ssh protocol version 1.0 no longer supported.");
+                return 0;
+        }
         buffer_init(&buffer);
         buffer_put_char(&buffer, SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE);
-        buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(n));
-        buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, e);
-        buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, n);
+        buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n));
+        buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->e);
+        buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->n);
         buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, challenge);
         buffer_append(&buffer, (char *) session_id, 16);
         buffer_put_int(&buffer, response_type);
@@ -318,6 +339,45 @@ ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
         return success;
 }
 
+/* ask agent to sign data, returns -1 on error, 0 on success */
+int
+ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
+    Key *key,
+    unsigned char **sigp, int *lenp,
+    unsigned char *data, int datalen)
+{
+        Buffer msg;
+        unsigned char *blob;
+        unsigned int blen;
+        int type;
+        int ret = -1;
+
+        if (dsa_make_key_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
+                return -1;
+
+        buffer_init(&msg);
+        buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST);
+        buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);
+        buffer_put_string(&msg, data, datalen);
+        xfree(blob);
+
+        if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+                buffer_free(&msg);
+                return -1;
+        }
+        type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+        if (type == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) {
+                log("Agent admitted failure to sign using the key.");
+        } else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
+                fatal("Bad authentication response: %d", type);
+        } else {
+                ret = 0;
+                *sigp = buffer_get_string(&msg, lenp);
+        }
+        buffer_free(&msg);
+        return ret;
+}
+
 /* Encode key for a message to the agent. */
 
 void
@@ -358,29 +418,29 @@ ssh_encode_identity_dsa(Buffer *b, DSA *key, const char *comment)
 int
 ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key, const char *comment)
 {
-        Buffer buffer;
+        Buffer msg;
         int type;
 
-        buffer_init(&buffer);
+        buffer_init(&msg);
 
         switch (key->type) {
         case KEY_RSA:
-                ssh_encode_identity_rsa(&buffer, key->rsa, comment);
+                ssh_encode_identity_rsa(&msg, key->rsa, comment);
                 break;
         case KEY_DSA:
-                ssh_encode_identity_dsa(&buffer, key->dsa, comment);
+                ssh_encode_identity_dsa(&msg, key->dsa, comment);
                 break;
         default:
-                buffer_free(&buffer);
+                buffer_free(&msg);
                 return 0;
                 break;
         }
-        if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &buffer, &buffer) == 0) {
-                buffer_free(&buffer);
+        if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+                buffer_free(&msg);
                 return 0;
         }
-        type = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
-        buffer_free(&buffer);
+        type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+        buffer_free(&msg);
         return decode_reply(type);
 }
 
@@ -390,23 +450,35 @@ ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key, const char *comment)
  */
 
 int
-ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, RSA *key)
+ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key)
 {
-        Buffer buffer;
+        Buffer msg;
         int type;
-
-        buffer_init(&buffer);
-        buffer_put_char(&buffer, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY);
-        buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(key->n));
-        buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->e);
-        buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->n);
-
-        if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &buffer, &buffer) == 0) {
-                buffer_free(&buffer);
+        unsigned char *blob;
+        unsigned int blen;
+
+        buffer_init(&msg);
+
+        if (key->type == KEY_RSA) {
+                buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY);
+                buffer_put_int(&msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n));
+                buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->e);
+                buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->n);
+        } else if (key->type == KEY_DSA) {
+                dsa_make_key_blob(key, &blob, &blen);
+                buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY);
+                buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);
+                xfree(blob);
+        } else {
+                buffer_free(&msg);
                 return 0;
         }
-        type = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
-        buffer_free(&buffer);
+        if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+                buffer_free(&msg);
+                return 0;
+        }
+        type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+        buffer_free(&msg);
         return decode_reply(type);
 }
 
@@ -416,20 +488,23 @@ ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, RSA *key)
  */
 
 int
-ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth)
+ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version)
 {
-        Buffer buffer;
+        Buffer msg;
         int type;
+        int code = (version==1) ?
+                SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES :
+                SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES;
 
-        buffer_init(&buffer);
-        buffer_put_char(&buffer, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES);
+        buffer_init(&msg);
+        buffer_put_char(&msg, code);
 
-        if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &buffer, &buffer) == 0) {
-                buffer_free(&buffer);
+        if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+                buffer_free(&msg);
                 return 0;
         }
-        type = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
-        buffer_free(&buffer);
+        type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+        buffer_free(&msg);
         return decode_reply(type);
 }