GSSAPI key exchange support

This patch has been rejected upstream: "None of the OpenSSH developers are
in favour of adding this, and this situation has not changed for several
years.  This is not a slight on Simon's patch, which is of fine quality, but
just that a) we don't trust GSSAPI implementations that much and b) we don't
like adding new KEX since they are pre-auth attack surface.  This one is
particularly scary, since it requires hooks out to typically root-owned
system resources."

However, quite a lot of people rely on this in Debian, and it's better to
have it merged into the main openssh package rather than having separate
-krb5 packages (as we used to have).  It seems to have a generally good
security history.

Author: Simon Wilkinson <simon@sxw.org.uk>
Author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Origin: other, https://github.com/openssh-gsskex/openssh-gsskex/commits/debian/master
Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1242
Last-Updated: 2020-06-07

Patch-Name: gssapi.patch

1 files changed, 10 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/kexdh.c b/kexdh.c
index 6e0159f9f..d024a8b9a 100644
--- a/kexdh.c
+++ b/kexdh.c
@@ -49,13 +49,23 @@ kex_dh_keygen(struct kex *kex)
 {
         switch (kex->kex_type) {
         case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1:
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+        case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
+#endif
                 kex->dh = dh_new_group1();
                 break;
         case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1:
         case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256:
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+        case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
+        case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256:
+#endif
                 kex->dh = dh_new_group14();
                 break;
         case KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512:
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+        case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512:
+#endif
                 kex->dh = dh_new_group16();
                 break;
         case KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512: