* New upstream release (closes: #395507, #397961, #420035). Important

  changes not previously backported to 4.3p2:
  - 4.4/4.4p1 (http://www.openssh.org/txt/release-4.4):
    + On portable OpenSSH, fix a GSSAPI authentication abort that could be
      used to determine the validity of usernames on some platforms.
    + Implemented conditional configuration in sshd_config(5) using the
      "Match" directive. This allows some configuration options to be
      selectively overridden if specific criteria (based on user, group,
      hostname and/or address) are met. So far a useful subset of
      post-authentication options are supported and more are expected to
      be added in future releases.
    + Add support for Diffie-Hellman group exchange key agreement with a
      final hash of SHA256.
    + Added a "ForceCommand" directive to sshd_config(5). Similar to the
      command="..." option accepted in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, this forces
      the execution of the specified command regardless of what the user
      requested. This is very useful in conjunction with the new "Match"
      option.
    + Add a "PermitOpen" directive to sshd_config(5). This mirrors the
      permitopen="..." authorized_keys option, allowing fine-grained
      control over the port-forwardings that a user is allowed to
      establish.
    + Add optional logging of transactions to sftp-server(8).
    + ssh(1) will now record port numbers for hosts stored in
      ~/.ssh/known_hosts when a non-standard port has been requested
      (closes: #50612).
    + Add an "ExitOnForwardFailure" option to cause ssh(1) to exit (with a
      non-zero exit code) when requested port forwardings could not be
      established.
    + Extend sshd_config(5) "SubSystem" declarations to allow the
      specification of command-line arguments.
    + Replacement of all integer overflow susceptible invocations of
      malloc(3) and realloc(3) with overflow-checking equivalents.
    + Many manpage fixes and improvements.
    + Add optional support for OpenSSL hardware accelerators (engines),
      enabled using the --with-ssl-engine configure option.
    + Tokens in configuration files may be double-quoted in order to
      contain spaces (closes: #319639).
    + Move a debug() call out of a SIGCHLD handler, fixing a hang when the
      session exits very quickly (closes: #307890).
    + Fix some incorrect buffer allocation calculations (closes: #410599).
    + ssh-add doesn't ask for a passphrase if key file permissions are too
      liberal (closes: #103677).
    + Likewise, ssh doesn't ask either (closes: #99675).
  - 4.6/4.6p1 (http://www.openssh.org/txt/release-4.6):
    + sshd now allows the enabling and disabling of authentication methods
      on a per user, group, host and network basis via the Match directive
      in sshd_config.
    + Fixed an inconsistent check for a terminal when displaying scp
      progress meter (closes: #257524).
    + Fix "hang on exit" when background processes are running at the time
      of exit on a ttyful/login session (closes: #88337).
* Update to current GSSAPI patch from
  http://www.sxw.org.uk/computing/patches/openssh-4.6p1-gsskex-20070312.patch;
  install ChangeLog.gssapi.

1 files changed, 66 insertions, 24 deletions

diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index 867431ff1..5db4d52da 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.90 2007/02/19 10:45:58 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -25,16 +26,38 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.64 2005/10/13 22:24:31 stevesk Exp $");
 
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
 
 #ifdef SKEY
 #include <skey.h>
 #endif
 
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
 #include "kex.h"
 #include "dh.h"
 #ifdef TARGET_OS_MAC    /* XXX Broken krb5 headers on Mac */
@@ -55,17 +78,16 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.64 2005/10/13 22:24:31 stevesk Exp $");
 #include "servconf.h"
 #include "monitor.h"
 #include "monitor_mm.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
 #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "misc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
 #include "compat.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
 
 #ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
 static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
 #endif
 
@@ -173,6 +195,7 @@ struct mon_table {
 #define MON_ISAUTH      0x0004  /* Required for Authentication */
 #define MON_AUTHDECIDE  0x0008  /* Decides Authentication */
 #define MON_ONCE        0x0010  /* Disable after calling */
+#define MON_ALOG        0x0020  /* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
 
 #define MON_AUTH        (MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
 
@@ -199,7 +222,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
 #endif
 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
-    {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH,mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
 #endif
 #ifdef SKEY
     {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
@@ -240,13 +263,13 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
     {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
     {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
-    {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
-    {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_keyallowed},
     {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
     {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
-    {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH,mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
 #endif
 #ifdef SKEY
     {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
@@ -272,7 +295,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
     {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
-    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
 #endif
     {0, 0, NULL}
 };
@@ -339,6 +362,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
 
         /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
         while (!authenticated) {
+                auth_method = "unknown";
                 authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
                 if (authenticated) {
                         if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
@@ -361,7 +385,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
 #endif
                 }
 
-                if (ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE) {
+                if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
                         auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, auth_method,
                             compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
                         if (!authenticated)
@@ -371,6 +395,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
 
         if (!authctxt->valid)
                 fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
+        if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
+                fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__);
 
         debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
             __func__, authctxt->user);
@@ -554,7 +580,11 @@ mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
         keyid = buffer_get_int(m);
         p = buffer_get_string(m, &datlen);
 
-        if (datlen != 20)
+        /*
+         * Supported KEX types will only return SHA1 (20 byte) or
+         * SHA256 (32 byte) hashes
+         */
+        if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32)
                 fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %u", __func__, datlen);
 
         /* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
@@ -629,6 +659,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
 #endif
         buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir);
         buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell);
+        buffer_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options));
+        if (options.banner != NULL)
+                buffer_put_cstring(m, options.banner);
 
  out:
         debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
@@ -648,9 +681,6 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
         if (options.use_pam)
                 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1);
 #endif
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-        monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, 1);
-#endif
 
         return (0);
 }
@@ -934,6 +964,7 @@ mm_answer_pam_query(int sock, Buffer *m)
                 xfree(prompts);
         if (echo_on != NULL)
                 xfree(echo_on);
+        auth_method = "keyboard-interactive/pam";
         mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m);
         return (0);
 }
@@ -949,7 +980,7 @@ mm_answer_pam_respond(int sock, Buffer *m)
         sshpam_authok = NULL;
         num = buffer_get_int(m);
         if (num > 0) {
-                resp = xmalloc(num * sizeof(char *));
+                resp = xcalloc(num, sizeof(char *));
                 for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
                         resp[i] = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
                 ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, resp);
@@ -976,6 +1007,7 @@ mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
         (sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt);
         buffer_clear(m);
         mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
+        auth_method = "keyboard-interactive/pam";
         return (sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt);
 }
 #endif
@@ -1021,17 +1053,20 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
                 case MM_USERKEY:
                         allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
                             user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key);
+                        auth_method = "publickey";
                         break;
                 case MM_HOSTKEY:
                         allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
                             hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
                             cuser, chost, key);
+                        auth_method = "hostbased";
                         break;
                 case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
                         key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
                         allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
                             auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
                             cuser, chost, key);
+                        auth_method = "rsa";
                         break;
                 default:
                         fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
@@ -1051,6 +1086,12 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
                 key_blobtype = type;
                 hostbased_cuser = cuser;
                 hostbased_chost = chost;
+        } else {
+                /* Log failed attempt */
+                auth_log(authctxt, 0, auth_method, compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
+                xfree(blob);
+                xfree(cuser);
+                xfree(chost);
         }
 
         debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
@@ -1252,7 +1293,7 @@ mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
         fromlen = sizeof(from);
         if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
                 if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
-                        (struct sockaddr *) & from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+                    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
                         debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
                         cleanup_exit(255);
                 }
@@ -1268,7 +1309,7 @@ mm_session_close(Session *s)
 {
         debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
         if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
-                debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d",  __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
+                debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
                 session_pty_cleanup2(s);
         }
         s->used = 0;
@@ -1328,7 +1369,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
         /* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
         s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
 
-        debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d",  __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
+        debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
 
         return (0);
 
@@ -1415,6 +1456,7 @@ mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
 
         debug3("%s entering", __func__);
 
+        auth_method = "rsa";
         if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) {
                 if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
                         fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
@@ -1651,8 +1693,7 @@ mm_get_kex(Buffer *m)
         void *blob;
         u_int bloblen;
 
-        kex = xmalloc(sizeof(*kex));
-        memset(kex, 0, sizeof(*kex));
+        kex = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*kex));
         kex->session_id = buffer_get_string(m, &kex->session_id_len);
         if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
             (kex->session_id_len != session_id2_len) ||
@@ -1662,8 +1703,10 @@ mm_get_kex(Buffer *m)
         kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
         kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
         kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+        kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
 #ifdef GSSAPI
         kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+        kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
         kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
 #endif
         kex->server = 1;
@@ -1825,9 +1868,8 @@ monitor_init(void)
         struct monitor *mon;
         int pair[2];
 
-        mon = xmalloc(sizeof(*mon));
+        mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
 
-        mon->m_pid = 0;
         monitor_socketpair(pair);
 
         mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];